Paul Carlos Southwick (ISB No. 12439) Emily Myrei Croston (ISB No. 12389) ACLU of Idaho Foundation P.O. Box 1897 Boise, ID 83701 Tel: (208) 344-9750 psouthwick@acluidaho.org

Chase B. Strangio*
Malita Picasso*
Leslie Cooper*
Alexandra R. Johnson*
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
FOUNDATION
125 Broad St.
New York, NY 10004
Tel: (212) 549-2584
cstrangio@aclu.org
mpicasso@aclu.org
lcooper@aclu.org
a.johnson@aclu.org

Pilar C. French*
Harlan Mechling*
Carlisle S. Pearson*
Nicholas J.H. Mercado*
BALLARD SPAHR LLP
601 S.W. Second Avenue, Suite 2100
Portland, OR 97204
Tel: (503) 778-2100
frenchp@ballardspahr.com
mechlingh@ballardspahr.com
pearsoncs@ballardspahr.com

mercadon@ballardspahr.com

*Admitted pro hac vice

ecroston@acluidaho.org

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

KATIE ROBINSON, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

RAÚL LABRADOR, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:24-cv-00306-DCN PLAINTIFFS' REPLY ISO MOTION FOR FOURTH PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

The Court is authorized to issue a fourth preliminary injunction that parallels the injunctions it issued on September 3, 2024, Dkt. 58, December 3, 2024, Dkt. 96, and March 3,

2025, Dkt. 120. None of the material facts have changed for the purpose of determining whether another preliminary injunction is warranted, just as was true when this Court issued the second and third preliminary injunctions in this case.

Defendants' only response to Plaintiffs' motion for a fourth preliminary injunction is to suggest—without any evidentiary support—that hormone therapy to treat gender dysphoria is not "essential medical care" for purposes of the Eighth Amendment because, they assert, there is "significant medical debate as to the safety and effectiveness of these hormones." Dkt. 135 at 2. There is no such debate within the medical field, and Defendants' response offers no evidence to support this assertion. 1 Id. In their first request for a preliminary injunction, which this Court granted, Dkt. 58, Plaintiffs submitted substantial evidence that this treatment is well-accepted in the medical field, see Dkt. 2-1 at 7-10, including the fact that this treatment is supported by every major medical association in the United States, see Dkt. 2-5 at 10-11.

Moreover, since that first preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs have introduced additional evidence that this care is essential, see Dkts. 114-5, 114-6, 114-7—which the Court has credited, see Dkt. 120 at 7. In contrast, Defendants still have not provided any evidence to the contrary. See id. at 6 ("State Defendants have provided no new evidence since the Court issued the last preliminary injunction regarding the question of the medical necessity of gender-affirming care."). Defendants' latest response similarly lacks any evidential support. See Dkt. 135.

¹ Defendants' citation to Dkt. 24 does not offer any evidence of the "significant medical debate" they claim exists. See Dkt. 135 at 2. Indeed, their own experts have supported the proscribed treatment in prior testimony. See Dkt. 25 at 3-4. In fact, despite financial barriers posed by the law, this treatment remains legally available to all nonincarcerated adults in Idaho. Cf. Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1063 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that a blanket policy denying medically indicated treatment solely because an individual is incarcerated "is the paradigm of deliberate indifference").

In any case, any uncertainty on the question of hormone therapy's necessity would counsel

in favor of, not against, another preliminary injunction. This question is a serious one going to the

merits of the case—meeting the first prong of the preliminary injunction test. See Dkt. 96 at 9

("Until the parties present the Court with more definitive evidence one way or another as to the

medical necessity of hormone therapy to individuals with gender dysphoria, there continues to be

a serious question as to the merits of this case, and this factor weighs in favor of granting another

preliminary injunction."); see also Dkt. 58 at 9 (similar); Dkt. 120 at 7 (similar). The Court has

previously found that the "period of 'deliberative investigation" on this question—in which this

case remains—"weighs in favor of another preliminary injunction" and it should find as much

again here. Id.

Defendants also "incorporate here their arguments opposing the previous injunctions."

Dkt. 135 at 2. Plaintiffs thus incorporate their responses to said arguments. See Dkt. 25, Dkt. 90,

Dkt. 118.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court issue a fourth preliminary injunction prior to

the third preliminary injunction's expiration on June 2, 2025.

Dated: May 26, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

<u>/s/ Emily Myrei Croston</u>

Emily Myrei Croston (ISB No. 12389)

ACLU of Idaho Foundation

3