



Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Homeland
Security

Strategic Intelligence Assessment and Data
on Domestic Terrorism

*Submitted to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on
Homeland Security, and the Committee of the Judiciary of the United States
House of Representatives, and the Select Committee on Intelligence, the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee
of the Judiciary of the United States Senate*

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I. Overview of Reporting Requirement

Pursuant to Section 5602(a) and (b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 2020¹ (hereafter “the Act”), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in consultation with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), including the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and the Department of Justice (DOJ), jointly produce a report containing a strategic intelligence assessment and data on domestic terrorism (DT). The Act requires the report to contain a strategic intelligence assessment, a discussion of specified activities, certain data on DT matters, and recommendations. Section 5602(d) of the Act requires the Director of the FBI and the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in a manner consistent with the authorities and responsibilities of such Director, to jointly submit to the appropriate Congressional committees annual updates to those reports. This report constitutes the annual update for FY 2023.²

II. Executive Summary

Preventing terrorist attacks remains a top priority for both the FBI and DHS, and the FBI serves as the lead investigative agency on terrorism matters. The threat posed by international and domestic threat actors has evolved significantly since 9/11. One of the most significant terrorism threats to the United States we face today is posed by lone actors³ and small groups of individuals who commit acts of violence motivated by a range of ideological beliefs and/or personal grievances. Of these actors, domestic violent extremists represent one of the most persistent threats to the United States today. These individuals are often radicalized online and look to conduct attacks with easily accessible weapons. Many of these violent extremists are motivated and inspired by a mix of ideological, socio-political, and personal grievances against their targets. This report provides our strategic intelligence assessments on DT, a detailed discussion of our procedures and methods to address DT threats, as well as data on DT incidents and FBI investigations.

¹ Public Law 116-92, enacted 20 December 2019.

² Consistent with Congressional direction, as of December 2022, NCTC has limited its work to the transnational and international dimensions of the terrorism threat against the United States.

³ The FBI and DHS define a lone actor as an individual motivated by one or more violent extremist ideologies who, operating alone, supports or engages in acts of unlawful violence in furtherance of that ideology or ideologies that may involve influence from a larger terrorist organization or a foreign actor. The mere advocacy of political or social positions, political activism, use of strong rhetoric, or generalized philosophic embrace of violent tactics does not constitute violent extremism, and may be constitutionally protected.

III. Domestic Terrorism: Definitions, Terminology, and Methodology

Section 5602(a) of the Act requires the Director of the FBI and the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the DNI, to jointly develop, to the fullest extent feasible and for purposes of internal recordkeeping and tracking, uniform and standardized definitions of the terms “domestic terrorism,” “act of domestic terrorism,” “domestic terrorism groups,” and any other commonly used terms with respect to DT; methodologies for tracking incidents of DT; and descriptions of categories and subcategories of DT and ideologies relating to DT; and to jointly submit the information in a report to the appropriate Congressional committees.

Definitions

For the FBI’s purposes, “domestic terrorism” is defined by 18 USC § 2331(5), as activities:

- Involving acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State;
- Appearing to be intended to:
 - Intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
 - Influence the policy of government by intimidation or coercion; or
 - Affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping; and
- Occurring primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.

DHS derives its definition of “domestic terrorism” from the Homeland Security Act definition of “terrorism,” 6 USC § 101(18), which is similar, but not identical, to the 18 USC § 2331(5) definition. Under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, “terrorism” is defined as any activity that:

- Involves an act that:
 - Is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources; and
 - Is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State or other subdivision of the United States; and
- Appears to be intended to:
 - Intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
 - Influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
 - Affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.

Both references in the U.S. Code are definitions and not federal criminal charging statutes for DT.

Terminology

The FBI and DHS use the term “domestic violent extremism” to refer to DT threats. The word “violent” is important because the mere advocacy of political or social positions, political activism, use of strong rhetoric, or generalized philosophic embrace of violent tactics does not constitute violent extremism and may be constitutionally protected. The FBI and DHS do not investigate, collect, or maintain information on U.S. persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment. Pursuant to the *Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations (AGG-Dom)*, no investigative activity may be based solely on activity protected by the

Constitution, or the apparent or actual race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or gender identity of an individual or group. Similarly, DHS is prohibited from engaging in any intelligence activities for the purpose of affecting the political process in the United States or for the sole purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment or the lawful exercise of other rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and DHS policy prohibits any intelligence activities based solely on an individual's or group's race, ethnicity, gender, religion, sexual orientation, gender identity, country of birth, or nationality.

A "domestic violent extremist" (DVE) is defined as an individual based and operating primarily within the United States or its territories without direction or inspiration from a foreign terrorist group or other foreign power who seeks to further political or social goals, wholly or in part, through unlawful acts of force or violence dangerous to human life.

The U.S. Government, including the FBI and DHS, continually reviews and evaluates intelligence and information from multiple sources to ensure it appropriately identifies and categorizes national security threats, including those that are criminal in nature, to the United States. As part of this continual internal review, the FBI and DHS prioritize threat categories, which are further described below, as needed and as threats evolve. While categories help the FBI and DHS better understand threats associated with broad categories of DT-related criminal actors, the FBI and DHS recognize motivations vary, are nuanced, and sometimes are derived from a blend of ideologies. Categories also inform our intelligence and prevention efforts.

Since 2019, the U.S. Government uses the following five threat categories to understand the DT threat:

- (1) Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism:** This threat category encompasses threats involving the potentially unlawful use or threat of force or violence, in violation of federal law, in furtherance of political or social agendas which are deemed to derive from bias, often related to race, held by the actor against others, including a given population group. Racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists (REMVEs) use both political and religious justifications to support their racially- or ethnically-based ideological objectives and criminal activities. One set of REMVE threat actors use their belief in the superiority of the white race to justify their use of violence to further their political, cultural, and religious goals. A separate and distinct set of REMVE threat actors use real or perceived racism or injustice in American society, their desire for a separate Black homeland, and/or violent interpretations of religious teachings to justify their use of violence to further their social or political goals.
- (2) Anti-Government or Anti-Authority Violent Extremism:** This threat category encompasses the potentially unlawful use or threat of force or violence, in violation of federal law, in furtherance of political and/or social agendas, which are deemed to derive from anti-government or anti-authority sentiment, including opposition to perceived economic, social, or racial hierarchies, or perceived government overreach, negligence, or illegitimacy. This threat category typically includes threats from anarchist violent extremists (AVEs), militia violent extremists (MVEs), sovereign citizen violent extremists (SCVEs), and anti-government or anti-authority violent extremists-other (AGAAVE-Other).

- (3) **Animal Rights or Environmental Violent Extremism:** This threat category encompasses the potentially unlawful use or threat of force or violence, in violation of federal law, in furtherance of political and/or social agendas by those seeking to end or mitigate perceived cruelty, harm, or exploitation of animals and/or the perceived exploitation or destruction of natural resources and the environment.
- (4) **Abortion-Related Violent Extremism:** This threat category encompasses the potentially unlawful use or threat of force or violence, in violation of federal law, in furtherance of political and/or social agendas relating to abortion, including individuals who advocate for violence in support of either pro-life or pro-choice beliefs.
- (5) **All Other Domestic Terrorism Threats:** This threat category encompasses threats involving the potentially unlawful use or threat of force or violence, in violation of federal law, in furtherance of political and/or social agendas which are not otherwise exclusively defined under one of the other threat categories. Such agendas may derive from, but are not limited to, a mixture of personal grievances and beliefs, political concerns, and aspects of conspiracy theories, including those described in the other DT threat categories. Some actors in this category may also carry bias related to religion, gender, or sexual orientation. Several DVEs have combined components of different ideologies to develop a personalized belief system that they use to justify violent, criminal action.

Methodology

The FBI defines a “DT incident” as a criminal act, including threats or acts of violence to specific victims, made in furtherance of a domestic political and/or social goal, which has occurred and can be confirmed. The FBI defines a “DT plot” as a combination of criminal activity and planning that collectively reflect steps toward criminal action in furtherance of a domestic political or social goal. “Disrupted DT plots” are plots which, absent law enforcement intervention, could have resulted in a DT incident.

The DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) defines a “DT attack” as an incident motivated by a DVE ideology in which a weapon or tactic is purposefully deployed against a target for the purpose of causing injury, death, or property destruction. DHS I&A defines a “DT plot” as an incident motivated by a DVE ideology in which a specific target is identified, and significant steps have been taken to acquire weapons or plan the tactics intended to be used against the target. For DHS, these ideologically driven criminal acts must be dangerous to human life or potentially destructive to critical infrastructure or key resources to meet the definition of DT. A single incident may be part of a spree of criminal or violent activity conducted by the same perpetrator(s) using the same tactic(s), which are carried out against multiple locations in short succession.

The FBI and DHS I&A make every effort to document lethal and non-lethal DT incidents, but there is no mandatory incident reporting requirement for state, local, Tribal, territorial, and campus (SLTTC) law enforcement agencies to report criminal activity that appears to be motivated by a social or political goal and is mitigated at the SLTTC level. As such, some DT incidents likely go unreported by other law enforcement agencies. These factors make it difficult for the FBI and DHS I&A to identify every DT incident that has occurred in the United States. DHS I&A complements the FBI’s

effort to document DT incidents through I&A's ongoing DT incident tracking initiative, which is informed by I&A's intelligence officers deployed to fusion centers, engagement with SLTTC law enforcement and homeland security partners, review of DHS Component information and US Intelligence Community reporting, and open source research.

The results of DHS's incident tracking efforts are also shared with the FBI, SLTTC, and private sector partners. Therefore, the appendix to this report provides information that represents significant DT incidents and disrupted plots that have occurred in the United States of which the FBI and DHS I&A have knowledge, but not a comprehensive listing of all incidents.

IV. Strategic Intelligence Assessment

The FBI, in coordination with prosecutors in the US Attorneys' Offices (USAOs) and DOJ's National Security Division (NSD), continues to successfully investigate and disrupt DVE activities, plots, and threats. The FBI and DHS I&A developed analytic overviews of the current state of the various DT threats, which can be found below. DVE lone actors and small groups motivated by a range of ideological beliefs and personal grievances continue to pose a persistent and lethal threat to the Homeland.

Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism

Throughout FY 2023, REMVEs driven by a belief in the superiority of the white race remained among the FBI's and DHS's highest priority threats. REMVEs continue to pose the most consistent threat of lethal and non-lethal violence against religious, cultural, and government targets, and more recently, individuals REMVEs deem to be ideological opponents. Throughout the year, the FBI, in conjunction with state and local partners, disrupted REMVE activity based on a wide array of criminal violations.

This REMVE movement is fluid and decentralized, consisting of organized groups and lone actors, and increasingly coalesces online using a variety of social media platforms, end-to-end encrypted messaging applications, and imageboards. This operating environment generates new, primarily online groups and the fragmentation of other groups. REMVEs have used the internet to spread propaganda for many years, and 2023 saw the continuation of some REMVEs' coordinated efforts to create and spread overtly violent and racist propaganda online to encourage like-minded extremists to engage in lone actor attacks. REMVE lethal attacks also continued in FY 2023. On 26 August 2023, for example, a REMVE shot and killed three Black individuals at a retail store in Jacksonville, Florida. In the shooter's manifesto, he specifically referenced and included images of violent and racist propaganda widely circulated online, sometimes drawing directly from content found on some forums and imageboards popular among REMVEs. The manifesto called for the "total death" of the Black race and praised preceding REMVE attackers, some of which had also written manifestos.

During FY 2023, REMVEs motivated by real or perceived racism or injustice in American society, the desire for a separate Black homeland, or violent interpretations of religious teachings, posed a sporadic threat of lethal and non-lethal violence. These REMVEs are characterized by disparate ideologies and grievances that target a range of perceived ideological opponents, including law enforcement, the Jewish community, and individuals of the White race. While some REMVEs

advocate for a separate Black homeland or starting a “race war,” many broadly target law enforcement and the federal government. Retaliation and retribution for perceived or actual color of law violations and the perception of unjust legal proceedings surrounding the officers involved are among the organizing drivers for some of these REMVEs. In addition, REMVEs who adhere to violent interpretations of Black Hebrew Israelite religious teachings use anti-Semitic rhetoric as justification for violence. Although violent rhetoric and threats of violence by these REMVEs remained consistent, there were minimal observed acts of violence in FY 2023. The most significant exception involved, in December 2023, a REMVE who was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole in state prison for the April 2023 murder of two in Tulsa, Oklahoma. This was both the first REMVE and first DT lethal attack of 2023.

Anti-Government or Anti-Authority Violent Extremism

Anarchist Violent Extremism

AVEs are a subset of the anti-government or anti-authority extremism (AGAAVE) threat category. The FBI and DHS I&A continue to assess the most serious threat AVEs pose likely will continue to be their use, or potential use, of improvised incendiary devices or improvised explosive devices; their injury of ideological opponents and law enforcement during confrontations; and their occasional intent to illegally use firearms. Throughout FY 2023, AVEs threatened acts of violence toward law enforcement and ideological opponents and continued to oppose government and corporate policies perceived to infringe on individual freedoms referencing anti-capitalism, anti-fascism, anti-government, and anti-law enforcement sentiment, and social justice issues related to the environment, immigration, reproductive rights, and Indigenous Peoples’ rights as justification for criminal activity. As anti-government and anti-law enforcement sentiment continue to be primary drivers for AVE-related criminal activity, continued threats of violence and criminal actions are possible—likely in response to perceptions of a contentious national and international political environment in 2024. Most AVE-related criminal activity continues to involve physical assaults, threats of violence, and property crimes, such as arson, vandalism, and acts of sabotage, often committed by self-directed or small groups of AVEs.

Militia Violent Extremism

MVEs, a subset of the AGAAVE threat category, have traditionally targeted non-native born Americans and perceived undocumented immigrants due to their perception that these groups pose a national security threat to the United States, as well as law enforcement and government agencies due to supposed government overreach and abuses of power. During 2020 and 2021, MVEs engaged in activity motivated by their perceptions of the COVID-19 pandemic, the introduction of objections to the 2020 general election, and violence at otherwise lawful protests. Since 2022, MVEs have returned to focusing on traditional targets as the galvanizing issues from 2020 and 2021 lack the same appeal.

In FY 2023, MVEs and their associates more frequently plotted attacks and acts of violence against immigrants crossing the U.S.-Mexico border compared to previous years. These MVEs often cited a belief that the U.S. Government was failing to prevent illegal immigration and associated criminal activity such as drug and human trafficking, and threatened law enforcement they believed were allowing illegal immigration. MVEs also continued to stockpile illegal firearms and explosives,

threaten elected officials and law enforcement, and developed plans to overthrow and replace the federal government, often over perceived incursions on the Second Amendment or based on the belief the U.S. Constitution needed to be “restored.”

Given the resurgence in more traditional MVE targeting, and the upcoming 2024 general election, the FBI and DHS I&A assess the MVE threat will likely be defined by lone actor and small cell activity driven by immigration trends, policy, and rhetoric, perceived vulnerability of the United States to attacks from foreign terror organizations, as well as legacy grievances related to the validity of the 2020 Presidential election results.

Sovereign Citizen Violent Extremism

SCVEs, a subset of the AGAAVE threat category, posed a threat of ideologically motivated violence and crimes through FY 2023 and into recent months, continuing to target law enforcement, government officials, and court personnel. SCVE violence occurs most commonly during law enforcement encounters, such as traffic stops. In March 2023, an individual was killed during an armed confrontation with local police in Utah following a routine traffic stop for a fraudulent license plate.

SCVEs often threaten and harass officials and personnel with threats of kidnapping and criminal acts including filing of fraudulent liens and illicit monetary or tax claims. Individuals also use the ideology to justify criminal acts and use of force related to loss of, or infringement upon, perceived rights. SCVE incidents, threats, and criminal acts in the past years remained rooted in grievances and perceptions of infringed rights, or claims of immunity from government actions, at times emanating from responses and circumstances relating to the COVID-19 pandemic.

SCVEs range from lone actors to loose networks and small groups. Disruption and prosecution of SCVEs occurs on an ongoing basis, frequently in coordination with federal, state, and local law enforcement partners.

Anti-Government or Anti-Authority Extremism-Other

AGAAVE-Other actors, a sub-set of the AGAAVE threat category, include DVEs citing anti-government or anti-authority motivations for violence or criminal activity not otherwise defined in the AGAAVE threat category. These DVEs include, but are not limited to, those motivated by a desire to commit violence against individuals or entities they perceive to be associated with a specific political grievance, party or faction thereof. The FBI and DHS I&A assess AGAAVE-Other actors who select targets based on perceived political grievances and associations likely pose a growing threat to government, election, and law enforcement targets, as these DVEs have already cited specific political- and policy-related grievances as motivation for violence surrounding elections, legislation, and court decisions regarding divisive sociopolitical issues.

In August 2023, when the FBI attempted to arrest an AGAAVE-Other actor in Utah who had made a specific threat to kill the President of the United States, the individual did not comply and was shot and killed in the resulting altercation. In October 2022, an AGAAVE-Other actor was arrested and later convicted of assault and attempted kidnapping for intruding into the California residence of the

then-Speaker of the House and assaulting the then-Speaker's husband. In FY 2023, additional AGAAVE-Other actors nationwide were arrested for threatening government, law enforcement, or media personnel to whom they were ideologically opposed. Such AGAAVE-Other actors likely will increase their violent extremist activities in response to political flashpoint events through at least 2024, including those linked to the general election. During campaigns and events surrounding the 2024 general election, and in response to potential law enforcement or legal actions against political figures, these actors likely will increasingly cite grievances related to perceptions of their targets' political affiliations and systematic election fraud, and draw inspiration from conspiracy theories.

Investigations, arrests, and prosecutions related to the 6 January 2021 siege of the U.S. Capitol remain in progress, with dozens of these subjects categorized as AGAAVE-Other actors. In September 2023, an AGAAVE-Other actor was sentenced to 22 years in prison – the longest U.S. Capitol siege-related sentencing to date – for seditious conspiracy and other charges.

Abortion-Related Violent Extremism

Abortion-related violent extremists (AbRVE) – both pro-life and pro-choice – have threatened, vandalized, and impeded access to facilities that provide reproductive health services or counseling, which can violate the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE Act). FACE Act violations can be jointly investigated as civil rights violations and as domestic violent extremism. The FBI assesses FACE Act violations likely will hold steady in FY 2024 in the absence of national-level court decisions or legislation affecting abortion access, such as national restrictions to medical abortion drugs or national legislation restricting or expanding surgical abortion access. In the presence of national-level court decisions or legislation affecting abortion access, the FBI and DHS I&A assess that AbRVEs in 2024 likely pose a threat to some religious institutions, and reproductive health services personnel and facilities.

Animal Rights or Environmental Violent Extremism

The FBI and DHS I&A assess the animal rights or environmental violent extremism threat remained persistent through FY 2023. Animal rights violent extremists (ARVEs) continued to target entities perceived to be harming or exploiting animals through crimes such as animal thefts, vandalism, trespassing, property destruction, and threats of violence. Typical targets for ARVEs included individuals and entities involved in animal research; the fur industry; and businesses selling animal products or involved in raising livestock and meat production. ARVEs operated and likely will continue to operate in individual or small groups when committing criminal acts. The FBI and DHS I&A assess ARVEs in FY 2024 likely will continue to pose a persistent threat, and likely will commit actions intended to cause financial losses, intimidation, and heightened awareness of animal rights-related issues.

The FBI and DHS I&A assess environmental violent extremists (EVEs) in FY 2023 continued to commit criminal actions intended to cause financial loss or operational damage and disruption against entities perceived to be exploiting or contributing to destruction of the environment or natural resources. Criminal acts continued mainly in the form of property destruction. The FBI and DHS I&A assess opposition to oil and natural gas infrastructure development projects and related aspects of critical infrastructure as well as issues related to the environmental impact of fossil fuels, climate

change, land development, and deforestation likely will remain drivers for some criminal actions in FY 2024. Criminal acts likely will continue to include acts of arson, property destruction, or vandalism to delay or disrupt construction projects and cause financial loss.

All Other DT Threats

DVEs motivated by a personalized ideology, or an ideology that does not fit within the identified categories, continue to pose an intermittent threat of lethal violence. DVEs within this broad category include those with a personalized mix of various DVE ideologies, and involuntary celibate violent extremists (IVEs). The FBI and DHS I&A classify DVEs in the “All Other DT Threats” category if they have a personalized mix of ideologies and have no assessed dominant ideological motivation. If a DVE has espoused aspects of multiple ideologies but has a primary assessed ideology, the FBI and DHS I&A classify them into the primary threat category, rather than as an “All Other DT Threat.”

IVEs continue to consume online rhetoric supporting their personal grievances against women who reject them or against men whom they deem as more romantically successful and praise past mass casualty attackers. IVEs target both men and women for violence in an attempt to either promote awareness of IVE grievances or punish a population for their own perceived romantic failures. Generally, IVE violence is rarely connected to current events or environmental variables, but may be indirectly influenced by gender-based societal issues.

V. Discussion and Comparison of Investigative Activities

The Act calls for a discussion and comparison of the following activities:

- The criteria for opening, managing, and closing DT and international terrorism (IT) investigations.
- Standards and procedures for the FBI with respect to the review, prioritization, and mitigation of DT and IT threats in the United States.
- The planning, development, production, analysis, and evaluation of intelligence and intelligence products relating to terrorism, noting any differences with respect to DT and IT.
- The sharing of information relating to DT and IT by and between the federal government, SLTTC and foreign governments, the appropriate Congressional committees, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector.
- The criteria and methodology used by the FBI to identify or assign terrorism classifications to DT investigations.
- Compliance with privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties policies and protections, including protections against the public release of names or other personally identifiable information of individuals involved in incidents, investigations, indictments, prosecutions, or convictions for which data is reported under the Act.

- Information regarding any training or resources provided to assist federal and SLTTC
- law enforcement agencies in understanding, detecting, deterring, and investigating acts of DT, including the date, type, subject, and recipient agencies of such training or resources.

Criteria for Opening, Managing, and Closing DT and IT Investigations

The FBI's criteria for opening, managing, and closing DT and IT investigations stem from agency authorities outlined in the *AGG-Dom* and are implemented through FBI policy, referred to as the *Domestic Investigation and Operations Guide (DIOG)*. Consistent with those policies, the following outlines the criteria and methodology the FBI utilizes when conducting both DT and IT investigations:

Opening: The FBI opens a full investigation⁴ predicated on an “articulable factual basis” that reasonably indicates the existence of federal criminal activity or a threat to national security, or to protect against such activity or threat. The opening of a full investigation must be approved by a Supervisory Special Agent and notice to the responsible Headquarters unit must be provided within 15 days of opening. The FBI may open a preliminary investigation⁵ on the basis of any “allegation or information” indicative of possible criminal activity or threats to the national security.⁶ The opening of a preliminary investigation by a Field Office requires the approval of a Supervisory Special Agent, but does not require notice to the DOJ unless it involves a sensitive investigative matter (SIM).⁷

The opening of an investigation involving a SIM must be reviewed by the Field Office's Chief Division Counsel (CDC), approved by the Special Agent in Charge, and provided to the responsible Headquarters Unit Chief within 15 days of opening as notice to Headquarters. The Field Office must notify the USAO within 30 days unless inappropriate and, in that case, Headquarters must notify and provide an explanation to DOJ within 30 days.

⁴ A full investigation may be opened if there is an “articulable factual basis” for the investigation that reasonably indicates one of the following circumstances exists: an activity constituting a federal crime or a threat to the national security has or may have occurred, is or may be occurring, or will or may occur, and the investigation may obtain information relating to the activity or the involvement or role of an individual, group, or organization in such activity. An enterprise investigation is a type of full investigation that examines the structure, scope, and nature of the group or organization.

⁵ A preliminary investigation is a type of predicated investigation that may be opened (predicated) on the basis of any “allegation or information” indicative of possible criminal activity or threats to the national security. Preliminary investigations may be opened to detect, obtain information about, or prevent or protect against federal crimes or threats to the national security. Enterprise investigations cannot be conducted as preliminary investigations or assessments, nor may they be conducted for the sole purpose of collecting foreign intelligence.

⁶ The significance of the distinction between the full and preliminary investigation is in the availability of investigative tools. A preliminary investigation, which is based on the lesser factual predicate, limits the investigative tools and methods available, while the full investigation, which is based on the more robust factual predicate, permits the full range of legally available investigative tools and methods. In some instances, cases opened as preliminary investigations may be converted to full investigations based on the development of additional facts during the course of the investigation.

⁷ A SIM involves the activities of a domestic public official or political candidate (involving corruption or a threat to the national security), religious or political organization or individual prominent in such an organization, or news media, or any other matter which, in the judgment of the official authorizing an investigation, should be brought to the attention of FBI Headquarters and other DOJ officials.

A fundamental principle of the *Attorney General's Guidelines* for FBI investigations and operations since the first guidelines were issued in 1976 has been that investigative activity may not be based solely on the exercise of rights guaranteed by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, nor can it be based on the race, ethnicity, gender, national origin, religion, disability, sexual orientation, or gender identity of the subject.

Opening a preliminary or full investigation classified as one of the identified DT threat categories must be approved by the Field Office's CDC even if it is not a SIM; however, the opening of a preliminary or full investigation classified as an IT matter does not require prior CDC approval unless it is a SIM.

Managing: The *AGG-Dom* authorizes all lawful investigative methods in the conduct of a full investigation; however, the *AGG-Dom* requires that the "least intrusive" means or method of investigation be considered and, if reasonable based on the facts and circumstances of the investigation, that investigative method should be used to obtain information in lieu of other more intrusive methods. The FBI requires file reviews of full investigations every 90 days. Some investigative methods the FBI is authorized to use differ between DT and IT investigations, based on the differences in statutory investigative authorities available in criminal matters, such as DT investigations, and in national security matters, such as IT investigations. For example, a full investigation of a DT matter may conduct electronic surveillance, if authorized, pursuant to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. A full investigation of an IT matter may also conduct electronic surveillance, as authorized, pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended. Additionally, investigations of DT and IT matters may make use of federal grand jury subpoenas to compel the disclosure of records and other relevant information, but investigations of IT matters may also use a National Security Letter⁸ to compel defined categories of records from certain businesses. Finally, investigations of DT matters require semi-annual consultation with the Field Office's CDC, and investigations of IT matters do not have the same requirement.

Closing: A Supervisory Special Agent must approve the closure of both full and preliminary investigations. A preliminary investigation must be closed within six months of its opening but may be extended for an additional six months. At the conclusion of either type of investigation, each of the following items must be documented:

- A summary of the results of the investigation.
- Whether logical and reasonable investigation was completed.
- Whether all investigative methods/techniques initiated have been completed and/or discontinued.
- Whether all set leads have been completed and/or discontinued.

⁸ A National Security Letter is a statutorily-created administrative tool that allows investigators to issue a demand for documents or records that are relevant to a predicated investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.

- Whether all evidence has been returned, destroyed, or retained in accordance with evidence policy.
- A summary statement of the reason the full investigation will be closed.

At the conclusion of a full investigation, the Field Office must also document whether sufficient personnel and financial resources were expended on the investigation, or an explanation or justification for not expending sufficient resources.

There are no substantive differences in how the FBI closes full investigations of DT or IT matters.

The following chart presents a comparison of FBI policies for both DT and IT preliminary and full investigations.

	PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION	FULL INVESTIGATION
PREDICATION	Information or an allegation indicating the existence of federal criminal activity or a threat to national security (or to protect against such activity or threat)	Articulable factual basis that reasonably indicates the existence of federal criminal activity or a threat to national security (or to protect against such activity or threat)
APPROVAL TO OPEN	• Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) • If a Domestic Terrorism (DT) matter, Field Office (FO) Chief Division Counsel (CDC)	• SSA • Notice to the responsible Headquarters (HQ) unit must be provided within 15 days of opening • If a DT matter, FO CDC
APPROVAL TO OPEN: SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER (SIM)	• FO CDC • FO Special Agent in Charge (SAC) • Notice to responsible HQ Unit Chief within 15 days of opening • Notice to the US Attorney's Office (USAO) within 30 days unless inappropriate, HQ must notify the Department of Justice (DOJ) within 30 days	• FO CDC • FO SAC • Notice to responsible HQ Unit Chief within 15 days of opening • Notice to the USAO within 30 days unless inappropriate, HQ must notify DOJ within 30 days
FILE REVIEW	Every 90 calendar days	Every 90 calendar days

	PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION	FULL INVESTIGATION
EXAMPLES OF AUTHORIZED INVESTIGATIVE METHODS	In a DT Matter: • Obtain public information • Physical surveillance • Federal grand jury subpoenas In an International Terrorism (IT) Matter: • Obtain public information • Physical Surveillance • Federal grand jury subpoenas and National Security Letters (NSLs)	In a DT Matter: • Obtain public information • Physical surveillance • Federal grand jury subpoenas • Electronic surveillance pursuant to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 In an IT Matter: • Obtain public information • Physical Surveillance • Federal grand jury subpoenas and NSLs • Electronic surveillance pursuant to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended
CLOSURE	Must be closed within six months but may be extended for an additional six months	No duration limit
APPROVAL TO CLOSE	• SSA • Notice to the responsible HQ unit must be provided prior to closing	• SSA • Notice to the responsible HQ unit must be provided prior to closing
APPROVAL TO CLOSE: SIM	SSA, with SAC approval	SSA, with SAC approval

Standards and Procedures for Reviewing, Prioritizing, and Mitigating DT and IT Threats

The FBI uses the Threat Review and Prioritization (TRP) process as a standardized method for reviewing and prioritizing threats within operational programs to inform threat strategies, mitigation plans, and resource allocation. Headquarters operational divisions use the TRP process to uniformly define threat issues for the organization, determine their prioritization at the national level, establish FBI National Threat Priorities, and develop national threat strategies for those threats for the FBI enterprise. Field Offices then cascade the results of the national-level TRP process to prioritize threat issues and create threat strategies to mitigate threats based on the threat landscape of their specific areas of responsibility (AORs). The FBI conducts the TRP process on a biennial basis, but it may be conducted annually at the discretion of the Field Office or Headquarters operational division head. For DT and IT threats, DOJ Counterterrorism Section (CTS) attorneys offer prosecutorial views during the national-level TRP process.

The TRP process seeks to build consensus, and includes applicable USAO(s) and stakeholders, such as NSD/CTS, to determine prioritization (banding) and to develop threat strategies for mitigation of threat issues. Headquarters operational divisions develop national threat strategies for each threat issue to guide enterprise-wide mitigation efforts. Field Offices develop threat strategies annually for all threat issues they band, and they detail the particular steps the Field Office plans to take to mitigate each banded threat issue in their AOR. These threat strategies must be used to guide mitigation of each threat issue for the upcoming fiscal year, unless a change in threat banding or

threat strategies occurs during midyear negotiations. The TRP of the FBI is classified as it incorporates sources and methods as a basis of strategic alignment of national security resources.

There are no differences in how the FBI reviews and prioritizes DT and IT threats, and each threat issue is reviewed independently; however, the threat band dictates priorities within these programs. Investigative methods the FBI is authorized to use differ between DT and IT investigations, and DT investigations may be subject to additional legal review.

Planning, Development, Production, Analysis, and Evaluation of Intelligence and Intelligence Products Relating to DT and IT

The FBI intelligence cycle for both DT and IT matters consists of planning intelligence efforts around priorities based on national or Field Office threat strategies, collecting raw intelligence information, processing and synthesizing data, analyzing and crafting assessments into analytic intelligence products, disseminating those products, briefing analysis to decision makers, and evaluating disseminated products and the production process to inform future efforts.

Similarly, DHS began Intelligence Threat Banding in 2019, a process in which DHS intelligence leadership, in coordination with the Homeland Security Intelligence Council, prioritizes threat topics. The process is informed by DHS's execution of the intelligence cycle – development of requirements, collection through field operations or open source collectors, and analysis to produce finished intelligence in the DT space. DHS implements Intelligence Threat Banding across its mission areas. Results are used to inform and drive the Department's collection and analysis efforts for maximum impact against the "high banded" topic areas; develop cross component programs, projects, and activities; and inform intelligence resource allocation decisions.

During the planning phase of the intelligence cycle, both the FBI and DHS consider the National Intelligence Priorities Framework, which documents the U.S. Intelligence Community's priorities; the FBI also considers its own standing intelligence and investigative responsibilities, which are addressed and prioritized in the TRP process. During the TRP process, the FBI identifies intelligence needs related to threat priorities, and those intelligence needs drive subsequent stages of the intelligence cycle. Meanwhile, DHS also addresses any additional priorities and/or requirements identified by the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis, the latter of whom serves as the DHS Chief Intelligence Officer.

During the collection and processing phases of the intelligence cycle, both the FBI and DHS obtain raw intelligence from lawful collection methods consistent with their respective authorities and then synthesize this data into a form intelligence personnel can use. In the analysis and evaluation phases, analysts examine and evaluate all source intelligence, including collected information; add context, as needed; and integrate the information into finished intelligence assessments. Analysts make assessments about information implications for national security.

Legal review is required for any FBI intelligence product, such as an Intelligence Information Report⁹ related to a potential SIM or other sensitive information, in accordance with the guidelines in the

⁹ An Intelligence Information Report is the FBI's primary document used to share raw, non-compartmented FBI intelligence information.

FBI's *DIOG* and identified "legal review triggers." One such legal review trigger is information related to DT. Similarly, in accordance with DHS I&A policy, I&A's finished intelligence products undergo a rigorous review prior to dissemination to ensure compliance with all legal requirements; policies for the protection of privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties; and oversight principles, guidelines, and procedures.

Finally, intelligence analysis is disseminated in either a written intelligence product or a verbal briefing during the production phase. Intelligence analysis customers for both the FBI and DHS include leadership, policymakers, military leaders, other federal and SLTT government officials, private sector partners, and operational counterparts who then make decisions informed by that information. For DHS, the Homeland Security Information Network is the primary platform for disseminating unclassified raw intelligence reporting and finished intelligence products to authorized federal and SLTTC partners.

The DHS also maintains a mobile application to enhance our SLTTC and federal government partners' ability to consume intelligence information from their mobile devices. The DHS Intel App was a collaborative effort, which enables a secure way for approved users to access and view intelligence information produced across the country, receive alerts on new intelligence products, and search key topics related to homeland security.

Sharing of Information Relating to DT and IT

The FBI's *National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding* provides the common vision, goals, and framework needed to guide information sharing initiatives with our federal and SLTTC partners, foreign government counterparts, and private sector stakeholders. The FBI shares information consistent with the Privacy Act, FBI policy, and any other applicable laws and memoranda of understanding or agreement with other agencies.

The FBI works closely with our federal and SLTTC law enforcement partners to investigate and disrupt both DT and IT. The FBI also has a strong working relationship with DOJ's CTS, which, as of June 2022, includes a DT Unit.

Drawing on expertise across NSD and the DOJ more broadly, the DOJ's DT Unit has several functions: prosecuting and coordinating DT cases, developing training and policies on DT matters, and supporting the work of the Department in implementing a whole-of- government strategy on countering DT. Recognizing that countering DT must be a whole-of-Department effort, the unit will work closely with the Domestic Terrorism Executive Committee, Civil Rights Division, and other DOJ components, to marshal Department-wide expertise and resources and offer a mechanism for DOJ components to assess collaboratively and bring to bear all available tools to hold violent extremists accountable. It will also leverage the strong work by our SLTTC law enforcement partners. The unit will engage in outreach to these partners to share lessons learned, increase information sharing, and ensure that we are bringing all available tools – state and federal – to bear against violent extremism.

The front line of the counterterrorism mission in the United States is the FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). The FBI maintains about 56 JTTFs nationwide spanning over 100 locations, with

representation in all 56 FBI Field Offices and satellite Resident Agencies. The JTTFs have participation of over 50 federal and over 500 SLTT agencies. These relationships are critical to effective information sharing and the leveraging of local expertise and experience in FBI investigations. The FBI also shares intelligence products with federal and SLTTC partners, as appropriate, to inform them of the current threat environment and these products are posted on portals like the Law Enforcement Enterprise Portal.

The FBI and DHS I&A, in coordination with the NCTC, produce Joint Intelligence Bulletins and other products that communicate updated threat information and assessments to our federal, SLTT, and private sector partners at the Unclassified//For Official Use Only (FOUO) or Law Enforcement Sensitive (LES) levels. Joint Intelligence Bulletins alert our partners to significant arrests – including those accomplished through collaboration among different law enforcement entities – and trends we have observed in both the DT and IT arenas.

DHS products within the DT and IT spaces are shared with authorized federal, SLTTC, and private sector partners, including the National Network of Fusion Centers, private sector security officials, and other customers. For those operating at primarily the unclassified level, products at the FOUO and LES levels are shared via the Homeland Security Information Network.

Criteria and Methodology to Identify or Assign Terrorism Classifications to FBI DT Investigations

While classifications, or categories, help the FBI better understand the criminal actors we pursue, we recognize actors' motivations vary, are nuanced, and sometimes are derived from a blend of socio-political goals or personal grievances. Regardless of the classification, the FBI follows the facts and evidence of the case to carry out our investigations. Currently, the U.S. Government broadly refers to the DT threat by using the following threat categories, which are further defined in the "Definitions, Terminology and Methodology" section of this report: (1) racially or ethnically motivated violent extremism; (2) anti-government or anti-authority violent extremism; animal rights or environmental violent extremism; (4) abortion-related violent extremism; and (5) all other DT threats.

In addition to conducting investigative activity in response to the DT threat categories, the FBI also conducts civil unrest and anti-riot investigations under its DT Program. Although civil unrest and anti-riot investigations may not be directly aligned to the DT threat categories, these investigations are part of the FBI's DT Program for multiple reasons, including: because investigation of these matters may be closely related to separate terrorism investigations; because this criminal activity may be motivated by similar ideologies as those that appear in the DT threat categories; and/or for other administrative or organizational matters.

The FBI conducts civil unrest investigations to address violations of federal criminal law involving a civil disorder, and the FBI conducts anti-riot investigations to address violations of federal criminal law in which an individual may use force or violence during a public gathering. For both civil unrest and anti-riot investigations, the investigating FBI field offices must articulate how the facts of the case support the potential violation. Finally, the FBI may provide information or assistance to other federal and SLTTC authorities.

Compliance with Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties Policies and Protections

The FBI is responsible for protecting the security of our nation and its people from crime and terrorism while maintaining rigorous obedience to the Constitution and compliance with all applicable statutes, regulations, and policies. The *AGG-Dom* establishes a set of basic principles that serve as the foundation for all FBI mission-related activities. These principles demonstrate respect for civil liberties and privacy as well as adherence to the Constitution and laws of the United States.

One of the most important principles in the *AGG-Dom* is the threshold requirement that all investigative activities be conducted for an authorized purpose, which under the *AGG-Dom* means an authorized national security, criminal, or foreign intelligence collection purpose. The authorized purpose must be well-founded and well-documented, and the information sought and investigative method used to obtain it must be focused in scope, time, and manner to achieve the underlying purpose. Furthermore, the Constitution sets limits on what that purpose may be. It may not be solely to monitor the exercise of constitutional rights, such as the free exercise of speech, religion, assembly, press and petition; and, equally important, the authorized purpose may not be based solely on the race, ethnicity, gender, national origin, religion, disability, sexual orientation, or gender identity of an individual, group, or organization, or a combination of only those factors.

The *AGG-Dom* authorizes all lawful investigative methods in the conduct of a full investigation. These methods, which range in intrusiveness, consider the effect on the privacy and civil liberties of individuals and the potential to cause harm to, or otherwise damage the reputation of individuals. According to policy, the least intrusive method should be used, based upon the circumstances of the investigation, but the FBI may use any lawful method consistent with the *AGG-Dom*. A more intrusive method may be warranted in light of the seriousness of a criminal or national security threat or the importance of a foreign intelligence requirement, and the options available to obtain the intelligence, information, or evidence.

By emphasizing the use of the least intrusive means to obtain intelligence, information, or evidence, FBI employees can effectively execute their duties while mitigating the potential negative impact on the privacy and civil liberties of all people encompassed within the investigation, including targets, witnesses, and victims.

As a matter of FBI policy, investigative activities within the scope of DT investigations are subject to semi-annual legal consultation and supervisory approvals to ensure constitutional rights, privacy, and civil liberties are protected at each juncture. DT investigations undergo numerous legal reviews due to the likelihood these investigations may touch upon First Amendment-protected activities, and/or other Constitutional rights, civil liberties and privacy-related considerations.

DHS is committed to ensuring activities are conducted in a manner that is consistent with the Constitution; applicable statutes, including the Privacy Act; applicable executive orders and Presidential Directives, including Executive Order 12333, *United States Intelligence Activities*, as amended; and other applicable law, policies, and procedures pertaining to the appropriate handling of information about U.S. persons (as defined in Executive Order 12333) and other individuals protected by U.S. law and Department policy.¹⁰ The DHS I&A is also governed by its *Intelligence Oversight*

¹⁰ Executive Order 12333 defines a U.S. person as a U.S. citizen, an alien known by the intelligence element concerned to

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Guidelines, approved by the Attorney General in 2017.¹¹ These guidelines reflect I&A's legal authorities and policy protections for privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. Countering domestic violent extremism is a vital part of the Department's broader obligation to help ensure the security of our nation, and DHS recognizes that our mission can succeed only if the Department respects and protects our national values. DHS prioritizes rigorous safeguarding civil rights, civil liberties, and individual privacy protections across all its domestic counterterrorism efforts, including those related to countering DT.

In confronting the threat of domestic violent extremism, DHS focuses on threats related to individuals, groups, and/or events that meet national and Departmental intelligence requirements. It does not engage in any intelligence activity for the sole purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment or the lawful exercise of other rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or for the purpose of retaliating against a whistleblower or suppressing or burdening criticism or dissent. Further, as a matter of internal DHS policy, I&A personnel are not permitted to engage in intelligence activities based solely on an individual's or group's race, ethnicity, gender, religion, sexual orientation, gender identity, country of birth, or nationality.

How DHS identifies and detects DT requires faithful adherence to fair information practice principles and privacy-focused departmental policies. DHS always incorporates privacy protections in information technology systems, technologies, rulemakings, programs, pilot projects, and other activities that involve the planned use of personally identifiable information. DHS's Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, Privacy Office, and Office of the General Counsel are involved in all of its counterterrorism and prevention missions, and DHS I&A's intelligence activities are further reviewed by its internal Privacy and Intelligence Oversight Branch. These offices continue to help oversee and train DHS intelligence personnel on how to respect the privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties of all people and communities.

The NCTC supports the FBI and DHS, as appropriate, including through analytic work focusing on the transnational dynamics of violent extremist movements and threats and by identifying linkages to international or transnational terrorism. The NCTC ensures these efforts are fully consistent with its authorities and undertaken in accordance with the *ODNI Intelligence Activities Procedures Approved by the Attorney General Pursuant to Executive Order 12333 (ODNI Guidelines)* for the protection of U.S. person information. The NCTC has issued procedures to implement the *ODNI Guidelines* requirements and established additional prudential safeguards to inform the Center's support to the FBI and DHS in this area. These safeguards include prior supervisory approval and completion of training on domestic counterterrorism authorities prior to undertaking queries designed to retrieve domestic counterterrorism intelligence.

Consistent with Congressional direction, the NCTC's support to the FBI and DHS focuses on transnational threats and trends, and when assessing individual actors to identify any connections to international or transnational terrorism, the NCTC relies on FBI and DHS determinations of whether

be a permanent resident alien, an unincorporated association substantially composed of U.S. citizens or permanent resident aliens, or a corporation incorporated in the United States, except for a corporation directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments.

¹¹ The *Intelligence Oversight Guidelines* are available via: www.dhs.gov/publication/office-intelligence-and-analysis-intelligence-oversight-program-and-guidelines.

specific individuals are DVEs. Legal, privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties officers advise on all aspects of the NCTC's support to the FBI and DHS related to domestic violent extremism. The NCTC is not authorized to and does not collect, access, obtain, or maintain information concerning U.S. persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment or the lawful exercise of other rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Training or Resources Provided to Federal, State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies

The FBI takes a leadership role in identifying and addressing emerging threats and, as such, actively engages with its federal and SLTTC law enforcement partners through the JTTFs. The FBI shares and encourages the sharing of intelligence and participates in multi-agency command posts to ensure maximum coordination. In order to proactively address threats, especially during ongoing incidents, the FBI has developed and shared best practices that are implemented across the nation.

The FBI's Behavioral Threat Assessment Center (BTAC), housed within the FBI's Critical Incident Response Group, supports the FBI JTTFs, as well as state and local law enforcement partners by providing operational support in the form of tailored threat management strategies in complex threat and terrorism investigations. The BTAC is the only national-level, multi-agency, multidisciplinary federal task force focused on the prevention of terrorism and targeted violence through the application of behaviorally-based operational support, training, and research. The BTAC trains internally and externally on lessons learned from operational experience and research to better inform violence prevention efforts. The BTAC is leading an unfunded national Threat Assessment and Threat Management (TATM) initiative to organize, coordinate, and synchronize the FBI's enterprise-wide strategy to incorporate TATM principles, which endeavors to build operational response capabilities within all FBI Field Offices and develop stronger partnerships across all levels of government, with local mental health practitioners, and other relevant stakeholders in an effort to prevent acts of terrorism and targeted violence.

Since 2018, the FBI's BTAC has established designated Threat Management Coordinators (TMCs) in each Field Office, provided advanced training to 149 TMCs, hosted a Mental Health Practitioners Conference to inform and educate FBI mental health partners on TATM-related topics, and commenced training of FBI Task Force Officers to work as liaison counterparts within state and local governments. The BTAC and local Field Office TMCs have identified 27 active local or regional TATM teams with FBI participation, and an additional three FBI-led TATM teams. The 27 local/regional teams are in/around and have participation from FBI Field Offices in Albuquerque, Baltimore, Birmingham, Buffalo, Chicago, Dallas, Denver, El Paso, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, Louisville, Miami, Milwaukee, Portland, Oklahoma City, New Haven, New York, Newark, Phoenix, Pittsburgh, Sacramento, Salt Lake, San Antonio, San Diego, St Louis, Washington DC, and Honolulu. The three FBI-led teams are run by FBI Boston, Philadelphia, and Minneapolis Field Offices. There has been great interest from the FBI Field Offices on helping establish and support local/regional teams. Given this interest, we expect these local/regional TATM teams to increase in 2024. In addition, during 2022, the FBI established the Behavioral Analysis Unit-Counterterrorism Division Threat Management Alliance, which aims to expand implementation of the BTAC's TATM initiative to mitigate terrorism threats, particularly in relation to challenging investigations involving subjects who are juveniles, young adults, or persons with severe mental health challenges.

The FBI also maintains the eGuardian system as a resource to facilitate sharing of suspicious activity reports for terrorism or other threat-related information by federal and SLTTC law enforcement agencies, to include 80 state and local fusion centers and the Department of Defense. Partners in all 50 states, four U.S. Territories, and the District of Columbia currently use eGuardian.

The FBI also offers the Counterterrorism Baseline Operational Learning Tool (CT BOLT) course to all new counterterrorism employees, including Task Force Officers supporting the JTTFs. In addition to operational training and instruction, the course provides training on applicable privacy and civil liberties law and policy and the fundamentals of protecting First Amendment rights during the course of FBI investigations. The FBI conducts the CT BOLT course on a monthly basis and, during 2023, more than 400 students completed the course.

The DHS I&A's National Threat Evaluation and Reporting (NTER) program, established in 2019, provides law enforcement and homeland security partners with resources and training to assist in identifying and preventing targeted violence and mass casualty incidents, including terrorism.

The NTER leads the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative, which assists partners in identifying, reporting, and sharing suspicious activity. Additionally, NTER's Master Trainer Program trains federal and SLTT partners in behavioral threat assessment and management techniques to assist local communities in implementing a behavioral approach to violence prevention by identifying and assessing risk and warning signs, and managing potential threat of future, targeted violence, regardless of motive.

(b)(5)

The DHS Office for State and Local Law Enforcement (OSLLE) is a headquarters-level organization created on the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission. OSLLE's mission is to lead DHS coordination, liaison, and advocacy for SLTTC law enforcement by building and cultivating strong partnerships. The office executes its mission by sharing timely and pertinent information and resources with SLTTC partners; advising the Secretary and DHS components on the issues, concerns, and recommendations of SLTTC law enforcement during policy, program, and initiative development; and ensuring that DHS law enforcement and terrorism focused grants are appropriately focused on terrorism prevention activities. To efficiently and effectively share many of the resources readily available to SLTTC law enforcement, including training and grant opportunities, OSLLE maintains the *DHS Law Enforcement Resource Guide*,¹² and works to share these resources with SLTTC law enforcement and other related stakeholders through various forums. When a SLTTC law enforcement request for resources cannot be fulfilled by existing DHS resources, OSLLE works with intra- and interagency partners to develop customized solutions.

The U.S. Secret Service National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC), within the DHS, is authorized by the Presidential Threat Protection Act of 2000¹³ to conduct research, training, and consultation on threat assessment and the prevention of targeted violence. The NTAC is comprised of a multidisciplinary team of social science researchers and regional program managers who support and empower our partners in law enforcement, schools, government, and other public and private sector organizations to combat the ever-evolving threat of targeted violence impacting communities across

¹² The DHS Law Enforcement Resource Guide is available via: https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-01/23_0126_OSLLE_LE-resource-guide-signed_508.pdf.

¹³ Public Law 106-544, enacted 19 December 2000.

the United States. The NTAC publishes operationally relevant research examining all forms of targeted violence and produces guides for establishing proactive, targeted violence prevention programs. NTAC staff provide training on threat assessment and the prevention of targeted violence, by request, to public safety audiences, which often include SLTTC law enforcement, schools, universities, and other agencies and organizations with public safety responsibilities. The NTAC is authorized to provide consultation on the development of threat assessment policies and protocols, as well as on complex threat assessment cases.

VI. Data on Domestic Terrorism

The Act calls for annual updates to the following data and information, and this report provides an annual update, to include data and information for FY 2023:¹⁴

- For each completed or attempted DT incident that has occurred in the United States: a description of such incident; the date and location of such incident; the number and type of completed and attempted federal nonviolent crimes committed during such incident; the number and type of federal and state property crimes committed during such incident, including an estimate of economic damages resulting from such crimes; and the number and type of completed and attempted federal violent crimes committed during such incident, including the number of people killed or injured as a result of such crimes.
- An identification of each assessment,¹⁵ preliminary investigation, full investigation, and enterprise investigation with a nexus to DT opened, pending, or closed by the FBI; and the number of assessments, preliminary investigations, full investigations, and enterprise investigations associated with each DT investigative classification.
- The number of assessments, preliminary investigations, full investigations, and enterprise investigations with a nexus to DT initiated as a result of a referral or investigation by a federal, SLTT, or foreign government of a hate crime.
- The number of federal criminal charges with a nexus to DT, including the number of indictments and complaints associated with each DT investigative classification; a summary of the allegations in each such indictment; the disposition of the prosecution; and, if applicable, the sentence imposed as a result of a conviction on such charges.
- Referrals of DT incidents by or to SLTT or foreign governments, to or by departments or agencies of the federal government, for investigation or prosecution, including the number of such referrals associated with each DT investigative classification, and a summary of each such referral that includes the rationale for such referral and the disposition of the applicable federal investigation or prosecution.

¹⁴ For data related to investigations, the DHS defers to the FBI.

¹⁵ An assessment is an investigative activity, which requires an authorized purpose and articulated objective(s). Assessments may be carried out to detect, obtain information about, or prevent or protect against federal crimes or threats to the national security or to collect foreign intelligence.

- The number of intelligence products associated with each DT investigative classification.
- With respect to the FBI, the number of staff working on DT matters and a summary of time utilization by and recordkeeping data for personnel working on such matters, including the number or percentage of such personnel associated with each DT investigative classification in the FBI's Headquarters Operational Divisions and Field Divisions.
- With respect to DHS I&A, the number of staff working on DT matters.
- With respect to NCTC, the number of staff working on DT matters and the applicable legal authorities relating to the activities of such staff.

Completed or Attempted DT Incidents in the United States

The appendix to this report provides information that represents significant DT incidents and disrupted plots that have occurred in the United States during FY 2023. Many DT incidents are rooted in state and local level criminal activity. While the FBI and DHS I&A make every effort to document lethal and non-lethal DT incidents, there is currently no mandatory incident reporting requirement for reporting these incidents by SLTTC law enforcement to the federal government. As such, some DT incidents likely go unreported by other law enforcement agencies, which makes it difficult for the FBI and DHS I&A to identify every DT incident that has occurred in the United States.

Identification and Number of Each FBI Investigation in the DT Program

As of the end of FY 2023, the FBI's DT Program included approximately 2,700 pending investigations. The following table presents the percentage breakout of investigations within the FBI's DT Program by investigative case classification as of the end of FY 2023.

Percentage Breakout of Investigations within the FBI's Domestic Terrorism Program, by Investigative Case Classification	
Investigative Classification	End of FY 2023
Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism	20%
Anti-Government or Anti-Authority Violent Extremism	31%
Animal Rights or Environmental Violent Extremism	1%
Abortion-Related Violent Extremism	1%
All Other DT Threats	11%
Anti-Riot Laws/Civil Unrest*	36%

*Non-DT threat category case classifications that are covered under the DT Program

Identification of FBI DT Assessments and Investigations as a Result of a Hate Crime

Hate crimes and DT are not mutually exclusive. A hate crime is motivated by the offender's bias against a person's actual or perceived characteristics, while a DT incident involves acts of force or violence that are in violation of criminal laws and in furtherance of a social or political goal. The FBI's Domestic Terrorism-Hate Crimes Fusion Cell helps to address the intersection of the FBI

counterterrorism and criminal investigative missions to combat DT and provide justice to those who are victims of hate crimes.

The Hate Crime Statistics Program of the FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program collects data regarding criminal offenses motivated, in whole or in part, by the offender's bias against a person's actual or perceived race/ethnicity, gender, gender identity, religion, disability, or sexual orientation, and committed against persons, property, or society. The FBI publishes an annual report of hate crime statistics and, in 2022, law enforcement agencies participating in the UCR Program reported 11,634 hate crime incidents.¹⁶

While the FBI collects and reports hate crime statistics, there is no mandatory reporting requirement to identify hate crime incidents that are also considered criminal activity that appears motivated by a political and/or social goal consistent with the DT threat categories. In instances of a potential hate crime, the FBI opens a civil rights investigation. If throughout the investigation a DT ideology is identified, the Criminal Investigative and Counterterrorism Divisions work together through the Domestic Terrorism-Hate Crimes Fusion Cell to determine the best path forward. This may include, but is not limited to, converting the investigation to a DT investigation, assigning a DT agent to the investigation, or developing regular communication between the two programs. In cases involving DVEs where a potential hate crime is identified, the Counterterrorism Division's DT Program coordinates with the Criminal Investigative Division's Civil Rights Program and the local USAO to assess the potential for a hate crimes charge. In certain instances, based on the specific context of the investigation, parallel DT and hate crimes cases are opened.

Number of Federal Charges with a DT Nexus

A litany of federal and state charges are used to charge DT subjects for applicable criminal violations. Federal charges include those related to weapons, explosives, threats, attacks on federal officials or facilities, hate crimes, arson, violence against animal enterprises, and material support to terrorists. Under 18 USC § 2339A, it is a crime to provide material support or resources to another knowing or intending they will be used in preparation for or carrying out certain terrorism-related offenses. Unlike a violation of 18 USC § 2339B, the recipient of material support need not be a designated foreign terrorist organization.

In FY 2023, the FBI, often in coordination with partner agencies, arrested approximately 400 subjects included within the DT Program.

Individuals whose conduct involves DT or a threat thereof may be prosecuted by any USAO under a wide range of criminal statutes, some of which on their face relate to DT, and others of which do not.¹⁷ While the criminal code includes a definition of DT, *see* 18 USC § 2331(5), there is no

¹⁶ The FBI's *Hate Crime Statistics, 2022*, released Fall 2023. As of the date of this report, the FBI has not yet published the annual report for 2023.

¹⁷ Several statutes reach conduct that may be associated with terrorism, without regard to whether the offense itself involves domestic or international terrorism. These include statutes relating to aircraft sabotage, *id.* § 32; weapons of mass destruction, *e.g.*, *id.* §§ 175, 175b, 175c, 229, 831, 832, 2332a, 2332h, 2332i; arson and bombing of federal property, *e.g.*, *id.* §§ 844, 2332a, 2332f; and causing injury or death to a federal official, *e.g.* *id.* §§ 111, 115, 351, 1114, 1751; among others. It is also a crime to provide material support or resources to another knowing or intending that they be used in preparation for or carrying out certain terrorism-related offenses. *Id.* § 2339A.

standalone federal DT statute. For example, the DOJ has prosecuted cases against such individuals using weapons charges, e.g., 18 USC §§ 922, 924; charges relating to use or possession of destructive devices, e.g., 26 USC §§ 5845, 5861;¹⁸ threat, hoax, or riot charges, e.g., 18 USC §§ 871, 875, 876, 1038, 2101; and charges proscribing attacks on federal officials or facilities, e.g., id. § 111, 115, 351, 844, 930, 1114, 1361, 1751. The DOJ has also prosecuted cases involving DT using the material support to terrorist activity statute at 18 USC § 2339A. Hate crimes charges, e.g., id. § 249, may be appropriate where individuals engage in DT that is motivated by biases against a race, religion, ethnicity, or other specified factors. However, not all hate crimes cases involve DT. Arson, id. § 844, or specific charges relating to violence against animal enterprises, id. § 43, may apply to animal rights or environmental violent extremists. In some cases, drug trafficking, tax, or state and local charges could also provide a lawful basis to disrupt an individual believed to be planning or pursuing acts of DT. Finally, in some DT cases, the DOJ seeks the use of the terrorism sentencing enhancement.¹⁹ The DOJ recognizes the need for coordination and consistency in DOJ and FBI efforts to hold accountable DVEs who engage in criminal conduct. An important part of achieving those goals is to have the ability to identify and internally track investigations and prosecutions involving conduct related to domestic violent extremism, and the Department is implementing changes that will allow us to better identify and track such cases. In March 2021, the Acting Deputy Attorney General issued guidance to all USAOs to provide information to NSD on DT investigations and prosecutions. This directive not only highlighted the need for effective coordination, but also implemented a plan for better tracking of the important DVE-related work being done by federal investigators and prosecutors around the country. In November 2022, an update to the Justice Manual codified these notification and coordination requirements and made additional changes to promote consistency and appropriate coordination and oversight of DVE-related matters.

Referrals of DT Incidents to the FBI

The eGuardian system is the FBI's case management system for handling suspicious activity reports from federal and SLTTC law enforcement agencies and the Department of Defense related to counterterrorism, counterintelligence, cyber incidents, criminal complaints, and weapons of mass destruction. These reports are then migrated to the FBI's internal Guardian system where they are further evaluated by the appropriate squad or JTTF for any action deemed necessary.

In FY 2023, the FBI had approximately 5,433 total Guardians on possible DT incidents. In FY 2023, the FBI received approximately 3,943 referrals of possible DT incidents from federal and/or SLTT partners. In FY 2023, the FBI referred approximately 953 possible DT incidents to federal and/or SLTT partners. The FBI refers incidents to partner agencies for multiple reasons. For example, the incident may not have a federal criminal nexus or the incident may be the statutory responsibility of another law enforcement organization. In addition, the FBI may refer an incident to a partner agency,

¹⁸ Offenses under the Gun Control Act of 1968 and National Firearms Act of 1934 are primarily investigated and enforced by the DOJ's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives.

¹⁹ The Sentencing Guidelines provide a significant sentencing enhancement for offenses that involve, or are intended to promote, a "federal crime of terrorism" – often increasing the guideline range to the statutory maximum. See USSG § 3A1.4. "The Sentencing Guidelines also provide for a similar upward departure for other offenses that were calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, to retaliate against government conduct, or to intimidate or coerce a civilian population." See id. cmt. n.4.

but continue to investigate the incident jointly. In FY 2023, the FBI converted approximately 327 Guardians on possible DT incidents to preliminary or full investigations.

DT Intelligence Products

During FY 2023, the FBI produced approximately 3,067 DT-related intelligence products. A single intelligence product often contains threat reporting or case information from subjects associated with multiple investigative classifications and, as such, the FBI does not have the data to determine the number of intelligence products associated with each DT investigative classification. FBI intelligence products incorporate collection, domain, targeting, or threat analysis and are written at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. FBI intelligence products are prepared for both internal and external audiences.

During FY 2023, DHS I&A produced over 200 DT-related raw intelligence reports (Intelligence Information Reports, Open Source Intelligence Reports, and Field Intelligence Reports) and produced, jointly produced, or contributed to approximately 100 finished intelligence products related to DT, with the majority of these products released at the Unclassified//FOUO level to better inform SLTT partners. The finished intelligence products are available to appropriate Congressional partners via CapNet.

Consistent with Congressional direction, the NCTC supports the FBI and DHS on DT-related intelligence analysis, as appropriate, including through analytic work focusing on the transnational dynamics of violent extremist movements and threats and by identifying linkages to international and transnational terrorism.

Number of Staff Working DT Matters

One of the FBI's most vital assets in the counterterrorism fight is our ability to remain agile in combatting the threats we face. Staffing for the FBI's counterterrorism mission is aligned based on threat priorities and, as is true across the FBI, can and does realign in response to the evolution of the threats and any critical incidents.

The front line of the counterterrorism mission in the United States is represented by the FBI-led JTTFs, which investigate both DT and IT matters. The FBI leads approximately 56 JTTFs spanning over 100 locations nationwide and across all 56 Field Offices, including our satellite Resident Agencies, with participation of over 50 federal and over 500 SLTT agencies. The JTTFs are comprised of approximately 4,400 investigators, including FBI special agents and task force officers, and additional analysts and professional staff who support these JTTF members and the investigations they lead. The JTTF partnerships at the federal and SLTT levels are force multipliers leveraging local expertise, experience, and resources in FBI counterterrorism investigations.

In FBI Field Offices, squads are dedicated to the counterterrorism mission and not necessarily assigned specifically to investigate DT or IT matters. This is significant because the motivation behind an alleged threat or act of terrorism may not be immediately apparent. Additionally, when an incident occurs, Field Office personnel from all operational programs – for example, criminal or counterintelligence – may respond.

Similar to our posture against the IT threat, the FBI's Counterterrorism Division at Headquarters has a dedicated Domestic Terrorism Operations Section (DTOS), comprised of special agents, intelligence analysts, and professional staff. The FBI's DTOS oversees and provides operational and tactical intelligence support to all 56 Field Offices and their Resident Agencies in investigating the use of violence by individuals to further political and/or social goals in violation of federal criminal statutes. The DTOS oversees the Domestic Terrorism-Hate Crimes Fusion Cell, which creates more opportunities for investigative creativity, provides multi-program coordination, helps ensure seamless information sharing, and enhances investigative resources to combat the DT threat.

The FBI's Counterterrorism Division also has specialized intelligence and targeting units that work to combat DT specifically, as well as additional units that provide support across the FBI's counterterrorism mission, not exclusive to DT or IT matters. The FBI conducts national-level strategic analysis of the DT threat through the Counterterrorism Analysis Section. This dedicated body of intelligence analysts focuses on providing strategic assessments of the IT and DT threat and actively works with DHS and NCTC to provide accurate intelligence on the threat picture. Additionally, the FBI's Office of the General Counsel employs in-house attorneys within the National Security and Cyber Law Branch who are dedicated to providing legal assistance on DT operations at FBI Headquarters. This aligns with the legal counsel represented in all 56 FBI Field Offices.

As previously discussed, the DOJ/NSD established a DT Unit within the CTS with several functions: prosecuting and coordinating DT cases, developing training and policies on DT matters, and supporting the work of the Department in implementing a whole-of-government strategy on countering DT. The DT Unit coordinates with the FBI and USAOs on operational matters and provides training and outreach to USAOs, federal, SLTTC law enforcement around the country, and foreign partners.

The DHS I&A's Counterterrorism Center (CTC) leads the I&A's analysis of DT issues. The CTC provides intelligence support and analysis that focuses on homeland threat actors, including DVEs, consistent with the Department's statutory charges to identify priorities for protective and support measures regarding terrorist and other threats to homeland security. In 2021, the DHS I&A created a DT Branch, housed within CTC, consisting of intelligence personnel solely dedicated to focusing on the DT landscape. These analysts have enabled the DHS I&A to increase its production and sharing of information on DT threats, engagement with FBI and NCTC counterparts to jointly author strategic DT intelligence products, briefings to government and private sector customers, and interactions with subject matter experts outside government. As of the end FY 2023, this branch consisted of ten full time DHS intelligence analysts and one manager. In addition, the DHS I&A maintains a presence at state and major urban area fusion centers through its Office of Regional Intelligence,²⁰ and DHS I&A analysts at DHS Headquarters work with those individuals to author joint products and share threat-related information on issues relevant to their regions, including domestic violent extremism and physical threats to critical infrastructure.

In addition, the DHS I&A maintains the Open Source Intelligence Division with a branch of open source collection officers that research and report on publicly available information sources online within the DT space, consistent with I&A's *Intelligence Oversight Guidelines*.

²⁰ The Office of Regional Intelligence was formerly the Field Operations Division.

The DHS I&A's Office of Regional Intelligence has over 130 personnel deployed to field locations across the United States, primarily in state and major urban area fusion centers. These officers work across a range of threat issues and actors, including the DVE mission space. DHS I&A's field-deployed intelligence officers collect and report intelligence information in serialized raw intelligence reports and provide regionally-focused analysis, which may include DVE topics.

The DHS I&A's Engagement and Liaison Office has one person detailed to FBI Headquarters to serve as the senior DHS Intelligence representative to the FBI responsible for improving the multi-directional information flow by meeting mutual intelligence needs of the Department and FBI. The Liaison Officer works across a range of threat issues and actors, including the DVE mission space.

All of the DHS staff mentioned are specific to DHS I&A, in accordance with reporting requirements. Similar to the FBI, the DHS added personnel and resources to counter DT in response to the evolution of the threat and to support implementation of the June 2021 *National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism*. These personnel span the breadth and depth of the DHS mission set, including but not limited to DHS representatives to JTTFs. The DHS is the largest and longest standing federal contributor to the JTTFs nationwide, and those personnel are closely involved with countering DT through the JTTFs.

While the NCTC's primary missions are focused on the threat posed by IT, the Center provides domestic counterterrorism support, where appropriate and consistent with Congressional direction, to the FBI and DHS, which are the lead domestic counterterrorism agencies. The NCTC identifies and monitors international and transnational trends across a range of violent extremist actors and looks for and analyzes transnational linkages. The NCTC defers to the FBI and DHS regarding assessments of the overall threat posed by DVEs and determinations of whether specific individuals are DVEs. The NCTC does not have analysts focused exclusively on domestic violent extremism threats.

VII. Recommendations

The Act requires the Director of the FBI and the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the DNI, to jointly submit to the appropriate Congressional committees a report on DT containing recommendations with respect to the need to change authorities, roles, resources, or responsibilities within the federal government to more effectively prevent and counter DT activities, and measures necessary to ensure the protection of privacy and civil liberties.

Legislative Initiatives

The DOJ continually assesses whether additional legislative authorities would improve our efforts to combat DT and other national security threats. The FBI is actively working with the DOJ on some broader legislative initiatives that can benefit both federal investigations and prosecutions, including those relating to DT. For example, there are ongoing discussions about adjusting legislation in response to the challenges in disrupting juvenile threat actors via federal law enforcement actions. We will inform and work with the Congress and the Office of Management and Budget in the event we identify any critical gaps in our authorities that may negatively impact our ability to accomplish our mission.

Resource Enhancements

To close the gaps in the FBI's ability to disrupt and deter DT threats, the DOJ and FBI have continuously engaged with Congress and the Office of Management and Budget to appropriately allocate resources towards combating the DT threat.

Appendix

Significant Domestic Terrorism Incidents in the United States from Fiscal Year 2023²¹

This appendix includes matters that, based on the circumstances, may be considered domestic terrorism (DT) incidents from fiscal year 2023 that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Intelligence and Analysis identify as significant, including high-profile attacks, plots, threats of violence, arrests, and disruptions. To be considered a DT incident, the incident must involve the use or threat of force or violence, have the potential for a federal violation, and appear intended to further social or political goals. These incidents are typically investigated by the FBI for a variety of potential federal criminal activities, including hate crimes, and/or investigated by state and local law enforcement for criminal violations in their respective jurisdictions.

DATE & LOCATION	DESCRIPTION	THREAT CATEGORY
October 2022: Minnesota	An individual was arrested and federally charged with illegal possession of a machine gun and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. In March 2023, the individual pleaded guilty, and in July 2023, was sentenced to over six years in prison. The individual desired to be a part of a militia group and discussed killing “liberals” by shooting them or attacking them with explosives. The individual also discussed a desire to attack members of the Black Lives Matter movement and believed the FBI’s search of a former President’s residence necessitated a revolution.	Militia Violent Extremism
October 2022: Missouri	Two individuals were arrested and federally charged with multiple violations, including attempted murder of a federal officer and assault of a federal officer with a deadly weapon. The two individuals allegedly planned to travel to the southern U.S. border and shoot perceived undocumented immigrants to “protect this country.” The individuals also allegedly plotted to murder U.S. Border Patrol officers whom the individuals thought were committing treason by allowing undocumented immigrants into the United States.	Militia Violent Extremism
October 2022: California	An individual was arrested and federally charged with assault and attempted kidnapping for intruding into the home of a former Speaker of the House and assaulting the former Speaker’s husband. In November 2023, the individual was convicted.	Anti-Government or Anti-Authority Violent Extremism-Other
November 2022: New Jersey	An individual was arrested and federally charged with multiple violations, including unlawful receipt of explosives and possession of explosives and ammunition by a convicted felon. Search warrants of the individual’s residence located cartridges and live explosive blasting caps.	Anarchist Violent Extremism

²¹ Unless otherwise noted, some of these matters are active/pending. All defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty in a court of law.

DATE & LOCATION	DESCRIPTION	THREAT CATEGORY
November 2022: Ohio	An individual was arrested and federally charged with unlawful possession of a machine gun and interstate threats. The individual allegedly threatened to attack government employees and buildings, sold and distributed drop in auto sears, and desired to make and use explosive devices. The individual also allegedly organized and encouraged others to help a likeminded individual who was being arrested by the U.S. Marshals Service, hoping that the situation would be seen as the "next Ruby Ridge." In April 2024, the individual pleaded guilty.	Militia Violent Extremism
November 2022: Ohio	One or more unidentified individuals released several thousand minks from a mink farm, resulting in an estimated loss of over \$1 million for the business. The perpetrators avoided surveillance cameras, cut through fences and barn door locks, and left graffiti at the scene suggesting a DT ideology. Several weeks after the incident, a claim of responsibility was posted to a public website.	Animal Rights Violent Extremism
November 2022: North Carolina	An individual was arrested and federally charged with threatening to murder a federal law enforcement officer and interstate threatening communications for issuing in-person and online threats to assault and murder FBI special agents. In March 2023, the individual pleaded guilty to interstate threatening communications, and in January 2024, was sentenced to time served.	Anti-Government or Anti-Authority Violent Extremism-Other
November 2022: Illinois	An individual was arrested on state firearms charges and is awaiting trial after allegedly making online posts advocating violence against law enforcement and government entities.	Anti-Government or Anti-Authority Violent Extremism-Other
December 2022: Georgia	Five individuals were arrested on multiple state charges, including aggravated assault, criminal trespass, felony obstruction, inciting a riot, interference with government property, and domestic terrorism. At the site of a future Atlanta public safety training center, the individuals allegedly threw rocks at police cars and used rocks and bottles to attack Emergency Medical Technicians outside neighboring fire stations.	Anarchist Violent Extremism
December 2022: Washington	An individual was arrested and federally charged with interstate threatening communications for allegedly making repeated telephone calls to members of Congress and leaving more than 400 voicemail messages threatening violence against them.	Anti-Government or Anti-Authority Violent Extremism-Other

DATE & LOCATION	DESCRIPTION	THREAT CATEGORY
December 2022: Tennessee	Two individuals were arrested and federally charged with conspiracy, retaliating against a federal official, interstate threatening communications, and solicitation to commit a crime of violence for allegedly planning attacks on law enforcement personnel and an FBI field office. In November 2023, one individual pleaded guilty to conspiracy to murder employees of the United States.	Anti-Government or Anti-Authority Violent Extremism-Other
December 2022: Texas	An individual was arrested and federally charged with interstate threatening communications for making online posts threatening violence against a county election official and a county attorney. In May 2023, the individual pleaded guilty, and in August 2023, was sentenced to 42 months in prison.	Anti-Government or Anti-Authority Violent Extremism-Other
December 2022: Oregon	An unidentified individual set fire to a bank, causing significant damage. After the arson, various open sources reported a claim of responsibility suggesting a DT ideology, including that the incident was an attack for "revenge against capital" and the targeted bank's financial support for a public safety training center.	Anarchist Violent Extremism
January 2023: Missouri	An individual was arrested and federally charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm following an investigation into illegal firearms trafficking. In March 2024, the individual pleaded guilty.	DT-Other
January 2023: Connecticut	An individual was arrested and federally charged with interstate threatening communications and threatening a federal law enforcement officer for allegedly sending threatening text messages to a Deputy U.S. Marshall.	Militia Violent Extremism
January 2023: Virginia	An individual was arrested and federally charged with conspiracy to commit bank robbery in furtherance of his and his co-conspirators' racially motivated goals. In April 2024, the individual pleaded guilty.	Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism
January 2023: Colorado	An individual was arrested and federally charged with interstate threatening communications after the individual allegedly threatened to commit mass shootings at an FBI field office and a local DHS office. The individual had previously recorded himself visiting and attempting to enter both offices. In January 2024, the individual pleaded guilty, and in May 2024, was sentenced to 21 months in prison.	DT-Other

DATE & LOCATION	DESCRIPTION	THREAT CATEGORY
January 2023: California	Unidentified individuals vandalized several businesses and attempted to set fire to a bank. Local law enforcement responded and observed the front windows of a bank shattered and located what appeared to be a Molotov cocktail that did not ignite. Area businesses were tagged with various anti-law enforcement or anti-government graffiti. Various open sources reported a claim of responsibility suggesting a DT ideology.	Anarchist Violent Extremism
February 2023: Maryland and Florida	Two individuals – one based in Maryland and one based in Florida – were arrested and federally charged with conspiracy to destroy an energy facility. The individuals allegedly formed a plot to attack multiple electrical substations in the United States, believing multiple attacks would cause a “cascading failure” in furtherance of their violent ideological objectives. In May 2024, one of the individuals pleaded guilty.	Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism
March 2023: Utah	An individual was killed during a confrontation with local police, following a routine traffic stop for a fraudulent license plate.	Sovereign Citizen Violent Extremism
March 2023: Texas	An individual was arrested on a state charge of terroristic threats after sending e-mails containing threats of violence to the publisher of a news website. The individual was subsequently federally charged with interstate threatening communications. In December 2023, the individual pleaded guilty to the federal charge.	Anti-Government or Anti-Authority Violent Extremism-Other
March 2023: Texas	An individual was arrested and federally charged with felon in possession of a firearm after threatening to blow up infrastructure and posting anti-government messages online. In August 2023, the individual pleaded guilty and was sentenced to five years in prison.	Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism
March 2023: Michigan	An individual was arrested and federally charged with possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, possession of an unregistered firearm, interstate threatening communications, and influencing a federal official by threat. The individual allegedly posted online threats of violence to federal officials, law enforcement, and members of the LGBTQIA+ community.	Anti-Government or Anti-Authority Violent Extremism-Other
March 2023: California	An individual was arrested and federally charged with conspiracy to transmit threatening communications after posting death threats targeting a journalist, who previously reported on the individual’s organization, in an online forum frequented by like-minded individuals. The posts included identifying information for the journalist, which others later reposted online. In September 2023, the individual pleaded guilty, and in April 2024, was sentenced to 44 months in prison.	Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism

DATE & LOCATION	DESCRIPTION	THREAT CATEGORY
March 2023: Ohio	An individual was arrested and federally charged with obstruction of persons in the free exercise of religious beliefs, arson, and possession of a destructive device after throwing Molotov cocktails at a church for its support of the LGBTQIA+ community. In October 2023, the individual pleaded guilty to obstruction of persons in the free exercise of religious beliefs and arson, and in January 2024, was sentenced to 18 years in prison.	Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism
April 2023: Vermont	An individual was arrested and federally charged with interstate threatening communications after calling the office of a member of Congress and leaving a voicemail message threatening to kill the Congressman. In October 2023, the individual pleaded guilty, and in January 2024, was sentenced to 3 years' probation.	Anti-Government or Anti-Authority Violent Extremism-Other
April 2023: Michigan	An individual was arrested and federally charged with interstate threatening communications after sending multiple messages via a social media platform about planning to commit a mass shooting against Jewish people. In November 2023, the individual pleaded guilty, and in March 2024, was sentenced to 12 months and one day in prison.	Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism
April 2023: Oklahoma	An individual was arrested on state charges of first degree murder, shooting with intent to kill, and a hate crime. The individual fatally shot a white individual at a library, then traveled to a gas station and fatally shot another white individual and shot at two gas station employees, who survived. During a court appearance, the individual admitted a racial motivation for the attack. In December 2023, the individual was found guilty and sentenced to life in state prison.	Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism
April 2023: Pennsylvania	Two individuals were arrested and federally charged with conspiracy and obstruction of law enforcement during civil disorder after they allegedly ignited and dropped two homemade smoke bomb containers in and around a line of persons waiting to enter a campus event. One of the individuals was also federally charged with using an explosive to commit a federal felony for allegedly igniting and throwing a large explosive firework into a group of campus law enforcement officers, causing injuries to several officers.	Anarchist Violent Extremism
April 2023: Washington	An individual was arrested and federally charged with interstate threatening communications after calling a governor's office and leaving voicemail messages threatening to kill the governor. In October 2023, the individual pleaded guilty, and in March 2024, was sentenced to 18 months in prison.	Anti-Government or Anti-Authority Violent Extremism-Other

DATE & LOCATION	DESCRIPTION	THREAT CATEGORY
May 2023: Texas	An individual conducted a mass shooting attack at a shopping center, killing eight individuals and wounding several others. The individual was fatally wounded following an encounter with law enforcement at the scene.	Domestic Violent Extremism with Components of Multiple Threat Categories
May 2023: North Dakota	An individual was arrested and federally charged with destruction of an energy facility, possession of a firearm by an undocumented immigrant, and possession of ammunition by an undocumented immigrant. The individual allegedly used a high-powered rifle to damage the Wheelock Substation, which disrupted electrical service to an estimated 200 customers.	Environmental Violent Extremism
May 2023: Texas	Three individuals were arrested on multiple federal and state charges after they detonated a test explosive device. Investigation revealed the individuals professed a fascination with high profile mass shootings, including the attacks at Columbine High School and the Emanuel AME Church in Charleston. One of the three individuals was federally charged with possession of a destructive device. In July 2023, that individual pleaded guilty to possession of an unregistered firearm and receipt of child pornography, and in November 2023, was sentenced to 14 years in prison. The other two individuals were charged by the state with possession of a prohibited weapon, specifically an improvised explosive device. In November 2023, one of those two individuals pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to 10 years' probation.	Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism
May 2023: Illinois	An individual was arrested and federally charged with attempted arson after the individual used his vehicle to breach the entrance of an under-construction commercial building to burn the building down before it could be used as a reproductive health services facility that would provide abortion services. In December 2023, the individual pleaded guilty, and in February 2024, was sentenced to five years in prison.	Abortion-Related Violent Extremism
May 2023: District of Columbia	An individual was arrested and federally charged with assault with a dangerous weapon; reckless operation of a motor vehicle; threatening to kill, kidnap, inflict harm on a president, vice president, or family member; destruction of federal property; and trespassing. The individual crashed his vehicle into the security perimeter surrounding the White House in an attempt to gain access to the White House to seize political power and replace the government with a dictatorship fueled by ideology of Nazi Germany. In May 2024, the individual pleaded guilty to willful injury or depredation of property of the United States.	Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism

DATE & LOCATION	DESCRIPTION	THREAT CATEGORY
June 2023: New Hampshire	An individual was arrested and federally charged with threatening to assault, kidnap or murder a United States official in connection with the official's performance of official duties and with interstate threatening communications after calling the office of a member of Congress and leaving a voicemail message threatening to kill the Congressman.	Anti-Government or Anti-Authority Violent Extremism-Other
June 2023: Nevada	An individual was arrested on a state charge of intimidating a public officer with immediate threat of physical force after the individual made threatening remarks toward government officials, protected class members, and others, on multiple occasions. In April 2023, the individual was found guilty, and in June 2023, was sentenced to five years in state prison.	DT-Other
June 2023: South Carolina	An individual was arrested and federally charged with possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence and interstate threatening communications after posting multiple online threats related to killing federal agents and their families, executing public officials, and violence against racial or ethnic groups. In February 2024, the individual pleaded guilty to interstate threatening communications, and in April 2024, was sentenced to 18 months in prison.	Militia Violent Extremism
July 2023: Louisiana	An individual was arrested on state charges of attempted second degree murder, improper telephone communications, and criminal property damage. The individual allegedly threatened violence against a local official and shot a tow truck driver attempting to repossess the individual's vehicle.	Sovereign Citizen Violent Extremism
July 2023: California	An individual was arrested and federally charged with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine; felon in possession of ammunition; and possession of machineguns. The individual posted messages online calling for others to join him in anti-Semitic killings and posted photographs documenting his use of a 3-D printer to manufacture firearms. In January 2024, the individual pleaded guilty to felon in possession of ammunition and possession of machine guns, and in April 2024, was sentenced to 57 months in prison.	Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism
August 2023: Utah	The FBI attempted to arrest an individual on federal charges of interstate threatening communication; influencing, impeding, and retaliating against federal law enforcement officers by threat; and threats against the President after allegedly making specific threats to kill the President of the United States. During the attempted arrest, the individual was shot and killed in an altercation in which he resisted arrest and pointed a firearm at the arresting agents.	Anti-Government or Anti-Authority Violent Extremism-Other

DATE & LOCATION	DESCRIPTION	THREAT CATEGORY
August 2023: Wisconsin	One or more unidentified individuals illegally entered a mink farm by cutting holes in a chain link fence surrounding the property and then released several thousand minks. A few days after the incident, a claim of responsibility suggesting a DT ideology was posted to a public website.	Animal Rights Violent Extremism
August 2023: Pennsylvania	During a local law enforcement attempt to serve an individual an eviction notice, the individual fired upon law enforcement, injuring one law enforcement officer. Following a several hours-long stand-off, during which hundreds of shots were fired, the individual was found dead inside the residence.	Sovereign Citizen Violent Extremism
August 2023: Nevada	An individual was arrested and federally charged with threats against U.S. Secret Service protectees and interstate threatening communication after leaving a voicemail message threatening violence against political figures and making online threats to a journalist and a member of the U.S. military. In February 2024, the individual pleaded guilty.	Anti-Government or Anti-Authority Violent Extremism-Other
August 2023: Florida	An individual shot and killed three Black individuals at a retail store. The shooter, who was turned away from a Historically Black College or University prior to attacking the store, carried a handgun and an AR-style rifle emblazoned with racist words and symbols. His written materials detailed his ideology and hatred of Black people, and stated the shooting was racially motivated. The shooter took his own life in the attack.	Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism
August 2023: Louisiana	During a vehicle pursuit, an individual fired on law enforcement, injuring one officer. The individual was found dead following the exchange of gunfire.	Sovereign Citizen Violent Extremism
August 2023: Texas	An individual shot and killed one woman and injured another during a shooting at a café in a shopping mall. The individual died of a self-inflicted gunshot wound as law enforcement arrived.	Involuntary Celebate Violent Extremism
August 2023: Virginia	One or more unidentified individuals used homemade explosive devices to set fire to two pieces of equipment used for the construction of the Mountain Valley Pipeline, resulting in estimated damages of nearly \$1 million. In September 2023, a claim of responsibility suggesting a DT ideology was posted online.	Environmental Violent Extremism
August 2023: Minnesota	One or more unidentified individuals trespassed onto a farm and released approximately 30 foxes and 175 minks. Several days later a claim of responsibility suggesting a DT ideology was posted online.	Animal Rights Violent Extremism

DATE & LOCATION	DESCRIPTION	THREAT CATEGORY
September 2023: Pennsylvania	One or more unidentified individuals trespassed onto a farm and released approximately 1,500 minks while video recording the activity and posting the video online. The individual(s) removed and scattered the minks' genetic records, which are relied upon for breeding, causing further financial loss.	Animal Rights Violent Extremism
September 2023: Virginia	An individual was arrested and federally charged with attempted obstruction of free exercise of religious beliefs; use and carry of a firearm during a crime of violence; and interstate threatening communication. The individual posted online threats against a church. Law enforcement later encountered the individual, armed with a handgun, at the church's entrance while services were underway.	DT-Other