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Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Homeland Security

Strategic Intelligence Assessment and Data on
Domestic Terrorism

(b)(5)

Submitted to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee of the Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives, and the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee of the Judiciary of the United States Senate

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I. Overview of Reporting Requirement

Pursuant to Section 5602(a) and (b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 2020¹ (hereafter “the Act”), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in consultation with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), including the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and the Department of Justice (DOJ), jointly produce a report containing a strategic intelligence assessment and data on domestic terrorism (DT). The Act requires the report to contain a strategic intelligence assessment, a discussion of activities, certain data on DT matters, and recommendations. Section 5602(d) of the Act requires the Director of the FBI and the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in a manner consistent with the authorities and responsibilities of such Director, to jointly submit to the appropriate Congressional committees annual updates to those reports. This report constitutes the annual updates for FY 2022².

II. Executive Summary

Preventing terrorist attacks remains a top priority for both the FBI and the DHS, and the FBI serves as the lead investigative agency on terrorism matters. The threat posed by international and domestic threat actors has evolved significantly since 9/11. One of the most significant terrorism threats to the United States we face today is posed by lone offenders³ and small groups of individuals who commit acts of violence motivated by a range of ideological beliefs and/or personal grievances. Of these actors, domestic violent extremists represent one of the most

¹ Public Law 116-92, enacted 20 December 2019.

² Consistent with congressional direction, as of December 2022, NCTC has limited its work to the transnational and international dimensions of the terrorism threat against the United States. Because this report covers the prior FY 2022 period, it includes descriptions of NCTC’s involvement in lines of effort and assessments during that period.

³ The FBI and DHS define a lone offender as an individual motivated by one or more violent extremist ideologies who, operating alone, supports or engages in acts of unlawful violence in furtherance of that ideology or ideologies that may involve influence from a larger terrorist organization or a foreign actor. The mere advocacy of political or social positions, political activism, use of strong rhetoric, or generalized philosophic embrace of violent tactics does not constitute violent extremism, and may be constitutionally protected.

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persistent threats to the United States today. These individuals are often radicalized online and look to conduct attacks with easily accessible weapons. Many of these violent extremists are motivated and inspired by a mix of ideological, socio-political and personal grievances against their targets. (b)(5) our strategic intelligence assessments on DT, a detailed discussion of our procedures and methods to address DT threats, as well as data on DT incidents and FBI investigations.

III. Domestic Terrorism: Definitions, Terminology and Methodology

Section 5602(a) of the Act requires the Director of the FBI and the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the DNI, to jointly develop, to the fullest extent feasible and for purposes of internal recordkeeping and tracking, uniform and standardized definitions of the terms “domestic terrorism,” “act of domestic terrorism,” “domestic terrorism groups,” and any other commonly used terms with respect to DT; methodologies for tracking incidents of DT; and descriptions of categories and subcategories of DT and ideologies relating to DT; and to jointly submit the information in a report to the appropriate Congressional committees.

Definitions

For the FBI’s purposes, “domestic terrorism” is defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5), as activities:

- Involving acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State;
- Appearing to be intended to:
 - Intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
 - Influence the policy of government by intimidation or coercion; or
 - Affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping; and
- Occurring primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.

DHS derives its definition of DT from the Homeland Security Act definition of terrorism, 6 U.S.C. § 101(18), which is similar, but not identical to, the 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5) definition. Under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, terrorism is defined as any activity that:

- Involves an act that:
 - Is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources; and
 - Is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State or other subdivision of the United States; and
- Appears to be intended to:
 - Intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
 - Influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
 - Affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.

Both references in U.S. Code are definitions and not federal criminal charging statutes for DT.

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Terminology

The FBI and DHS use the term “domestic violent extremism” to refer to DT threats. The word “violent” is important because the mere advocacy of political or social positions, political activism, use of strong rhetoric, or generalized philosophic embrace of violent tactics does not constitute violent extremism and is constitutionally protected. The FBI and DHS do not investigate, collect, or maintain information on U.S. persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment. Under FBI policy and federal law, no investigative activity may be based solely on activity protected by the First Amendment, or the apparent or actual race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or gender identity of the individual or group. Similarly, DHS’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) is prohibited from engaging in any intelligence activities for the purpose of affecting the political process in the United States or for the sole purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment or the lawful exercise of other rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and DHS policy prohibits any intelligence activities based solely on an individual’s or group’s race, ethnicity, gender, religion, sexual orientation, gender identity, country of birth, or nationality.

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A “domestic violent extremist” (DVE) is defined as an individual based and operating primarily within the United States or its territories without direction or inspiration from a foreign terrorist group or other foreign power who seeks to further political or social goals, wholly or in part, through unlawful acts of force or violence dangerous to human life.

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The U.S. government, including the FBI and DHS, continually reviews and evaluates intelligence and information from multiple sources to ensure it appropriately identifies and categorizes national security threats, including those that are criminal in nature, to the United States. As part of this continual internal review, the FBI and DHS prioritize threat categories, which are further described below, as needed, and as threats evolve. While categories help the FBI and DHS better understand the threat associated with broad categories of DT-related criminal actors, the FBI and DHS recognize motivations vary, are nuanced, and sometimes are derived from a blend of ideologies. The categories also inform our intelligence and prevention efforts.

Since 2019, the U.S. government has used the following five threat categories to understand the DT threat:

- (1) **Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism:** This threat category encompasses threats involving the potentially unlawful use or threat of force or violence, in violation of federal law, in furtherance of political or social agendas which are deemed to derive from bias, often related to race, held by the actor against others, including a given population group. Racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists (RMVEs) use both political and religious justifications to support their racially- or ethnically-based ideological objectives and criminal activities. One set of RMVE threat actors use their belief in the superiority of the white race to justify their

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use of violence to further their political, cultural, and religious goals. A separate and distinct set of RMVE threat actors use real or perceived racism or injustice in American society, a separate Black homeland, and/or violent interpretations of religious teachings to justify their use of violence to further their social or political goals.

- (2) **Anti-Government or Anti-Authority Violent Extremism:** This threat category encompasses the potentially unlawful use or threat of force or violence, in violation of federal law, in furtherance of political and/or social agendas, which are deemed to derive from anti-government or anti-authority sentiment, including opposition to perceived economic, social, or racial hierarchies, or perceived government overreach, negligence, or illegitimacy. This threat category typically includes threats from anarchist violent extremists (AVEs), militia violent extremists (MVEs), sovereign citizen violent extremists (SCVEs), and Anti-Government or Anti-Authority Violent Extremists-Other (AGAAVE-Other).
- (3) **Animal Rights/Environmental Violent Extremism:** This threat category encompasses the potentially unlawful use or threat of force or violence, in violation of federal law, in furtherance of political and/or social agendas by those seeking to end or mitigate perceived cruelty, harm, or exploitation of animals and/or the perceived exploitation or destruction of natural resources and the environment.
- (4) **Abortion-Related Violent Extremism:** This threat category encompasses the potentially unlawful use or threat of force or violence, in violation of federal law, in furtherance of political and/or social agendas relating to abortion, including individuals who advocate for violence in support of either pro-life or pro-choice beliefs.
- (5) **All Other Domestic Terrorism Threats:** This threat category encompasses threats involving the potentially unlawful use or threat of force or violence, in violation of federal law, in furtherance of political and/or social agendas which are not otherwise exclusively defined under one of the other threat categories. Such agendas may derive from, but are not limited to, a mixture of personal grievances and beliefs, political concerns, and aspects of conspiracy theories, including those described in the other DT threat categories. Some actors in this category may also carry bias related to religion, gender, or sexual orientation. Several DVEs have combined components of different ideologies to develop a personalized belief system that they use to justify violent, criminal action.

Methodology

(U) The FBI defines a “DT incident” as a criminal act, including threats or acts of violence to specific victims, made in furtherance of a domestic political and/or social goal, which has occurred and can be confirmed. The FBI and DHS define a “DT plot” as a combination of criminal activity and planning that collectively reflect steps toward criminal action in

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furtherance of a domestic political or social goal. Disrupted DT plots are plots which, , absent law enforcement intervention could have resulted in a DT incident. .

For DHS, these ideologically driven criminal acts must be dangerous to human life or potentially destructive to critical infrastructure or key resources to meet the definition of DT. A single incident may be part of a scheme or a serial criminal or violent activity conducted by the same perpetrator(s) using the same tactic(s).

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The FBI makes every effort to document lethal and non-lethal DT incidents, but it is important to note there is no mandatory incident reporting requirement for state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) law enforcement agencies to report criminal activity that appears to be motivated by a social or political goal and is mitigated at the SLTT level. As such, some DT incidents likely will go unreported by other law enforcement agencies. These factors make it difficult for the FBI to be aware of every DT incident that has occurred in the United States. DHS complements the FBI's effort to document DT incidents through complementary efforts to identify and analyze DT attacks and disrupted plots. DHS's DT incident tracking is informed by DHS intelligence officers deployed to fusion centers and other strategic locations, engagement with SLTT law enforcement and homeland security partners, review of DHS Component information and Intelligence Community reporting, and open source research. The results of DHS's incident tracking efforts are also shared with the FBI, SLTT, and private sector partners. Therefore, the appendix provides information that represents significant DT incidents and disrupted plots that have occurred in the United States, of which the FBI has knowledge, but not a comprehensive listing of all incidents.

IV. Strategic Intelligence Assessment

The FBI, in coordination with prosecutors in the U.S. Attorneys' Offices (USAOs) and DOJ's National Security Division (NSD), continues to successfully investigate and disrupt DVE activities, plots, and threats. The FBI and DHS continue to provide strategic warnings and analysis of the heightened DT threat. DVE lone offenders acting independently and without direction from specific groups are the primary actors in lethal DT incidents.

(U) Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism (RMVE)

(U) Throughout 2022, racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists (RMVEs) driven by a belief in the superiority of the white race remained among the FBI's highest priority threats. RMVEs continued to pose the most consistent threat of lethal and non-lethal violence against religious, cultural, and government targets. The FBI, in conjunction with state and local partners, continued to disrupt RMVEs based on a number of criminal violations. This RMVE movement remained fluid and decentralized, consisting of both organized groups and individuals. Nearly all those in this RMVE movement engaged heavily online across a variety of different platforms, which continued to contribute to some RMVEs coalescing online; the creation of new, primarily online groups; and the fragmentation of other groups. While RMVEs have used the online realm to spread propaganda for many years, 2022 saw a significant shift in some RMVEs' coordinated efforts to spread overtly violent and racist propaganda within encrypted chat applications,

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specifically to encourage others to engage in violence. RMVE lethal attacks also continued in 2022, including one in the United States and another abroad. In May 2022, a RMVE in the United States conducted an attack that resulted in the deaths of 10 Black individuals. Before the attack, the RMVE posted a manifesto online which aligned with that of New Zealand RMVE attacker Brenton Tarrant. In November 2022, a Slovak RMVE conducted an attack which resulted in two fatalities. The attacker also authored a manifesto; referenced past attackers, including the May 2022 RMVE attacker; and lauded other RMVEs' propaganda and efforts to incite others to violence. These RMVEs' behavior, and their attacks, signify the influence overtly violent propaganda and manifestos continue to have on this RMVE movement in the United States and abroad.

(U) During 2022, RMVEs motivated by perceptions of racial injustice in American society, the desire for a separate Black homeland, or violent interpretations of religious teachings continued to pose a generally low threat of lethal and non-lethal violence. This RMVE threat continues to be characterized by disparate motivating ideologies and grievances that target a range of perceived ideological opponents, to include law enforcement, the Jewish community, and individuals of the white race. While some of these RMVEs advocate for a separate Black homeland or starting a "race war," many broadly target law enforcement and the US Government. Retaliation and retribution for perceived or actual police brutality and the perception of unjust legal proceedings surrounding the officers involved are organizing drivers for some RMVEs. RMVEs who adhere to violent interpretations of Black Hebrew Israelite religious teachings use anti-Semitic rhetoric as justification for violence. Although violent rhetoric and threats of violence by these RMVEs remained consistent, there were minimal observed acts of violence in 2022.

(U) All Other DT Threats

(U) DVEs who were motivated by a personalized ideology, or one that does not fit within the U.S. government's established categories, continued to pose an intermittent threat of lethal violence. DVEs within this broad category included involuntary celibate violent extremists (IVEs) and DVEs with a personalized mix of various DVE ideologies. IVEs continue to consume online rhetoric that supports their personal grievances against women who reject them or men whom they deem as more romantically successful. IVEs have targeted both men and women for violence in an attempt to either promote awareness of IVE grievances or punish populations for their own perceived romantic failures. Generally, IVE violence is rarely connected to current events or environmental variables.

(U) Abortion-Related Violent Extremism (AbRVE)

(U) Abortion-related violent extremists (AbRVEs), both pro-life and pro-choice, have threatened, vandalized, and impeded access to facilities that provide reproductive health services or counseling, which can violate the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE Act). FACE Act violations can be jointly investigated as civil rights violations and as domestic violent extremism. AbRVE violence can be connected to flashpoint events such as abortion-related legislation or court proceedings. The leak of and subsequent Dobbs decision was one such flashpoint. For example, prior to the Dobbs decision, the majority of abortion-related violent

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extremism was seen from pro-life aligned violent extremists. The Dobbs decision, which intersected with the grievances of pro-choice aligned violent extremists, has exacerbated that threat—and in addition to criminal activity from the Jane's Revenge movement, there is concern about future violent action from pro-choice aligned individuals.

(U) Anti-Government or Anti-Authority Violent Extremism (AGAAVE)

(U) Anarchist Violent Extremism

(U) Anarchist violent extremists (AVEs) are a subset of the AGAAVE threat category. The FBI continues to assess the most serious threat AVEs pose likely will continue to be their use, or potential use, of improvised incendiary devices (IIDs) or improvised explosive devices; their injury of law enforcement and others during confrontations; and their access and intent to illegally use firearms. Throughout FY 2022, AVEs continued to oppose government and corporate policies perceived to infringe on individual freedoms and continued to reference anti-capitalism, anti-fascism, anti-gentrification, anti-government and anti-law enforcement sentiment, and social justice issues related to the environment, immigration, reproductive rights, and Indigenous Peoples' rights as justification for criminal activity. For example, on several occasions throughout 2022, AVEs and others opposed to construction of a public safety training facility committed numerous crimes to include vandalizing construction equipment and personal property, and using IIDs to damage law enforcement vehicles, construction equipment, and business property. Law enforcement authorities continue to investigate these and other related incidents throughout the country to identify perpetrators. Most AVE-related criminal activity continues to involve physical assaults and property crimes, often committed by self-directed or small groups of AVEs. While most crimes violate state or local laws, some crimes such as arson, acts of sabotage, and threats of violence are investigated by the FBI and may be prosecuted at the federal level.

(U) Militia Violent Extremism

(U) In late 2021 and 2022, militia violent extremists (MVE), a subset of the AGAAVE threat category, more frequently cited singular sociopolitical issues as their justifications for violence or criminal activity. These increasingly diffuse grievances contrasted with the compounding grievances of 2020 surrounding civil unrest, COVID-related restrictions, election issues, and the deaths of individuals in encounters with law enforcement, which led to a surge in MVE activity and, to a degree, centralization within the movement. As the overlapping grievances of 2020 faded, MVEs began citing standalone issues that often did not have movement-wide appeal but that individual MVEs still perceived to indicate the movement's longstanding narratives surrounding government overreach, abuse of power, and incompetence. Additionally, the lack of a high-profile, public leader within the MVE movement; prominent law enforcement arrests and disruptions of MVE actors; and absence of a galvanizing event that could unite MVEs contributed to the increasingly diffuse nature of the MVE threat from late 2021 through 2022. The issues that MVEs most frequently cited as potential mobilizers to violence included immigration and southern border policy; potential changes to firearms laws; conspiratorial perceptions about the tax enforcement provision of the US Inflation Reduction Act of 2022; and perceived government inaction or overreach related to child welfare issues, including crimes against children or Child Protective Services matters. Despite MVE grievances being more

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disjointed than in previous years, the most likely targets for MVE violence very likely continue to be government officials, facilities, law enforcement personnel, and specific populations. Barring unifying events or figures reminiscent of 2020, the FBI assesses that through 2023, the MVE threat likely will be defined by lone actors and small cells who cite singular sociopolitical issues in their mobilization to violence.

(U) Sovereign Citizen Violent Extremism

(U) AGAAVE sovereign citizen violent extremists (SCVE) posed a threat of ideologically motivated violence and crimes through FY 2022 and into recent months, continuing to target law enforcement, government officials and court personnel. SCVE violence occurs most commonly during law enforcement encounters. SCVEs threaten and harass officials and personnel with threats of kidnapping and criminal acts including filing of fraudulent liens and illicit monetary or tax claims. Individuals also use the ideology to justify criminal acts and use of force related to loss of, or infringement upon, perceived rights. SCVE incidents, threats, and criminal acts in the past two years remained rooted in grievances and perceptions of infringed rights, or claims of immunity from government actions, frequently emanating from responses and circumstances relating to the COVID-19 pandemic. Currently SCVEs range from lone actors to loose networks and small groups. Disruption and prosecution of SCVEs occurs on an ongoing basis, frequently in coordination with federal, state, and local law enforcement partners. The FBI assesses SCVE and ideologically motivated threats and crimes of fraud or theft likely will increase if economic circumstances within the United States result in widespread housing or property losses, to include widespread evictions. Historically, periods of major economic downturns with broad scale negative impacts on the housing sector, have borne an attendant rise in SCVE and other sovereign citizen crimes involving property.

(U) AGAAVE-Other

(U) AGAAVEs citing anti-government or anti-authority motivations for violence or criminal activity not otherwise defined include, but are not limited to, those motivated by a desire to commit violence against individuals or entities they perceive to be associated with a specific political party or faction thereof. Threats from these DVEs have increased in the last two years, and any further increases in threats likely will correspond to potential flashpoints, such as high-profile elections and campaigns or contentious current events.

(U) Historically, these DVEs have conducted or plotted attacks targeting perceived political opponents, including elected officials, other government officials and law enforcement, candidates for public office, political party offices, and members of the media. In 2018, a DVE mailed 16 IEDs packed with explosive material and glass shards to victims including prominent figures in the media and Democratic Party; he pleaded guilty to 65 felony counts and was sentenced to 20 years in federal prison. In 2017, a now-deceased DVE injured several members of Congress, staffers, and responding officers after opening fire at a charity baseball event in Alexandria, Virginia.

(U) More recently, an AGAAVE-Other subject was indicted in November 2022 on charges related to breaking into the residence of the Speaker of the House and assaulting the Speaker's

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husband. Since FY 2022, at least six other AGAAVE-Other subjects were arrested for threatening government or law enforcement officials to whom they were ideologically opposed. These DVEs likely will continue to pose a heightened threat as they plot or threaten violence to redress political and/or social grievances and continue to draw inspiration from conspiracy theories surrounding a range of current events.

(U) Investigations, arrests, and prosecutions related to the 6 January 2021 siege of the US Capitol are ongoing, and dozens of these subjects are categorized as AGAAVE-Other. For example, in March 2022, an AGAAVE-Other subject was arrested in Miami, Florida, for alleged activity related to the Capitol siege; in June 2022, he and four associates were charged in a superseding indictment with seditious conspiracy and other counts.

(U) Animal Rights or Environmental Violent Extremism (ARVE)

(U) The FBI assesses the animal rights violent extremist (ARVE) threat remained persistent throughout FY 2022. ARVEs continued to target entities perceived to be harming or exploiting animals through crimes such as vandalism, trespassing, and threats of violence. Typical targets included individuals and entities involved in animal research; the fur industry; and businesses selling animal products or involved in concentrated animal feeding operations. ARVEs operated and likely will continue to operate in individual or small groups when committing criminal acts. ARVEs used vitriolic rhetoric and threats of violence as a means to intimidate or coerce those perceived as harming or exploiting animals. ARVEs often communicate threats of violence by telephone or email, or by posting threatening language on social media. The FBI assesses ARVEs in FY 2023 likely will continue to pose a persistent threat, and likely will commit actions intended to cause financial losses, intimidation, and heightened awareness of animal rights-related issues.

(U) The FBI assesses environmental violent extremists (EVEs) in FY 2022 continued to commit criminal actions intended to cause financial loss or operational damage and disruption against entities perceived to be exploiting or contributing to destruction of the environment or natural resources. Criminal acts continued in the form of property destruction, acts of vandalism, and threats of violence. Although federal criminal activity associated with EVEs has decreased in the last several years, some crimes, such as threats of violence or destruction of property are investigated by the FBI, and may be prosecuted at the federal level. The majority of criminal activity in the last few years has violated state or local laws. The FBI assesses opposition to oil and natural gas infrastructure developments or expansion projects—particularly those near perceived ecologically sensitive habitats or waterways or in close proximity to farmlands, urban, or Native American lands—and issues related to the environmental impact of climate change and deforestation likely will remain drivers for criminal actions in FY 2023. Criminal acts likely will continue to include acts of vandalism or arson to delay or disrupt construction projects and cause financial loss.

V. Discussion and Comparison of Investigative Activities

The Act calls for a discussion and comparison of the following activities:

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- The criteria for opening, managing, and closing DT and international terrorism (IT) investigations.
- Standards and procedures for the FBI with respect to the review, prioritization, and mitigation of DT and IT threats in the United States.
- The planning, development, production, analysis, and evaluation of intelligence and intelligence products relating to terrorism, noting any differences with respect to DT and IT.
- The sharing of information relating to DT and IT by and between the federal government; SLTT and foreign governments; the appropriate Congressional committees; nongovernmental organizations; and the private sector.
- The criteria and methodology used by the FBI to identify or assign terrorism classifications to DT investigations.
- Compliance with privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties policies and protections, including protections against the public release of names or other personally identifiable information of individuals involved in incidents, investigations, indictments, prosecutions, or convictions for which data is reported under the Act.
- Information regarding any training or resources provided to assist federal and SLTT law enforcement agencies in understanding, detecting, deterring, and investigating acts of DT, including the date, type, subject, and recipient agencies of such training or resources.

Criteria for Opening, Managing, and Closing DT and IT Investigations

Opening: The FBI opens a full investigation⁴ predicated on an “articulable factual basis” that reasonably indicates the existence of federal criminal activity or a threat to national security, or to protect against such activity or threat. The opening of a full investigation must be approved by a Supervisory Special Agent and notice to the responsible Headquarters unit must be provided within 15 days of opening. The FBI may open a preliminary investigation⁵ on the basis of any “allegation or information” indicative of possible criminal activity or threats to the national

⁴ A full investigation may be opened if there is an “articulable factual basis” for the investigation that reasonably indicates one of the following circumstances exists: an activity constituting a federal crime or a threat to the national security has or may have occurred, is or may be occurring, or will or may occur, and the investigation may obtain information relating to the activity or the involvement or role of an individual, group, or organization in such activity. An enterprise investigation is a type of full investigation that examines the structure, scope, and nature of the group or organization.

⁵ A preliminary investigation is a type of predicated investigation that may be opened (predicated) on the basis of any “allegation or information” indicative of possible criminal activity or threats to the national security. Preliminary investigations may be opened to detect, obtain information about, or prevent or protect against federal crimes or threats to the national security. Enterprise investigations cannot be conducted as preliminary investigations or assessments, nor may they be conducted for the sole purpose of collecting foreign intelligence.

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security.⁶ The opening of a preliminary investigation by a Field Office requires the approval of a Supervisory Special Agent, but does not require notice to the DOJ, unless it involves a sensitive investigative matter (SIM).⁷

The opening of an investigation involving a SIM must be reviewed by the Field Office's Chief Division Counsel (CDC), approved by the Special Agent in Charge, and provided to the responsible Headquarters Unit Chief within 15 days of opening as notice. The Field Office must notify the USAO within 30 days unless inappropriate, and in that case, Headquarters must notify and provide an explanation to DOJ within 30 days.

No investigation may be opened based solely on activities protected by the First Amendment or the lawful exercise of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

The opening of a preliminary or full investigation classified as a DT matter must be approved by the Field Office's CDC; however, the opening of a full investigation classified as an IT matter does not have the same requirement.

Managing: The *Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations (AGG-Dom)* authorize all lawful investigative methods in the conduct of a full investigation. The FBI requires file reviews of full investigations every 90 days. Some investigative methods the FBI is authorized to use differ between DT and IT investigations, based on the differences in statutory investigative authorities available in criminal matters, such as DT investigations, and in foreign intelligence matters, such as IT investigations. For example, a full investigation of a DT matter may conduct electronic surveillance, if authorized, pursuant to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. A full investigation of an IT matter may also conduct electronic surveillance, as authorized, pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended. Additionally, investigations of DT and IT matters may make use of federal grand jury subpoenas to compel the disclosure of records and other relevant information, but investigations of IT matters may also use a National Security Letter⁸ to compel defined categories of records from certain businesses. Finally, investigations of DT matters must be periodically reviewed by the Field Office's CDC, and investigations of IT matters do not have the same requirement.

⁶ The significance of the distinction between the full and preliminary investigation is in the availability of investigative tools. A preliminary investigation, which is based on the lesser factual predicate, limits the investigative tools and methods available, while the full investigation, which is based on the more robust factual predicate, permits the full range of legally available investigative tools and methods. In some instances, cases opened as preliminary investigations may be converted to full investigations based on the development of additional facts during the course of the investigation.

⁷ A sensitive investigative matter (SIM) involves the activities of a domestic public official or political candidate (involving corruption or a threat to the national security), religious or political organization or individual prominent in such an organization, or news media, or any other matter which, in the judgment of the official authorizing an investigation, should be brought to the attention of FBI Headquarters and other DOJ officials.

⁸ A National Security Letter is an administrative demand for documents or records that are relevant to a predicated investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.

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Closing: A Supervisory Special Agent must approve the closure of both full and preliminary investigations. A preliminary investigation must be closed within six months of its opening but may be extended for an additional six months. At the conclusion of either type of investigation, each of the following items must be documented:

- A summary of the results of the investigation.
- Whether logical and reasonable investigation was completed.
- Whether all investigative methods/techniques initiated have been completed and/or discontinued.
- Whether all set leads have been completed and/or discontinued.
- Whether all evidence has been returned, destroyed, or retained in accordance with evidence policy.
- A summary statement of the reason the full investigation will be closed.

At the conclusion of a full investigation, the Field Office must also document whether sufficient personnel and financial resources were expended on the investigation, or an explanation/justification for not expending sufficient resources.

There are no substantive differences in how the FBI closes full investigations of DT or IT matters.

The following chart presents a comparison of FBI policies for both DT and IT preliminary and full investigations.

	PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION	FULL INVESTIGATION
PREDICATION	Information or an allegation indicating the existence of federal criminal activity or a threat to national security (or to protect against such activity or threat)	Articulate factual basis that reasonably indicates the existence of federal criminal activity or a threat to national security (or to protect against such activity or threat)
APPROVAL TO OPEN	• Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) • If a Domestic Terrorism (DT) matter, Field Office (FO) Chief Division Counsel (CDC)	• SSA • Notice to the responsible Headquarters (HQ) unit must be provided within 15 days of opening • If a DT matter, FO CDC

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APPROVAL TO OPEN: SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER (SIM)	• FO CDC • FO Special Agent in Charge (SAC) • Notice to responsible HQ Unit Chief within 15 days of opening. • Notice to the US Attorney's Office (USAO) within 30 days unless inappropriate, HQ must notify the Department of Justice (DOJ) within 30 days	• FO CDC • FO SAC • Notice to responsible HQ Unit Chief within 15 days of opening • Notice to the USAO within 30 days unless inappropriate, HQ must notify DOJ within 30 days
FILE REVIEW	Every 90 calendar days	Every 90 calendar days
EXAMPLES OF AUTHORIZED INVESTIGATIVE METHODS	In a DT Matter: • Obtain public information • Physical surveillance • Federal grand jury subpoenas In an International Terrorism (IT) Matter: • Obtain public information • Physical Surveillance • Federal grand jury subpoenas and National Security Letters (NSLs)	In a DT Matter: • Obtain public information • Physical surveillance • Federal grand jury subpoenas • Electronic surveillance pursuant to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 In an IT Matter: • Obtain public information • Physical Surveillance • Federal grand jury subpoenas and NSLs • Electronic surveillance pursuant to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended
CLOSURE	Must be closed within six months but may be extended for an additional six months	No duration limit
APPROVAL TO CLOSE	SSA • Notice to the responsible HQ unit must be provided prior to closing	SSA • Notice to the responsible HQ unit must be provided prior to closing
APPROVAL TO CLOSE: SIM	SSA, with SAC approval	SSA, with SAC approval

Standards and Procedures for Reviewing, Prioritizing, and Mitigating DT and IT Threats

The FBI uses the Threat Review and Prioritization (TRP) process as a standardized method for reviewing and prioritizing threats within operational programs to inform threat strategies, mitigation plans, and resource allocation. Headquarters operational divisions use the TRP process to uniformly define threat issues for the organization, determine their prioritization at the national level, establish FBI National Threat Priorities (NTPs), and develop national threat strategies for those threats to the FBI enterprise. Field Offices then cascade the results of the national-level TRP process to prioritize threat issues and create threat strategies to mitigate threats based on the threat landscape of their specific areas of responsibility (AORs). The FBI conducts the TRP process on a biennial basis, but it may be conducted annually at the discretion of the Field Office or Headquarters operational division head. For DT and IT threats, DOJ

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Counterterrorism Section (CTS) attorneys offer prosecutorial views during the national-level TRP process.

The TRP process seeks to build consensus, and includes applicable USAO(s) and stakeholders, such as NSD/CTS, to determine prioritization (banding) and to develop threat strategies for mitigation of threat issues. Headquarters operational divisions develop national threat strategies for each threat issue to guide enterprise-wide mitigation efforts. Field Offices develop threat strategies annually for all threat issues they band, and they detail the particular steps the Field Office plans to take to mitigate each banded threat issue in their AOR. These threat strategies must be used to guide mitigation of each threat issue for the upcoming fiscal year, unless a change in threat banding or threat strategies occurs during midyear negotiations. The TRP of the FBI is classified as it incorporates sources and methods as a basis of strategic alignment of national security resources.

There are no differences in how the FBI reviews and prioritizes DT and IT threats, and each threat issue is reviewed independently; however, the threat band dictates priorities within these programs. Investigative methods the FBI is authorized to use differ between DT and IT investigations, and DT investigations may be subject to additional legal review.

Planning, Development, Production, Analysis, and Evaluation of Intelligence and Intelligence Products Relating to DT and IT

The FBI intelligence cycle for both DT and IT matters consists of planning intelligence efforts around priorities based on national or Field Office threat strategies, collecting raw intelligence information, processing and synthesizing data, analyzing and crafting assessments into analytic intelligence products, disseminating those products, briefing analysis to decision makers, and evaluating disseminated products and the production process to inform future efforts.

Similarly, DHS began Intelligence Threat Banding in 2019, a process in which DHS intelligence leadership, in coordination with of the Homeland Security Intelligence Council (HSIC), prioritizes threat topics. The process is informed by DHS's execution of the intelligence cycle – the development of requirements, collection through field operations or open source collectors, and analysis to produce finished intelligence in the DT space. DHS implements Intelligence Threat Banding across its mission areas. The results are used to inform and drive the Department's collection and analysis efforts for maximum impact against the "high banded" topic areas; develop cross component programs, projects, and activities; and inform intelligence resource allocation decisions.

During the planning phase of the intelligence cycle, both the FBI and DHS consider the National Intelligence Priorities Framework, which documents the U.S. Intelligence Community's priorities; the FBI also considers its own standing intelligence and investigative responsibilities, which are addressed and prioritized in the TRP process. During the TRP process, the FBI identifies the intelligence needs related to the threat priorities, and those intelligence needs drive the subsequent stages of the intelligence cycle. Meanwhile, DHS also addresses any additional priorities and/or requirements identified by the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Under

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Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis, the latter of whom serves as the DHS Chief Intelligence Officer.

During the collection and processing phases of the intelligence cycle, both the FBI and DHS obtain raw intelligence from lawful collection methods consistent with their respective authorities and then synthesize this data into a form intelligence personnel can use. In the analysis and evaluation phases, analysts examine and evaluate all source intelligence, including collected information; add context, as needed; and integrate the information into finished intelligence assessments. The analysts make assessments about the implications of the information for United States national security.

Legal review is required for any FBI intelligence product, such as an Intelligence Information Report (IIR),⁹ related to a potential SIM or other sensitive information, in accordance with the guidelines in the FBI's *Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide* (DIOG) and identified "legal review triggers." One such legal review trigger is information related to DT. Similarly, all of DHS's finished intelligence products undergo a rigorous legal, privacy, civil rights and civil liberties and as intelligence oversight review prior to dissemination outside DHS to help ensure the rights of U.S. persons are protected.

Finally, intelligence analysis is disseminated in either a written intelligence product or a verbal briefing during the production phase. Intelligence analysis customers for both FBI and DHS include leadership, policymakers, military leaders, other federal and SLTT government officials, private sector partners, and operational counterparts who then make decisions informed by that information. For DHS, the Homeland Security Information Network-Intelligence (HSIN-Intel) is the primary platform for disseminating unclassified DHS raw intelligence reporting and finished intelligence products to authorized federal, SLTT, and private sector partners.

Sharing of Information Relating to DT and IT

The FBI's *National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding* provides the common vision, goals, and framework needed to guide information sharing initiatives with our federal and SLTT partners, foreign government counterparts, and private sector stake holders. The FBI shares information consistent with the Privacy Act, FBI policy, and any other applicable laws and memoranda of understanding or agreement with other agencies.

The FBI works closely with our federal and SLTT law enforcement partners to investigate and disrupt both DT and IT. The FBI also has a strong working relationship with DOJ's CTS which, as of June 2022, includes a Domestic Terrorism Unit.

Drawing on expertise across NSD and the DOJ more broadly, the Domestic Terrorism Unit has several functions: prosecuting and coordinating DT cases, developing training and policies on DT matters, and supporting the work of the Department in implementing a whole-of-government strategy on countering DT. This structure preserves flexibility, while allowing CTS to better

⁹ An Intelligence Information Report (IIR) is the FBI's primary document used to share raw, non-compartmented FBI intelligence information.

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support the FBI, which has dedicated teams for handling DT and IT matters. We recognize that countering DT must be a whole-of-Department effort. To that end, the unit will include liaisons from components outside of NSD, including the Civil Rights Division and the Tax Division, among others, to marshal Department-wide expertise and resources and offer a mechanism for DOJ components to assess collaboratively and bring to bear all available tools to hold violent extremists accountable. We also leverage the strong work by our SLTT law enforcement partners. The unit will engage in outreach to these partners to share lessons learned, increase information sharing, and ensure that we are bringing all available tools – state and federal – to bear against violent extremism.

The front line of the counterterrorism mission in the United States is the FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). The FBI maintains about 56 JTTFs nationwide spanning over 100 locations, with representation in all 56 FBI Field Offices and satellite Resident Agencies. The JTTFs have participation of over 50 federal and over 500 SLTT agencies. These relationships are critical to effective information sharing and the leveraging of local expertise and experience in FBI investigations. The FBI also shares intelligence products with federal and SLTT partners as appropriate to inform them of the current threat environment and these products are posted on portals like the Law Enforcement Enterprise Portal.

The FBI and DHS, in coordination with NCTC, produce Joint Intelligence Bulletins (JIBs) and other products that communicate updated threat information and assessments to our federal SLTT, and private sector partners at the Unclassified//For Official Use Only (FOUO) or Law Enforcement Sensitive (LES) levels. JIBs alert our partners to significant arrests – including those accomplished through collaboration among different law enforcement entities – and trends we have observed in both the DT and IT arenas. Additionally, beginning in early 2022, the FBI, DHS, and NCTC began producing tri-seal domestic violent extremism-focused intelligence products under the auspices of a Joint Analytic Cell (JAC). The JAC ensures close collaboration among the three agencies, as appropriate, to provide more data-informed strategic analysis of the DT threat environment and better inform policymakers and state and local law enforcement agencies of changes in the threat landscapes. NCTC will ensure any continued collaboration and contributions through the JAC are consistent with recent congressional direction.

DHS products within the DT and IT spaces are shared with authorized federal, SLTT, and private sector partners, including the National Network of Fusion Centers, private sector security officials, and other customers. For those operating at primarily the unclassified level, products at the FOUO and LES levels are shared via the Homeland Security Information Network.

Criteria and Methodology to Identify or Assign Terrorism Classifications to FBI DT Investigations

While classifications, or categories, help the FBI better understand the criminal actors we pursue, we recognize actors' motivations vary, are nuanced, and sometimes are derived from a blend of socio-political goals or personal grievances. Regardless of the classification, the FBI follows the facts and evidence of the case to carry out our investigations. Currently, the U.S. government broadly refers to the DT threat by using the following threat categories, which are further defined

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in the “Definitions, Terminology and Methodology” section of this report: (1) Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism; (2) Anti-Government or Anti-Authority Violent Extremism; (3) Animal Rights/Environmental Violent Extremism; (4) Abortion-Related Violent Extremism; and (5) All Other Domestic Terrorism Threats.

In addition to conducting investigative activity in response to the DT threats described above, the FBI also conducts civil unrest and anti-riot investigations under its DT Program. Civil unrest and anti-riot investigations are criminal case classifications managed by the DT program, but are not considered DT investigations as they are not aligned to DT threats and do not meet the statutory definition of DT. These investigations are part of the DT program for various reasons, including, but not limited to, investigating crimes closely related to terrorism, investigating criminal activity by actors motivated by a set of beliefs also appearing in DT, and/or for other administrative or organizational matters.

The FBI conducts civil unrest investigations to address violations of federal criminal law involving a civil disturbance. The FBI conducts anti-riot investigations to address violations of federal criminal law in which an individual uses force or violence during a public gathering. For both civil unrest and anti-riot investigations, the FBI provides information or assistance to other federal, state, or local authorities.

Compliance with Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties Policies and Protections

The FBI is responsible for protecting the security of our Nation and its people from crime and terrorism while maintaining rigorous obedience to the Constitution and compliance with all applicable statutes, regulations, and policies. The *AGG-Dom* establishes a set of basic principles that serve as the foundation for all FBI mission-related activities. These principles demonstrate respect for civil liberties and privacy as well as adherence to the Constitution and laws of the United States.

One of the most important principles in the *AGG-Dom* is the threshold requirement that all investigative activities be conducted for an authorized purpose, which under the *AGG-Dom* means an authorized national security, criminal, or foreign intelligence collection purpose. The authorized purpose must be well-founded and well-documented; and the information sought and investigative method used to obtain it must be focused in scope, time, and manner to achieve the underlying purpose. Furthermore, the Constitution sets limits on what that purpose may be. It may not be solely to monitor the exercise of constitutional rights, such as the free exercise of speech, religion, assembly, press and petition, and, equally important, the authorized purpose may not be based solely on the race, ethnicity, gender, national origin, religion, disability, sexual orientation, or gender identity of an individual, group, or organization, or a combination of only those factors.

The *AGG-Dom* authorizes all lawful investigative methods in the conduct of a full investigation. These methods, which range in intrusiveness, consider the effect on the privacy and civil liberties of individuals and the potential to cause harm to, or otherwise damage the reputation of

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individuals. According to policy, the least intrusive method should be used, based upon the circumstances of the investigation, but the FBI may use any lawful method consistent with the *AGG-Dom*. A more intrusive method may be warranted in light of the seriousness of a criminal or national security threat or the importance of a foreign intelligence requirement, and the options available to obtain the intelligence, information, or evidence.

By emphasizing the use of the least intrusive means to obtain intelligence, information, or evidence, FBI employees can effectively execute their duties while mitigating the potential negative impact on the privacy and civil liberties of all people encompassed within the investigation, including targets, witnesses, and victims.

As a matter of FBI policy, law enforcement activities within the scope of DT investigations are particularly subject to close internal legal review and supervisory approvals to ensure constitutional rights, privacy, and civil liberties are protected at each juncture. DT investigations undergo numerous legal reviews due to the likelihood these investigations may touch upon First Amendment-protected activities, and/or other Constitutional rights, civil liberties and privacy-related considerations.

DHS is steadfastly committed that its activities are conducted in a manner that is consistent with the Constitution; applicable statutes including the Privacy Act; applicable executive orders and Presidential Directives including Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, as amended; and other applicable law, policies, and procedures pertaining to the appropriate handling of information about U.S. persons (as defined in Executive Order 12333) and other individuals protected by U.S. law and Department policy. DHS's intelligence activities within the terrorism space are governed by DHS's *Intelligence Oversight Guidelines*, which were approved by the Attorney General in 2017. These guidelines reflect DHS's legal authorities as well as legal and policy protections for privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. Countering domestic violent extremism is a vital part of the Department's broader obligation to help ensure the security of our Nation, and DHS recognizes that mission can succeed only if the Department respects and protects the values of the Nation. DHS prioritizes rigorous safeguarding civil rights, civil liberties, and individual privacy protections across all its domestic counterterrorism efforts, including those related to countering DT.

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In confronting the threat of domestic violent extremism, DHS focuses on potential criminal activity. It does not engage in any intelligence activity for the sole purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment or the lawful exercise of other rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or for the purpose of retaliating against a whistleblower or suppressing or burdening criticism or dissent. Further, DHS policy also prohibits the consideration of nationality, race or ethnicity in its intelligence, investigative, screening, or law enforcement activities in all but the most exceptional instances. Additionally, how DHS identifies and detects DT requires faithful adherence to fair information practice principles and privacy-focused departmental policies. DHS always incorporates privacy protections in information technology systems, technologies, rulemakings, programs, pilot projects, and other activities that involve the planned use of personally identifiable information. DHS's Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, Privacy Office, and Office of the General Counsel are involved in all of its counterterrorism and prevention missions, and DHS-I&A's intelligence activities are

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further reviewed by its internal Privacy and Intelligence Oversight Branch. These offices continue to help oversee and train DHS intelligence personnel on how to respect the privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties of all people and communities.

NCTC supports the FBI and DHS, as appropriate, including through analytic work focusing on the transnational dynamics of violent extremist movements and threats and by identifying linkages to international or transnational terrorism. NCTC ensures these efforts are fully consistent with NCTC's authorities and undertaken in accordance with the *ODNI Intelligence Activities Procedures Approved by the Attorney General Pursuant to Executive Order 12333 (ODNI Guidelines)* for the protection of U.S. person¹⁰ information. NCTC has issued procedures to implement the *ODNI Guidelines* requirements and established additional prudential safeguards to inform the Center's support to the FBI and DHS in this area. These safeguards include prior supervisory approval and completion of training on domestic counterterrorism authorities prior to undertaking queries designed to retrieve domestic counterterrorism intelligence. Consistent with congressional direction, NCTC's support to the FBI and DHS focuses on transnational threats and trends, and when assessing individual actors to identify any connections to international or transnational terrorism, NCTC relies on FBI and DHS determinations of whether specific individuals are DVEs. Legal and privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties officers advise on all aspects of NCTC's support to the FBI and DHS related to domestic violent extremism. NCTC is not authorized to and does not collect, access, obtain, or maintain information concerning U.S. persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment or the lawful exercise of other rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Training or Resources Provided to Federal, State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies

The FBI takes a leadership role in identifying and addressing emerging threats, and as such, actively engages with its federal and SLTT law enforcement partners through the JTTFs. The FBI shares and encourages the sharing of intelligence and participates in multi-agency command posts to ensure maximum coordination. In order to proactively address threats, especially during ongoing incidents, the FBI has developed and shared best practices that are implemented across the nation.

The FBI's Behavioral Threat Assessment Center (BTAC), housed within the FBI's Critical Incident Response Group, supports the FBI, JTTFs as well as state and local law enforcement partners by providing operational support in the form of tailored threat management strategies in complex threat and terrorism investigations. The BTAC is the only national-level, multi-agency, multidisciplinary federal task force focused on the prevention of terrorism and targeted violence through the application of behaviorally-based operational support, training, and research. The

¹⁰ Executive Order 12333 defines a U.S. person as a U.S. citizen, an alien known by the intelligence element concerned to be a permanent resident alien, an unincorporated association substantially composed of U.S. citizens or permanent resident aliens, or a corporation incorporated in the United States, except for a corporation directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments.

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BTAC trains internally and externally on lessons learned from operational experience and research to better inform violence prevention efforts. The BTAC is leading an unfunded national Threat Assessment and Threat Management (TATM) initiative to organize, coordinate, and synchronize the FBI's enterprise-wide strategy to incorporate TATM principles, which endeavors to build operational response capabilities within all FBI field offices and develop stronger partnerships across all levels of government, with local mental health practitioners, and other relevant stakeholders in an effort to prevent acts of terrorism and targeted violence.

Since 2018, the FBI's BTAC has established designated Threat Management Coordinators (TMC) in each Field Office, provided advanced training to 115 TMCs, hosted a Mental Health Practitioners Conference to inform and educate FBI mental health partners on TATM-related topics, and commenced training of FBI Task Force Officers to work as liaison counterparts within state and local governments. The BTAC and local Field Office TMCs have identified 12 active local or regional TATM teams with FBI participation, and an additional five FBI-led TATM teams. The 12 local/regional teams are in/around and have participation from FBI Field Offices in Baltimore, Buffalo, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, Miami, Minneapolis, New Haven, New York, Phoenix, Pittsburgh, San Antonio, and Washington, DC; the five FBI-led teams are run by the FBI Boston, Denver, Honolulu, Oklahoma City, and Philadelphia Field Offices. There has been great interest from the FBI Field Offices on helping establish and support local/regional teams. Given this interest, we expect these local/regional TATM teams to increase in 2023. In addition, during 2022 the BTAC and CTD teamed up to establish the BAU-CTD Threat Management Alliance, which aims to expand implementation of the BTAC's TATM initiative to mitigate terrorism threats, particularly in relation to challenging investigations involving subjects who are juveniles, young adults, or persons with severe mental health challenges.

In 2021, the FBI, DHS, and NCTC jointly updated the booklet, *U.S. Violent Extremist Mobilization Indicators*, which contains observable indicators to help bystanders or observers recognize behaviors that may indicate mobilization to violence. Unlike prior editions – which focused entirely on foreign terrorist-inspired homegrown violent extremists – the 2021 edition was expanded to include indicators that apply across U.S.-based ideologically motivated violent extremists, including indicators validated as relevant for DVEs.¹¹ The booklet was published to help law enforcement and first responder partners and the public at large recognize potentially dangerous behaviors to help identify terrorists before they conduct deadly attacks. It is important to note some behavioral indicators may relate to Constitutionally-protected or otherwise lawful activities. Law enforcement action should never be taken solely on the basis of Constitutionally-protected activities; therefore, the FBI considers the totality of the circumstances in determining whether there is a lawful basis for investigative activity.

The FBI also maintains the eGuardian system as a resource to facilitate sharing of suspicious activity reports for terrorism or other threat related information by federal and SLTT law enforcement agencies, to include 80 state and local fusion centers, and the Department of Defense. eGuardian is currently utilized in all 50 states, four US Territories, and the District of Columbia.”

¹¹ The 2021 edition served as an update to a prior version published in 2019, and it was published on the ODNI's public website.

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Specific to formalized training, the FBI offers the Counterterrorism Baseline Operational Learning Tool (CT BOLT) course to all new counterterrorism employees, including Task Force Officers supporting the JTTFs. In addition to operational training and instruction, the course provides training on applicable privacy and civil liberties law and policy and the fundamentals of protecting First Amendment rights during the course of FBI investigations. The FBI conducts the CT BOLT course on a monthly basis, and during 2022, more than 220 students completed the course.

DHS's National Threat Evaluation and Reporting Program (NTER), established in 2019, serves as a joint collaborative effort by the DHS and federal and SLTT partners that builds on the success of the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Program. It provides law enforcement and homeland security partners with additional resources and training to help identify and prevent targeted violence and mass casualty incidents implicating homeland security, including those associated with terrorism, as well as facilitating a national capacity for identifying, evaluating, and reporting, and sharing tips and leads related to those threats. NTER is the program and training lead for the Nationwide SAR Initiative (NSI) to assist partners in reporting and sharing suspicious activity and is arranging a review of the NSI SAR pre-operational behavioral categories through the lens of domestic violent extremism and targeted violence. The NTER's Master Trainer Program trains homeland security partners to assist their local communities in adapting to an evolving threat landscape. Master Trainers teach behavioral threat assessment techniques and best practices to local partners, and are equipped to empower SLTT partners to identify and assess risk and warning signs, and manage potential threats of future, targeted violence regardless of motive.

The DHS Office for State and Local Law Enforcement (OSLLE) is a headquarters-level organization that was created on the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission. OSLLE's mission is to lead DHS coordination, liaison, and advocacy for SLTT and campus law enforcement by building and cultivating strong partnerships. The office executes its mission by sharing timely and pertinent information and resources with SLTT and campus partners; advising the Secretary and DHS components on the issues, concerns, and recommendations of SLTT and campus law enforcement during policy, program, and initiative development; and ensuring that DHS law enforcement and terrorism focused grants are appropriately focused on terrorism prevention activities. To efficiently and effectively share many of the resources readily available to SLTT and campus law enforcement, including training and grant opportunities, OSLLE maintains the DHS Law Enforcement Resource Guide,¹² and works to share these resources with SLTT and campus law enforcement officials, and other related stakeholders through various forums. When a SLTT or campus law enforcement agency submits a request for resources that cannot be fulfilled by existing DHS resources, OSLLE works with intra- and interagency partners to develop customized solutions.

The U.S. Secret Service National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC) is authorized by the Presidential Threat Protection Act of 2000 (Pub. L. 106-544) to conduct research, training, and

¹² Available via: <https://www.dhs.gov/LEP-resources>

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consultation on threat assessment and the prevention of targeted violence. NTAC is comprised of a multidisciplinary team of social science researchers and regional program managers who support and empower our partners in law enforcement, schools, government, and other public and private sector organizations to combat the ever-evolving threat of targeted violence impacting communities across the United States. NTAC publishes operationally relevant research examining all forms of targeted violence and produces guides for establishing proactive, targeted violence prevention programs. NTAC staff provide training on threat assessment and the prevention of targeted violence, by request, to public safety audiences, which often include SLTT law enforcement, schools, universities, and other agencies and organizations with public safety responsibilities. NTAC is authorized to provide consultation on the development of threat assessment policies and protocols, as well as on complex threat assessment cases.

VI. Data on Domestic Terrorism

The Act calls for annual updates to the following data and information, and this report provides an annual update, to include data and information for 2022:¹³

- For each completed or attempted DT incident that has occurred in the United States: a description of such incident; the date and location of such incident; the number and type of completed and attempted federal nonviolent crimes committed during such incident; the number and type of federal and state property crimes committed during such incident, including an estimate of economic damages resulting from such crimes; and the number and type of complete and attempted federal violent crimes committed during such incident, including the number of people killed or injured as a result of such crimes.
- An identification of each assessment,¹⁴ preliminary investigation, full investigation, and enterprise investigation with a nexus to DT opened, pending, or closed by the FBI; and the number of assessments, preliminary investigations, full investigations, and enterprise investigations associated with each DT investigative classification.
- The number of assessments, preliminary investigations, full investigations, and enterprise investigations with a nexus to DT initiated as a result of a referral or investigation by a federal, SLTT, or foreign government of a hate crime.
- The number of federal criminal charges with a nexus to DT, including the number of indictments and complaints associated with each DT investigative classification; a summary of the allegations in each such indictment; the disposition of the prosecution; and, if applicable, the sentence imposed as a result of a conviction on such charges.
- Referrals of DT incidents by or to SLTT or foreign governments, to or by departments or agencies of the federal government, for investigation or prosecution, including the number of such referrals associated with each DT investigative classification, and a summary of

¹³ For data related to investigations, DHS defers to the FBI.

¹⁴ An assessment is an investigative activity, which requires an authorized purpose and articulated objective(s). Assessments may be carried out to detect, obtain information about, or prevent or protect against federal crimes or threats to the national security or to collect foreign intelligence.

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each such referral that includes the rationale for such referral and the disposition of the applicable federal investigation or prosecution.

- The number of intelligence products associated with each DT investigative classification.
- With respect to the FBI, the number of staff working on DT matters and a summary of time utilization by and recordkeeping data for personnel working on such matters, including the number or percentage of such personnel associated with each DT investigative classification in the FBI's Headquarters Operational Divisions and Field Divisions.
- With respect to the DHS-I&A, the number of staff working on DT matters.
- With respect to the NCTC, the number of staff working on DT matters and the applicable legal authorities relating to the activities of such staff.

Completed or Attempted DT Incidents in the United States

Appendix A provides information that represents significant DT incidents and disrupted plots that have occurred in the United States during FY 2022. Many DT incidents are rooted in state and local level criminal activity. While the FBI makes every effort to document lethal and non-lethal DT incidents, there is currently no mandatory incident reporting requirement for these incidents to be reported by SLTT law enforcement to the federal government.

Identification and Number of Each FBI Investigation in the Domestic Terrorism Program

As of the end of FY 2022, the FBI's domestic terrorism program included approximately 2,700 pending investigations; Approximately half of the FY 2022 investigations were directly related to the unlawful activities during the January 2021 siege on the U.S. Capitol. The following table presents the percentage breakout of investigations within the FBI's domestic terrorism program by investigative case classification as of the end of FY 2022.

Percentage Breakout of Investigations within the FBI's Domestic Terrorism Program, by Investigative Case Classification	
Investigative Classification	End of FY 2022
Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism	18%
Anti-Government or Anti-Authority Violent Extremism	30%
Animal Rights/Environmental Violent Extremism	<1%
Abortion-Related Violent Extremism	1%
All Other DT Threats	13%
Anti-Riot Laws/Civil Unrest*	35%

*Criminal case classification included in FBI's domestic terrorism program

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Identification of FBI DT Assessments and Investigations as a Result of a Hate Crime

Hate crimes violations and DT are not mutually exclusive. A hate crime is targeted violence motivated by the offender's bias against a person's actual or perceived characteristics, while a DT incident involves acts dangerous to human life that are in violation of criminal laws and in furtherance of a social or political goal. The FBI's Domestic Terrorism-Hate Crimes Fusion Cell help to address the intersection of the FBI counterterrorism and criminal investigative missions to combat DT and provide justice to those who are victims of hate crimes.

The Hate Crime Statistics Program of the FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program collects data regarding criminal offenses that were motivated, in whole or in part, by the offender's bias against a person's actual or perceived race/ethnicity, gender, gender identity, religion, disability, or sexual orientation, and were committed against persons, property, or society. The FBI publishes an annual report of hate crime statistics, and in 2021, law enforcement agencies participating in the UCR Program reported 7,303 hate crime incidents.¹⁵

While the FBI collects and reports hate crime statistics, there is no mandatory reporting requirement to identify hate crime incidents that would also be considered criminal activity that appears to be motivated by a political and/or social goal consistent with the DT threat categories. In instances of a potential hate crime, the FBI will open a civil rights investigation. If throughout the investigation a DT ideology is identified, the Criminal Investigative Division and Counterterrorism Division will work together through the Domestic Terrorism-Hate Crimes Fusion Cell to determine the best path forward. This may include, but is not limited to, converting the investigation to a DT case, assigning a DT agent to the case, or developing regular communication between the two programs. In cases involving DVEs, where a potential hate crime is identified, the Counterterrorism Division's DT Program will coordinate with the Criminal Investigative Division's Civil Rights Program and the local USAO to assess the potential for a hate crimes charge. In certain instances, based on the specific context of the investigation, parallel DT and hate crimes cases will be opened.

Number of Federal Charges with a DT Nexus

A litany of federal and state charges are used to charge DT subjects for applicable criminal violations. Federal charges include those related to weapons, explosives, threats, attacks on federal officials or facilities, hate crimes, arson, violence against animal enterprises, and material support to terrorists. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, it is a crime to provide material support or resources to another knowing or intending they will be used in preparation for or carrying out certain terrorism-related offenses. Unlike a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, the recipient of the material support need not be a designated foreign terrorist organization.

¹⁵ The FBI's *Hate Crime Statistics, 2021*, released Fall 2022. As of the date of this report, the FBI has not yet published the annual report for 2022.

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In FY 2022, the FBI, often in coordination with partner agencies, arrested over 400 subjects included within the domestic terrorism program.

Individuals whose conduct involves DT or a threat thereof may be prosecuted by any USAO under a wide range of criminal statutes, some of which on their face relate to DT, and others of which do not.¹⁶ While the criminal code includes a definition of DT, *see* 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5), there is no standalone federal DT statute. For example, the DOJ has prosecuted cases against such individuals using weapons charges, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 922, 924; charges relating to use or possession of explosives, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 5845, 5861; threat, hoax, or riot charges, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 871, 875, 876, 1038, 2101; and charges proscribing attacks on federal officials or facilities, e.g., *id.* § 111, 115, 351, 844, 930, 1114, 1361, 1751. DOJ has also prosecuted cases involving DT using the material support to terrorist activity statute at 18 U.S.C. § 2339A. Hate crimes charges, e.g., *id.* § 249, may be appropriate where individuals engage in DT that is motivated by biases against a race, religion, ethnicity, or other specified factors. However, not all hate crimes cases involve DT. Arson, *id.* § 844, or specific charges relating to violence against animal enterprises, *id.* § 43, may apply to animal rights/environmental violent extremists. In some cases, drug trafficking, tax, or state and local charges could also provide a lawful basis to disrupt an individual believed to be planning or pursuing acts of DT. Finally, in some DT cases, DOJ seeks the use of the terrorism sentencing enhancement.¹⁷

DOJ recognizes the need for coordination and consistency in DOJ/FBI efforts to hold accountable DVEs who engage in criminal conduct. An important part of achieving those goals is to have the ability to identify and internally track investigations and prosecutions involving conduct related to domestic violent extremism, and the Department is implementing changes that will allow us to better identify and track such cases. In March 2021, the Acting Deputy Attorney General issued guidance to all USAOs to provide information to NSD on DT investigations and prosecutions. This directive not only highlighted the need for effective coordination, but also implemented a plan for better tracking of the important DVE-related work being done by federal investigators and prosecutors around the country. In November 2022, an update to the Justice Manual codified these notification and coordination requirements and made additional changes to promote consistency and appropriate coordination and oversight of DVE-related matters.

¹⁶ Several statutes reach conduct that may be associated with terrorism, without regard to whether the offense itself involves domestic or international terrorism. These include statutes relating to aircraft sabotage, *id.* § 32; weapons of mass destruction, e.g., *id.* §§ 175, 175b, 175c, 229, 831, 832, 2332a, 2332h, 2332i; arson and bombing of federal property, e.g., *id.* §§ 844, 2332a, 2332f; and causing injury or death to a federal official, e.g. *id.* §§ 111, 115, 351, 1114, 1751; among others. It is also a crime to provide material support or resources to another knowing or intending that they be used in preparation for or carrying out certain terrorism-related offenses. *Id.* § 2339A.

¹⁷ The Sentencing Guidelines provide a significant sentencing enhancement for offenses that involve, or are intended to promote, a “federal crime of terrorism”—often increasing the guideline range to the statutory maximum.” *See* USSG § 3A1.4. “The Sentencing Guidelines also provide for a similar upward departure for other offenses that were calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, to retaliate against government conduct, or to intimidate or coerce a civilian population.” *See id.* cmt. n.4.

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Referrals of DT Incidents to the FBI

The eGuardian system is the FBI's case management system for handling suspicious activity reports from federal and SLTT law enforcement agencies and the Department of Defense related to counterterrorism, counterintelligence, cyber incidents, criminal complaints, and weapons of mass destruction. These reports are then migrated to the FBI's internal Guardian system where it is further evaluated by the appropriate squad or JTTF for any action deemed necessary.

In FY 2022, the FBI had approximately 5,772 total Guardians on possible DT incidents. In FY 2022, the FBI received approximately 3,440 referrals of possible DT incidents from federal and/or SLTT partners. In FY 2022, the FBI referred approximately 1,118 possible DT incidents to federal and/or SLTT partners. The FBI refers incidents to partner agencies for multiple reasons. For example, the incident may not have a federal criminal nexus or the incident may be the statutory responsibility of another law enforcement organization. In addition, the FBI may refer an incident to a partner agency, but continue to investigate the incident jointly. In FY 2022, the FBI converted approximately 394 Guardian on possible DT incidents to preliminary or full investigations.

DT Intelligence Products

For FY 2022, the FBI produced approximately (b)(5) DT-related intelligence products. A single intelligence product often contains threat reporting or case information from subjects associated with multiple investigative classifications, and as such, the FBI does not have the data to determine the number of intelligence products associated with each DT investigative classification. FBI intelligence products incorporate collection, domain, targeting, or threat analysis and are written at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. FBI intelligence products are prepared for both internal and external audiences.

From FY 2022, I&A has produced over 500 DT-related raw intelligence reports (IRs, Open Source Intelligence Reports, and Field Intelligence Reports) and produced, jointly produced, or contributed to approximately 100 finished intelligence products related to DT, with the majority of these products released at the Unclassified//FOUO level to better inform SLTT partners. The finished intelligence products are available to appropriate Congressional partners via CapNet.

Number of Staff Working DT Matters

One of the FBI's most vital assets in the counterterrorism fight is our ability to remain agile in combatting the threats we face. Staffing for the FBI's counterterrorism mission is aligned based on threat priorities and, as is true across the FBI, can and does realign in response to the evolution of the threats and any critical incidents.

The front line of the counterterrorism mission in the United States is represented by the FBI-led JTTFs, which investigate both DT and IT matters. The FBI leads approximately 56 JTTFs spanning over 100 locations nationwide and across all 56 Field Offices, including our satellite Resident Agencies, with participation of over 50 federal and over 500 SLTT agencies. The

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JTTFs are comprised of approximately 4,400 investigators, including FBI Special Agents and Task Force Officers, and additional analysts and professional staff who support these JTTF members and the investigations they lead. The JTTF partnerships at the federal and SLTT levels are force multipliers as they leverage local expertise, experience, and resources in FBI counterterrorism investigations.

In FBI Field Offices, squads are dedicated to the counterterrorism mission and not necessarily assigned specifically to investigate DT or IT matters. This is significant because the motivation behind an alleged threat or act of terrorism may not be immediately apparent. Additionally, when an incident occurs, Field Office personnel from all operational programs – for example, criminal or counterintelligence – may respond.

Similar to our posture against the IT threat, the FBI's Counterterrorism Division at Headquarters has a dedicated Domestic Terrorism Operations Section (DTOS), comprised of Special Agents, Intelligence Analysts, and Professional Staff. The FBI's DTOS oversees and provides operational and tactical intelligence support to all 56 Field Offices and their Resident Agencies in investigating the use of violence by individuals to further political and/or social goals in violation of federal criminal statutes. The DTOS oversees the Domestic Terrorism-Hate Crimes Fusion Cell, which creates more opportunities for investigative creativity, provides multi-program coordination, helps ensure seamless information sharing, and enhances investigative resources to combat the DT threat.

The FBI's Counterterrorism Division also has specialized intelligence and targeting units that work to combat DT specifically, as well as additional units that provide support across the FBI's counterterrorism mission, not exclusive to DT or IT matters. The FBI conducts national-level strategic analysis of the DT threat through the Counterterrorism Analysis Section. This dedicated body of Intelligence Analysts focuses on providing strategic assessments of the IT and DT threat and actively works with DHS and NCTC to provide accurate intelligence on the threat picture. Further, all FBI counterterrorism investigations are led by Counterterrorism Division Deputy Assistant Directors, who have unique vantage points from which to assess the terrorism threat around the globe and prioritize investigations and operations across the country. Additionally, the FBI's Office of the General Counsel employs in-house attorneys within the National Security and Cyber Law Branch that are dedicated to providing legal assistance on DT operations at FBI Headquarters. This aligns with the legal counsel represented in all 56 FBI field offices.

As indicated above, DOJ/NSD also recently established a Domestic Terrorism Unit within the CTS that has several functions: prosecuting and coordinating DT cases, developing training and policies on DT matters, and supporting the work of the Department in implementing a whole-of-government strategy on countering DT. The Department believes that this change best enables us to respond to the evolving and persistent DT threat.

DHS I&A's Counterterrorism Mission Center (CTMC) leads I&A's analysis of DT issues. CTMC provides intelligence support and analysis that focuses on domestic threat actors, including DVEs, consistent with the Department's statutory charges to identify priorities for protective and support measures regarding terrorist and other threats to homeland security. In 2021, I&A created a Domestic Terrorism Branch, housed within CTMC, consisting of

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intelligence personnel solely dedicated to focusing on the DT landscape. These analysts have enabled I&A to increase its production and sharing of information on DT threats, engagement with FBI and NCTC counterparts to jointly author strategic DT intelligence products, and interactions with subject matter experts outside government. This branch currently consists of nine full time DHS intelligence analysts and one manager. Additionally, I&A maintains a presence at state and major urban area fusion centers through its Office of Regional Intelligence,¹⁸ and I&A analysts at DHS Headquarters work with those individuals to author joint products and share threat-related information on issues relevant to their regions, including domestic violent extremism and physical threats to critical infrastructure.

In addition, I&A's Current and Emerging Threat Center maintains a small team of open source intelligence collectors to monitor and report on publicly available information sources online within the DT space, consistent with I&A's *Intelligence Oversight Guidelines*.

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I&A's Office of Regional Intelligence has over 130 personnel deployed to field locations across the United States, primarily in state and major urban area fusion centers. These officers work across a range of threat issues and actors, including the DVE mission space. I&A's field-deployed intelligence officers collect and report intelligence information in serialized raw intelligence reports and provide regionally-focused analysis, which may include DVE topics.

All of the DHS staff mentioned are specific to I&A, in accordance with the reporting requirements. Similar to FBI, DHS has added personnel and resources to counter DT in response to the evolution of the threat and to support the implementation of the June 2021 *National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism*. These personnel span the breadth and depth of the DHS mission set, including but not limited to DHS representatives to JTTFs. DHS is the largest and longest standing federal contributor to the JTTFs nationwide and those personnel are closely involved with countering DT through the JTTFs.

While NCTC's primary missions are focused on the threat posed by IT, the Center provides domestic counterterrorism support, where appropriate and consistent with congressional direction, to the FBI and DHS, which are the lead domestic counterterrorism agencies. NCTC identifies and monitors international and transnational trends across a range of violent extremist actors and looks for and analyzes transnational linkages. NCTC defers to the FBI and DHS regarding assessments of the overall threat posed by DVEs and determinations of whether specific individuals are DVEs. NCTC does not have analysts focused exclusively on domestic violent extremism threats.

VII. Recommendations

The Act requires the Director of the FBI and the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the DNI, to jointly submit to the appropriate Congressional committees a report on DT containing recommendations with respect to the need to change authorities, roles, resources, or responsibilities within the federal government to more effectively prevent and counter DT activities, and measures necessary to ensure the protection of privacy and civil liberties.

¹⁸ The Office of Regional Intelligence was formerly the Field Operations Division.

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Implementation of the National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism

In June 2021, the White House released the first-ever *National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism*, which provides a government-wide strategy to counter domestic violent extremism. The national strategy references the March 2021 U.S. Intelligence Community intelligence assessment titled, *Domestic Violent Extremism Poses Heightened Threat in 2021*, and lays out a comprehensive strategy to address the DT threat, building on a foundation of U.S. government collaboration on programmatic aspects of countering DT – such as information sharing, training, prevention, and intervention efforts – while fostering a broader community that extends beyond the U.S. government to critical partners. The national strategy also reinforces the U.S. government’s commitment to approaching this important work while avoiding unlawful discrimination, bias, and stereotyping and the protection of American civil rights and civil liberties, including preserving and safeguarding constitutionally protected freedom of speech and association, while focusing on addressing unlawful violence. The strategy also includes prevention efforts to enhance community resilience against domestic terrorism and the provision of available resources.

The FBI, DHS, and NCTC remain dedicated to working with our partners on the effective implementation of the national strategy and continue to evolve our response to this threat.

As part of the national strategy, the FBI has increased intelligence production regarding the DT threat; continued to develop and implement TATM teams throughout the country; enhanced engagement with private sector partners; and developed and provided unclassified resources – such as the *U.S. Violent Extremist Mobilization Indicators* booklet, which was jointly developed with DHS and NCTC – to multiple audiences, including law enforcement partners, first responders, and the American public.

Importantly, DHS plays a key role in this whole-of-government effort, and I&A has undertaken a number of actions and initiatives to support the national strategy, in line with broader Departmental efforts. As noted above, in 2021, I&A established a Domestic Terrorism Branch solely focused on analyzing threats from domestic violent extremism. I&A has also delivered numerous briefings to a variety of partners regarding the DVE movements and various trends impacting homeland security, and I&A has contributed to the development of a number of National Terrorism Advisory System bulletins, which provide the public awareness of the current threat environment for the Homeland.

DHS continues to enhance the role of its Counterterrorism (CT) Coordinator. As the principal counterterrorism official at DHS, the CT Coordinator, who is responsible for the Department’s counterterrorism-related activities ensuring they are appropriately developed, coordinated, integrated, aligned, and implemented.

DHS’s Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships (CP3) also continues to expand its efforts to prevent terrorism and targeted violence by providing partners at the state and local level with tools to prevent violence. Through technical, financial, and educational assistance,

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CP3 is leveraging community-based partnerships to enhance local capabilities and ensure individuals receive help before they radicalize to violence. CP3 also partners with DHS's Federal Emergency Management Agency to administer the Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention (TVTP) Grants Program, which provides funding to enhance and expand prevention capabilities. The TVTP grant program complements existing programs that enhance the preparedness of our nation, including the Nonprofit Security Grant Program which provides support for target hardening and other physical security enhancements at nonprofit organizations, as well as the State Homeland Security Program and Urban Area Security Initiative grant programs, which have prioritized combating domestic violent extremism as a "National Priority Area" in both FY 2021 and FY 2022.

DHS's Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) conducts extensive engagement with diverse communities across the country, including communities threatened by targeted violence, and frequently facilitates direct engagement between senior DHS leadership and these communities. CRCL partners with DOJ and other federal agencies to provide information to communities on federal efforts to prevent violent extremism and hear directly from communities about concerns they need to address. The trusted partnerships built as a result of these CRCL engagements enable DHS to work closely with diverse communities on domestic terrorism prevention efforts.

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Legislative Initiatives

The DOJ continually assesses whether additional legislative authorities would improve our efforts to combat DT and other national security threats. The FBI is actively working with DOJ on some broader legislative initiatives that can benefit both federal investigations and prosecutions, including those relating to DT. For example, there are ongoing discussions about adjusting legislation in response to the challenges in disrupting juvenile threat actors via federal law enforcement actions. We will inform and work with the Congress in the event we identify any critical gaps in our authorities that may have negative effects on our ability to accomplish our mission.

Resource Enhancements

To close the gaps in the FBI's ability to disrupt and deter DT threats, the DOJ and FBI have continuously engaged with Congress and the Office of Management and Budget to appropriately allocate resources towards combatting the DT threat.

Meanwhile, DHS is committed to expanding its ability to collect, analyze, and share domestic violent extremism information overtly or from publicly available sources, consistent with its authorities, while simultaneously safeguarding privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties of all persons, to enhance the Department's ability to rapidly analyze and communicate DT threats and inform policy makers' and its homeland security partners' decisions and actions, and to enhance the ability of our partners across all levels of government and the private sector to prevent acts of terrorism and targeted violence.

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Appendix A

Significant Domestic Terrorism Incidents in the United States from FY 2022¹⁹

This appendix includes domestic terrorism incidents from FY 2022 that the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Homeland Security identify as significant, including high-profile attacks, plots, threats of violence, arrests, and disruptions. All incidents must involve the use or threat of force or violence, have the potential for a federal violation, and further social or political goals. These incidents have typically been investigated by the FBI for a variety of potential federal criminal activities, including hate crimes, and/or investigated by state and local law enforcement for criminal violations in their respective jurisdictions.

Date and Location	Description
October 2021: Missouri	(U) Federal authorities arrested an anarchist violent extremist (AVE) for conspiracy to commit arson in connection with a June 2020 incident in which a convenience store was looted and set on fire. In August 2022, the AVE received 27-month prison sentence. In September 2021, an AVE co-conspirator plead guilty to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon and intentionally demonstrating a technique that would be unlawfully employed in furtherance of a civil disorder and was sentenced to 36 months imprisonment.
October 2021: Michigan	(U) Approximately 10 masked individuals claiming association with environmental groups broke into a pipeline facility and used tools and equipment to close an emergency shut-off valve on the pipeline. The event was livestreamed and posted to multiple social media accounts. This incident remains under investigation.
November 2021: Arkansas	(U) Four racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists (RMVEs) were indicted and subsequently arrested for alleged unlawful possession of, and conspiracy to sell, a firearm to a prohibited person.
November 2021 Ohio	(U) An alleged RMVE was arrested for alleged possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. This arrest disrupted the movement of illegally purchased firearms to numerous individuals, some of whom are known felons.
November 2021: Virginia	(U) An RMVE was arrested for alleged possession of a firearm by an unlawful user of controlled substances. On 25 July 2022 he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to four years and 9 months in prison.
November 2021: Pennsylvania	(U) Federal authorities arrested an AVE who placed telephone calls threatening violence against law enforcement officers following an officer involved shooting. In March 2022, the AVE pleaded guilty to one count of interstate threatening communications.

¹⁹ Unless otherwise noted, some of these matters are active/pending.

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November 2021: New York	(U//FOUO) An RMVE was arrested for alleged unlawful possession by a convicted felon following the execution of a search warrant which recovered a firearm and ammunition.
December 2021: Washington	(U) Federal authorities arrested an AVE for the possession of a dozen Molotov cocktails during an anti-law enforcement demonstration in September 2020. The AVE pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of destructive devices in September 2022 and is awaiting sentencing.
December 2021-January 2022: Washington	(U) Two militia violent extremists (MVEs) were arrested and federally charged for conspiracy to make or possess an unregistered destructive device, which they allegedly planned to use attack law enforcement officers.
January 2022: Texas	(U) An MVE who identifies as leader of the Oath Keepers was arrested and later federally convicted on charges of seditious conspiracy, obstruction of an official proceeding, and tampering with documents or proceedings for his role in the 6 January 2021 siege of the US Capitol.
January 2022: North Carolina	(U) An MVE was arrested and federally charged on one count of teaching the making of an explosive device weapon of mass destruction for use in furtherance of a federal crime of violence, and seven counts of possession of unregistered firearms and destructive devices. The MVE owned a tactical training company and provided instructions for the manufacture and sale of improvised explosive devices.
January 2022: Texas	(U) An AVE pled guilty to attempted arson and was sentenced to five years in federal prison after placing an improvised explosive device (IED) on a natural gas pipeline near Kyle, Texas. The AVE called authorities after placing the device and admitted to wanting to cause damage to the pipeline and die by suicide using the IED. The device, containing a mixture of a Tannerite-like substance, was located and rendered safe.
February 2022: Alabama	(U) Federal authorities arrested 8 DVEs likely motivated by a combination of personal, anti-government and anti-capitalist grievances, all of whom allegedly set fires in four stores—two in Alabama and two in Mississippi—during regular business hours while customers, vendors, and employees were inside and outside the stores, from late May through early June 2021. No injuries were reported.
February 2022: Florida	(U) A DVE was arrested after posting a video online threatening to shoot an FBI agent if the agent came to question her about her involvement with the 6 January 2021 Capitol siege.
March 2022: New York	(U) A DVE was arrested for transmitting threatening voicemails to a Member of Congress due to dislike for public statements by the Congressperson.

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April 2022: New York	(U) A DVE was arrested after he was identified as the person responsible for an attack on the Brooklyn subway that resulted in dozens of gunshot wounds and other injuries. In January 2023, he pleaded guilty to committing a terrorist attack or other violence against a mass transportation vehicle and discharging a firearm in furtherance of his attack.
April 2022: Utah	(U) Local police arrested two EVEs in connection with the May 2020 purposeful damaging or sabotaging of several pieces of heavy operating machines used in construction. Losses were estimated in excess of \$500,000.
April 2022: Oklahoma	(U) Federal authorities arrested an AVE, who has made threatening statements towards law enforcement, on charges including illegal possession of a machine gun and possession of numerous firearms and ammunition by a convicted felon. The AVE pleaded guilty in July 2022 and is awaiting sentencing.
May 2022: New York	(U) An RMVE using a firearm killed 10 and injured three at a grocery store, allegedly targeting victims because of their actual or perceived race or color. The RMVE posted a manifesto on social media outlining extremist views, including self-identified white supremacist ideology, and livestreamed the shooting on social media. In November 2022, the RMVE pleaded guilty to state charges of murder motivated by hate; and federal hate crime charges were pending.
May 2022: Nevada	(U) An SCVE was indicted and arrested after allegedly threatening Douglas County court personnel—including a judge, defense attorney, district attorneys, and county sheriff—in furtherance of his SCVE ideology. The SCVE reportedly filed false legal documents alleging violations of federal statutes, threatening the individuals with arrest and death.
May 2022: Illinois	(U) An SCVE was arrested following a traffic stop during which he refused to recognize the authority of the officers and self-proclaimed as a "nationalist." Due to the SCVE's uncooperative nature, physical force was applied to remove him from the vehicle, and he was charged with state charges including aggravated battery to a peace officer and resisting arrest.
June 2022: Louisiana	(U) An alleged RMVE was arrested for alleged possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The alleged RMVE posted threats to kill preachers on Facebook, apparently motivated in part by violent interpretations of Black Hebrew Israelite teachings.
June 2022: New York	(U) An RMVE was arrested for allegedly aiding and abetting the making of a false statement to a federal firearm licensee that was material to the lawfulness of the sale of a firearm and pertained to information required to be kept by the licensee in connection with purchase of a firearm, and conspiring to do the same.
June 2022: Maryland	(U) An AbRVE was indicted for an attempt to kill or kidnap a Supreme Court Justice following a leaked draft opinion of a Court case regarding federal abortion protections.

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June 2022: Oregon	(U) Local police arrested an AVE on state charges for attempting to build a destructive device. The arrest followed information the AVE was constructing Molotov cocktails and may have been planning to use them at a protest; search warrants resulted in seizure of material consistent with manufacture of destructive devices.
June 2022: Ohio	(U) Federal authorities arrested an RMVE on charges related to making and selling untraceable homemade weapons using a 3D printer. While employed to provide security services at local synagogues and Jewish schools, the RMVE had allegedly threatened to commit a shooting attack at a synagogue. Prior to the RMVE's federal arrest, the RMVE was arrested by local law enforcement on charges including making Terroristic Threats.
July 2022: Texas	(U) An MVE was arrested and federally charged for unlawful possession of a firearm as a felon. The MVE conducted armed patrols of the US-Mexico border.
July 2022: South Dakota	(U) One or more unknown individuals fired multiple gunshots into a substation that powers the Keystone Pipeline. The damages resulted in lost production and physical property damage to transformer and pump station. This incident remains under investigation.
July 2022: Tennessee	(U) An AbRVE was arrested on charges related to a drive-by shooting which struck the windows of an occupied federal courthouse in Knoxville, Tennessee. He also allegedly fired at and set fire to a reproductive health services facility.
July 2022: Nevada	(U) A juvenile RMVE was formally petitioned after calling in a false active shooter threat to a middle school and making threatening calls and swatting incidents targeting historically Black colleges and universities. In October 2022, after pleading guilty in a state charge of conspiracy to make false threats, the RMVE was sentenced to nine months' probation, including a juvenile assessment, counseling and behavior program.
August 2022: Oklahoma	(U) Two reported SCVEs were arrested and charged with kidnapping following the abduction of a minor and refusal to comply with law enforcement.
August 2022: Ohio	(U) A DVE attempted to breach the FBI's Cincinnati office with the intention of killing FBI personnel. The DVE fled the area and was fatally wounded after an hours-long standoff with law enforcement.
August 2022: Pennsylvania	(U) An MVE was arrested and federally charged with making interstate threats against the FBI following an August 2022 FBI search of a former President's Florida home.
August 2022: Pennsylvania	(U) One or more AVEs vandalized construction vehicles in a state park and left warning signs that trees had been "spiked" and cutting the trees could result in damage or injury.

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August 2022: Florida	(U) An AGAAVE-Other subject pleaded guilty in October 2022 to a charge of mailing threatening communications after sending nine threatening letters to individuals who participated in or were linked to the 6 January 2021 Capitol siege.
September 2022: North Carolina	(U) An SCVE was arrested and indicted after sending multiple purported "Writs of Execution" all threatening to arrest county officials, law enforcement, and others. In January 2023, the SCVE pleaded guilty to transmission of interstate threats.
September 2022: North Carolina	(U) An RMVE was arrested for allegedly receiving, possessing, transferring, or manufacturing an unregistered firearm. The subject is in custody pending trial.
September 2022: Texas	(U) An RMVE was arrested for alleged interstate threatening communications and threatening a federal officer. A social media review revealed a history of threatening statements against law enforcement officers, government officials, and racial and religious groups.

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Appendix B

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS
JOINT ANALYTIC CELL

17 JUNE 2022



(U) Wide-Ranging Domestic Violent Extremist Threat to Persist

(U) The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) assess that domestic violent extremists (DVEs)⁴⁰ fueled by various evolving ideological and sociopolitical grievances pose a sustained threat of violence to the American public, democratic institutions, and government and law enforcement officials. Flashpoint events in the coming months may exacerbate these perceived grievances, further increasing the potential for DVE violence. DVEs adhering to different violent extremist ideologies have coalesced around anger at issues including perceived election fraud, as well as immigration and government responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, drawing on their varied perceptions of those issues. These factors, along with fluid conspiracy theories, have amplified longstanding DVE grievances, including perceptions of government and law enforcement overreach or oppression and shifts in US demographics and cultural values.

- (U) The mass shooting last month targeting Black people in Buffalo, New York, was allegedly perpetrated by a racially or ethnically motivated violent extremist (RMVE) driven by a belief in the superiority of the white race. The RMVE was charged with federal hate crimes and using a firearm to commit murder in June 2022. This attack underscores how RMVEs—who have been responsible for a majority of DVE-related deaths since 2010—pose a significant threat of lethal violence against civilians, particularly of racial, ethnic, and religious minorities.
- (U) The lethal threat from militia violent extremists (MVEs) remains elevated, primarily toward government and law enforcement personnel, as MVEs remain willing to use violence to redress perceived government overreach and other sociopolitical grievances, judging from an increase in MVE plotting, disruptions, and FBI investigations since 2020. Anarchist violent extremists (AVEs) present a threat of sporadic violent physical assaults and property crimes impacting the efficient operation of critical infrastructure; developments that heighten perceptions of inequality or social injustice might further embolden AVEs to commit acts of violence.
- (U) Several DVEs motivated by perceptions of fraud in the 2020 general election were arrested in 2021 and 2022 for plotting or threatening violence against federal, state, and local officials and political party representatives, highlighting the elevated threat posed to elected officials countrywide. In November 2021, a New York-based MVE was sentenced to 19 months in prison for threatening to assault and murder members of the US Congress.
- (U) A wide-ranging set of DVEs have shared their perceptions of government overreach on COVID-19 pandemic mitigation efforts and anger at government responses to immigration issues in person and online and have encouraged one another to act violently. Anger at the mitigation efforts of businesses and federal, state, and local governments motivated several DVE attacks, plots, and calls for violence against health care workers and mobile vaccine clinics in 2020 and 2021. In 2021, some DVEs visited the US-Mexico border with the intention of detaining those crossing into the United States.

⁴⁰For the purpose of this assessment, DHS, FBI, and NCTC use the term DVE to refer to an individual based and operating primarily within the United States or its territories without direction or inspiration from a foreign terrorist group or other foreign power who seeks to further political or social goals, wholly or in part, through unlawful acts of force or violence. The mere advocacy of political or social positions, political activism, use of strong rhetoric, or generalized philosophical embrace of violent tactics do not constitute domestic violent extremism and is constitutionally protected. DHS, FBI, and NCTC apply this term as appropriate within the scope of their respective authorities.

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS

JOINT ANALYTIC CELL

17 APR 2022



(i) DVEs carried out at least four lethal attacks in 2021—the same number as in 2020—killing 13 people. Additional potential DVE incidents that have occurred in 2022 remain under FBI investigation. The number of pending FBI domestic terrorism investigations grew from approximately 1,000 in the spring of 2020 to approximately 2,700 in late 2021, in part because of investigations related to the siege of the US Capitol on 6 January 2021. Since the beginning of 2010, DVEs adhering to various violent extremist ideologies have conducted at least 47 lethal attacks that have killed 152 people in the United States. These figures do not include lethal attacks classified as violent hate crimes rather than DVE attacks.

(ii) Developments related to midterm elections, immigration, perceptions of government overreach or social injustice, and other flashpoint events will probably motivate some DVEs across ideologies to plot or attempt violence in the coming months. In the context of these events, some DVEs might promote or exploit the public prevalence of violent extremist narratives to encourage violence. DVE attackers and plotters are typically lone actors—individuals acting without the direct support of others—who plot or conduct attacks on soft targets using easily accessible weapons. The persistent difficulty of detecting threats from such actors underscores the value of the public's assistance in identifying people who might be mobilizing to violence and in reporting concerning behavior to authorities before violence occurs.

- (ii) Heightened tensions surrounding the 2022 midterm election cycle will probably cause some DVEs to target political candidates, party offices, judges, election events, or poll workers because of their actual or perceived political affiliations, as several did in 2021. On 26 January 2021, FBI arrested a California-based MVE for allegedly threatening family members of a member of the US Congress and a journalist. The MVE was sentenced to three years in prison in December 2021.
- (ii) Immigration-related developments, amplified by DVEs in violent extremist messaging, might spur DVEs to conduct planned or opportunistic violence. Historically, RMVEs—such as the Pittsburgh synagogue attacker in 2018 and the El Paso Walmart attacker in 2019—have conducted attacks motivated in part by immigration-related grievances, and MVEs have targeted perceived immigration-related threats to national security, including initiating armed border patrols with the intent of curbing illegal immigration, posing a potential risk to law enforcement and immigrants. AVEs have targeted US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) facilities in opposition to US Government immigration policies.
- (ii) Even if perceptions of government overreach related to COVID-19 mitigation measures subside, some DVEs will probably continue adhering to evolving anti-government and conspiracy narratives that they adopted during the pandemic and might use to justify violence. Some DVE adherents to QAnon conspiracy theories continue to violently target a shifting array of individuals and entities that they accuse of perpetrating or enabling child abuse. Such conspiracy theories have led to threats or acts of violence, including against businesses, US Government buildings, public officials, and the transportation sector that significantly impacted their operations.
- (ii) New legislation or US Supreme Court rulings that exacerbate DVEs' grievances or deepen their animosity toward perceived ideological opponents, including on high-salience issues such as abortion and gun rights, might result in increased threats of violence from a range of DVEs. Law enforcement involvement in the deaths of DVEs or like-minded people might also lead to calls for violence. Additionally, in 2020, some DVEs exploited lawful gatherings after law enforcement-involved deaths of unarmed African-Americans to engage in violence against ideological opponents and other targets.

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10) We assess that of all the DVE movements, RMVEs driven by a belief in the superiority of the white race continue to possess the most persistent and concerning transnational connections because adherents to this ideology are present throughout the West, frequently communicate with each other, and, at times, have inspired attacks. US-based RMVEs primarily forge connections with foreign counterparts online to network with like-minded individuals and deepen their commitment to RMVE causes. Many transnational, online RMVE networks have emerged since the mid-2010s, fostering a decentralized movement that often promotes violent extremism and encourages supporters to undertake violent action that is framed around the concept of leaderless resistance.

APPENDIX

(U) WIDE VARIETY OF DVE ACTORS THREATEN THE UNITED STATES

10) We assess that the United States faces threats from a wide range of DVEs who seek to engage in ideologically motivated violence. This appendix gives an overview of the five DVE threat categories that the US Government uses: RMVE, anti-government or anti-authority violent extremism, which includes MVE, AVE, and sovereign citizen violent extremism (SCVE); "all other domestic terrorism threats" that do not fit into the other DVE threat categories, including violent extremists driven by political, personal, or conspiracy theory-related grievances, as well as involuntary celibate violent extremists (IVEs); abortion-related violent extremism; and animal rights or environmental violent extremism.

(U) Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism

10) RMVEs Driven by Belief in the Superiority of the White Race Present Enduring Lethal Threat

10) We assess that RMVEs who are driven by a belief in the superiority of the white race continue to pose the primary threat among DVEs of committing lethal violence against civilians, based on their ideology and attack history. These RMVEs advocate and commit violence in support of a transnational movement whose adherents believe that white people of European descent are superior to and threatened by minority populations, as well as by other whites whom they perceive as supporting these populations. Some of these RMVEs promote accelerationist thinking, which advocates committing violence to precipitate a large-scale conflict, often framed as a "race war," in the United States and other Western democracies that these RMVEs believe will result in a white ethnostate.

- 10) The most recent such RMVE attack before the Buffalo shooting took place on 26 June 2021, when a now-deceased RMVE who allegedly used his belief in the superiority of the white race to justify violence conducted a shooting in Winthrop, Massachusetts, resulting in two deaths.
- 10) Since 2010, US-based RMVEs driven by a belief in the superiority of the white race have committed 17 lethal attacks that have killed a total of 77 people—slightly more than half of all fatalities from DVE attacks during that period. These RMVE attacks include the mass shootings in Buffalo, New York, in 2022; El Paso, Texas, in 2019; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in 2018; and Charleston, South Carolina, in 2015. Typical targets of these RMVEs include houses of worship, areas conducive to large gatherings, and people whom the attackers see as representative of those against whom they hold grievances.

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(U) RMVEs Motivated by Real or Perceived Racism and Injustice in American Society, the Desire for a Separate Black Homeland, and/or Violent Interpretations of Religious Teachings Will Probably Engage in Sporadic Violence

(U) RMVEs who are motivated by perceptions of racial injustice in American society, the desire for a separate Black homeland, and/or violent interpretations of religious teachings will probably continue to commit intermittent acts of violence. This subset of RMVEs has historically targeted those they perceive as representing oppression, including government officials, law enforcement, and white people, as well as individuals and locations associated with Judaism. These RMVEs conducted 11 lethal attacks from 2010 to 2021, resulting in 25 fatalities.

- (U) On 23 June 2021, an RMVE allegedly used his interpretations of Black Hebrew Israelite religious teachings to justify violence and shot to death a law enforcement officer in Daytona Beach, Florida. The suspect has been charged with capital murder and is awaiting trial.
- (U) In December 2019, an RMVE allegedly motivated by antisemitism and his interpretations of Black Hebrew Israelite religious teachings attacked the home of a Hasidic rabbi in New York during a Hanukkah celebration, wounding five people, one of whom later died. In the same month, two RMVEs with similar motivations fatally shot a local law enforcement officer at a cemetery in New Jersey and attacked a nearby kosher supermarket, killing three people and injuring several others. Both RMVEs were fatally wounded during an encounter with responding law enforcement officers.
- (U) RMVEs conducted attacks on law enforcement during the weeks after the officer-involved shooting deaths of two African Americans in Louisiana and Minnesota in July 2016. On 7 July 2016, a now-deceased RMVE motivated by incidents of actual or perceived police brutality ambushed and shot 11 law enforcement officers, killing five, in Dallas, Texas. On 17 July 2016, a now-deceased RMVE with similar motivations ambushed and shot six law enforcement officers, killing three, in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.

(U) Anti-Government or Anti-Authority Violent Extremism

(U) MVEs Pose Heightened Lethal Threat to Law Enforcement and Symbols of Government

(U) The lethal threat level from MVEs to law enforcement and government personnel will almost certainly remain elevated in the coming months because some of these actors are willing to use violence to redress perceived government overreach and other sociopolitical issues. Some MVEs will almost certainly continue to harbor grievances over their perceptions of fraud during the 2020 election and government measures related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Some MVEs might also mobilize to violence in response to the enactment of any legislation that they perceive as restricting access to firearms, expanding immigration, or managing public land that MVEs might view as unacceptable infringements on civil liberties or harmful to the security of the United States.

- (U) In April 2021, FBI arrested an MVE in Texas who intended to bomb a commercial cloud service provider's servers under the belief that the data center provided services to federal agencies, including CIA and FBI. The MVE pleaded guilty to a malicious attempt to destroy a building with an explosive and was sentenced to 10 years in federal prison in October 2021.
- (U) In January 2021, FBI disrupted a plot by two suspected MVEs who were allegedly planning to bomb the state headquarters of a political party in Sacramento, California. Federal investigators discovered multiple pipe bombs and dozens of firearms at the home of one of the MVEs. The subjects pleaded guilty to multiple offenses and are awaiting sentencing.

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- (U) Dozens of probable AVEs were arrested for their involvement in the violent, unlawful entry of the US Capitol building on 6 January 2021.

(U) Most AVEs Will Probably Engage in Nonlethal Criminal Activity, Impact Law Enforcement Operations

(U) We assess that AVEs will continue to plot and potentially conduct sporadic attacks on critical infrastructure and federal, state, and local facilities, as well as violent physical assaults against their perceived ideological opponents. Perceptions of inequality or social injustices related to flashpoint events might further embolden AVEs to commit acts of violence. Target selection by AVEs—whether premeditated or opportunistic—will probably remain focused on people or institutions seen as representing authority, capitalism, and oppression, including perceived racism or fascism. Although AVEs have sometimes acted collectively, we assess AVEs are not organized at the countrywide level.

- (U) In January 2021, FBI arrested a Florida-based AVE after he issued a “call to arms” for like-minded individuals to join him with firearms to violently confront others who might gather at a lawful protest at the Florida Capitol earlier that month. In October 2021, the AVE was sentenced to 44 months in federal prison for communicating a threat to kidnap or injure others.
- (U) In August 2020, an individual who expressed views on social media consistent with AVE ideology fatally shot a man during an event with individuals of opposing ideologies in Portland, Oregon. This incident was the first known lethal attack in the United States by an AVE in more than 20 years. The AVE was subsequently killed after drawing a firearm when law enforcement attempted to arrest him.
- (U) In July 2019, a probable AVE set fire to a vehicle and threw incendiary devices at a building near a detention facility linked to ICE operations in Tacoma, Washington. He then engaged responding law enforcement officers with an AR-style rifle and was killed during the encounter.

(U) SCVEs Pose Sporadic Threat of Violence Against Law Enforcement and Government Personnel

(U) We assess that sovereign citizen violent extremists (SCVEs) will continue to pose a sporadic threat of violence against law enforcement and government personnel on the basis of SCVEs’ perceived rights and belief in their immunity from government authority and laws. In furtherance of these beliefs, SCVEs have committed a wide variety of property and financial crimes that have often brought them into conflict with law enforcement, sometimes resulting in violence. Law enforcement officers will probably remain SCVEs’ most frequent targets, with violence most likely to occur during law enforcement encounters, including traffic stops.

- (U) On 3 July 2021, 11 individuals, believed to be members of an armed organization that espouses sovereign citizen ideology, engaged in an hour-long armed standoff with Massachusetts State Police near Wakefield that was streamed live by the group’s spokesperson on a social media platform. The incident occurred after an attempted traffic stop on a vehicle driven by group members and had the potential to escalate to violence. After the standoff, the individuals were charged with multiple firearms-related violations. Group members’ statements before, during, and after the standoff have been consistent with sovereign citizen extremist ideology.
- (U) In February 2016, a probable SCVE opened fire on local law enforcement officers who were trying to serve a warrant at the violent extremist’s residence in Locust Grove, Georgia, for failure to appear in court. After the SCVE killed one police officer and wounded two sheriff’s deputies, law enforcement officers shot and killed him.

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(U) All Other Domestic Terrorism Threats

(U) Other DVEs Pose Threat of Violence Because of Political Grievances, Conspiracy Theories

(U) We assess that DVEs who mobilize to commit violence in response to partisan grievances and who do not fall under other DVE threat categories will pose a heightened threat to individuals in the 2022 midterm election cycle because of their actual or perceived political affiliation. These DVEs might target candidates, government officials, other civilians, and institutions with violence to try to redress their perceived grievances or advance their agendas. Conspiracy theories related to the 2020 general election will probably continue to contribute to the radicalization of some DVEs with partisan grievances and potentially be reinforced by their view that the Capitol breach on 6 January 2021 was a success.

- (U) In December 2021, a DVE motivated by partisan grievances who is awaiting trial was arrested en route to Washington, DC, after telling law enforcement officers that he would "do whatever it takes" to kill government leaders on his "hit list." The DVE was found to have a rifle, ammunition, loaded magazines, body armor, and medical kits.
- (U) In September 2021, authorities arrested a DVE motivated by partisan grievances for throwing a Molotov cocktail at the offices of a political party in Austin, Texas. The subject pleaded guilty to one count of arson and was sentenced to six years in prison.
- (U) In June 2017, a now-deceased DVE injured several members of Congress, staffers, and responding officers after opening fire at a charity baseball event in Alexandria, Virginia.

(U) Conspiracy theories related to the COVID-19 pandemic almost certainly contribute to the mobilization to violence of some DVEs who do not fall into the other threat categories. We assess that these DVEs pose an ongoing threat to government officials and critical infrastructure.

- (U) In March 2020, a DVE deliberately detailed a train that he was operating near the USNS Mercy hospital ship at the Port of Los Angeles to draw media attention to the ship's presence. The DVE told law enforcement that he believed that the ship had an "alternate purpose" related to COVID-19 or an unspecified US Government takeover and that he wanted to "wake people up." In April 2022, he was sentenced to three years in prison after pleading guilty to committing a terrorist attack and other violence against railroad carriers and mass transportation systems.

(U) We assess that adherence to elements of the continuously evolving QAnon conspiracy theory—some of which are bolstered by the resonance of election fraud narratives—will contribute to the radicalization and mobilization to violence of a small number of DVEs, posing a threat to individuals and institutions that supporters of the conspiracy theory have prominently denounced. The participation of some self-identifying QAnon adherents in the breach of the US Capitol on 6 January 2021—who were arrested and charged with violent entry and disorderly conduct in a restricted building and obstruction of an official proceeding—underscores how some QAnon adherents can accept the legitimacy of violent action.

- (U) On 7 January 2021, a North Carolina-based, self-identified QAnon adherent was arrested by FBI in Washington, DC, and charged with interstate communication of threats after he brought firearms and ammunition into the city and threatened the Speaker of the House and DC Mayor. The DVE pleaded guilty and was sentenced to two years in federal prison.
- (U) On 8 January 2021, a probable DVE and self-identified QAnon adherent was arrested on charges of destroying government property after allegedly firing several rounds at a federal courthouse in Oregon. In November 2021, the DVE was sentenced to probation.

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(U) Some DVEs form uniquely personalized grievances that might also draw from established DVE movements and, on a limited basis, from other violent extremist ideologies, probably aided by the proliferation and accessibility of a wide range of DVE and other extremist content online, a trend we expect to continue in coming years.

- (U) On 21 June 2021, a now-deceased DVE conducted a shooting attack in Arvada, Colorado, killing two people. The preliminary investigation revealed that the alleged attacker's personalized ideology included a hatred of police stemming from perceptions of corruption among law enforcement agencies.
- (U) On 15 March 2021, a DVE with a personalized ideology related to his claimed sex and pornography addictions allegedly conducted shootings at spas near Atlanta, Georgia, killing eight people. The attacker was sentenced to life in prison for four murders to which he pleaded guilty and is awaiting trial on four counts of murder to which he pleaded not guilty.

(U) We assess that involuntary celibate violent extremists (IVEs) pose a persistent threat of violence against women, heterosexual couples, and others perceived as successful in sexual or romantic pursuits. IVEs motivated by grievances related to their belief that society unjustly denies them sexual or romantic attention have conducted three lethal attacks in the United States since 2014, mostly using firearms, that have resulted in 17 fatalities. The incel movement, which includes IVEs, has online participants in many Western countries, and at least four Canadian IVEs have conducted lone-actor attacks since 2016.

- (U) In July 2021, FBI arrested an IVE based on his alleged actions in planning an attack on women at a university in Ohio. The IVE allegedly wrote a manifesto describing his hatred of women and his desire to "slaughter" them. He was charged with illegal firearms possession and attempting to commit a hate crime and is awaiting trial.
- (U) In May 2020, a self-identified involuntary celibate shot and injured three people at an outdoor mall in Glendale, Arizona, before authorities arrested him. In March 2022, the IVE pleaded guilty to two counts of attempted first degree murder and two counts of assault with a deadly weapon.

(U) Abortion-Related Violent Extremism

(U) Abortion-Related Violent Extremists Might React to Ongoing Events

(U) We assess that abortion-related violent extremist activity will probably increase in line with abortion-related legislative and legal debates, such as those surrounding the recent unauthorized disclosure of a draft opinion in the anticipated US Supreme Court ruling in the case of *Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization*. Historically, abortion-related violent extremists motivated by pro-life beliefs have committed acts of violence, including at least 10 murders and dozens of bombings and arsons, all targeting abortion providers and facilities. Abortion-related violent extremists motivated by pro-choice beliefs—although historically less violent than pro-life abortion-related violent extremists—will probably pose a threat to individuals or critical infrastructure and will most often likely target organizations or people expressing pro-life views.

- (U) On 31 December 2021, a fire destroyed an unoccupied reproductive health clinic in Knoxville, Tennessee. Local investigators determined that the event was an arson attack by unknown perpetrators.
- (U) In September 2021, an individual from Oklahoma was arrested for making online threats targeting Texas lawmakers associated with state-level abortion restrictions. The individual pleaded guilty and is awaiting sentencing.

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- (U) On 3 January 2020, a DVE with a history of expressing pro-life beliefs online threw an incendiary device at the front window of a reproductive healthcare facility in Newark, Delaware, starting a fire that damaged the front porch and window. The subject pleaded guilty in February 2021 and was sentenced to 26 months in federal prison in March 2022.

(U) Animal Rights and Environmental Violent Extremism

(U) Animal Rights and Environmental Violent Extremists Primarily Target Critical Infrastructure

(U) We assess that violent extremists supporting animal rights and environmental causes will continue to disrupt the operation of critical infrastructure to try to exact an economic toll on the industries they target. Most environmental violent extremist activity in recent years has opposed oil and natural gas infrastructure projects, particularly those near perceived ecologically sensitive habitats or waterways, while animal rights violent extremists primarily oppose large-scale farming or animal agriculture.

- (U) In November 2020, two environmental violent extremists in Whatcom County, Washington, were arrested and charged with impeding the operation of a railroad signal system by using a "shunt" across the railroad tracks, which disrupts the electrical current on the tracks and can disable safety features, potentially causing derailments or other accidents. A claim of responsibility followed a similar incident in early 2020, stating that extremists had carried out the shunting with the goal of preventing the construction of an oil pipeline across British Columbia. Both defendants were found guilty and sentenced to one year and to six months in prison, respectively.

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