

DETROIT POLICE REQUEST FOR WARRANT

181005-0167 Police Offense Number		INVESTIGATOR'S REPORT				Prosecutor Case No.	
<input type="checkbox"/> MORE DEFN.		19-CI-03-250				DATE: 07/30/2019	
CUST	DEFENDANT NAME (Last, First, Middle)	FULL ADDRESS	AGE	SEX	RACE	D.O.B.	ST & LOCAL I.D.
<input type="checkbox"/>	WILLIAMS, ROBERT JULIAN-BORCHAK	FARMINGTON HILLS, MI 48334	41	M	B	[REDACTED]	MI
<input type="checkbox"/>							
<input type="checkbox"/>							
Offense (To be filled in by Prosecutor)							
Place of Offense: RETAIL FRAUD 1					Date: 10/02/2018		Date of Complaint: 10/05/2018
Complainant's Name (Last, First, Middle) SHINOLA					Full Address 441 W CANFIELD ST, DETROIT		Age Sex Race Phone No. 313-285-2390
Person to Sign (Last, First, Middle)				Reviewing Attorney and Bar No.			
Info and belief							

DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION

CIRCUMSTANCES: On October 02, 2018 an unknown suspect (later ID as Robert Julian- Borchak Williams B/M/[REDACTED]) was in Shinola, located at 441 W. Canfield, in the city of Detroit. Mr. Williams spoke with store associate and walked over to the watch area of the store. After Mr. Williams left the location, store associates when over to the watch area and notice watches were missing.

Video was reviewed by Katherine Johnston of Mackinac Partners, Loss Prevention Company used by Shinola. Ms. Johnston seen the suspect Mr. Williams in the watch area take 5 watches from the displays and then exit the store. Ms. Johnston saved the video and store notified police.

INVESTIGATION: Ms. Katherine Johnston provided a statement from the store and video of the incident. Video and still photo's time and data's are off, due to system date and time not right. Video and stills were sent to Crime Intel for facial recognition. Facial Recognition came back with a hit for suspect Robert Julian-Borchak Williams B/M/[REDACTED]. A 6-pack photo lineup was done and showed by Det. Posey to Ms. Johnston, who positively ID suspect Robert Williams.

Receipt for items taken was provided by Ms. Johnston, with a total of \$3,800.00.

Det. Donald Bussa **D-688**
Officer in Charge
Dependants Initial Disclosures 00001
3rd PDU
Precinct/Bureau

Reviewed & Approved By: [Signature]
Supervising Officer **3rd PDU**
Precinct/Bureau

DETROIT POLICE REQUEST FOR WARRANT

Items taken: 47 Runwell Chrono - \$750
47 Runwell Chrono - \$750
47 Runwell Chrono Rosegold - \$800
47 Runwell Chrono - \$750
47 Runwell Chrono - \$750

EVIDENCE:

See attached list

WITNESS LIST:

See attached list

Det. Donald Bussa D-608 3rd PDU
Officer in Charge Badge Precinct/Bureau

Reviewed & Approved By: [Signature] 3rd PDU
Supervising Officer Precinct/Bureau

WAYNE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY'S RECOMMENDATION

IN CUSTODY () YES (X) NO	Dept. Precinct 3 rd PDU	Date	() Further Investigation Ordered () Further Investigation Completed				
I () DENY () RECOMMEND THE ISSUING OF A WARRANT AGAINST:			MISDEMEANOR ()	FELONY ()			
DEFENDANT NAME (Last, First, Middle)		FULL ADDRESS	AGE	SEX	RACE	D.O.B.	ST. & LOCAL ID.
WILLIAMS, ROBERT JULIAN-BORCHAK		FARMINGTON HILLS, MI 48334	41	M	B	██████████	MI ██████████
Offense 1 _____ Defn. No. 1 2 3							
Attempted () MCLA _____							
Offense 2 _____ Defn. No. 1 2 3							
Attempted () MCLA _____							
Offense 3 _____ Defn. No. 1 2 3							
Attempted () MCLA _____							
Denial Reason: _____							
Denial Code: _____							
Defn. No. 1: _____		Defn. No. 2: _____		Defn. No. 3: _____			
Instructions: _____							
_____				Signed: _____			
Date Completed				Assistant Prosecuting Attorney & Bar No.			

INCIDENT/INVESTIGATION REPORT

Agency Name
Detroit Police Department

ORI
MI 8234900

Case#
181005-0167

Date / Time Reported
10/05/2018 12:04 Fri

Last Known Secure
10/05/2018 12:04 Fri

At Found
10/05/2018 12:04 Fri

Location of Incident	Premise Type	Zone/Tract	Activity
441 W Canfield St, Detroit MI 48201-	Department/discount	309	
#1 Crime Incident(s) (Com)	Weapon / Tools		
Retail Fraud - Theft	Entry	Exit	Security
30002			
#2 Crime Incident ()	Weapon / Tools		Activity
	Entry	Exit	Security
#3 Crime Incident ()	Weapon / Tools		Activity
	Entry	Exit	Security

INCIDENT DATA

# of Victims / Type: BUSINESS		Injury:		Domestic: NO	
V1	Victim/Business Name (Last, First, Middle)	Victim of Crime #	DOB	Race	Sex
	SHINOLA	1	Age	199	199
Home Address				Home Phone	
441 W CANFIELD ST, Detroit, MI 48201-				313-285-2390	
Employer Name/Address			Business Phone	Mobile Phone	
VYR	Make	Model	Style	Color	Lic/Lis
					VIN

VICTIM

CODES: V- Victim (Denote V2, V3) O = Owner (if other than victim) R = Reporting Person (if other than victim)					
Type: INDIVIDUAL/ NOT LAW ENFORCEMENT					
Injury:					
Code	Name (Last, First, Middle)	Victim of Crime #	DOB	Race	Sex
RP	RATKOWSKI, SCOTT		Age 24	W	M
Home Address				Home Phone	
441 W Canfield St Detroit, MI 48201					
Employer Name/Address			Business Phone	Mobile Phone	
			313-285-2390		
Type:		Injury:			
Code	Name (Last, First, Middle)	Victim of Crime #	DOB	Race	Sex
			Age		
Home Address				Home Phone	
Employer Name/Address				Business Phone	Mobile Phone

OTHERS INVOLVED

1 = None 2 = Burned 3 = Counterfeit / Forged 4 = Damaged / Vandalized 5 = Recovered 6 = Seized 7 = Stolen 8 = Unknown							
(*OJ* = Recovered for Other Jurisdiction)							
VI #	Code	Status From/To	Value	OJ	QTY	Property Description	Make/Model
1	19	7	\$3,800.00		1	MISC MERCHANDISE	

PROPERTY

Officer/ID#	Dinkfelt, Shawn (WSUP, 3RD) (W1160)	Outstanding Stolen Val (Total Stolen)	\$3,800.00 (\$3,800.00)
Invest ID#	Bussa, Donald G (EAS, 3PDU) (238617)	Supervisor	Eljaafari, Rana (WSUP, 3RD) (W1473)
Status	Complainant Signature	Case Status	Case Disposition:
		Active	05/20/2019

INCIDENT/INVESTIGATION REPORT

Detroit Police Department

Case # 181005-0167

Status Codes 1 = None 2 = Burned 3 = Counterfeit / Forged 4 = Damaged / Vandalized 5 = Recovered 6 = Seized 7 = Stolen 8 = Unknown

	IBR	Status	Quantity	Type Measure	Suspected Type	
D R U G S						

Assisting Officers
BEAUREGARD, F. (W1545)

Suspect Hate / Bias Motivated: **NONE**

NARRATIVE

[10/05/2018 13:09, DINKFELTS 1160, 26]
PO F. BEAUREGARD, BADGE#154

PERP: B/M, TALL MEDIUM BUILD, RED BASEBALL CAP(ST. LOUIS) WRITING, BLACK LEATHER JACKET, BLACK PANTS, NFD

SOURCE:

RADIO RUN TO 441 WEST CANFIELD SHINOLA, DETROIT AT 1205 HRS
"RETAIL FRAUD REPORT"

CIRCUMSTANCE:

REPORTING PARTY STATED ABOVE PERP CAME INTO THE LOCATION WEDNESDAY, 10/03/2018 AT APPROXIMATELY 1713HRS WITH A PINK T-MOBILE BAG. THE PERP SET THE BAG DOWN ON A TABLE, AND FROM THERE PROCEEDED OVER TO THE MAIN MEN SECTION WHERE THE WATCHES WERE ON DISPLAY. ONCE OVER IN THE MAIN MEN SECTION, THE PERP WAS GREETED FOR ASSISTANCE BY AN ASSOCIATE. UPON THE ASSOCIATE LEAVING THE PRESENCE OF THE PERP, THE PERP LOOKED AT SOME WATCHES WHILE LOOKING AROUND TO SEE IF ANYONE WAS PAYING ATTENTION. WHEN THE PERP REALIZED NO ONE WAS PAYING ATTENTION, HE GRABBED TWO WATCHES FROM THE DISPLAY SHELF, AND PLACED INSIDE OF HIS COAT PACKET. PERP THEN LOOKED AROUND FOR A SECOND TIME TO SEE IF ANYONE WAS PAYING ATTENTION, AND GRABBED TWO MORE WATCHES FROM ANOTHER DISPLAY SHELF, AND PLACING THEM INSIDE OF HIS COAT POCKET. PERP LOOKED A THIRD TIME TO SEE IF ANYONE WAS PAYING ATTENTION, AND GRABBED A THIRD WATCH OFF A DISPLAY SHELF, AND PLACED IT INSIDE OF HIS COAT POCKET BEFORE GRABBING HIS PINK BAG AND LEFT LOCATION FROM THE FRONT ENTRANCE.

REPORTING PARTY GAVE ME A FLASH DRIVE COPY OF THE VIDEO OF THE THEFT AND A PRINT OUT OF THE ITEMS TAKEN. I TURNED OVER BOTH THE FLASH DRIVE AND THE PRINT OUT TO THE 3RD PRECINCT INVESTIGATIVE UNIT.

PROPERTY (TAKEN):

(5) THE RUNWELL CHROME 47MM WATCHES
ITEM #

- (1) 10000051 VALUE: \$750.00
- (1) 20008178 VALUE: \$800.00
- (2) 20109242 VALUE: \$750.00 TOTAL: \$1,500.00
- (1) 10000167 VALUE: \$750.00
- TOTAL VALUE: \$3800.00**

" 2
REPORTING OFFICER NARRATIVE

Detroit Police Department

OCA 181005-0167
Date / Time Reported Fri 10/05/2018 12:04

Victim SHINOLA	Offense RETAIL FRAUD - THEFT
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THE INFORMATION BELOW IS CONFIDENTIAL - FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY

[10/05/2018 13:09, DINKFELTS1160, 26]
 PO F. BEAUREGARD, BADGE#154

PERP: B/M, TALL MEDIUM BUILD, RED BASEBALL CAP(ST. LOUIS) WRITING, BLACK LEATHER JACKET, BLACK PANTS, NFD

SOURCE:

RADIO RUN TO 441 WEST CANFIELD SHINOLA, DETROIT AT 1205 HRS
 "RETAIL FRAUD REPORT"

CIRCUMSTANCE:

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REPORTING PARTY GAVE ME A FLASH DRIVE COPY OF THE VIDEO OF THE THEFT AND A PRINT OUT OF THE ITEMS TAKEN. I TURNED OVER BOTH THE FLASH DRIVE AND THE PRINT OUT TO THE 3RD PRECINCT INVESTIGATIVE UNIT.

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 - (2) 20109242 VALUE: \$750.00 TOTAL: \$1,500.00
 - (1) 10000167 VALUE: \$750.00
- TOTAL VALUE: \$3800.00

Incident Report Related Property List

Detroit Police Department

OCA: 181005-0167

1 Property Description MISC MERCHANDISE		Make		Model		Caliber	
Color	Serial No.	Value \$3,800.00	Qty 1.000	Unit	Jurisdiction Locally		
Status Stolen	Date 10/05/2018	NIC #	State #	Local #	OAN		
Name (Last, First, Middle) Shinola,			DOB	Age	Race	Sex	

Notes

WATCHES STOLEN:

THE RUNWELL CHRONO 47MM

ITEM #:

(1) 10000051 VALUE: \$750.00

(1) 20008178 VALUE: \$800.00

(2) 20109242 \$750.00 EA TOTAL VALUE: \$1,500.00

(1) 10000167 VALUE: \$750.00

TOTAL VALUE: \$3,800.00

SHINOLA DETROIT

STORE #: 10001
CASE #: 18-SHPLFT-10001-16
CASE STATUS: OPEN
ASSIGNED TO: Mackinac Partners

Detroit - Shoplifting Report
 441 W. Canfield St., Detroit, MI 48201

Case Information			
Incident Date:	10/2/2018	Case Stage:	(1) Initial Incident Reporting
Actual or Attempted? (If Applicable)	Actual	Police Case #:	1810050167
Did Suspect Have/Use a Weapon?	No	Weapon Description (If Applicable):	
Was Anyone Injured?	No	Name(s) of Injured and Description of How Occurred (If Applicable):	
Action Taken:	Police Report Filed (Suspect(s) Not Arrested)	Source of Info:	Audit
# of Employees Working:	12	Incident on CCTV?	Yes
CCTV Comments:	on the attached file Ch03_20181003061350 the time of 06:15 through 06:16 you see the suspect grab the watches and put them in his pockets. Please note that at the time of this theft, the CCTV unit timestamps were incorrect, indicating the theft occurred around 6:15am on 10/3/2018, when the theft occurred around 5:15pm on 10/2/2018.		
Report Completed By			
Full Name:	Katherine Johnston	Job Title:	Security Advisor/Consultant to Shinola
Suspect Information			
First Name:		Last Name:	
Date of Birth:		Age:	40
Sex:	Male	Race:	Black or African American
Height/Weight:	6'2/240	Eye Color:	
Hair Color:		Attire:	Black Jacket
Build:	Large	Identifying Feature:	Pink Tmobile bag and Red SL hat
Address:		Address 2:	
City:		State:	
Zip:		Phone #:	

SHINOLA

DETROIT

STORE #: 10001
CASE #: 18-SHPLFT-10001-16
CASE STATUS: OPEN
ASSIGNED TO: Mackinac Partners

Detroit - Shoplifting Report
 441 W. Canfield St., Detroit, MI 48201

Suspect Vehicle Information					
Vehicle Make/Model	Vehicle Color	License Plate/State	Other Vehicle Info		
Incident Narrative					
<p>On October 2, 2018, a guest entered our Shinola Canfield store, at approximately 5:13pm. In under 3 minutes, he concealed five (5) Shinola watches and exited without paying or even attempting to pay, thus stealing merchandise totaling a retail value of \$3,800. I, Katherine Johnston, Security Advisor to Shinola, witnessed this theft occur on CCTV once the store reported this theft internally to my team. The theft was reported to me on 10/2/18 at 5:50pm and I received/reviewed CCTV footage on 10/8/18 at 10:31am. In reviewing the CCTV footage from this incident, I witnessed the individual enter with a pink T-Mobile shopping bag, wearing a red hat, brown boots, and a black leather jacket. He briefly engaged with employees near the front entrance and then immediately placed his T-Mobile shopping bag on the center, front display. He then proceeded to the Men's watch area, located directly behind a wall which separated him from the store employees situated at the front of the store.</p> <p>One associate approached the Suspect, shook his hand and appeared to engage in a brief dialogue. Once the associate left the Suspect's line of sight, at approximately 5:15pm, the Suspect concealed five (5) watches in his jacket pockets and proceeded back to the entrance, grabbing his T-Mobile bag, and exiting the store at 5:16pm with the concealed and stolen merchandise.</p> <p>Footage has been retained for the incident, however, it is important to note that at the time of this incident, the date and timestamps of our store's CCTV system were off, displaying a date of 10/3/18 (<i>instead of 10/2/18</i>) and a suspect entry time of 6:13am (<i>instead of 5:13pm</i>). This is an issue that occurs from time to time with the store's Stanley HikVision system, but I can attest to the fact that the incident occurred at 5:15pm on 10/2/18.</p>					
People Involved					
Person Type	Name	DOB	Work Phone	Home Phone	Notes/Statement
Police Information					
Police Officer:	Det Bussa		Badge #:		
Police Department:	DPD 3rd Pct (filed with Wayne State)		Police Phone #:	313-596-5156	
Police Address:			City State/Zip:	Detroit MI/	

SHINOLA DETROIT

STORE #: 10001
CASE #: 18-SHPLFT-10001-16
CASE STATUS: OPEN
ASSIGNED TO: Mackinac Partners

Detroit - Shoplifting Report 441 W. Canfield St., Detroit, MI 48201

Merchandise								
Merch Type	UPC	Item ID	Description	Recovered?	Damaged?	Qty	Price Each	Total Price
Merchandise	8873651023 23	10000167	47 Runwell Chrono	No	No	1	\$750.00	\$750.00
Merchandise	8873654478 68	20109242	47 Runwell Chrono	No	No	2	\$750.00	\$1,500.00
Merchandise	8873652224 72	20008178	47 Runwell Chrono Rosegold	No	No	1	\$800.00	\$800.00
Merchandise	8873650109 25	10000051	47 Runwell Chrono	No	No	1	\$750.00	\$750.00
GRAND TOTAL:								\$3,800.00



Q: Do You see anyone you recognize?

A: Yes

Q: If the answer to question #1 was yes, identify by number the photo(s) you recognize.

A: # 3

Q: Where do you recognize them from?

A: 10/2/18 shoplifting at Shinola's Carfield store

Time:

Start 11:40 AM
Stop 11:47 AM


SIGNATURE OF WITNESS

7/30/19 11:47 AM
DATE / TIME

Presented By






OFFICERS SIGNATURE

7/30/19 11:47 AM
DATE / TIME

Prepared By DET. D Bussa

REPORT# 1810050167



Q: Do You see anyone you recognize?

A: _____

Q: If the answer to question #1 was yes, identify by number the photo(s) you recognize.

A: _____

Q: Where do you recognize them from?

A: _____

Time:

Start _____
Stop _____

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS

DATE / TIME

Presented By _____

OFFICERS SIGNATURE

DATE / TIME

Prepared By DET. D Bussa

Defendants' Initial Disclosures00012

REPORT# 1810050167

Camera 01

2018 Wed 06:14:12

Disclosures00012





MICHIGAN STATE POLICE
INVESTIGATIVE LEAD REPORT



LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

THIS DOCUMENT IS NOT A POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION. IT IS AN INVESTIGATIVE LEAD ONLY AND IS NOT PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST. FURTHER INVESTIGATION IS NEEDED TO DEVELOP PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST.

BID DIA Identifier: BID-39641-19	Requester: CA Yager, Rathe
Date Searched: 03/11/2019	Requesting Agency: Detroit Police Department
Digital Image Examiner: Jennifer Coulson	Case Number: 1810050167 File Class/Crime Type: 3000

Probe Image	Investigative Lead

Name: ROBERT JULIAN-BORCHAK WILLIAMS Alias: Date of Birth: [REDACTED] SID #: FBI/UCN #: DL/PID: [REDACTED]

This document is the property of the Digital Image Analysis Section (DIAS) - SNAP Unit and is prepared for the limited purpose of information sharing. This information is designated U//LES and is shared in confidence. This document contains Personally Identifiable Information (PII) and must be handled in accordance with the SNAP Acceptable Use Policy and FBI CJIS Security Policy. It shall not be shared outside your agency or organization and may not be posted within public view. This document must not be reclassified in any way, in whole or in part. Questions pertaining to this document can be directed to MSPSNAP@Michigan.gov.

Queried: WILLIAMS, ROBERT

Response: WILLIAMS, ROBERT JULIAN-BORCHAK

Statistics Summary

DOB: [REDACTED]	Race: N/A	Sex: M	Skin Tone: N/A
Height: [REDACTED]	Weight: N/A	Eyes: BRO	Hair: N/A

OLN Details:

OLN: [REDACTED]	State: MI	Effective: [REDACTED]	Expires: [REDACTED]
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
Residence

Address Summary

[REDACTED] FARMINGTON HILLS, MI 48334-2706 Country: US

NOTICEState and federal law restrict the use of driver's license images. Images can only be used for the identification of subjects in a criminal proceeding or for victim identification. Misuse of images may result in criminal and/or civil penalties. Contact your LEIN TAC for more information.

Associated Image(s)



[Copy Image](#) [Save Image](#) [Contact Info](#)

Wayne County Prosecutor's Office Witness List

The People of the State of Michigan

Circuit Court No.

vs.
ROBERT JULIAN-BORCHAK WILLIAMS

Recorder's Court No.
Detroit Case No.

Zenell B Brown
Clerk of Recorder's Court

Cathy M. Garrett
Wayne County Clerk

Attorney for Defendant

The names and residences of the witnesses for the People in the above-entitled cause are listed below. The witnesses the People intend to produce at trial, pursuant to MCLA 767.40a(3), are designated by an "X" in the boxes to the left.

NAMES

RESIDENCES

<input type="checkbox"/>	KATHERINE JOHNSTON
<input type="checkbox"/>	PO F. BEAUREGARD #154
<input type="checkbox"/>	CA RATHE YAGER
<input type="checkbox"/>	JENNIFER COULSON
<input type="checkbox"/>	DET. STEVIE POSEY #D-2698
<input type="checkbox"/>	
<input type="checkbox"/>	
<input type="checkbox"/>	
<input type="checkbox"/>	
<input type="checkbox"/>	
<input type="checkbox"/>	
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248-258-6900 / 74 W Long Lake Rd Suite 205 Bloomfield Hills, MI 48304
WAYNE STATE POLICE
CRIME INTEL / DETROIT
STATE POLICE
DETROIT / 3 PDU


O.I.C. Det. Donald Bussa
Investigative Operations/3rd Precinct Detective Unit
Detroit Police Department
2875 W. Grand Blvd, Detroit Michigan 48202
(313) 596-5344

	Date:		Date:
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Warrant APA

Trial APA-Final Witness List

DETROIT POLICE REQUEST FOR WARRANT

181005-0167 Police Offense Number		INVESTIGATOR'S REPORT			201971530		
<input type="checkbox"/> MORE DEFENDANTS 19059693		19-CI-03-250			Prosecutor Case No. DATE: <u>07/30/2019</u>		
CUST	DEFENDANT NAME (Last, First, Middle)	FULL ADDRESS	AGE	SEX	RACE	D.O.B.	ST. & LOCAL ID.
<input type="checkbox"/>	WILLIAMS, ROBERT JULIAN-BORCHAK	FARMINGTON HILLS, MI 48334	41	M	B	[REDACTED]	MI [REDACTED]
<input type="checkbox"/>							
<input type="checkbox"/>							
Offense (To be filled in by Prosecutor) RF 1							
Place of Offense:					Date:	10/02/2018	Date of Complaint
RETAIL FRAUD 1					Time	17:00	10/05/2018
Complainant's Name (Last, First, Middle)			Age	Sex	Race	Phone No.	
SHINOLA						313-285-2390	
Person to Sign (Last, First, Middle)			Reviewing Attorney and Bar No.				
Info and belief							


DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION

CIRCUMSTANCES: On October 02, 2018 an unknown suspect (later ID as Robert Julian- Borchak Williams B/M [REDACTED]) was in Shinola, located at 441 W. Canfield, in the city of Detroit. Mr. Williams spoke with store associate and walked over to the watch area of the store. After Mr. Williams left the location, store associates when over to the watch area and notice watches were missing.

Video was reviewed by Katherine Johnston of Mackinac Partners, Loss Prevention Company used by Shinola. Ms. Johnston seen the suspect Mr. Williams in the watch area take 5 watches from the displays and then exit the store. Ms. Johnston saved the video and store notified police.

INVESTIGATION: Ms. Katherine Johnston provided a statement from the store and video of the incident. Video and still photo's time and data's are off, due to system date and time not right. Video and stills were sent to Crime Intel for facial recognition. Facial Recognition came back with a hit for suspect Robert Julian-Borchak Williams B/M [REDACTED]. A 6-pack photo lineup was done and showed by Det. Posey to Ms. Johnston, who positively ID suspect Robert Williams.

Receipt for items taken was provided by Ms. Johnston, with a total of \$3,800.00.

Def. Donald Bussa D-608 Officer in Charge Badge.	3 rd PDU Precinct/Bureau	Reviewed & Approved By:  Supervising Officer Precinct/Bureau
---	--	--

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EVIDNECE:

See attached list

WITNESS LIST:

See attached list

PRE-EXAM

Det. Donald Bussa D-608 3rd PDU
 Officer in Charge Badge. Precinct/Bureau

Reviewed & Approved By: [Signature] 3rd PDU
 Supervising Officer Precinct/Bureau

WAYNE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY'S RECOMMENDATION

IN CUSTODY () YES (X) NO	Dept. Precinct 3rd PDU	Date	() Further Investigation Ordered () Further Investigation Completed
I () DENY () RECOMMEND THE ISSUING OF A WARRANT AGAINST:		MISDEMEANOR () FELONY ()	
DEFENDANT NAME (Last, First, Middle)	FULL ADDRESS	AGE	SEX
WILLIAMS, ROBERT JULIAN-BORCHAK	[REDACTED], FARMINGTON HILLS, MI 48334	41	M
Offense 1	<u>R.F. 1st</u>	Defn. No. 1 2 3	
Attempted () MCLA	<u>750.350C</u>		
Offense 2		Defn. No. 1 2 3	
Attempted () MCLA			
Offense 3		Defn. No. 1 2 3	
Attempted () MCLA			
Denial Reason:			
Denial Code:			
Defn. No. 1:	Defn. No. 2:	Defn. No. 3:	
Instructions:	<u>(C+1)</u>	<u>1. Spinola</u>	
	<u>2. b</u>		
<u>8-24-19</u> Date Completed		Signed: <u>[Signature]</u> Assistant Prosecuting Attorney & Bar No.	

PRE-EXAM

INCIDENT/INVESTIGATION REPORT

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Agency Name
Detroit Police Department

ORI
MI 8234900

Case#
181005-0167

Date / Time Reported
10/05/2018 12:04 Fr

Last Known Secure
10/05/2018 12:04 Fr

At Found
10/05/2018 12:04 Fr

Location of Incident
441 W Canfield St, Detroit MI 48201-

Premise Type
Department/discount

Zone/Tract
309

#1 Crime Incident(s) (Com)
Retail Fraud - Theft
30002

#2 Crime Incident ()

#3 Crime Incident ()

Weapon / Tools

Entry Exit Security Activity

Weapon / Tools

Entry Exit Security Activity

Weapon / Tools

Entry Exit Security Activity

MO

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of Victims *1* Type: **BUSINESS** Injury: Domestic: **NO**

V1 Victim/Business Name (Last, First, Middle)
SHINOLA

Victim of Crime # *1* DOB Age Race Sex Relationship To Offender Resident Status Military Branch/Status

Home Address
441 W CANFIELD ST, Detroit, MI 48201- Home Phone
313-285-2390

Employer Name/Address Business Phone Mobile Phone

VYR Make Model Style Color Lic/Lis VIN

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CODES: V - Victim (Denote V2, V3) O = Owner (if other than victim) R = Reporting Person (if other than victim)

Type: **INDIVIDUAL/ NOT LAW ENFORCEMENT** Injury:

Code Name (Last, First, Middle) Victim of Crime # DOB Age Race Sex Relationship To Offender Resident Status Military Branch/Status

RP *RATKOWSKI, SCOTT* Age *24* Race *W* Sex *M*

Home Address
441 W Canfield St Detroit, MI 48201 Home Phone

Employer Name/Address Business Phone *313-285-2390* Mobile Phone

Type: Injury:

Code Name (Last, First, Middle) Victim of Crime # DOB Age Race Sex Relationship To Offender Resident Status Military Branch/Status

Home Address Home Phone

Employer Name/Address Business Phone Mobile Phone

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1 = None 2 = Burned 3 = Counterfeit / Forged 4 = Damaged / Vandalized 5 = Recovered 6 = Seized 7 = Stolen 8 = Unknown
("OJ" = Recovered for Other Jurisdiction)

VI #	Code	Status From/To	Value	OJ	QTY	Property Description	Make/Model	Serial Number
1	19	7	\$3,800.00		1	MISC MERCHANDISE		

Officer/ID# *Dinkfelt, Shawn (WSUP, 3RD) (WI160)* Outstanding Stolen Val (Total Stolen): \$3,800.00 [\$3,800.00]

Invest ID# *Bussa, Donald G (EAS, 3PDU) (238617)* Supervisor *Eljaafari, Rana (WSUP, 3RD) (WI473)*

Status Complainant Signature Case Status *Active* Date *05/20/2019* Case Disposition: Page 1

INCIDENT/INVESTIGATION REPORT

Detroit Police Department

Case # 181005-0167

Status Codes 1 = None 2 = Burned 3 = Counterfeit / Forged 4 = Damaged / Vandalized 5 = Recovered 6 = Seized 7 = Stolen 8 = Unknown

	IBR	Status	Quantity	Type Measure	Suspected Type
D R U G S					

Assisting Officers
BEAUREGARD, F. (W1545)

Suspect Hate / Bias Motivated: **NONE**

NARRATIVE

[10/05/2018 13:09, DINKFELTS1160, 26]
PO F. BEAUREGARD, BADGE#154

PERP: B/M, TALL MEDIUM BUILD, RED BASEBALL CAP(ST. LOUIS) WRITING, BLACK LEATHER JACKET, BLACK PANTS, NFD

SOURCE:

RADIO RUN TO 441 WEST CANFIELD SHINOLA, DETROIT AT 1205 HRS
"RETAIL FRAUD REPORT"

CIRCUMSTANCE:

REPORTING PARTY STATED ABOVE PERP CAME INTO THE LOCATION WEDNESDAY, 10/03/2018 AT APPROXIMATELY 1713HRS WITH A PINK T-MOBILE BAG. THE PERP SET THE BAG DOWN ON A TABLE, AND FROM THE THERE PROCEEDED OVER TO THE MAIN MEN SECTION WHERE THE WATCHES WERE ON DISPLAY. ONCE OVER IN THE MAIN MEN SECTION, THE PERP WAS GREETED FOR ASSISTANCE BY AN ASSOCIATE. UPON THE ASSOCIATE LEAVING THE PRESENCE OF THE PERP, THE PERP LOOKED AT SOME WATCHES WHILE LOOKING AROUND TO SEE IF ANYONE WAS PAYING ATTENTION. WHEN THE PERP REALIZED NO ONE WAS PAYING ATTENTION, HE GRABBED TWO WATCHES FROM THE DISPLAY SHELF, AND PLACED INSIDE OF HIS COAT PACKET. PERP THEN LOOKED AROUND FOR A SECOND TIME TO SEE IF ANYONE WAS PAYING ATTENTION, AND GRABBED TWO MORE WATCHES FROM ANOTHER DISPLAY SHELF, AND PLACING THEM INSIDE OF HIS COAT POCKET. PERP LOOKED A THIRD TIME TO SEE IF ANYONE WAS PAYING ATTENTION, AND GRABBED A THIRD WATCH OFF A DISPLAY SHELF, AND PLACED IT INSIDE OF HIS COAT POCKET BEFORE GRABBING HIS PINK BAG AND LEFT LOCATION FROM THE FRONT ENTRANCE.

REPORTING PARTY GAVE ME A FLASH DRIVE COPY OF THE VIDEO OF THE THEFT AND A PRINT OUT OF THE ITEMS TAKEN. I TURNED OVER BOTH THE FLASH DRIVE AND THE PRINT OUT TO THE 3RD PRECINCT INVESTIGATIVE UNIT.

PROPERTY (TAKEN):

- (5) THE RUNWELL CHROME 47MM WATCHES
- ITEM #
- (1) 10000051 VALUE: \$750.00
- (1) 20008178 VALUE: \$800.00
- (2) 20109242 VALUE: \$750.00 TOTAL: \$1,500.00
- (1) 10000167 VALUE: \$750.00
- TOTAL VALUE: \$3800.00

REPORTING OFFICER NARRATIVE

Detroit Police Department

OCA
181005-0167

Victim
SHINOLA

Offense
RETAIL FRAUD - THEFT

Date / Time Reported
Fri 10/05/2018 12:04

THE INFORMATION BELOW IS CONFIDENTIAL - FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY

[10/05/2018 13:09, DINKFELTS1160, 26]
PO F. BEAUREGARD, BADGE#154

PERP: B/M, TALL MEDIUM BUILD, RED BASEBALL CAP(ST. LOUIS) WRITING, BLACK LEATHER JACKET, BLACK PANTS, NFD

SOURCE:

RADIO RUN TO 441 WEST CANFIELD SHINOLA, DETROIT AT 1205 HRS
"RETAIL FRAUD REPORT"

CIRCUMSTANCE:

REPORTING PARTY STATED ABOVE PERP CAME INTO THE LOCATION WEDNESDAY, 10/03/2018 AT APPROXIMATELY 1713HRS WITH A PINK T-MOBILE BAG. THE PERP SET THE BAG DOWN ON A TABLE, AND FROM THERE PROCEEDED OVER TO THE MAIN MEN SECTION WHERE THE WATCHES WERE ON DISPLAY. ONCE OVER IN THE MAIN MEN SECTION, THE PERP WAS GREETED FOR ASSISTANCE BY AN ASSOCIATE. UPON THE ASSOCIATE LEAVING THE PRESENCE OF THE PERP, THE PERP LOOKED AT SOME WATCHES WHILE LOOKING AROUND TO SEE IF ANYONE WAS PAYING ATTENTION. WHEN THE PERP REALIZED NO ONE WAS PAYING ATTENTION, HE GRABBED TWO WATCHES FROM THE DISPLAY SHELF, AND PLACED INSIDE OF HIS COAT PACKET. PERP THEN LOOKED AROUND FOR A SECOND TIME TO SEE IF ANYONE WAS PAYING ATTENTION, AND GRABBED TWO MORE WATCHES FROM ANOTHER DISPLAY SHELF, AND PLACING THEM INSIDE OF HIS COAT POCKET. PERP LOOKED A THIRD TIME TO SEE IF ANYONE WAS PAYING ATTENTION, AND GRABBED A THIRD WATCH OFF A DISPLAY SHELF, AND PLACED IT INSIDE OF HIS COAT POCKET BEFORE GRABBING HIS PINK BAG AND LEFT LOCATION FROM THE FRONT ENTRANCE.

REPORTING PARTY GAVE ME A FLASH DRIVE COPY OF THE VIDEO OF THE THEFT AND A PRINT OUT OF THE ITEMS TAKEN. I TURNED OVER BOTH THE FLASH DRIVE AND THE PRINT OUT TO THE 3RD PRECINCT INVESTIGATIVE UNIT.

PROPERTY (TAKEN):

(5) THE RUNWELL CHROME 47MM WATCHES
ITEM #

(1) 10000051 VALUE: \$750.00

(1) 20008178 VALUE: \$800.00

(2) 20109242 VALUE: \$750.00 TOTAL: \$1,500.00

(1) 10000167 VALUE: \$750.00

TOTAL VALUE: \$3800.00

Incident Report Related Property List

Detroit Police Department

OCA: 181005-0167

1	Property Description MISC MERCHANDISE			Make	Model	Caliber
Color	Serial No.	Value	Qty	Unit	Jurisdiction	
Status Stolen	Date 10/05/2018	NIC #	\$3,800.00	1.000	Locally	
Name (Last, First, Middle) Shinola,			State #	Local #	OAN	
			DOB	Age	Race	Sex


Notes

**WATCHES STOLEN:
THE RUNWELL CHRONO 47MM
ITEM #:**

- (1) 10000051 VALUE: \$750.00**
- (1) 20008178 VALUE: \$800.00**
- (2) 20109242 \$750.00 EA TOTAL VALUE: \$1,500.00**
- (1) 10000167 VALUE: \$750.00**

TOTAL VALUE: \$3,800.00

WAYNE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY'S RECOMMENDATION

IN CUSTODY () YES (X) NO	Dept. Precinct 3rd PDU	Date	() Further Investigation Ordered () Further Investigation Complete
I () DENY () RECOMMEND THE ISSUING OF A WARRANT AGAINST:			
DEFENDANT NAME (Last, First, Middle)		FULL ADDRESS	MISDEMEANOR () FELONY
WILLIAMS, ROBERT JULIAN-BORCHAK		FARMINGTON HILLS, MI 48334	
	AGE	SEX	RACE
	41	M	B
	D.O.B.	ST. & LOCAL I.D.	
		MI	
Offense 1	R.F. 1st		Defn. No. 1 2 3
Attempted () MCLA	750.350C		
Offense 2			Defn. No. 1 2 3
Attempted () MCLA			
Offense 3			Defn. No. 1 2 3
Attempted () MCLA			
Denial Reason:			
Denial Code:			
Defn. No. 1:	Defn. No. 2:	Defn. No. 3:	
Instructions:	(CTI) 1. Spinola		
	2. b		
Date Completed		Signed: 	
8.24.19		Assistant Prosecuting Attorney & Bar No.	

PRE-EXAM

SHINOLA DETROIT

STORE #: 10001
CASE #: 18-SHPLFT-10001-16
CASE STATUS: OPEN
ASSIGNED TO: Mackinac Partners

Detroit - Shoplifting Report
441 W. Canfield St., Detroit, MI 48201

Case Information			
Incident Date:	10/2/2018	Case Stage:	(1) Initial Incident Reporting
Actual or Attempted? (If Applicable)	Actual	Police Case #:	1810050167
Did Suspect Have/Use a Weapon?	No	Weapon Description (If Applicable):	
Was Anyone Injured?	No	Name(s) of Injured and Description of How Occurred (If Applicable):	
Action Taken:	Police Report Filed (Suspect(s) Not Arrested)	Source of Info:	Audit
# of Employees Working:	12	Incident on CCTV?	Yes
CCTV Comments:	on the attached file Ch03_20181003061350 the time of 06:15 through 06:16 you see the suspect grab the watches and put them in his pockets. Please note that at the time of this theft, the CCTV unit timestamps were incorrect, indicating the theft occurred around 6:15am on 10/3/2018, when the theft occurred around 5:15pm on 10/2/2018.		
Report Completed By			
Full Name:	Katherine Johnston	Job Title:	Security Advisor/Consultant to Shinola
Suspect Information			
First Name:		Last Name:	
Date of Birth:		Age:	40
Sex:	Male	Race:	Black or African American
Height/Weight:	6'2/240	Eye Color:	
Hair-Color:		Attire:	Black Jacket
Build:	Large	Identifying Feature:	Pink Tmobile bag and Red SL hat
Address:		Address 2:	
City:		State:	
Zip:		Phone #:	

1



2



3

Robert Williams



4



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Q: Do You see anyone you recognize?

A:

Q: If the answer to question #1 was yes, identify by number the photo(s) you recognize.

A:

Q: Where do you recognize them from?

A:

Time:

Start _____
Stop _____

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS

DATE / TIME

Presented By _____

OFFICERS SIGNATURE

DATE / TIME

Prepared By DET. D Bussa

REPORT# 1810050167

SHINOLA DETROIT

STORE #: 10001
CASE #: 18-SHPLFT-10001-16
CASE STATUS: OPEN
ASSIGNED TO: Mackinac Partners

Detroit - Shoplifting Report 441 W. Canfield St., Detroit, MI 48201

Merchandise								
Merch Type	UPC	Item ID	Description	Recovered?	Damaged?	Qty	Price Each	Total Price
Merchandise	8873651023 23	10000167	47 Runwell Chrono	No	No	1	\$750.00	\$750.00
Merchandise	8873654478 68	20109242	47 Runwell Chrono	No	No	2	\$750.00	\$1,500.00
Merchandise	8873652224 72	20008178	47 Runwell Chrono Rosegold	No	No	1	\$800.00	\$800.00
Merchandise	8873650109 25	10000051	47 Runwell Chrono	No	No	1	\$750.00	\$750.00
GRAND TOTAL:								\$3,800.00



WARRANT PROSECUTOR'S NOTES AND INSTRUCTIONS

ASSISTANT J. Gillis
DATE 8-24-19

DEFENDANT(S) Robert Williams

ANALYSIS OF CASE ISSUES (EVIDENCE, STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, PROBLEMS) AND ADDITIONAL FACTS INCLUDING INFORMATION FROM COMPLAINANT AND OIC

CLEARED VICTIM SERVICES NOTIFICATION YES NO

VICTIM'S HOME PHONE _____ VICTIM'S WORK PHONE _____

ALTERNATE PHONE CONTACT (NEIGHBORS, FRIENDS, OR RELATIVES) _____

WAS COMPLAINANT PERSONALLY INTERVIEWED BY WARRENT APA? YES NO

WITNESS LIST CHECKED TO SEE IF PROPER WITNESSES LISTED? YES NO

LIST PENDING CASES AGAINST DEFENDANT _____

INCLUDED IN PROSECUTOR'S FILE:

POLICE REPORTS CONFESSIONS, ADMISSIONS WITNESS STATEMENTS LAB REPORTS

CRIMINAL RECORD OF DEFENDANT (LIEN PRINTOUT, COMPUTER PRINTOUT, CCH, JUVENILE)

LINE UPS / ID PHOTOS 911 CALLS VIDEO (BWC, SURVEILLANCE, RECORDED STATEMENTS)

HABITUAL INFORMATION DRAFTED YES NO

AN INTERPRETER IS NEEDED FOR THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE _____

WITNESS DID NOT APPEAR	WITNESS APPEARED	TESTIFIED	WITNESSES NECESSARY FOR EXAMINATION:	ANTICIPATED TESTIMONY
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	1. <u>Katherine Johnson</u>	
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	2. <u>need Rep from store who</u>	
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	3. <u>originally waived on Def</u>	
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	4. _____	
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	5. _____	
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	6. _____	

Wayne County Prosecutor's Office Witness List

The People of the State of Michigan

Circuit Court No.

vs.
ROBERT JULIAN-BORCHAK WILLIAMS

Recorder's Court No.
Detroit Case No.

Zenell B Brown
Clerk of Recorder's Court

Cathy M. Garrett
Wayne County Clerk

Attorney for Defendant

The names and residences of the witnesses for the People in the above-entitled cause are listed below. The witnesses the People intend to produce at trial, pursuant to MCLA 767.40a(3), are designated by an "X" in the boxes to the left.

NAMES

RESIDENCES

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	KATHERINE JOHNSTON	248-258-6900 / 74 W Long Lake Rd Suite 205 Bloomfield Hills, MI 48304
<input type="checkbox"/>	PO F. BEAUREGARD #154	WAYNE STATE POLICE
<input type="checkbox"/>	CA RATHE YAGER	CRIME INTEL / DETROIT
<input type="checkbox"/>	JENNIFER COULSON	STATE POLICE
<input type="checkbox"/>	DET. STEVIE POSEY #D-2698	DETROIT / 3 PDU
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O.I.C. Det. Donald Bussa
Investigative Operations/3rd Precinct Detective Unit
Detroit Police Department
2875 W. Grand Blvd, Detroit Michigan 48202
(313) 596-5344


Date: 8-22-11
Warrant APA
Trial APA-Final Witness List

SHINOLA DETROIT

STORE #: 10001
CASE #: 18-SHPLFT-10001-16
CASE STATUS: OPEN
ASSIGNED TO: Mackinac Partners

Detroit - Shoplifting Report
 441 W. Canfield St., Detroit, MI 48201

Suspect Vehicle Information					
Vehicle Make/Model	Vehicle Color	License Plate/State	Other Vehicle Info		
Incident Narrative					
<p>On October 2, 2018, a guest entered our Shinola Canfield store, at approximately 5:13pm. In under 3 minutes, he concealed five (5) Shinola watches and exited without paying or even attempting to pay, thus stealing merchandise totaling a retail value of \$3,800. I, Katherine Johnston, Security Advisor to Shinola, witnessed this theft occur on CCTV once the store reported this theft internally to my team. The theft was reported to me on 10/2/18 at 5:50pm and I received/reviewed CCTV footage on 10/8/18 at 10:31am. In reviewing the CCTV footage from this incident, I witnessed the individual enter with a pink T-Mobile shopping bag, wearing a red hat, brown boots, and a black leather jacket. He briefly engaged with employees near the front entrance and then immediately placed his T-Mobile shopping bag on the center, front display. He then proceeded to the Men's watch area, located directly behind a wall which separated him from the store employees situated at the front of the store.</p> <p>One associate approached the Suspect, shook his hand and appeared to engage in a brief dialogue. Once the associate left the Suspect's line of sight, at approximately 5:15pm, the Suspect concealed five (5) watches in his jacket pockets and proceeded back to the entrance, grabbing his T-Mobile bag, and exiting the store at 5:16pm with the concealed and stolen merchandise.</p> <p>Footage has been retained for the incident, however, it is important to note that at the time of this incident, the date and timestamps of our store's CCTV system were off, displaying a date of 10/3/18 (<i>instead of 10/2/18</i>) and a suspect entry time of 6:13am (<i>instead of 5:13pm</i>). This is an issue that occurs from time to time with the store's Stanley HikVision system, but I can attest to the fact that the incident occurred at 5:15pm on 10/2/18.</p>					
People Involved					
Person Type	Name	DOB	Work Phone	Home Phone	Notes/Statement
Police Information					
Police Officer:	Det Bussa		Badge #:		
Police Department:	DPD 3rd Pct (filed with Wayne State)		Police Phone #:	313-596-5156	
Police Address:			City State/Zip:	Detroit MI/	



Queried: WILLIAMS, ROBERT

Response: WILLIAMS, ROBERT JULIAN-BORCHAK

Statistics Summary

DOB: [REDACTED]	Race: N/A	Sex: M	Skin Tone: N/A
Height: [REDACTED]	Weight: N/A	Eyes: BRO	Hair: N/A

OLN Details:

OLN: [REDACTED]	State: MI	Effective: [REDACTED]	Expires: [REDACTED]
-----------------	-----------	-----------------------	---------------------

Residence

Address Summary

[REDACTED] FARMINGTON HILLS, MI 48334-2706 Country: US

NOTICEState and federal law restrict the use of driver's license images. Images can only be used for the identification of subjects in a criminal proceeding or for victim identification. Misuse of images may result in criminal and/or civil penalties. Contact your LEIN TAC for more information.

Associated Image(s)



[Copy Image](#) [Save Image](#) [Contact Info](#)





MICHIGAN STATE POLICE
INVESTIGATIVE LEAD REPORT



LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

THIS DOCUMENT IS NOT A POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION. IT IS AN INVESTIGATIVE LEAD ONLY AND IS NOT PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST. FURTHER INVESTIGATION IS NEEDED TO DEVELOP PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST.

BID DIA Identifier: BID-39641-19	Requester: CA Yager, Rathe
Date Searched: 03/11/2019	Requesting Agency: Detroit Police Department
Digital Image Examiner: Jennifer Coulson	Case Number: 1810050167
	File Class/Crime Type: 3000


Probe Image	Investigative Lead
	

Name: ROBERT JULIAN-BORCHAK WILLIAMS Alias: Date of Birth: [REDACTED] SID #: FBI/UCN #: DL/PID: [REDACTED]

This document is the property of the Digital Image Analysis Section (DIAS) - SNAP Unit and is prepared for the limited purpose of information sharing. This information is designated U//LES and is shared in confidence. This document contains Personally Identifiable Information (PII) and must be handled in accordance with the SNAP Acceptable Use Policy and FBI CJIS Security Policy. It shall not be shared outside your agency or organization and may not be posted within public view. This document must not be reclassified in any way, in whole or in part. Questions pertaining to this document can be directed to MSPSNAP@Michigan.gov.

Camera 01

2018 Wed 06:14:12



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KJ 3



4



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Q: Do You see anyone you recognize?

A: Yes

Q: If the answer to question #1 was yes, identify by number the photo(s) you recognize.

A: # 3

Q: Where do you recognize them from?

A: 10/2/18 shoplifting at Shinola's Carfield store

Time:

Start 11:40 AM
Stop 11:47 AM

[Signature]
SIGNATURE OF WITNESS

7/30/19 11:47
DATE / TIME

Presented By *[Signature]*

[Signature]
OFFICERS SIGNATURE

7/30/19 11:47
DATE / TIME

Prepared By DET. D Bussa

REPORT# 1810050167

CASE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT

Printed: 04/12/2021 11:11

Detroit Police Department

OCA: **1810050167**

THE INFORMATION BELOW IS CONFIDENTIAL - FOR USE BY AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY

Case Status: **WARRANT OBTAINED**

Case Mng Status: **WARRANT OBTAINED**

Occurred: **10/05/2018**

Offense: **RETAIL FRAUD - THEFT**

Investigator: **ALI, ALAA M (240619)**

Date / Time: **01/09/2020 17:36:41, Thursday**

Supervisor: **MCINTOSH, RUSSELL M (232862)**

Supervisor Review Date / Time: **01/09/2020 21:24:47, Thursday**

Contact:

Reference: **Assisting Officer's Report**

[01/09/2020 17:36, ALIA619, 3508]
P.O.A.ALI BADGE NUMBER 399
P.O.M.SALEM BADGE NUMBER 431
BWCA
NO FORCE USED
SCOUT 3-33

SCOUT 3-33 MADE THE LOCATION OF 28955 GLENARDEN ST FARMINGTON HILL MI PER CAPTAIN COX 2303 FOR AN ATTEMPT 9300 ON ROBERT WILLIAMS FOR THE FOLLOWING WARRANT.

OFF:FELONY FOR SHOPLIFTING
OCA:1810050167 DOW:08/27/2019
COURTORI:MI820365J-CT 36TH DISTRICT

SCOUT 3-33 MADE THE LOCATION AND MADE CONTACT WITH ROBERT WILLIAMS AND PLACED HIM UNDER ARREST AND TRANSPORTED HIM TO THE DDC FOR BOOKING AND HOUSING WITH NO INCIDENT.

Investigator Signature

Supervisor Signature

Defendants' Initial Disclosures00038

r_supp3

User:

Detroit Police Department

04/12/2021

Case Management (DPD 181005-0167) Tracking

Time	Action	Description	Officer	Time Spent (Mins)
09/02/2019 09:46	WARRANT	WARRANT OBTAINED: Warrant#19-59693, Charges: RF 1st [09/02/2019 09:48, IRVINC074, 1200, DPD]	IRVIN, CHIMENE	0.00
Total Time Spent in Minutes:				0.00

Case Management (DPD 181005-0167) Tracking

Time	Action	Description	Officer	Time Spent (Mins)
07/30/2019 15:03	OTHER	Warrant retyped, same Jackst number [07/30/2019 15:03, BUSSAD617, 921, DPD]	BUSSA, DONALD G	120.00
Total Time Spent in Minutes:				120.00

User:

Detroit Police Department

04/12/2021

Case Management (DPD 181005-0167) Tracking

Time	Action	Description	Officer	Time Spent (Mins)
07/30/2019 11:52	OTHER	With Det. Posey, did 6 pack photo lineup [07/30/2019 11:53, BUSSAD617, 921, DPD]	BUSSA, DONALD G	20.00
Total Time Spent In Minutes:				20.00

User:

Detroit Police Department

04/12/2021

Case Management (DPD 181005-0167) Tracking

Time	Action	Description	Officer	Time Spent (Mins)
07/25/2019 15:23	OTHER	Got a corrected incident report from Shinola. Need to redo a photo 6 pack [07/25/2019 15:24, BUSSAD617, 921, DPD]	BUSSA, DONALD G	5.00
Total Time Spent in Minutes:				5.00

Case Management (DPD 181005-0167) Tracking

Time	Action	Description	Officer	Time Spent (Mins)
07/23/2019 13:41	OTHER	OTHER - Met with CEO of Shinola and Director of Mackinac PARTner [07/23/2019 13:42, BUSSAD617, 921, DPD]	BUSSA, DONALD G	60.00
Total Time Spent in Minutes:				60.00

User:

Detroit Police Department

04/12/2021

Case Management (DPD 181005-0167) Tracking

Time	Action	Description	Officer	Time Spent (Mins)
07/19/2019 09:53	OTHER	OTHER - Appointment set for 07/23/2019 at 1300 [07/19/2019 09:54, BUSSAD617, 921, DPD]	BUSSA, DONALD G	10.00
Total Time Spent in Minutes:				10.00

User:

Detroit Police Department

04/12/2021

Case Management (DPD 181005-0167) Tracking

<u>Time</u>	<u>Action</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Time Spent (Mins)</u>
06/19/2019 11:49	WARRANT	WARRANT SUBMITTED - Jacket # 19-CI-03-250 [06/19/2019 11:49, BUSSAD617, 921, DPD]	BUSSA, DONALD G	240.00
Total Time Spent in Minutes:				240.00

User:

Detroit Police Department

04/12/2021

Case Management (DPD 181005-0167) Tracking

Time	Action	Description	Officer	Time Spent (Mins)
06/18/2019 14:50	OTHER	OTHER - 6 pack photo lineup with PO Atkinson [06/18/2019 14:51, BUSSAD617, 921, DPD]	BUSSA, DONALD G	20.00
Total Time Spent in Minutes:				20.00

Case Management (DPD 181005-0167) Tracking

Time	Action	Description	Officer	Time Spent (Mins)
06/17/2019 15:57	OTHER	OTHER - Set appointment for 6 pack on 06/18/2019 10:00am [06/17/2019 15:58, BUSSAD617, 921, DPD]	BUSSA, DONALD G	0.00
Total Time Spent in Minutes:				0.00

User:

Detroit Police Department

04/12/2021

Case Management (DPD 181005-0167) Tracking

Time	Action	Description	Officer	Time Spent (Mins)
06/10/2019 10:33	TELEPHONE CALL	TELEPHONE CALL - Spoke with Ms Johnson who stated that the store staff will contact me to set up a appointment [06/10/2019 10:34, BUSSAD617, 921, DPD]	BUSSA, DONALD G	10.00
Total Time Spent in Minutes:				10.00

Case Management (DPD 181005-0167) Tracking

Time	Action	Description	Officer	Time Spent (Mins)
06/09/2019 10:07	TELEPHONE CALL	TELEPHONE CALL - Return call to Kathlyn Johnson, no answer. Left VM [06/09/2019 10:07, BUSSAD617, 921, DPD]	BUSSA, DONALD G	5.00
Total Time Spent in Minutes:				5.00

Case Management (DPD 181005-0167) Tracking

Time	Action	Description	Officer	Time Spent (Mins)
06/03/2019 12:00	OTHER	Went to store location, spoke with PRO Scott Ratkowski who was able to provide video and statement for the incident. Mr. Ratkowski stated that they did no want to send someone in place of the store to court, and would have to get it cleared with corporate and would contact me when he finds out, to move forward. [06/04/2019 10:18, BUSSAD617, 921, DPD]	BUSSA, DONALD G	60.00
Total Time Spent in Minutes:				60.00

Case Management (DPD 181005-0167) Tracking

Time	Action	Description	Officer	Time Spent (Mins)
05/30/2019 15:39	TELEPHONE-CALL	TELEPHONE CALL - Talked with PRO and set up to pick up reports, statements and video on 06/03/2019 [05/30/2019 15:40, BUSSAD617, 921, DPD]	BUSSA, DONALD G	10.00
Total Time Spent in Minutes:				10.00

User:

Detroit Police Department

04/12/2021

Case Management (DPD 181005-0167) Tracking

Time	Action	Description	Officer	Time Spent (Mins)
05/30/2019 09:28	TELEPHONE CALL	TELEPHONE CALL - Left VM with PRO [05/30/2019 09:28, BUSSAD617, 921, DPD]	BUSSA, DONALD G	5.00
Total Time Spent in Minutes:				5.00

-Case Management (DPD 181005-0167) Tracking

Time	Action	Description	Officer	Time Spent (Mins)
05/20/2019 15:35	OTHER	Just recived case folder on 05/20/2019. Info for video, receipt and statements were not in the file, requested from Shinola, per Sgt Jackson, that security with the information will not be back to work until 05/22/2019 [05/20/2019 15:38, BUSSAD617, 921, DPD]	BUSSA, DONALD G	20.00
Total Time Spent in Minutes:				20.00

Case Management (DPD 181005-0167) Tracking

Time	Action	Description	Officer	Time Spent (Mins)
10/09/2018 11:51	OTHER	OTHER - STILL WAITING ON VIDEO IT WAS ADAMS, LEVAN C STATED IT WAS GIVING TO THE OFFICERS. UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME IF THE VIDEO IS GOOD FACE RECOGNITION. [10/09/2018 11:53, ADAMSL723, 235, DPD]		15.00
Total Time Spent in Minutes:				15.00



DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT MANUAL

Series 200 Operations	Effective Date 11/5/2014	Review Date Annually	Directive Number 202.1
Chapter 202 - Limits on Authority			<input type="checkbox"/> New Directive <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Revised <small>Revisions in <i>Italics</i></small>
Reviewing Office Planning and Deployment			
References			

ARRESTS

202.1 - 1 PURPOSE

To provide guidelines and procedures for members of the Detroit Police Department (DPD) in making lawful arrests, the detention of material witnesses, to provide supervisory review of arrests for probable cause, and to provide for prompt judicial review of arrests.

202.1 - 2 POLICY

Short of the application of force, an arrest is the most serious action an officer can undertake. An arrest can cause repercussions throughout a person's life, even if eventually found not guilty or never brought to trial. The most important legal question facing an officer at the moment of arrest is the existence of probable cause. Without probable cause the arrest is illegal and the evidence of criminality that was obtained because of the arrest is inadmissible. It is the policy of the DPD:

- That no person shall be arrested with less than probable cause having been established at the time of the arrest;
- That a DPD supervisor shall review every arrest; and in all instances in which a probable cause determination is made, document same on the CRISNET report;
- That for all arrests unsupported by probable cause, the Review of Arrest Exception Form (UF-001) shall be completed within twelve (12) hours of the event;
- That for every arrestee, a warrant request for arraignment on the arrest shall be submitted to the prosecutor's office within forty-eight (48) hours of arrest;
- That in every instance in which an exception of this department's prompt judicial review policy occurs, the exception shall be documented on the Warrant Tracking Hold Form (UF-004/007); and
- That all arrests in which an arraignment warrant was not sought, the Warrant Tracking Hold Form (UF-004/007) shall be completed within twelve (12) hours.

202.1 - 3 Definitions

202.1 - 3.1 Arrest

An arrest is a seizure of greater scope or duration than an investigatory or Terry stop. An arrest is lawful when supported by probable cause.

202.1 Arrests

202.1 - 3.2 Investigatory Stop or "Terry Stop"

An investigatory Stop or "Terry Stop" is a limited seizure. A stop is a temporary detention of an individual for purposes of investigation and is based on a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.

A frisk is authorized **only** when the officer has reasonable suspicion to fear for his/her safety and the scope of the frisk must be narrowly tailored to those specific reasons. A frisk is a limited search of a person usually limited to a pat down of outer clothing where the primary purpose is the discovery of weapons for the protection of the officer. Refer to Directive 202.2 (Search and Seizure).

202.1 - 3.3 Material Witness

A witness subpoenaed to testify in a criminal case.

202.1 - 3.4 Probable Cause

A reasonable belief that an individual has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense¹.

202.1 - 3.5 Prompt Judicial Review

Prompt judicial review means the presentment of an arrestee before a court of appropriate jurisdiction for a probable cause determination as soon after an arrest that is reasonably feasible. A reasonable feasible time period is the period of time necessary to schedule the arraignment and complete the administrative processing of the arrestee within a period up to and not exceed forty-eight (48) hours, absent extraordinary circumstances.

202.1 - 3.6 Reasonable Suspicion

The facts and circumstances that existed at the time of the stop that would lead a reasonable officer to believe that criminal activity was (or had been, or was about to be) afoot.

¹ It should be noted that the definition of probable cause includes a reasonable belief that a person is "about to commit" a crime. MCL 750.92 requires that "[a]ny person who shall attempt to commit an offense prohibited by law, and in such attempt shall do any act towards the commission of such offense" has committed an attempt crime. If a person has not taken any act towards the commission of a criminal offense, there is no probable cause for an arrest. However, an investigative detention (Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 1968) is permitted when there exists reasonable articulable suspicion. Reasonable articulable suspicion exists where the facts and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts convince an ordinarily prudent person that criminality is at hand.

202.1 Arrests**202.1 - 3.7 Seizure or Detention**

A seizure or detention occurs when an officer's words or actions convey to a reasonable person that he/she is not free to leave.

202.1 - 4 Authority**202.1 - 4.1 General**

1. Members making an arrest shall inform the person arrested of his/her authority and the cause of the arrest, except when the person arrested is engaged in the commission of a criminal offense, flees, or if the person forcibly resists arrest before the member has time to inform him/her. However, as soon as the resistance is overcome, the subject shall be informed of the reason for the arrest.
2. Individuals shall be given the opportunity to submit to arrest before force is used and force may be used only when verbal commands and other techniques not requiring the use of force would be ineffective or present a danger to the officer or others.

202.1 - 4.2 Police Action Regarding Off-Duty Arrest

1. Off-duty officers shall notify on-duty DPD or local law enforcement officers (if outside of the city of Detroit) before taking police action, absent exigent circumstances, so that they may respond with appropriate personnel and resources to handle the problem.
2. Off-duty officers are prohibited from carrying or using firearms or taking police action in situations where an officer's performance may be impaired or the officer's ability to take objective action may be compromised.
3. If it appears that the officer making an arrest or carrying a firearm while off-duty has consumed alcohol or is otherwise impaired, the officer shall submit to field sobriety, breathalyzer, an/or blood tests.

202.1 - 4.3 Illegal Arrest

1. The unlawful restraint of a person's liberty for any length of time is considered an illegal arrest.
2. Even if justified, a restraint of an individual may be considered unlawful if executed in an unreasonable manner.
3. An officer who restrains or arrests a person unlawfully is subject to criminal and/or civil sanctions, as is every person who aids in the unlawful arrest.
4. Officers shall bear in mind that every person has a lawful right to resist an illegal arrest. However a citizen's right to resist an unlawful arrest does not include the right to use deadly force.

202.1 - 4.4 Material Witness Policy

1. Under Michigan law, only a court has the authority to decide whether an individual is a material witness, and whether that material witness should be committed to jail

202.1 Arrests

- pending his/her testimony. Refer to training Directive #04-01 (Confinement of Material Witness).
2. A material witness can be taken into custody **only** upon an order from the court where the criminal matter is pending. No material witness shall be taken into DPD custody without the member first obtaining a court order.
 3. A material witness can only be subject to further confinement after:
 - a. The witness is given an opportunity to be heard in court;
 - b. The court determines, after the hearing, that there is a danger that the testimony may be lost; and
 - c. The witness does not enter into a recognizance with the surety (bail) in order to ensure his/her appearance in court.
 4. All material witnesses taken into DPD custody shall be documented on a Detention of Material Witness Form (UF-006). A copy of the court order authorizing the confinement shall be attached.

202.1 - 5 Arrests with a Warrant**202.1 - 5.1 Execution of Arrest Warrants**

1. Only sworn members shall serve arrest warrants.
2. In executing an arrest warrant, the officer must be sure that the person upon whom the warrant is served is positively identified as the person named in the warrant.
3. A mistake in identity may subject the officer to a civil suit for false arrest.
4. When an arrest is made pursuant to a warrant, the arresting officer need not have the warrant in his possession. However, the officer shall show the warrant to the person or otherwise inform the person of the nature and contents of the warrant, as soon as feasible, and at a time when doing so will not increase the danger of escape or harm to the officer, arrestee, or bystanders.

202.1 - 5.2 Individual Surrendering with a Warrant

DPD members taking an individual into custody, where there is an existing warrant for his/her arrest shall first:

1. Verify the identity of the person surrendering (via identification supplied by the individual or the Law Enforcement Information Network [LEIN]); and
2. Verify the existence of the warrant for which the individual is surrendering (via LEIN, the Message Center, or other law enforcement agency).

The arresting member shall complete a CRISNET report which details the circumstances for the arrest, including the warrant information and the name of the person providing confirmation of the warrant.

If a citizen, under his/her own accord, turns him/herself in to any DPD facility for a crime, a not in custody warrant, or any type of offense, he/she may immediately be taken into custody. The officers and/or supervisors at the facility shall perform the aforementioned manual procedures and then cause the detainee to be transported to the Detroit Detention

202.1 Arrests

Center (DDC) for processing without delay. Under NO circumstances shall a citizen wishing to turn him/herself in be turned away and redirected to the DDC.

202.1 - 5.3 Arrest of Suspect inside Private Residence

A greater burden is placed on officers who enter a home or dwelling without consent to make an arrest. Freedom from intrusions into a home or dwelling is at the center of the privacy protection guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. Therefore:

1. If an officer wishes to arrest a suspect inside a residence, the officer must first obtain an arrest warrant or a search warrant and have a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is inside the residence. If the residence belongs to the suspect, only an arrest warrant is required. If the dwelling belongs to someone else, the officer must obtain a search warrant; and
2. There are two (2) exceptions to a warrant requirement in order to arrest a person inside a dwelling:
 - a. With consent; or
 - b. If exigent (emergency) circumstances exist. Refer to Directive 202.2 (Search and Seizure) for a discussion of what constitutes consent and exigent circumstances.

202.1 - 6 Arrests without Warrant

202.1 - 6.1 When Warrantless Arrest may be Made

1. When a person commits a felony or misdemeanor in the officer's presence.
2. When the officer has positive information that another officer holds a warrant e.g., the member has received positive information either written or by teletype, telephone, radio or other authoritative source that another officer holds a warrant for such arrest.
3. The officer has received positive information broadcast from a recognized police or other governmental radio station, or teletype, that affords the officer probable cause to believe a misdemeanor punishable by more than ninety-two (92) days, or a felony has been committed and probable cause to believe the person committed it.
4. There is probable cause to believe a person:
 - a. Is an escaped convict;
 - b. Has violated a condition of parole from any prison;
 - c. Has violated a condition of probation imposed by any court; or
 - d. Has violated any condition of a pardon granted by the executive (governor).
5. When the officer has probable cause to believe that the person has committed a felony.
6. When the officer has probable cause to believe that the person has committed a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for more than ninety-two (92) days. In all other misdemeanor arrests, a warrant must be obtained if the crime is not committed in the officer's presence.

The following are examples of misdemeanors (punishable by imprisonment for more than ninety-two [92] days) for which an officer may arrest on probable cause without a warrant,

202.1 Arrests

even if the crime was not committed in the officer's presence. This list is not all-inclusive, but it is meant to provide examples encountered daily by officers:

- a. Assault and infliction of serious injury (aggravated assault);
- b. Child abuse, 4th degree;
- c. Stalking (less than aggravating circumstances);
- d. Malicious use of service provided by communications common carrier;
- e. Breaking and Entering a motor vehicle, trailer, etc. (property taken less than \$200);
- f. Gambling;
- g. Malicious and willful destruction of property (less than \$200);
- h. Indecent exposure; and
- i. Simple assault or simple assault and battery.

202.1 - 6.2 Person Accusing Another

1. When an individual accuses another person of committing a felony or a misdemeanor punishable by more than ninety-two (92) days, and insists that an arrest be made, the officer should take the person into custody only if he/she has probable cause to believe that the accused person has committed a crime.
2. If probable cause is based solely upon the word of the accuser, the officer must be prepared to demonstrate both why the accuser is worthy of belief and that the accuser obtained his/her information in a reliable way. The officer should not have difficulty meeting this requirement when the accuser claims to be either a victim of or an eyewitness to a crime. Unlike confidential information, victims and citizen eyewitnesses are usually presumed credible.
3. Unless an officer observes a crime that is punishable by ninety-two (92) days imprisonment or less an officer cannot make an arrest without a warrant. In those cases, the officer should advise the complainant of the process for obtaining a warrant.

202.1 - 6.3 Citizen's Arrest

1. While citizens have the legal right to make arrests under certain circumstances, the DPD does not encourage citizen arrests. Whenever possible, the taking of persons into custody should be accomplished by trained and authorized law enforcement officers. A private person may make a citizen's arrest in the following situations:
 - a. For a felony committed in the citizen's presence;
 - b. When he/she knows the person to be arrested has committed a felony although not in his/her presence; and
 - c. When summoned by an officer to assist in making an arrest.
2. There is additional statutory authority for merchants, his/her agents and security guards providing security for merchants to arrest for retail fraud regardless of whether the offense was committed in the presence of the private person.

202.1 Arrests

3. If an officer encounters a citizen that has made a citizen's arrest, or is attempting to make a citizen's arrest, the arrestee shall be taken into custody only after the officer has determined that probable cause exists.

202.1 - 7 Probable Cause**202.1 - 7.1 Reviewing Arrests**

1. When any individual who has been arrested is brought into *the DDC*, the officer-in-charge (OIC) of the *DDC* desk shall review the circumstances of the arrest and confirm whether or not probable cause existed at the time of the arrest. If the reviewing supervisor determines that there was not probable cause to detain the person, he/she shall be immediately released.
2. If the OIC of the *DDC* desk or specialized command makes such a determination, and releases a person for lack of probable cause, he/she shall document the facts and circumstances of the arrest and subsequent release on a Review of Arrest Exception Form (UF-001), within twelve (12) hours of the arrest.
3. The reviewing supervisor shall also ensure that at the beginning of the narrative section of the CRISNET report, members shall make a declarative statement specifically stating whether force was used during the arrest, e.g. "no force was used" or "force was used."

202.1 - 7.2 Prompt Judicial Review Policy

1. When a law enforcement officer arrests a person without a warrant, based on probable cause, he/she must, within the statutory and constitutional limits as reflected by DPD policies, either discharge the person and seek a "not in custody" arrest warrant, or obtain prompt judicial approval of the arrest by bringing the accused before a judicial officer "without unnecessary delay."
2. A warrant request for arraignment on the charges underlying the arrest shall be submitted to the prosecutor's office within forty-eight (48) hours of arrest. If the warrant request for arraignment is denied by the prosecutor's office, the arrestee must be released immediately. If the request for a warrant is approved by the prosecutor's office then the arrestee shall be brought before a judicial officer for a prompt judicial review (arraignment) without "unnecessary delay."
3. DPD members shall ensure that all in-custody arrestees are brought before a judicial officer for judicial approval of the arrest (arraignment) within a period up to and not to exceed forty-eight (48) hours of the arrest. This is not to say that the probable cause determination in a particular case passes constitutional muster simply because it is provided within forty-eight (48) hours. Such a hearing may, nonetheless, be a constitutional violation if the arrested individual can prove that his/her probable cause determination was delayed unreasonably. Examples of unreasonable delay are delays for the purpose of gathering additional evidence to justify the arrest, a delay motivated by ill-will against the arrested individual, or delay for delay's sake.

202.1 Arrests

4. Where an arrested individual does not receive a probable cause determination within forty-eight (48) hours, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate the existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance. The fact that, in a particular case, it may take longer than forty-eight (48) hours to prepare the paperwork or the fact that there is an intervening weekend or holiday, does not qualify as an extraordinary circumstance.

202.1 - 8 Documentation**202.1 - 8.1 General**

1. Documentation on a Warrant Tracking Hold Form (UF-004/007) shall be completed by the officer-in-charge of the case, or a supervisor at the *DDC* that is responsible for submitting the warrant, in all instances in which:
 - a. A request for arraignment warrant is submitted more than forty-eight (48) hours after arrest; and
 - b. An arrestee is not presented for arraignment within forty-eight (48) hours of arrest in which extraordinary circumstances delayed the arraignment.
2. This documentation shall be completed by the end of the shift in which there was:
 - a. A failure to request an arraignment warrant within forty-eight (48) hours;
 - b. An arraignment was delayed because of extraordinary circumstances; or
 - c. A failure to comply with this department's prompt judicial review policy.

202.1 - 8.2 Commander's Review Report

The commanding officer of *the DDC* shall review in writing all reported EXCEPTIONS to the DPD's arrest, investigatory stop and frisk, witness identification and questioning policies, and all reports of arrests in which an arraignment warrant was not sought. The Commander's Review Report shall be completed within seven (7) days of receiving the Review of Arrest Form. The Commander's Review Report shall include an evaluation of the actions taken to correct the EXCEPTION and whether any corrective or non-disciplinary action was taken. The Commander's Review Report is located on the lower portion of the Review of Arrest Exception Form (UF-001).

202.1 - 8.3 Commander's Daily Review Report

The commanding officer of *the DDC* shall review in writing all reported EXCEPTIONS of the DPD's prompt judicial review, holds, restrictions and material witness policies. The Commander's Review Report shall be completed on a daily basis of receiving the Warrant Tracking Hold Form (UF-004/007). The Commander's Review Report shall include an evaluation of the actions taken to correct the EXCEPTION and whether any corrective or non-disciplinary action was taken. The Commander's Review Report is located on the lower portion of the Warrant Tracking Hold Form (UF-004/007).

202.1 Arrests**202.1 - 9 Special Arrest Notifications**

When an officer makes an arrest of certain governmental employees, the following procedures are to ensure that citizens who may rely on these governmental employees for services are not inconvenienced any more than necessary.

202.1 - 9.1 Arrest of Bus Drivers and Postal Employees

1. If a bus driver driving a bus, or a person engaged in the delivery or collection of mail, is charged with a simple misdemeanor and is not intoxicated or does not pose a continuing threat (e.g., domestic violence, disorderly, etc.), the person shall not be taken into custody, but shall be required to report to the precinct station that the arresting officer is assigned in time to be registered for the next session of court. The member shall notify Communications *Section* and the OIC of the precinct with details of the incident.
2. For a felony or a misdemeanor where the bus driver is intoxicated or poses a continuing public safety concern, the arresting officer shall notify Communications *Section* with the details of the arrest. Communications *Section* will notify the arrestee's dispatch office to request proper relief. In this same instance, U.S. Postal Service employees shall be taken to the nearest precinct station. The member shall notify Communications *Section* with the details of the arrest.
3. Whenever a U.S. Postal service employee is arrested for a felony, the arresting officer shall notify Communications *Section* of the arrest. Communications *Section* shall notify the office of the inspector in charge of the U.S. Postal Service.
4. A representative of the inspector in charge of the U.S. Postal Service may contact the officer-in-charge of the case to be apprised of the details. A copy of the CRISNET report may be made available to the representative after a warrant has been obtained.

202.1 - 9.2 Internal Revenue Service Employees

1. In the event that an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) employee is arrested for an offense other than a minor traffic violation, the arresting officer shall notify Communications *Section* of the arrest. Communications *Section* shall notify the Internal Revenue Service, Detroit Inspection Office.
2. Notification shall be made within a reasonable time following the arrest and the officer-in-charge of the case shall maintain liaison with the Detroit Inspection Office throughout the course of his/her investigation.

202.1 - 9.3 City of Detroit Employees

1. Whenever members of this department have cause to arrest an employee of the city of Detroit for any serious offense, the arresting officer shall notify Communications *Section* of the arrest.
2. The Communications *Section* shall notify the concerned department head of the arrest and status of the involved employee.

202.1 Arrests

202.1 - 9.4 Arrest of DPD Employees

1. When members of the DPD detain and/or arrest a member of the DPD, irrespective of the reason, the arresting officer shall notify his/her immediate supervisor without unnecessary delay.
2. The supervisor shall notify Internal Controls *Section* during normal business hours, Monday through Friday, 7:00 a.m. - 5:00 p.m. If other than normal business hours, the Alert Team shall be contacted through Communications *Section*.
3. Members shall report detention or arrest by a law enforcement agency other than the DPD to his/her commanding officer without unnecessary delay.
4. The commanding officer shall ensure that Internal Controls *Section* is notified as soon as possible.

202.1 - 9.5 Members of the Armed Forces

1. Members of this department shall be authorized to arrest armed forces personnel who may be deserters or are Absent Without Leave (A.W.O.L.), upon the request of military authorities. The arresting officer shall notify Communications *Section*.
2. The military authorities of armed forces personnel who are deserters or who are A.W.O.L., shall notify the Message Center via LEIN. The Message Center shall be responsible for notifying the appropriate *Precinct Detective Unit (PDU)*.
3. When a reward is offered for the apprehension of deserters or A.W.O.L. personnel of the armed forces, the Chief of Police shall determine who is entitled to the reward.
4. When a member desires to enter a military installation for the purpose of arresting a member of the armed forces for violation of a state law, the member shall first clear his/her actions through the Office of *Enforcement Operations*. The Office of *Enforcement Operations* shall determine if the action is necessary and shall ensure that formal requirements are met. After approval, the member shall notify Communications *Section* before entering the installation.

Related Policies:

- Directive 202.2 - Search and Seizure
- Directive 303.4 - Foot Pursuits
- Training Directive 04-01 - Material Witness

Related Forms:

- Review of Arrest Form (UF-001)
- Warrant Tracking Hold (UF-004/007)
- Detention of Material Witness Form (UF-006)



DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT MANUAL

Series 200 Operations	Effective Date 05122015	Review Date Annually	Directive Number 202.2
Chapter 202 - Limits on Authority			
Reviewing Office Police Legal Advisor			<input type="checkbox"/> New Directive <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Revised <small>Revisions are in <i>italics</i></small>
References			

SEARCH AND SEIZURE

202.2 - 1 PURPOSE

To establish guidelines and procedures for conducting searches by members of the Detroit Police Department (DPD) including searches by consent, searches of motor vehicles, searches of persons (e.g., incident to an arrest, detainee inventory, body cavity and strip searches), investigatory stops, stops and frisks, searches under exigent circumstances and other searches authorized by state and federal law.

202.2 - 2 POLICY

Officers shall observe the rights of citizens under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution which guarantees the right of people to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures of his/her home, person, and things. Searches shall be accomplished pursuant to a valid search warrant obtained upon probable cause, except in those instances where there is a clearly recognized legal exception to the warrant requirement. Officers conducting a search and/or seizure, with or without a warrant, shall be courteous and show respect for the rights, welfare and property of the citizens involved.

202.2 - 3 Definitions

202.2 - 3.1 Body Cavity Search

A physical intrusion into the interior of the human body not visible by normal observation. The search shall only be conducted by a qualified medical professional and only with a valid search warrant.

202.2 - 3.2 Container

An item capable of holding another item.

202.2 - 3.3 Open View

Situations when there is no reasonable expectation of privacy, it is not a search. A member sees what the public could see.

202.2 - 3.4 Plain View

Involves a situation when the police are lawfully in an area that is protected by the Fourth Amendment. While in the area the police find items that they have probable cause to believe could be evidence or contraband, and it is immediately apparent to them.

DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

MANUAL

202.2 Search and Seizure

202.2 - 3.5 Probable Cause

In the arrest context, a reasonable belief that an individual has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.¹ In the search context, a reasonable belief that the person(s) or items subject to seizure will be found in a place specified at the location.

202.2 - 3.6 Reasonable Suspicion

The specific facts and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts to convince an ordinarily prudent person that criminality is at hand.

202.2 - 3.7 Search

An intrusion on an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy.

202.2 - 3.8 Strip Search

A search of a person requiring the removal of a person's clothing to expose underclothing, breasts, buttocks or genitals.

202.2 - 3.9 Vehicle

All vehicles impelled on the public highways by mechanical power, except traction engines, road rollers and such vehicles as run only upon rails or tracks.

202.2 - 4 Procedures

202.2 - 4.1 Search Warrant

1. An application for a search warrant is presented to a judge for review. It outlines the particular contraband or evidence to be seized that a member believes is present on the premises and why. The document also describes the exact geographical location of the property or place, what the place looks like and how the member learned about these things.
2. If the judge concludes that there is probable cause to support the application (e.g., belief that seizable property exists in a particular place or on a particular person), he/she will issue a search warrant. This document permits police officers to search the property without the owner's permission and seize the items named in the warrant.
3. After the officer executes the warrant, he/she must file a return or search warrant (within 24 hours) with the court itemizing what (if anything) was seized. (Refer to Directive 202.3 Search Warrants)

¹ It should be noted that the definition of probable cause includes a reasonable belief that a person is "about to commit" a crime. MCL 750.92 requires that "[a]ny person who shall attempt to commit an offense prohibited by law, and in such attempt shall do any act towards the commission of such offense" has committed an attempt crime. If a person has not taken any act towards the commission of a criminal offense, there is no probable cause for an arrest. However, an investigative detention (Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 1968) is permitted when there exists reasonable articulable suspicion. Reasonable articulable suspicion exists where the facts and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts convince an ordinarily prudent person that criminality is at hand."

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202.2 - 4.2 Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement

1. Courts and department policy recognize that some situations may require officers to take immediate action; and, as a result, have exempted officers from the usual requirement of a warrant under some circumstances. The following are circumstances that may exempt an officer from securing a search warrant prior to a search:
 - a. Consent searches;
 - b. Community Caretaking (Emergency Situations) search;
 - c. Exigent Circumstances search;
 - d. Plain view;
 - e. Abandoned personal property;
 - f. Executing arrest warrants;
 - g. Terry Stops and Frisks;
 - h. Searches incident to an arrest;
 - i. Detainee inventory searches; and
 - j. Vehicle searches (in specific instances)

202.2 - 5 Consent Search

202.2 - 5.1 General

1. A search warrant, probable cause, or reasonable suspicion is not necessary to conduct a search where a person, who has authority or control over the thing or place to be searched, consents to the search. An officer may merely ask for permission from someone with authority or control over the premises or the item he/she wishes to search. If that person grants permission, the search may take place.
2. Written consent should be obtained whenever possible before conducting a search based on consent by utilizing the Consent to Search Form (DPD675).
3. The sole justification for a consent search is the existence of a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary consent. The legal standard for determining if consent was given voluntarily is an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances. If an officer requests consent from a citizen under circumstances which a reasonable person would consider coercive, then the officer must seek a warrant (if probable cause exists) prior to a search.
4. A person need not be told that they have a right to refuse consent. A member may not misrepresent the limits of his/her authority and should accurately answer any questions that are asked.
5. A person may withdraw his/her consent at any time and has the right to limit the scope of his/her consent (e.g., a person can consent to the search of only one room of a house). Revocation of consent does not constitute probable cause that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.
6. All consent searches must be conducted reasonably. For example, consent to search the trunk would justify the opening of containers, but unless explicitly authorized, it would be unreasonable to believe that general consent would authorize a member to break open and damage locked containers.

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202.2 - 5.2 Consent During Traffic Stops

1. Once a member issues a civil infraction or a verbal warning, the officer shall return the license, registration, and certificate of insurance before asking for consent to search the motor vehicle.
2. The officer may advise the driver, but is not required to, that he/she is free to go before requesting consent to search.

202.2 - 5.3 Third Party Consent

1. One person may not "give up" the constitutional rights of another person.
2. Third party consent recognizes that people have "common authority" over a piece of property or premises at which property is stored and may give consent in his/her own right. Common authority rests "on mutual use of the property by persons having joint access or control for most purposes" (United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 [1974]).
3. Common authority is not the same as legal ownership. A person can have common authority, but not have legal ownership (e.g. one person who resides with another in the other person's apartment would have no legal ownership or is the signed contractual tenant, but would have common authority in shared areas).

202.2 - 5.4 Consent by Parents

There is no common rule or guidelines that a parent cannot give valid consent to search a room of an adult son or daughter. Each case depends on the circumstances because the parent may have actual common authority based on joint access or control.

202.2 - 5.5 Co-occupant Objection to Consent Searches

In dealing with third party consent where a co-occupant is at the scene and refuses consent, a warrantless search has been deemed unreasonable because of the objecting co-occupant. As a general rule, if one person who possesses common authority to give consent to jointly controlled premises gives consent, but a second co-occupant is physically present and refuses to give permission to search, a consent search is not justified.

202.2 - 6 Community Caretaking (Emergency Situations)

A search warrant is not necessary in emergency situations if a person within the dwelling is in need of aid or assistance. Officers must be able to articulate the specific facts that an emergency did exist and that entry was needed to assist. A guiding principle is whether an officer would be derelict in his/her duties for not entering.

202.2 - 7 Exigent Circumstances

The following exigent circumstances would justify a warrantless search:

- a. If officers have a reasonable belief that contraband is about to be removed or destroyed, he/she may conduct a search and seizure, without a warrant, provided

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probable cause exists, and it can be shown that the search was necessary to prevent the possible imminent destruction of evidence. (Not all crimes are serious enough to create exigent circumstances); and

- b. If officers are pursuing a felony suspect, and have reason to believe that he/she has entered a particular premise, the officers may enter those premises to search for him/her. To justify warrantless entry following the pursuit, the arrest process must have begun away from the premises and the offender is trying to avoid arrest.

202.2 - 8 Plain View Doctrine

1. A plain view seizure is, technically, not a search. To make a plain view seizure of property (contraband or evidence of a crime) two (2) requirements must be met:
 - a. Officers are lawfully present and observe the contraband; and
 - b. It must be immediately apparent to the officer that the items he/she observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. An officer may not move an item to look underneath for serial numbers or identifying marks.
2. From time to time an officer may have a lawful reason to open a vehicle door or enter a vehicle (e.g., to examine the vehicle identification number, check for defective equipment, assist a motorist in moving a disabled vehicle). If the officer's actions are reasonable and are narrowly limited to those necessary to accomplish his/her goal, and if while properly within the vehicle the member sees a weapon carried in violation of the law or contraband, then the officer may seize it.

202.2 - 9 Abandoned Personal Property

A search warrant is not required for personal property that has been abandoned. To constitute abandoned property, two (2) conditions must apply:

- a. The property was voluntarily abandoned; and
- b. The property was discarded outside the area in which someone has a reasonable expectation of privacy (e.g., in a trash receptacle in an alley).

202.2 - 10 Executing Arrest Warrants

1. Officers with an arrest warrant may search for a person in his/her home provided the warrant is valid and there is reason to believe that the suspect is home at the time of the search. The search for the suspect must be limited to places where a person may be found. For example, an officer may not open a dresser drawer if it does not appear that a person is able to hide there.
2. To search for a person in the home of a third party, an officer must have a search warrant.
3. Officers may undertake a "protective sweep" of the premises where the arrest is for a violent crime and the arrest takes place without a warrant. The purpose of the

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“protective sweep” is to discover persons on the premises who might present a danger to officers. In order to extend a “protective sweep” beyond closets and adjoining spaces, officers must have reasonable suspicion for fearing that persons may be on the premises that pose a threat. In such cases the sweep is limited to places where a person may hide.

202.2 - 11 Searches and Seizures of Persons

An understanding of this area of the law requires an understanding that courts have classified police interaction with citizens in three (3) categories. Police officers interact with the public in many different ways, only some of which involve the enforcement of criminal laws. Depending on the police conduct, the Fourth Amendment may or may not come into play and whether constitutional restrictions apply depends on the intrusiveness of the police conduct and whether the conduct constitutes either a “seizure” or “search” as those terms are defined by case law. If the Fourth Amendment applies, it may require either reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Obviously, if probable cause is required, the police violate the Constitution if only reasonable suspicion exists.

202.2 - 11.1 Interactions with Citizens

Law Enforcement and citizen contacts can be broken down in three (3) tiers of conduct, each having different levels of searches and seizures of a person. The following is the three (3) tiers of interactions with citizens and citizens’ legal standards:

Tier 1 - Informational Encounters

Does it constitute a seizure?	No
Does it constitute a search?	No
Is the police conduct covered by the Fourth Amendment?	No
What level of justification must the officer have?	None

Tier 2 - Investigative Detentions (Terry Stop)

Does it constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure?	Yes
Does it constitute a Fourth Amendment search ² ?	Yes
Is the police conduct covered by the Fourth Amendment?	Yes
What level of justification is required?	Reasonable Suspicion

² When a frisk is conducted during a Tier 2 Investigative Detention, reasonable suspicion for the frisk is required. Please see 202.2-11.3.

Tier 3 - Arrests (or equivalent)

Does it constitute a seizure?	Yes
Does it constitute a search?	Yes

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Is it governed by the Fourth Amendment?
What justification is required?

Yes
Probable Cause

202.2 - 11.2 Informational Encounters (Tier 1)

1. The first tier is based on the recognition that not all personal interaction between a citizen and the police rises to the level of either a Fourth Amendment "search" or a Fourth Amendment "seizure." Therefore, Tier 1 conduct is usually conceived as a "non-seizure."
2. The Constitution does not forbid the police asking for a citizen agreeing to voluntarily cooperate with the police. "A consensual encounter is simply the voluntary cooperation of a private citizen in response to non-coercive questioning by a law enforcement official."
3. A person has been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of the circumstances, a reasonable person would conclude that he/she was not free to leave. In some circumstances, it is useful to frame the question as whether the subject of the interaction with the police would reasonably have felt free to terminate the conversation.
4. This is an objective standard. The person's subjective belief that he/she was not free to leave or to terminate the conversation is not determinative because that person may or may not be a "reasonable person." Although doing so is a strong indication that the person was not detained, an officer is not required to advise the person that he/she is free to leave or free to decline to cooperate or answer questions. Several factors can be used to determine if an officer/citizen contact is an informational encounter or if it rises to another tier level:
 - a. Language used by the officer;
 - b. Commands;
 - c. Threatening presence of several officers;
 - d. Tone of voice;
 - e. Display of weapon;
 - f. Physical touching;
 - g. Words or actions indicating compliance with the officer's request might be compelled; or
 - h. Failure to return documents.
5. Simply asking if a person is willing to step aside and talk with the police is a consensual encounter that implicates no Fourth Amendment interest. Cooperation may not be induced by intimidating or coercive means.
6. The officer cannot act (by words or actions) in a manner that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that he/she was required to answer questions or would not be allowed to leave if he/she attempted to do so.

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GUIDELINES FOR INFORMATIONAL ENCOUNTERS

1. It should not be called a "stop" in the report or during testimony because reasonable suspicion is required for the type of Fourth Amendment seizure commonly referred to as a "stop."
2. Asking a person "would you mind" answering a few questions is advisable.
3. Do not make demands or give instructions. A request for voluntary cooperation must be made in a manner that does not indicate that compliance will be required.
4. Do not frisk without reasonable suspicion or consent.
5. Do not give *Miranda* warnings.
6. Do not use any force.
7. Do not detain the person if he/she refuses to cooperate and attempts to leave. The failure to cooperate does not constitute reasonable suspicion justifying an investigative detention. Likewise, declining to give consent to frisk or search does not constitute reasonable suspicion or probable cause.
8. Do not arrest for refusing to provide a name.
9. Except in appropriate circumstances, do not arrest for providing a false name or false information during an investigative detention. The Michigan Supreme Court has ruled that a person cannot be charged with obstructing a police officer in the performance of duty (MCL 750.479) for giving a false name because that statute was construed to require threatened or actual physical interference. However, MCL 257.324(h) makes it a misdemeanor to furnish a peace officer false, forged, fictitious or misleading verbal or written identification identifying the person as another person, if (and only if) the person is detained for a violation of the motor vehicle code. However, in combination with other circumstances, an attempt to disguise one's identity might increase reasonable suspicion justifying an investigative detention into an arrest for a crime other than making a false police report. (Refer to Training Directive #12-08 New Law on Providing False Information in Criminal Investigations)
10. Think through the answer if asked on cross-examination by defense counsel "what would you have done, officer, if my client had not cooperated and walked away?" While the duty is always to answer all questions truthfully, the truth may be that the officer had not decided on the course of action that would be followed under various contingencies that never happened. Courts do not ordinarily permit questions that call for speculation. The prosecutor's objection to the question should also be sustained on another ground.
11. Since the relevant test for a seizure is defined by the objectively reasonable conclusion that would be reached under the circumstances on whether the person is free to leave, the unexpressed intention of the officer to detain the person if he were to walk away is not relevant to the custody inquiry.
12. While not legally required, specifically informing the subject that he/she is not being detained and is free to leave if he/she chooses, substantially increases the likelihood that a court will categorize the event as an informational encounter.

202.2 Search and Seizure**202.2 -11.3 Investigatory Detentions (Tier 2)**

An officer may stop an individual for the purpose of conducting an investigatory stop only where reasonable suspicion is present. Reasonable suspicion must be more than a hunch or feeling, but need not meet the test for probable cause, sufficient to make an arrest. The officer must be able to point to the specific facts that, when taken together with rational inferences, reasonably warranted the stop. Officers shall, if feasible and if it does not pose a danger to the officer or others, adhere to the following guidelines:

- a. Officers shall be courteous at all times during the contact but maintain caution and vigilance for furtive movements to retrieve weapons, conceal or discard contraband, or other suspicious actions;
- b. If not in uniform, officers shall clearly identify himself/herself as a law enforcement officer, by announcing his/her identity and displaying departmental identification;
- c. Before approaching more than one (1) suspect, individual officers should determine whether the circumstances warrant a request for backup assistance and whether the contact can and should be delayed until such assistance arrives;
- d. Officers shall confine questions to those concerning the suspect's identity and other questions necessary to resolve the officer's suspicions; and
- e. Suspects are not required, nor can suspects be compelled to answer questions posed during an investigatory stop. Failure to respond to an officer's inquires is not, in and of itself, sufficient grounds to make an arrest although it may provide sufficient justification for additional observation and/or investigation.

"Pat-Down" (Frisk)

Although the words "stop" and "frisk" have become synonymous with each other, they involve two (2) distinct acts and require separate justification by officers: the investigatory stop which is a brief detention of a person because of suspected criminal activity and the "pat-down" (frisk) which is a limited search for weapons for officer safety. Not every investigatory stop justifies a "pat-down" (frisk).

- a. A frisk is authorized only when the officer has reasonable suspicion that the person is armed and presently dangerous and the scope of the frisk is narrowly tailored to those specific reasons.
- b. Clearly, not every investigatory stop poses sufficient justification for conducting a "pat-down." An officer must have facts indicating that the person may be armed and presently dangerous (e.g., the type of crime suspected, prior knowledge of the suspect's propensity for violence, any indication that the suspect is armed, etc.). For example, there is an obvious difference between what is allowed during an "investigative stop" of a person sleeping on a park bench after the park has closed, as opposed to a person stopped for possession of narcotics. In the latter case, courts acknowledge that persons who engage in serious criminal conduct commonly carry weapons, so the officer's fear of the person is presumptively reasonable. The person

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- sleeping on the park bench may be frisked only if the officer can articulate reasonable grounds for believing that he/she is armed and dangerous.
- c. If an officer detects an object during a "pat-down" that he/she reasonably believes is contraband, the officer may seize it under the "plain feel" doctrine. However, the "plain feel" doctrine applies only if the officer has the right to conduct the "pat down" in the first place (just as the "plain view" doctrine applies only where the police have the right to be in the position from which he/she got the view). In addition, the officer may not conduct the "pat-down" in a manner that exceeds what is necessary to determine whether the person has a weapon.
 - d. During a traffic stop officers shall take reasonable steps to protect themselves. Officers may direct the occupants to step out of the vehicle. If the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person is armed and dangerous, the officer may conduct a "pat-down." It is of critical importance that officers be able to state specifically what it was about this situation that made him/her suspicious. It is not enough to say; "I was suspicious." Officers shall include all details in his/her CRISNET report as to those circumstances that attracted his/her attention to the suspect or the suspect's vehicle and made him/her suspicious.

Procedures for performing a "Pat-Down"

When reasonable suspicion exists to perform a "pat-down," it should be performed with due caution, restraint and sensitivity. If reasonable suspicion exists to perform a "pat-down," it shall be conducted as follows:

- a. If possible, "pat-downs" should be conducted by at least two (2) officers, one of whom performs the "pat-down" while the other provides protective cover;
- b. Officers are permitted only to externally feel the outer clothing of the suspect. The evidence must be "immediately apparent" to the officer and the fabric cannot be manipulated. Officers may not place his/her hands in pockets unless he/she feels an object that could reasonably resemble a weapon, e.g., firearm, knife, etc.; and
- c. If the external feeling of the suspect's clothing fails to disclose evidence of a weapon, no further search may be made.
- d. If a weapon is found, the possession of which is a crime, the officer may make an arrest of the suspect and complete a full custodial search of the suspect. The search shall not be discontinued simply because one (1) weapon has been found.

Recording the Investigatory Stop or Stop and Frisk

- 1. Officers must check either the "FRISK" or "STOP" box on his/her Activity Log.
- 2. Officers shall articulate and document on his/her Activity Log and CRISNET report the precise description of all the facts and circumstances of the initial stop or stop and frisk.
- 3. All members shall turn his/her Activity Logs in to his/her supervisor by the end of his/her shift.
- 4. Supervisors shall review Activity Logs for all investigatory stops or stops and frisks conducted by members of his/her command. Those unsupported by reasonable

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suspicion shall be documented on an Investigatory Stop or Stop and Frisk Form (UF-003), within twenty-four (24) hours of receiving the Activity Log.

Commander's Review Report

The commander of the precinct and, if applicable, the commander that the specialized unit reports to shall review in writing all reported EXCEPTIONS to this department's investigatory stop and frisk policy. The Commander's Review Report (U-59) shall be completed within seven (7) days of receiving the Investigatory Stop or Stop and Frisk Form (UF-003). The Commander's Review Report shall include an evaluation of the actions taken to correct the EXCEPTION and whether any corrective or non-disciplinary action was taken.

202.2 - 11.4 Arrests (Tier 3)

1. The investigative detention and protective search authorized by Terry v. Ohio is limited. It authorized only a limited detention and a limited search. If the police exceed those limits the conduct enters Tier 3 and is illegal in the absence of probable cause. Every arrest, and every seizure having the essential attributes of a formal arrest, violates the Constitution unless supported by probable cause.
2. A person's mere presence or proximity to criminal activity does not, without more, support probable cause to search or arrest that person.

202.2 - 12 Detainee Inventory Searches

1. A search of the arrestee's personal effects at the precinct, as part of the booking process, is justified as an inventory procedure. An inventory search protects the department from false claims of missing or damaged property and prevents the introduction of contraband into the system.
2. Any contraband or evidence found during a detainee inventory search is admissible in court and can form the basis of new charge(s) being filed against the detainee.

202.2 - 13 Search Incident to an Arrest

1. The most common warrantless search is the search of a person under arrest. The major reason for this exemption is to protect the officer from a potential attack. Having to wait for a search warrant could increase the officer's exposure to possible injury from weapons that the arrested person may have.
2. For this exemption to be applicable there must be: a lawful custodial arrest; the search is for weapons and evidence located within the immediate control of the arrestee; and the search is conducted contemporaneously (almost immediately) to the arrest.

202.2 - 13.1 Strip Searches

1. An officer's authority to conduct a strip search incident to a lawful arrest is restricted to persons known or suspected of having committed a felony.

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2. A person arrested for a misdemeanor offense shall not be strip searched unless there exists probable cause to believe that the arrested person is concealing a weapon, a controlled substance, or evidence of a crime.
3. Persons arrested for misdemeanor offenses may be strip searched only after written authorization is documented by preparation of the Strip Search Authorization Form (DPD190). Only the Chief of Police, or designee, (Commander of a precinct or specialized unit, Deputy Chief, Assistant Chief or *Chief Duty Officer*) may give written authorization.
4. Distribution is as indicated on the form. The original shall be given directly to the person being searched. A CRISNET report shall also be prepared by the arresting officer to include relative information concerning the search.
5. A person of the same sex as the detainee shall conduct the search out of the view of persons not conducting or necessary to assist with the search. A member assisting in a strip search shall also be of the same sex as the person being searched.

202.2 - 13.2 Body Cavity Searches

1. Under no circumstances shall there be a body cavity search of an arrested person by department personnel.
2. Where there exists probable cause to support a body cavity search, the member shall apply for a search warrant.
3. If a search warrant is granted, the detainee shall be taken to Detroit Receiving Hospital (DRH), where a qualified medical professional will conduct the search.
4. Any member of the DPD witnessing the search shall be of the same sex of the person that is being searched.
5. The member of this department that applied for the search warrant shall document the search on the return of search warrant and prepare a CRISNET report including the following information:
 - a. Name and sex of person subjected to the search;
 - b. Name and sex of all persons conducting, assisting and witnessing the search;
 - c. Time, date, and place of the search;
 - d. Name of Judge authorizing the search warrant;
 - e. A list of all items recovered from the person searched; and
 - f. Attach a copy of the search warrant and the return of the search warrant to the CRISNET report.

202.2 - 14 Vehicle Searches**202.2 - 14.1 General**

For Fourth Amendment purposes, the automobile has a lesser expectation of privacy when compared to a dwelling and therefore there is a vehicle exception to the search warrant requirement. The vehicle exception is based upon two (2) main rationales:

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- a. A vehicle is readily mobile; and
- b. Is subject to a range of police regulations inapplicable to a fixed dwelling (e.g., licensing, etc.)

Consent search

When the owner or driver voluntarily consents to a search of a vehicle. The consent must be voluntary and not made under any threat or compulsion. The test for a valid consent search is based on the totality of the circumstances.

Undriveable Vehicles

There are several types of vehicle searches based on varying legal standards and justifications, these are:

- a. With a Search Warrant;
- b. Probable cause search;
- c. Search incident to arrest of driver or occupant; and
- d. Inventory search

202.2 - 14.2 With a Search Warrant

When searching under a warrant, members may search all areas in which the object of the search warrant could be located.

202.2 - 14.3 Probable Cause Search of a Vehicle

1. If a member has probable cause to search a vehicle, a warrantless search may be made of any area of the vehicle that could conceal the object of the search.
2. The search should take place within a reasonable amount of time. If the time period exceeds what is reasonable, then a search warrant should be obtained.
3. If probable cause exists to search a vehicle, the search may be conducted on the street or the vehicle may be removed to a more convenient location, such as the precinct.
4. Vehicles stored in garages may need a search warrant unless the search is based upon a recognized exception, such as consent or exigent circumstances. The reason for obtaining a search warrant in this case is because a garage is a Fourth Amendment protected premises.
5. The scope of this type of search is anywhere in the vehicle, and any containers, that could hold the object for the probable cause search. Members have the authority to force open any locked containers or compartments as if authorized by a search warrant.

Dual Use Vehicles or "Mobile Homes"

Mobile homes can be considered a "dwelling" and a search warrant may be required in order to search a mobile home vehicle. Some factors to consider if the mobile home is a vehicle and not a "dwelling" is:

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- a. Is the vehicle mobile with a turn of the key?
- b. Is the mobile home elevated on blocks?
- c. Is the mobile home connected to utilities (e.g., water, electricity, etc.)?
- d. Is the mobile home readily accessible to a road?

202.2 - 14.4 Search of Vehicles Incident to Arrest of Driver or Occupant

1. Under limited circumstances a member has the authority to search the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to an arrest of an occupant of the vehicle.
2. Based on the court case Arizona v. Grant 556 U.S. 332 (2009), a police officer may search the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only in two (2) circumstances:
 - a. The arrested person is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search; or
 - b. It is reasonable for the officer to believe the vehicle contains evidence that pertains to the offense for which the person is being arrested.
3. The search permitted by a search incident to lawful arrest is confined to the passenger compartment and does not include the trunk. Courts construe the term "passenger compartment" as areas that could be reached by an individual without exiting the vehicle.
4. Unlike a vehicle search justified by probable cause, a vehicle search incident to an arrest must be performed at the location of the arrest.

202.2 - 14.5 Inventory Search

Vehicles seized, taken as evidence, or taken into police custody and towed at the direction of department members shall be inventoried to safeguard the person's property and to protect the department from false claims of damage or removed property from the vehicle. The following procedures shall be followed when conducting an inventory search:

- a. The impounding officer shall conduct an itemized inventory of the vehicle for personal property and place all property of value into safekeeping;
- b. Any containers found in the vehicle shall be opened, and all contents of such containers shall be inventoried; and
- c. A locked glove compartment, locked trunk or other locked compartment shall be opened and the contents inventoried if the impounding officer has possession of a key to these areas during the inventory.

202.2 - 15 Vehicle "Frisk" for Weapons³

202.2 - 15.1 General Requirement

1. Reasonable suspicion to believe a person in the vehicle is about to commit, is committing, or has committed a crime.

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2. Reasonable suspicion to believe the person is armed and dangerous (either on the person or in the vehicle).
3. Officers must be able to articulate the specific facts and circumstances supporting the objectively reasonable conclusion that the subject was potentially dangerous.
4. Member may remove the subject, frisk the subject, and place the subject in the scout car or away from the vehicle.
5. Member can still "frisk" the passenger compartment (not the trunk) for offensive weapons and open-easily accessible containers, even if the subject is not in the position to get a weapon from inside the vehicle.
6. The scope of the "frisk" or "protective search" of the vehicle is any place in the passenger compartment in which an easily accessible dangerous weapon could likely be placed or hidden.
7. The scope of the "frisk" or "protective search" also includes containers in the passenger compartment that are capable of containing a dangerous weapon and are easily accessible without breaking the container open.
8. In order to avoid confusion, members must remember that the Arizona v. Grant case does not apply in the "frisk" of a vehicle for weapons. Officers are permitted to frisk the passenger compartment of the vehicle (if all of the above requirements are met) on the premise that the individual may re-enter the vehicle and have access to a weapon after the investigatory detention is concluded.

202.2 - 16 Searches of Containers - Inside and Outside of a Vehicle

202.2 - 16.1 Container Outside of a Vehicle

1. Closed containers and packages outside of a vehicle cannot be opened and searched without a search warrant.
2. An officer can seize a container or package outside a vehicle if he/she has probable cause to seize the object.
3. In extraordinary circumstances requiring immediate action, courts may excuse the warrant requirement.

202.2 - 16.2 Containers Inside of a Vehicle

1. Probable cause for a search of a lawfully stopped vehicle can be any part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object.
2. A package or container can be searched within a vehicle if the officer has probable cause to search the vehicle. There is no search warrant requirement.
3. However, the container or package must be capable of concealing the object of the search (e.g., officers cannot search a briefcase if he/she has probable cause for a 40-inch television).

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202.2 - 17 Searches of Cellular Telephone Devices

1. *Members cannot search the digital contents of a cellular telephone device or track any telephonic device **without securing a search warrant**. However, members may examine the physical aspects of a cell phone to ensure that it will not be used as a weapon (e.g. the placement of a razor blade between the phone and the case.)*
2. *Limited case-specific exceptions to obtaining a warrant to search a cellular device may include the need to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence in individual cases, to pursue a fleeing suspect, or to assist persons who are seriously injured or are threatened with imminent injury.*

³Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983)

Related Procedures:

- Directive 202.1 - Arrest
- Training Directive 09-02 Searches of Vehicles Incident to Arrest of Driver or Occupant
- Training Directive 12-08 New Law on Providing False Information in Criminal Investigations

Related Forms:

- Strip Search Authorization Form (DPD190)
- Investigatory Stop and Stop and Frisk Form (UF 003)
- Consent to Search Form (DPD675)



Detroit Police Department

Training Directive

Numbered Directives shall
be retained by all members
Number: 19-07
Date: 04/09/2019

USE OF TRAFFIC LIGHT-MOUNTED CAMERAS AND FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY

PURPOSE

The purpose of this directive is to ensure that images and video footage from cameras that are mounted on traffic signals, or on Public Lighting Authority (PLA) poles (1) are used in a manner that honors the privacy of Detroit residents, while (2) providing Detroit Police Department (DPD) members the resources they need to ensure that Detroit neighborhoods are safe. The cameras subject to this directive, which include both PLA-pole mounted cameras and traffic-signal mounted cameras, are hereinafter referred to as "traffic light-mounted cameras."

Compliance with Applicable Laws

Any use of images and/or video footage from traffic light-mounted cameras is subject to applicable local, state, and federal law; including, but not limited to, the protections provided in the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. This directive is subject to all applicable law. This directive is meant to provide additional protections beyond those already provided by law.

Relationship to other DPD Policies

This directive provides requirements that are applicable to traffic light-mounted cameras only. It does not supersede any generally applicable DPD policies with respect to other records or operating procedures. If this directive directly speaks to a subject that is also covered in a separate policy, this directive governs with respect to traffic light-mounted cameras only. If this directive is silent on a subject that is covered in a separate policy, the separate policy governs.

Discipline

Any violations to this Training Directive specific to privacy, violation of use and private use shall be deemed egregious conduct.

Severability

If any term or section of this directive is found to be to any extent illegal, otherwise invalid, or incapable of being enforced, such term or section shall be excluded to the extent of such invalidity or unenforceability; all other terms or sections hereof shall remain in full force and effect.

Detroit Police Department

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This Training Directive is for internal departmental use only, and violations of the procedures outlined in this Training Directive may form the basis for Departmental administrative sanctions. This document is not intended for third-party use or benefit. No criminal or civil duty or standard of care is intended to be, or is, created by the issuance of this Training Directive.

Training Directive: TRAFFIC LIGHT-MOUNTED CAMERAS

Number: 19-07

Date: 04/09/2019

PERMISSIBLE USES OF TRAFFIC LIGHT-MOUNTED CAMERAS

Permissible Law Enforcement Purposes

DPD members may use footage and images obtained from traffic light-mounted cameras for legitimate law enforcement purposes only. For purposes of this directive, "legitimate law enforcement purposes" includes investigations into criminal activity; pursuit of a criminal suspect; monitoring an ongoing situation in which criminal activity is, or is reasonably expected to occur; and/or monitoring cameras at the Detroit Real-Time Crime Center (RTCC), where all generally applicable RTCC policies apply. The Crime Intelligence Unit must establish reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before creating or analyzing intelligence in any way gathered from traffic light-mounted cameras.

Traffic Enforcement and Related Monitoring Prohibited

DPD members are strictly prohibited from using footage or images obtained from traffic light-mounted cameras to enforce non-criminal traffic or pedestrian laws (e.g. red-light violations, jaywalking), or to issue civil infractions of any kind.

Immigration uses Prohibited

DPD members are strictly prohibited from using footage or images obtained from traffic light-mounted cameras to assist, in any way, with federal immigration enforcement.

PLACEMENT OF CAMERAS

Positioning

Traffic light-mounted cameras will be positioned so that they provide video and images from public spaces only.

Accidental Capture of Private Spaces

If, notwithstanding the positioning of traffic light-mounted cameras as stated above, a traffic light-mounted camera accidentally captures video or images from a private area not accessible to the general public—including, but not limited to, a view of the interior of any building that is not visible from the street—DPD members will not monitor that camera until it is repositioned to capture video and images from public spaces only.

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Training Directive: TRAFFIC LIGHT-MOUNTED CAMERAS

Number: 19-07

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RECORD RETENTION

Retention of Imagery

Subject to the exception listed in the below section (Evidence of Criminality), any video or images from a traffic light-mounted camera may be retained for no more than 30 days, and must be deleted and destroyed no later than 30 days after recording. DPD may, in its discretion, opt to retain video or images from a traffic light-mounted camera for fewer than 30 days.

Preservation of Evidence

Any recording that contains evidence of a criminal activity will be retained until the case is solved, closed, and litigation ends. Any recording that is subject to a lawful request to preserve evidence in a civil matter will be retained until that request is lifted or expires.

USE OF FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY

Criminal Investigation Required

DPD members will not use facial recognition technology unless that technology is in support of an active or ongoing criminal or homeland security investigation.

Individualized Targeting

DPD members may not use facial recognition technology on any person unless there is reasonable suspicion that such use of facial recognition technology will provide information relevant to an active or ongoing criminal or homeland security investigation.



Series 300 Support Services	Effective Date 09/19/2019	Review Date Annually	Directive Number 307.5
Chapter 307 – Information System			
Reviewing Office Crime Intelligence			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> New Directive <input type="checkbox"/> Revised
References:			

FACIAL RECOGNITION

307.5 - 1 PURPOSE

The purpose of this policy is to establish acceptable use for the Detroit Police Department's (DPD) facial recognition software. Facial Recognition shall only be used when there is reasonable suspicion that such use will provide information relevant to an active or ongoing Part 1 Violent Crime investigation or a Home Invasion I investigation. If a match is found through DPD's Facial Recognition Process, it shall be considered an investigative lead, and the requesting investigator shall continue to conduct a thorough and comprehensive investigation.

307.5 - 2 Definitions

307.5 - 2.1 Biometric Data

Data derived from one or more intrinsic physical or behavioral traits of humans, to include fingerprints, palm prints, iris scans, and facial recognition data.

307.5 - 2.2 DataWorksPlus

The facial recognition software with which the Department has a contract.

307.5 - 2.3 Examiner

An individual who has received advanced training in the facial recognition system and its features. Examiners have at least a working knowledge of the limitations of facial recognition and the ability to use image editing software. They are qualified to assess image quality and appropriateness for facial recognition searches and to perform one-to-many and one-to-one facial image comparisons.

307.5 - 2.4 Facial Recognition (FR)

The automated searching of a facial image in a biometric database (one-to-many), typically resulting in a group of facial images ranked by computer-evaluated similarity. All Facial Recognition searches must be corroborated by at least two examiners and one supervisor.

307.5 Facial Recognition

307.5 - 2.5 Highly Restricted Personal Information

An individual's photograph or image, social security number, digitized signature, medical and disability information.

307.5 - 2.6 Home Invasion I

Unlawful entry of a dwelling with intent to commit or committing a felony, larceny, or assault on the home when either the unlawful entrant is armed with a dangerous weapon or when another person is lawfully present in the dwelling.

307.5 - 2.7 Part 1 Violent Crimes

For the purposes of this directive, Part 1 Violent Crimes are defined as robbery, sexual assault, aggravated assault, or homicide.

307.5 - 2.8 Personally Identifiable Information (PII)

Information which can be used to distinguish or trace an individual's identity, such as name, social security number, or biometric records, alone or when combined with other personal or identifying information which is linked or linkable to a specific individual, such as date and place of birth, or mother's maiden name.

307.5 - 2.9 Reasonable Suspicion

The specific facts and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts to convince an ordinarily prudent person that criminality is at hand.

307.5 - 2.10 Statewide Network of Agency Photos (SNAP)

A computer application managed by the SNAP Unit, deployed through the Michigan Criminal Justice Information Network (MiCJIN) portal, which serves as an investigative tool and a central repository of images from local, state, and federal agencies.

307.5 - 3 Prohibited Uses

307.5 - 3.1 Surveillance

Members shall not use facial recognition to surveil the public through any camera or video device.

307.5 - 3.2 Live Streaming or Recorded Videos

Members shall not use facial recognition on live stream or on recorded videos. This prohibition applies to all videos, whether they originate from DPD itself, from private citizens, or from any other source.

307.5 - 3.3 Mobile Facial Recognition

Members shall not use mobile facial recognition.

307.5 - 3.4 Predictive Analysis

Members shall not use facial recognition for predictive analysis.

307.5 Facial Recognition**307.5 - 3.5 First Amendment Events**

The Detroit Police Department will not violate First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments and will not perform or request facial recognition searches about individuals or organizations based solely on the following:

- a. Their religious, political, or social views or activities;
- b. Their participation in a particular noncriminal organization or lawful event; or
- c. Their races, ethnicities, citizenship, places of origin, ages, disabilities, genders, gender identities, sexual orientations, or other classification protected by law.

307.5 - 3.6 Facial Recognition Use for Immigration Enforcement

DPD members are strictly prohibited from using facial recognition to assess immigration status.

307.5 - 4 Discipline

1. Any violations to this policy shall be deemed major misconduct. Any misuse of the facial recognition software will be investigated and reviewed for criminality. The remedy for this misconduct is dismissal from DPD.
2. If facial recognition is used contrary to section 307.5 -3.5 First Amendment Events, DPD shall notify the Board of Policy Commissioners, the Mayor of Detroit, City Council President, and City Council President Pro Tem within 24 hours of the violation.

307.5 - 5 Use of Facial Recognition Technology**307.5 - 5.1 Use Limited to Still Images**

Facial recognition software may only be used on a still image of an individual.

307.5 - 5.2 Criminal Investigation Required

Members shall not use facial recognition technology unless that technology is in support of an active or ongoing Part 1 Violent Crime investigation (e.g. robbery, sexual assault, or homicide) or a Home Invasion 1 investigation.

307.5 - 5.3 Individualized Targeting

Members shall not use facial recognition technology on any person unless there is reasonable suspicion that such use of facial recognition technology will provide information relevant to an active or ongoing Part 1 Violent Crime investigation or a Home Invasion I investigation.

307.5 - 5.4 Process for Requesting Facial Recognition

1. Requests for facial recognition services shall be submitted to the Crime Intelligence Unit (CIU), with photograph(s) to be reviewed, the incident number, the crime type, and other pertinent information. Photographs shall be handled as specified in Manual Directive 306.1 Evidence Property.

307.5 Facial Recognition

2. CIU shall perform facial recognition searches utilizing the Statewide Network of Agency Photos (SNAP) which include criminal mug shot images. In the event additional analysis is needed for confirmation of an investigative lead, a formal request may be made to MSP to search the state's database. Any such request must be approved by a CIU supervisor.
3. If the examiner detects an investigative lead, the examiner must corroborate this lead with at least one other examiner and a CIU supervisor. The corroboration must have written sign-off by the supervisor and all examiners' involved.
4. Upon final approval, CIU shall complete a supplemental incident report for the requestor. The supplemental incident report shall detail how the examiner came to their conclusion, and include the following language:

"The result of a facial recognition search is provided by the Detroit Police Department only as an investigative lead and IS NOT TO BE CONSIDERED A POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF ANY SUBJECT. Any possible connection or involvement of any subject to the investigation must be determined through further investigation and investigation and investigative resources."

5. In the event that a viable candidate cannot be located, the requestor will be notified that no candidate was identified.
6. If CIU cannot discern a viable candidate, the photograph of the suspect will be removed from the facial recognition system.

307.5 - 5.5 Outside Agency Using Facial Recognition

An outside agency, or investigators from an outside agency, may request searches to assist with investigations only if the following requirements are met:

- a. Prior to making the request, the outside agency has a formalized agreement (e.g. a memorandum of understanding or an interagency agreement) between the Detroit Police Department and the outside agency;
- b. The outside agency is a law enforcement agency that is making the request based on a valid law enforcement purpose that falls within the authorized uses listed in this directive and the requestor provides a case number and contact information (requestor's name, requestor's agency, address, and phone number) and acknowledges an agreement with the following statement:
 - "The result of a facial recognition search is provided by the Detroit Police Department only as an investigative lead and IS NOT TO BE CONSIDERED A POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF ANY SUBJECT. Any possible connection or involvement of any subject to the investigation must be determined through further investigation and investigation and investigative resources."

307.5 Facial Recognition

- c. If any agency is found not in compliance with this Directive, the Department shall immediately suspend all Facial Recognition requests until the requesting agency becomes in compliance with this Directive.

307.5 - 6 Governance and Oversight

307.5 - 6.1 LASO & Crime Intel Responsibilities

1. The primary responsibility for the operation of the Department's criminal justice information systems, facial recognition program and system, operations, and the coordination of personnel, the receiving, seeking, retention, evaluation, data quality, use, purging, sharing, disclosure, or dissemination of information; and the enforcement of this policy is assigned to the Local Agency Security Officer (LASO) who is assigned to Technical Services.
2. The LASO will be responsible for the following:
 - a. Overseeing and administering the facial recognition program to ensure compliance with applicable laws, regulations, standards, and policy;
 - b. Acting as the authorizing official for individual access to facial recognition information;
 - c. Ensuring that user accounts and authorities granted to personnel are maintained in a current and secure "need-to-know" status; and
 - d. Ensuring that random evaluations of user compliance with system requirements along with this policy and applicable laws are conducted and documented;
3. The commanding officer of the Crime Intelligence Unit will be responsible for the following:
 - a. Reviewing facial recognition search requests, reviewing the results of facial recognition searches, and returning the most likely candidates – or candidate images – if any, to the requestor.
 - b. Ensuring that protocols are followed to ensure that facial recognition information (including probe images) is automatically purged in accordance with this Department's retention policy, unless determined to be of evidentiary value;
 - c. Confirming, through random audits, that facial recognition information is purged in accordance with this policy and to ensure compliance with applicable laws, regulations, standards, and policy; and
 - d. Ensuring and documenting that personnel (including investigators from external agencies who request facial recognition searches) meet all prerequisites stated in this policy prior to being authorized to use the facial recognition system.
4. The Detroit Police Department is guided by applicable laws, regulations, and standards to ensure that privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties are not violated by this facial recognition policy or by the Department's facial recognition information collection, receipt, access, use, dissemination, retention, and purging processes and procedures.

307.5 Facial Recognition**307.5 - 6.2 Weekly Report to the Board of Police Commissioners**

The Crime Intelligence Unit shall provide a weekly report to the Board of Police Commissioners with information pertaining to the number of facial recognition requests that were fulfilled, the crimes that the facial recognition requests were attempting to solve, and the number of leads produced from the facial recognition software. During this report, if there are any upgrades to the facial recognition software, any planned changes to the contract, and/or any confirmed policy violations, the Department shall notify the Board of Police Commissioners.

307.5 - 6.3 Annual Report to the Board of Police Commissioners

The Crime Intelligence Unit shall provide an annual report to the Board of Police Commissioners. This annual report shall include a summary of the weekly reports and an evaluation of the efficacy of the Department's facial recognition technology. The evaluation shall include if there were any relevant lawsuits or settlements involving facial recognition, the number of cases that use of the technology assisted in investigations, and any other relevant factors. This shall be disseminated at the Board of Police Commissioners' meeting, and electronic copy shall be provided to the Board for dissemination to the public.

307.5 - 6.4 All Policy Changes to the Board of Police Commissioners

The Department shall seek the Board of Police Commissioners' approval regarding any and all changes to the Facial Recognition Policy.

307.5 - 7 Security and Maintenance

1. The Detroit Police Department will comply with generally accepted industry or other applicable standards for security to protect data at rest, in motion, or in use. Security safeguards will cover any type of medium (printed or electronic) or technology (e.g. physical servers, virtual machines, and mobile devices) used in a work-related Department activity. The Department's facial recognition system will operate in a secure facility protected with multiple layers of physical security from external intrusion and will utilize secure internal and external security and privacy safeguards against network intrusions, such as strong multifactor authentication; encrypted communications; firewalls; and other reasonable physical technological, administrative, procedural, and personnel security measures to minimize the risks of unauthorized access to the system. Access to the Department's facial recognition information from outside the facility will be allowed only over secure networks. All results produced by the Department as a result of a facial recognition search are disseminated by secured electronic means (such as an official government e-mail address). Non-electronic disseminations will be conducted personally or by phone with the requestor or designee. When such non-electronic dissemination is made, the member shall memorialize the dissemination as follows:

307.5 Facial Recognition

- a. To whom it was released;
 - b. Date and time it was released; and
 - c. Manner in which it was released (i.e. if by phone, include the number; if in person, include name of witness who saw it released).
2. All members with access to the Department's information or information systems will report a suspected or confirmed breach to their immediate supervisor who will ensure that the local agency security officer (LASO), assigned to Technical Services, is notified as soon as possible without unreasonable delay, consistent with applicable laws, regulations, policies, and procedures. This includes a breach in any medium or form, including paper, oral, and electric. Following assessment of the suspected or confirmed breach and as soon as practicable, the Department will notify the originating agency from which the entity received facial recognition information of the nature and scope of a suspected or confirmed breach of such information. The Department will determine whether a data breach requires notification to an affected individual, in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, policies, and procedures.
 3. All facial recognition equipment and facial recognition software and components will be properly maintained in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations, including routine updates as appropriate.
 4. The Department will store facial recognition information in a manner that ensures that it cannot be modified, accessed, or purged except by members authorized to take such actions.
 5. Authorized access to the Department's facial recognition system will be granted only to members whose positions and job duties require such access and who have successfully completed a background check and required training.
 6. Usernames and passwords to the facial recognition system are not transferrable, must not be shared by Department members, and must be kept confidential.
 7. The system administrator (Department LASO) will ensure that all manufacturer-generated default passwords are replaced with secure passwords before web-based interfacial of the system become operational. User passwords must meet the standards outlined in Manual Directive 307.4, Criminal Justice Information Systems (CJIS).
 8. Queries made to the Department's facial recognition system will be logged into the system identifying the user initiating the query. All user access, including participating agency access, and queries are subject to review and audit.
 9. The Department will maintain an audit trail of requested, accessed, searched, or disseminated facial recognition information. An audit trail will be kept for a minimum of one (1) year of requests, access, and searches of facial recognition information for specific purposes and of what facial recognition information is disseminated to each individual in response to the request. Audit logs will include:
 - a. The name and unit of the law enforcement user;
 - b. The date of access;

DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

MANUAL

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- c. Case number; and
- d. The authorized law enforcement or public safety justification for access including a relevant case number.

CRIME INTELLIGENCE UNIT: STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOP)

Deputy Chief Marlon Wilson

Effective Date:
7/1/2018

Revised Date:
4/1/2019




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STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE (SOP)		Section 1
DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT		
Crime Intelligence Unit		
	EFFECTIVE DATE 7/1/2018	REVISED DATE 4/1/2019
	TOTAL SECTION PAGES: 2	
	SUBJECT 1. ESTABLISHMENT OF STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES	
APPROVED BY: Deputy Chief Marlon Wilson		

1.1. PURPOSE

It is the purpose of this policy to provide members of the Detroit Police Department's Crime Intelligence Unit (CIU) with guidelines and principles for fulfilling the requirements of the unit and for the collection, analysis, and distribution of intelligence information.

1.2. MISSION

It is the mission of the CIU to gather information from all sources in a manner consistent with the law, to analyze that information, and to assist law enforcement, particularly members of DPD, with information that may be used to prevent crime, pursue and apprehend offenders, obtain evidence necessary for conviction, protect officer and civilian safety, and/or assist with any other lawful duties and objectives of DPD.

1.3. APPLICABILITY

This SOP applies directly to all employees assigned to the Crime Intelligence Unit within the Detroit Police Department (DPD) and takes effect immediately.

1.4. REQUIREMENT TO FOLLOW APPLICABLE LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND POLICIES

- (a) All members must comply with all applicable federal, state, and local laws, regulations, and rules, as well as any Detroit Police Department policies.
- (b) If a conflict arises between the policies set forth within the CIU SOP and those of the department, department policy and directives take precedence.

1.5. PROMULGATION OF GOOD PRACTICE

- (a) Part of the purpose of this policy is to encourage and detail best practices amongst CIU members. To encourage the development of these practices, CIU members should report to his/her immediate supervisor developments in practice or procedure that could improve upon best practices of the unit. Requests to modify this policy should never divert from the overall aim of the unit.
- (b) Command staff will then properly evaluate such reports or requests and determine the potential for action or necessary response. Command staff may consider any number of appropriate factors, including feasibility, institutional gain, unit purpose, and resource distribution before choosing whether to move forward.


- (c) Any change to the policies set forth will be made only under the express approval of the current Commanding Officer of the CIU.
- (d) Any changes to this policy will be immediately communicated to the unit as a whole, through a reliable method of communication such as a unit-wide email. Impromptu meetings of a single platoon and/or verbal shift-trade briefings will not be considered reliable methods of communication for this purpose.
- (e) A designated member of CIU will then update the policy and distribute the revised edition either directly or through the use of shared resources, such as a CIU-approved shared folder.
- (f) Duties and responsibilities, as outlined in the policy set forth, are subject to change based upon the needs of the unit, administration, or citizens of Detroit. If members are unsure if an action or request is within the scope of the unit and/or position, he/she should confer with an immediate supervisor.
- (g) CIU command staff should work with all individual members to ensure that the unit and individual are adequately resourced to comply with policies set forth.
- (h) Command staff, shift supervisors, and members may temporarily deviate from this internal policy if necessary to secure the immediate safety of DPD members or civilians. All deviations should be reported directly to the Commanding Officer, as soon as safely possible.

1.6. SANCTIONS FOR MISUSE

Any member who violates the provisions of this policy or the policies set forth by the Detroit Police Department may be subject to disciplinary action, up to and including termination.

1.7. SEVERABILITY

- (a) If any term or section of this policy is found to be to any extent illegal, otherwise invalid, or incapable of being enforced, such term or section shall be excluded to the extent of such invalidity or unenforceability; all other terms or sections hereof shall remain in full force and effect.
- (b) To the extent permitted and possible, any invalid or unenforceable term or section shall be deemed replaced by one that is valid and enforceable and that comes closest to expressing the intention of such invalid or unenforceable term or section.


STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE (SOP)		Section 2
DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT		
Crime Intelligence Unit		
	EFFECTIVE DATE 7/1/2018	REVISED DATE 4/1/2019
	TOTAL SECTION PAGES: 2	
	SUBJECT 2. DEFINITIONS	
APPROVED BY: Deputy Chief Marlon Wilson		

2.1. DEFINITIONS

For the purposes of this set of policies, the terms below are defined as follows:


- (a) **Commanding Officer:** Head supervisor assigned to the CIU.
- (b) **Command staff:** All CIU supervisory staff ranked sergeant or above.
- (c) **Span-of-control supervisor:** Each member shall be assigned to a permanent supervisor, who shall have direct control of and responsibility for the member.
- (d) **Shift supervisor:** The on-duty sergeant assigned to oversee the activities of the CIU on the current day and current shift. The term can apply to the lieutenant or captain in the absence of an on-duty sergeant. In the absence of all three, the term applies to the CIU member with the most unit seniority on-duty, or the designee of the shift supervisor, lieutenant, or captain.
- (e) **Member:** All sworn and non-sworn employees assigned to the CIU.
- (f) **Officer in Charge (OIC):** The lead officer or investigator assigned to a report, case, or incident. Any required authorizations may also come from an OIC's supervisor/superior.
- (g) **Product:** Any document, database, record, publication, or other material created, collected, analyzed, or authored by a member of CIU in performance of his/her duties. Usually meant for distribution. Does not apply to the body text of emails, logs, or personal notes.
- (h) **Reasonable suspicion or criminal predicate:** Established when sufficient facts are presented that give a CIU employee the basis to believe that there is a reasonable possibility that an individual or organization is involved in a definable criminal activity or enterprise.
- (i) **Project Green Light Detroit (PGL):** A public-private-community partnership wherein businesses enter into an agreement with DPD to provide the department access to real-time video footage at the location in exchange for DPD staff devoted to effectively receive, monitor, and analyze video feeds. All CIU intelligence, attention, and interaction with PGL businesses is considered part of PGL.
- (j) **Real-Time Crime Center (RTCC),** located on the fourth floor of the Detroit Public Safety Headquarters, serves as the home for both the Crime Intelligence Unit and the Traffic Management Center. The space houses the best technology available so that CIU members can provide useful, actionable intelligence and information to law enforcement and first responders. The RTCC operates 24 hours a day, seven days a week.

- (k) *Real-Time Crime Center Console ("console")* is the workstation comprised of both a computer hosting a Motorola CommandCentral Aware computer and a DPD computer, located within the RTCC.
- (l) *Project Green Light (PGL) Operators* are personnel assigned to monitoring PGL cameras during any given shift.
- (m) *Breaking news alerts or text alerts*: Emails sent as a text to specified DPD personnel informing them of worldwide police violence, potential terrorist activities, or natural disasters for situational awareness purposes.
- (n) *Person of Interest (POI)*: A person identified by a DPD member to be associated with criminally suspicious behavior or criminal investigation. POIs may also be identified by request from a DPD member without further information, if an associated report number is provided. The identification of a POI will likely result in a corresponding intelligence product.
- (o) *Intelligence Work-Up*: An intelligence product that provides detailed investigative information for a particular incident, including RMS/CAD narratives, known vehicle information, and known victim or suspect details, among other items. A work-up is to be completed on all homicides, non-fatal shootings, and critical assaults, or may be completed for other crimes upon request.
- (p) *Social media*: A category of internet-based resources that integrate user-generated content and user participation. This includes, but is not limited to, social media networking sites (Facebook), micro blogging sites (Twitter), photo and video-sharing sites (YouTube), wikis (Wikipedia), blogs, and news sites (Reddit).
- (q) *Social media monitoring tool*: A tool used to capture data and monitor social media sites by using automated tools such as web crawlers and word search functions to make predictive analysis, develop trends, or collect information. Examples include Tweetdeck and Welink.

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE (SOP)		Section 3
DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT		
Crime Intelligence Unit		
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SUBJECT		
3. CRIME INTELLIGENCE UNIT (CIU) STRUCTURE		
APPROVED BY: Deputy Chief Marlon Wilson		

3.1. COMPONENTS OF THE CIU

The Crime Intelligence Unit is comprised of the Real-Time Crime Center (RTCC), the Audio Video Evidence Response Team (AVERT), the Counterterrorism Threat Analysis Team (CTAT), Project Green Light Detroit, and the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) program.



3.2. PROJECT GREEN LIGHT DETROIT

Project Green Light Detroit (PGL) began on January 1, 2016 when DPD partnered with eight gas stations to install real-time camera connections with police headquarters as part of a ground-breaking crime-fighting partnership. PGL is the first public-private-community partnership of its kind, blending a mix of real-time crime-fighting and community policing aimed at improving neighborhood safety, promoting the revitalization and growth of local businesses, and strengthening DPD's efforts to deter, identify, and solve crime. Today, the program has hundreds of participants, spanning the entire city.

PGL requires activities on both the part of the participant and the part of the department.

- (a) Each participant signs a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and agrees to the following requirements:
 - i. Install and maintain a number of high-definition (1080p) indoor and outdoor cameras;
 - ii. Upgrade to high-speed network connections capable of allowing for consistent video streaming to DPD;
 - iii. Purchase 30 days of cloud storage;
 - iv. Display PGL signage and a flashing green light; and
 - v. Improve lighting.
- (b) In return, the department engages in the following activities:
 - i. CIU members monitor real-time footage from PGL cameras, providing virtual patrol and response to 911 calls at PGL locations.
 - ii. Patrol units provide priority response to 911 calls at all PGL locations.
 - iii. Neighborhood Police Officers (NPO) make frequent proactive visits to each PGL location.

The program has wide-reaching effects on the activities that take place in the CIU.

3.3. COUNTERTERRORISM THREAT ANALYSIS TEAM (CTAT)

The Counterterrorism Threat Analysis Team (CTAT) is tasked with ongoing threat assessments as it relates to domestic and foreign terrorism, particularly in relation to the City of Detroit. This includes a thorough focus on Detroit critical infrastructure and key resources within Detroit. Duties include:

- (a) Perform all CIU functions if minimum staffing or extraordinary workload requires it.
- (b) Perform and disseminate strategic intelligence analysis to a wide range of recipients, including the Detroit Police Department, City of Detroit's Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, private sector, US intelligence community, and other law enforcement agencies.
- (c) Work in conjunction with the Detroit Crime Commission (DCC) to establish, maintain, and vet for threats, maintaining an accurate list of all upcoming events within the City of Detroit.
- (d) Conduct special event threat analyses and assessments at the request of DPD or its partners.
- (e) Regularly vet for threats against critical infrastructure within Detroit and actively monitor all critical infrastructure and critical infrastructure camera assets, as well as maintain an accurate list of these camera assets.
- (f) Create and disseminate a weekly intelligence product for DPD summarizing a few key terrorism-related current events and anniversaries.

- (g) Join, follow, or research intelligence products disseminated by other intelligence agencies throughout the country. If a member joins a listserv, he/she should log that information in the shared folder to inform other members.
- (h) Maintain and add to a master contact list of law enforcement agencies, critical infrastructure, and any other helpful persons or organizations within the CTAT shared folder.
- (i) Locate and preliminarily investigate any potential international or domestic terrorism threat nexus, particularly in connection with social media threats to the city or law enforcement. This includes taking the lead on any social media threats against the city or law enforcement, even if such threats are found by other members working RTCC.
- (j) Mine available social media for safety concerns, threat assessments, or possible terrorist activities that may impact the city of Detroit, including its officers, residents, infrastructure, and/or visitors.
- (k) Use social media tools and resources to investigate and produce intelligence related to any threats to the city or law enforcement or in any case where assistance of social media is requested or where it may assist in a criminal investigation.
- (l) In the event of a terrorist attack in the world, CTAT members will:
 - i. Send out a breaking news alert with preliminary information.
 - ii. Notify shift supervisor.
 - iii. Once a short narrative of the events is available, send a CTAT email alert. Include links to sources and indicate whether or not CTAT will continue to monitor. Record event on the CTAT-specific blotter.
 - iv. If applicable, send out an update within 24-48 hours with a more detailed timeline of events and sources. This should ideally be completed by Platoons 1 or 3, in time for any morning executive meetings.
 - v. Complete 45-day and 90-day follow-ups as necessary. Release updates if new information is available.

3.4. DPD SHIELD

DPD Shield is a member of the National Shield Network (NSN), a series of Shield programs across the nation, starting with the originator of Shield, the New York City Police Department. NYPD initiated Shield after September 11, 2001 as a public-private partnership to increase the safety and security of all. Inclusion in the NSN gives the department access to intelligence analysis products and alerts directly from other departments and their private-sector corporate partners. The mission of DPD Shield is to support national, state, and local Homeland Security strategies by effectively addressing private-sector awareness, safety, and incident management.

- (a) DPD Shield is a central destination for private sector security professionals to obtain information and engage with Police Department resources.
- (b) DPD Shield seeks collaboration between law enforcement and private-sector security professionals to share information and best practices relating to safety, security, and crime prevention.
- (c) DPD Shield program objectives include:
 - i. Partnering private-sector security with public-sector first responders to protect critical infrastructure, high-profile targets, and key City of Detroit assets.

- ii. Coordinating policies and strategies to ensure organized, unified, and consistent response to terrorism.
- iii. Increasing information sharing between private-sector partners and the law enforcement community.
- iv. Providing networking and training opportunities for private-sector partners.
- v. Disseminating incident assessments and open-source intelligence bulletins.
- vi. Promoting mitigation, preparedness, and response plans to support economic viability in times of crisis.

(d) Duties include:

- i. DPD Shield members are required to perform all CIU and CTAT functions if minimum staffing or extraordinary workload requires it.
- ii. Presenting training materials and workshops for private security partners.
- iii. Providing recommendations for private-sector partners with respect to Civilian Response to Active Shooter Events (CRASE).
- iv. Partnering with public-sector partners at both the local and federal level to provide training in Terrorism Awareness for Security Professionals, Suspicious Package Awareness and Procedures, and Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) Awareness.
- v. Serving as liaisons with other public and private-sector partners.
- vi. Identifying opportunities for networking.

3.5. STAFFING

(a) Commanding Officer

The Commanding Officer of the Crime Intelligence Unit reports directly to the Assistant Chief of Enforcement Operations and is responsible for the following:

- i. Operating the Crime Intelligence Unit in an efficient manner and properly discharging duties and responsibilities;
- ii. Briefing the chain of command of pertinent command situations and conditions;
- iii. Supervising and evaluating members assigned to the Crime Intelligence Unit and preparing written evaluations to assure member performance meets standards and represents the department in a professional manner;
- iv. Performing accountability inspections of all material, equipment, and property assigned to Crime Intelligence;
- v. Developing and evaluating operating procedures for program effectiveness;
- vi. Initiating and/or making recommendations for procedural revisions as necessary;
- vii. Managing external relationships with local community groups and businesses in accordance with the unit's objectives;
- viii. Planning, organizing, and disseminating information, encouraging responsiveness and participation in the unit's plans and objectives; and
- ix. Ensuring program compliance with grant or funding source requirements.

(b) Lieutenant(s)

The Lieutenant reports directly to the Commanding Officer of the Crime Intelligence Unit and is responsible for all administrative duties of the unit. Duties include but are not limited to the following (and can be shared among multiple Lieutenants):

- i. Assuming any assigned responsibilities delegated by the Commanding Officer;
- ii. Supervising members assigned to statistical and analytical responsibilities;
- iii. Maintaining awareness of current patterns of crime, changes in patterns, and developing trends of specific crime categories and ensure the proper dissemination of emerging issues;
- iv. Managing the Crime Intelligence Unit staffing plan to effectively manage a 24/7 operation;
- v. Ensuring all members assigned to the Crime Intelligence Unit complete all mandatory training and qualifications, including New Hire Training and ongoing monthly trainings, as well as training specific to the unit functions;
- vi. Ensuring all administrative duties are managed efficiently, including furlough draw, performance evaluations, and weekly and monthly reports within the unit's responsibility;
- vii. Providing intelligence products on wanted persons for large-scale operations when requested;
- viii. Maintaining all shared email groups in GroupWise;
- ix. Managing all responsibilities of the unit Timekeeper and other administrative staff;
- x. At any time, the Lieutenant may assume the responsibilities of the shift supervisor.

(c) Executive Manager(s)

The Executive Manager reports directly to the Commanding Officer of the Crime Intelligence Unit and assists in improving processes and analytic capacity of the unit, as well as managing Project Green Light Detroit. Duties include but are not limited to the following (and can be shared among multiple Executive Managers):

- i. Working in conjunction with the Lieutenant(s);
- ii. Focusing on oversight of Project Green Light Detroit program staff and activities;
- iii. Facilitating custom mapping requests;
- iv. Supervising members assigned to statistical and analytical responsibilities;
- v. Coordinating with lieutenant to schedule specialized training of unit personnel to improve use of department systems and enhance analytic capability;
- vi. Verifying all department statistical data for publication, distribution, and presentation;
- vii. Responding to all Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests and internal statistical data information requests and the documentation of such;
Maintaining and updating the Crime Intelligence Unit SOP quarterly;
- viii. Project managing new technology that comes into the unit;

- ix. Securing and managing grants for the unit;
- x. Managing the department's Open Data portfolio on the City's Open Data Portal website.

(d) Administrative Assistant/Clerk

- i. Assists the Captain, Lieutenant(s), and Executive Manager(s) with administrative paperwork and clerical duties, including timekeeping.

(e) Shift Supervisor

The Crime Intelligence Unit shift supervisor shall oversee and ensure thorough computer investigations and monitor ongoing priority incidents citywide, while ensuring efficient management over all operations. Duties include but are not limited to:

- i. Assuming any assigned responsibilities delegated by the Commanding Officer or Lieutenant;
- ii. Overseeing the daily operation of the Crime Intelligence Unit and the Counterterrorism Threat Analysis Team;
- iii. Managing all CIU personnel and responsibilities by training members, prioritizing case assignments, reviewing investigative results, providing investigative direction, and ensuring timely completion of assignments;
- iv. Managing response to Project Green Light incidents;
- v. Managing and assigning all incoming Requests for Information (RFI) received through the Crime Intelligence Bureau email proxy or otherwise, ensuring all assigned requests are properly documented on the Information Tracker SmartSheet;
- vi. Coordinating the appropriate response to any active crime incident that will benefit from the services of the CIU;
- vii. Preparing all mandatory shift reports;
- viii. Closely monitoring the Crime Intelligence Bureau email proxy for important requests or notifications;
- ix. Assigning each CIU member specific cameras and precincts to be monitored during his/her shift;
- x. Overseeing camera functionality checks;
- xi. Managing the layout of the RTCC's video wall;
- xii. Reviewing and ensuring all completion of daily details in MAS;
- xiii. Ensuring departmental notification of all new Green Light locations;
- xiv. Monitoring all significant activities at Green Light locations;
- xv. Overseeing the release of video requests;
- xvi. Maintaining the Supervisor Blotter by documenting all pertinent CIU activity, including all Part I Green Light incidents;
- xvii. Ensuring proper notification of all critical incidents – Green Light or otherwise – are made to the CIU Commanding Officer, including homicide, non-fatal shootings, critical assaults, carjackings, robberies, or anything newsworthy;

- xviii. Reviewing and approving reports submitted by CIU members prior to distribution, including, but not limited to intelligence work-ups, crime patterns, and POIs.

(f) Intelligence Specialist

All specialists assigned to the Crime Intelligence Unit shall be responsible for all of the following:

- i. Completing critical infrastructure searches;
- ii. Monitoring and maintaining a list of critical infrastructure camera assets;
- iii. Drafting and disseminating the CTAT weekly brief, daily threat assessments, school threat assessments, and critical infrastructure reports;
- iv. Drafting and disseminating briefs, bulletins, and assessments relating to current or ongoing terrorist attacks or threats to police;
- v. Performing daily searches for threats published on open-source, public-facing mediums to detect violence or threats of violence against or within the City of Detroit;
- vi. Conducting special event vetting using open-source keyword searches of the event, venue, and performers, as well as performing a geographic analysis of open-source social media posts;
- vii. Monitoring terrorist attacks and threats to police nationwide and globally;
- viii. Creating intelligence products relating to found threats, including situational awareness intelligence reports, threat assessments, or person of interest reports;
- ix. Sending breaking news alerts (text alerts);
- x. Assisting with the Detroit Shield Program;
- xi. Presenting training to private businesses and community groups;
- xii. Corresponding with the local, state, and federal intelligence community regarding found threats;
- xiii. Supporting overall function of the CIU through vetting, analyzing, and monitoring social media during or as follow-up to Part 1 crime incidents;
- xiv. Functioning in a Crime Analyst or PGL Operator role when designated by a supervisor.

(g) Geographic Information Systems (GIS) Specialist

The GIS Specialist assigned to the CIU reports to an Executive Manager and shall be responsible for the following:

- i. Assisting in preparing for CompStat;
- ii. Compiling weekly Project Green Light Target Lists;
- iii. Completing spatial and analytical requests as needed and/or delegating requests upon the direction of the Executive Manager;
- iv. Leading the Research and Development Team;
- v. Assessing GIS infrastructure needs and implementing new systems and/or tools;
- vi. Providing training on GIS, analytical tools, or other data-related topics.

(h) Crime Analyst/Police Officer/Police Assistant

All analysts assigned to the Crime Intelligence Unit shall be responsible for all of the following:

- (a) Assuming all responsibilities of the PGL Operator when designated by any supervisor.
- (b) Analysts are responsible for their respective crime categories and/or geographic areas. As such, each analyst is responsible for liaising with specific entities within that assignment, including precinct command personnel, investigators, Ceasefire analysts, and various specialized units (i.e., Sex Crimes, Armed Robbery, etc.). Personnel assigned to the Crime Intelligence Unit shall notify their supervisors prior to contacting personnel from the above assignments. Further, it is the responsibility of each to maintain a rapport with personnel from these locations as a normal course of their daily duties;
- (c) In addition to monitoring the Crime Intelligence Unit email in GroupWise, analysts must answer the main phone line in the Crime Intelligence Unit and take appropriate action, including taking phone calls for Homicide (weekends and after-hours);
- (d) Completing a comprehensive and thorough investigation and report of any Requests for Information assigned to him/her;
- (e) Contributing to the daily shift report/brief to be conveyed to oncoming personnel;
- (f) Providing intelligence support including, but not limited to, developing suspect leads; locating last known addresses, vehicles, business licenses, etc. for known suspects; identifying victims and associated cases; and searching selected databases for stolen property;
- (g) Effectively communicating with responding officers and Precinct Detective Units (PDU) personnel to give the most current, real-time information to units on the street;
- (h) Providing appropriate analysis or intelligence products when necessary, including:
 - a. Developing suspect profiles, victim profiles, and/or target profiles;
 - b. Completing crime and intelligence work-ups;
 - c. Completing person of interest work-ups;
 - d. Monitoring for crime patterns;
 - e. Disseminating crime maps to department personnel;
 - f. Conducting threat assessments in conjunction with CTAT;
 - g. Completing detailed deployment strategy reports for patrol units when assigned.
- (i) Project Green Light Detroit Program Manager

The Project Green Light Detroit Program Manager reports directly to an Executive Manager and is responsible for:

- i. Maintaining the Project Green Light Detroit Master SmartSheet;
- ii. Onboarding new PGL businesses and moving them through the pipeline;
- iii. Ensuring all PGL businesses and installers have proper paperwork and certifications;
- iv. Noting compliance issues and communicating with the Compliance Manager and the Compliance Team on which businesses require site visits;

- v. Coordinating with the Audio Video Evidence Response Team (AVERT) to ensure proper installation of PGL camera systems;
- vi. Coordinating other PGL-related activities as needed.

(j) Compliance Manager

The Compliance Manager reports directly to an Executive Manager and is responsible for:


- i. Monitoring compliance violations and issue warnings when necessary;
- ii. Collaborating and creating strong interpersonal relationships with participants to prevent compliance violations;
- iii. Training participants in program requirements and technical troubleshooting;
- iv. Devising plans with participants when compliance violations do occur;
- v. Recruiting new participants;
- vi. Creating and implementing compliance-related policies and procedures;
- vii. Establishing reliable internal controls;
- viii. Advising on compliance issues across the department;
- ix. Working with department leadership to review potential compliance red flags or risks;
- x. Documenting all compliance-related activities and manage information in an accessible database;
- xi. Coordinating other PGL-related activities as needed.

(k) Compliance Team Members

Members assigned to the Compliance Team – whether Police Officers, Police Assistant, Crime Analyst, or otherwise – are responsible for the following:

- i. Monitoring compliance violations and issue warnings when necessary;
- ii. Collaborating and creating strong interpersonal relationships with participants to prevent compliance violations;
- iii. Devising plans with participants when compliance violations do occur;
- iv. Recruiting new participants;
- v. Conducting in-person site visits and communicating with PGL business owners to ensure proper compliance with the program;
- vi. Advising PGL business owners and staff on how to gain compliance or how to troubleshoot camera outage issues (no DPD member is allowed to manually troubleshoot the business's system);
- vii. Issuing verbal or written warnings or cease-and-desist letters to those PGL businesses that are in compliance;
- viii. Participating in program meetings;
- ix. Working with department leadership to review potential compliance red flags or risks;

- x. Documenting all compliance-related activities and manage information in an accessible database;
- xi. Coordinating other PGL-related activities as needed.

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Crime Intelligence Unit		
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	SUBJECT 4. GENERAL UNIT PROVISIONS	
APPROVED BY: Deputy Chief Marlon Wilson		

4.1. DRESS CODE

- (a) All members must dress in a clean, professional, and conservative manner.
- (b) Monday through Thursday: All sworn personnel must wear a Class A or B uniform or department-approved polo shirt (i.e. Crime Intelligence Unit or Class B polo) with Class B pants.
- (c) Monday through Thursday: Non-sworn personnel may wear:
 - i. Men
 - a. Sports coats or blazers
 - b. Slacks, Chinos, or Dockers
 - c. Polo shirts with a collar
 - d. Oxford button-down shirts
 - e. Sweaters and cardigans
 - f. Dress shoes
 - ii. Women
 - a. Blazers
 - b. Dress/Casual slacks
 - c. Polo shirts with a collar
 - d. Oxford button-down shirts
 - e. Sweaters and cardigans
 - f. Dress shoes
 - g. Dresses
 - h. Skirts
 - i. Blouses
 - iii. Monday through Thursday: Non-sworn personnel are not permitted to wear tennis shoes.

(d) Friday, Saturday, and Sunday: All members are permitted to wear jeans with a polo shirt, button-down collared shirt, sweater, and/or blouse. Jeans may not be faded or ripped.

(e) Unacceptable Attire:

- i. Casual t-shirts or t-shirts without a collar
- ii. Athletic wear or sweatpants
- iii. Spandex or Lycra such as biker shorts
- iv. Shorts
- v. Tank tops, tube tops, halter tops, or tops with spaghetti straps
- vi. Provocative attire
- vii. Off-the-shoulder or sleeveless tops
- viii. Sweatshirts or hoodies
- ix. Yoga-style pants or leggings
- x. Pajama pants
- xi. Baseball caps
- xii. Sandals or flip flops
- xiii. Capri pants
- xiv. Attire that contains any of the following is strictly prohibited for all shifts:
 - a. Depictions of nudity or violence
 - b. Sexually explicit or vulgar art, words, phrases, or profane language
 - c. Symbols likely to incite a strong negative reaction in any group (e.g., swastikas)
 - d. Initials or acronyms that represent criminal or historically oppressive organizations (e.g., KKK, SS, street gangs)

(f) If members are unclear on dress code allowances, he/she should check with a span-of-control supervisor for further guidance.

4.2. TRAINING

- (a) Training will be held on the second Tuesday of every month. The shift supervisor is responsible for coordinating trainings at the direction of the Commanding Officer, a Lieutenant, or their designee.
- (b) Training requests shall be formally submitted to a member's span-of-control supervisor by Inter-Office Memorandum (DPD-568) and follow all regular DPD guidelines. CIU members are encouraged to submit training requests with as much advance notice as possible. All training requests should be submitted three months prior to the training date. The DPD-568 must be submitted through proper channels for approval. A template can be found on the Forms tab of the department's Intranet website.

4.3. VACATION REQUESTS

Vacation leave shall be requested by non-sworn members via the Vacation Request Form found here: <https://goo.gl/UHukza>. The vacation requests will be approved by shift based on seniority and staffing

needs. Members shall submit their Vacation Request Form by February 15 for any vacation days between April and October. Members shall submit their Vacation Request Form by August 15 for any vacation days between November and March of the following year. Requests outside of this process will be accepted and approved at the discretion of the Commanding Officer and/or Lieutenant(s).

4.4. CHANGE IN SHIFT ASSIGNMENTS

Change in shift assignments shall be requested by Inter-Office Memorandum (DPD-568) and will be granted based on availability, seniority, and at the sole discretion of the Commanding Officer of the Unit.

4.5. WORK ATTENTION


CIU members should spend working hours providing adequate attention to work duties and unit needs. Members shall not sleep, watch entertainment videos, work on personal projects, read non-work materials, or use a phone for personal use during working hours. If a member does not have any duties, responsibilities, or special assignments to work on, he/she should notify the shift supervisor.

4.6. TECHNOLOGY

The RTCC houses software and equipment of a highly sensitive and confidential nature. CIU members shall not access, use, or disclose information gleaned from this software and/or equipment for any other purpose than for their professional duties. Any member who violates this provision may be subject to disciplinary action, up to and including termination, and may face possible criminal charges.

4.7. SCHEDULING THE RTCC CONFERENCE ROOM

The RTCC Conference Room is scheduled on a first-come, first-serve basis. The Crime Intelligence Bureau proxy calendar serves as the official calendar for the conference room. Members who wish to reserve space must do so either by creating a meeting invite using the Crime Intelligence Bureau email proxy or by sending a meeting invite directly to the Crime Intelligence Bureau email, CCing the CIU Administrative Assistant. Before reserving the space, members must check to see if the room is available. Members may be required to cede the room to other members of the department, depending on priority and rank.

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	SUBJECT 5. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE CIU	
APPROVED BY: Deputy Chief Marlon Wilson		

5.1. REQUIREMENTS OF ALL MEMBERS

All members of CIU shall be responsible for completing the following daily on-duty operational requirements:

- (a) Appropriately and efficiently responding to all emails and communications in a timely manner.
- (b) Monitoring proxy email accounts for intelligence requests, inquiries, or any other items requiring response.
 - i. All proxy emails must be addressed in a timely manner by the on-duty shift or formally passed from one supervisor to another during briefings.
 - ii. Replies to emails received through a proxy account must be sent through that same account; replies will not be sent from an individual member's email address.
 - iii. Once an email has been addressed, the member shall properly organize the message in the proper folder.
- (c) Checking all teletypes and notifications for relevant information to the performance of his/her duties. All personnel are responsible for continually checking teletypes for areas pertinent to the normal business of any Crime Intelligence Unit function;
- (d) Complying with 28 CFR Part 23 federal guidelines with all Crime Intelligence Unit databases;
- (e) Participating in periodic meetings with other team or shift members, led by the appropriate team supervisor or shift supervisor.

5.2. RESPONSIBILITIES OF ALL MEMBERS

The CIU supports patrol, traffic, investigations, crime prevention, and administrative functions and provides statistical and analytical support to the various entities within the department. In order to fully support that responsibility, all members must be competent in, and may be required to perform, any or all of the following duties:

- (a) Following the Floor Operation Plan set in Appendix A.
- (b) Analyzing information, preparing documentation, and distributing intelligence products.
- (c) Following up on any potential self-initiated leads or necessary case support. If a member recognizes a potential for intelligence assistance in a case, the member shall conduct all necessary communication and offer assistance in the follow-up to the OIC or assigned CIU member.

- (d) Maintaining current CIU databases or information systems that may be applied to the analysis of crime patterns and trends within the city; this may include the analysis of RMS incident reports, arrest records, corrections information, and crime pattern forecasting.
- (e) Monitoring an assigned precinct(s) or crime category.
 - i. Members given these assignments are required to monitor crime activity and trends within their assigned area, communicate regularly with necessary personnel outside of CIU, and work as the unit's expert for criminal activity and intelligence for their assigned area.
 - ii. Other members may contribute intelligence products without being assigned to the area; however, the designated member should still review these products by checking CIU databases and records daily for any such contributions to his/her area.
- (f) Attentively monitoring crime incidents citywide to detect crime issues or trends, especially violent crimes.
- (g) Compiling background information, intelligence, or warrant information for large-scale enforcement operations.
- (h) Maintaining all GIS files for use by the Crime Intelligence Unit.
- (i) Generating reports for the Commanding Officer of the Crime Intelligence Unit upon request.
- (j) Identifying emerging crime patterns based upon offender descriptions, victimology, or modus operandi. This responsibility is shared with precinct crime analysis officers and specialized units. With this shared responsibility comes an inherent liaison with department personnel.
- (k) Collecting, analyzing, and disseminating statistics to assist in planning the deployment of resources, preventing and suppressing criminal activities, aiding in investigations, increasing apprehensions, or clearing cases.
- (l) Researching crime intelligence emerging methods and the patterns, structures, trends, and movements of criminal or terrorist groups.
- (m) Mining available social media software and databases for risk and threat assessment.
- (n) Presenting intelligence information to individuals or groups in a clear and concise manner.
- (o) Performing as a liaison for CIU with various department, local, state, or federal agencies and in any possible public-private partnerships with private entities or the public.
- (p) Conducting virtual patrol.

5.3. SPECIAL ASSIGNMENTS

At any time, CIU command staff may create a special assignment or project for a CIU member.

- (a) The member's span-of-control supervisor will be notified through a reliable method of communication such as email, with a copy sent to the current CIU Commanding Officer. Verbal notifications are not to be considered reliable methods of communication for this purpose.
- (b) The span-of-control supervisor will assist in providing the resources and time necessary for the member to complete the assignment, including prioritizing or delegating other daily responsibilities as needed.

- (c) The member will provide regular updates to the span-of-control supervisor, and to the Commanding Officer upon his/her request.
- (d) In order to impact the operations of virtual patrol as little as possible, special assignments should be primarily given to members not assigned as PGL Operator throughout the duration of the assignment; however, consideration of the needs of the unit and individual abilities of all CIU members may result in assignments to any CIU member.

5.4. SPECIAL NOTIFICATIONS

- (a) For all major incidents at PGL businesses or any critical incident that occur during the shift, the shift supervisor will notify the Commanding Officer of the details of both the incident and the Unit's response.
- (b) If an incident includes an individual with gang affiliation(s), the associated intelligence work-up will be sent as an urgent email to the CIU Captain, CIU Lieutenant(s), Detective Bureau Deputy Chief, Organized Crime Unit Commander and Captain, Precinct Commander, and Precinct Captain.
- (c) If any activity is identified on the dumping cameras, the shift supervisor should be immediately notified verbally and with an email explaining the circumstances and including any relevant images or information, such as license plate data. The analyst will then forward the email to the designated contact person at the General Assignment Unit.
- (d) Any POI work-ups written up for an individual outside of the Detroit area should include notifications to the local law enforcement agency or fusion-center.
- (e) Crime bulletins regarding current crime patterns may be distributed to external law enforcement agencies with the approval of the shift supervisor.

5.5. PROJECT GREEN LIGHT AND CONSOLE COVERAGE

All members assigned to the Crime Intelligence Unit are responsible for knowing and performing operations of Project Green Light Detroit (PGL) and virtual response when necessary. Supervisors shall include minimum staffing assignments for the RTCC on all daily details. Those assigned to PGL operation will prioritize PGL above other responsibilities as much as possible. Any vacant console position must be filled by any available personnel.

5.6. GENERAL PGL OPERATOR DUTIES

In addition to the duties and responsibilities described in Sections 3 and 4, members assigned as PGL Operators are specifically tasked with the strategic monitoring of available citywide cameras to assist in the detection, prevention, and investigation of crime incidents. PGL Operators shall also provide "virtual patrol" to locations requiring additional patrol and effectively communicate with responding officers and PDU personnel any information of investigative value. PGL Operators are responsible for:

- (a) Providing patrol officers with any available aid in real time relating to all patrol and investigative functions;
- (b) Proactively identifying and notifying proper personnel of potential criminal activity at PGL locations;
- (c) Reviewing video footage for possible investigative and safety concerns during PGL events;
- (d) Capturing preliminary video footage to support investigation and prosecution in cases of criminal activity at PGL locations;
- (e) Providing virtual patrol to PGL locations in your assigned group;

- (f) Monitoring for and/or report any camera malfunctions, distortions, or other issues affecting viewing ability, recording, or review;
- (g) Monitoring all CAD and department radio traffic within his/her assigned camera group;
- (h) Identifying and responding to any department incident that may benefit from the services of the RTCC;
- (i) Effectively communicating any information of investigative value to responding officers, PDU detectives, or other appropriate personnel;
- (j) Utilizing the Project Green Light Detroit Target List to prioritize camera watching;
- (k) Providing "virtual response" by calling the 911 caller for non-assaultive calls to determine whether a scout car is still needed on scene (see Appendix F);
- (l) Documenting virtual patrol activities in a digital activity log.
- (m) When a new PGL business notification email is sent out, PGL Operators shall check the "RTCC CAMERA CHECK" SmartSheet to ensure the new Green Light location has been added to it. If the new Green Light location has not been added, it is then the responsibility of the person who is working the associated group of the new Green Light to add it to the sheet before the end of shift;

5.7. PROJECT GREEN LIGHT DETROIT POLICE RUNS

- (a) PGL Operators will be responsible for the available camera assets, divided into groups geographically. Additionally, the PGL Operator will monitor all CAD and 800Mhz and 400Mhz radio traffic within his/her assigned camera group and respond to any incident that may benefit from the services of the RTCC. During such events the PGL Operator is responsible for:
 - i. Immediately checking for camera assets in the area of the incident and begin to monitor activity if available;
 - ii. Contacting the 911 caller for non-assaultive calls to determine if a scout car is still needed (See Appendix F);
 - iii. Providing any available actionable intelligence to responding units or Zone Dispatcher, including but not limited to: information discovered from available camera feeds, updated suspect or scene information, LEIN information, historical data, and relevant crime pattern information;
 - iv. Checking all relevant databases that pertain to the incident;
 - v. Disseminating, through the authorized Crime Intelligence Unit GroupWise electronic mail, still images captured from relevant video clips to appropriate law enforcement personnel, as necessary;
 - vi. In the event the CIU provides information in a major incident (i.e., shooting, robbery, police chase, etc.), this information shall be documented properly on the Information Tracker SmartSheet;
 - vii. Throughout the duration of the event, the PGL Operator shall keep the shift supervisor apprised of all circumstances regarding the incident and shall be directed by such supervisor;
 - viii. Completing any supplemental reports in RMS required based on what was witnessed via department assets or PGL cameras.

- (b) Personnel assigned to virtual patrol shall continuously cycle through available camera feeds providing "police presence" watching for any issues. The operator shall observe the location for several minutes to determine if there is activity that may need to be addressed and determine the appropriate response (i.e., contact dispatch to request a unit or communicating necessary information over the district). All actions shall be captured on a digital activity log in RMS.
- (c) The PGL Operator will monitor businesses that have entered into Project Green Light Detroit at times including, but not limited to, emergency or other exigent circumstances. Periodic virtual patrol of identified businesses for any issues is mandatory. All CIU staff shall be familiar with the complete list of businesses participating in the initiative and should be aware of the specific response to any incident. In the event a 911 call comes from a participating business or if the PGL Operator identifies an issue through virtual patrol, the operator shall make every effort to continuously monitor the cameras until the member deems the premises secure and shall respond by following these steps:
- i. **Monitor:** Immediately begin to monitor all available camera feeds at that location in an attempt to witness any crime in progress. The PGL Operator should pay special attention to identify escalating situations and advise the Zone Dispatcher of any important updates. Likewise, if the situation resolves itself before a unit arrives at the location it is the responsibility of the PGL Operator to clear the run with the Zone Dispatcher, allowing the unit to go back in service.
 - ii. **Inform:** If the incident is ongoing or requires a unit to respond, the PGL Operator shall gather all available information/intelligence regarding the incident from the source the event was triggered.
 - iii. **Communicate:** Provide any available actionable intelligence to responding units or Zone Dispatcher, including but not limited to: information discovered from camera feeds, updated suspect or scene information, LEIN information, historical data, and relevant crime pattern information.
 - iv. **Observe:** Once the incident has concluded and is deemed secure by the PGL Operator or the responding unit, it is the responsibility of the PGL Operator to follow up or provide "wrap around" service by checking the camera feeds at the location. This shall be performed within a reasonable amount of time to re-evaluate for the return of offenders or problems. If there is further incident, the PGL Operator shall advise the Zone Dispatcher via radio or telephone requesting a unit return.
 - v. **Prepare:** In the event there was an incident at any Green Light business, the PGL Operator will prepare documentation of such event on the RTCC Blotter SmartSheet or in RMS. This shall include all relevant details of the event and a detailed description of the CIU response. In the event further documentation is prepared by the PGL Operator (i.e., Intelligence Report or Person of Interest Report), the information shall be properly distributed.
 - vi. Throughout the duration of any criminal event at a Green Light business, the PGL Operator shall keep the shift supervisor apprised of all circumstances regarding the incident and shall be directed by such supervisor if necessary.

5.8. CAMERA FUNCTION EVALUATION

At the start of the shift, each PGL Operator must complete a timely function check of all cameras for that operator's assigned camera group, including dumping cameras and LPRs. Steps taken must include:

- (a) Pull up camera feeds on the console for each location within their camera group.
- (b) Document findings on the RTCC CAMERA CHECK SmartSheet.
 - i. Operator's name and date/time of check by camera group.
 - ii. Functioning cameras: cells following location information will be blank.
 - iii. Total malfunction: camera name, person notified, and date notified must be recorded.
 - iv. Partial malfunction: camera name with specific malfunction information, person notified, and date notified must be recorded.
 - v. If information already exists within the cell and new information is added, new information will be added to the end of the previous contents, separated by "/" marks.
- (c) Check Genetec for possible Motorola/Genetec disparities.
- (d) Contact the Department of Innovation and Technology (DoIT) by email and by phone once per day at 6am for any new malfunctioning cameras in both systems.
- (e) Contact the Motorola Representative for any camera issues showing on the console, but not in Genetec.
- (f) Contact Jack Fennessey if a dumping camera or an LPR is malfunctioning.
- (g) At 6am each day, one final copy of the RTCC CAMERA CHECK sheet must be uploaded to the RTCC BLOTTER SmartSheet.
 - i. SmartSheet completion: Date, Time, *Shift Camera Check* (in location and incident type), Green Light box checked, *See attached* (in details cell), names of all CIU members completing the check, and any person(s) notified.
 - ii. File name format: DATE *Camera Check* PLATOON. For example, 170101 Camera Check Platoon 1.

5.9. ACTIONS REQUIRED FOR CAMERA FEED MALFUNCTIONS, DISTORTIONS, OR OTHER ISSUES OUTSIDE OF ROUTINE CAMERA CHECK

- (a) Determine if the issue has been previously addressed.
- (b) Immediately notify the appropriate member from the Department of Innovation and Technology (DoIT) of the issue, including camera name(s) and location(s).
- (c) Document issue on RTCC CAMERA CHECK SmartSheet and the RTCC Blotter SmartSheet if malfunction occurs outside of the normal daily-camera check.
- (d) The member from DoIT will determine the source of the issue and make proper notifications based upon his/her findings.

5.10. BREAKING NEWS ALERTS

At least one on-duty member of CIU shall be assigned to monitor all incoming Google Alert emails for possible news stories that qualify for text alerts. Any qualifying stories shall be sent out appropriately. Mandatory hourly checks shall be logged on the appropriate department form.

- (a) A text alert must be sent anytime the unit becomes aware of an event that involves a terrorist attack, large-scale mass casualties, officers that were shot or significantly injured, police-involved shootings resulting in injuries or death, or similar circumstances.

- (b) Mutual combat in known major conflict zones does not need to be sent unless the information is particularly noteworthy.
- (c) Text alerts should only be sent for events that have occurred within the last 48 hours.
- (d) Text alerts shall only be sent once per event, unless there is a major change in casualty information or additional correlated attacks occur.
- (e) New sources for text alerts should be checked for reliability. Avoid any distrustful sources. Local news publications are acceptable if a major news organization has not reported the information. If the source is questionable, search for additional news sources from a more reliable source or confirm with an on-duty supervisor prior to sending any text alerts.
- (f) If CIU personnel are unsure if the news story meets text alert qualifications, err on the side of sending the information.
- (g) All text alerts must adhere to the following formatting requirements, listed in descending order of importance:
 - i. Limited to 125 characters, including spaces.
 - ii. Do not include any text combinations known to create emojis (e.g. :)).
 - iii. Include a shortened URL link. URLs can be shortened using services such as Google URL Shortener and Bitly.
 - iv. Include location of the event. If within the United States, city and state should be included. Locations outside of the United States should include city and country. If cities are unknown, personnel should be as specific as possible.
 - v. Include a short description. If possible/applicable, the description should provide: method of violence (e.g., shooting, vehicle ramming, explosion), casualty and injury estimates, officer's medical status, and claims of responsibility.
 - vi. Abbreviations should be avoided but are acceptable if commonly used and necessary to remain within character count.
 - vii. (Example 1) City, State: 1 officer shot before fatally shooting 2 suspects in robbery. Officer stable. <https://goo.gl/dYjMje>
 - viii. (Example 2) City, Country: 13 killed, 30 injured in concert explosion. 1 PO critical. Unknown responsibility. <https://goo.gl/dYjMje>
- (h) All text alerts must be logged into the "NEWS ALERTS" SmartSheet.
- (i) All text alerts will use the CIU's back-up cell phone. The process is as follows:
 - ix. Open the phone and select the "Contacts" app.
 - x. Under "Contacts" select "Groups."
 - xi. Select "Breaking News 1."
 - xii. Select the three dots in the upper right hand corner and select "Send Message."
 - xiii. Please DO NOT select the "Group Conversation" option. There should be no orange check mark next to "Group Conversation," only an empty circle.

- xiv. Send the message in the same format as previous breaking news: City, State. Text of Message. Hyperlink
- xv. Repeat Steps 3-6 for "Breaking News 2" and "Breaking News 3."

5.11. RADIO PROCEDURES

- (a) Members shall use the "5220" code assigned to their console while using the radio.
- (b) Avoid using the radio unless the information is vital or immediate.
- (c) All radio transmissions must be very brief and professional. If you must provide complicated, lengthy, or sensitive information, members should request the unit to call the office.

5.12. INTELLIGENCE WORK-UPS AND PERSON OF INTEREST (POI) REPORTS

- (a) An intelligence work-up will be done on any incident involving a homicide, shooting, critical assault, or suspicious death handled by the Detroit Police Department.
 - i. Officer-involved shootings and attempted suicide by shooting are qualifying incidents. Officer information shall not be used in the work-up.
 - ii. Intelligence work-ups do not need to be completed for BB gun / airsoft incidents, critical accidents (unless assaultive intent exists), or successful suicides.
- (b) Actions required:
 - i. Notify and apprise the shift supervisor of all circumstances regarding the incident.
 - ii. Immediately check for camera assets in the area of the incident and begin to monitor activity if available.
 - iii. Review CAD information and communicate with Notification and Control in an effort to gather identification and circumstance information.
 - iv. Immediately begin working up any confirmed information.
 - v. Provide any available actionable intelligence to responding units or dispatch, including but not limited to, information discovered from available camera feeds, updated suspect or scene information, significant LEIN information, and relevant crime pattern information.
 - vi. Check all relevant databases that pertain to the incident.
 - vii. Disseminate, through the authorized proxy CIU email account, still images or relevant video clips, if necessary for immediate investigatory or officer safety purposes.
 - viii. Record all information products distributed during the event.
 - a. Attachments for both Word and PDF formats should be included on the Information Tracker SmartSheet and saved in the appropriate folder on the shared drive.
 - b. All appropriate fields on the SmartSheet row should be properly completed.
 - c. File name formats should comply with the following, unless the shift supervisor advised differently:
 - 1. For intelligence work-ups, Date Location Incident Type Precinct. For example, 170101 1301 3rd St NFS 3 Pct.

2. For POI work-ups, Date POI Name. For example, 170101 POI John Smith. May also include gang affiliation or offense at the end, if association predicated request.
- (c) When a qualifying incident occurs, the current on-duty CIU members shall attempt to complete the work-up prior by the end of shift. The shift supervisor may require the member to continue the work-up through completion into the next shift, if deemed appropriate.
- (d) All intelligence work-ups must conform to the formatting, instructions, and templates numbered CIU0401-01 through CIU0401-01.2. Any deviations require express permission from the shift supervisor. All work-ups must be checked by the on-duty supervisor prior to dissemination.

5.13. GENERAL INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT GUIDELINES

- (a) CIU members shall not retain official intelligence documentation for personal reference or for any other purposes outside its legally prescribed criminal justice use.
- (b) The intelligence process should be conducted in an objective manner, with all effort to remove personal or departmental bias made.
- (c) Appropriately labeled hypotheses, suggestions, and/or conclusions based upon logical analysis may be included in intelligence products when appropriate, but personal opinion or opinion without substantive evidentiary support must be omitted.
- (d) Research shall be thorough and use all appropriate available sources.
- (e) Consistency is particularly valuable and vital to the professionalism and effectiveness of an intelligence unit. Therefore, all members will ensure that all intelligence products are consistent throughout the entirety of the document. This includes information provided, terms used, formatting, font style, etc. Members should make sure to strictly follow any available templates and keep consistent between separate but similar documents, as well.
- (f) Font used in all work-ups will be Tahoma size 9 font.
- (g) CIU members are responsible for establishing the existence of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity either through examination of supporting information or by delegation of this responsibility to an identified law enforcement member prior to the creation or analysis of intelligence related to an individual, address, or personal property.
- (h) CIU members shall not take any actions that could potentially compromise an OIC's investigation of a case.
- (i) CIU members shall not directly contact an involved person in a case without the expressed authorization from the OIC *and* a CIU supervisor. This provision does not include PGL business contacts during a PGL run.
- (j) If a member is unsure whether an action would be within or outside the bounds of CIU, he/she shall contact his/her shift or span-of-control supervisor. Members should err on the side of providing legally available information when requested by a sworn DPD member.
- (k) Members should be aware that the information provided to officers, either as a result of a work-up or PGL virtual patrol, directly affects officer safety. Thus, members should communicate this information with the utmost care.

5.14. SOURCES

- (a) In all cases, source identification should be noted on intelligence products in some form. The true source method should be used and identified, unless there is a need to restrict information from product recipients.
- (b) Sources should always be evaluated by members for reliability and validity. Dubious statements and sources in particular must be noted so the recipient may make judgments as to how much weight or validity to ascribe to the information. Circulating information that may not have been evaluated, or where the source reliability is poor or the content validity is doubtful but is included without notation, is detrimental to the agency's operations and contrary to the individual's right to privacy.

5.15. DISSEMINATION

- (a) Information gathered and maintained by CIU for intelligence purposes may be disseminated only to appropriate persons for legitimate law enforcement purposes in accordance with law and procedures established by DPD policy or state and federal laws. A record shall be kept regarding the dissemination of all such information.
- (b) Intelligence shall be compiled and provided to appropriate recipients as soon as possible where meaningful trends, patterns, methods, characteristics or intentions of criminal enterprises or individuals emerge.
- (c) Information having relevance to active cases or that requires immediate attention shall be forwarded to responsible investigative or other personnel as soon as possible.
- (d) All intelligence products distributed should be recorded in a corresponding SmartSheet and in the appropriate shared drive folder. Both MS Word and PDF formats should be saved in all locations. If requested, a hard copy of any product disseminated by CIU should be distributed to the CIU Commanding Officer and Lieutenant(s). Hard copies are not required for products with specialized printing procedures, such as large-scale maps, and/or products excessively voluminous in nature.
- (e) If a product is created as a result of a specific request by a member of DPD, the completed information or product will be disseminated back to the individual and any additional DPD members indicated by the requestor. CIU members are required to get authorization from the shift supervisor prior to sending out information to non-DPD contacts.
- (f) Intelligence work-ups are to be disseminated based upon the sensitivity of the information involved. The designated distribution lists are as follows:
 - i. *Crime Product Distro List*: Default mailing list used for the distribution of products. Recipients are varied in rank. The subject line should correspond with the title of the attached intelligence product (Date Location Incident Type Precinct – 170101 1301 3rd St NFS 3 Pct).
 - ii. *Critical Notifications*: Used for any incident or information that is high-profile or newsworthy. This list is limited to Precinct PDU lieutenants, CIU command staff, and DPD captains and above.
 - iii. *Confidential Notifications*: Used for the most sensitive of incidents and information. Officer-involved shootings should always be sent to this group. This list is limited to CIU command staff and DPD Deputy Chiefs and above.

- (g) Products such as PGL police run sheets, breaking news alerts, and statistics have designated mailing lists that should be used for product dissemination.
- (h) If necessary for immediate investigatory or officer safety purposes, PGL images and video may be disseminated at the request of sworn DPD members. Dissemination content, recipient, and requestor should be recorded on the RTCC Blotter. Information may be noted within a corresponding RTCC event line. Video and images should only be sent to an official DPD email address or department phone. Any communication containing PGL images/videos is required to include:
 - i. Name of the CIU member that pulled the images or video.
 - ii. Location, date, and time of the footage/image.
 - iii. Name of the requestor, if different from the recipient.
 - iv. Reminder that all video or images needed for evidentiary purposes must be requested through the Audio Video Evidence Response Team (AVERT).
 - v. Standard proxy email disclaimers including classification, media restriction, and mistaken recipient instructions.

5.16. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION

- (a) Only sworn Detroit Police Department members or civilian executives, with approval from the Chief of Police and for use in his/her official duties, may submit a Request for Information (RFI) to the Crime Intelligence Unit. Initiation of a non-emergency request must be submitted through the Smartsheet form located here: <https://goo.gl/qWQwMy>. The form must be filled out in its entirety so that all relevant information needed to complete the request is obtained. All related images, videos, and supporting documentation must be included as attachments at the bottom of the form. The form will also be available on the intranet homepage. The Crime Intelligence Unit will still accept phone calls and emails for requests during emergency situations.
- (b) Crime Intelligence Unit members receiving an RFI shall verify the identity of the requestor. Requests shall then be forwarded to the shift supervisor for feasibility and assignment. After a feasibility assessment is made, the shift supervisor shall assign the request to a CIU member assigned to analysis responsibilities. Once the CIU member completes the request, it shall be returned to the shift supervisor for approval prior to dissemination. All requests shall be entered in the Information Tracker SmartSheet and assigned a tracking number prior to assignment and after completion.
- (c) Requests for official video footage shall continue to be made to AVERT, in accordance with Detroit Police Department teletype #15-0591, issued June 21, 2015.
- (d) Any request for work to be performed by the Wayne State Center for Urban Studies or the Detroit Crime Commission shall be routed through the Commanding Officer of the Crime Intelligence Unit for approval.
- (e) Types of requests:
 - i. *Departmental Statistical Requests:* All departmental statistical requests shall be directed to a CIU Executive Manager, who will determine the appropriate data source and assignment. The requestor shall be notified of the data source, its limitations, and reasoning for its use. In addition to the notification of the requestor, a notation shall be made on the report stating "Preliminary Information," and the source of the data. Once

an assignment is made to a Crime Intelligence member assigned to statistical responsibilities, it shall be completed by the due date and returned to the shift supervisor prior to dissemination. Under no circumstances shall statistics be released prior to supervisory approval. All requests shall be entered in the Information Tracker SmartSheet and assigned a tracking number prior to assignment and after completion.

- ii. *Departmental Mapping Requests:* All requests for maps shall be forwarded to a CIU Executive Manager. The requestor shall be notified of the data source, its limitations, and reasons for using the data source. If needed, a notation on the map shall be made stating "Preliminary Data," and the data source. Maps shall be forwarded to an Executive Manager prior to dissemination for approval. All requests shall be entered in the Information Tracker SmartSheet and assigned a tracking number prior to assignment and after completion.
- iii. *Departmental Analysis Requests:* Any personnel assigned to the Crime Intelligence Unit shall accept a request for analysis on possible crime patterns from department personnel. The shift supervisor shall be notified in all instances when a request is made. The following guidelines shall be used: If available, the specific analyst that handles the area of concern shall handle the request. If that person is not available, the person taking the request shall search databases without delay. The results of each search should be reported to the supervisor prior to dissemination even when the search provides "negative" results. In the event that a request is made for a category that the Crime Intelligence Unit does not track, the call shall be forwarded to the supervisor. The supervisor shall then be responsible for notifying the requestor of other means that the Crime Intelligence Unit can assist the requestor, or other department entities that may assist the requestor. All requests shall be entered in the Information Tracker SmartSheet and assigned a tracking number prior to assignment and after completion. A supervisor must approve the analytical product before it is sent to the requestor.
- iv. *Non-Departmental Requests:* All statistical, analytical, or mapping requests from outside law enforcement agencies shall be required to submit a written request to the Office of the Chief of Police. Requests related to media should be referred to Media Relations. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests or subpoenas should be referred to the City of Detroit Law Department. All FOIA requests received by the Crime Intelligence Unit from the Law Department shall be directed to an Executive Manager, who will determine the appropriate data source and assignment. Any FOIA requests shall be entered in the Information Tracker SmartSheet and assigned a tracking number prior to assignment and after completion. **UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHALL NON-DEPARTMENTAL REQUESTS BE PROCESSED DIRECTLY THROUGH THE CRIME INTELLIGENCE UNIT.** Outside of the FOIA process, requests from external entities may require the Commanding Officer or Executive Manager to submit a DPD-568 directed to the department's Legal Advisor for approval.

5.17. DATA SHARING LIMITS

- (a) Limits must be placed on data sharing with third parties in order to protect the rights of citizens and to comply with laws and regulations. Except as required by law, subpoena, or court process, or as expressly permitted by the CIU Commanding Officer, the following restrictions must be strictly followed by members of CIU:

- i. Law enforcement sensitive data will only be shared with other law enforcement agencies, subject to all other policies.
- ii. Video and/or license plate reader (LPR) data may not be shared with third parties unless a current Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) exists between DPD and the third party, approved and documented by the Chief of Police.
- iii. All data sharing must be in compliance with DPD Data Sharing Policy 101.12 and the FBI CJIS policy.
- iv. At no time will a member of CIU share any information, footage, or data accessed within the course of their duties with the press or general public.

5.18. DUMPING CAMERAS

- (a) Each shift is responsible for reviewing two four-hour increments of video and documenting the findings in the Dumping Camera SmartSheet: Platoon 1 reviews 19:00-23:00 and 23:00-03:00; Platoon 2 reviews 03:00-07:00 and 07:00-11:00; and Platoon 3 reviews 11:00-15:00 and 15:00-19:00.
- (b) If any activity is identified on the dumping cameras, the shift supervisor should be immediately notified verbally and sent an email explaining the circumstances, including any relevant images or information such as license plate data. The email should also be sent to the designated contact person at the General Assignment Unit.

5.19. LICENSE PLATE READER (LPR)


The License Plate Reader (LPR) provides automated detection of license plates. The LPR system consists of a high-speed camera – mounted either at a fixed location or on a mobile patrol vehicle – and a computer that compares data from electronic images of vehicle license plates against specified databases of license plates. The system captures data about the image – camera identification, date, time, and GPS coordinates – as well as data about the vehicle – the vehicle’s make and model, the vehicle’s driver and passenger(s), distinguishing features (e.g., bumper stickers, damage); and state of registration.

DPD’s LPRs compare against two databases of license plates, otherwise known as “hot lists.” One is maintained by the FBI’s National Crime Information Center (NCIC), which contains information about wanted vehicles and persons nationwide. DPD also maintains a “Local Hot List,” which consists of vehicle plate information entered by members of DPD. License plates entered into the Local Hot List are automatically purged within 24 hours.

When Genetec registers that there is a match with one of the hot lists, otherwise known as a “hit,” CIU members must do the following:

- (a) Verify first whether the LPR hit came from a fixed or mobile unit. If the LPR hit came from a mobile unit, the CIU member must confirm the time that the plate was read by the LPR camera to ensure that the location information is still relevant. Verification may also require checking the scout’s AVL to see if the unit is still in the vicinity of the hit.
- (b) Run the plate in LEIN and visually verify the plate and type of vehicle. If the LPR hit cannot be verified, the CIU member must log information into the RTCC Blotter SmartSheet and specify why the information was not able to be verified.
- (c) If the LPR hit is confirmed and the hit is for a felony, the CIU member must give the information on the appropriate district and monitor for updates.

- (d) The CIU member should check the location of scouts near the fixed LPR location by looking at AVL and check for PGL video in the area.
- (e) The CIU member must begin an intelligence check on the vehicle or any associated persons.
- (f) All information must be documented in the RTCC Blotter SmartSheet.

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE (SOP)		Section 6
DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT		
Crime Intelligence Unit		
	EFFECTIVE DATE 7/1/2018	REVISED DATE 4/1/2019
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	SUBJECT 6. PLATOON DUTIES	
APPROVED BY: Deputy Chief Marlon Wilson		

6.1. PLATOON-BASED DUTIES

The following section of this policy lists duties that are currently assigned to each platoon, in addition to those duties described in Sections 3, 4, and 5. If listed below, it is *primarily* the responsibility of that platoon; however, all members of CIU are responsible for the effectiveness of the unit. Therefore, all members may contribute to any of the duties listed below, regardless of assigned platoon.

6.2. PLATOON 1 (23:00 – 07:00)

- (a) Updating all intelligence work-ups with FBI findings, distributing to the Precinct PDU Lieutenant and the OIC if information is available, and saving the update to the SmartSheet.
- (b) Monitoring and documenting all incidents discovered on dumping cameras.
- (c) Closely monitoring crime reports in assigned precincts or for the purpose of identifying crime patterns.
- (d) Researching, writing, and disseminating the CTAT weekly brief and daily threat assessment. (CTAT)
- (e) Scoring GunStat records.
- (f) Submitting the list of down cameras to the Department of Innovation and Technology (DoIT) by 6am each day.
- (g) Vetting incoming Project Green Light business applications.


6.3. PLATOON 2 (07:00 – 15:00)

- (a) Updating all intelligence work-ups with FBI findings, distributing to the Precinct PDU Lieutenant and the OIC if information is available, and saving the update to the SmartSheet.
- (b) Monitoring and documenting all incidents discovered on dumping cameras.
- (c) Compiling and distributing daily and weekly statistics.
- (d) Closely monitoring crime reports in assigned precincts or for the purpose of identifying crime patterns.
- (e) Creating and distributing a weekly heat map of crime hotspots within the city of Detroit.
- (f) Assisting the DCC with event vetting procedures. (CTAT)
- (g) Printing a list of vetted events for the Commanding Officer. (CTAT)

- (h) Completing and disseminating the CTAT Critical Infrastructure product. (CTAT)
- (i) Redacting downtown partner crime reports submitted daily.
- (j) Vetting incoming Project Green Light business applications.

6.4. PLATOON 3 (15:00 – 23:00)

- (a) Updating all intelligence work-ups with FBI findings, distributing to the Precinct PDU Lieutenant and the OIC if information is available, and saving the update to the SmartSheet.
- (b) Monitoring and documenting all incidents discovered on dumping cameras.
- (c) Closely monitoring crime reports in assigned precincts or for the purpose of identifying crime patterns.
- (d) Scoring GunStat records.
- (e) Producing a daily school threat assessment. (CTAT)
- (f) Vetting incoming Project Green Light business applications.

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE (SOP)		Section 7
DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT		
Crime Intelligence Unit		
	EFFECTIVE DATE 7/1/2018	REVISED DATE 4/1/2019
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	SUBJECT 7. SOCIAL MEDIA USE	
	APPROVED BY: Deputy Chief Marlon Wilson	

7.1. DEFINITIONS

- (a) *Criminal Intelligence Information* – Data that meets criminal intelligence collection criteria and has been evaluated and determined to be relevant to the identification of criminal activity engaged in by individuals who or organizations which are reasonably suspected of involvement in criminal activity.
- (b) *Criminal Nexus, Criminal Predicate* – Established when behavior or circumstances are related to an individual or organization’s involvement or planned involvement in criminal activity or enterprise.
- (c) *Online Alias* – An online identity encompassing identifiers, such as name and date of birth, differing from the employee’s actual identifiers. An online alias may be used to monitor activity on social media websites; to conduct covert investigations, monitoring or collection of information; or to engage in authorized online undercover activity.
- (d) *Online Undercover Activity* – The utilization of an online alias to engage in interactions with a person via social media sites that may or may not be in the public domain (i.e. “friending a person on Facebook”).
- (e) *Public Domain* – Any Internet resource that is open and available to anyone.
- (f) *Social Media* – A category of Internet-based resources that integrate user-generated content and user participation. This includes, but is not limited to, social media networking sites (Facebook, MySpace), micro blogging sites (Twitter), photo- and video-sharing sites (Flickr, YouTube), wikis (Wikipedia), blogs, and news sites (Digg, Reddit).
- (g) *Social Media Monitoring* – Online viewing of information posted or otherwise made available on a social media or information website wherein the CIU member DOES NOT interact with any individuals and merely reads or copies content for analysis or data/information collection.
- (h) *Social Media Monitoring Tool* – A tool used to capture data and monitor social media sites by utilizing automated tools such as web crawlers and word search functions to make predictive analysis, develop trends, or collect information. Examples include Netbase, Twitterfall, Trackur, Tweetdeck, Socialmention, Socialpointer, Plancast, WELink, and LookingGlass.
- (i) *Social Media Websites* – Sites that focus on building online communities of people who share interests and activities and/or exploring the interests and activities of others. Social media

websites are further categorized by Internet-based resources that integrate user-generated content and user participation. This includes, but is not limited to, social networking sites (Facebook, MySpace), micro blogging sites (Twitter, Nixle), photo-and video-sharing sites (Flickr, YouTube), wikis (Wikipedia), blogs, and news sites (Digg, Reddit). The absence of an explicit reference to a specific social media website does not limit the application of this policy.

- (j) **Valid Law Enforcement Purpose** – A purpose for information/intelligence gathering development, or collection, use, retention, or sharing that furthers the authorized functions and activities of a law enforcement agency, which may include the prevention of crime, ensuring the safety of the public, furthering officer safety, and homeland and national security, while adhering to law and agency policy designed to protect the privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties of Americans.

7.2. RESTRICTIONS

- (a) All members shall follow DPD's Manual Directive 102.8 regarding Department Internet Usage.
- (b) CIU members may use social media as an information source for the following valid reasons: situation assessments, crime analysis, criminal intelligence development, and criminal investigation. Use of social media by CIU members for these valid purposes will be consistent with all applicable laws, regulations, and department policies.
- (c) CIU members will use social media, access social media, use an online alias, or use social media monitoring tools ONLY for a valid investigative, analytical, or law enforcement purpose.
- (d) CIU members will only utilize social media to seek or retain information that:
 - i. Is based upon a criminal predicate, a threat to public safety, or to assess an event that has the potential to threaten public safety;
 - ii. Is based on a reasonable suspicion that an identifiable individual has committed an identifiable criminal offense or is involved in or is planning criminal conduct or activity that presents a threat to any individual, the community, or the nation and the information is relevant to the criminal conduct or activity;
 - iii. Is relevant to:
 - a. The investigation and prosecution of suspected criminal incidents;
 - b. The resulting justice system response
 - c. The enforcement of sanctions, orders, or sentences; or
 - d. The prevention of crime.
 - iv. Is useful in crime analysis or situational assessment reports for administration of criminal justice and public safety.
- (e) CIU members will not utilize social media to seek or retain information about:
 - i. Individuals or organizations based solely on their religious, social, political opinions or activities;
 - ii. An individual's participation in a particular non-criminal organization or lawful event;
 - iii. An individual's religion, race, ethnicity, citizenship, place of origin, disability, gender, or sexual orientation, unless such information is relevant to the individual's criminal conduct or activity, or if required to identify the individual; or

- iv. An individual's age other than to determine if the person is a minor, or to assist in correctly identifying an individual.
- (f) CIU members will not directly or indirectly receive, seek, accept, or retain information from:
 - i. An individual or non-governmental information provider who may or may not receive a fee or benefit for providing the information if there is a reason to believe that the information provider is legally prohibited from obtaining or disclosing the information; or
 - ii. Any source that used prohibited or illegal means to acquire the information.

7.3. AUTHORIZATION FOR ACCESSING AND SEARCHING SOCIAL MEDIA WEBSITES

- (a) Overt monitoring, searching, and collecting of information in the Public Domain for any legitimate law enforcement purpose requires no supervisory authorization. This includes social media sites, news sites, or other widely available information sources.
- (b) Covert collecting or using an online alias to interact with individuals online or to collect information will only be done by sworn law enforcement officers with approval from the Deputy Chief of the Detective Bureau. CIU members can gain approval by submitting a DPD-568 to the Deputy Chief through channels.
- (c) Covert monitoring or using an online alias to access information posted to social media sites on an individual's pages or other commonly available media requires approval by the Deputy Chief of the Detective Bureau.
- (d) Online aliases will only be used to obtain or retain information that is based on the following:
 - i. A criminal predicate or imminent threat to public safety;
 - ii. A reasonable suspicion that an identifiable individual has committed an identifiable criminal offense or is involved in or is planning criminal conduct or activity that presents a threat to any individual, the community, or the nation and the information is relevant to the criminal conduct or activity; or
 - iii. Is relevant to:
 - a. The investigation and prosecution of suspected criminal incidents;
 - b. The resulting justice system response
 - c. The enforcement of sanctions, orders, or sentences; or
 - d. The prevention of crime.
 - iv. Is useful in crime analysis or situational assessment reports for administration of criminal justice and public safety.

7.4. ESTABLISHING SOCIAL MEDIA ALIASES

- (a) CIU members desiring to use an online alias must submit an Inter-Office Memorandum (DPD-568) to the Deputy Chief of the Detective Bureau through channels.
- (b) The online alias must follow these guidelines:
 - i. CIU members will not use their personal or work email addresses. Only alias email addresses created for the purpose of the online alias are allowed.

- ii. CIU members will not use images or reproductions of other people, unless permission from that individual is obtained.
 - iii. CIU members will not use images containing copyrighted or potentially copyrighted content, including memes or photos taken without the consent of the photographer.
 - iv. The following images are allowed – photos taken by the CIU member during work hours of public landmarks (e.g. Joe Louis fist, Spirit of Detroit, etc.) or other non-placeable objects (e.g. flowers, bricks, etc.). If the photo is taken on a personal device, the CIU member must sign an agreement waiving any artistic rights to the image.
- (c) The CIU member must receive the approval of the shift supervisor for any content generated as the online alias (e.g. posts). Content must follow these guidelines:
- i. No references to people, groups, organizations, or businesses, either specifically or generally.
 - ii. No disparaging, derogatory, offensive, or otherwise negative remarks.
- (d) CIU members using their approved online aliases to simply monitor and not interact may access social media through their normal department computer. CIU members approved to interact with other users using their online aliases will access social media through an “Undercover Computer” or other undercover device, with a non-governmental IP address.
- (e) The Lieutenant will maintain a roster of personnel using aliases and the alias name along with the pertinent information associated with the alias, and name of each social media site where the alias is employed.
- (f) CIU members will report any potential compromise of an online alias by either the public or a social media provider to the Lieutenant.

7.5. AUTHORIZATION TO USE SOCIAL MEDIA MONITORING AND SEARCHING SOFTWARE

- (a) CIU members will use available department-provided software and computers/devices to monitor, search, or collect from social media sites when they are working within the scope of their duties and pursuing a valid law enforcement purpose.
- (b) CIU members will only utilize social media monitoring and searching software to seek or retain information that:
 - i. Is based upon a criminal predicate, a threat to public safety, or to assess an event that has the potential to threaten public safety;
 - ii. Is based on a reasonable suspicion that an identifiable individual has committed an identifiable criminal offense or is involved in or is planning criminal conduct or activity that presents a threat to any individual, the community, or the nation and the information is relevant to the criminal conduct or activity;
 - iii. Is relevant to:
 - a. The investigation and prosecution of suspected criminal incidents;
 - b. The resulting justice system response
 - c. The enforcement of sanctions, orders, or sentences; or
 - d. The prevention of crime.


- iv. Is useful in crime analysis or situational assessment reports for administration of criminal justice and public safety.

7.6. PROHIBITIONS

- (a) CIU members will not use their own personal computers, social media accounts, or devices, either from home or at work, to conduct investigations or searches that are part of, or related to their regular duties.
- (b) CIU members will not associate with known or suspected criminals electronically or in person, except as a function of their assigned duties. In the event of an unexpected encounter, employees are to limit exposure as much as possible with the objective maintaining personal safety and the fidelity of aliases and investigations.
- (c) CIU members will not use department-provided software, applications, or devices to perform investigations, checks, look ups, etc. on any personal business, personal interest, or on any situation where there is not a valid law enforcement purpose.
- (d) Because the internet is an open media with infinite possibilities to input fraudulent information and create misinformation, CIU members using information developed from social media or social media search applications must use standard investigative approaches to attempt to verify as much of the information gathered from social media as possible.

7.7. DOCUMENTATION AND RETENTION

- (a) Any information that is collected and held for evaluation or assessment purposes where no criminal predicate or threat to public safety is found will be deleted within 90 days of collection.
- (b) For assessments of public events where no criminal predicate or threat to public safety is found, a file may be maintained that will be useful in the event that the event will occur again (annual events like auto shows). The only information that can be retained will be non-personally identifying information, and information like useful websites, useful search terms, etc.
- (c) Collected information that has a criminal predicate or indicates a threat to public safety will be saved and documented as is the case for any criminal investigation. Information will be passed to the sworn officer(s) assigned, and if necessary, disseminated through the appropriate CIU product.
- (g) CIU members will still forward information that is found to not have a criminal predicate but qualifies as suspicious activity to the appropriate agencies.

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE (SOP)		Section 8
DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT		
Crime Intelligence Unit		
	EFFECTIVE DATE	REVISED DATE
	7/1/2018	4/1/2019
	TOTAL SECTION PAGES: 9	
	SUBJECT	
8. FACIAL RECOGNITION		
APPROVED BY: Deputy Chief Marlon Wilson		

8.1. DEFINITIONS

- (a) **Biometric data** – Data derived from one or more intrinsic physical or behavioral traits of humans, to include fingerprints, palm prints, iris scans, and facial recognition data.
- (b) **DataWorks Plus** – The company with which DPD has a contract to provide facial recognition software.
- (c) **Facial recognition (FR)** – The automated searching of a facial image in a biometric database (one-to-many), typically resulting in a group of facial images ranked by computer-evaluated similarity.
- (d) **Examiner** – An individual who has received advanced training in the face recognition system and its features. Examiners have at least a working knowledge of the limitations of face recognition and the ability to use image editing software. They are qualified to assess image quality and appropriateness for face recognition searches and to perform one-to-many and one-to-one face image comparisons.
- (e) **Highly Restricted Personal Information** – An individual's photograph or image, social security number, digitized signature, medical and disability information.
- (f) **Mobile Facial Recognition (Mobile FR)** – The process of conducting an automated FR search in a mobile environment.
- (g) **P/CRCL** – Privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties.
- (h) **Personally Identifiable Information (PII)** – Information which can be used to distinguish or trace an individual's identity, such as name, social security number, or biometric records, alone or when combined with other personal or identifying information which is linked or linkable to a specific individual, such as date and place of birth, or mother's maiden name.
- (i) **Statewide Network of Agency Photos (SNAP)** – A computer application managed by the SNAP Unit, deployed through the Michigan Criminal Justice Information Network (MiCJIN) Portal, which serves as an investigative tool and a central repository of images from local, state, and federal agencies.

8.2. PURPOSE

- (a) Facial recognition technology involves the ability to examine and compare distinguishing characteristics of a human face through the use of biometric algorithms contained within a

software application. This technology can be a valuable investigative tool to detect and prevent criminal activity, reduce an imminent threat to health or safety, and help in the identification of persons unable to identify themselves or deceased persons. DPD has established access and use of a face recognition system to support its investigative efforts.

- (b) It is the purpose of this policy to provide CIU personnel with guidelines and principles for the collection, access, use, dissemination, retention, and purging of images and related information applicable to the implementation of a face recognition (FR) program. This policy will ensure that all FR uses are consistent with authorized purposes while not violating the privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties (P/CRCL) of individuals. Further, this policy will delineate the manner in which requests for face recognition are received, processed, catalogued, and responded to. The Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs) form the core of the privacy framework for this policy. This policy assists the CIU and its personnel in:
- i. Increasing public safety and improving state, local, tribal, territorial, and national security.
 - ii. Minimizing the threat and risk of injury to specific individuals.
 - iii. Minimizing the threat and risk of physical injury or financial liability to law enforcement and others responsible for public protection, safety, or health.
 - iv. Minimizing the potential risks to individual privacy, civil rights, civil liberties, and other legally protected interests.
 - v. Protecting the integrity of criminal investigatory, criminal intelligence, and justice system processes and information.
 - vi. Minimizing the threat and risk of damage to real or personal property.
 - vii. Fostering trust in the government by strengthening transparency, oversight, and accountability.
 - viii. Making the most effective use of public resources allocated to public safety entities.
- (c) All deployments of the face recognition system are for official use only/law enforcement sensitive (FOUO/LES). The provisions of this policy are provided to support the following authorized uses of face recognition information:
- i. A reasonable suspicion that an identifiable individual has committed a criminal offense or is involved in or planning criminal (including terrorist) conduct or activity that presents a threat to any individual, the community, or the nation and that the information is relevant to the criminal conduct or activity.
 - ii. An active or ongoing criminal or homeland security investigation.
 - iii. To mitigate an imminent threat to health or safety through short-term situational awareness or other means.
 - iv. To assist in the identification of a person who lacks capacity or is otherwise unable to identify him- or herself (such as an incapacitated, deceased, or otherwise at-risk person).
 - v. To investigate and/or corroborate tips and leads.
 - vi. For comparison to determine whether an individual may have obtained one or more official state driver's licenses or identification cards that contain inaccurate, conflicting, or false information.

- vii. To assist in the identification of potential witnesses and/or victims of violent crime.
 - viii. To support law enforcement in critical incident responses.
- (d) In the event that DPD deploys a mobile FR, mobile face image searches may be performed only by a sworn officer who has completed training and only during the course of an officer's lawful duties, in furtherance of a valid law enforcement purpose. Sample valid law enforcement purposes include:
- i. For persons who are detained for offenses that:
 - a. Warrant arrest or citation or
 - b. Are subject to lawful identification requirements and are lacking positive identification in the field.
 - ii. For a person who an officer reasonably believes is concealing his or her true identity and has a reasonable suspicion the individual has committed a crime other than concealing his or her identity.
 - iii. For persons who lack capacity or are otherwise unable to identify themselves and who are a danger to themselves or others.
 - iv. For those who are deceased and not otherwise identified.

8.3. POLICY APPLICABILITY AND LEGAL COMPLIANCE

- (a) This policy was established to ensure that all images are lawfully obtained, including face recognition probe images obtained or received, accessed, used, disseminated, retained, and purged by the CIU. This policy also applies to:
- i. Images contained in a known identity face image repository and its related identifying information.
 - ii. The face image searching process.
 - iii. Any results from face recognition searches that may be accessed, searched, used, evaluated, retained, disseminated, and purged by the CIU.
 - iv. Lawfully obtained probe images of unknown suspects that have been added to unsolved image files, pursuant to authorized criminal investigations.
- (b) All CIU personnel, participating agency personnel, and authorized individuals working in direct support of CIU personnel (such as interns), personnel providing information technology services to the CIU, private contractors, and other authorized users will comply with DPD and the CIU's face recognition policy and will be required to complete the training referenced in section 8.11. In addition, authorized CIU personnel tasked with processing face recognition requests and submissions must also complete the specialized training referenced in section 8.11.
- (c) An outside agency, or investigators from an outside agency, may request face recognition searches to assist with investigations only if the outside agency is a law enforcement agency that is making the request based on a valid law enforcement purpose that falls within the authorized uses listed in section 8.2 and the requestor provides a case number and contact information (requestor's name, requestor's agency, address, and phone number) and acknowledges an agreement with the following statement: The result of a face recognition search is provided by DPD only as an investigative lead and IS NOT TO BE CONSIDERED A POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF

ANY SUBJECT. Any possible connection or involvement of any subject to the investigation must be determined through further investigation and investigative resources.

- (d) All technology associated with face recognition, including all related hardware and software support, is bound by the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Security Policy, particularly Policy Area 13, and the Michigan CJIS Security Addendum.
- (e) The information within the face recognition database(s) is considered highly restricted personal information and PII which may only be transmitted, accessed, used, disseminated, and disposed of in accordance with state and federal laws, rules, policies, and regulations; including, but not limited to, the most recent federal CJIS Security Policy, the Michigan CJIS Security Addendum, the CJIS Policy Council Act (1974 PA 163), MCL 28.211-28.216, and the most current CJIS Administrative Rules.
- (f) Improper access, use, or dissemination of highly restricted personal information or PII obtained from the use of the face recognition software may result in criminal penalties and/or administrative sanctions. Criminal violations include, but are not limited to, those found in MCL 28.214 and MCL 257.903.

8.4. ACQUIRING AND RECEIVING FACE RECOGNITION INFORMATION

- (a) DPD's face recognition system can access and perform face recognition searches utilizing the following entity-owned face image repositories: DataWorks Plus.
- (b) The CIU is also authorized to access and perform face recognition searches utilizing the following external repositories: Statewide Network of Agency Photos (SNAP).
- (c) In addition to above, the CIU is authorized to submit requests for face recognition searches to be performed by external entities that own and maintain face image repositories.
- (d) For the purpose of performing face recognition searches, authorized CIU personnel will obtain probe images or accept probe images from authorized requesting or participating agencies only for the authorized uses identified in 8.2.
- (e) The CIU can receive probe images from other law enforcement agencies, as long as it falls within the SNAP Acceptable Use Policy. If a non-law enforcement entity wants to submit a probe image for the purpose of a face recognition search, the entity will be required to file a criminal complaint with the appropriate law enforcement entity prior to the search.
- (f) The CIU and, if applicable, any authorized requesting or participating agencies will not violate First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments and will not perform or request face recognition searches about individuals or organizations based solely on their religious, political, or social views or activities; their participation in a particular noncriminal organization or lawful event; or their races, ethnicities, citizenship, places of origin, ages, disabilities, genders, gender identities, sexual orientations, or other classification protected by law.
 - i. However, DPD accords special consideration to the collection of face images relating to First Amendment-protected events, activities, and affiliations. Because of the sanctity of the First Amendment, law enforcement's role at First Amendment-protected events is usually limited to crowd control and public safety. If, however, during the planning assessment and approval process for the particular event, before proceeding with the collection, the CIU anticipates a need for the collection of face images, the member assigned to vetting the event shall submit a request to DPD's Legal Advisor on a DPD-

568 through channels. The Legal Advisor will articulate whether collection of face images through video of the event is permissible. The memo shall include the legal or justified basis for such collection (including specifics regarding the criminal behavior that is suspected); and how face images may be collected, used, or retained, in accordance with this policy, as appropriate. If face images will be collected, the plan will specify the type of information collection that is permissible, identify who will collect face images, and define the permissible acts of collection.

8.5. USE OF FACE RECOGNITION INFORMATION

- (a) Access to or disclosure of face recognition search results will be provided only to individuals within the entity or in other governmental agencies who are authorized to have access and have completed applicable training outlined in section 8.11, and only for valid law enforcement purposes (e.g., enforcement, reactive investigations), and to IT personnel charged with the responsibility for system administration and maintenance.
- (b) The CIU will prohibit access to and use of the face recognition system, including dissemination of face recognition search results, for the following purposes:
 - i. Non-law enforcement purposes (including but not limited to personal purposes).
 - ii. Any purpose that violates the U.S. Constitution or laws of the United States, including the protections of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
 - iii. Prohibiting or deterring lawful individual exercise of other rights, such as freedom of association, implied by and secured by the U.S. Constitution or any other constitutionally protected right or attribute.
 - iv. Harassing and/or intimidating any individual or group.
 - v. Any other access, use, disclosure, or retention that would violate applicable law, regulation, or policy.
- (c) DPD may connect the face recognition system to any interface that performs live video, including cameras, drone footage, and body-worn cameras. The face recognition system may be configured to conduct face recognition analysis on live or recorded video.
- (d) The following describes the CIU's manual and automated face recognition search procedure, which is conducted in accordance with a valid law enforcement purpose and this policy.
 - i. Authorized CIU personnel will submit a probe image of a subject of interest through the face recognition system.
 - ii. Trained CIU authorized examiners will initially run probe images without filters, using a filtered search as a secondary search, if needed. In some cases, enhancements may be considered after running an image as is against the image repository.
 - iii. Prior to executing the search, the member must enter the reason for the search within the application, as well as an associated case number, if available. Reasons may include the following:
 - a. Consent – when an individual consents to have his or her photograph taken for the purpose of identification.
 - b. Reasonable suspicion of a crime – A reasonable suspicion that an identifiable individual has committed a criminal offense or is involved in or planning criminal

- (including terrorist) conduct or activity that presents a threat to any individual, the community, or the nation and that the information is relevant to the criminal conduct or activity.
- c. Physical/mental incapacity – When an individual is unable to provide reliable identification due to physical incapacitation or defect, mental incapacitation or defect, or death, and immediate identification is needed to assist DPD in performance of his or her lawful duties.
 - d. Comparison to multiple IDs – For comparison to determine whether an individual may have obtained one or more official state driver’s licenses or identification cards that contain inaccurate, conflicting, or false information.
 - e. Identification of other persons of interest – To assist in the identification of potential witnesses and/or victims of violent crime.
- iv. In the automated search, most likely candidates are returned to the requestor ranked in order based on the similarity or confidence level.
 - v. The resulting candidates, if any, are then manually compared with the probe images and examined by an authorized trained examiner. Examiners shall conduct the comparison of images, biometric identifiers, and biometric information in accordance with their training.
 - a. If no likely candidates are found, the requesting entity will be informed of the negative results with the following standard response: “No likely candidates were found with the probe image given.”
 - b. In the case of a negative result, the images examined by the examiner will not be provided to the requesting entity.
 - vi. Examiners will submit the search and subsequent examination results for a peer review of the probe and candidate images for verification by other authorized, trained examiners.
 - vii. All results of most likely candidate images from the face recognition search must be approved by a trained supervisor prior to dissemination.
 - viii. The CIU member shall fill out a Facial Recognition product template for all requests that return likely candidates with the following information:
 - a. The reason facial recognition search request
 - b. The requestor’s name and title and date and time requested
 - c. The original probe image(s), along with any modified image and a description of the type of modifications made to the image
 - d. Source of image
 - e. Possible image matches
 - f. The face recognition software used
 - g. The following statement will accompany the released most likely candidate image(s) and any related records: “The result of a facial recognition search provided by the Detroit Police Department is only an investigative lead and is

NOT TO BE CONSIDERED A POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF ANY SUBJECT. Any possible connection or involvement of any subject to the investigation must be determined through further investigation and investigative resources.”

- ix. The CIU member shall log this in the Information Tracker SmartSheet, along with attachments of the original image plus any modified image, noted in the name.

8.6. SHARING AND DISSEMINATING FACE RECOGNITION INFORMATION

(a) The CIU’s face recognition search information will not be:

- i. Sold, published, exchanged, or disclosed to commercial or private entities or individuals except as required by applicable law and to the extent authorized by DPD’s agreement with the commercial vendor.
- ii. Disclosed or published without prior notice to the originating entity that such information is subject to disclosure or publication. However, DPD and the originating agency may agree in writing in advance that DPD will disclose face recognition search information as part of its normal operations, including disclosure to an external auditor of the face recognition search information.
- iii. Disclosed on a discretionary basis unless the originating agency has provided prior written approval or unless such disclosure is otherwise authorized by DPD and the originating agency.
- iv. Disclosed to unauthorized individuals or for unauthorized purposes.

(b) The CIU will not confirm the existence or nonexistence of face recognition information to any individual or agency that would not be authorized to receive the information unless otherwise required by law.

8.7. DATA QUALITY ASSURANCE

- (a) Original probe images will not be altered, changed, or modified in order to protect the integrity of the image. Any enhancements made to a probe image will be made on a copy, saved as a separate image, and documented to indicate what enhancements were made, including the date and time of change.
- (b) CIU examiners will analyze, review, and evaluate the quality and suitability of probe images, to include factors such as the angle of the face image, level of detail, illumination, size of the face image, and other factors affecting a probe image prior to performing a face recognition search.
- (c) The integrity of information depends on quality control and correction of recognized errors which is key to mitigating the potential risk of misidentification or inclusion of individuals in a possible identification. CIU will investigate, in a timely manner, alleged errors and malfunctions or deficiencies of face recognition information or, if applicable, will request that the originating agency or vendor investigate the alleged errors and malfunctions or deficiencies. The CIU will correct the information or advise the process for obtaining correction of the information.

8.8. SECURITY AND MAINTENANCE

- (a) Access to DPD face recognition information from outside the facility will be allowed only over secure networks. All results produced by the CIU as a result of a face recognition search are disseminated by secured electronic means (such as an official government e-mail address). Non-electronic disseminations will be conducted personally or by phone with the requestor or designee.

- (b) Authorized access to DPD's face recognition system will be granted only to personnel whose positions and job duties require such access and who have successfully completed a background check and the training referenced in section 8.11 Training.
- (c) Usernames and passwords to the face recognition system are not transferrable, must not be shared by CIU personnel, and must be kept confidential.
- (d) Queries made to DPD's face recognition system will be logged into the system identifying the user initiating the query. All user access, including participating agency access, and queries are subject to review and audit.

8.9. INFORMATION RETENTION AND PURGING

- (a) All members shall follow DPD's information retention policies in relation to face recognition searches and images.
- (b) In accordance with Recommendations for First Amendment-Protected Events for State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, "[a]gencies should limit the retention of information as much as possible to avoid the perception of maintaining files on groups or persons who engage in protected First Amendment activities."
- (c) Images accessed by DPD for face recognition searches in SNAP are not maintained or owned by DPD and are subject to the retention policies of the respective agencies authorized to maintain those images.


8.10. ACCOUNTABILITY AND ENFORCEMENT

- (a) If CIU personnel, a participating agency, or an authorized user is found to be in noncompliance with the provisions of this policy regarding the collection, receipt, access, use, dissemination, retention, and purging, the Commanding Officer of the CIU will:
 - i. Suspend or discontinue access to information by the CIU personnel, the participating agency, or the authorized user.
 - ii. Apply appropriate disciplinary or administrative actions or sanctions.
 - iii. Refer the matter to appropriate authorities for criminal prosecution, as necessary, to effectuate the purposes of the policy.
- (b) DPD reserves the right to establish the qualifications and number of personnel having access to DPD's face recognition system and to suspend or withhold service and deny access to any participating agency or participating agency personnel violating this face recognition policy.

8.11. TRAINING

- (a) DPD's face recognition policy training program will cover:
 - i. Elements of the operation of the face recognition program, including:
 - a. Purpose and provisions of the face recognition policy.
 - b. Substance and intent of the provisions of this face recognition policy and any revisions thereto relating to collection, receipt, access, use, dissemination, retention, and purging of DPD's face recognition information.
 - c. Policies and procedures that mitigate the risk of profiling.

- d. How to implement the face recognition policy in the day-to-day work of the user, whether a paper or systems user.
 - e. Security awareness training.
 - f. How to identify, report, and respond to a suspected or confirmed breach.
 - g. Cultural awareness training.
- ii. Elements related to the results generated by the face recognition system, including:
 - a. Originating and participating agency responsibilities and obligations under applicable federal, state, or local law and policy.
 - b. The P/CRCL protections on the use of the technology and the information collected or received, including constitutional protections, and applicable state, local, and federal laws.
 - c. Face recognition system functions, limitations, and interpretation of results.
 - d. Mechanisms for reporting violations of CIU and DPD face recognition policy provisions.
 - e. The nature and possible penalties for face recognition policy violations, including possible transfer, dismissal, criminal liability, and immunity, if any.
- iii. In addition to the training described, CIU face recognition examiners are required to complete advanced specialized training to include:
 - a. Face recognition system functions, limitations, and interpretation of results.
 - b. Use of image enhancement and video editing software.
 - c. Appropriate procedures and how to assess image quality and suitability for face recognition searches.
 - d. Proper procedures and evaluation criteria for one-to-many and one-to-one face image comparisons.
 - e. Candidate image verification process.

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE (SOP)		Section 9
DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT		
Crime Intelligence Unit		
	EFFECTIVE DATE 7/1/2018	REVISED DATE 4/1/2019
	TOTAL SECTION PAGES: 7	
	SUBJECT 9. EMERGENCY PROCEDURES	
APPROVED BY: Deputy Chief Marlon Wilson		

9.1. PURPOSE

The purpose of this section is to establish a no-notice response plan in the event that the RTCC becomes inoperable and must relocate to the Emergency Operations Center (EOC), located at the Lyndon facility at 13331 Lyndon. This relocation plan shall meet the following goals:


- (a) Guide supervision by providing a plan to safely execute the relocation of all employees of the CIU to the EOC.
- (b) To ensure the continuous service and operation of the RTCC, CTAT, and Project Green Light Detroit.
- (c) To establish protocol for transportation and the establishment of temporary operations at EOC.
- (d) To establish protocol for reactivation of the RTCC once all issues are resolved.

9.2. EXECUTION

In the event CIU personnel must evacuate and relocate to the EOC, the highest ranking member or designee shall make every effort possible to complete each of the following steps before evacuating the RTCC. Depending on the urgency of the situation, these steps may be completed out of order and it shall be the responsibility of the RTCC floor supervisor to use their best judgement in determining what order to execute them. The supervisor is strongly encouraged, if possible, to identify a scribe that will assist the supervisor by documenting the details of event.

9.3. STEP 1: MAKE NOTIFICATIONS

- (a) *Internal Notifications:* The shift supervisor will notify the Commanding Officer of CIU. The Captain will then make executive notifications as well as notifications to the Lieutenant(s) and Executive Manager(s). Subsequent notifications will be made following the Mobilization Chart in SmartSheet, advising oncoming shifts to report to the EOC. All CIU supervision shall ensure they have access to the CIU mobilization SmartSheet on their mobile device in advance of any emergency.



(b) **Department Notifications:** The RTCC shift supervisor shall make the following departmental notifications:

- i. **Notification and Control:** Notifications to the Notification and Control Desk can be made in person or via telephone. The notification must include a request for a citywide broadcast indicating the RTCC is inoperable. In the event that Communications is not operational, notification will be made directly to:
 - a. Lieutenant Jamar Rickett at (313) 648-9371, or
 - b. TCRU Supervisor at (313) 267-4635.
- ii. **Emergency Operation Center (EOC):** Detroit Homeland Security and Emergency Management shall be notified to activate the EOC for the purposes of standing up the temporary RTCC.
 - a. During normal business hours, call (313) 596-2590.
 - b. After hours, call Deputy Director Hilton Kincaid at (313) 300-7486 or
 - c. Emergency Management Coordinator Donna Northern at (313) 600-5266.

9.4. STEP 2: PEPARE TRANSPORTATION TO THE EMERGENCY OPERATION CENTER

- (a) **Conduct a Roll Call of all on-duty CIU personnel:** Before leaving the RTCC, a roll call shall be conducted to ensure all personnel are accounted for, including staff that may be in the field.

Send all non-essential personnel home and log their absence. All essential personnel shall prepare for the evacuation and relocation.

- (b) **Establish Transportation:** In the event CIU personnel are not able to utilize their personal vehicles, the RTCC floor supervisor must arrange for transportation to the EOC. Transportation request can be arranged by Communications or the Notification and Control Desk. In the event those entities cannot request transportation, the RTCC supervisor shall make a request in the following order. If transport cannot be established, move to the next entity.
 - i. **Metro Division Bus and/or Fleet Management:**
 - a. Deputy Chief Elvin Barren Neighborhood Policing Bureau-East (313) 614-3143
 - b. Commander Szilagy Metro Division (313) 920-7965
 - c. Captain Kurt Worboys Metro Division (313) 268-4695
 - d. Lieutenant Matt Taylor Bomb Squad (313) 614-3755
 - e. Lieutenant John Watkins Fleet Management (313) 596-5590
 - ii. **Detroit Department of Transportation (DDOT) Police Department to arrange for a DDOT bus:**
 - a. Chief Ricky Brown at (313) 224-4528 or (313) 530-0119
 - b. Deputy Chief William Hart (313) 596-1565 or (313) 530-0362
- (c) **Use of CIU vehicles:** The keys are kept at the supervisor's console (#13) on the RTCC floor. The vehicles will be parked on the 7th floor of the parking structure of the DPSH along the north outer wall. These vehicles will be used to convey personnel from DPSH to EOC by a designee established by the floor supervisor of CIU, making return trips until all staff has been transferred safely.
 - i. 143023 – 2014 Dodge Charger 088x522
 - ii. 152634 – 2015 Gray Ford Fusion 088x525

9.5. STEP 4: PREPARE TO EVACUATE THE RTCC

- (a) **Forward CIU telephone:** The RTCC floor supervisor shall ensure the main CIU phone number (313) 596-2250 is forwarded to the EOC at (313) 596-1675. To forward the CIU main line, go to the front reception desk phone, leave the phone in the cradle and follow these steps:
 - i. Press "Fwd" on the display and enter the number "596-1675."
 - ii. Press "Fwd" again. This will forward any calls coming in to (313) 596-1675.
- (b) **Collect essential equipment:** The RTCC floor supervisor shall designate staff to collect and secure the following equipment until arrival at the EOC. If circumstances allow, the supervisor shall audit all CIU equipment before evacuation. Once the temporary RTCC is established at the EOC, the supervisor shall conduct a second audit of all equipment.
 - i. 30 PREP radios and 5 Lighthouse radios
 - ii. Rifles and any other valuables stored in the CIU safe (to be removed and secured by sworn staff only)
 - iii. (2) Laptop computers, stored in the Lieutenant's office

- iv. Vehicle keys
 - v. Daily detail for each shift
 - vi. Phone Number Resource Guide
 - vii. Necessary office supplies
- (c) **CTAT Alert:** Direct a member to send out a CTAT alert regarding the evacuation.
- (d) **Secure the RTCC:** All efforts shall be made by the floor supervisor to secure the RTCC in our absence.
- i. Lock the office doors.
 - ii. Lock the conference room, plotter and storage room.
- (e) **Inform staff:** Clearly communicate to ALL staff where they are to report.
- i. If CIU staff are driving their personal vehicles, they are to meet at the EOC. Ensure everyone has the address (13331 Lyndon, Detroit, MI 48227) and directions if necessary.
 - ii. If group transportation is necessary, advise all staff they shall meet at Third and Howard.



9.6. STEP 5: EVACUATE

Instruct all staff to evacuate using the nearest emergency exit and according to protocol previously established by DPSH Security (add info). Proceed to the pre-determined location.


- (a) **Conduct Roll Call:** If CIU staff meets at Third and Howard for group transportation, a roll call shall be conducted to ensure all personnel are accounted for.

9.7. STEP 6: ESTABLISH THE TEMPORARY RTCC AT THE EOC

All CIU supervisors will be able to access the front gate and enter the facility by utilizing their DPSH access card. Once personnel has arrived at the EOC, the supervisor shall ensure the following tasks are complete to reestablish the operation of the RTCC.

- (a) *Conduct a Roll Call of all on-duty CIU personnel:* A roll call shall be conducted to ensure all personnel are present.
- (b) *Notify oncoming staff:* The supervisor shall ensure the oncoming shift is notified to report to the EOC for on-duty roll call.
- (c) *Assignments:* Re-assign all duties to staff and assign a console based on the layout below.

Detroit Emergency Operations Center (EOC)



- (d) *Console set-up:* Each console has the ability to access the department intranet for Groupwise, Genetec, Talon, and individual Z-Drives, which will allow for the continuation of RTCC operations. Templates and folders can be accessed from individual Z-Drives. There will not be access to Motorola Command Aware Console except at the supervisor's workstation. The EOC Directory can be found in Appendix E.
- (e) *Test the printer:* Printer access is 13331 Lyndon HSEM Xerox C8030 on DPD-Print.
- (f) *Test the phone:* Test the functionality of the CIU main line. If there is any issue receiving telephone calls at the EOC, CIU will utilize (313) 596-1675 as the main line until otherwise notified. If CIU is using the alternate phone line, the Notification and Control Desk must be notified.
- (g) *Make notifications:* Once the operation of the temporary RTCC is established, the supervisor shall notify the Commanding Officer of the Crime Intelligence Unit and the Notification and Control Desk. The supervisor will request that the Notification and Control Desk make a citywide

broadcast announcing the re-opening of the RTCC. Operations will continue at the EOC until the RTCC is restored at DPSH.

9.8. STEP 7: RESTORE OPERATIONS AT THE RTCC AT DPSH

Once it is determined that CIU can restore operations at DPSH, the following steps shall be taken:

- (a) *Coordinated Operations:* A CIU supervisor and two employees shall remain at the EOC to continue operations of the temporary RTCC while all other personnel relocates to DPSH.
- (b) *Transportation:* A CIU supervisor will contact Metro Division to coordinate transportation with the Metro Division bus if necessary.
- (c) *RTCC Operations:* Upon arrival to the RTCC, all consoles shall be checked for functionality. Once it is determined that all equipment is functioning normally, operations will be transferred back to the RTCC.
- (d) *Transfer telephones:* Follow these steps from the reception desk phone to transfer telephone operations back to the RTCC:
 - i. Press the button under the "Fwd" on the left side.
 - ii. Press under the "Cancel" on right hand side. This will restore the phones to the RTCC.
- (e) *Notifications:* The Commanding Officer of the CIU will make executive notifications regarding the restoration of the RTCC. A CIU supervisor shall notify the Notification and Control Desk that operations are restored at DPSH and request a citywide broadcast announcing the RTCC is operational.
- (f) *Preparing for departure from the EOC:* The supervisor shall ensure the EOC is clean prior to leaving and collect all DPD equipment collected and returned to the RTCC.
- (g) *Leaving the EOC:* Once CIU personnel arrives at DPSH and can confirm that operations are reestablished, the supervisor and the two remaining employees should return to the RTCC.

9.9. MAINTENANCE OF THE EOC

Quarterly testing will be established by the Lieutenant to ensure the functionality of the necessary equipment at the EOC in the event that it has to be activated. This shall be documented on the RTCC supervisor blotter. Quarterly drills involving CIU members will also be coordinated by the Lieutenant.

9.10. CHECKLIST FOR EMERGENCY EVACUATION

- (a) Make Notifications
 - i. CIU Commanding Officer
 - ii. Communications
 - iii. EOC, Lyndon Facility
 - iv. Transportation
- (b) Transfer phones
- (c) Secure radios
- (d) Secure weapons from safe
- (e) Secure laptop computers


- (f) Secure cell phone
- (g) Pens, note books, phone number resource guide
- (h) Mobilization Sheet
 - i. Daily Details for upcoming shifts
- (i) Emergency Contact Cards for employees
- (j) Vehicle Keys

9.11. BUILDING SECURITY PLAN

In response to a minor incident at the building, CIU is responsible for:

- (a) Monitoring DEPSC5 at all times. Building security may communicate with the RTCC by using this channel or by phone. All consoles should have this channel unselected and the volume up. There will be radio checks occasionally.
- (b) If security calls for police assistance due to an incident in the building, members must notify District 1 and request a scout.
- (c) CIU must also send two sworn members to assist security. If only one member is available, the CIU member must request assistance from other sworn members in the building that are monitoring DEPSC5. There should be a floor captain monitoring on each floor during business hours. If the RTCC is unable to contact another sworn member, the remaining RTCC sworn member may either respond using caution or wait for the responding scout to approach.
- (d) If there are no sworn personnel at CIU, CIU members must communicate that information over DEPSC5 and let District 1 know that RTCC is unable to respond.

10. APPENDIX A: RTCC FLOOR OPERATIONS



11. APPENDIX B: DPSH SECURITY RESPONSE MANUAL

DPSH



Detroit Public Safety Headquarters

Security Response Manual

Detroit Public Safety Headquarters (DPSH)

EMERGENCY AND SAFETY PROCEDURES

Important Phone Numbers

Police/Fire/Medical:	911
DPSH DFD EMS (6 th Floor North)	(313) 596-5187
DPSH Command Center:	(313) 237-6399
DPSH Property Management Office:	(313) 237-6655
DPSH Director of Security	(313) 910-5147

After hours, the Property Management Office number forwards to building security.


Detroit Public Safety Headquarters 1301 Third Street Detroit, MI 48226

MEDICAL EMERGENCIES

If someone becomes ill or is injured and requires medical attention:

- Call 911; give them the building's address (1301 Third Street, Detroit), your floor (Core, North or South). Advise them to respond to the Abbott Street Guard House.
- Contact the Detroit Fire Department (DFD) Emergency Medical Services (EMS) personnel in the DPSH building on the 6th Floor North at **(313) 596-5187**. Give them the location of the incident within the DPSH.
- Call the Command Center at (313) 237-6399; advise them of your location and the nature of the victim's illness/injury. Confirm 911 and EMS has been called.
- Unless trained, do not attempt to render any first aid before trained assistance arrives.
- Do not attempt to move a person who has fallen.
- Comfort the victim and reassure them that medical assistance is on the way.

Workstations will have a number assigned to them throughout the building as designated by a small clear sign hanging on each workstation panel. These numbers will be a source to direct 911, EMS, the building courtesy staff or property management staff to a specific location in the building if needed. An example of this is the following:



Private Offices and Conference Rooms have numbers assigned to the wall outside the door into respective rooms.

If you do not know or see a workstation number, then provide the floor, suite, and area detail.

EMERGENCY PHONE NUMBERS	
Police/Fire/Medical:	911
DPSH DFD EMS (6 th Floor North)	(313) 596-5187
DPSH Command Center:	(313) 237-6399
DPSH Property Management Office:	(313) 237-6655

FLOODING AND WATER DAMAGE

If a water leak occurs:

- Call the Property Management Office at (313) 237-6655, report the exact location and severity of the leak.
- If there are electrical appliances or outlets near the leak, use extreme caution. If there is any possible danger, evacuate the area immediately.
- If you know the source of the water and are confident of your ability to stop the flow (i.e., unclog the drain, turn off the water, etc.), then do so.
- Be prepared to assist as directed in protecting objects that are in jeopardy. Take only necessary steps to avoid or reduce immediate water damage such as covering objects with plastic sheeting, or moving small or light objects out of danger.

EMERGENCY PHONE NUMBERS

Police/Fire/Medical:	911
DPSH DFD EMS (6 th Floor North)	(313) 596-5187
DPSH Command Center:	(313) 237-6399
DPSH Property Management Office:	(313) 237-6655

POWER OUTAGE

If a power outage occurs in the building:

- Call the Command Center at (313) 237-6399; advise them of your location and the nature of the problem.
- Turn off equipment such as computers and monitors to avoid potential serious damage once the power is restored.
- If you are in a dark area, proceed cautiously to an area that has emergency lights.
- If you are on an elevator, stay calm. Use the alarm button to alert the Command Center.
 - Pick up the elevator phone to dial directly into the elevator company's emergency response office. They will be able to assist in proper notifications and responses.
- If instructed to evacuate, proceed cautiously as directed

EMERGENCY PHONE NUMBERS

Police/Fire/Medical:	911
DPSH DFD EMS (6 th Floor North)	(313) 596-5187
DPSH Command Center:	(313) 237-6399
DPSH Property Management Office:	(313) 237-6655

TORNADO/SEVERE WEATHER

Emergency Communications System

- The Command Center will make an announcement over the Emergency Communications System in the event that severe weather conditions make it necessary for employees to move to designated shelter areas.
- An announcement will be made over the Emergency Communications System advising employees when it is safe to return to work areas.

If a tornado warning is issued:

- Proceed to the interior stairwells, corridors and restrooms.
- Avoid windows, mirrors, glass and unsecured objects such as filing cabinets.
- Do not use elevators.

EMERGENCY PHONE NUMBERS

Police/Fire/Medical:	911
DPSH DFD EMS (6 th Floor North)	(313) 596-5187
DPSH Command Center:	(313) 237-6399
DPSH Property Management Office:	(313) 237-6655

CHEMICAL SPILLS/CHEMICAL FIRES

If a chemical spill occurs:

- If toxic chemicals come in contact with your skin or eyes, immediately flush the affected area with clear water.
- Call the Property Management Office immediately at (313) 237-6655.
- Always err on the side of safety – if there is any possible danger, evacuate the area.

If a chemical fire occurs:

- Call 911; give them the building's address (1301 Third Avenue, Detroit), your floor (Core, North or South).
- Call the Command Center at (313) 237-6399 immediately.
- If the fire is small, and you are not exposed to its fumes and you have received appropriate training, attempt to put it out with a proper fire extinguisher.
- Evacuate the area if you are unable to put out the fire. Close doors and windows behind you to confine the fire. Proceed to the nearest exit.
- Do not attempt to save possessions at the risk of personal injury.
- All chemical spills and fires, no matter how small, should be reported.

EMERGENCY PHONE NUMBERS

Police/Fire/Medical:	911
DPSH DFD EMS (6 th Floor North)	(313) 596-5187
DPSH Command Center:	(313) 237-6399
DPSH Property Management Office:	(313) 237-6655

BOMB THREATS

If you receive a bomb threat:

- Keep the caller on the line as long as possible. Listen carefully. Note the time of call and telephone number from which it came.
 - Remember to check caller ID and note the incoming telephone number and time.
- Write down any pertinent information such as background noises, sex of caller, accents and patterns of speech.
 - Also note whether caller has specific knowledge of the facility or personnel.
 - Is the line called a published or general number or a private number?
 - Does caller appear familiar with explosives?
- Call the Command Center at (313) 237-6399 as soon as possible.

Ask caller the following questions:

- Where is the bomb?
- When will it explode?
- What does the bomb look like?
- What kind of bomb is it?
- What is the caller's name and motive for placing the bomb?
- Are you an employee?

EMERGENCY PHONE NUMBERS

Police/Fire/Medical:	911
DPSH DFD EMS (6 th Floor North)	(313) 596-5187
DPSH Command Center:	(313) 237-6399
DPSH Property Management Office:	(313) 237-6655

If you receive a written threat:

- Notify the Command Center at (313) 237-6399 immediately.
- If the threat poses an imminent risk contact the Police immediately.
- Advise Security and the Police if the threat is specific to any individual or location.
- Isolate the letter or note and do not allow it to be handled.
 - This includes the envelope or package it was received in.
 - Protect the evidence for police.
- If received via email do not turn off your computer.
- Write down everything you remember about the letter or parcel.
- Save all packing materials.

Always err on the side of safety. If you believe that the parcel may be an explosive device, calmly alert individuals in your area to leave quietly, and contact the Command Center immediately.

EMERGENCY PHONE NUMBERS

Police/Fire/Medical:	911
DPSH DFD EMS (6 th Floor North)	(313) 596-5187
DPSH Command Center:	(313) 237-6399
DPSH Property Management Office:	(313) 237-6655

SUSPICIOUS PACKAGE OR PARCEL

If you receive a suspicious package:

- Notify the Command Center at (313) 237-6399 immediately.
- Do not attempt to open the package.
- Do not place the article in water or a confined space such as desk drawer.
- Keep anyone from handling the package or going near it.
- Do not use a portable radio or cellular phone near the package.
- Write down everything you remember about the letter or parcel.
- Save all packing materials.

Always err on the side of safety. If you believe that the parcel may be an explosive device, calmly alert individuals in your area to leave quietly, and contact the Command-Center immediately.

EMERGENCY PHONE NUMBERS

Police/Fire/Medical:	911
DPSH DFD EMS (6 th Floor North)	(313) 596-5187
DPSH Command Center:	(313) 237-6399
DPSH Property Management Office:	(313) 237-6655

EXPLOSIONS

If you hear or experience a nearby explosion:

- Call 911; give them the building's address (1301 Third Ave, Detroit), your floor (Core, North or South).
- Call the Command Center at (313) 237-6399; advise them of your location and provide a description of what occurred and what you observed.
- Be prepared for the possibility of further explosions.
- Seek immediate shelter under a table or desk.
- Stay as far away as possible from windows, mirrors, overhead fixtures, filing cabinets and bookcases. Also avoid electrical equipment and large, heavy, unstable objects.
- Be guided by Security, Police or Fire Department personnel. If evacuation is ordered, see the Evacuation section of this pamphlet.
- Do not move seriously injured persons unless they are in obvious immediate danger (i.e., fire, building collapse, etc.)
- Open doors carefully, and watch for falling objects.
- Do not use elevators.
- If requested, accompany and assist persons with disabilities who appear to need direction or assistance.
- Do not use matches or lighters.
- Use telephones for emergencies only. Remember that others may also be calling emergency phone numbers. If the line is busy, remain calm and try your call again.
- Prior planning includes being familiar with possible hazards in your area and knowing evacuation routes and the location of the nearest pull stations and fire extinguishers.

EMERGENCY PHONE NUMBERS

Police/Fire/Medical:	911
DPSH DFD EMS (6 th Floor North)	(313) 596-5187
DPSH Command Center:	(313) 237-6399
DPSH Property Management Office:	(313) 237-6655

EARTHQUAKES

If you are inside:

- Stay inside.
- Watch for falling objects.
- Crawl under a desk or table.
- Get into a protective position by tucking your head to your knees and covering your head with your arms.
- Stay away from:
 - Windows and mirrors
 - Overhead fixtures
 - Filing cabinets
 - Bookcases
 - Electrical appliances
 - Hanging objects

After the earthquake:

- Remain calm.
- Be prepared for aftershocks.
- If evacuation is ordered, proceed to the nearest clear exit.
- Do not use elevators.
- Do not move seriously injured persons unless they are in danger.
- Open doors carefully.
- Watch out for falling objects.
- Do not use matches or lighters.
- Use telephones for emergencies only. Remember that others may also be calling emergency phone numbers. If the line is busy, remain calm and try your call again.

EMERGENCY PHONE NUMBERS

Police/Fire/Medical:	911
DPSH DFD EMS (6 th Floor North)	(313) 596-5187
DPSH Command Center:	(313) 237-6399
DPSH Property Management Office:	(313) 237-6655

EVACUATIONS

Evacuation procedures:

If an Emergency Team Leader or an emergency announcement instructs you to evacuate the building or go to a safe area:

- Remain calm.
- Do not take personal items with you.
- Close doors behind you while exiting.
- Use stairways to exit the floor; listen to the emergency announcement for specific evacuation instructions.
- Walk; do not run.
- Do not use elevators
- All tenants will gather on Howard Street between the service drive and third street south of the DPSH parking structure.
- It is imperative that you "check-in" with your Emergency Team Leader at the assembly area so that they can account for your whereabouts.
- Assist your Emergency Team Leader and Security by determining if all persons from your area are accounted for.

Emergency Team Leader:

- Know your Emergency Team Leader.
- If you are the Emergency Team Leader, make sure you know your floor.
- The Emergency Team Leader will assist in the evacuation of all personnel.
- If an Emergency Team Leader asks you to assist them in the evacuation (i.e., guiding others, carrying disabled employees, etc.), please comply with the request.

EMERGENCY PHONE NUMBERS

Police/Fire/Medical:	911
DPSH DFD EMS (6 th Floor North)	(313) 596-5187
DPSH Command Center:	(313) 237-6399
DPSH Property Management Office:	(313) 237-6655

FIRE ALARM DETECTION DEVICE

If a fire alarm detection device is activated

- Activated device will be displayed in the annunciator panel in the Abbott Security Booth.
- Security dispatches FA system trained security or engineering staff to area of alarm for confirmation.
- If alarm is real, Security over-rides the alarm delay putting building in immediate alarm.
- Security dials 911 to inform of nature of alarm and location.
- Begin orderly evacuation of Building tenants to the designated meeting area at Howard Street between Third Street and the Lodge Service Drive. Each Floor has an assigned emergency team leader who is responsible for confirming everyone is out of private offices, conference rooms, storage rooms and restrooms before he (she) heads down the exist stairway.
- If Security and response personnel determine the alarm to be false, the device is cleared and reset by Security.
- In the event of an evacuation, all tenants will gather on Howard Street between the service drive and third street south of the DPSH parking structure.
- All alarms are to be responded to as legitimate. DO NOT call Security or Building Management to inquire whether an alarm is legitimate or false. Treat all alarms as real and evacuate.

EMERGENCY PHONE NUMBERS

Police/Fire/Medical:	911
DPSH DFD EMS (6 th Floor North)	(313) 596-5187
DPSH Command Center:	(313) 237-6399
DPSH Property Management Office:	(313) 237-6655

FIRE

If you discover fire or smoke:

- Call 911; give them the building's address (1301 Third Ave., Detroit), your floor (Core, North or South).
- Call the Command Center at (313) 237-6399 and describe the location and size of the fire if possible, or alert the Command Center by pulling a fire alarm. Please note that the initial alarm will sound only in the Command Center.
- Assist other employees, if it is safe to do so.
- Close the door to confine smoke and fire.
- Take immediate action to control the fire, if it is safe to do so and you have been properly trained.
- Proceed to a safe stairwell and begin to evacuate, unless told to do otherwise by emergency personnel.
- If entering a room, feel the door with the back of your hand before opening it.
- Do not open any door that appears hot.
- If smoke is present, stay low. The best quality of air is near the floor.
- Return to the building only when instructed by emergency personnel.
- In the event of an evacuation, all tenants will gather on Howard Street between the service drive and third street south of the DPSH parking structure.

i.

If you catch on fire:

DO NOT RUN!

- **STOP** where you are,
- **DROP** to the ground, and
- **ROLL** over and over to smother flames.

EMERGENCY PHONE NUMBERS

Police/Fire/Medical:	911
DPSH DFD EMS (6 th Floor North)	(313) 596-5187
DPSH Command Center:	(313) 237-6399
DPSH Property Management Office:	(313) 237-6655

If you are trapped in your workspace:

- Wedge wet towels or cloth materials along the bottom of the door to keep out smoke.
- Close as many doors between you and the fire as possible.
- Use the telephone to notify the Command Center at (313) 237-6399 or the Fire Department (911) of your location.
- If you are trapped in an area and need fresh air, only break the window as a last resort.

If you hear an audible fire alarm or an Emergency Communication System Announcement instructing you to evacuate:

- Go to the nearest exit or emergency stairwell and begin orderly evacuation to the designated meeting area at Howard Street between Third Street and the Lodge Service Drive. Do not use elevators.
- If requested, accompany and assist persons with disabilities who appear to need direction or assistance.
- Leave all personal belongings and packages behind.
- Return to the building only when instructed by emergency personnel.

EMERGENCY PHONE NUMBERS

Police/Fire/Medical:	911
DPSH DFD EMS (6 th Floor North)	(313) 596-5187
DPSH Command Center:	(313) 237-6399
DPSH Property Management Office:	(313) 237-6655

LOCK DOWN

Barricading procedures:

In the event of a serious physical security breach posing a threat to tenants:

- If you see an armed intruder or hear shots fired, move to a secure location and call 911 immediately and report this information to Security.
- An announcement will be made over the Emergency Communications System alerting personnel to initiate a lock down.
- Secure yourself and co-workers in a locked office suite, interior office, closet, lockable storage area, or lockable restroom and await an all clear announcement by responding Police.
- Stay off of elevators, out of stairwells and open corridors.
- Silence cellular telephones and radios.
- Do not pull a fire alarm to alert personnel of a threat, as this could place personnel at risk.
- Remain barricaded until cleared by Police or an announcement is made over the Emergency Communications System.

- If Police swept your area, do not make sudden moves and follow the commands of responding officers at all times.

EMERGENCY PHONE NUMBERS

Police/Fire/Medical:	911
DPSH DFD EMS (6 th Floor North)	(313) 596-5187
DPSH Command Center:	(313) 237-6399
DPSH Property Management Office:	(313) 237-6655

12. APPENDIX C: TMC STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES SUMMARY SHEET

HOURS

(a) Standard Operating Hours

- i. M-W 06:00-19:00
- ii. Th 06:30-20:00
- iii. Fri 06:30-02:00
- iv. Sat 18:00-03:00

(b) Special Events

- i. Adjusted staffing hours/overtime for some events
 - a. North American Auto Show
 - b. Fireworks Display
 - c. Thanksgiving Day Parade
 - d. Tigers Opening Day
 - e. Free Press Marathon
- ii. City Holidays
 - a. The TMC currently remains closed on City holidays and non-essential services shutdowns.

OPERATIONS

(a) Twice Daily Equipment Checks

- i. Morning check and afternoon check
- ii. Communication status of CCTVs, signals, and system detectors
- iii. Summary of non-communicating equipment sent to TED and MCE staff
- iv. Create work orders as necessary for equipment failures

(b) System Monitoring

- i. Watch for congestion and note recurring queueing
- ii. Observe effects of road closures on traffic and propose to TED that changes be made if necessary

(c) Reports

- i. Compile monthly operations report
 - a. Includes communication status of ITS equipment for the month
 - b. Includes crash data, such as total crashes, highest crash frequency locations, fatalities, and pedestrian-involved crashes
 - c. Includes street maintenance information, such as miles of road paved and potholes filled

- d. Includes sign information, such as the number of signs fabricated, removed, etc.
- ii. Event specific reports
 - a. Highlights hours worked for the event
 - b. Notes incidents and queueing that occurred during the event


CCTV CAMERAS

- (a) Current SOP defines TMC operations to monitor traffic conditions with the CCTV cameras
- (b) Non-traffic related incidents are not to be viewed or have information released
 - i. Exception is allowed when requested specifically by a DPD or MSP officer who is present at the TMC
 - ii. Any members of the public, including staff at Little Caesar's Arena, Ford Field, and Comerica Park, can receive only traffic-related information, such as:
 - a. Location of an incident
 - b. Number of lanes blocked, number of vehicles involved, length of backup
 - c. Estimate of duration of blockage/congestion
 - d. Advise alternate routes
 - iii. First responders may receive additional information regarding incidents, such as:
 - a. Confirmed locations and severity of event
 - b. Number of units involved in the incident
 - c. Details regarding how the incident occurred, if available
 - d. Advise first responders of current traffic conditions in the area
 - e. Ensure all information given is confirmed

SIGNALS

- (a) Monitor signal status
 - i. Input work orders in WOTS for communication interruptions as necessary
 - ii. Notify maintenance of any signals that have flashing mode indicated in Tactics
- (b) Timing plans
 - iii. If TED deems it necessary for an event, adjust dials to special event timings

13. APPENDIX D: DPSH EMERGENCY EVACUATION PLAN



1st Floor
Detroit Public
Safety Headquarters

Emergency Evacuation Plan

YOU ARE HERE ●

PRIMARY EVACUATION ROUTE →

SECONDARY EVACUATION ROUTE →


STAIRWAYS ■

ELEVATORS ⊠

FIRE EQUIPMENT T

NORTH ↓


3rd Floor Detroit Public Safety Headquarters



Emergency Evacuation Plan

- YOU ARE HERE
- ➔ PRIMARY EVACUATION ROUTE
- ➔ SECONDARY EVACUATION ROUTE
- ▬ STAIRWAYS
- ⊠ ELEVATORS
- ⊠ FIRE EQUIPMENT


4th Floor Detroit Public Safety Headquarters



Emergency Evacuation Plan

- YOU ARE HERE
- ➔ PRIMARY EVACUATION ROUTE
- ➔ SECONDARY EVACUATION ROUTE
- ▬ STAIRWAYS
- ⊠ ELEVATORS
- 🔥 FIRE EQUIPMENT


5th Floor Detroit Public Safety Headquarters



Emergency Evacuation Plan

- YOU ARE HERE
- ➔ PRIMARY EVACUATION ROUTE
- ➔ SECONDARY EVACUATION ROUTE
- ▬ STAIRWAYS
- ⊠ ELEVATORS
- ⊠ FIRE EQUIPMENT


6th Floor Detroit Public Safety Headquarters



Emergency Evacuation Plan

- YOU ARE HERE
- PRIMARY EVACUATION ROUTE
- SECONDARY EVACUATION ROUTE
- STAIRWAYS
- ⊠ ELEVATORS
- ⊠ FIRE EQUIPMENT

7th Floor Detroit Public Safety Headquarters



Emergency Evacuation Plan

- YOU ARE HERE
- ➔ PRIMARY EVACUATION ROUTE
- ➔ SECONDARY EVACUATION ROUTE
- ▬ STAIRWAYS
- ⊠ ELEVATORS
- ⊠ FIRE EQUIPMENT

14. APPENDIX E: DETROIT EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER (EOC) DIRECTORY

Table 1

Detroit Police – 596-1676	Fire Marshall – 596-6589
Detroit Police – 596-1678	Fire Chief – 596-5026
Detroit Police – 596-1675	Fire Admin – 596-1680

Table 2

Wayne County – 596-5034	Homeland Security/Emerg. Mgmt – 596-5031
Detroit Crime Commission – 596-5056	MSP – Emergency Management – 596-5041
Detroit Crime Commission – 596-1689	MSP – 596-1688

Table 3

Federal Agency – 596-1599	FBI – 596-1670
Federal Agency – 596-1597	Federal Agency – 596-1589
Federal Agency – 596-1598	Federal Agency – 596-1671

Table 4

Detroit Police – 596-5061	Detroit Fire – 596-5080
Detroit Police – 596-1667	EMS – 596-5029
Detroit Police – 596-5028	Fire Chaplain – 596-1669

Table 5

Municipal Parking – 596-5035	DDOT – 596-5066
People Mover – 596-6588	Transit Police – 596-5677
Transit Police – 596-5036	DDOT – 596-5047

Table 6

Recreation – 596-1674	Public Health – 596-6585
Salvation Army – 596-1681	Region 2 South – 596-5084
Red Cross – 596-1682	Hospital Representative – 596-5082

Table 7

Public Lighting – 596-6583	DTE Energy – 596-5038
Public Lighting – 596-5040	Gaming – 596-5039

Table 8

Environmental – 596-6567	DPW – 596-6580
Building & Safety – 596-5052	DPW – 596-5049

Table 9

Water & Sewerage – 596-1690	Water & Sewerage – 596-1691
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North Wall

HSEM Coordinator – 596-1595	HSEM Director/Deputy Director – 596-1596
HSEM Project Manager – 596-1592	Public Information – 596-1591
Mayor’s Staff/CCSD – 596-1593	Mayor’s Staff – 596-5053

South Wall

Police & Fire Dispatch	DOIT & Technical Support
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Policy Room

596-1588	596-1586
596-1587	596-1585


JIC Room / Conference

596-5000	596-1646
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15. APPENDIX F: REAL-TIME CRIME CENTER VIRTUAL RESPONSE



Real-Time Crime Center CFS Response



INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM
INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Date

November 5, 2020

To: Commander Michael McGinnis, Professional Standards Bureau (Through Channels)

Subject: **IA CASE #20 058**
DETECTIVE LEVAN ADAMS, BADGE D-4317, PENSION 236723
APPOINTED: SEPTEMBER 25, 2000
ASSIGNED: COMMERCIAL AUTO THEFT SECTION
ALLEGATION: VIOLATION OF FACIAL RECOGNITION POLICY

From: Sergeant Dominic Davidson, Internal Affairs

INTRODUCTION:

On October 2, 2018, a First Degree Retail Fraud occurred at Shinola, located at 441 W. Canfield. On March 11, 2019, Michigan State Police (MSP) utilized facial recognition technology, at the request of Detective Levan Adams, badge D-4317, formerly assigned to the Third Precinct, currently assigned to the Commercial Auto Theft Section, to help identify the suspect from a still photo that was obtained through an in-store surveillance system. Through the use of the technology, an investigative lead was developed that possibly matched the provided image to Mr. Robert Williams, B/M, DOB: [REDACTED] of Farmington Hills, Michigan. It should be noted that, outside of the investigative lead developed through the use of facial recognition software, Detective Adams was not successful in completing other work on the case which could have led him to identify a suspect or rule Mr. Williams out as a suspect.

On May 20, 2019, the case was reassigned to Detective Donald Bussa, badge D-608, assigned to the Third Precinct, upon Detective Adams transferring from the Third Precinct Detective Unit (PDU).

On July 30, 2019, Detective Stevie Posey, badge D-2698, presented a photographic lineup, at the request of Detective Bussa, which contained a photograph of Mr. Williams, to Ms. Katherine Johnston, of Mackinac Partners, which is the loss prevention company utilized by Shinola. Ms. Johnston was familiar with the theft due to her viewing the theft on the in-store surveillance system on a date after the original theft. Ms. Johnston identified Mr. Williams as the individual that she observed in the video taking the merchandise from Shinola without paying.

On or around July 30, 2019, Detective Bussa presented an Investigator's Report to the Wayne County Prosecutor's Office (WCPO) for review, which named Mr. Williams as the defendant.

On August 24, 2019, the WCPO authorized one (1) count of First Degree Retail Fraud against Mr. Williams.

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From: Sergeant Dominic Davidson, Internal Affairs

On January 9, 2020, Mr. Williams was arrested on the outstanding warrant.

On a later date, around the time that this case was featured in the media, Captain Rodney Cox's, assigned to the Third Precinct, knowledge of the case prior to it being in the media, was called into question.

On or around July 16, 2020, I received information from Captain Aric Tosqui, Crime Intelligence Unit, that Detective Bussa had requested the use of facial recognition software to develop leads on fourteen (14) of his cases; however, after a review of the cases, it was determined that the number was actually twelve (12). I was instructed to review the cases that Detective Bussa requested the use of facial recognition software, including the request that assisted in identifying, and ultimately the arrest of, Mr. Michael Oliver, B/M/ DOB: [REDACTED], of [REDACTED], which was also featured in the media. Mr. Oliver claimed to be the victim of being falsely identified by the use of facial recognition software. This case, along with the other cases, will be discussed in the Investigation section of this report as well as during a Garrity Interview with Detective Bussa.

INTERNAL AFFAIRS ASSIGNMENT:

On July 1, 2020, IA Case #20-058 was assigned to me, Sergeant Dominic Davidson, badge S-1019, assigned to Internal Affairs, for investigation and closure, with a due date of October 1, 2020.

INVESTIGATION:

It should be noted that the vast majority of this investigation was done by conducting interviews, which can be found below in their respective sections.

A review of the Investigators Report that Detective Bussa submitted to the WCPO on July 30, 2019, indicated that a theft of approximately \$3,800.00 worth of merchandise was stolen from Shinola on October 2, 2018. The investigators report stated that the incident was captured on surveillance video which, "Was reviewed by Katherine Johnston of Mackinac Partners, Loss Prevention Company used by Shinola." The Investigation section of the Investigators Report indicated that Ms. Johnston provided a statement from the store and video of the incident. The video, along with still photographs, were sent to Crime Intelligence for facial recognition. An investigative lead was developed by the facial recognition software which listed Mr. Williams as the focus of the investigative lead. Detective Bussa prepared a photo lineup,

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Subject: IA CASE FILE #20 058 Page 3
From: Sergeant Dominic Davidson, Internal Affairs

which contained a photograph of Mr. Williams. The photo lineup was presented to Ms. Johnston who identified Mr. Williams as the suspect in the larceny.

The complete warrant package, presumably except the video, was found as an attachment to Superior Report #1810050167. The warrant package included the Investigator's Report, Police Report, Shinola Incident Report authored by Ms. Johnston, photo lineup key as well as the photo lineup presented to Ms. Johnston, a still photo of the Shinola larceny suspect obtained from surveillance video, facial recognition investigative lead from Michigan State Police (MSP), Mr. Williams information from LEIN as well as his CCH, and a Witness List.

After a review of the Investigator's Report, and associated evidence, I found that, although the Investigator's Report didn't specifically state that Ms. Johnston witnessed the larceny first hand, it did indicate that Ms. Johnston "reviewed" video and saw the suspect take the merchandise. Additionally, the incident report that was prepared by Ms. Johnston indicated that she reviewed the video of the larceny on 10/8/18, six (6) days after the larceny occurred. (Attachment 9)

While Mr. Williams was in custody at the Detroit Detention Center, he was interviewed by Detective James Ronan, badge D-4878, and Police Officer Benjamin Atkinson, badge 3931, both assigned to the Third Precinct. During the interview, Mr. Williams advised Detective Ronan and Officer Atkinson that he was aware that he was arrested due to the use of facial recognition because he had family that worked for "Greenlight" and favors were called in. I conferred with Captain Lena Liddell, assigned to Internal Controls, regarding this information. Paperwork was prepared for the Real Time Crime Center to conduct a command level investigation for misconduct for possible dissemination of law enforcement information.

The following cases were identified by the Real Time Crime Center as cases that Detective Bussa requested the use of facial recognition software.

- 2004140032, Aggravated/Felonious Assault
- 1908190208, Robbery
- 1907230128, Retail Fraud
- 1905180199, Assault and Battery
- 1905150273, Larceny
- 1905190145, Larceny
- 1905090368, Retail Fraud

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From: Sergeant Dominic Davidson, Internal Affairs

- 1904300325, Retail Fraud
- 1904080259, Assault and Battery
- 1905020003, Damage to Property
- 1904270320, Fraud
- 1809080058, Assault and Battery

At the time of the requests for the use of facial recognition, all of the above cases, with the exception of case #2004140032, were permissible by the guidelines of Training Directive 19-07. Case #2004140032, an Aggravated Assault, facial recognition was permissible to be utilized based on the guidelines set forth in the Detroit Police Manual Directive 307.5. The following paragraphs will discuss the three (3) cases in which facial recognition was requested, and a warrant was issued. It should be noted that Detective Bussa answered questions regarding the following three (3) cases during his Garrity Interview. Additionally, all of the other cases in which facial recognition was requested did not lead to the authorization of warrants for various reasons. It should be noted that in all of the above cases, I did not find anything that would suggest the misuse of facial recognition or wrong suspects being identified because of its use.

Case #1904080259 involved a perpetrator that was known to the victim due to an intimate relationship; however, the victim only knew the perpetrator by his first name, Curtis. The victim provided Detective Bussa a photograph of the perpetrator from Facebook. Detective Bussa utilized facial recognition, which provided an investigative lead for Mr. [REDACTED], B/M, DOB: [REDACTED] of [REDACTED]. The victim was presented a single photo of Mr. [REDACTED] who positively identified Mr. [REDACTED] as the person who had assaulted him. A warrant was ultimately authorized for Felonious Assault and Possession of Metallic Knuckles which led to the arrest of Mr. [REDACTED]. Mr. [REDACTED] was ultimately found not guilty during a bench trial.

Case #1809080058 involved a suspect that was known to the victim. During the Garrity Interview with Detective Bussa, he did not recall using facial recognition in this case. It was later discovered, after speaking with Captain Aric Tosqui, assigned to Crime Intelligence, that although Detective Bussa did request facial recognition for the case, the request did not provide any investigative leads. Although this case ultimately led to the conviction of the perpetrator, facial recognition did not assist in the identification of the suspect.

Case #1905150273 was featured in the media where Mr. [REDACTED] claimed he was falsely identified by the use of facial recognition. This case

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From: Sergeant Dominic Davidson, Internal Affairs

was discussed in greater depth during Detective Bussa's Garrity Interview which can be found below in the Garrity Interviews section of this report. The following is a brief synopsis of the case.

The victim, Mr. [REDACTED], a teacher at a local school, was filming a fight near the school on his cell phone on May 15, 2019. While filming, a perpetrator took Mr. [REDACTED]'s cell phone from his hand and threw it. The case was assigned to Detective Bussa for investigation. Mr. [REDACTED] provided a video to Detective Bussa which contained images of the perpetrator. Facial recognition was used which developed an investigative lead which named Mr. [REDACTED] as a person of interest. A photo lineup was presented to Mr. [REDACTED] and he identified Mr. [REDACTED] as the person who took the cell phone from his hands. A warrant request was present for the offense and a warrant was ultimately issued for Mr. [REDACTED].

Detective Bussa stated that while the case was in court, it was observed that Mr. [REDACTED] had more tattoos than the suspect in the video, specifically, a tattoo on his face. The case was dismissed at Third Circuit Court.

A query of photographs of Mr. [REDACTED] in LEIN, as well as Jail Management System (JMS) revealed that Mr. [REDACTED] was arrested on May 16, 2019, on an unrelated case, and he did not have any facial tattoos at that time. Additionally, Mr. [REDACTED]'s mugshot from this case on July 31, 2020, revealed that he had a tattoo on his face at that time.

At the time of his Garrity Interview, Detective Bussa was still confident that Mr. [REDACTED] was the correct perpetrator in the crime.

AUDIO/VIDEO REVIEW:

There was no audio or video to review that would assist with this investigation. I do recommend that copies of the in-car video of Mr. Williams' conveyance, as well as the DDC video of Mr. Williams' interrogation, be forwarded to the RTCC as part of their command level investigation into the possible dissemination of law enforcement sensitive information.

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November 5, 2020

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From: Sergeant Dominic Davidson, Internal Affairs

WITNESS STATEMENTS:

Mr. Rathe Yager, Civilian Crime Analyst, assigned to the Fourth Precinct

The following is a synopsis of the audio-recorded Witness Interview that I conducted on July 15, 2020, at approximately 8:57 A.M. with Mr. Yager at the Fourth Precinct. His attorney, Ms. Samia Yager, was present for the interview via telephone. A copy of the interview can be found enclosed in its entirety.

Mr. Yager stated that he did not recall the facial recognition request that was made by Detective Adams regarding the Shinola larceny.

Mr. Yager stated that at the time of the request, he had only been working in the Real Time Crime Center for a short period of time. Mr. Yager stated that, at the time the request for the Shinola larceny came in, requests were made via email to the Real Time Crime Center via a shared email address. Mr. Yager stated that an analyst would look at the video or photo that was sent to determine if they could do anything with it. Mr. Yager stated that if the Real Time Crime Center was unable to process the photo or video, they would send the request to MSP due to them having different technologies and or policies that he could not speak to. Mr. Yager stated that after MSP utilized their software for facial recognition, they would send their response back to the same Real Time Crime Center shared email address. Mr. Yager stated that typically another analyst would receive the response due to the response being sent back to the shared email address, and that analyst would forward it to the officer requesting the information. CD

Ms. Katherine Johnston, Director of Investigations, Mackinac Partners

The following is a synopsis of the audio-recorded Zoom Witness Interview that I conducted on July 16, 2020, at approximately 2:10 P.M. with Ms. Johnston. The Zoom meeting was set up by her attorney, Mr. Patrick Hurford. A copy of the interview can be found enclosed in its entirety. It should be noted that Attorney Hurford requested that portions of this interview not be recorded due to Mackinac Partners still having a business relationship with Shinola. The portions of this interview that were not recorded were insignificant in regards to this investigation. It should also be noted that Mr. Hurford requested that any of his commentary not be captured in this synopsis.

Ms. Johnston stated that she was not at Shinola on October 2, 2018, the day of the larceny. Ms. Johnston stated that she works as a liaison between

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Shinola and law enforcement. Ms. Johnston stated that she provided Detective Adams with reports and video footage pertaining to the larceny. Ms. Johnston stated the only reason she knew the larceny took place was because she reviewed a report from a Shinola employee regarding the larceny and also reviewing a video of the larceny.

Ms. Johnston stated that she did not recall speaking with Detective Adams via telephone; however, she did remember email communication. Ms. Johnston stated that it was not until March 2019, she received communications that Detective Adams was having difficulty downloading the video.

Ms. Johnston stated that on March 29, 2019, her partner, Ms. Hannah Phillips received an email from Detective Adams advising her that he received a facial recognition hit. Ms. Johnston stated that Detective Adams advised that he would need to setup a lineup with someone from the Shinola store. Ms. Johnston stated that telephone numbers of employees from Shinola were provided to Detective Adams and Ms. Johnston advised her client, Shinola, know that Detective Adams would be reaching out to them to conduct the photo lineup. Ms. Johnston stated that there was a lot of "back and forth" between her and Detective Adams and between her and her client to see if the photo lineup had ever been scheduled; however, she never heard anything. Ms. Johnston believed that sometime in June 2019, a photo lineup was conducted with Omari Jackson, an assistant store manager.

Ms. Johnston stated that while at a Wayne State University Compstat Meeting, possibly in the middle of May, she spoke with Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills regarding the fact that they were aware of the facial recognition hit but they were still not seeing any movement on the case. Ms. Johnston stated that she sent Lt. Chadwick-Bills an email and was advised a couple of weeks later that the case had been reassigned to Detective Bussa.

Ms. Johnston stated that on July 30, 2019, she participated in a photo lineup at the Third precinct at the request of Detective Bussa. Ms. Johnston stated that there was no one else from either Shinola or Mackinac Partners when the photo lineup was conducted with her. Ms. Johnston stated two (2) detectives were present at the time the photo lineup was conducted with her. Ms. Johnston stated that Detective Bussa was present, but stood off to the side while she was presented the photo lineup, while another unknown detective presented the lineup to her. Ms. Johnston described the other detective as a black male, probably older than forty (40) (presumed to be Detective Posey due to his name being on the photo lineup).

Ms. Johnston stated that, from what she recalled, the lineup was presented to her by the unknown detective, was not suggestive at all. Ms.

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Johnston stated that she recalled the unknown detective specifically saying something to the effect of, "The suspect that was identified by facial recognition may or may not be present in this." Ms. Johnston stated that she did not feel any pressure to pick anyone out of the lineup. Ms. Johnston stated that she did recall picking the person in the photo lineup that she believed was the person in the video that she had viewed. Ms. Johnston stated that she believed that she had to circle and initial her choice.

Ms. Johnston stated that she did bring a still photograph of the larceny suspect, which was obtained from the video from the larceny, with her when she did the photo lineup. Ms. Johnston stated that she recalled asking the detectives before the photo lineup had begun, if she could compare the still photo to the photos in the lineup. Ms. Johnston stated that she did not recall if she asked Detective Bussa or both detectives if she could look at the still photographs while she looked at the photo lineup. Ms. Johnston stated that the detectives allowed her to look at the still photographs while looking at the photo lineup to compare the photos.

Ms. Johnston stated that after the warrant was authorized, Mr. Williams name and date of birth were provided to her. Ms. Johnston stated that she requested the name of the suspect so he could be tracked through the courts so a restitution request could be made on Shinola's behalf. CD

CANVASS:

A canvass was not required due to the allegations of this investigation.

WAYNE COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S RECOMMENDATION:

This matter was an administrative investigation, not a criminal complaint; therefore, this investigation was not presented to the Wayne County Prosecutor's Office.

GARRITY INTERVIEWS:

Sergeant Ray Saati, badge S-879, assigned to Centralized Time Keeping

The following is a synopsis of the audio recorded Garrity Interview that Sergeant Lisa Porter, badge S-930, assigned to Internal Affairs, and I conducted on July 9, 2020, at approximately 9:10 A.M. with Sergeant Saati at the Office of Internal Affairs. Sergeant Saati declined union/legal representation for the purpose of this interview. A copy of the interview can be found enclosed in its entirety.

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From: Sergeant Dominic Davidson, Internal Affairs

Sergeant Saati stated that he signed the Investigators Report, as the reviewing supervisor, that was prepared by Detective Bussa. Sergeant Saati stated that he did not specifically recall signing the Investigators Report.

Sergeant Saati stated that prior to his Garrity Interview he had a chance to review the Investigators Report. Sergeant Saati stated that after reading the Investigators Report, he did recall parts of it but not all of it in detail.

Sergeant Saati stated that at the time he signed the Investigators Report, he guessed that he may have been the only supervisor at the precinct. Sergeant Saati stated that his time keeping office is across the hall from the PDU and he also occasionally works overtime at the Third Precinct. Sergeant Saati stated that he has signed other documents, such as Witness Statements, for members of the PDU. Sergeant Saati stated that he believed that this was the first Investigators Report that he had signed.

Sergeant Saati stated that he does not have any investigative background with the department.

Sergeant Saati stated that when the Investigators Report was presented to him by Detective Bussa, he saw that it was signed, there were dates and times, a police report number, and he felt that the information contained in the report was acceptable. CD

Detective Levan Adams, badge D-4317, assigned to Commercial Auto Theft Section

The following is a synopsis of the audio recorded Garrity Interview that Sergeant Toniqua Davis, badge S-959, Sergeant Jamie Lewandowski, badge S-793, both assigned to Internal Affairs, and I conducted on July 10, 2020, at approximately 10:00 A.M. with Detective Adams at the Office of Internal Affairs. LSA Attorney Fred Walker was present for the interview. A copy of the interview can be found enclosed in its entirety.

Detective Adams stated that upon being assigned the Shinola case involving Mr. Williams, he did not recall video being in the case file. Detective Adams stated that he reached out to an unknown female security person from Shinola in an attempt to obtain video. Detective Adams stated that the female was able to provide him the video on an unknown date.

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From: Sergeant Dominic Davidson, Internal Affairs

Detective Adams stated at the time he received the Shinola case, he was assigned to the Robbery/Shooting Team. Detective Adams stated that he was assigned other cases outside of robberies and shootings however. Detective Adams stated that he felt a robbery or shooting case would be a higher priority than a larceny case.

Detective Adams stated that between the time he received the case in October 2018, until March 2019, he received the video, requested facial recognition, and created a photo lineup. Detective Adams stated that he was never able to have anyone view the photo lineup due to scheduling issues with the security advisor. Detective Adams stated that he attempted to schedule a meeting with an unknown male who worked at the store; however, he was never able to arrange a meeting because every time that he called the store, the male was never there. Detective Adams stated that sometime in March or April 2019, since he received no response from his several telephone calls, Detective Posey and himself went to Shinola and the male that he was going to present the photo lineup to was not there. Detective Adams stated that the male who he was going to show the photo lineup to was someone who was at the store at the time of the arrest.

Detective Adams stated that he did not have a reason or excuse as to why he did not put notes in the case which indicated his attempts to solve the case. Detective Adams was very forthcoming and stated, "The notes should be in there, bottom line." Detective Adams stated that there were multiple emails and phone calls made regarding the case that were not included in his notes.

Detective Adams stated that, although he was not able to meet with the male who was at Shinola at the time of the Larceny, he never asked the female security advisor to view the lineup. Detective Adams stated that the female security advisor was not at the store so it would not have been proper to have her view the lineup.

Detective Adams stated that he personally felt that the investigation that he put in to the case was sufficient. Detective Adams stated that he felt he had hit a dead end regarding the case because the suspect was unknown.

Detective Adams stated that he was not aware why the video was not in the case file upon Detective Bussa receiving the case. Detective Adams stated that upon being transferred from the PDU he left all of his cases, and their contents, at the PDU. **CD, Attachment 15**

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From: Sergeant Dominic Davidson, Internal Affairs

Captain Rodney Cox, assigned to the Third Precinct

The following is a synopsis of the audio recorded Garrity Interview that Captain Lena Liddell, assigned to Internal Controls, and I conducted on July 14, 2020, at approximately 10:29 A.M. with Captain Cox at the Office of Internal Affairs. Detroit Police Officers Command Officer's Association Attorney Marshall Widick and Commander Darrell Patterson, assigned to the Eighth Precinct, were present for the interview. A copy of the interview can be found enclosed in its entirety.

Captain Cox stated that as the Captain of the Third Precinct, which he has been since approximately April 2017, he is responsible for monitoring cases and investigations that go into the PDU and come out of the PDU. Captain Cox stated that he is responsible for proper management and oversight of the PDU. Captain Cox stated that he does not review all paperwork that is associated with the PDU. Captain Cox stated that there are some cases that he would review, and some cases that "He would determine based on pattern."

Captain Cox stated that in regards to his audit process, he would typically meet with the PDU weekly, starting with the crime analysis officer, then the Lieutenant in charge of the PDU, and go over the cases from the previous week. Captain Cox stated for violent crimes, they would look at what the cases entailed, and find what the investigated outcome of the cases were. However, cases involving shooting and other major crimes would be discussed the day following the incident. Captain Cox stated that, as it related to property crimes, he would look for patterns, area of concentration, similar modus operandi, and known perpetrators who were responsible for several cases at once. Captain Cox stated that all of the information that he received regarding crimes would help him develop a deployment strategy.

Captain Cox stated that he also held quarterly meetings with all members assigned to the PDU as well as occasionally have members of Special Operations present. Captain Cox stated that during those meeting, he would prepare an agenda and would discuss a litany of topics that would be relevant. Captain Cox stated that these meeting would be discussing topics in general and not so much specifics of individual cases.

Captain Cox stated that in addition to the PDU, he is responsible for managing the Third Precinct operations, to include all patrol functions.

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Captain Cox stated that the theft which occurred at Shinola in October 2018 would not have hit his radar as part of an established pattern. Captain Cox stated that if he were made aware of the Shinola case when it had occurred it would have just been as a Larceny; however, he did not recall being made aware of it when it occurred.

Captain Cox stated that he informed the PDU that he needed to be aware of all violent crimes, news-worthy events, and any major events, so they could discuss what investigative action needed to be taken and what he would be looking for. Captain Cox stated that he would most likely know about any major incident due to him receiving notifications to his cellular phone automatically.

Captain Cox stated that when the Shinola case was brought to light in the media, he became aware of the specifics that were being alleged as it related to facial recognition. Captain Cox stated that possibly just prior to the news story, he, along with the department executives, became aware of the incident due to FOIA requests coming in. Captain Cox stated that he did recall some mention of the Shinola case in January 2020, because he sent Officers Salem and Ali to arrest Mr. Williams. Captain Cox stated that he asked the arresting officers why he had sent them to make the arrest and they advised him that it was due to a complaint that Captain Cox had received. Captain Cox believed that a complaint must have come to him shortly before Mr. Williams' arrest, from a source that he could not recall, that nothing was being done to take Mr. Williams into custody even though there was a warrant for his arrest, which caused him to send officers out to arrest Mr. Williams. Captain Cox stated that he was not aware of the Larceny at Shinola until he received the complaint.

Captain Cox stated that he was not aware why Mr. Williams was not taken into custody when the warrant was issued; however, having outstanding warrants is not uncommon. Captain Cox stated that occasionally, they would do warrant sweeps to pick up individuals on outstanding warrants. Captain Cox stated that there is not a set schedule for when warrant sweeps are completed.

Captain Cox stated that sometime between June and July 2020, he was made aware that Detective Bussa did not believe Mr. Williams was the perpetrator in the Shinola Larceny. Captain Cox stated that he only found out that Detective Bussa did not believe Mr. Williams was the perpetrator in the Shinola larceny until he was ordered to complete a timeline of the events leading to the arrest of Mr. Williams.

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Captain Cox stated when Mr. Williams' arrest came to light in the media, he began to look into the investigation and ask questions. Captain Cox stated that he was asked by his superiors to provide a timeline regarding the Shinola larceny case, including the arrest of Mr. Williams. Captain Cox stated that as he was preparing the timeline, as directed, he then became aware of what the case involved.

Captain Cox stated while preparing the timeline, he spoke with Detective Atkinson who interrogated Mr. Williams at the DDC while he was in custody. Captain Cox stated that Detective Atkinson was interrogating Mr. Williams regarding a separate Shinola larceny as well as a larceny at John Varvatos. Captain Cox stated that Detective Atkinson made it clear to him that Detective Atkinson did not believe Mr. Williams was not the perpetrator in the cases that he was investigating, he was not speaking about the perpetrator in Detective Bussa's Shinola case.

Captain Cox stated that he did not recall if he reviewed the report or case file prior to sending Officers Salem and Ali to arrest Mr. Williams, but he was at least aware that there was an active warrant.

Captain Cox stated that in the absence of a PDU supervisor, members of the PDU have gone to other supervision within the precinct to review and sign off on the Investigators Report. Captain Cox stated that a PDU supervisor did not sign the Investigators Report which named Mr. Williams as the defendant. Captain Cox stated that he would have preferred for a PDU supervisor to sign off on this Investigators Report because it was a not in custody warrant request so there was no urgency to have it signed.

Captain Cox stated that since this incident, he issued a directive that for not in custody cases, if no PDU supervision is available at the precinct, detectives should contact one of the supervisors to receive guidance on how to proceed.

On Friday August 21, 2020, at approximately 11:35 A.M., a follow-up Garrity Interview was conducted with Captain Cox. DPCOA Attorney Marshall Widick and Captain Michael Parish, assigned to Support Services Bureau, were present for the interview. A copy of the interview in its entirety can be found enclosed for review.

Captain Cox stated that he did not recall being made aware that the officers who arrested Mr. Williams had concerns about statements that Mr. Williams had made during his conveyance.

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Captain Cox stated that he did not recall being notified that Detective Bussa had concerns that Mr. Williams was the wrong person in custody. Captain Cox stated that once the story was in the media, and he was ordered to do a timeline of the events, he spoke with Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills and she advised him that she did not even know that Detective Bussa believed that Mr. Williams was not the correct person just after Mr. Williams was arrested.

Captain Cox stated that outside of the complaint that led him to sending officers out to arrest Mr. Williams, he did not recall taking other complaints regarding the case; however, he did say that it was possible that he may have.

Captain Cox stated that he did not recall speaking to Detective Bussa regarding the case around the time the case had been assigned to Detective Bussa; however, he stated that he might have.

Captain Cox stated that in regards to case #1909290209, (the case in which Detective Bussa stated that he felt pressured by Captain Cox to submit a warrant request against the registered owner of the vehicle for a larceny) he did recall the complainant's name, and upon looking at his email during the Garrity Interview, a complaint came to Captain Cox via email from the complainant. Captain Cox stated that the circumstances in the police report did not look familiar to him. Captain Cox stated that he believed that he had spoken to someone within the PDU about the case after receiving the complaint but did not recall whom.

Captain Cox stated that he did not recall speaking to anyone about submitting a warrant request on the case. Captain Cox stated that submitting a warrant request against the registered owner of the vehicle would not be proper because you could not determine if the registered owner was at the scene.

Captain Cox stated, after further review of the report, he recalled that the victim felt that there was enough information for an arrest, due to the fact that the incident was captured on video. Captain Cox stated that he believed that he spoke to either Detective Bussa or Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills when he received the complaint. Captain Cox stated he could not recall specifics, but there may have been concerns about identifying a suspect due to the clarity of the video or identifying suspects in the video. Captain Cox stated that if there was additional work that could have been done to identify a suspect, he

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would have ordered for the additional work to have been done; however, he once again stated that he did not recall specifics of the case. CD

Lieutenant Angellique Chadwick-Bills, badge L-202, assigned to the Third Precinct

The following is a synopsis of the audio recorded Garrity Interview that Captain Liddell and I conducted on July 14, 2020, at approximately 12:00 P.M. with Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills at the Office of Internal Affairs. LSA Attorney Fred Walker was present for the interview. A copy of the interview can be found enclosed in its entirety.

Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills stated that she had been assigned to the Third Precinct PDU since April 2019. Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills stated that she became aware of Shinola case involving Mr. Williams when it was transferred to Detective Bussa. Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills believes the case may have been reassigned to Detective Bussa after she met with Ms. Katherine Johnston, a security advisor from Shinola, on an unknown date at a bi-weekly Compstat meeting for Midtown. Lieutenant Chadwick Bills stated that Ms. Johnston had advised her that there were a couple open cases from Shinola in the Third Precinct PDU. Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills stated that she and Ms. Johnston discussed that Shinola did not require their employees to participate in the prosecution of cases that stemmed from Shinola. Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills stated that Ms. Johnston was concerned about the lack of cooperation that Shinola provided as it related to prosecution. Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills stated that she was aware of approximately three (3) cases in which Shinola was uncooperative in the prosecution of Retail Fraud cases.

Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills stated that the Shinola case involving Mr. Williams was transferred from Detective Adams to Detective Bussa just prior to Detective Adams transferring to the Commercial Auto Theft Section.

Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills stated that upon Detective Bussa's arrival to the Third Precinct PDU in April 2019, he was a newly promoted Detective. Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills stated that now retired Sergeant Michael Jackson, formerly assigned to the PDU, was assigned as Detective Bussa's span of control supervisor.

Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills stated that after Detective Bussa had the case, she spoke with him to find out what his findings were. Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills stated that Detective Bussa advised her that Shinola was not cooperating with his investigation. Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills stated that while

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speaking to Detective Bussa regarding Shinola's lack of cooperation, he also informed her of the facial recognition investigative lead. Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills stated that Detective Bussa advised her that Shinola requested that a representative of the company be utilized for the prosecution instead of someone that worked in the store. Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills stated that she advised Detective Bussa that she did not know if a representative would work for the prosecution of the case and advised Detective Bussa to contact the Wayne County Prosecutor's Office and ask them for an opinion on the matter. Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills stated that she was not aware if Detective Bussa contacted the Prosecutor's Office.

Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills stated that she recalled seeing the facial recognition lead along with the still photographs from the Shinola larceny when Detective Bussa was working the case. Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills stated that she did see a resemblance between the still photographs of the suspect and Mr. Williams.

Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills stated that she and Captain Cox spoke nearly every day regarding different cases and expectations of the PDU. Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills stated that in addition to her speaking with Captain Cox daily, Captain Cox also scheduled meetings with other PDU supervision, as well as the staff assigned to the PDU. Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills stated that the last meeting the Captain Cox had with the PDU as a group was sometime around when COVID-19 became prevalent in the Detroit Police Department. Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills stated that she remembered this in particular because some of the members who were present later tested positive for COVID-19. Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills stated the meetings that took place with all PDU members present may have occurred every other month. Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills stated that Captain Cox would also hold meetings, where Special Operations would be present occasionally. Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills stated that for these meeting, Captain Cox would prepare an agenda and speak of statistics, investigations, and other pertinent matters.

Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills stated the standard process for a detective when typing an Investigators Report is to have a peer review their report, then give it to a PDU supervisor for review. Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills stated that for the case in question, Sergeant Saati signed the Investigators Report as the reviewing supervisor. Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills stated that on the day the report was signed, she worked 6:00 A.M. to 2:00 P.M., Sergeant Irvin was off, and Sergeant Jackson had retired. Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills stated that since there was no PDU supervision available, she assumed that is why

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Detective Bussa had Sergeant Saati sign the Investigators Report. Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills stated that it was not a common practice to have a non-PDU supervisor sign Investigators Reports, and was usually only done for in-custody warrant requests when no PDU supervision was available. Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills stated that since Mr. Williams' case had come to light, it is now mandatory for all not in custody warrant requests to be reviewed by a PDU supervisor.

Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills stated that when Captain Cox directed Special Operations Officers to arrest Mr. Williams on the active warrant, she did not believe that Captain Cox showed any special interest in the case. Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills stated that it was common for Captain Cox to go through not in custody warrants and direct Special Operations to pick up the named individual in the cases. Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills stated that she did not recall Captain Cox ever speaking with her about the case involving Mr. Williams before Mr. Williams was arrested. However, Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills stated that after she had the conversation with Ms. Johnston, Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills did advise Captain Cox of what Ms. Johnston had said.

Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills stated that after Mr. Williams was arrested, Detectives Ronan and Atkinson went to the DDC to interview Mr. Williams regarding cases they had that involved retail fraud.

Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills stated that Detective Bussa reviewed the video of the interview that Detectives Ronan and Atkinson conducted with Mr. Williams. Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills stated that Detective Bussa advised her that he did not believe that Mr. Williams was the correct perpetrator in the Shinola larceny. Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills stated that Detective Bussa had already reported his concerns to the prosecutor's office prior to him advising her of the issue. Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills stated that she recalled Detective Bussa advising her that he had informed Captain Cox that he did not believe that Mr. Williams was the correct person. Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills stated that she also spoke with Captain Cox about the same matter once Detective Bussa informed her that he had already spoke with Captain Cox. Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills stated that she remembered Captain Cox saying that Detective Bussa did the right thing.

Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills stated that the day after Mr. Williams was arrested, "The thirty series officers" advised her that during the conveyance of Mr. Williams, Mr. Williams mentioned facial recognition, and that a family member told him about facial recognition. Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills stated that she notified Captain Cox of the statement by telephone immediately.

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Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills stated the same day that she notified Captain Cox, she, along with the "Thirty series officers" went to Captain Cox's office and reviewed the in car-video from Mr. Williams arrest. Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills stated that Captain Cox concluded that Mr. Williams had not received any inside information from anyone within the police department regarding his arrest.

It should be noted that the in-car video did reveal that Mr. Williams mentioned that he knew someone that worked for "Greenlight;" however, he just mentioned it in a conversation that he was having with the transport officers. Due to the context of the conversation, I found no reason to believe that Mr. Williams had inside information, it simply appeared that Mr. Williams was making small talk. Additionally, I did not hear Mr. Williams speak about facial recognition. CD

Sergeant Chimene Irvin, badge S-822, assigned to the Third Precinct

The following is a synopsis of the audio recorded Garrity Interview that Sergeant Lisa Porter, badge S-930, assigned to Internal Affairs, and I conducted on July 15, 2020, at approximately 10:20 A.M. with Sergeant Irvin at the Office of Internal Affairs. LSA Attorney Fred Walker was present for the interview. A copy of the interview can be found enclosed in its entirety.

Sergeant Irvin stated that she has been in the Third Precinct PDU for approximately three (3) years.

Sergeant Irvin stated that Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills had implemented a system where, once a month, cases that do not contain notes from the investigator would be examined by a supervisor. Sergeant Irvin stated that in regards to higher priority cases, she would take an active role into speaking with the detectives about their progress and leads. Sergeant Irvin stated that she would not typically have a meeting with detectives regarding lower level crimes such as an MDP or Larceny.

Sergeant Irvin stated that Captain Cox has meeting with members of the PDU approximately every one (1) to two (2) months. Sergeant Irvin stated that she recalled a meeting that was organized by Captain Cox that also contained Special Operations personnel. Sergeant Irvin stated that when the meetings took place, Captain Cox had an agenda, which he printed out, and spoke about various items including crime hot spots and combatting crime.

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Sergeant Irvin stated that she is not aware why there were not any notes from Detective Adams regarding the Shinola case.

Sergeant Irvin stated that prior to the case involving Mr. Williams being on the news, she did not recall the case. Sergeant Irvin stated that she believes she may have assigned Detective Bussa the case. Sergeant Irvin stated that Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills told her to reassign the case to Detective Bussa, and Sergeant Irvin believed that Captain Cox had told Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills to have the case reassigned to Detective Bussa. Sergeant Irvin stated that she was not aware of the reason that people above her wanted the case reassigned to Detective Bussa. Sergeant Irvin believed at the time the case was reassigned, Detective Adams had been transferred. Sergeant Irvin later clarified herself and said that she was not told to give the case to Detective Bussa, she was simply told to reassign the case to someone else. Sergeant Irvin stated that she reassigned it to Detective Bussa due to him being newer and other members in the PDU had other things going on. Sergeant Irvin stated that when she assigned the case to Detective Bussa, she did not recall giving him any specific instructions regarding the case.

Sergeant Irvin stated that she did not recall Detective Bussa speaking with her about the case after she had assigned it to him.

Sergeant Irvin stated that she was not aware why Detective Bussa used someone that only viewed the larceny at Shinola on video to identify a suspect in the photo lineup.

Sergeant Irvin stated that she was not aware that Detective Bussa had submitted the Investigators Report to the prosecutor's office. Sergeant Irvin stated that she may have seen a supplemental report from Detective Bussa indicating that he had submitted a warrant request; however, she could not say for sure.

Sergeant Irvin stated that she was not aware of who or why the officers were sent to arrest Mr. Williams on the active warrant. Sergeant Irvin stated that she was unaware that Detectives Atkinson and Ronan interviewed Mr. Williams while he was in custody.

Sergeant Irvin stated that she was not aware that Detective Bussa had reviewed the interview that Detectives Atkinson and Ronan with Mr. Williams, nor was she aware that Detective Bussa did not think Mr. Williams was the correct perpetrator in his case.

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Sergeant Irvin stated, at the time of this interview, she had not been made aware of any process changes in regards to a situation where a PDU supervisor is not available to sign an Investigators Report.

Sergeant Irvin stated that she is aware of other cases that involved Shinola and in those cases, they did not cooperate with the investigation.

Sergeant Irvin stated that she has not been involved in any warrant sweeps between the PDU and Special Operations.

Sergeant Irvin stated that she has not requested Special Operations to pick up a perpetrator on active warrants; however, she is aware that does occur. Sergeant Irvin stated that detectives have made arrangements for Special Operations to arrest individuals who had active warrants. CD

Lieutenant Barbara Kozloff, L-67, assigned to the Compstat Unit

The following is a synopsis of the audio recorded Garrity Interview that Captain Liddell and I conducted on July 14, 2020, at approximately 1:33 P.M. with Lieutenant Kozloff at the Office of Internal Affairs. Lieutenant Kozloff declined union/legal representation for the purpose of this interview. A copy of the interview can be found enclosed in its entirety.

Lieutenant Kozloff stated that she was the Third Precinct PDU Lieutenant from approximately October 2014, until March 25, 2019.

Lieutenant Kozloff stated that in regards to the Shinola case in question, she was not aware of the video that the officers from Wayne State University Police Department dropped off at the Third Precinct as they had indicated in their report. Lieutenant Kozloff stated that Wayne State University Police would occasionally submit items to the PDU by handing the items to someone in the PDU.

Lieutenant Kozloff stated that she is not aware why Detective Adams did not enter any notes regarding the case. Lieutenant Kozloff stated that she did not recall having any conversations with Detective Adams regarding the case while she was in the PDU.

Lieutenant Kozloff stated that she did not recall this case specifically. Lieutenant Kozloff stated that she was aware that the Third Precinct PDU had some cases from Shinola previously. Lieutenant Kozloff stated that she

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recalled Shinola being reluctant in the prosecution of theft, as far as participating in the court process.

Lieutenant Kozloff stated that upon receiving the Garrity Notice for this investigation, she reviewed the case and associated notes. Lieutenant Kozloff stated that when she looked at the case, she noted that she had made the case inactive in February 2019. Lieutenant Kozloff stated that she would make cases inactive at the request of the OIC for reasons such as the investigation stalling; however, she could not speak specifically to this case.

Lieutenant Kozloff stated that during her time in the PDU, she did advise detectives facial recognition software was a tool that was available. Lieutenant Kozloff stated that Captain Cox also encouraged the use of facial recognition software. Lieutenant Kozloff stated that facial recognition was simply a resource, or an investigative tool.

Lieutenant Kozloff stated that she would meet with Captain Cox at least weekly to discuss major crimes that the PDU was handling. Lieutenant Kozloff stated that Captain Cox would also hold meetings with all members of the PDU probably every couple of months. Lieutenant Kozloff stated that Captain Cox would speak about different issues regarding investigations during the group meetings.

Lieutenant Kozloff stated that while she was in the PDU, all warrant requests were signed by either herself or a sergeant assigned to the PDU; however, on very rare occasions, in custody warrant requests that needed to be signed immediately due to the arrestee possibly "timing out," a patrol supervisor would sign if a PDU supervisor was unavailable. **CD, Attachment 14**

Police Officer Mohammed Salem, badge 431, assigned to Homicide

The following is a synopsis of the audio recorded Garrity interview that Sergeant Deanna Wilson, badge S-477, Sergeant Jamie Lewandowski, badge S-793, both assigned to Internal Affairs, and I conducted on July 21, 2020, at approximately 11:05 A.M. with Officer Salem at the Office of Internal Affairs. DPOA Attorney Carrie Seward was present for the interview. A copy of the interview can be found enclosed in its entirety.

Officer Salem stated that at the time of the arrest of Mr. Williams, he was working at the Third Precinct in Special Operations.

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Officer Salem stated that on January 9, 2020, he and his partner, Officer Alaa Ali, badge 399, assigned to the Third Precinct, were directed by Captain Cox to arrest Mr. Williams. Officer Ali stated that Captain Cox advised him that Mr. Williams was wanted on an older warrant that needed to be taken care of, and if he and Officer Ali could pause whatever they were doing at the time and take care of it, he would appreciate it. Officer Salem stated that Captain Cox provided all of Mr. Williams' information to him, which Officer Salem used to access the warrant in LEIN. Officer Salem said that from time to time, Captain Cox would ask him to pick up offenders on other active warrants; however, this was the only one for the day in question. Officer Salem stated that he did not know anything about the case that led to the warrant being issued against Mr. Williams.

Officer Salem stated that after speaking with Captain Cox, he and Officer Ali confirmed that there was in fact an active warrant for Mr. Williams arrest for Retail Fraud.

Officer Salem stated that upon getting to Mr. Williams' neighborhood, he called Mr. Williams and advised him who he was and that Mr. Williams had an active warrant for his arrest. Officer Salem stated that Mr. Williams apparently thought that it was a prank call so Officer Salem advised Mr. Williams that he could call the Third Precinct to confirm his identity.

Officer Salem stated that he and Officer Ali then went to Mr. Williams' residence and spoke with Mr. Williams' wife who was at the residence.

Officer Salem stated he called Mr. Williams back and advised him that it would be easier for him to turn himself in at the precinct; however, Mr. Williams advised him that if he had a warrant, Officer Salem would have to pick him up at his residence.

Officer Salem stated that he waited at or near Mr. Williams' residence until Mr. Williams arrived. Officer Salem stated that Mr. Williams was compliant and he was arrested without incident.

Officer Salem stated that during the conveyance, Mr. Williams advised him that they had the wrong person. Officer Salem stated that he advised Mr. Williams that maybe someone used his name or something, and that hopefully this situation would get worked out.

Officer Salem stated that during random conversations with Mr. Williams during the conveyance, Mr. Williams advised him that he had family that

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worked for "Greenlight." Officer Salem stated that he did not know what prompted Mr. Williams to mention his family that worked for "Greenlight." Officer Salem stated that other than that, he simply recalled speaking to Mr. Williams about cars during the conveyance.

Officer Salem stated that he believed that he had advised Captain Cox that Mr. Williams may have had family on the job.

Officer Salem stated that after he had taken Mr. Williams into custody, he was almost positive that he had called Captain Cox and advised him that he had arrested Mr. Williams.

Officer Salem stated that he did not recall being asked questions by Captain Cox after this situation was on the news.

Officer Salem stated that he felt like the encounter that he had with Mr. Williams went well and stated that Mr. Williams seemed like a nice person.
CD

Detective Stevie Posey, badge D-2698, assigned to the Third Precinct

The following is a synopsis of the audio recorded Garrity Interview that Sergeant Kenneth Butler, badge S-669, assigned to Internal Affairs, and I conducted on August 3, 2020, at approximately 9:32 A.M. with Detective Posey at the Office of Internal Affairs. LSA Attorney Fred Walker was present for the interview. A copy of the interview can be found enclosed in its entirety.

Detective Posey stated that prior to the Shinola case hitting the news, he did have knowledge of the case. Detective Posey stated that he believed that Detective Bussa received the case due to it originally being assigned to Detective Adams then he left the precinct so the case was reassigned. Detective Posey stated that he was unaware of why the case was given to Detective Bussa as opposed to another detective.

Detective Posey stated that, after Detective Bussa had generated a photo lineup, he assisted Detective Bussa by showing the person from Shinola the six pack that Detective Bussa had prepared. Detective Posey stated that he was unaware of who the suspect was in the photo lineup at the time he presented it.

Detective Posey stated that prior to Detective Bussa asking him to present the photo lineup, he had limited knowledge of the case. Detective

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Posey stated that he was aware that Detective Adams had received an investigative lead via facial recognition when he had the case.

Detective Posey stated that he knew that the person that he presented the photo lineup to was a representative of Shinola. Detective Posey stated that he learned just prior to presenting the lineup to the female that she only viewed the crime on video. Detective Posey stated that he believed someone higher in the Detroit Police Department, but did not know whom, advised Detective Bussa to use the Shinola representative for the photo lineup. Detective Posey stated that he did not know if Detective Bussa spoke to anyone at the prosecutor's office regarding using the Shinola representative for the photo lineup.

Detective Posey stated that he did not recall giving the Shinola representative permission to view photographs prior to looking at the photo lineup or during the photo lineup, nor did he recall hearing Detective Bussa give her permission. Detective Posey stated that he did recall the female looking at her phone after she was presented the lineup; however, she had stepped away from the lineup and he was not aware of what she was doing on her phone, but he did admit that she very well could have been looking at a photograph. Detective Posey stated that he was aware that the female also looked at a photo that was in her phone prior to the photo lineup being presented.

Detective Posey stated that when he presents photo lineups, he tells the person that the person of interest may or may not be present in the photo array. Detective Posey stated that he advises individuals that things such as facial hair can change, so focus on things that will not change such as the eyes, ears, and nose.

Detective Posey stated that he could not say for certain that Detective Bussa was being pushed to close the case but he believed, "It was a political move to get the case solved."

Detective Posey stated that Detective Bussa had previously spoke to him about being pushed to take care of the case; however, Detective Posey did not say by who.

Detective Posey stated that he felt facial recognition was encouraged to be used by the department in general. CD

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Detective James Ronan, badge D-4878, assigned to the Third Precinct

The following is a synopsis of the audio recorded Garrity interview that Sergeant Butler and I conducted on August 3, 2020, at approximately 10:15 A.M. with Detective Ronan at the Office of Internal Affairs. Detective Ronan declined union/legal representation for the interview. A copy of the interview can be found enclosed in its entirety.

Detective Ronan stated that on January 10, 2020, he, along with Officer Atkinson, went to the DDC to conduct interviews of multiple arrested persons. Detective Ronan stated that the purpose of him going to the DDC was not to specifically interview Mr. Williams, he went there regarding some of his cases, along with cases that involved other detectives in the Third Precinct PDU.

Detective Ronan stated that prior to going to the DDC, he had no knowledge of Mr. Williams; however, Officer Atkinson wanted to speak with Mr. Williams because Officer Atkinson had some open cases that Mr. Williams may have been connected with. Detective Ronan stated that prior to arriving at the DDC, he only knew that Officer Atkinson wanted to speak with someone regarding his cases, he did not know Mr. Williams' identity. Detective Ronan stated that he did not know the details of Officer Atkinson's cases, he only knew that the cases involved the downtown Shinola location and the John Varvatos location in downtown.

Detective Ronan stated that while in the interrogation room at the DDC with Mr. Williams, Detective Ronan stated that Officer Atkinson handed him some photographs of the suspect from Officer Atkinson's cases and Detective Ronan did not believe that Mr. Williams was the same individual in Officer Atkinson's cases. Detective Ronan stated that even though he did not think that Mr. Williams looked like Officer Atkinson's suspect, that is the reason detectives will show photographs to multiple people to see what their opinion is.

Detective Ronan stated that sometime after the interview with Mr. Williams, he and Officer Atkinson returned to the Third Precinct. Detective Ronan stated that while at the precinct, he asked Officer Atkinson why they had interviewed Mr. Williams. Detective Ronan stated that Officer Atkinson advised him that since Mr. Williams was locked up on a warrant for a larceny at Shinola, Officer Atkinson wanted to see if Mr. Williams was possibly the suspect in his case.

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Detective Ronan stated that he is not aware of why Officer Atkinson brought out the facial recognition lead paperwork while interviewing Mr. Williams.

Detective Ronan stated that he believed he spoke with Detective Bussa upon returning to the Third Precinct; however, it was later clarified that his timeframe was off due to the amount of time that had past, and he could have spoke with Detective Bussa one (1) or two (2) days later. Detective Ronan stated that when he spoke with Detective Bussa and Detective Bussa explained how he had obtained Mr. Williams' identity, along with Detective Ronan viewing photographs from the larceny, he advised Detective Bussa that he did not believe that Mr. Williams was the same person that was in the photographs from the larceny that Detective Bussa had investigated.

Detective Ronan stated that during the interview with Mr. Williams, Mr. Williams had advised him and Officer Atkinson that he knew that facial recognition was used to identify him because he had family that worked for the police department and Crime Intel and was advised that facial recognition was used in the case that brought him to jail. Detective Atkinson stated that he did advise Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills of this information. CD

Police Officer Benjamin Atkinson, badge 3931, assigned to the Third Precinct

The following is a synopsis of the audio recorded Garrity Interview that Sergeant Butler and I conducted on August 5, 2020, at approximately 8:16 A.M. with Officer Atkinson at the Office of Internal Affairs. DPOA Attorneys Carrie Seward and Cheri Wyrick were present for the interview. A copy of the interview can be found enclosed in its entirety.

Officer Atkinson stated that he did not recall assisting Detective Bussa with his Shinola case. Officer Atkinson stated that prior to interviewing Mr. Williams at the DDC, he did not have an extensive knowledge of Detective Bussa's case with Mr. Williams. Officer Atkinson stated that prior to interviewing Mr. Williams, he was aware that Mr. Williams was the person accused of stealing the watches in Detective Bussa's case. Officer Atkinson stated that since Detective Bussa had been in contact with unknown people from Shinola, he had spoken with Detective Bussa who advised Officer Atkinson that it was probably the same individual that had committed the larceny from Officer Atkinson's case and Detective Bussa's case.

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Officer Atkinson stated that he is not aware of who Detective Bussa's point of contact at Shinola was.

Officer Atkinson stated that he is not aware of why Detective Bussa was assigned the Shinola case nor did he know who had assigned Detective Bussa the case.

Officer Atkinson stated that he believed Detective Bussa had called him on January 9, 2020, and advised him that the person wanted for the larcenies at Shinola was in custody at the DDC.

Officer Atkinson stated that he believed that he had reviewed the video from Detective Bussa's case prior to going to the DDC.

Officer Atkinson stated on January 10, 2020, he and Detective Ronan went to the DDC to interview Mr. Williams to see if Mr. Williams was the same perpetrator in his Shinola case. Officer Atkinson stated that since it presumably the same individual committing the larcenies, it would have been a good time to see if Mr. Williams was his suspect. Officer Atkinson stated that he did not recall speaking to Mr. Williams regarding a larceny at John Varvatos.

Officer Atkinson stated that after speaking to Mr. Williams, he was not able to positively rule Mr. Williams out as a suspect; however, he did not feel that he was the correct person for his case.

Officer Atkinson stated that after speaking to Mr. Williams and thinking about the person that he had seen in the video from Detective Bussa's case, he recalled noticing the shape of Mr. Williams head appeared to be different from the suspect in the video. Officer Atkinson described Mr. Williams head as large and square, which was different from the person in the video from Detective Bussa's case.

Officer Atkinson stated that he believed that he spoke with Detective Bussa within forty-eight (48) hours of interviewing Mr. Williams and advised him that he did not believe Mr. Williams was the correct person. Officer Atkinson stated that although he did not believe that Mr. Williams was the correct person for Detective Bussa's case, if Detective Bussa believed that he was, it was his case.

Officer Atkinson stated that he was aware that facial recognition was utilized to identify Mr. Williams and that Detective Bussa had done a photo

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lineup, but he did not know whom Detective Bussa had completed the photo lineup with. Detective Bussa stated that he would assume that since the Wayne County Prosecutor's Office authorized a warrant against Mr. Williams, there was sufficient evidence that he would have been the perpetrator.

Officer Atkinson stated that Captain Cox contacted him, via telephone, sometime around the time when Mr. Williams' story was featured on the news. Officer Atkinson stated that he advised Captain Cox of the reason for going to the DDC to interview Mr. Williams. Officer Atkinson stated that he did advise Captain Cox that after reviewing the video of Detective Bussa's case and interviewing Mr. Williams, that Mr. Williams did not look like the guy.

Officer Atkinson stated that rumor going around the precinct, as of the writing of this report, is that Captain Cox knew about Detective Bussa's case because Captain Cox had spoken with people from Shinola about it; however, he stated that he had no firsthand knowledge if that was true.

Officer Atkinson stated that while speaking with Mr. Williams at the DDC, Mr. Williams advised him that he was able to get in touch with someone who worked at "Greenlight" who advised him that the case that he was in jail on was "bullshit." Officer Atkinson stated that he notified Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills of what Mr. Williams had stated. CD

Detective Donald Bussa, badge D-608, assigned to the Third Precinct

The following is a synopsis of the audio recorded Garrity Interview that Sergeant Butler and I conducted on August 5, 2020, at approximately 11:47 A.M. with Detective Bussa at the Office of Internal Affairs. LSA Attorney Fred Walker was present for the interview. A copy of the interview can be found enclosed in its entirety.

Detective Bussa stated that at the time he had been promoted, he had never been in an investigatory unit. Detective Bussa stated that he was promoted on a Friday, and on the days leading up to his promotion, he was walking the beat as radio code Monroe Beat 1. Detective Bussa stated that even up until the date of this interview, he had not been required to take, nor has he put in to take, any training that is specialized towards investigations. Detective Bussa stated that from his experience, he would ask another detective on how to do something in particular, only to be told later by a separate detective that it should be done another way. Detective Bussa stated that supervision within the PDU was always there to listen to him and provide

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guidance; however, he wondered what their level of training or experience was due some of his questions being referred to other people.

Detective Bussa stated that he received the Shinola case in question on May 20, 2019. Detective Bussa stated that upon receiving the case, there was no video in the folder, there was only a "six (6) pack and photo recognition." Detective Bussa stated that the six (6) pack in the folder was only the answer key that had been prepared by Detective Adams. Detective Bussa stated that now retired Sergeant Michael Jackson handed him the case; however, he did not know who had assigned him the case. Detective Bussa stated that he was assigned the case because Detective Adams had left the precinct.

Detective Bussa stated that upon receiving the Shinola case, he had been at the PDU for approximately five (5) weeks. Detective Bussa stated that prior to receiving the case, he believed that he may have submitted one (1) or two (2) cases to the prosecutor's office.

Detective Bussa stated that upon Sergeant Jackson giving him the case folder, Sergeant Jackson advised him the case was already done, and that Detective Bussa just had to submit the warrant. Detective Bussa stated that once he opened the folder and discovered that it had only contained the six (6) pack and photo recognition, he advised Sergeant Jackson that he had nothing to go off of, only a photo. Detective Bussa stated that Sergeant Jackson advised him that he was in contact with Shinola and that he would obtain the video and reports that were prepared by Shinola.

Detective Bussa stated that he never spoke with Detective Adams regarding the case.

Detective Bussa stated that at an unknown time after he had received the case, Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills advised him that someone from Shinola had filed a complaint regarding the case not being completed and that Detective Bussa would need to continue to work on the case. Detective Bussa stated that he advised Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills that the case file only contained a facial recognition lead and that he had never received the information that Sergeant Jackson said he would obtain for the case. Detective Bussa stated that he also advised Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills that he was not able to get in touch with anyone from Shinola to obtain the information that Sergeant Jackson said he would obtain.

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Detective Bussa stated at some time later, he came into contact with a female named "Katherine," now known as Ms. Katherine Johnston, Mackinac Partners. Detective Bussa stated that Ms. Johnston acted as the representative for Shinola from that point forward. Detective Bussa stated that Ms. Johnston, and another unknown female, were the lead security personnel, from a firm contracted by Shinola, that would handle all larcenies at Shinola. Detective Bussa stated that he was in contact with Ms. Johnston multiple times while working on the investigation.

Detective Bussa stated that on June 3, 2020, he went to Shinola and spoke with the manager, Scott Ratkowski, in an attempt to obtain video and to schedule a time to conduct a photo lineup.

Detective Bussa stated that he spoke with Ms. Johnston on June 10, 2019, and she advised him that someone from the Shinola store would contact him to set up a time to conduct a photo lineup with a Shinola employee. Detective Bussa stated that an appointment with Mr. Ratkowski, which was facilitated by Ms. Johnston, was setup for June 18, 2019, so Mr. Ratkowski could view a photo lineup; however, Mr. Ratkowski did not arrive for the scheduled appointment.

Detective Bussa stated that a note that he made on June 19, 2019, which stated, "WARRANT SUBMITTED" was not correctly worded. Detective Bussa stated that there is a drop down box and he picked the "WARRANT SUBMITTED" tab due to no other tabs being relevant. Detective Bussa stated this entry was simply made so he could obtain a "Jacket Number."

Detective Bussa stated that on July 23, 2019, he had a meeting at the Third Precinct with Ms. Johnston and the unnamed CEO of Shinola. Detective Bussa stated that the CEO advised him that it was corporate policy not to force their employees to attend court proceedings unless they wanted to. Detective Bussa stated that the CEO advised him that going forward, all contact regarding larcenies at Shinola would go through Mackinac Partners.

Detective Bussa stated that after the above meeting he spoke with Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills and asked her if he could present a photo lineup to Ms. Johnston. Detective Bussa stated that Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills advised him to reach out to someone at the prosecutor's office and ask them if he could use Ms. Johnston to view a photo lineup. Detective Bussa stated that he did contact the prosecutor's office, possibly on July 24, 2019, at the general number and they transferred him to an unknown prosecutor. Detective Bussa stated, after explaining the circumstances, the unknown

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prosecutor advised him that he could present the photo lineup to Ms. Johnston due to it being a Retail Fraud case.

Detective Bussa stated that on July 30, 2019, Detective Posey presented a photo lineup, which Detective Bussa had prepared, to Ms. Johnston. Detective Bussa stated that when the lineup was presented to Ms. Johnston, which was done in a large conference room at the Third Precinct, he stood by the doorway while Detective Posey presented it to Ms. Johnston. Detective Bussa stated that Detective Posey was not aware of who the suspect was in the photo lineup and from what he could see, the lineup was not presented in a suggestive way.

Detective Bussa stated that, at the time the photo lineup was presented to Ms. Johnston, it made sense to use Ms. Johnston due to the prosecutor saying it would be fine and also him not understanding the concept of a person witnessing a crime in person as opposed to someone viewing it on video.

Detective Bussa stated that he did not recall Ms. Johnston ever asking if she could look at still photos from the larceny while she was looking at the lineup. Detective Bussa stated that he did recall Ms. Johnston having her cellular phone during the lineup; however, he did not recall what she was doing with it. Detective Bussa stated that, from his detective experience at the time this lineup was done, he would probably not have "denied her" if she had asked to look at images that she had brought with her to compare to the lineup that was presented. Detective Bussa stated that, at that time, he would have thought that there would have been no harm due to Ms. Johnston having the photos and videos for so long, her looking at them again would not have been an issue.

I asked Detective Bussa directly, "Why did you put so much interest in a Retail Fraud Investigation?" Detective Bussa stated that, "I feel like I've done that for all my cases." Detective Bussa clarified, and further stated that he did not want to do the investigation in the first place because the crime dated back to 2018 and he did not know what he was doing.

Detective Bussa stated that sometime, he believed, in May 2019, Captain Cox approached him while Detective Bussa was sitting in his cubicle, and asked Detective Bussa what the status on the Shinola case in question was. Detective Bussa stated that it was "not a formal thing" when approached by Captain Cox, Captain Cox just wanted to know the progress on the case. Detective Bussa stated that he advised Captain Cox that he still did not have

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anything to go with on the case. Detective Bussa stated that Captain Cox stated something to the effect of, "Since we have a person ID'd, submit the warrant and let the prosecutor decide." Detective Bussa stated that at the time Captain Cox approached him, the only way a suspect, Mr. Johnson, was identified was because of the facial recognition lead that was developed by Detective Adams. Detective Bussa stated that even though he was told to submit the case as it was, he had no idea what he was submitting.

Detective Bussa stated that he felt like he was pressured regarding this case prior to it being submitted. Detective Bussa stated that between being told that there was a complaint regarding this case and command staff being aware of the case, he felt that this case was being held higher than anything else he would have been working on.

Detective Bussa stated that he was unaware if anyone else had heard Captain Cox speaking to him about the case; however, Detective Posey was sitting directly next to Detective Bussa when this occurred. Detective Bussa stated that after Captain Cox had spoken with him, other detectives approached him and said, "They're making you do this!" Detective Bussa stated that he responded, "What else am I going to do besides submit the warrant!"

Detective Bussa stated that he was not aware of why Captain Cox had knowledge of his case; however, he was informed by Ms. Johnston that she had spoken with Commander Franklin Hayes and Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills at a Compstat meeting and advised them that there were larcenies at Shinola.

Detective Bussa stated that on the day that he had prepared the warrant request he had worked late. Detective Bussa stated at the time that he had completed the Warrant Request, all supervision from the PDU had left for the day. Detective Bussa stated that he approached Sergeant Saati, because he was the first supervisor that he had seen, to sign the Warrant Request. Detective Bussa stated that he had previously been advised, that if there were not any PDU supervision available, a patrol supervisor could sign a Warrant Request.

Detective Bussa stated that possibly a week prior to Mr. Williams being arrested, Ms. Johnston had contacted him asking why it was taking so long for the perpetrator to be taken into custody (she apparently knew a warrant had been authorized). Detective Bussa stated that Ms. Johnston advised him that she had been in contact with Wayne State University Police and she was going to send them out because she was able to track Mr. Williams down

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herself. Detective Bussa stated that after speaking with Ms. Johnston, in passing, he advised unknown members of 30 Series that he had someone with an active warrant; however, they apparently did not act on his information. Detective Bussa stated that he was unaware that Captain Cox had directed 30 Series to arrest Mr. Williams on the active warrant.

Detective Bussa stated that, he believes on January 11, 2020, he spoke with Detective Ronan and Officer Atkinson regarding their interview of Mr. Williams the previous day at the DDC. Detective Bussa stated that Detective Ronan and Officer Atkinson advised him that they did not know if Mr. Williams was the correct person in custody for Detective Bussa's case. Detective Bussa stated that Detective Ronan and Officer Atkinson advised him that Mr. Williams did not look exactly the same as the person in the video from the larceny.

Detective Bussa stated that he reviewed the interrogation video with Mr. Williams on January 12, 2020, and he had doubts that Mr. Williams was the correct person for the larceny. Detective Bussa stated that Mr. Williams appeared to be larger than the person in the surveillance video from Shinola. Detective Bussa stated that he was not 100 percent positive that Mr. Williams was not the correct person; however, he was concerned enough to notify the prosecutor's office. Detective Bussa stated that he called the prosecutor (presumed to be APA Gillis) immediately; however, it was on a Sunday and he received a voicemail. Detective Bussa stated that he emailed APA Gillis on January 13, 2020, to advise her of his belief that Mr. Williams was not the correct person.

Detective Bussa stated that at the time that he had prepared the Investigator's Report, he was not aware that he should have typed that Ms. Johnston viewed the crime on video instead of being an actual witness to the crime when it had occurred. Detective Bussa stated that him leaving that information out of the Investigator's Report was not an attempt to deceive anyone.

Detective Bussa stated that after this case was featured in the news, he received multiple phone calls from Captain Cox regarding this case. Detective Bussa stated that during one (1) week, he counted seventeen (17) personal calls from Captain Cox and two (2) conference calls. Detective Bussa stated that the calls entailed what he had done with this investigation and why he had done it. Detective Bussa stated that during all of the calls, he was asked the same things repeatedly. Detective Bussa stated that while speaking with Captain Cox, the conversation that Detective Bussa had with

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Captain Cox in May 2019, was never discussed. Detective Bussa stated that during all of the conversations he simply answered the questions that he was asked. Detective Bussa stated that during all of the conversations, he felt that it was an attempt to "railroad" him. When Detective Bussa was asked directly why he did not address the fact that Captain Cox had knowledge of this case at least dating back to May 2019, while at least on the conference calls, he once again responded that he was just answering the questions that he was asked.

Detective Bussa stated that he did not recall giving Ms. Johnston Mr. Williams' information after the warrant had been obtained. Detective Bussa stated that Ms. Johnston's investigative team actually sent him information regarding Mr. Williams that they had obtained from Facebook and other sources.

Detective Bussa stated that Captain Cox had approached him directly regarding other lower level crimes. Detective Bussa stated one case (1909290209) that he recalled Captain Cox approaching him about was a larceny. Detective Bussa stated that the complainant on the case had filed a complaint that nothing was being done on the case. The complainant was able to provide the license plate number of the vehicle that the perpetrator of the larceny was driving at the time. Captain Cox advised Detective Bussa to submit a warrant request even though Detective Bussa did not know if the owner of the vehicle was the perpetrator of the crime. Detective Bussa stated that he did not submit a warrant request on this case. Detective Bussa stated that he did not think that it was right to submit a warrant request against the owner of the vehicle because he could not establish that the owner was the perpetrator in the crime. Detective Bussa stated that other detectives supported him in not submitting a warrant request on this case due to his concerns.

It should be noted that the Real Time Crime Center compiled a list of twelve (12) other cases that Detective Bussa had requested facial recognition for. Out of those cases, I found three (3) that involved warrants being authorized, and arrests were made. The following paragraphs will discuss each of those cases. Additionally, after a review of the case where arrests were made, and with explanation from Detective Bussa, I did not find any information that the wrong suspect had been identified due to the use of facial recognition.

Detective Bussa stated in total, he believed that he had requested the use of facial recognition approximately ten (10) times. Detective Bussa stated

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that out of those cases, he believed that facial recognition was used in four (4) cases total where warrants were authorized and arrests were made. The following three (3) cases were the only cases that Detective Bussa had requested facial recognition and arrest were made in the cases. This information is also captured above in the Investigation section of this report.

Detective Bussa stated that in regards to case #1905150273, which was the other case that was featured on the news, Mr. [REDACTED] was the victim. Detective Bussa stated that on May 15, 2019, [REDACTED] was filming a fight between a group of individuals. Detective Bussa stated that Mr. [REDACTED] was a teacher at a local school. Detective Bussa stated that Mr. [REDACTED] advised him that a student of his, and another unknown male, approached him and asked him what he was doing. Mr. [REDACTED] advised the individuals that he was filming them and they were going to get in trouble. Mr. [REDACTED] alleged that the unknown male took his cellphone from his hands and threw it, causing the screen to crack.

Detective Bussa stated that he took a statement from Mr. [REDACTED] who also provided a video to Detective Bussa that revealed the suspect. Detective Bussa stated that photo recognition was utilized to develop a suspect and Mr. [REDACTED] B/M/ [REDACTED], was identified.

Detective Bussa stated that he prepared a photo lineup, that was presented by Detective Posey, to Mr. [REDACTED] who identified Mr. [REDACTED] as the person who took his cellphone from his hands.

Detective Bussa stated that after the case had proceeded to court, Mr. [REDACTED] testified that he did not want to get his student involved in the court process so he did not identify him to Detective Bussa. Detective Bussa also stated that during testimony, Mr. [REDACTED] revealed that he later found out the suspects identity, Mr. [REDACTED] from his student; however, he testified that he did not share that information with Detective Bussa.

Detective Bussa stated that during the court proceedings, the prosecutor pulled him off to the side and advised him that because facial recognition was used and it was controversial, he was going to drop the case.

Detective Bussa stated that he still believed that Mr. [REDACTED] was the correct perpetrator in the crime.

Detective Bussa stated that Mr. [REDACTED] tattoos came into question at some time. Detective Bussa stated that the video clearly showed the suspects face, and six (6) months later when he came to court, there was a tattoo above

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his eye which was not there at the time of the larceny. It should be noted that I located a photograph of Mr. [REDACTED] in LEIN, via SNAP, which was dated May 6, 2019, which revealed that Mr. [REDACTED] did not have a tattoo above his eye at the time Mr. Cassani's cellphone was taken. Additionally, Mr. [REDACTED] mugshot from this case on July 31, 2020, revealed that he had a tattoo on his face at that time.

Detective Bussa stated that in regards to case #1904080259, Mr. [REDACTED] B/M/71, was assaulted by Mr. [REDACTED] B/M/30, a known perpetrator. Detective Bussa stated that facial recognition was utilized to positively identify Mr. [REDACTED] who had an intimate relationship with Mr. [REDACTED] however, Mr. [REDACTED] only knew Mr. [REDACTED] first name. After being provided a photograph of Mr. [REDACTED] from Facebook, facial recognition was utilized to verify his identity. After the facial recognition had identified Mr. [REDACTED] a single photo was shown to Mr. [REDACTED] who positively identified Mr. [REDACTED]

Detective Bussa stated that in regards to case #1809080058, a larceny with a known offender, he did not recall utilizing facial recognition in this case as identified by the Real Time Crime Center. Detective Bussa stated that although he did not recall utilizing facial recognition, it is possible that he did. This case did result in a jury finding the defendant guilty and he was sentenced to probation. It should be noted that it was discovered after further investigation, Detective Bussa did in fact request facial recognition for this case; however, the request was negative for an investigative lead.

On August 19, 2020, at approximately 11:22 A.M, I conducted a follow-up Garrity Interview with Detective Bussa to determine what notifications he made to his supervision regarding his belief that Mr. Williams was not the correct suspect in the Shinola larceny. The following is a synopsis of the interview which can be found enclosed for review. It should be noted that Detective Bussa refused legal/union representation, as well as advanced notice for the interview.

Detective Bussa stated that after he had notified the prosecutor, via email, that he did not believe Mr. Williams was the correct suspect in the Shinola larceny, he did notify Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills of the same information; however, he did not recall exactly when that notification occurred. Detective Bussa stated that he did not recall notifying Captain Cox of this development until Captain Cox questioned him at the time the story was in the media. Detective Bussa stated that he did not believe that he advised Lieutenant Chadwick-Bills that he had notified Captain Cox of the information.
CD

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
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
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
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
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CONCLUSION:




To: Commander Michael McGinnis, Professional Standards Bureau (T.C.)

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
To: Commander Michael Ginnis, Professional Standards Bureau (T.C.)

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
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Based upon the information garnered through this investigation, I recommend that **IA Case #20 058** be closed at Internal Affairs with a finding of **"EXONERATED"** as it relates to the allegation of Misuse of Facial Recognition; however, **"SUSTAINED"** for several violations of DPD Policy by certain members of the Third Precinct PDU and this matter be referred to Disciplinary Administration for adjudication for the following violations of the departmental rules and regulations:

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ATTACHMENTS

1. CD containing Interviews
2. Garrity Notice Captain Cox
3. Garrity Notice Captain Cox
4. Rank Waiver Captain Cox
5. Rank Waiver Captain Cox
6. Garrity Rights Captain Cox
7. Garrity Rights Captain Cox
8. Garrity Notice Lieutenant Kozloff
9. Garrity Rights Lieutenant Kozloff
10. Garrity Notice Detective Adams
11. Garrity Rights Detective Adams
12. Facial Recognition Policy and the Shinola Incident from AC White
13. Warrant Package regarding Mr. Robert Williams
14. Incident Tracking 1810050167
15. Supplement and Tracking 1810050167

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FIRST ENDORSEMENT

I have read and reviewed the investigation submitted by Sergeant Davidson and I find it to be complete and accurate. I concur with Sergeant Davidson's finding of "EXONERATED" as it relates to the allegation of Misuse of Facial Recognition and "SUSTAINED" for violating DPD policy. I recommend that this report be forwarded to Disciplinary Administration for adjudication.



WILLIAM TRZOS
Lieutenant, L-339
Internal Affairs

APPROVED
NOV 05 2020
PROFESSIONAL
STANDARDS BUREAU