not make any affirmative investigative use of post-cut-through digits acquired through pen register authorization that do not constitute call dialing, routing, addressing or signaling information, unless separately authorized by this Court.

The government extensively briefed the issue of post-cut-through digits in its Verified Memorandum of Law that was filed with the FISC on August 17, 2009 (Memorandum). - In that filing, the government represented that there was no technology reasonably available to the government that could distinguish between content and non-content post-cut-through digits at the time of acquisition.

b3 Per FBI Memorandum at 7-9. b7E

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 <u>Id</u> . at 26 n. 17.
The government shall make a written submission to the Court either at the time of submission of a proposed renewal application for the above-captioned matter of the issuance of this Supplemental Order, whichever is sooner. This submission shall include:
(1) A description of whether and to what extent technology that is now reasonably available to the government can distinguish between content and non-content post-cut-through digits prior to acquisition, and what efforts the government is making to develop such technology if it does not currently exist.
(2) An updated description of the procedures the government is using to prevent the unauthorized use of post-cut-through digits that constitute "content" and are acquired pursuant to FISC pen register/trap and trace orders.
(3) A description of the volume of post-cut-through digits acquired pursuant to the Court's order in this matter and an explanation of how any post-cut through digits acquired were stored and handled, and what steps the government took to prevent the use of any post-cut-through digits that constituted "content."
(4) A report on the status of the FBI's efforts to implement the technical enhancements described in the Memorandum.
ENTERED this 2 day of July, 2015 in Docket No. PR/TT 15-53

CLAIRE V. EAGAN

Judge, United States Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court

b3 Per FBI

b7E

FISC, certify that this document is a true and correct copy of the original b6, b7C

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