Report on Eyewitness Identification Issues Identified in

*Robert Julian-Borchak Williams v. City of Detroit, Detroit Police Chief James Craig and Detective Donald Bussa*

Prepared for University of Michigan Civil Rights Litigation Initiative

May 26, 2023

I. Purpose of the Report

I was asked by Professor Michael Steinberg to review relevant case materials and prepare a report on the psychological research on eyewitness memory that is relevant to understanding the likely reliability of the eyewitness identification made in this case.

II. Credentials

I have a B.A. in Psychology (with departmental honors) from Northwestern University and a Ph.D. in Social Psychology from the University of Minnesota. I have been on the faculties of Reed College and Florida International University (FIU). Currently, I am a Presidential Scholar and full Professor of Psychology at John Jay College of the City University of New York (CUNY), with appointments in the Psychology and Law, Basic and Applied Social Psychology, and Criminal Justice Ph.D. programs at the CUNY Graduate Center. I have served as the Director of the Psychology and Law Ph.D. programs at both FIU and at CUNY. I have published over 80 papers (articles and chapters) and several books in the area of eyewitness identification and legal decision making. The National Science Foundation has funded much of this research, with over $2.8 million in federal grant funding received to date.

I am a Fellow of the American Psychological Association, the Association for Psychological Science, the American Psychology-Law Society (APLS), the Society for Experimental Social Psychology, the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, and the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues. I have received awards from APLS, recognizing me for my outstanding research and teaching. I am a past-president of APLS, an interdisciplinary organization of psychologists and lawyers whose members are devoted to scholarship, practice, and public service in psychology and law. I also served seven years as the Editor-in-Chief (and an additional seven years as Associate Editor) of the journal *Law and Human Behavior*, which is a peer-reviewed publication and the premier outlet for eyewitness identification research. As Editor, I was responsible for guiding the peer review process for the most influential journal in psychology and law, determining which papers meet our very high standards for scientific rigor and which do not. My cv is attached as Exhibit A to this report.

I keep current on the research being done in the area by conducting my own research (which includes reading others’ papers on the topic), serving as an editor and reviewer of many eyewitness papers, attending conference presentations on the topic, and by teaching at the undergraduate and graduate levels on eyewitness issues. I have been qualified as an expert on a
variety of social science and law issues (mostly eyewitness issues) in federal and state venues, including Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, New York, Ohio, South Carolina, Texas, the District of Columbia, the Southern District of Mississippi, the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York, the District of Massachusetts, and the Canadian province of Ontario.

III. Materials Reviewed

This report is based on information learned from depositions taken for the litigation of this case, the photo-array used in this case, and other discovery materials related to the administration of the photo-array.

IV. Case Synopsis

On October 2, 2018, approximately $3,800 in property was taken from a Shinola store. The theft was captured on surveillance video. Detective Levan Adams of the Detroit Police Department developed an investigative lead by submitting a still from the surveillance video to the Michigan State Police for facial recognition testing. The probe photo consisted of a large Black man, wearing a hat, which partially obscured and resulted in poor lighting of the man’s face. This testing, which searched a database including Michigan Driver’s License photos, returned a match for Mr. Williams. Det. Adams created a photo array with Mr. Williams as the suspect but did not administer it. The case was ultimately transferred to Detective Donald Bussa. On July 30, 2019, Detective Stevie Posey, at the direction of Det. Bussa, presented a new six-person photo-array containing Mr. Williams to Katherine Johnston, a security professional employed by Mackinac Partners Loss Prevention Company who was not a witness to the crime but who viewed the surveillance video that captured the theft. Johnston, a White woman, had a still from that video in view while she was viewing the photo array. Detective Bussa remained in the room while Det. Posey administered the array (Posey deposition, p. 39). Johnston took seven minutes before she made a positive identification of Mr. Williams, a Black man, from that array.

V. Summary of Issues Identified

After reviewing the materials this case, I identified the following issues that increase the likelihood that identifications made under the same circumstances would be unreliable. In particular, (1) the identification in this case was not a typical eyewitness identification but the result of a non-eyewitness viewing a video of the crime and attempting to match the face on the video still in her possession to one of the faces in the photo array. Face matching is a task in which people regularly make errors even under the best of circumstances but in this case (2) the suspect’s face was not well lit, which reduces the ability of people to make accurate face matching decisions. In addition, there were factors present that inhibit the ability of a witness to encode features of the face that promote accurate recognition: (3) the culprit wore a baseball cap (partial disguise) and (4) the identification is cross-race; that is the “witness”, a White woman, belongs to a different racial group than Mr. Williams, a Black man. The face-matching was done without the traditional safeguards of police best practices in obtaining witness identifications in that (5) the “witness” was told that facial recognition technology had returned a suspect and she was needed to make an identification, (6) fillers were, by virtue of the fact that they were chosen through a process other than matches generated by facial recognition technology, less similar to the perpetrator than was the suspect, and (7) the lead detective, who knew which photo depicted the suspect, was in the room while the identification was being made. There were also two characteristics of the identification procedure and the identification decision itself that are
consistent with a further decreased reliability of the identification. (8) Facial recognition technology is more likely to return a mistaken match for Black than White faces, resulting in a decreased prior probability of guilt for matches of Black faces. Moreover, the search was conducted on a database of Michigan driver’s license photos, a huge database with multiple thousands of faces of innocent people—which constitutes a high-risk search. Other than this problematic facial recognition match of Mr. Williams with the suspect, there is no other specific evidence linking Mr. Williams with this specific crime. When evidence-based suspicion is lacking, as it was in this case, the prior probability of guilt of the suspect is low and even a positive identification will not support a high posterior probability of guilt (e.g., the likely guilt of the suspect after the identification). In addition, (9) the “witness” took seven minutes to make her identification of Williams. Because recognition processes are automatic and quick, accurate witnesses tend to make their identifications quickly, within seconds not minutes. Finally, because (10) confidence was not collected using pristine identification conditions, it is not a good indicator of accuracy. For each of these variables, a substantial body of literature has emerged in recent years, which demonstrates the role that these variables play in decreasing the reliability of face-matching and identification evidence. Any one of these issues could significantly diminish the reliability of the eyewitness identification that was relied on in Mr. Williams case. In my expert opinion, given that many of the poor practices present in the elicitation of this identification had been documented as bad practices since the 1990s, detectives should know that the circumstances under which this identification was made produce unreliable identifications and the department should have trained their officers on using evidence-based practices to prevent this type of error.

VI. Background Information Regarding Witness Identifications

The prominence of mistaken identifications as a source of erroneous convictions has been reaffirmed by the results of exonerations based on DNA evidence. By 1998, post-conviction DNA testing had freed 62 persons in the United States convicted by juries of crimes that they did not commit—8 of whom were on death row. In Scheck et al.’s (2000) analysis of the first 62 DNA exoneration cases, 52 were mistaken eyewitness identification cases with a total of 77 mistaken eyewitnesses. Thus, sometimes more than one witness had mistakenly identified the defendants (Kirk Bloodsworth was mistakenly identified by 5 separate witnesses!). In the current Innocence Project database, 32% of the cases that involved mistaken identifications contained identifications of the same innocent suspect by multiple witnesses (https://www.innocenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states/). University of Virginia law professor Brandon L. Garrett’s (2008) systematic examination of the first-200 DNA exculpation cases demonstrated that the leading cause of the wrongful convictions was erroneous eyewitness identification, which occurred in 79 percent of the cases. In a quarter of the cases, eyewitness testimony was the only direct evidence against the defendant. The likelihood of false identifications makes it particularly urgent that, when police rely upon identifications, such identifications must be performed in the most rigorous way possible, with rigorous safeguards in place, and in circumstances best calculated to avoid suggestive results.

Eyewitness Identifications and Face-Matching are Unreliable

Face Recognition is Far from Perfect Even Under Optimal Testing Conditions. Megreya and Burton (2008) conducted a study in which participants were shown a live person for 30 seconds and were then tested, from memory, on a 10-person photoarray. When the target was in the array, 70% of the participants identified him and 10% of the participants identified
someone else from the array. When the target was not in the array, 20.5% misidentified someone else from the array. When participants were shown the live person and the photoarray together (a matching task rather than a recognition memory test), 66.9% of the participants identified the target but 15% of the participants identified someone else (even when the target person was standing before them when they were choosing from the photo array!). When the target was not in the array, 37.8% misidentified someone else, again, even though they could view the live target person as they were selecting a photo.

Field Experiments Show High Rates of Witness Identification Errors. Realistic field studies of eyewitness identification provide relevant data about the accuracy rates of actual eyewitness identifications. Across several studies, the average correct identification rate from presentations which included the target person was 41.8%. Thus, nearly 60% of witnesses failed to identify the target when he was present. Unfortunately, the false identification rate of innocent foils was nearly as high as the rate of guilty-target identifications (35.8%). In short, identification errors were frequent (Valentine, 2008).

Archival Studies of Real Witness Performance Show High Rates of Identification Errors. Similarly, studies of actual witnesses reveal low accuracy rates from actual eyewitness identifications. In these studies, it is not known whether the suspect is the actual perpetrator, but it is still possible to gauge the rate of inaccurate identifications of fillers (i.e., the known innocents placed in arrays along with the suspects). The results from nearly 17,000 actual eyewitnesses showed that nearly 40% of positive identifications were identifications of an innocent filler, which underscores that many witnesses are willing to guess and consequently they make errors at a high rate (e.g., Valentine, 2008; Wells et al., 2020).

VII. Scientific Basis of Research Underlying My Analysis

The research on which my analysis is based has been conducted using the scientific method, either experiments testing how factors influence eyewitness accuracy or meta-analyses of these experiments. Experiments are the primary method used by scientists (whether they are physicists, chemists, biologists, or psychologists) to isolate the causal effects of one variable upon another. Eyewitness researchers conduct experiments in which they vary a set of variables that they think may affect witness accuracy and observe whether these variables do indeed change witnesses’ identification and face-matching decisions. The scientific method involves generating hypotheses (identifying variables that you think will influence face-matching and eyewitness accuracy), testing those hypotheses (by conducting experiments in which you vary the variables you predict to influence accuracy while holding others constant), collecting data to observe the effect of the manipulated variables, analyzing the data, and evaluating whether the hypotheses were supported.

When enough experiments have been conducted, it is possible to statistically combine the data across studies into a single meta-analysis, which provides an estimate of the size of a variable’s effect across experiments that likely varied in a variety of ways (e.g., perpetrators, lineup pictures, witnessed events). Those effect size estimates give us a more accurate picture of how much a variable influences eyewitness accuracy than can be achieved merely by counting the number of studies that found an effect and those that did not because whether an effect is found is in part determined by the number of participants in a study. Sometimes effects are not found in a given study because there were too few participants for an effect that was truly there to become statistically significant. By combining the data across all the studies testing a particular
research question, we can derive stable estimates of how much of an effect a given variable might have.

Does this research meet the scientific standards required by the courts? One can address this question from multiple perspectives. Under the traditional *Frye* standard, the relevant question would be whether the testimony is generally accepted within the relevant scientific community. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence and *Daubert* considerations such as whether: (a) the expert is qualified; (b) the testimony assists the trier of fact; (c) the expert's testimony is sufficiently reliable, and (d) the materials about which the expert testifies are the product of the scientific method (including falsifiable theories, peer-review).

Virtually all of the empirical eyewitness research conducted by psychologists makes use of standard experimental methods employed in all the experimental sciences. Use of appropriate research methods is an essential requirement for publication in peer-reviewed scientific journals across all scientific disciplines and psychology is no exception. The results and conclusions summarized below are the products of precisely the methods underscored by the Supreme Court in *Daubert* and are generally accepted in the relevant scientific community as required by *Frye*.

VIII. Features of the Present Case that Affect Identification Accuracy

Identifications take place in a social context in which the eyewitness's performance can be influenced by *his or her* expectations and inferences, which in turn can be influenced by the verbal and nonverbal behaviors of investigators, the structure of the identification test and the environment in which the identification test is conducted. Suggestive procedures are aspects of the identification test that are under the control of police investigators and that enhance the likelihood that an eyewitness will choose someone—whether that choice is correct or not.

**Face Matching.** The identification in this case is not a traditional eyewitness identification, in which a witness identifies someone based on her memory of a perpetrator. In this case, a security professional who was not on the scene of the theft viewed the surveillance video of the theft, knowing that the theft had already happened, and then was shown a 6-person photo array in which Mr. Williams was the suspect. While looking at the photo-array, Ms. Johnston pulled out an image taken from the surveillance video to compare with the photos in the array. Therefore, the “witness” in this case was looking at two images that were simultaneously present and deciding whether they depict the same person, a process known as face- or person-matching.

Person-matching is quite a bit more difficult than people might expect. People are quite proficient at accurately judging whether two photos of a familiar other (in other words, someone they are familiar with) match, with correct matches occurring about 90% of the time. When the others are unfamiliar, however, correct matching rates can drop to chance levels, indicating that people perform no better at matching than they would if choosing at random (Rumschik et al., 2021). Person-matching is made more difficult when one or both images are low quality (Bruce, Henderson, Newman, & Burton, 2001). Appearance changes between photos (e.g., Bindemann & Sandford, 2011; Kemp et al., 1997) and lighting of the photo (e.g., Hill & Bruce, 1996; Longmore, Liu, & Young, 2008) also affect the accuracy of person-matching. In this case, the lighting of the face in the photo is very poor, making it extremely difficult to make out features of the face, which that would enhance the ability to match faces.

**Partial Disguise.** The perpetrator of the theft at Shinola was wearing a hat. Hats and hoods can be quite effective in diminishing the facial feature cues, such as hair and hairline cues, that are
necessary for the encoding of faces (Cutler, 2006; Cutler, Penrod, & Martens, 1987; Cutler et al., 1986; O'Rourke et al., 1989). In the above-listed experiments, participants viewed a videotaped liquor store robbery. In half of the robberies, the robber wore a knit pullover cap that covered his hair and hairline. In the other half, the robber did not wear a hat. The robber was less accurately identified when he was disguised by the hat. For example, in one of the experiments (Cutler et al., 1987), 45% of the participants gave correct judgments on a lineup test if the robber wore no hat during the robbery, but only 27% gave a correct judgment if the robber wore the hat during the robbery.

**Own Race Bias in Cross-Racial Identifications.** The person who identified the defendant from the photo array is White. The culprit was Black. Research on cross-race identification impairment began forty years ago and has included various mixes of Caucasian, Asian, Hispanic, Black, and Middle Eastern witnesses. Meissner and Brigham (2001) have conducted a meta-analysis and reviewed research on the problems of what interchangeably has been called other-race or cross-race identifications or own-race bias (ORB). Meissner and Brigham analyzed data from 39 research articles, with 91 independent samples involving nearly 5,000 witness participants. They examined measures of correct identifications and false alarm rates, as well as aggregate measures of discrimination accuracy and response criterion. Overall, they reported that when the perpetrator is present in a lineup, the ratio of correct to incorrect identifications was 40% higher for same-race identifications. The ratio of mistaken identifications to correct rejections (a rejection is when the witness indicates that the culprit is not present in the lineup) in target-absent arrays was 56% greater for other-race identifications. Overall, the ratio of correct to incorrect identifications was more than 2.2 times greater for own-race faces as compared with performance on other-race faces. This cross-race effect was replicated in two additional, recently published meta-analyses (Katzman & Kovera, 2023; Lee & Penrod, 2022).

**Lineup Instructions.** Because Detective Bussa had communicated to Ms. Johnston how Mr. Williams was developed as a suspect, Ms. Johnston knew before the identification procedure that a suspect had been identified through facial recognition technology. Even though Detective Posey eventually instructed Ms. Johnston that the perpetrator may or may not be in the photo array, as is best practice (Wells et al., 2020), the damage had already been done. Ms. Johnston knew that there was a suspect in the lineup that artificial intelligence had identified as the perpetrator. A pre-admonition suggestion that the culprit was contained among the photos in a photo array decreased the effectiveness of later instructing the witness that a culprit may or may not be in a lineup; moreover, those witnesses who received the pre-admonition suggestion were more confident in the accuracy of their identifications than were those who did not receive the suggestion, including when their identifications were inaccurate (Quinlivan et al., 2012).

Suggesting to a witness that the suspect is contained in a photo array decreases the reliability of any resulting identification. Malpass and Devine (1981) staged an act of vandalism during a lecture to about 350 undergraduate students; 100 of these students were asked to identify the vandal from one of two live lineups within the next three days. Half of the eyewitnesses were given instructions suggesting the perpetrator was in the array and the remaining eyewitnesses were given an "unbiased" instruction: "The person . . . may be one of the five individuals in the lineup. It is also possible that he is not in the lineup.” Among eyewitnesses who viewed a vandal-absent lineup, 78% of those who received biased instructions identified one of the lineup members as the perpetrator. Of course, all of those who did so were incorrect. In contrast, only 33% of those who received unbiased instructions made an identification from the vandal-absent
Thus, significantly more false identifications were obtained with biased instructions than with neutral instructions. Steblay (1997) reviewed the research on instruction bias by conducting a meta-analysis of 22 studies involving nearly 2600 witness-participants. She found that biased instructions (i.e., those that failed to provide a warning that the perpetrator may not be in the lineup or photoarray) were particularly harmful in target-absent lineups in which witness accuracy declined from 60% (unbiased instructions) to 35% (biased instructions).

**Composition of the Identification Procedure.** Because the suspect was developed using facial recognition technology, which chose Mr. Williams’ photo as a match from millions of photos, and the fillers were selected from “photos that we had saved, lots of photos of people” (Deposition of Detective Adams, p. 72), it is highly probable that Mr. Williams was a better match to the perpetrator than any of the fillers. Low-similarity fillers increase the chances of mistaken identification of an innocent suspect, a finding that has been repeatedly replicated (Fitzgerald, Price, Oriet, & Charman, 2013).

Why do low similarity fillers increase the chances of mistaken identifications? Witnesses make decisions about whether a particular photo in a photo array depicts the perpetrator of a crime by comparing their mental representation of the perpetrator with each photo in the array. Witnesses tend to identify the photo that best matches their mental representation of the culprit as long as the quality of that match exceeds their internal criterion for the confidence that they need to make an identification (Clark, 2005; Goodsell et al., 2010). A suspect is more likely to exceed the witnesses' criterion to make an identification under conditions that motivate witnesses to make identifications, including biased instructions (Clark, 2005; Malpass & Devine, 1981a, 1981b), which include suggestions that the suspect is present in the photo array, and cross-racial identifications (Meissner & Brigham, 2001). Note that these conditions were present in this case, in addition to pressure on both Detective Bussa and Ms. Johnston from their superiors to find a resolution to the Shinola case. Pressure to solve the case could have made Detective Bussa more motivated to secure an identification from Ms. Johnston, unconsciously influencing behavioral cues as to which photo depicted the suspect, and Ms. Johnston more motivated to make an identification from the photo array. In both cases, the result is an increased likelihood that Ms. Johnston would identify the suspect than if these pressures had not been present.

**Non-Blind Lineup Administration.** In this case, Detective Bussa knew which photo in the array depicted the suspect. Identification procedures that are conducted “non-blind”—that is, those present during the identification know which lineup member is the suspect—raise well-documented concerns. Psychological and medical researchers have completely abandoned non-blind research out of fear that researchers may unwittingly communicate their expectations (e.g., about the effectiveness of a new treatment) to research participants and that those communicated expectations will influence the behavior of the participants. Similarly, best practices for lineup identification (National Academy of Sciences, 2014; Wells et al., 2020) recommend that identification procedures be conducted by administrators who do not know which lineup member is the suspect.

In the first study to establish the effects of single-blind administration on both correct and mistaken identifications, Greathouse and Kovera (2009) manipulated whether an administrator had knowledge of the suspect’s identity, the type of lineup (simultaneous vs. sequential), the presence of the actual perpetrator in the lineup and the type of lineup instructions (biased vs. unbiased). When the witnesses received biased instructions and simultaneous line-ups, i.e., the types of lineups that were conducted by Detective Bussa in the Williams case, they were
significantly more likely to make suspect identifications in non-blind than in blind lineups. These additional errors, of course, are on top of the increased error already present due to the use of a biased photo array. The pattern of filler and suspect identifications suggested that the increase in mistaken identifications was the result of non-blind administrators influencing those who would have, under blind conditions, made filler identifications to make suspect identifications instead. Lineup rejections did not significantly increase or decrease as a function of line-up administrator knowledge. Suspect identifications were twice as diagnostic (i.e., the odds of an accurate versus an inaccurate identification were twice as high) for blind administrations as they were for non-blind administrations. Neither witnesses nor administrators participating in single-blind lineup administrations reported feeling or delivering more pressure than those witnesses and administrators participating in double-blind administrations. That is, self-reports of feeling pressure or delivering pressure are not reliable indicators of whether an administrator exerted pressure. Numerous studies have replicated the effects of non-blind administrators on the inaccuracy of witnesses, and a recent meta-analysis supports the conclusion that non-blind administrators increase the likelihood that a witness will identify the suspect, irrespective of whether the suspect is the culprit and that this increase in identifications of the suspect comes in part from witnesses who initially identify a filler but later change their identification to the suspect (Kovera & Evelo, 2017). Behaviors can be very subtle, such as a detective leaning forward when a witness’s behavior indicates that they might be considering choosing the suspect. Thus, everyone present for the administration of a photo-array or lineup should be kept blind to which lineup member is the suspect.

**Probability of Guilt Prior to Identification.** Mr. Williams was identified as a suspect through facial recognition technology that matched a probe photo to his expired driver’s license photo during a search of a very large database of innocent people whose photos had been collected when they applied for driver’s licenses. Police officers often overestimate the prior probability of guilt (i.e., the likelihood that a suspect is guilty before an identification is attempted) when the evidentiary connection between a suspect and a specific crime is weak (Katzman & Kovera, 2022). The most effective way of reducing the risk of mistaken identifications is for police officers to ensure that there is an articulable, evidence-based suspicion linking the suspect to the crime under investigation before placing that suspect in an identification procedure (Wells, Yang, & Smalarz, 2015). This practice increases the ratio of guilty to innocent suspects in identification procedures, consequently increasing the base-rate of culprit-present lineups. When the base-rate of culprit-present lineups in a jurisdiction is higher so is the probative value of a positive identification of a suspect (also known as the posterior probability of guilt). Thus, a panel of eyewitness experts (Wells et al., 2020) selected by the American Psychology-Law Society to draft a set of evidence-based best practices for collecting eyewitness evidence included among its recommendations that police officers should have an articulable, evidence-based suspicion that a suspect is guilty of this particular crime before subjecting him or her to a lineup. The Executive Committee of the APLS voted to make those best practices the policy of the organization. (Costanzo & Levett, 2020),

Facial matches obtained through facial recognition technology are not to be used as evidence at trial, per Detroit Police Department policy; it merely provides an investigatory lead. Thus, facial recognition matches on their own are recognized by the department as failing to provide evidence of a high prior probability of guilt (i.e., prior to the identification procedures or other investigations that uncover additional evidence).
Moreover, there is evidence that racial disparities in prior probability of guilt may contribute to the racial disparities in wrongful convictions based on mistaken identifications. A recent article (Katzman & Kovera, 2023, p. 23) concluded that:

Memory errors caused by the own-race bias are likely not the sole or even primary cause of racial disparities in misidentifications; rather, systemic bias in the amount of evidence that police have before placing a suspect at risk of misidentification likely explains more of the variance of racial disparities in wrongful convictions based on mistaken identifications. Requirements for evidence-based suspicion before placing suspects in an identification procedure are needed to prevent systemic racism in mistaken identifications.

**Speed of Identification Decision.** Correct identifications are made more rapidly than incorrect identifications (e.g., Brewer, Caon, Todd, & Weber, 2006; Brewer, Gordon, & Bond, 2000; Dunning & Stern, 1994; Weber, Brewer, Wells, Semmler, & Keast, 2004). In addition, self-reports by witnesses that they have made an automatic rather than a deliberative decision (Dunning & Stern, 1994) and that they have used an absolute rather than relative or comparative judgment strategy (Lindsay & Bellinger, 1999) are associated with accurate identification decisions. Early research suggested that a 10-12 second cut-off did a good job of classifying identification decisions as fast (and, therefore, likely to be accurate) versus slow (and, therefore, not likely to be accurate; Dunning & Perretta, 2002). Subsequent research confirmed that faster decisions were more likely to be accurate, however, the optimum time boundary was found to vary (a) across different targets and lineups (Weber et al., 2004), and (b) across retention intervals and lineup size (Brewer et al., 2006). Despite this variability, the optimum cut-off between fast/accurate and slow/inaccurate identifications never exceeded 36 seconds in these studies. In this case, the witness took seven minutes to make her identification of the defendant, which is much longer than even the longest optimum cut-off (36 seconds) between fast/accurate and slow/inaccurate decisions.

**Witness Confidence and Witness Accuracy**

**Jurors Infer Accuracy from Confidence.** There is consistent evidence to indicate that the confidence that an eyewitness expresses in his or her identification during testimony is the most powerful single determinant of whether observers of that testimony will believe that the eyewitness made an accurate identification (Cutler, Penrod, & Dexter, 1990).

**Witnesses are Over-Confident.** Witnesses are overly confident in the accuracy of their identifications. In one study, eyewitnesses who were very confident of the accuracy of their identifications (95% certain) were only about 70%-75% correct (Brewer, Keast, & Rishworth, 2002). Another study reported that among witnesses who made an identification with 90-100% confidence, 40% were inaccurate; for witnesses who were 70-80% confident, there was a 50% error rate (Sauer, Brewer, & Wells, 2008). A recent study involving the identification of individuals with whom participants interacted for up to a minute showed poor calibration of accuracy and confidence, with participants being over-confident about their accuracy (Sučić, Tokić, & Ivešić, 2015).

**Post-Identification Confidence, if Measured Properly, is Modestly Correlated with Accuracy.** A meta-analysis of research testing whether witness identification accuracy is associated with witness confidence revealed a confidence-accuracy correlation of .41 among those witness who made an identification from the lineup (Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler,
1995). This finding suggests that witnesses who are highly confident in their identifications are significantly more likely to be correct than are witnesses who display a lower level of confidence. However, recent research suggests that high confidence is an indicator of accuracy only when the procedures used to collect the identifications are pristine (Wixted & Wells, 2017). Procedures are pristine if there is 1) only one suspect, 2) the lineup is not biased toward the suspect (e.g., fillers do not cause the suspect to stand out), 3) the witnesses are instructed that the perpetrator may not be in the photo array (and have not been given contrary suggestive information), 4) the administrator does not know who the suspect is (i.e., procedure is double-blind), and 5) witness confidence is collected immediately after the identification by a blind administrator. These conditions were not met in this case because the eyewitness identification was collected with a non-blind detective in the room with a photo array that was biased toward the suspect (as described above), and the witness was told that a suspect had been identified through facial matching and that the police needed her to make an identification. The witness was not asked to provide and neither she nor either Detective recorded her confidence at the time she made the identification. Therefore, any statements of confidence now made by the witness are of no evidentiary value.

Jury simulation research shows that jurors are highly and inappropriately influenced by witness confidence when judging the accuracy of an eyewitness identification (Cutler et al., 1990).

Conclusions

The type of search conducted by the Michigan State Police of databases with driver’s license photos has been characterized by the Georgetown Law Center on Privacy and Technology as a High-Risk Search because of its likelihood of returning an inaccurate result given that the faces in the database are overwhelmingly innocent of the crime in question (Garvie et al., 2016). Because facial recognition technology is trained primarily on databases of White and Asian faces, among other reasons, it is known to have higher error rates for Black faces (Garvie et al., 2016).

Detective Bussa put Mr. Williams at risk of misidentification through his failure to follow best practices in collecting eyewitness identification evidence. First, it is important to note that Det. Bussa did not have an eyewitness to the theft that could make an identification of the culprit but instead had a security staff person watch grainy and dark surveillance video of the theft and attempt an identification of a suspect that a fellow detective had developed through facial recognition technology. The fillers for the photo array were chosen from “saved photos” and were not evaluated for their similarity to the probe photo in the way that Mr. Williams’s photo was. Thus, Mr. Williams’s photo stood out from the others in that it had been judged, by artificial intelligence, to be among the most similar to the probe photo of any of the photos in the Michigan State Police database, thus violating best practices.

Although research suggests that eyewitness identifications are one of the most persuasive forms of evidence to a jury, there are compelling reasons to question the reliability of the identifications in this case. The witness did not view the theft while it was in progress, so she was merely matching the face on the surveillance video with one of the faces in the photo array. There is no research to suggest that people are capable of making reliable face-matching judgments in such circumstances. Moreover, this witness had a vested interest in finding a match (i.e., she had been hired to identify the perpetrator to prevent future losses to Shinola) and had been told prior to the identification procedure that facial recognition technology had uncovered a match for the person...
depicted in the surveillance video. According to the science, this type of knowledge is not undone by later instructions that the culprit may or may not be in the photo array. Moreover, Detective Bussa, who knew which photo in the array depicted Mr. Williams (whom he believed to be the culprit based on facial recognition), was in the room while the identification procedure was made. Unfortunately, the poor viewing conditions provided by the surveillance video (e.g., partial disguise, poor lighting), the cross-racial nature of the identification, and the identification procedures that did not conform to standard, let alone best, practices do nothing to improve the likelihood that the identification in this case is reliable. Based on my background and expertise, police departments that conduct lineups that contain any of the sources of errors described above—let alone lineups featuring all these sources of error—are eliciting identifications that are likely to be unreliable, increasing the risk of false arrest and conviction. The unreliability of such evidence would be evident to anyone aware of the basic science of lineups. This science was well established, and should be known to police departments and police officers, in 2019, when the lineup at issue here was conducted. For the same reasons, it is my expert opinion that any judge, jury, or decisionmaker who is being asked to make a decision based on the identification evidence present in this case should be educated about the sources of unreliability in the lineup at issue here if asked to decide whether the culprit in the Shinola video was actually Mr. Williams.

Taken together, in my expert opinion, there is substantial evidence that there were factors present in this case that would have adversely affected the witness’s ability to make a correct identification.

I declare under penalty of perjury that to the best of my ability the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on May 26, 2023.

[Signature]

Margaret Bull Kovera, Ph.D.
References


MARGARET BULL KOVERA
Department of Psychology
John Jay College of Criminal Justice
City University of New York
524 W. 59th St.
New York, NY 10019
(212) 484-1112
mkovera@jjay.cuny.edu
http://www.margaretkovera.com

Education
Ph.D. University of Minnesota (1994)
    Major Program: Social Psychology; Supporting Program: Statistics
B.A. Northwestern University (1988), with Departmental Honors
    Major: Psychology

Academic Positions
Presidential Scholar and Professor of Psychology, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, CUNY (2015–present)
Professor of Psychology, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, CUNY (2004–2015)
Professor, Social Psychology PhD Program, Graduate Center, CUNY, (2008–present)
Professor, Psychology and Law Ph.D. Program, Graduate Center, CUNY (2004–present)
Professor, Criminal Justice Ph.D. Program, Graduate Center, CUNY (2005–2022)
Assistant to Associate Professor of Psychology, Florida International University (1995–2005)
Visiting Assistant Professor, Reed College (1993–1995)

Other Professional Appointments and Activity

2020–2025 American Psychological Association Council of Representatives (Division 41/American Psychology-Law Society Representative)
2012–2018 Editor-in-Chief, Law and Human Behavior
2002–2011 Associate Editor, Law and Human Behavior
2009–2012 Secretary/Treasurer of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (Division 41, American Psychological Association)
2006–2009 President Elect, President, and Past President of the American Psychology-Law Society (Division 41, American Psychological Association)
2006– Expert Witness in U.S. State (CO, CT, DC, FL, IA, IL, IN, LA, MD, MI, NY, OH, SC, TX), U.S. Federal (District of MA, Eastern and Southern Districts of NY, Southern District of MS), and Canadian Courts
2000–2006 Treasurer of the American Psychology-Law Society (Division 41, American Psychological Association)
Honors and Awards

Outstanding Scholarly Mentor Award, John Jay College – CUNY (2023)
Distinguished Graduate Alumni Award, University of Minnesota Psychology Department (2022)
Fellow, Division 8 of the American Psychological Association (2020)
Fellow, Society for Personality and Social Psychology (2018)
Distinguished Lecturer, National Science Foundation Distinguished Lecture Series (2017–2018)
Distinguished Service Award, Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (2014)
Distinguished Teaching Prize, John Jay College – CUNY (2010)
Fellow, Association for Psychological Science (2009)
Fellow, Society for Experimental Social Psychology (2009)
Ursa Major Award for Outstanding Professional Contributions, Alpha Phi Fraternity (2008)
Fellow, American Psychological Association (2005)
Fellow, American Psychology Law-Society (2005)
Saleem Shah Early Career Award for Excellence and Achievement in Research (2000)
Awarded by the American Academy of Forensic Psychology and the American Psychology-Law Society (Division 41 of the American Psychological Association)
Teaching Incentive Program Award, Florida International University (1999), a university-wide teaching award
American Psychology-Law Society Dissertation Award, First Place (1994)
University of Minnesota Departmental Fellowship (1988–1989)
Departmental Honors in Psychology, Northwestern University (1988)
National Merit Scholarship, Northwestern University (1984–1985)

RESEARCH

Grant Summary Data

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As of 2018, ranked #5 in funding from the Law and Social Science Program of the National Science Foundation since its founding in 1966.
Research Grants

PSC-CUNY Grant
Title: Assessing the Reliability of Witness Familiarity Judgments and Non-Stranger Identifications
PI: Margaret Bull Kovera
Amount: $12,000

Bureau of Justice Assistance #15PBJA-22-GG-03921-WRNG /subcontract from Midwest Innocence Project (2022-2024)
Title: Investigating the Role of Policing Practice in Eyewitness Misidentification: A Novel Method for Researching Eyewitness Identification Practices and Reviewing Post-Conviction Innocence Cases
PI: Midwest Innocence Project, Inc.
Co-PI: Margaret Bull Kovera
Amount: $499,960 (subcontract to John Jay: $311,392)

National Science Foundation SES# 2016661/subcontract from Arizona State University (2022–2023)
Title: Examining the role of evidence-based suspicion in racial disparities in wrongful convictions
PI: Jacqueline Katzman
Co-PI: Margaret Bull Kovera
Amount: $20,000

National Science Foundation SES# 2043334 (2021–2024)
Title: COLLABORATIVE RESEARCH: Social influence in eyewitness identification procedures: Do blind administrator behaviors magnify the effects of suspect bias?
Amount: $199,619

National Science Foundation SES# 1920404 (2019–2021)
Title: Improving the Accuracy of Juror Self-Reports of Bias during Rehabilitative Voir Dire
Co-PI: Natalie Gordon
Amount: $19,779

National Science Foundation SES# 1655265 (2017–2023)
Title: The Role of Phenotypic Bias in Eyewitness Identification Accuracy
Amount: $306,932

National Science Foundation SES# 1823500 (2018–2023)
Title: Exploring Psychological Mechanisms Underlying Plea Bargaining Decisions
Co-PI: Melanie J. Close
Amount: $19,020
National Science Foundation SES# 1728938 (2017–2019)
Title: Extra-Legal Information Transfer during Eyewitness Identification
Co-PI: Andrew J. Evelo
Amount: $20,000

Title: Testing the Efficacy of Interventions to Decrease Racial Bias in Jury Selection
Co-PI: Karima Modjadidi
Amount: $2,000

National Science Foundation SES# 1323677 (2013–2016)
Title: The Impact of Jury Diversity on Deliberation Quality
Co-PI: Amanda Nicholson
Amount: $19,304

National Science Foundation SBE# 1155352 (2012–2014)
Title: Conference on the Future of Jury Research
Amount: $36,890

National Science Foundation SES# 1155251 (2012–2014)
Title: Evaluating the Influence of Daubert's Cross-Examination Safeguard on Jurors',
      Attorneys', and Judges' Judgments about Scientific Evidence
Co-PI: Jacqueline L. Austin
Amount: $14,934

National Science Foundation SES# 1155250 (2012–2014)
Title: Judges' and Attorneys' Judgments of the Extent to Which Jurors Have Been
      Prejudiced by Pretrial Publicity
Co-PI: David M. Zimmerman
Amount: $14,550

National Science Foundation SES# 1023796 (2010–2013)
Title: Concurrent Expert Testimony as a Potential Remedy for Expert Witness
      Partisanship
Amount: $260,000

National Science Foundation SES# 0922314 (2009–2013)
Title: Moderators of Lineup Administrator Expectancy Effects on Eyewitness
      Identification Accuracy
Amount: $367,988

National Science Foundation SES# 0921408 (2009–2010)
Title: An Investigation of the Psychological Processes Involved in Juror Rehabilitation
Co-PI: Caroline B. Crocker
Amount: $12,000

National Science Foundation SES# 0921065 (2009–2010)
Title: Psychological Mechanisms Underlying Racially Biased Peremptory Challenges
Co-PI: Julia Busso Kennard
Amount: $11,275

National Science Foundation SES# 0752638 (2008–2009)
Title: Does Cross-Examination Uncover Deception?
Co-PI: Sarah M. Greathouse

National Science Foundation SES# 0520617 (2006–2009)
Title: Psychological Mechanisms Underlying the Biasing Effects of Voir Dire
Amount: $365,000

National Science Foundation SES# 0453197 (2005–2006)
Title: Educating the Jury about Junk Science through an Opposing Expert Witness
Co-PI: Lora M. Levett
Amount: $12,820

National Science Foundation SES# 0136652 (2002–2006)
Title: When Juveniles Are Tried as Adults: The Effects of Voir Dire on Jury Composition and Juror Decisions.
Amount: $300,062

Title: Lay versus Expert Knowledge of the Consequences of Sexual Harassment.
PIs: Jane Goodman-Delahunty and Margaret Bull Kovera
Amount: $2,000

National Science Foundation SBE# 9986240 (2000–2003)
Title: Investigator Bias in Identification Procedures: Mechanisms and Safeguards.
Co-PI: Brian Cutler
Amount: $191,682

National Science Foundation SBE# 9711225 (1997–2000)
Title: Reasoning about Scientific Evidence: The Effects of Heuristic Cues, Evidence Quality, and Reasoning Ability.
Amount: $110,772

Florida International University Foundation (1997)
Title: Cognitive, Social, and Developmental Factors in Suggestibility: A Meta-Analysis
Amount: $10,978

University of Minnesota Doctoral Dissertation Special Grant (1992)
Title: The Media and Allegations of Sexual Misconduct: The Effect of Agenda-Setting on Appraisals of Credibility
Amount: $1,498
Publication Summary Data

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*PhD student; †MA student; §Undergraduate Student

Google Scholar Citations ^ = 10+; † = 25+; « = 50+; # = 100+; ## = 200+

Books


Articles

✔ = Link to Preregistration  🚶 = Link to Open Materials  🔗 = Link to Open Data


https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000503  🚶  🔗


https://doi.org/10.1111/lcrp.12238


Cited in APA CEO Evans’s testimony on racism in policing before the United States House of Representative Judiciary Committee on June 10, 2020.
Cited in APA Resolution on Harnessing Psychology to Combat Racism.

Cited in APA Resolution on the Role of Psychology and the American Psychological Association in Dismantling Systemic Racism against People of Color in the US.


**Book Chapters**


Kovera, M. B. (2020). When justice is not blind: The effects of expectancies on social interactions and judgments in legal settings. In J. P. Forgas, W. D. Crano, & K. Fiedler (Eds.), *Applications of social psychology: How social psychology can contribute to the solution of real-word problems* (pp. 231–249). Routledge - Psychology Press.


**Other Publications**


Manuscripts under Review or Contract


Manuscripts in Preparation


Invited Presentations


Kovera, M. B. (2014, September). *Evaluating the validity and importance of research on lay participation.* Invited keynote address presented at the Third International Conference on


Kovera, M. B. (1997, November). *Jury persuasion strategies for expert witnesses.* Invited address at the 14th annual meeting of the National Forensic Center, Tampa, FL.


**Conference Presentations**


Kovera, M. B. (2009, October). Biased hypothesis testing and behavioral confirmation in jury selection procedures. In N. Kerr (Chair), *Current research at the social psychology/law interface*. Symposium presented at the meeting of the Society for Experimental Social Psychology, Portland, ME.


*winner of the APLS Student Section Poster Award


**Workshops**


Invited Colloquia

American Bar Foundation, Amherst College, Beijing Normal University (China), City University of New York-Graduate Center, College of the Holy Cross, Connecticut College, Cornell University School of Law, Florida Atlantic University; Fordham University; Indiana State University, Iowa State University, Lewis and Clark College, New Mexico Psychological Association (× 2), Ontario Consortium on Psychology and Law/University of Ontario Institute of Technology (Canada), Oregon State University, Rutgers University, Scripps College, St. Thomas University (Miami), Temple University (Law School), Temple University (Psychology/Criminal Justice), University of Alabama at Huntsville, University of Alaska at Anchorage, University of Florida, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, University of Minnesota, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, University of New South Wales (Australia), University of North Florida, University of Oslo (Norway), Williams College

SERVICE

Ad-hoc Reviewer

American Psychologist; Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy; Applied Cognitive Psychology; Basic and Applied Social Psychology; Canadian Journal of Behavioral Science; Canadian Psychologist; Communication Yearbook; Criminal Justice and Behavior; Criminal Justice Review; Current Directions in Psychological Science; Current Issues in Criminal Justice; Group Processes and Interpersonal Relations; Journal of Applied Psychology; Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition; Journal of Applied Social Psychology; Journal of Behavioral Decision Making; Journal of Clinical Child Psychology; Journal of Experimental Criminology; Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied; Journal of Experimental Psychology: General; Journal of Experimental Social Psychology; Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling; Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology; Journal of Personality and Social Psychology; Law and Human Behavior; Law and Policy; Law and Social Inquiry; Law and Society Review; Legal and Criminological Psychology; Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin; Perspectives on Psychological Science; Psychiatry, Psychology, and Law; Psychological Methods; Psychological Review; Psychological Science; Psychology, Crime and Law; Psychology of Women Quarterly; Psychology, Public Policy and Law; Sex Roles; Social Cognition; Social Psychology and Personality Compass, Stigma and Health

Academy of the Social Sciences (Australia)
American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) Research Competitiveness Program
Economic and Social Research Council (Europe)
National Research Foundation (South Africa)
National Science Foundation: Law and Social Science Program
National Science Foundation: Decision, Risk, and Management Sciences Program
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada
Tenure and/or Promotion File Review

Arizona State University (Tenure × 2/Promotion)
Bates College (Tenure/Promotion)
City University of New York (Distinguished Professor)
Drexel University (Full Professor)
Florida State University at Sarasota (Tenure/Promotion; Full Professor)
George Mason University (Full Professor)
Iowa State University (Tenure/Promotion)
Memorial University of Newfoundland (University Research Professor × 2)
Oregon State University (Tenure/Promotion)
Portland State University (Tenure/Promotion)
Roger Williams University (Tenure/Promotion)
Rutgers University (Tenure/Promotion, Full Professor × 2)
Tufts University (Tenure/Promotion)
University of Alabama at Huntsville (Full Professor)
University at Albany—SUNY (Tenure/Promotion)
University of Arizona (Distinguished Professor)
University of California at Davis (Distinguished Professor)
University of Colorado at Colorado Springs (Tenure/Promotion)
University of Massachusetts at Lowell (Tenure/Promotion)
University of Nebraska at Lincoln (Chaired Professorship)
University of Nevada at Reno (3rd Year Review, Tenure/Promotion)
University of Ontario Institute of Technology (Full Professor)
University of Texas at Austin (Full Professor)
University of Wyoming (Tenure/Promotion)

External Reviewer for a Departmental Program Review

University of Florida, Department of Criminology, Law, and Society

Editorial, Panelist, and Advisory Board Activities
Member, Advisory Committee for Assessment of the Netherlands Register of Court Experts (2017–present)
Academic Advisory Board, New York University’s Civil Jury Project (2015–present)
Panelist, National Science Foundation, Law and Social Sciences Program (2005–2007)
Panelist, National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowships (2002; 2004)

**Service to Professional Organizations**

American Psychological Association (APA)

- APA Council, Division 41 Representative (2020–2025)
  - Caucus on Science and the Application of Psychology (2021–present; Secretary, 2021–present)
  - Caucus on Applied Psychology and Practice (2021–present; Chair, 2022–present)
- APA Amicus Expert Panel (2022–present; Chair 2002–present)
- Working Group on Restructuring of the APA Amicus Brief Program (Chair, 2021–2022)
- Task Force on the Publication of Previously Published Material (2015)
- Committee on Division/APA Relations (2009–2011; Chair, 2011)
- Agenda Planning Group (2011)

American Psychology-Law Society (Division 41 of APA)

- President-Elect, President, Past-President (2006–2009)
- Task Force on Administrative Support (2021)
- Ad-hoc Committee on a Code of Conduct (2018–present)
- Publications Committee (Chair, 2012–2018)
- APLS International Conference Program Co-Chair (2011)
- Fellows Committee (2009–2011; Chair, 2010–2011)
- Early Career Psychologists Committee (2009–2011)
- Nominations and Awards Committee (2007–2009; Chair, 2008–2009)
- Teaching and Mentoring Award Committee (2007)
- Continuing Education Committee (2007–2009)
- APA Conference Program Chair (2000)
APA Conference Program Co-Chair (1999)
Children and Law Committee Co-Chair (1996–1998)

Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (Division 9 of APA)
  Secretary-Treasurer (2009–2012)
  Executive Committee (2009–2012)
  Audit and Finance Committee (Chair, 2009–2012)
  Nominations and Elections Committee (2009–2012)
  Fellows Committee (Chair, 2008–2010)
  Court Watch Committee (1996–2005; Chair, 1997–2005)

Society for Applied Research in Memory and Cognition
  JARMAC Contract Committee (2020–2021)

Service to the College/University

City University of New York

Chair, Psychology and Physiological Psychology Panel, PSC-CUNY Awards (2016–2022)
Member, University Committee on Research (2016–2022)
Member, Review Oversight Committee for the CUNY Collaborative Incentive Research Program (2013)
Member, University Task Force on the Restructuring of the PSC-CUNY Research Award Program (2008–2010)
Psychology and Law Doctoral Program
  Executive Committee (2014–2021; 2022–present)
  Comprehensive Exam Committee (Chair, 2007–2009)
  Student Admissions and Awards Committee
  Colloquium Committee (Chair, 2004–2005)
  Curriculum Committee (2006–2007)
  Ad-hoc Committee on Basic Science Track (2004–2005)
Criminal Justice Doctoral Program
  Comprehensive Exam Grader (2006–2012)
Basic and Applied Social Psychology Doctoral Program
  Steering Committee (2012–2017)
  Curriculum Committee (2012–2017)
  Admissions Committee (Chair; 2012–2015)

John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York

Search Committee Chair, Vice Provost/Dean of Research (2013–2014)
Search Committee, Director of Office of Sponsored Programs (2013)
Steering Committee for Faculty Development Day (2012–2013)
Committee on Tenure Standards for Scholarship (2010)
Associate Provost Search Committee (2008–2009)
Research Integrity Officer (2007–2008)
IRB Task Force (2006)
Faculty Panel, Provost Search (2006)
Honors Council (2004–2005)

**Florida International University**

Millennium Strategic Planning Committee (2000–2002)
Provost/FIU Foundation Summer Research Competition Committee (2002)
Faculty Senate Task Force on Enrollment (1999–2000)
North Campus Strategic Planning Committee (1997–1998)

**Service to the Department**

*John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York*

Psychology and Law Search Committee (2022-2023)
Hiring Plan Committee (Co-Chair; 2021-2022)
Forensic Psychology Research Institute Panel Member (2016–2020; 2021–present)
Cognitive Psychology Search Committee (2017–2018)
Developmental Psychology Search Committee (2016–2017)
Cognitive Psychology Search Committee (2012)
Strategic Planning Committee (2009–2010)
Departmental Research Advisory Committee (2008–2010)
Departmental Curriculum Committee (2004–2006; Chair, 2005–2006)
Space Committee (2004–2005)

*Florida International University*

Legal Psychology Graduate Program (1997–2004; Director, 2000–2004)
Graduate Faculty Committee (2003)

**Undergraduate Honor’s Theses/McNair Projects Supervised**

Brittany Lahey (2016)
Lauren Stepinski (2019)
Miriam Lieber (2021)
Jaleel King (2023)
Master’s Theses Supervised

Bradley D. McAuliff (1998)  
Melissa Russano (2001)  
Stacie Cass (2002)  
Tara Mitchell (2002)  
Fadia Narchet (2003)  
Lora Levett (2004)  
Sarah Greathouse (2004)  
Erin Danielsen (2005) — Outstanding Student Research Award, American Society of Trial Consultants  
Frances (Katy) Sothmann (2006)  
Rosa DeAngelis (2006)  
Caroline Crocker (2008)  
Joseph Vitriol (2010)  
Jacqueline Austin (2011)  
Marlee Berman (2011)  
Lauren Gundrum (2011)  
Jimmy Yip (2011)  
Angela Yarbrough (2013)  
Karima Modjadidi (2015)  
Lauren Clatch (2015)  
Nikoleta Despodova (2017)  
Melanie Close (2017)  
Sydney Wood (2017) – Outstanding Forensic Research Award – Greater NY Conference for Behavioral Research  
Alexa Hiley (2017)  
Catherine Hackett (2020)  
Kelsey Doherty (2020)  
Erin O’Donnell (2020)  
Melanie Fessinger (2020)  
Jacqueline Katzman (2020)  
Elaina Welch (2021)  
Nicholas Welter (2023)  
Eliana Aronson (in progress)  
Miri Lieber (in progress)  
Jay Carty (in progress)  
Stacie Keck (in progress)  
Natalie Tesfamicael (in progress)  
Maya Walker (in progress)
Dissertations Supervised

Kellye S. Hebert (2000)
Marisa Collett (2001)
Tracey R. Carpenter (2001)
Sarah M. Greathouse (2009)
Julia Busso Kennard (2011) — American Psychology-Law Society (APA Division 41) Dissertation Award (3rd place)
Jacqueline Austin (2013)
David M. Zimmerman (2013)
Lindsey Rhead (2014)
Amanda Bergold (2016)
Karima Modjadidi (2018)
Andrew Evelo (2020)
Melanie Close (2020)
Natalie Gordon (2021) — Winner of the Graduate Center Dissertation Showcase
Jacqueline Katzman (2023)
Melanie Fessinger (2023) — Society for Personality and Social Psychology (APA Division 8) Outstanding Student Research Award (2023)
Audience Choice Winner of the Graduate Center Dissertation Showcase
Nikoleta Despodova (in progress)
Alexis Hardy (in progress)
Jennifer Jones (in progress)

Post-Doctoral Supervision/Mentorship

Lori Hoggard (Assistant Professor, Rutgers University, Ford Foundation Fellowship)

Memberships in Professional Organizations

American Association for the Advancement of Science
American Psychological Association, Fellow
American Psychology-Law Society, Fellow
Association for Psychological Science, Fellow
European Association for Psychology and Law
Society of Experimental Social Psychology, Fellow
Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Fellow
Society for the Psychological Study of Culture, Ethnicity, and Race
Society for Applied Research in Memory and Cognition
Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, Fellow
TEACHING

University of Minnesota (1990-1993)

Undergraduate Courses
Social Psychology
Applied Social Psychology
Attitudes and Social Behavior

Graduate Courses
Applied Social Psychology
Attitudes and Social Behavior

Reed College (1993-1995)

Introduction to Psychology
Psychology as a Cognitive Science
Legal Psychology
Social Psychology
Attitudes and Social Behavior


Undergraduate Courses
Introduction to Psychology
Legal Psychology
Social Psychology
Attitudes and Social Behavior
Experimental Social Psychology

Graduate Courses
Proseminar in Legal Psychology
Proseminar in Social Psychology
Experimental Psychology and Law
Psychology of Juries
Social Cognition

John Jay College, City University of New York (2004-present)

Introduction to Psychology
Psychology and Law

Graduate Center, City University of New York (2004-present)

Attitudes and Persuasion
Experimental Psychology and Law
Psychology of Juries
Research Methods and Design I
Research Methods and Design II
Research Practicum
People of the State of New York v. Linden Beaton, 2023, Richmond County, NY
State of Illinois v. Tyrone Smith, 2023, Cook County, IL
State on Minnesota v. Cody Logan Fohrenkam, 2023, Hennepin County, MN
State of Missouri v. Lamar Johnson, 2022 St. Louis County, MO
People v. Lewis Williams, 2022, Kings County, NY
US v. Aubrey Jordan, 2022, Southern District of Mississippi (bond hearing)
People of the State of Louisiana v. Miles D. Price, 2022, New Orleans, LA
Cory Epps v. City of Buffalo, et. al., deposition, 2022
State of Ohio v. Lavontae Knight, 2022, Youngstown, OH
State of Connecticut v. Orlando Berrios, Jr., 2022
State of Maryland vs Gregory Deshawn Collins, 2022, Charles County, MD
People of Colorado v. Shane Hammond, 2022, Bloomfield County, CO
People of New York v. Shamel Rodriguez, 2022, Kings County, NY
State of Indiana v. Tywaine Perry, 2021, Madison County, IN
State of Connecticut v. Cecil Grant, 2021
US v. Alonte Nolan, 2021, District of Columbia Superior Court
Horace Hampton v. People of New York, 2021, New York County, NY
People of New York v. Irian Combris, 2021, Kings County, NY
People v. Tyrone Kennedy, 2021, appeal of Case No. 87-2560, Calhoun County, Michigan
In re Wilbert Jones, 2021, 19th Judicial Circuit, Baton Rouge, LA
Ex parte Joseph Colone, 2020, Jefferson County, TX

People of New York v. Stanley Gray, 2019, Kings County, NY

People of New York v. Steven Hambrick, 2019, New York County, NY

State of Connecticut v. Antonio Inglis, 2019, Vernon, CT

US v. Camille Covington, 2019, District of Columbia Superior Court

People v. Ricardo Pacheco, 2018, Kings County, NY (Frye hearing; case resolved with plea)

People v. Ronnell Burgess, 2018, Kings County, NY

State v. William Edward Wilson, 2018, West Palm Beach, FL (suppression hearing)

State of Connecticut v. Raymond Vega, 2018, Hartford, CT