APPENDIX

APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS

Exhibit #	Document	Appendix Page #
Exhibit 1	Notice of Intent sent by Florida's Chief of Domestic Security	App.001
Exhibit 2	Government Exhibit, Philly Meeting Summary, 3:04-CR-240-G, *U.S. v. HLF, et al.*	App.009
Exhibit 3	Government Exhibit, Philly Meeting – 4, 3:04-CR-240-G, *U.S. v. HLF, et al.*	App.011
Exhibit 4	Government Exhibit, Ashqar Search – 4, 3:04-CR-240-G, *U.S. v. HLF, et al.*	App.030
Exhibit 5	*Foreign Terrorist Organizations*, BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPT. OF ST.	App.036
Exhibit 6	*Sanctions Search List*, OFF. OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL	App.048
Exhibit 7	Search Results for "Holy Land Foundation", *Sanctions Search List*, OFF. OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL	App.050
Exhibit 8	Press Release, U.S. Att'y N.D. Tex., Infocom Corporation and Its Operators Sentenced in Federal Court: Elashi Brothers Convicted for Doing Business with Terrorist (Oct. 13, 2006)	App.052
Exhibit 9	Press Release, Off. of Pub. Affs., U.S. Dept. of Just., Federal Judge Hands Downs Sentences in Holy Land Foundation Case (May 27, 2009)	App.055
Exhibit 10	*Targeted Financial Sanctions: Local Terrorist List*, UAE EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR CONTROL & NON-PROLIFERATION	App.060
Exhibit 10-1	*Local Terrorist List*, UAE EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR CONTROL & NON-PROLIFERATION	App.064
Exhibit 11	Press Statement, Marco Rubio, Sec. of St., Two-Year Anniversary of October 7th Attack (Oct. 7, 2025)	App.077
Exhibit 12	*The Path to October 7: How Iran Built Up and Managed a Palestinian 'Axis of Resistance'*, COMBATTING TERRORISM CENTER AT WEST POINT	App.081
Exhibit 12-1	Phillip Smyth, *The Path to October 7: How Iran Built Up and Managed a Palestinian 'Axis of Resistance'*, CTC SENTINEL (Dec. 2023)	App.100
Exhibit 13	Adam Rasgon, *Hamas Official Expresses Reservations About Oct. 7 Attack on Israel*, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2025)	App.117
Exhibit 14	Johanna Chisholm, *US-Israeli hostage reunites with family after being freed by Hamas*, BBC NEWS (May 12, 2025)	App.127

Exhibit #	Document	Appendix Page #
Exhibit 15	*Hidden in Plain Sight: Confronting the Muslim Brotherhood Network in America: Subcomm. on Fed. Cts., Oversight, Agency Action, & Fed. Rts.*, S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY	App.135
Exhibit 16	*Hidden in Plain Sight: Confronting the Muslim Brotherhood Network in America: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fed. Cts., Oversight, Agency Action, & Fed. Rts. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary*, 119th Cong. (2026) (written testimony of Lara L. Burns, Senior Research Fellow, Program on Extremism The George Washington University)	App.163
Exhibit 17	*Hidden in Plain Sight: Confronting the Muslim Brotherhood Network in America: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fed. Cts., Oversight, Agency Action, & Fed. Rts. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary*, 119th Cong. (2026) (written testimony of Arielle F. Klepach, Senior Litigation Counsel, National Jewish Advocacy Center)	App.206
Exhibit 18	*Hidden in Plain Sight: Confronting the Muslim Brotherhood Network in America: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fed. Cts., Oversight, Agency Action, & Fed. Rts. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary*, 119th Cong. (2026) (written testimony of Kyle Shideler, Director and Senior Analyst for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Center for Security Policy)	App.255
Exhibit 19	*Hidden in Plain Sight: Confronting the Muslim Brotherhood Network in America: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fed. Cts., Oversight, Agency Action, & Fed. Rts. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary*, 119th Cong. (2026) (appendices to written testimony of Kyle Shideler, Director and Senior Analyst for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Center for Security Policy)	App.262

Exhibit 1

Notice of Intent of Designating **Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), including CAIR-Florida,** as a Florida Domestic Terrorist Organization

Notice To: Council on American-Islamic Relations
Address: 453 New Jersey Ave SE, Washington, DC 20003

Notice To: CAIR Florida
Address: 8076 N 56th St, Tampa, FL 33617

The Chief of Domestic Security formally issues this Notice of Intent for the purpose of designating **Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), including CAIR-Florida,** as a Florida Domestic Terrorist Organization.

In accordance with CS/CS/HB 1471 (2026) and s. 943.03102, a designated domestic terrorist organization must meet the following legal criteria:

1. The organization is based or operates in this state or the United States.
2. The organization is engaging in terrorist activity as defined in s. 775.30.
3. The terrorist activity of the organization is an ongoing threat to the security of this state or the United States.

Per Section 943.03102(2) FS, please be advised that a public meeting regarding this designation will be held:

Date: September 29, 2026 Time: 09:00 EST

Location: Florida Cabinet Meeting Room, The Capitol
400 S Monroe St, Tallahassee, FL 32399

Process for Objection/Removal/Appeal:
You may, within seven days of receipt of this notice, object to the proposed designation in writing and provide any information and documentation you believe would counsel against the designation.

To object to the designation, you may submit your objection to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement via email at DesignationAppealorObjection@fdle.state.fl.us or at the following address:

Florida Department of Law Enforcement
c/o Chief of Domestic Security
Agency Clerk
PO Box 1489
Tallahassee, FL 32302-1489

In the event the Governor and Cabinet approve the designation, you may petition the Department at any time for the removal of such designation. The petition for removal may include any information and documentation you believe would support removal of the designation. You can submit your petition and documentation to the above Department addresses.

To appeal the outlined designation, you or any of your members may challenge such designation in the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit in and for Leon County.

Part 1 – Domestic Terrorist Organization Criteria:

☒ 1. **Observed Base or Operations Sites in this state or the United States**

- The organization is based or operates in Florida; or
- The organization is based or operates in the United States.

☒ 2. **Engaging in Terrorist Activity as Defined in s. 775.30**

Section 775.30 provides:

- (1) As used in this chapter and the Florida Criminal Code, the terms "terrorism" or "terrorist activity" mean an activity that:
  (a) Involves:
  1. A violent act or an act dangerous to human life which is a violation of the criminal laws of this state or of the United States; or
  2. A violation of s. 815.06; and
  (b) Is intended to:
  1. Intimidate, injure, or coerce a civilian population;
  2. Influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
  3. Affect the conduct of government through destruction of property, assassination, murder, kidnapping, or aircraft piracy.
- (2) A person who violates s. 782.04(1)(a)1. or (2), s. 782.065, s. 782.07(1), s. 782.09, s. 784.045, s. 784.07, s. 787.01, s. 787.02, s. 787.07, s. 790.115, s. 790.15, s. 790.16, s. 790.161, s. 790.1615, s. 790.162, s. 790.166, s. 790.19, s. 806.01, s. 806.031, s. 806.111, s. 815.06, s. 815.061, s. 859.01, or s. 876.34, in furtherance of intimidating or coercing the policy of a government, or in furtherance of affecting the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping, commits the crime of terrorism, a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

☒ 3. **Ongoing threat to the security of this state or the United States**

- The terrorist activity of the organization is an ongoing threat to the security of this state or the United States.

Part 2 – Basis Summary Findings:

During the 2008 Holy Land Foundation (HLF) trial, the U.S.-Muslim Brotherhood's Palestine Committee (PALCOM) was revealed as a committee whose sole purpose was supporting Hamas from within the U.S. with media, money, and personnel. The HLF, Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP), United Association for Studies and Research (UASR), and CAIR were identified as PALCOM's organizational structures designated to achieve PALCOM's goals. The IAP printed the founding Hamas charter in English for wider consumption in the western hemisphere. The founding charter called for the annihilation of Israel through violent jihad, to include suicide bombings against civilian targets to be carried out by the Al-Qassam Brigades.

There is substantial evidence that CAIR is engaging in terrorist activity. CAIR's founding members have connections with Hamas leadership to include Mousa Mohammed Abu Marzook. Additionally, co-founding CAIR-TX member Ghassan Elashi, who was convicted of dealings and material support to Specially Designated Terrorists, also has ties to Hamas. Likewise, as referenced below, current CAIR members have connections with an alleged member of the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ). During the October 7, 2023, terror attacks in Israel, Hamas and PIJ members brutally murdered, kidnapped and raped Israelis and foreign nationals, to include U.S. civilians. The terror attacks were accomplished utilizing a vast tunnel network built by Hamas.

This tunnel system in Gaza and Israel was built over decades and cost over $1 billion to construct. In 2014, Hamas reportedly spent $90 million to build just three dozen tunnels.

- **1928** – **Muslim Brotherhood** founded in Egypt.

- **1987** – members of the **Muslim Brotherhood** create **Hamas**.

- **1993** – Members of the Palestine Committee of the **Muslim Brotherhood** in the United States met in Philadelphia to discuss Oslo Accords and the conversation focused on how to continue to support Hamas (not yet a U.S.-designated terrorist organization). The Palestine Committee included three Hamas-supporting organizations in the United States—the IAP, the Occupied Land Fund (later named the Holy Land Foundation, or HLF), and the UASR. CAIR co-founder, Nihad Awad, and Ghassan Elashi (co-founder of CAIR-TX) were identified as presenters at a "Future of Islamic Action for Palestine in North America Seminar." Documents seized in relation to the HLF trial from these meetings suggest ties within the U.S. to support efforts by the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas. Nihad Awad is currently CAIR's National Executive Director.

https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2025-02/philly-meeting-summary.pdf
https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2025-02/Philly%20Meeting%204.pdf
https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2025-02/Ashqar_Search_4.pdf

- **1994** – Former IAP members Nihad Awad, Omar Ahmad and a third man founded the Council on American-Islamic Relations, or CAIR (HLF – wiretapped transcripts indicate a "front" organization would be needed to "camouflage" their actions).

- **1997** – Hamas and PIJ were designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO).

https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/

- **2001** – **HLF** was designated a Specially Designated Global Terrorist organization for funneling millions to Hamas, following the latter's designation as a terrorist group in 1997.

https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/?SEQ=sanctions+list+search

- **2002** – Ghassan Elashi was arrested for conspiracy, money laundering, and dealing in the property of a designated terrorist with his brothers Bayan and Basman. The three brothers reportedly tried to hide Hamas official **Mousa Mohammed Abu Marzook's** $250,000 investment in their Texas-based company (Infocom). Bayan was the chief executive officer; Ghassan was the vice-president of marketing; and Basman was the logistics and credit manager.

https://www.justice.gov/archive/usao/txn/PressRel06/elashi_bayan_ghassan_basman_infocom_sent_pr.html

  - Mousa Mohammed Abu Marzook: served as the first chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau in the early 1990s.

- **2008** – **HLF** conviction of five indicted conspirators found them guilty on more than 100 counts in criminal trial. Ghassan Elashi was convicted of conspiracy to provide material

support to a foreign terrorist organization (i.e. Hamas). **CAIR** was an unindicted co-conspirator.

https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/federal-judge-hands-downs-sentences-holy-land-foundation-case

- **2014** – The United Arab Emirates (UAE) designates **CAIR** as a terrorist group due to its ties to the global **Muslim Brotherhood** which includes **Hamas**. CAIR is still listed on the "Local Terrorist List," within the "Sanctions List" as of 2026.

https://www.uaeiec.gov.ae/en-us/un-page?p=1#

- **2023** – Hamas and PIJ launched terror attacks against Israel which led to the deaths of more than 1,200 Israelis and foreign nationals (including 46 U.S. citizens in Israel). Additionally, Hamas took 254 hostages, of which 12 were U.S. citizens. In 2006, Hamas and PIJ started the Joint Operation Room (JOR) for the Palestinian Factions of Resistance, which grew to include many major and minor militant Palestinian factions in Gaza and the West Bank. This JOR hosted training operations, including drilling tactics that were later utilized in the October 7th attack.

https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/10/two-year-anniversary-of-october-7th-attack
https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-path-to-october-7-how-iran-built-up-and-managed-a-palestinian-axis-of-resistance/

- **2025** - As head of Hamas' foreign relations office, Mousa Mohammed Abu Marzook said he would not have supported an attack on Israel had he known of the devastation it would wreak on Gaza. According to an article published on February 24, 2025, he told the New York Times "Hamas was open to releasing all hostages at the same time, if Israel was willing to free the thousands of Palestinians in its prisons, end the war and withdraw from Gaza." On May 12, 2025, U.S.-Israeli hostage Edan Alexander, thought to be the last U.S. citizen held by Hamas who was still alive, was freed.


https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/24/world/middleeast/hamas-official-interview-attack-israel.html
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4gr2qvzn0no

- **2025** – Texas designates CAIR as an FTO.

- **2026** – **Muslim Brotherhood** chapters (Lebanese Muslim Brotherhood and Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood) designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist organization by the U.S. Government.

- **2026** – Retired FBI Agent Lara Burns, Senior Litigation Counsel Arielle Klepach, and Homeland Security Senior Analyst Kyle Shideler provided testimony to the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary regarding ties between the Muslim Brotherhood and PALCOM organizations, to include CAIR, titled "Hidden in Plain Sight: Confronting the Muslim Brotherhood Network in America."

https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/committee-activity/hearings/hidden-in-plain-sight-confronting-the-muslim-brotherhood-network-in-america-08-05-2026


Palestine Committee (PC) of the Muslim Brotherhood
Philadelphia Meeting in 1993
Organization Ties:
Palestine Committee (PC), and
Council on American-Islamic Relations
Organization Ties:
Palestine Committee (PC),
Holy Land Foundation (HLF), and
Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP)
Nihad Awad
Co-founder of CAIR's TX Chapter
Ghassan Elashi
2002
conspiracy, money laundering,
and dealing in the
property of a designated terrorist
co-founder and current
National Executive Director
CAIR - TX
Vice President of Marketing
Cousins
CAIR
Council on American-Islamic Relations
former
Vice Chairman
Nabil Sadoun
Infocom Corp.
TX-based
Computer Company
2008
co-founder
Investor
CAIR - CA
United Association for
Studies and Research
co-founder
Husband
and Wife
Nadia Marzook
Mousa Mohammed Abu Marzook
Executive Director
of CAIR's
San Francisco Bay Area office
First Chairman of the Hamas
Political Bureau
Zahra Billoo
Hamas
Foreign Terrorist Organization since 1997
conspiracy to provide
material support to a
foreign terrorist organization
(Hamas) via the
Holy Land Foundation Trial
Board Member
Coalition for Civil Freedoms Foundation
October 7, 2023, terror attacks in Israel
led to the deaths of 1,200 Israelis and
foreign nationals (including 46 US citizens in Israel).
Additionally, Hamas and PIJ took 254 hostages (12 US).
Treasurer
Pled guilty to several charges including the intent
to make or receive a contribution of funds, goods,
or services, to, or for the benefit of a
Specially Designated Terrorist.
Alleged PIJ Member
Hatem Fariz
Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
Foreign Terrorist Organization since 1997

1. Historical Action Against CAIR

In November 2014, the UAE designated CAIR as a terrorist organization due to alleged ties to the Muslim Brotherhood and concerns in promoting extremism. The UAE upheld their designation when challenged due to CAIR's honoring of convicted Palestinian Islamic Jihad terrorist Sami Al-Arian, former University of South Florida professor, with a "Promoting Justice Award." According to open-source reporting and the UAE's anti-terror legislation by the Emirates, an annual review of their terrorist organization designations must be conducted.

2. Recent Legal or Legislative Action Against CAIR in the U.S.

As of November 2025, CAIR is designated as a Foreign Terrorist and Transnational Criminal Organization under Texas Penal and Texas Property Codes, which led to property acquisition bans and civil enforcement authority for the Attorney General. Texas' Governor directed the Texas Department of Public Safety to launch criminal investigations into CAIR and the Muslim Brotherhood, and announced a separate investigation into 'Sharia tribunals masquerading as legal courts' in Collin and Dallas counties. In December 2025, the Governor formally requested the U.S. Treasury Department to investigate and suspend CAIR's 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status for its three entities operating in Texas. In February 2026, Texas' Attorney General filed lawsuits against CAIR and the Muslim Brotherhood, with the intent to ban them from operating in Texas, prohibit fundraising and membership solicitation, and block property ownership in the state.

Federally, on June 24, 2025, a Florida Representative introduced H.R. 4097: Designate CAIR as a Terrorist Organization Act. The bill was last referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary the same day without any additional action published by the House. The bill aimed to have a review conducted on CAIR to determine whether the organization meets criteria for designation as a FTO pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189).

In August 2025, an Arkansas Senator formally requested the Internal Revenue Service investigate CAIR's 501(c)(3) compliance due to their alleged ties to Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood. In January 2026, Chairman Cody Smith, representing Missouri, referred CAIR-California for IRS investigation and potential revocation of tax-exempt status, referencing Texas' FTO designation and alleged systematic misuse of millions in taxpayers' dollars. At this time, Texas joined a legal brief in a federal case targeting American Muslims for Palestine (AMP), whose predecessor's board members were convicted of providing material support for Hamas, with overlapping ties to the same Palestine Committee network cited in CAIR cases.

3. CAIR's ties to persons previously convicted of terrorist financing

CAIR California's San Francisco Bay Area (CAIR-SFBA) Executive Director Zahara Billoo is listed as a Board Member of the Coalition for Civil Freedoms Foundation, according to their last publicly published 990EZ Tax Form. Hatem Fariz is identified as the foundation's Treasurer. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, Hatem Fariz was an alleged Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) member. Hatem Fariz pleaded guilty to several charges including the intent to make or receive a contribution of funds, goods, or services, to, or for the benefit of a Specially Designated Terrorist.

<u>Convictions</u>
State/Federal Court: U.S. District Court, Northern District of Texas
Case #: CR No. 3:04-00240-P(N.D.T.X) United States v. Holy Land Foundation, et al.
Person: Ghassan Elashi

Case Summary: On May 27, 2009, five Holy Land Foundation leaders were convicted of Providing Material Support to the Hamas Terrorist Organization. One of the leaders, Ghassan Elashi, 55, of Richardson, Texas, was sentenced to a total of 65 years in prison for 10 counts of conspiracy to provide, and the provision of, material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization; 11 counts of conspiracy to provide, and the provision of, funds, goods and services to a Specially Designated Terrorist; 10 counts of conspiracy to commit, and the commission of, money laundering; and one count of conspiracy to impede and impair the Internal Revenue Service; and one count of filing a false tax return. According to the superseding indictment (pg.6) the Holy Land Foundation was created by Elashi and two others as the fundraising component of the Palestinian Committee, whose purpose was to support Hamas.

Significance: According to the U.S Department of State, Hamas is a designated foreign terrorist organization (since 1997). According to open-source news, Elashi was one of the founding members of CAIR's Texas chapter. CAIR was designated by the State of Texas as a foreign terrorist and transnational criminal organization by Governor Greg Abbott (18-Nov-2025 proclamation). Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton has filed a lawsuit (26-Feb-2026) against the Muslim Brotherhood and CAIR, which identifies CAIR as the American Chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood.

According to the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) the Hamas charter calls for establishing an Islamic Palestinian state in place of Israel and rejects all agreements made between the Palestinian Liberation Organization and Israel. Hamas' strength is concentrated in the Gaza Strip and areas of the West Bank. Hamas has a military wing known as the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades that has conducted many anti-Israel attacks in both Israel and the Palestinian territories since the 1990s. These attacks have included large-scale bombings against Israeli civilian targets, small-arms attacks, improvised roadside explosives, and rocket attacks. On October 7, 2023, Hamas launched a terrorist attack from the Gaza Strip into Israel. More than 1,200 Israelis and foreign nationals (including 46 U.S. citizens in Israel) were killed, and Hamas and other groups also seized an estimated 251 hostages.

According to government documents presented during the U.S. v. HLF trial, Nihad Awad, CAIR's current National Executive Director, was listed as a representative of CAIR during a meeting held between October 2–3, 1993, in Philadelphia. The organization is believed to have been created at this meeting where Hamas operatives – under FBI surveillance – strategized about how to support Hamas's mission while evading law enforcement detection. The wiretapped transcripts captured attendees, including Nihad Awad, discussing the need for "deception," "camouflage," and maintaining a "front" organization. One year later, Nihad Awad and Omar Ahmad officially founded CAIR. Additionally, in a 1994 forum discussion videotaped at Barry University, Awad declared: "I am in support of the Hamas movement."

Exhibit 2

PHILADELPHIA MEETING October 2-3, 1993

Attendees	Organizations	HLF AMEX Records-Flights (exh: Amex1, Amex2)	Marriott Hotel Records (exh: Marriott)	Speaker at Conference (exh: Philly Meeting 1-18)	Surveillance Photos (exh: Philly Pictures 1-6)	Planning Phone Calls (exh: Ashqar Wire Tap 1-6)
Shukri Abu Baker	PC, HLF, IAP	√	√	√	√	√
Ghassan Elashi	PC, HLF, IAP	√	√	√	√	
Mufid Abdulqader	HLF, Al Sakra Band		√			
Haitham Maghawri	HLF	√	√		√	
Akram Kharoubi	PC, HLF, IAP			√		√
Omar Ahmad	PC, IAP	√	√	√		√
Ismail Elbarasse	PC, IAP				√	√
Abdel Haleem Ashqar	PC, AEF			√	√	√
Ghassan Saleh Dahduli	PC, IAP	√	√	√		
Muin Shabib	PC		√			√
Abdul Rahman Barakji	IAP	√	√	√		
Sharif Battikhi	HLF	√		√		
Riad Ahmed			√			
Hassan Sabri	IAP		√	√		√
Abdul Jabar Hamdan	HLF		√			
Ayman Sharawi	PC		√	√		
Jawad al Hamad	Palestine Section			√		√
Abdel Salam				√		
Nihad Awad	PC, CAIR			√		√
Osama	IAP			√		
Abu Ahmad				√		
Mohamed El-Mezain	PC, HLF		√			√
Mohamed Al Hanooti	PC					√
Salah						√
Issam Siraj	PC					√
Yasser Bushnaq	PC, IAP					√
Mohamed Abbas	PC					√

GOVERNMENT EXHIBIT
Philly Meeting Summary
3:04-CR-240-G
U.S. v. HLF, et al.

Exhibit 3

[UM]	Unidentified Male.
[UI]	Unintelligible.
[NFI]	Not Further Identified.
(LNU)	Last name unknown.
[*Italics*]	Translator's comments.
[...]	Incomplete sentence.

Sh = Shukri Abu Baker
Om = Omar Ahmad
Gh = Ghassan Elashi
Gh2 = Ghassan (LNU)
Ss = Sheik Sharif
Ga = Gawad (LNU)
Ab = Abdel Salam (LNU)
Ak = Akram (LNU)
Au = Abou Usama (NFI)
As = Abdel Halim Al Ashqar (Aboul Hasan)
Aa = Abou Ahmad (NFI)
Aj = Abdel Jabbar
Ab2 = Abou Bassem (NFI)
Mu = Muin (LNU)
Ar = Abdel Rahman
Ni = Nihad (LNU)
Os = Osama (NFI)

Audio file: MTGB_19931002_15.WAV

Ak: ...over night. In the near future, he might surprise you with something new which leaves unable to determine what to do. That would happen if you adopt a point of view which is hostile to the agreement only because it didn't bring about a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza...UI in the [*West*] Bank and Gaza. And what are you going to say? We stick to the fundamentals of our cause which is our complete rights in the entire land of Palestine. How are we going to present them is something different but, we don't have to abandon them and sell out in the same way as the [*Palestinian Liberation*] Organization was thinking a while back, for instance. Let's remain..., we know that they are not going to give up anything. We just keep saying the West Bank and Gaza and we will win the media war because they are not going to give us anything. Let them give you something.

GOVERNMENT
EXHIBIT
Philly Meeting - 4
3:04-CR-240-G
U.S. v. HLF, et al.

You had to make concessions after concessions until you got the minimum. We shouldn't commit mistake and say that they won't give us a state. Ok, what if they did? Are we going to look for a different justification why we oppose the agreement? No. We should be clear in our position regarding Palestine, either with an American person, a Palestinian person, an Arab person or a Muslim person. We might give one of them more details than the other but, we shouldn't abandon our right in '48 Palestine because, by God, America won't accept it. On the contrary, the Americans respect someone who has a point of view which he holds on to and don't respect someone who wears a different color everyday and who doesn't take a position. The second thing is that we must know the future media strategy of the Jews in regards to the media campaign they will launch against us in America and even in Palestine itself. It is clear that the main enemy of the agreement right now is the Islamists. The other people don't have a public..., a weight like the Islamists and it is clear that the attack will be on the Islamists. In their minds, they have no one else to focus on other than the Islamists. Not only do they want a Jew to attack the Islamists, but also the entire world to march behind them to attack the Islamists as well. This will reflect on us here in America because, at the end, we will see that the American media - with the Jewish media in America and Palestine implied in it - discuss these issues and we will be forced to respond to an issue whenever one is raised. All of our positions will be reactions and they won't have...UI what are we expecting to happen, how to prepare for it so that we are not surprised with the unexpected every time. For example, there was a seminar at George Washington University a week ago about the Middle East process and terrorism, this was its title. They brought experts from...er, from the Center of Strategic International Studies, from the Near East Policies, from the Israeli embassy, the military attache and his deputy. I mean there were some people who were trying to present the Israeli point of view, mostly, about how the coming stage will be like. I just wanted to mention some of the points which they unanimously agreed on as these will be the points we will work on in the future. For example, instead of saying that terrorism now is... So that all of you are in the picture, they defined terrorism as anyone who is opposed to the agreement. You are against peace and a terrorist if you oppose the agreement. The issue of being opposed to the agreement as a point of view is no longer there with them. You are against peace. If you are opposed to peace, it means that it is Ok to slaughter you in any suitable manner they deem fit. They're trying to discuss this issue and how they are going to present it to the media in the future in order to discredit those who are opposed to peace. And the most important party they talk about is..., they didn't mask it like us and say Hossam and stuff. They were saying Hamas is our main goal in the next stage. [*laughter*]. So,...

UM1: You're quoting them.

Ak: Yes, that is what they said.

2

Sh: Quote unquote. He is quoting them. Don't you hear him?

Ak: They came up with some points some of which is that the near future will witness terrorism against the Palestinians. There was almost a complete accord that, in the next stage, the Jews are used to terrorism. It is not something strange to them. And the Americans are...UI and they deal with it. But, the Palestinian people..., the new arriving government is not used to terrorism and doesn't know how to deal with terrorism. It still doesn't have the experiences to deal with terrorism. [*UI brief group talk*]... against the agreement in Palestine. Therefore, this is something we ought to be ready for from now. There is always...UI how to address even the Americans and tell them that those who oppose the agreement do not oppose peace, for instance. We should address the American mentality which is one of their convictions they always preach saying that, for instance, the people who accepted the agreement and signed the agreement didn't get an authorization from the people, nor did they get an authorization from its organizations. I mean, some things like that in order to give credibility to people who oppose the agreement from now. You don't wait until the self-rule takes place and then you say, "By God, we are against the self-rule because it is not legal and stuff". No, you work on it from now in your media so that you give..., so that you prepare for the future opposition of the self rule which is about to take effect. You have to defend it as the real target is the Islamic Movement over there. This is the first thing. The second thing which must be focused on is that we must attempt to improve the living conditions of the Palestinians. This was unanimously agreed on by the Jews and the Americans. They're concerned with...UI over there. This is the only solution which might make the self rule successful. Therefore, we must focus on our rights in Palestine. Not only our economic rights. The people of Palestine don't have to sign an agreement so that their living conditions improve. Why is the entire infrastructure of the Palestinian people in tatters and its condition is that bad? Why don't we tie this condition..., why don't we tie this to the occupation? Why don't we say that this is a normal thing and that now because there is peace the living conditions of the Palestinians must improve. We try to bring to the surface not only the economic rights of the Palestinians. This is one thing. The...

UM1: Now, brothers...

Ak: Go ahead.

UM1: So, now the Algerian who is fighting in Algeria, the Egyptian who is fighting in Egypt, the Tunisian who is fighting in Tunisia, the Iraqi in Iraq and the Syrian in Syria and everywhere..., the legal status of their fighting is..., What? What I really want to say is that if we don't focus on the doctrinal and the Sharia issue we are not really presenting any new legitimacy for our work. If I clothe or feed a Palestinian or stuff this will not

silence the people of Islam and the people of faith from pursuing the cause.

Ak: This is what I mentioned at the beginning. Our undisputable rights.

UM1: I mean....,

Ak: I said that at the beginning. Our rights in Palestine don't have anything to do with any living conditions. We have undisputable rights in Palestine as Islamists. They don't change with the changing of the events.

UM1: But, our issue now is..., it is even a fundamental issue that blocking the Sharia of God, fighting Islam and confronting God the Almighty..., this is a grand issue. May it be good, God's willing.

Om: We are confronting the biggest enemy for Islam.

UM1: What?

Om: We in Palestine are confronting the biggest enemy of Islam. It is..., it is a two-sided enemy, an enemy of Islam and an enemy of...UI.

UM1: I'm not denying the partial rights. But, the grand issue we must focus on and the one we must teach people its aspects is the issue of belief and disbelief.

Om: Yes.

Sh: But, please allow me...

UM1: You taught us interruptions and objections. Why did you teach us that? [*laughter*].

Ak: There remains two points, two or three points. We must take advantage of the current situation. The media sees that we adopt the point of view of the Islamic Movement as I mentioned in the beginning. Therefore, we should try to publish some articles by representatives of the Islamic Movement in the U.S. papers. This is not something simple. Some believe that this is a marginal thing to do. Maybe so in the Orient. But, if we manage to reach the Western media, you reach a large audience through it even in the Orient itself. For example, Prince Hassan can publish an article as Prince Hassan, for instance. I believe that there is big desire in the American media, the famous outlets in America, to understand a point of view representing the Islamic Movement, or to read an article representing the Islamic Movement. Something about your opinion regarding the

agreement, for instance, or regarding any new developments which might occur. Why do we wait for people to ask us for an article in English when we know what they think? Why can't we write this article, show it to them, for instance, and if they approve it we send it in the person's name, in this person's name. We have the deportees, for instance, some of them are key figures and they..., for instance, ...UI in establishing the Movement here. Why can't we have them - being doctors and stuff - write the articles they want somehow and give them to the media to publish and say that this article represents the point of view of people who represent the Movement and not a personal point of view. This is just like when a researcher in American sends an article which they might or might not publish. This is what I'm thinking. The second thing is that we are approaching events we must be ready for like I mentioned. For instance, a little later Arafat will supposedly go back to the [*West*] Bank and take over. We are approaching events which will..., the media is interested in the issue and it will make new contacts and find out the opinion of those who are opposed. So, a day later or later on we will be thinking what are we supposed to do. I mean,...UI the agreement. We need to be ready for the day the media is interested again in the cause..., we must be ready to contact people in the media today, who...UI, who represents us, what are the organizations the media might contact in case...UI so that we are ready for these events. The other thing; there are preparations under way to compensate the refugees of '48 or '67 for their rights meaning, to forsake their land, sell their land in compensation for money. This is a decision which might be reached. So, why are we waiting for this decision to be made before we publish legal edicts, before we warn people that it is not permissible? Why can't we issue a statement now that any resolution reached by the United Nations or a joint Israeli-Palestinian committee to compensate the Palestinians for their rights is legally not permissible, that selling the land is a treason. Why are waiting for...UI before we take action. By then, those who want to consent will have consented and those who want to fill out applications will have filled out applications. Right now, you have time to mobilize the public and manage your affairs in anticipation of what is going to happen in the future. Therefore, I believe there are a lot of expectations. We can expect two or three options to happen in the future; ...UI at the media level at least if not at the public level. Like our brother Shukri mentioned, I would like to stress that we should discredit Arafat in the eyes of the Palestinian people and in the eyes of the American people and we have a good case. We must know that. We should ...UI about him; about his management of the [*Palestinian Liberation*] Organization during the time it was an organization, about political assassinations which they used to commit. Of course, these things are not going to result in people changing their view of him but, they will give you some credit in the future as an opposing party to the agreement. We don't oppose the person who is democratic. We don't oppose a person who is peace-loving, we oppose a person who is a criminal. This is what I have...[*UI brief group talk*]. Opposition can also be done by writing about some of its figures, by writing about their personal biographies and

educational levels so that people get an idea about the opposition that it is not a primitive movement. It is a sophisticated thing. This issue is important not only to...UI, but also to the Palestinian people and public activism and media activism.

Sh: May God reward you well. May God reward you well. May God reward you well. Regarding the media doctrinal address, I believe that it requires caution. What is the shape and the form of the address. Our address in the doctrinal aspect might be a rock. We climb atop the rock and say "Save Jerusalem". Jerusalem in particular appeals to the Muslims and I don't think it appeals to the Muslims as much as it appeals to an infidel. When there is a..., allow me,... When there is a reference regarding...., regarding a mosque..., I mean, how much does the Kaaba's pulpit appeal to you? As a pulpit? Too much focus on Jerusalem and overlooking the sanctity of the rest of Palestine brings about, in my opinion, a negative result with people [*thinking that*] it is Ok that the remainder of Palestine is lost as long as Jerusalem has a special status. We must focus on the sanctity of all of Palestine, all of Palestine including Jerusalem. I believe that Muslims generally are not going to feel the credibility..., the Islamic aspect of the cause of Palestine until we see an Pakistani brother raising the Palestinian banner an defending it, or the Algerian, the Libyan or the non-Palestinian. This thing must come to the surface of the earth. We must find non-Palestinians spearheading Palestinian activism. Otherwise, it won't materialize meaning that it will not be convincing. People will still see us within a certain nationalistic circle. I believe that the role of the [*Islamic*] Association [*for Palestine*] is that we must try to make Islamic leaders who adopt the cause of Palestine with the same force we adopted it with. They adopt it from a very clear Islamic aspect as their countrymen would believe this talk. I believe a segment of Muslims believe that we are commercialize the Islamic aspect of the Palestinian cause for our nationalist interest. We tell them that Jerusalem is lost and stuff and they tell you lost it..., who lost it? You lost Palestine. And you want me to bring it back to you? This is one. The second thing is: why do we want to discuss the Islamic aspect of the cause in a very narrow sense. I fear that if we keep saying that our struggle is Islamic, our struggle Islamic, our struggle is doctrinal we void the... There is a nationalistic aspect for the Palestinian cause. There is a certain characteristic. There is a land that is lost, rights that are lost. Even if it weren't Jews who violated them, even if they were Barbarians, if they were Arabs and Muslims, certain rights still remain outside the scope of the religious conflict. Let me be clear. In this manner you are showing - as Israel claims- that your conflict with Israel is no different from the conflict of the Islamists in Algeria, in Tunisia or in Egypt. It is the same conflict. It is an attempt to impose fundamentalism in the region and that there are no nationalistic rights there. It is just a conflict of Islamists trying to impose the Islamic state by force and among those [*countries*] is Israel. Of course, this no different from Egypt, Libya and Algeria. I say, no. We must defend nationalistic rights as nationalistic rights, as any human who has a right to live in the shadow of a homeland and it is true

6

there is an Islamic aspect to this cause but, too much talking about an Islamic aspect is not going to do us good as long as we are unable to recruit the children of the Islamic community for our cause, for instance. As long you find yourself in a certain situation where a Pakistani brother tells you "O brother, yesterday you collected money for Palestine. Why didn't you collect money for the Indians?". This means that he doesn't understand the dimension at all. He doesn't understand why do I focus on the Palestinian cause. He will tell you "Yes, you're taking advantage of the religion just for what...". Like they sometimes say..., these guys take advantage of the Palestinian brothers, sometimes they say that, when they want something, they go up to the pulpit and talk about Islam and stuff just because they want money or something. This means that the Islamic dimension hasn't taken its scope on the field and he doesn't believe that... [*break in recording*]... that the Palestinians speak... [*break in recording*]... and that I live for him. But, he must carry the same religious aspect with the same zeal I do otherwise, it will remain words on paper.

UM1: Allow me a question [*break in recording*]...

Om: Are you going to discuss the subject...

UM1: No, by God. [*Break in recording*]... I don't want to talk. [*Break in recording*]... I'm amazed, amazed... The issue of Palestine is..., Jerusalem is an issue, the issue of Palestine as a holy land I don't believe this thing. I speak as one of us, a Muslim.

UM2: What is that talk, Sheik?

UM1: I will explain this to you and...UI. The Quran also spoke about Mecca [*saying*] "And warn the Mother of Villages and its surroundings", meaning that the call of prophet, God's prayers and peace be upon him, reached where? "Its surroundings" is where the call of Islam is the surroundings.

Sh: Fine.

UM1: So, the issue then is not an issue of land. The issue is where the call reaches.

Ni: It is still a holy land because...UI.

UM1: Yes, I say it is known where the holy land is, "The one God has assigned to you...".

Ni: Palestine.

UM1: No. It is not true. The holy land is Jerusalem.

Ni: Only?

UM1: Yes, my brother. And also the word "holy"..., there is another point, the word "holy" means holy in regards to revelations, messengers and the call. I don't have..., this is not the issue but, when someone comes to me and tells me "All of the land of Palestine is a holy land and all Muslims must go out to fight for it". I say that this slogan is not clear. I agree with you that all Muslims are responsible for any injustice befalls Muslims. Therefore, I tell the Indian, the Pakistani and so forth "You must support me in my cause just like he supports any Muslim brother in a Muslim cause". This is one issue. The second issue is that..., that if we stand up to address people in a way which they perceive as a nationalistic or stuff..., this is not correct. We must stress that our problem..., our problem will be there if we discuss the cause from pure political angles. As long as we focus on the Islamic aspect of the cause, the Indian, the Pakistani, the Malaysian and others will react to it.

Ni: How do you point out the Islamic aspect of the cause.

UM1: What?

Ni: How do you point out the Islamic aspect of the cause if you say that the holy land is not all of Palestine but just Jerusalem and that this cause is not a cause of land and that people will say that this is a nationalistic cause...

UM1: I really believe..., I really think..., by God my belief is that...

Ni: It is a question. I'm asking how could you explain the...

UM1: I'm answering you. My brother, my creed is..., the cause of Palestine, the cause of Palestine with its dimension and status is a central cause for the entire Islamic nation. Study history and you will see that the Ottoman empire collapsed and then the Palestinian cause began. Now, the solution to the Palestinian cause won't happen unless the other countries surrounding it are liberated. As long as these regimes are existing and lying heavily, there won't be a solution to the cause of Palestine. By God, this is my creed. Therefore, we must adopt the Islamic cause in its collective dimension and stress this issue by saying that it pertains to Jerusalem and that it pertains to an injustice for the nation. There is no doubt. Other than that, I have nothing. The cause of..., I never discussed the cause of Palestine one day from the land angle alone. Land is a part of the injustice and man fights in defense of his property and etc. But, the grand issue is the

issue of a nation. Yes. And I went to Pakistan in '67 and I found that people were crying when whatever part of Palestine fell including Jerusalem. Also, the issue of Jerusalem is not an issue the Jews will not abandon by any means as long as they have existence and entity on the land of Palestine. That's it.

Om: There is a quick word.

UM2: Go ahead.

Om: Senator Patrick Leahy..., Moyenham said on the day the agreement was signed..., he said "Now, World War I has ended". He said "Now, World War I has ended..."

UM1: Moyenham?

Om: Patrick Moyenham.

UM1: Patrick what? Moyenham, this is New York.

Om: New York. He is a Senator from New York.

UM1: Oh, yeah. He is Jewish.

Om: I don't know if he is Jewish. I don't think so.

UM1: I think he is gay [*laughter*].

Om: He says, "Now, after we signed the agreement...", he says "Now, World War I has ended". By "now" he is referring to the Ottoman empire and stuff".

Ni: Because it carried out the Belfore's Pledge.

[*UI group talk*].

Ga: I have two things. First, I hope we don't start discussing issues which lead us to other points [*laughter*]... because...UI and I believe we need to finish. I mean I don't believe there is a...UI we don't agree on and the path of the Movement is one and there is no other. Just to be in the picture.

Ni: The path of the Movement...UI.

Ga: It is a different path from what he talked about. This is just the issue is bright as the sun.

UM2: What Movement?

Ga: Hamas..., the Samah Movement [*laughter*]. I mean Samah. Anyway, the path is really somewhat different. There is no disagreement over the fundamentals but, as far as the second thing, the nationalistic aspect, there is no doubt that the system of the Movement is very...UI. Therefore, from the latest events, it was proven very clearly to us that the effective circle in world politics as far as the Palestinian cause is concerned is the Palestinian circle. The truth is now final. Work on the Palestinian front. Hold on to the Palestinian front and they will deal with you even if he doesn't want to. It is not his choice. It is yours.

Om: What is the goal from the war? Isn't it the liberation of Palestine? Come on. How are you going to liberate Palestine?

UM2: Through Jihad.

Om: Who is going to carry out Jihad? The Palestinians only are the ones who will go to Jihad against a national occupation. Do you think that...UI

Ga: Yes, it is possible that...UI. Nothing is taken for granted. The issue of impossible and impossible factors is...

Sh: This is political talk.

Ga: Anyway, this is what I meant. This way we won't go into many side issues.

UM2: Yes, yes. Fine.

Ga: But to talk about impossibilities and absolute assumptions..., I used to speak in this manner and the experience taught me that I was wrong. Politics taught me that it is not right to say such stuff. These are absolutes we learned just from books but, in reality, things are different on the ground...

UM1: I will talk the political talk.

Ga: They were proven..., they were proven wrong. Therefore, these things are subject to discussion. That's it.

Om: Is what you say really the point of view of the Movement?

Ga: No. The Sheik is saying that the Movement...

UM1: Let's stay on our point because things are drifting away.

Om: The point of view of the Movement mentioned by brother Abou Ayoub is not accurate. The Movement still talks about the Islamic aspect of the cause and we must...

Ga: No, this is not the issue...UI. The Sheik is saying that all of Palestine is holy, the Movement is saying that the entire land is holy. On the contrary, we say that it is an endowment and not just holy. There is a Saying that goes...[*UI followed by UI comment and laughter*]. This is...UI and the Movement is going on that direction. The other direction which is saying that we can liberate Palestine by the Islamic nations only is not agreed upon....UI.

Om: But, the Movement has not made a decision that the nationalistic current is the one which will liberate Palestine and that the Islamic current is not...UI.

[*Brief UI group talk*].

Sh: This is not the topic, our brothers.

[*Brief UI group talk*].

Ga: ...I say that establishing the Islamic state is not...UI its current shape. This is just so that we are clear...UI.

UM2: Is this the last point?

Ga: I mean, on condition that the Islamic leadership...UI in order to liberate Palestine...UI neither internal or external.

Ni: The matters needs clarification. This is his opinion. Yes, right.

[*Brief UI group talk*].

Gh: You have a presentation to make.

Ga: Something other than the presentation. Other than the presentation.

11

UM2: There is just a remark about what our brother Abou Ratib said. Go ahead.

Ni: This is in regards to remaining steadfast to the principles and...UI in regards to remaining steadfast on the principles and the fact that people always look... I mean, the reason the situation changed is that, during the first part of the year when the incident of the World Trade Center happened and people were looking at..., looking at the Islamic organizations. We were holding onto principles, Islamic principles as an Islamic organization. After the signing of the agreement we remained steadfast to the principles in the statements and the releases we made. This gave credibility to the [*Islamic*] Association [*for Palestine*], it gave popularity to the [*Islamic*] Association [*for Palestine*]. I mean, the ADC..., I will give you an example. The ADC..., one of the things which increased its [*Membership*] numbers is during the Gulf war because it sided with the Arab community against the FBI and...UI. During the Gulf war, no one was able to open his mouth. Everyone was worried about himself. Then the ADC was mobilized because this was an issue for it as an organization to handle. It was then that Zoghby stood up very proudly and said "We came a long way, baby" as it appeared on all the networks. That was because they adopted an issue and moved with it even though they were the only ones on the front. The same thing applies to the [*Islamic*] Association [*for Palestine*]; remaining steadfast to the doctrinal principles we follow is the one thing which gives it credibility with the public.

UM2: Are there any other remarks? Ok, we will listen to the second presentation by... Is it by Abdel Rahman or Nihad?

Om: In the name of God, the Beneficent, the Merciful. Thanks be to God, prayers and peace be upon God's messenger and upon all of his family and supporters. To proceed, I was..., this is not the first meeting to take place to study the future of Islamic activism for Palestine in North America. A meeting was held before in August...

Ni: In July.

Om: In July?

Ni: July 14.

Om: July 14, before all of these problems happened. I had prepared a paper I didn't submit. I was supposed to discuss it. I had two things in my mind; in order to strengthen the Islamic activism for Palestine in North America we must do the two things; widening the Muslims' circle of influence and reducing the Jews' circle of influence. Based on that, I placed a lot of..., a lot of... I said that in order to strengthen Islamic activism for Palestine

in North America we must do the two things. They are, first of all, widening the Muslims' circle of influence and reducing the Jews' circle of influence. I assumed that Islamic activism for Palestine in North America won't get stronger unless Muslims are strong. The nature of this country is that you cannot work unless you are strong; have money, relationships and certain tools for pressure. If you know how to talk but don't have tools for pressure your words are futile. Based on this study I concluded three things and they were almost discussed. They are: having organizations which include media and research department, another for politics and public relations and the third department is concerned with money and law. Each one of these [*departments*] has certain goals. But, after what happened, we changed the title to "The future of Islamic activism for Palestine in North America in light of the peace developments". I repeat here that any organization which seeks to do activism here in America must be very strong. Its main goal should to become strong. This is the... The goals sought by the Islamic activism for Palestine are six goals, I believe. First, making the Islamic position regarding Palestine the strongest position and the most supported between Muslims in general and Palestinians in particular. I mean, for Muslims in general and Palestinian the Islamic position should be the one they adopt and stick to. The second thing is to have the position of the Islamic Association for Palestine in regards to anything that has to do with Palestine the position which is adopted by Muslims and Islamic organizations. It should also be the position heard by non-Muslims. I mean, when a Muslim person or an Islamic organization adopt a position regarding the Gaza-Jericho agreement, for instance, the position of the [*Islamic*] Association [*for Palestine*] should be the adopted one. Here is the organization which represents the point of view of Muslims in regards to Palestine. The other thing is that should the outside media or any foreign organization want to find out the point of view of Muslims, they would ask us and not any other entity. This is my second goal. The third goal is mobilizing the Palestinian and the Islamic community to support the Islamic project in Palestine and Islamic activism for Palestine in North America. This means that it is not enough that we provide awareness to the community. We must mobilize it to support the Islamic project in Palestine over there and then support Islamic activism for Palestine also in North America. These are the ones which we..., which we must pay a lot of attention to. This is one of the results of awareness of media activism. The fourth issue is increasing financial support for the kinsmen in the Occupied Territories in Palestine in general or even as we said today for Palestinians living elsewhere such as Lebanon, Syria and Jordan or wherever. I am not going to speak about this issue in this presentation because I believe it was discussed extensively. There were special sessions dedicated for it. The fifth goal is to form a lobby to pressure the Palestinian decision-makers abroad. This is a long-term goal. I mean, we must really be strong and have a large base but I believe it is a reasonable goal for us to adopt for the long-run. The last goal is enhancing and developing methods of activism. This one relates to the organizations. These are six goals. How are we going to carry them out? There are five fields; the first way is the

media. The second field is the field of politics and public relations, public activism, our financial strength and strengthening our organizations. God's willing, I will be talking briefly about each one of these fields. In regards to the media field...er, this form of activism seeks to make the tools of the Islamic Association for Palestine such as Al Zaytouna and the Muslim World Monitor or other researches which we make and public the main and the popular source of information about Palestine among the Palestinian and the Muslim community. I mean, we don't want us to be the [*Islamic*] Association [*for Palestine*] while we see Muslims read papers from other people. It is possible that there will be [*other papers*] but they are not going to be the dominant or the ones which are widespread between the people. The main reason for that is to wipe illiteracy among Muslims in regards to the political reality and the conspiracies against Palestine. The biggest catastrophe we learned from this agreement is that Muslims totally ignore what happened. They didn't read the agreement or listened to news. They saw some headlines and they cheered and celebrated like other people did. So, if we don't reach them, this deeply-rooted ignorance will rule them and they will become our enemies and we start working on them instead of us working on the Americans and others. This will happen by enhancing both newspapers, boosting their distribution and propagating them, and by making sure our researchers and news reach the audience and the influential people like people who are the imams of mosques and those in charge of mosque, those who can receive the news and distribute it. We have to make sure that he received our research and our news. I believe this is on going on now but we must make it stronger. The second goal for media activism is broadcasting the Islamic point of view in U.S. media. The first goal was relating to activism among Muslims and Palestinians but we must broadcast our point of view in U.S. media. There is a very good reason for that which is bringing the voice of the Islamists to the surface, keeping them informed and explaining their positions in order to ease the severity of allegations of radicalism and other things. This will also make our position known to Muslims and sympathizers whom we cannot reach via our media tools. So, the first thing is that if we don't go out and talk about our position people like Thomas Friedman and others will rise to attack the Islamists. This will happen if we don't stand up and speak about our positions. So, we must take this initiative and express our position. This will limit the allegations of radicalism. I mean, when Nihad appeared on CNN and talked in the way he spoke, this greatly reduces the severity of allegations of radicalism. The other thing which is the same thing brother Akram said is that when Muslims see these things they will be encouraged. For instance, we were conducting interviews for local TV in our locality, these were not for the Americans but for the Muslims in or locality who don't understand. When they see that there are Muslims like you who stand up you become a sort of a supporter for them and a motive for them to stand up. This can be achieved by being open to the various media outlets..., media outlets, and broadcasting news such as INN organization which is already part of the [*Islamic*] Association [*for Palestine*], the Islamic News Network...er.

We can also use the people who agree with our opinion. I mean, if you have someone like Edward Said and someone like that... We have a brother in our region whose name Sabri Kaoush, a member of the National Assembly. He is very light Islamist. But he is a man who has a lot of information, he is retired and understands. Bring him on and let him demonstrate and explain things. There is no problem with that. He will assist you, help you out. So, we must not be shy and timid. Any newspaper or any radio which seek your opinion you should stand up and talk but learn how to talk. And I believe if you stand up and talk is what benefits you. But if you kept silent in this country they will toss you any way they want. The third goal of the media is producing researches, collecting information and providing them to those concerned and publishing them in order to make scholarly research and information which support our position available to those concerned with our cause. Also, preparing studies which define a method for dealing and address which suits the American political and media atmosphere. We now have a research organization which is UASR, for instance. But UASR organization does not help us in Palestinian activism in America unless with very little. We don't have an organization which conducts research for us on how to address the American society, how to deal with the U.S. organizations. So, I believe research is a very important thing. Also, people in the studies and research centers don't benefit a lot from a newspaper alone. He wants to see if you wrote an analysis or something like that for him. And I believe that the brothers..., the existing organizations, Dr. Yousef, do not negate the need for a research or a research center which we direct for activism in America. The fourth and the last goal of media activism is strengthening our influence in the educational organizations and particularly universities and studies centers. This is also a long-term goal but a plan must be put in place by the concerned brothers to specify the means through which we have a heard voice in these universities. This might begin by holding seminars to which we invite teachers in... Most prominent universities have teachers and have college for political science, Middle Eastern studies. You have research centers specialized in Palestine. You can invite them and hold a seminar or a conference for them and engage them, at least, through your opinion and show them that you really adopt an opinion based on a scientific things, that you are not a radical, that you are balanced and have research and stuff like that. The problem and the catastrophe here in America is that the majority of the people who go to work for the U.S. government graduate from these universities from under professors who are under very strong Jewish influence. I mean you won't find one professor speaking in a classroom in a way which might harm Israel or praise the Palestinians unless the Jewish students in the university make an issue of him and bring a person from the Consulate or a Jewish person to respond. Therefore, our goal is to be... But this is a..., a long-term goal. Regarding the second issue which is political activism and public relations, the goal of this activism is to make the position of the [*Islamic*] Association [*for Palestine*] in regards of issues relating to Palestine the adopted position. This is one of the general goals...UI the Muslims and the Islamic organizations.

There is a very good reason for that. It is in order to unify the forces..., the position of the Islamic forces in a unified activism program for Palestine. If the positions of the Islamic organizations started to contradict, which is what is currently happening as the [*Islamic*] Association [*for Palestine*] is saying one thing, the AMC is saying one thing, MAS is saying another thing and they say that the Pakistanis are talking about moon sighting and everyone is saying something different, when there is such a contradiction in the positions of the different Islamic organizations it will weaken the Islamic position in regards to Palestine a great deal. Then we as the [*Islamic*] Association [*for Palestine*], as people who are responsible for Islamic activism for Palestine that there is a state of great weakness and acute frailty in our position because we then...UI our position with Muslims. Therefore, we must be careful that the positions of Muslims remain the same. This unified program should mobilize Muslims for the Islamic project through the unity of logic and direction. If the thinking of Muslims is unified with you their mobilization will be easy. You tell them "Coordinate with me. All of Palestine is for Muslims. You coordinate with me that our position regarding Gaza-Jericho is so and so. How about you and me hold this seminar, this conference, this donation". This can be done through notifying the organizations of our position in a continuous and clear manner and establishing official and personal with them and giving them a role in determining the Islamic position in regards to Palestine and the appropriate method of address in America. This is the outcome of experience. You must first tell them what is our position. It is not enough that we wait for someone to call us and ask us "By God, what is your position in the issue", or wait for us. No, we go to him, make the initiative and tell him "Our position is like that; one, two, three, four". And we should make sure, make sure that he got the message and understands it so that when he stands up to talk he wouldn't say stuff we didn't mean by our statements. There should also be personal and official relationships between us and them. This means that we should a personal relationship between us and the guy who is in charge of that organization. And also an official relationship in our capacity as the [*Islamic*] Association [*for Palestine*], we should have mutual positions where we supported him in positions. This is America all over; organizations with interests. They should also be partners in determining the Islamic position for Palestine. It is not enough that we say "By God, my position is so and so. Go ahead, adopt this position and go on". You must make him a partner in the decision, present to him and discuss it. You then stay with them to write the final wording of the position. And I believe that this work must be done. This might not be a fast way to do it but, in the future, there could be certain mechanism to unify the Islamic position in all of America. As for the organizations which want to dissent from the Islamic position for personal interests or out of fear... I mean, there are Islamic organizations such as the AMC and others which want to dissent from the Islamic position, either for personal interests, to promote itself, or for fear. We must pressure them and embarrass them by various means until they adhere to our position or, at least, remain neutral. This is something..., Maher


16


Hathout said that thing when we were at the...UI. He said "If the Palestinians say this and that we are with them". If the Palestinians abandoned Palestine you must speak up as an Islamist. He said "But you Palestinians say this and that and there are pressures on us and stuff". I told him "If you are under pressure then stay silent. You don't have to say yes or no. Just stay silent and remain neutral". We shouldn't let these people...., these people splinter the unity of the Islamic Palestinian front. Thus, we should pressure them by various means until they either adhere to our position or remain neutral. Also, forming a lobby for the decision-makers abroad. This is also a very important thing. It is a long-term goal. This can be achieved through our popular, political, financial and media strength in America. I mean, when we are strong like I said in the beginning, I can be a means for pressure on them but if we are weak and we don't have an Islamic community, we don't have influence over the Congress or the organizations such as the ADC, ...UI and others people won't pay attention to us. This will also bolster our position in America with the U.S. Administration and other media and political organizations. If we are strong we can influence what they decide over there, for instance. If Yasser Arafat were to think twice before he does something in America because he worries about the Islamic community in America it would give us some sort of credit with the U.S. Administration or media outlets...UI in addition to the fact that it reinforces the position of the pro-Islamic solution for Palestine abroad and lessens the danger those who surrendered. When we are strong, people who are against surrender will see that they have a large community in America which supports them financially and stands with them. It pressures the other people which reinforces their position. This is the thing..., the thing brother Gawad spoke about. He said that it won't be achieved unless we are strong in this country. The other thing is in regards to political activism is lessening the animosity of America and the West to Muslims and to Palestinians, in particular because pressure now is not only on Muslims but they focus on the term Palestinian-Islamic such as Mohamed Salam and others. I mean they focus on the fact that this guy is Palestinian and an Islamist because the Jews' target is the Palestinian individual. Also, strengthening the influence with Congress or other than the Congress. This is also one of the long-term goals but we have started to do some things about it. This can be achieved by infiltrating the American media outlets, universities and research centers as we previously said. It is also achieved by working with Islamic political organizations and the sympathetic ones such as..., you have now many emerging Islamic organizations, such as the American Muslim Alliance, such as the United Muslims of America, MPAC and AIPAC and others. All of those try to...UI and recruit Muslims to engage in political activism in America and I think that it is our mission to assist them because if Muslims engage in political activism in America and started to be concerned with Congress and public relations we will have an entry point to use them to pressure Congress and the decision-makers in America.

****

END OF RECORDING.

Exhibit 4


CAMERA 1
ROLL #21
[redacted]
12/04/93
1-21-1
ASH464
GOVERNMENT
EXHIBIT
Ashqar Search - 4
3:04-CR-240-G
U.S. v. HLF, et al.



الجلسة الثانية : العمل الخيري واستغلاله في ضوء المتغيرات
منذ [illegible] بعد الظهر
الأوراق المقدمة
- [illegible]
- [illegible]
- شكل
- [illegible]
مدير الجلسة : آزم

الجلسة الثالثة : العمل الإنساني / الإغاثي / الجماهيري / العلاقات العامة في مجال الأزمات
المستقبل والتحديات منذ الساعة (٩ - ١١)
الأوراق المقدمة:
- كا - [illegible]
- [illegible]
- كا - [illegible]
- كا - [illegible]
- كا - آزم
-

مدير الجلسة : [illegible]

1-21-21

ASH484 2

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

ندوة مستقبل العمل الإسلامي لفلسطين في اربيا الشمالية
٢-٣ اكتوبر ١٩٩٢

[١] اهداف الندوة

- تحديد استراتيجيات وسياسات وهياكل العمل الإسلامي لفلسطين في اربيا الشمالية في المجالات القريبة والبعيدة في جوانبه التالية
  - العمل السياسي والعلاقات العامة
  - العمل الجماهيري
  - العمل الخيري
  - العمل الإعلامي

[٢] اداء الندوة

تنقسم الندوة الى اربعة جلسات خلال يومي السبت والاحد بحيث يتم عقد الدورة العادية وتوزيعها على ثلاثة جلسات يوم السبت وتكون الجلسة الصباحية مباشرة للواجب والخروج بالنتائج والاتفاق على كيفية التنفيذ.

الجلسة الاولى : الوضع السياسي العام وانعكاساته على العمل في اربيا
السبت - الفترة الصباحية

الدورة العادية
-
- حوار + ابو الكسب
-

مدير الجلسة : [illegible]

1-21-22

ASH485 3

ASH484-485

In the name of God, the Beneficent, the Merciful

Future of Islamic Action for Palestine in North America seminar
2-3 October 1993

1) Seminar goals:
* Determining the strategies, policies and frames of Islamic activism for Palestine in North America in the near and far stages in its following aspects:
- Political action and public relations.
- Popular action
- Charitable action
- Media action

2) Seminar moderation:
The seminar will be divided into four sessions on Saturday and Sunday so that the presentation and distribution of papers is limited to three sessions on Saturday. The last session on Sunday is for review, drawing of conclusions and agreement on methods of execution.

The first session: The general political atmosphere and its reflections on action in America.
Saturday - morning period.
Presented papers:
- Sherif + Abdel Salam
- Jawad + Aboul Hasan
-
Session moderator: Shukri

Second session: Charity work and its future in light of the changes.
Afternoon period
Presented papers:
- Osama
- Muin
- Shukri
- Abou Bassem
Session moderator: Akram

4

ASH484-485 (Cont`d)

Third session: Political, media, popular action and public relations in North America, the future and the challenges (Evening period 6-11).

Presented papers:
- Ghassan [checked].
- Jawad
- Abdel Rahman [checked]
- Nihad [checked]
- Akram [checked]
-

Session moderator: Issam

Exhibit 5

An official website of the United States Government Here's how you know

Foreign Terrorist Organizations

BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM

Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) are foreign organizations that are designated by the Secretary of State in accordance with section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended. FTO designations play a critical role in our fight against terrorism and are an effective means of curtailing support for terrorist activities and pressuring groups to get out of the terrorism business.

Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations

Date Implemented	Name
September 10, 2026	**Los Tiguerones**
July 16, 2026	**Juarez Cartel, aka La Linea**
July 16, 2026	**Los Viagras**
July 2, 2026	**Chone Killers**
June 5, 2026	**Primeiro Comando da Capital**
June 5, 2026	**Comando Vermelho**
March 16, 2026	**Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood**
January 14, 2026	**Lebanese Muslim Brotherhood**
December 17, 2025	**Clan del Golfo**

Give Feedback

Cookie Settings

Date Implemented	Name
November 24, 2025	Cartel de los Soles
November 20, 2025	Antifa Ost, aka Hammerbande
November 20, 2025	Informal Anarchist Federation/International Revolutionary Front (FAI/FRI)
November 20, 2025	Armed Proletarian Justice
November 20, 2025	Revolutionary Class Self-Defense
September 24, 2025	Barrio 18
September 18, 2025	Harakat al-Nujaba (HAN)
September 18, 2025	Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS)
September 18, 2025	Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya (HAAA)
September 18, 2025	Kata'ib al-Imam Ali (KIA)
September 5, 2025	Los Choneros
September 5, 2025	Los Lobos
August 12, 2025	Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA)
May 5, 2025	Viv Ansanm
May 5, 2025	Gran Grif
March 5, 2025	Ansarallah
February 20, 2025	Cartel de Sinaloa
February 20, 2025	Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion (CJNG)
February 20, 2025	Cartel del Noreste
February 20, 2025	La Nueva Familia Michoacana
February 20, 2025	Cartel del Golfo (Gulf Cartel)

Date Implemented	Name
February 20, 2025	Carteles Unidos
February 20, 2025	Tren de Aragua
February 20, 2025	Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13)
December 1, 2021	Segunda Marquetalia
December 1, 2021	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People's Army (FARC-EP)
March 11, 2021	ISIS-DRC
March 11, 2021	ISIS-Mozambique
January 14, 2021	Harakat Sawa'd Misr (HASM)
January 10, 2020	Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH)
April 15, 2019	Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
September 6, 2018	Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)
July 11, 2018	al-Ashtar Brigades
May 23, 2018	ISIS in the Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS)
February 28, 2018	ISIS-West Africa
February 28, 2018	ISIS-Philippines
February 28, 2018	ISIS-Bangladesh
August 17, 2017	Hizbul Mujahideen (HM)
July 1, 2016	al-Qa'ida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
May 20, 2016	ISIS-Libya
January 14, 2016	Islamic State's Khorasan Province (ISIS-K)
September 30, 2015	Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al Naqshabandi (JRTN)
April 10, 2014	ISIS-Sinai Province (formerly Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis) — ISIL Sinai Province Amendment (September 30, 2015)
January 13, 2014	Ansar al-Shari'a in Benghazi
January 13, 2014	Ansar al-Shari'a in Darnah
January 13, 2014	Ansar al-Shari'a in Tunisia
December 19, 2013	al-Mulathamun Battalion, aka al-Murabitoun

Date Implemented	Name
November 14, 2013	Ansaru
November 14, 2013	Boko Haram
March 22, 2013	Ansar al-Dine (AAD)
September 19, 2012	Haqqani Network (HQN)
May 30, 2012	Abdallah Azzam Brigades — Marwan Hadid Brigades Amendment (November 2, 2017)
March 13, 2012	Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT)
September 19, 2011	Indian Mujahedeen (IM)
May 23, 2011	Army of Islam (AOI)
November 4, 2010	Jaysh al-Adl (formerly Jundallah) — Jaysh al-Adl Amendment (July 2, 2019)
September 1, 2010	Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
August 6, 2010	Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HUJI)
January 19, 2010	al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) — Ansar al-Shari'a Amendment (October 5, 2012)
July 2, 2009	Kata'ib Hizballah (KH)
May 18, 2009	Revolutionary Struggle (RS)
March 18, 2008	al-Shabaab — al-Hijra Amendment (August 1, 2018)
March 5, 2008	Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B)
June 17, 2005	Islamic Jihad Union (IJU)
December 17, 2004	ISIS (formerly al-Qa'ida in Iraq) — Islamic State of Iraq Amendment (January 26, 2012) — al-Hayat Media Center and Amaq News Agency Amendments (March 22, 2019)
July 13, 2004	Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)
March 22, 2004	Ansar al-Islam (AAI)
January 30, 2003	Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ)

Date Implemented	Name
October 23, 2002	Jemaah Islamiya (JI)
August 9, 2002	Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army (CPP/NPA)
March 27, 2002	al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (formerly Salafist Group for Call and Combat) — AQIM Amendment (February 20, 2008)
March 27, 2002	Asbat al-Ansar (AAA)
March 27, 2002	Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMB)
December 26, 2001	Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) — Tehrik-e-Tahafuz Qibla Awwal, Tehrik-e-Hurmat-e-Rasool, and Al-Anfal Trust Amendments (June 26, 2014) — Al Muhammadia Students Amendment (December 30, 2016) — Tehreek-e-Azadi-e-Kashmir and Milli Muslim League Amendments (April 4, 2018) — The Resistance Front Amendment (July 18, 2025)
December 26, 2001	Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM)
May 16, 2001	New Irish Republican Army (formerly Real IRA) — New IRA Amendment (June 30, 2023)
September 25, 2000	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
October 8, 1999	al-Qa'ida (AQ)
October 8, 1997	Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
October 8, 1997	HAMAS
October 8, 1997	Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM) — Ansar ul-Ummah Amendment (August 8, 2014)
October 8, 1997	Hizballah
October 8, 1997	Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)
October 8, 1997	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
October 8, 1997	National Liberation Army (ELN)
October 8, 1997	Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)
October 8, 1997	Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
October 8, 1997	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
October 8, 1997	PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC)

Date Implemented	Name
October 8, 1997	Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)
October 8, 1997	Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, SL)

Delisted Foreign Terrorist Organizations

Date Removed	Name	Date Originally Listed
July 8, 2025	al-Nusrah Front, aka Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (ANF/HTS)	May 15, 2014
May 20, 2022	Aum Shinrikyo (AUM)	October 8, 1997
May 20, 2022	Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)	October 8, 1997
May 20, 2022	Gama'a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group – IG)	October 8, 1997
May 20, 2022	Kahane Chai (Kach)	October 8, 1997
May 20, 2022	Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem (MSC)	August 20, 2014
December 1, 2021	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)	October 8, 1997
February 16, 2021	Ansarallah	January 19, 2021
June 1, 2017	Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)	October 8, 1997
December 9, 2015	Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)	December 17, 2004
September 3, 2015	Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17N)	October 8, 1997
July 15, 2014	United Self Defense Forces of Colombia	September 10, 2001
May 28, 2013	Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM)	October 11, 2005
September 28, 2012	Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK)	October 8, 1997
October 15, 2010	Armed Islamic Group (GIA)	October 8, 1997

Date Removed	Name	Date Originally Listed
May 18, 2009	Revolutionary Nuclei	October 8, 1997
October 8, 2001	Tupac Amaru Revolution Movement	October 8, 1997
October 8, 2001	Japanese Red Army	October 8, 1997
October 8, 1999	Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front Dissidents	October 8, 1997
October 8, 1999	Khmer Rouge	October 8, 1997
October 8, 1999	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine -Hawatmeh Faction	October 8, 1997

Identification

The Bureau of Counterterrorism in the State Department (CT) continually monitors the activities of terrorist groups active around the world to identify potential targets for designation. When reviewing potential targets, CT looks not only at the actual terrorist attacks that a group has carried out, but also at whether the group has engaged in planning and preparations for possible future acts of terrorism or retains the capability and intent to carry out such acts.

Designation

Once a target is identified, CT prepares a detailed “administrative record,” which is a compilation of information, typically including both classified and open sources information, demonstrating that the statutory criteria for designation have been satisfied. If the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury, decides to make the designation, Congress is notified of the Secretary’s intent to designate the organization and given seven days to review the designation, as the INA requires. Upon the expiration of the seven-day waiting period and in the absence of Congressional action to block the designation, notice of the designation is published in the Federal Register, at which point the designation takes effect. By law an organization designated as an FTO may seek judicial review of the designation in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit not later than 30 days after the designation is published in the Federal Register.

Until recently the INA provided that FTOs must be redesignated every 2 years or the designation would lapse. Under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), however, the redesignation requirement was replaced by certain review and revocation procedures. IRTPA provides that an FTO may file a petition for revocation 2 years after its designation date (or in the case of redesignated FTOs, its most recent redesignation date) or 2 years after the determination date on its most recent petition for revocation. In order to provide a basis for revocation, the petitioning FTO must provide evidence that the circumstances forming the basis for the designation are sufficiently different as to warrant revocation. If no such review has been conducted during a 5 year period with respect to a designation, then the Secretary of State is required to review the designation to determine whether revocation would be appropriate. In addition, the Secretary of State may at any time revoke a designation upon a finding that the circumstances forming the basis for the designation have changed in such a manner as to warrant revocation, or that the national security of the United States warrants a revocation. The same procedural requirements apply to revocations made by the Secretary of State as apply to designations. A designation may be revoked by an Act of Congress, or set aside by a Court order.

Legal Criteria for Designation under Section 219 of the INA as amended

1. It must be a foreign organization.

2. The organization must engage in terrorist activity, as defined in **section 212 (a)(3)(B) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B))**,or terrorism, as defined in **section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2))**, or retain the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism.

3. The organization's terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests) of the United States.

Legal Ramifications of Designation

1. It is unlawful for a person in the United States or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to knowingly provide "material support or resources" to a designated FTO. (The term "material support or resources" is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) as " any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who maybe or include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious materials." 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(2) provides that for these purposes "the term 'training' means instruction or teaching designed to impart a specific skill, as opposed to general knowledge." 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(3) further provides that for these purposes the term 'expert advice or assistance' means advice or assistance derived from scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge."

2. Representatives and members of a designated FTO, if they are aliens, are inadmissible to and, in certain circumstances, removable from the United States (see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV)-(V), 1227 (a)(1)(A)).

3. Any U.S. financial institution that becomes aware that it has possession of or control over funds in which a designated FTO or its agent has an interest must retain possession of or control over the funds and report the funds to the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the U.S. Department of the Treasury.

Other Effects of Designation

1. Supports our efforts to curb terrorism financing and to encourage other nations to do the same.

2. Stigmatizes and isolates designated terrorist organizations internationally.

3. Deters donations or contributions to and economic transactions with named organizations.

4. Heightens public awareness and knowledge of terrorist organizations.

5. Signals to other governments our concern about named organizations.

Revocations of Foreign Terrorist Organizations

The Immigration and Nationality Act sets out three possible basis for revoking a Foreign Terrorist Organization designation:

1. The Secretary of State must revoke a designation if the Secretary finds that the circumstances that were the basis of the designation have changed in such a manner as to warrant a revocation;
2. The Secretary of State must revoke a designation if the Secretary finds that the national security of the United States warrants a revocation;
3. The Secretary of State may revoke a designation at any time.

Any revocation shall take effect on the date specified in the revocation or upon publication in the Federal Register if no effective date is specified. The revocation of a designation shall not affect any action or proceeding based on conduct committed prior to the effective date of such revocation.

TAGS

Bureau of Counterterrorism | Combating Violent Extremism | Counterterrorism | Sanctions and Designations

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Exhibit 6

Sanctions List Search

Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list ("SDN List") and all other sanctions lists administered by OFAC, including the Foreign Sanctions Evaders List, the Non-SDN Iran Sanctions Act List, the Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List, the List of Foreign Financial Institutions Subject to Correspondent Account or Payable-Through Account Sanctions and the Non-SDN Palestinian Legislative Council List. Given the number of lists that now reside in the Sanctions List Search tool, it is strongly recommended that users pay close attention to the program codes associated with each returned record. These program codes indicate how a true hit on a returned value should be treated. The Sanctions List Search tool uses approximate string matching to identify possible matches between word or character strings as entered into Sanctions List Search, and any name or name component as it appears on the SDN List and/or the various other sanctions lists. Sanctions List Search has a slider-bar that may be used to set a threshold (i.e., a confidence rating) for the closeness of any potential match returned as a result of a user's search. Sanctions List Search will detect certain misspellings or other incorrectly entered text, and will return near, or proximate, matches, based on the confidence rating set by the user via the slider-bar. OFAC does not provide recommendations with regard to the appropriateness of any specific confidence rating. Sanctions List Search is one tool offered to assist users in utilizing the SDN List and/or the various other sanctions lists; use of Sanctions List Search is not a substitute for undertaking appropriate due diligence. The use of Sanctions List Search does not limit any criminal or civil liability for any act undertaken as a result of, or in reliance on, such use.

Download the SDN List | Sanctions List Search: Rules for use | Visit The OFAC Website

Download the Consolidated Non-SDN List | Program Code Key

Lookup

Type:	All	**Address:**	
Name:		**City:**	
ID # / Digital Currency Address:		**State/Province:***	
Program:	All 561-Related BALKANS BALKANS-EO14033	**Country:**	All
		List:	All
Minimum Name Score:	100	Search	Reset

Lookup Results:

Name	Address	Type	Program(s)	List	Score

* U.S. states are abbreviated on the SDN and Non-SDN lists. To search for a specific U.S. state, please use the two letter U.S. Postal Service abbreviation.

SDN List last updated on: 10/9/2026 10:01:28 AM
Non-SDN List last updated on: 9/14/2026 2:35:42 PM

Exhibit 7

Sanctions List Search

Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list ("SDN List") and all other sanctions lists administered by OFAC, including the Foreign Sanctions Evaders List, the Non-SDN Iran Sanctions Act List, the Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List, the List of Foreign Financial Institutions Subject to Correspondent Account or Payable-Through Account Sanctions and the Non-SDN Palestinian Legislative Council List. Given the number of lists that now reside in the Sanctions List Search tool, it is strongly recommended that users pay close attention to the program codes associated with each returned record. These program codes indicate how a true hit on a returned value should be treated. The Sanctions List Search tool uses approximate string matching to identify possible matches between word or character strings as entered into Sanctions List Search, and any name or name component as it appears on the SDN List and/or the various other sanctions lists. Sanctions List Search has a slider-bar that may be used to set a threshold (i.e., a confidence rating) for the closeness of any potential match returned as a result of a user's search. Sanctions List Search will detect certain misspellings or other incorrectly entered text, and will return near, or proximate, matches, based on the confidence rating set by the user via the slider-bar. OFAC does not provide recommendations with regard to the appropriateness of any specific confidence rating. Sanctions List Search is one tool offered to assist users in utilizing the SDN List and/or the various other sanctions lists; use of Sanctions List Search is not a substitute for undertaking appropriate due diligence. The use of Sanctions List Search does not limit any criminal or civil liability for any act undertaken as a result of, or in reliance on, such use.

Download the SDN List | Sanctions List Search: Rules for use | Visit The OFAC Website

Download the Consolidated Non-SDN List | Program Code Key

Details:

Type:	Entity	**List:**	SDN
Entity Name:	HOLY LAND FOUNDATION FOR RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT	**Program:**	SDGT
		Remarks:	and other locations within the United States

Identifications:

Type	ID#	Country	Issue Date	Expire Date
US FEIN	95-4227517			
Secondary sanctions risk:	section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886			

Aliases:

Type	Category	Name
f.k.a.	strong	OCCUPIED LAND FUND

Addresses:

Address	City	State/Province	Postal Code	Country
525 International Parkway, Suite 509	Richardson	TX	75081	United States
P.O. Box 832390	Richardson	TX	75083	United States
9250 S. Harlem Avenue	Bridgeview	IL		United States
345 E. Railway Avenue	Paterson	NJ	07503	United States
	Hebron			Region: West Bank
				Region: Gaza
12798 Rancho Penasquitos Blvd., Suite F	San Diego	CA	92128	United States
	Jenin			Region: West Bank
Shurta Street, 'Amira al-Ramuna, 4th Floor	Ramallah			Region: West Bank

Back

SDN List last updated on: 9/23/2026 10:07:28 AM
Non-SDN List last updated on: 9/14/2026 2:35:42 PM

Exhibit 8

U.S. Department of Justice

United States Attorney
Northern District of Texas

1100 Commerce St., 3rd Fl.
Dallas, Texas 75242-1699

Telephone (214) 659-8600
Fax (214) 767-0978

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
CONTACT: 214/659-8600
www.usdoj.gov/usao/txn

DALLAS, TEXAS
OCTOBER 13, 2006

INFOCOM CORPORATION AND ITS OPERATORS SENTENCED IN FEDERAL COURT

ELASHI BROTHERS CONVICTED FOR DOING BUSINESS WITH TERRORIST

In a series of hearings conducted this week in federal court in Dallas by the Honorable Sam A. Lindsay, United States District Judge, Bayan Elashi, Ghassan Elashi, Basman Elashi, and Infocom Corporation were sentenced, announced United States Attorney Richard B. Roper. The three defendants, along with their brothers, Hazim and Ihsan "Sammy" Elashi, operated a family-run, Richardson, Texas, business, Infocom, that sold computers and Internet services mostly to customers in the Middle East.

Today, Basman Elashi, age 50, was sentenced to 80 months imprisonment. Yesterday, Ghassan Elashi, age 52, was also sentenced to 80 months imprisonment. On Wednesday, Bayan Elashi, age 51, was sentenced to 84 months imprisonment and Infocom Corporation was sentenced to two years probation (the corporation is defunct). Bayan and Basman Elashi have been in federal custody on immigration violations since their arrest in December 2002. Ghassan Elashi was ordered to surrender to Bureau of Prison officials on January 16, 2007. He is currently scheduled to go on trial, along with seven co-defendants, again in February 2007, before the Honorable A. Joe Fish, United States Chief District Judge, in a case styled U.S. v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, et al.

U.S. Attorney Roper said, "The sentences in this case demonstrate that the Government's efforts to restrict the assets and funds of terrorist organizations and those who lead those terrorist organizations must be recognized and adhered to. Those who knowingly violate the laws prohibiting any transactions with such assets can expect to face the prospect of prosecution and a lengthy incarceration for violating the laws passed by Congress to combat the threat imposed by terrorism. The sentences also demonstrate that the laws and regulations concerning the exporting of technology to foreign countries are a serious matter and must be respected by all who operate in that field."

In May 2004, the Court granted the defendants' motion to sever the indictment into two separate trials. In July 2004, during the trial of the export violations portion of the indictment, all five Elashi brothers, and Infocom Corporation, were convicted on charges they conspired

to violate the Export Administration Regulations and the Libyan Sanctions Regulations. Each of the five brothers was found guilty of conspiracy to file false Shipper's Export Declaration forms. All of the brothers were convicted of making false statements and all of the defendants, except Ihsan Elashi, were also convicted on money laundering charges. At that trial, the jury found that from 1997 to 2000, the defendants made illegal computer shipments to Libya and Syria, in violation of U.S. laws that restrict or prohibit the export of technology, goods or software to countries listed as state sponsors of terrorism as designated by Secretary of State in order to protect the national security of the United States.

During the second trial on the remaining charges in the indictment, in April 2005, the jury found that Bayan Elashi, Ghassan Elashi, Basman Elashi and Infocom Corporation conspired together and sent money to co-defendant Mousa Abu Marzook, an investor in Infocom and a self-admitted leader of the Islamic Resistance Movement, a/k/a Hamas. In 1995, the Department of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, designated Hamas as a Specially Designated Terrorist Organization, making it illegal for any United States person or entity to conduct any business with Hamas or its representatives. Nadia Marzook, also a defendant in the case, is Mousa Abu Marzook's wife and is the Elashi brothers' cousin. Bayan Elashi, Ghassan Elashi, Basman Elashi, and Infocom Corporation were each found guilty of conspiracy to deal in the property of a Specially Designated Terrorist and conspiracy to commit money laundering. In addition, Bayan Elashi and Ghassan Elashi were each convicted on 10 counts of dealing in the property of a Specially Designated Terrorist and nine counts of money laundering. Basman Elashi was also convicted on one count of dealing in the property of a Specially Designated Terrorist.

Brothers Hazim and Ihsan Elashi were sentenced in January 2006 to 66 months imprisonment and 72 months imprisonment, respectively. Hazim Elashi will be deported after his sentence is served. Ihsan Elashi's sentence will run consecutively to the 48-month federal sentence he is presently serving on unrelated charges.

At Infocom, Bayan Elashi was the chief executive officer; Ghassan Elashi was the vice-president of marketing; Basman Elashi was the logistics and credit manager; Hazim Elashi was the manager of personal computer systems; and Ihsan Elashi was a systems consultant and sales representative

United States Attorney Roper praised the collaborative investigative efforts of the United States Department of Commerce; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Internal Revenue Service - Criminal Investigation; United States Secret Service; and Immigration and Customs Enforcement. U.S. Attorney Roper also thanked the U.S. Marshals Service and the Federal Protective Service for their excellent work in providing security throughout the trials.

The case was prosecuted by First Assistant United States Attorney James T. Jacks, Assistant United States Attorney Nathan Garrett, Trial Attorney Barry Jonas of the Department of Justice Counterterrorism Section, and Trial Attorney Martha Rubio from the Department of Justice.

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Exhibit 9

PRESS RELEASE

Federal Judge Hands Downs Sentences in Holy Land Foundation Case

Wednesday, May 27, 2009

For Immediate Release

Office of Public Affairs

Holy Land Foundation and Leaders Convicted on Providing Material Support to Hamas Terrorist Organization

Today, in federal court in Dallas, U.S. District Judge Jorge A. Solis sentenced the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF) and five of its leaders following their convictions by a federal jury in November 2008 on charges of providing material support to Hamas, a designated foreign terrorist organization.

"Today's sentences mark the culmination of many years of painstaking investigative and prosecutorial work at the federal, state and local levels. All those involved in this landmark case deserve our thanks," said David Kris, Assistant Attorney General for National Security. "These sentences should serve as a strong warning to anyone who knowingly provides financial support to terrorists under the guise of humanitarian relief."

HLF was incorporated by Shukri Abu Baker, Mohammad El-Mezain, and Ghassan Elashi. Mufid Abdulqader and Abdulrahman Odeh worked as fund raisers. Together, with others, they provided material support to the Hamas movement.

Shukri Abu Baker, 50, of Garland, Texas, was sentenced to a total of 65 years in prison. He was convicted of 10 counts of conspiracy to provide, and the provision of, material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization; 11 counts of conspiracy to provide, and the provision

of, funds, goods and services to a Specially Designated Terrorist; 10 counts of conspiracy to commit, and the commission of, money laundering; one count of conspiracy to impede and impair the Internal Revenue Service (IRS); and one count of filing a false tax return.

Mohammad El-Mezain, 55, of San Diego, California, was sentenced to the statutory maximum of 15 years in prison. He was convicted on one count of conspiracy to provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization.

Ghassan Elashi, 55, of Richardson, Texas, was sentenced to a total of 65 years in prison. He was convicted on the same counts as Abu Baker, and one additional count of filing a false tax return.

Mufid Abdulqader, 49, of Richardson, Texas, was sentenced to a total of 20 years in prison. He was convicted on one count of conspiracy to provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization, one count of conspiracy to provide goods, funds, and services to a specially designated terrorist, and one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering.

Abdulrahman Odeh, 49, of Patterson, New Jersey, was sentenced to 15 years in prison. He was convicted on the same counts as Abdulqader.

HLF, now defunct, was convicted on10 counts of conspiracy to provide, and the provision of, material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization; 11 counts of conspiracy to provide, and the provision of, funds, goods and services to a Specially Designated Terrorist; and 10 counts of conspiracy to commit, and the commission of, money laundering.

The Court reaffirmed the jury's $12.4 million money judgment against all the defendants, with the exception of El Mezain, who was not convicted of money laundering.

From its inception, HLF existed to support Hamas. Before HLF was designed as a Specially Designated Terrorist by the Treasury Department and shut down in December 2001, it was the largest U.S. Muslim charity. It was based in Richardson, Texas, a Dallas suburb. The "material support statute," as it is commonly referred to, was enacted in 1996 as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. That statute recognizes that money is fungible, and that money in the hands of a terrorist organization — even if for so called charitable purposes — supports that organization's overall terrorist objectives.

The government presented evidence at trial that, as the U.S. began to scrutinize individuals and entities in the U.S. who were raising funds for terrorist groups in the mid-1990s, the HLF intentionally hid its financial support for Hamas behind the guise of charitable donations. HLF and these five defendants provided approximately $12.4 million in support to Hamas and its goal of creating an Islamic Palestinian state by eliminating the State of Israel through violent jihad.

The government's case included testimony that in the early 1990's, Hamas' parent organization, the Muslim Brotherhood, planned to establish a network of organizations in the U.S. to spread a militant Islamist message and raise money for Hamas. The government's case also included testimony about Hamas material found in zakat committees. The defendants sent HLF-raised funds to Hamas-controlled zakat committees and charitable societies in the West Bank and Gaza. Zakat is an Arabic word referring to the religious obligation to give alms.

HLF became the chief fundraising arm for the Palestine Committee in the U.S. created by the Muslim Brotherhood to support Hamas. According to a wiretap of a 1993 Palestine Committee meeting in Philadelphia, former HLF President and CEO Shukri Abu Baker, spoke about playing down their Hamas ties in order to keep raising money in the U.S. Another wiretapped phone call included Abdulrahman Odeh, HLF's New Jersey representative, referring to a suicide bombing as "a beautiful operation."

The government also presented evidence that several HLF defendants have family members who are Hamas leaders, including Hamas' political chief, Mousa Abu Marzook, who is married to a cousin of Ghassan Elashi, HLF's former Chairman of the Board. Ghassan Elashi, who also served as the vice-president of marketing for Infocom Corporation, is currently serving an 80-month sentence following his conviction on several charges related to export violations. Mohammed El-Mezain was HLF's Director of Endowments and Mufid Abdulqater was a major HLF fundraiser. Two named defendants, Akram Mishal and Haitham Maghawri are fugitives.

The defendants provided financial support to the families of Hamas martyrs, detainees, and activists knowing and intending that such assistance would support the Hamas terrorist organization. Since 1995, when it first became illegal to provide financial support to Hamas, HLF provided approximately $12.4 million in funding to Hamas through various Hamas-affiliated committees and organizations located in Palestinian-controlled areas and elsewhere.

During trial, the government also presented evidence that HLF was so concerned about investigators uncovering the group's intentions that they kept a manual entitled "The Foundation's Policies and Procedures." HLF followed various security procedures outlined in the manual to include hiring a security company to search the HLF for listening devices, ordering defendant Haitham Maghawri, a fugitive, to take training on advanced methods in detecting wiretaps, shredding documents after board meetings, and maintaining incriminating documents in off-site locations.

The case was investigated by the Joint Terrorism Task Force, involving agents from federal, state, and local agencies including: FBI, IRS - Criminal Investigation, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Department of State, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division, the Texas Department of Public Safety, and the Dallas, Plano, Garland and Richardson, Texas, Police Departments. In addition, the Department of Justice Criminal Division's Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section provided assistance.

The case was prosecuted by James T. Jacks, acting U.S. Attorney; Barry Jonas, Trial Attorney for the Department of Justice Counter-terrorism Section; and Elizabeth J. Shapiro, Deputy Director, Federal Programs Branch, Department of Justice, serving as a Special Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Updated February 5, 2025

Component

National Security Division (NSD)

Press Release Number: 09-519

Office of Public Affairs

U.S. Department of Justice

950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Washington DC 20530

Office of Public Affairs Direct Line

202-514-2007

Department of Justice Main Switchboard

202-514-2000

Exhibit 10

United Arab Emirates

Legal Framework +

Local Terrorist List -

Overview
International cooperation pursuant UNSCR 1373 (2001)
Updating & Re-listing

Sanctions Implementation +

Sanction Evasion +

UAE Government Authorities Role +

Grievances and Requests +

Frequently Asked Questions +

Online Resources +

Contact +

Local Terrorist List

Overview

All United Nations (UN) member states must implement freezing measures with regards to individuals, entities and groups designated by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). In addition, **UNSC Resolution 1373** (2001) mandates each UN member state to develop the procedures to identify and designate individuals, entities or groups that are suspected of, attempt to, and/or commit terrorist acts, and apply freezing measures on them.

The Supreme Council for National Security (Supreme Council) in the UAE prepares such designations and each listing must be approved by the Cabinet of the UAE. Specifically, the Supreme Council proposes a Local List that meets the designation criteria under UNSC Resolution 1373 (2001). The Supreme Council can include individuals, entities or groups in the Local List without prior notice to the designated person, and irrespective of whether criminal proceedings exist.

International Cooperation Pursuant UNSCR 1373 (2001)

United Arab Emirates

Sending a designation request

The Supreme Council may unilaterally request a foreign country to designate an individual or entity that meets the criteria for listing under UNSC Resolution 1373 (2001). The listing proposal may include the following:

1. Specific information establishing links to terrorist individuals, entities or groups or otherwise establishing that the individuals, entities or groups meet the designation criteria.
2. Evidence or documents supporting the listing proposal, such as reports of law enforcement authorities, intelligence agencies, the judiciary, or others.

Receiving a designation request

Any foreign country may request the Supreme Council to include in the Local List an individual, entity or group that is suspected or believed to meet the designation criteria under UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001).

The Supreme Council shall determine whether the request meets the designation criteria. If so, the request is presented to the UAE Cabinet for consideration and decision.

Updating & Re-listing

The Supreme Council conducts periodic reviews of the Local List, in coordination with the Ministry of Justice and based on information from Law Enforcement Authorities (LEAs) and other relevant agencies in the UAE.

If the Supreme Council considers that there are no longer reasonable grounds to believe that an individual, entity or group in the Local List meets the designation criteria, the Supreme Council shall propose de-listing that individual, entity or group from the Local List and de-listing occurs following approval by the UAE Cabinet.

Documents

United Arab Emirates



UNSC Resolution 1373 (/API/Upload/DownloadFile?FileID=65bf72a4-da88-417e-ae9c-a9c5989c128c)

PDF , 105.3 KB

U.AE

EXPO 2020 إكسبو
دبي، الإمـــارات العربيـة المتحـدة
DUBAI, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

OFFICIAL SUPPORTER | داعم رسمي

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Exhibit 10-1

الأفراد المدرجين في قائمة الإرهاب المحلية																	
أولاً- المعلومات الرئيسية								ثانيًا: الأسماء المعرفة للمدرج	ثالثًا- العنوان			رابعًا- الوثائق				سادسًا- معلومات
#	التصنيف	الجنسية	اسم العائلة (بالحروف العربية)	اسم العائلة (بالحروف اللاتينية)	الاسم الكامل (بالحروف العربية)	الاسم الكامل (بالحروف اللاتينية)	تاريخ الميلاد	مكان الميلاد	الاسم	الشارع	المدينة	الدولة	النوع	رقم الوثيقة	جهة الإصدار	تاريخ الإصدار	تاريخ الانتهاء	معلومات أخرى
1	شخص إرهابي	قطر	السبيعي	AL SUBAEY	خليفة محمد تركي السبيعي	KHALIFA MOHD T AL SUBAEY	1/1/1965	قطر	خليفة محمد تركي السبيعي	-	-	قطر	جواز سفر	685868	قطر	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
2	شخص إرهابي	الأردن	عبدالسلام	ABDELSALAM	عبد الملك محمد يوسف عبد السلام	ABDULMALIK MOHAMMAD YOUSEF ABDELSALAM	7/13/1989	العراق	عبد الملك محمد يوسف عبد السلام	-	-	قطر	جواز سفر	475336	الأردن	5/29/2012	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
3	شخص إرهابي	الأردن	عبدالسلام	ABD AL SALAM	أشرف محمد يوسف عثمان عبد السلام	ASHRAF MUHAMMAD YUSUF UTHMAN ABD ALSALAM	-	-	أشرف محمد يوسف عثمان عبد السلام	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
4	شخص إرهابي	قطر	الباكر	AL-BAKR	إبراهيم عيسى الحجي محمد الباكر	IBRAHIM 'ISA HAJJI MUHAMMAD AL-BAKR	7/12/1977	-	إبراهيم عيسى الحجي محمد الباكر (أبوخليل)	-	-	قطر	جواز سفر	01016646	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
5	شخص إرهابي	قطر	العطية	ALATTIYAH	عبد العزيز بن خليفة العطية	ABDULAZIZ BIN KHALIFA ALATTIYAH	-	-	عبد العزيز بن خليفة العطية	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
6	شخص إرهابي	قطر	الكواري	AL-KUWARI	سالم حسن خليفة راشد الكواري	SALIM HASAN KHALIFA RASHID AL-KUWARI	-	-	سالم حسن خليفة راشد الكواري	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
7	شخص إرهابي	قطر	الخوار	AL-KHAWAR	عبد الله غانم محفوظ مسلم الخوار	ABDALLAH GHANIM MAHFUZ MUSLIM AL-KHAWAR	12/17/1981	-	عبد الله غانم محفوظ مسلم الخوار	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
8	شخص إرهابي	قطر	الكعبي	AL-KA'BI	سعد بن سعد محمد الكعبي	SA'D BIN SA'D MUHAMMAD SHARIAN AL-KA'BI	-	-	سعد بن سعد محمد الكعبي	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
9	شخص إرهابي	قطر	الكواري	AL-KUWARI	عبد اللطيف بن عبد الله الكواري	ABD AL-LATIF BIN ABDALLAH SALIH MUHAMMAD AL-KAWARI	9/28/1973	-	عبد اللطيف بن عبد الله الكواري	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
10	شخص إرهابي	قطر	النعيمي	AL-NU'AYMI	عبد الرحمن بن عمير النعيمي	ABD AL-RAHMAN BIN 'UMAYR AL-NU'AYMI	5/6/1951	-	عبد الرحمن بن عمير النعيمي	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
11	شخص إرهابي	اليمن	الحميقاني	AL-HUMAYQANI	عبد الوهاب محمد عبد الرحمن الحميقاني	ABD AL-WAHHAB MUHAMMAD ABD AL-RAHMAN AL-HUMAYQANI	-	-	عبد الوهاب محمد عبد الرحمن الحميقاني	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
12	شخص إرهابي	الكويت	العجمي	AL-AJMI	حجاج بن فهد حجاج محمد العجمي	HAJJAJ BIN FAHD HAJJAJ MUHAMMAD AL-AJMI	8/10/1987	الكويت	حجاج بن فهد حجاج محمد العجمي	-	-	-	جواز سفر	107706887	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
13	شخص إرهابي	قطر	القرضاوي	AL-QARADAWI	يوسف عبد الله القرضاوي	YUSUF ABDULLAH AL-QARADAWI	1/13/1963	مصر	يوسف عبد الله القرضاوي	-	-	قطر	جواز سفر	5113	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
14	شخص إرهابي	ليبيا	الصلابي	AL-SALLABI	علي محمد محمد الصلابي	ALI MOHAMMED MOHAMMED AL-SALLABI	1/1/1976	ليبيا	علي محمد محمد الصلابي	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
15	شخص إرهابي	ليبيا	بلحاج	BELHAJ	عبد الحكيم بلحاج	ABD AL-HAKIM BELHAJ	5/1/1966	ليبيا	عبد الحكيم بلحاج	-	-		جواز سفر	454365	ليبيا	-	9/6/2020	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
16	شخص إرهابي	ليبيا	الحاراتي	AL-HARATI	مهدي الحاراتي	MAHDI AL-HARATI	1975	ليبيا	مهدي الحاراتي	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
17	شخص إرهابي	ليبيا	الصلابي	AL-SALLABI	إسماعيل محمد محمد الصلابي	ISMAIL MOHAMMED MOHAMMED AL-SALLABI	-	-	إسماعيل محمد محمد الصلابي	-	-		-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
18	شخص إرهابي	ليبيا	الغرياني	AL-QHRIANY	الصادق عبد الرحمن علي الغرياني	AL-SADIQ ABD-ALRAHMAN ALI AL-QHRIANY	12/8/1942	طرابلس - ليبيا	الصادق عبد الرحمن علي الغرياني	-	طرابلس	ليبيا	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
19	شخص إرهابي	مصر	الاسلامبولي	ISLAMBOULI	محمد أحمد شوقي الإسلامبولي	MOHAMMED AHMED SHAWQI ISLAMBOULI	1/21/1952	نجع حمادي-قنا	محمد أحمد شوقي الإسلامبولي	-	-	-	جواز سفر	304555	مصر	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
20	شخص إرهابي	مصر	الزمر	AL-ZUMAR	طارق عبد الموجود إبراهيم الزمر	TAREK ABD AL-MAWGOUD IBRAHIM AL-ZUMAR	5/15/1959	مصر	طارق عبد الموجود إبراهيم الزمر	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
21	شخص إرهابي	مصر	عفيفي	AFIFI	محمد عبد المقصود محمد عفيفي	MOHAMMED ABD AL-MAQSOUD MOHAMMED AFIFI	7/14/1947	مصر	محمد عبد المقصود محمد عفيفي	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
22	شخص إرهابي	مصر	محمد	MOHAMMED	محمد الصغير عبد الرحيم محمد	MOHAMMAD ELSAGHEER ABD AL-RAHIM MOHAMMED	4/13/1970	مصر - القاهرة	محمد الصغير عبد الرحيم محمد	-	-	-	جواز سفر	A08670835	مصر	-	1/1/2020	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
23	شخص إرهابي	مصر	غنيم	GHONIEM	وجدي عبد الحميد محمد غنيم	WAGDY ABDEL HAMIED MOHAMED GHONIEM	8/2/1951	سوهاج - مصر	وجدي عبد الحميد محمد غنيم	-	-	-	جواز سفر	4155047	مصر	-	7/5/2015	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
24	شخص إرهابي	الامارات	الهوتي	AL-HOUTI	حسن أحمد حسن محمد الدقي الهوتي	HASSAN AHMED HASSAN MOHAMED AL-DIQQI AL-HOUTI	1/3/1957	الشارقة	حسن أحمد حسن محمد الدقي الهوتي	بشاك شهير	إسطنبول	تركيا	جواز السفر	2116728	الامارات	7/24/2008	7/23/2013	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
25	شخص إرهابي	السعودية / الكويت	المطيري	AL-MUTAIRI	حاكم عيسان الحميدي المطيري	HAKEM OBAYSAN AL-HAMIDI AL-MUTAIRI	11/7/1964	الكويت	حاكم عيسان الحميدي المطيري	بشاك شهير	إسطنبول	تركيا	جواز السفر	3229745	الكويت	16/05/2011	5/15/2021	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
26	شخص إرهابي	السعوديه	المجيسني	AL-MUHAYSINI	عبد الله محمد بن سليمان المجيسني	ABDALLAH MUHAMMAD BIN SULAYMAN AL-MUHAYSINI	10/30/1987	-	عبد الله محمد بن سليمان المجيسني	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
27	شخص إرهابي	الكويت	العلي	AL-ALI	حامد عبد الله أحمد العلي	HAMID ABDALLAH AHMAD AL-ALI	1/20/1960	الكويت	حامد عبد الله أحمد العلي	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
28	شخص إرهابي	مصر	حسنين	HASSANEIN	أيمن أحمد عبد الغني حسنين	AYMAN AHMED ABDUL GHANI HASSANEIN	11/1/1964	مصر	أيمن أحمد عبد الغني حسنين	-	-	مصر	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
29	شخص إرهابي	مصر	ماضي	MADI	عاصم عبد الماجد محمد ماضي	ASSEM ABDEL-MAGED MOHAMMED MADI	1958	مصر (المينا)	عاصم عبد الماجد محمد ماضي	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
30	شخص إرهابي	مصر	عقيل	AQEEL	يحيى عقيل سالمان عقيل	YAHYA AQIL SALMAN AQEEL	-	مصر	يحيى عقيل سالمان عقيل	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
31	شخص إرهابي	مصر	إبراهيم	IBRAHIM	محمد حمادة السيد إبراهيم	MOHAMED HAMADA EL-SAYED IBRAHIM	1/20/1982	مصر	محمد حمادة السيد إبراهيم	-	-	-	جواز سفر	11180132	مصر	1/1/2013	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
32	شخص إرهابي	مصر	عبدالرحمن	ABDEL RAHMAN	عبد الرحمن محمد شكري عبد الرحمن	ABDEL RAHMAN MOHAMED SHOKRY ABDEL RAHMAN	1947	مصر	عبد الرحمن محمد شكري عبد الرحمن	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
33	شخص إرهابي	مصر	يوسف	YOUSSEF	حسين محمد رضا إبراهيم يوسف	HUSSEIN MOHAMED REZA IBRAHIM YOUSSEF		مصر	حسين محمد رضا إبراهيم يوسف	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
34	شخص إرهابي	مصر	عبدالهدى	ABDELHADY	أحمد عبد الحافظ محمود عبد الهدى	AHMED ABDELHAFID MAHMOUD ABDELHADY	-	مصر	أحمد عبد الحافظ محمود عبد الهدى	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
35	شخص إرهابي	مصر	طرفان	TARFAN	مسلم فؤاد طرفان	MUSLIM FOUAD TARFAN	-	-	مسلم فؤاد طرفان	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
36	شخص إرهابي	مصر	رفعت	RIFAT	أيمن محمود صادق رفعت	AYMAN MAHMOUD SADEQ RIFAT	1970	مصر (الجيزة)	أيمن محمود صادق رفعت	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
37	شخص إرهابي	مصر	أحمد	AHMED	محمد سعد عبد النعيم أحمد	MOHAMED SAAD ABDEL-NAIM AHMED	-	-	محمد سعد عبد النعيم أحمد	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
38	شخص إرهابي	مصر	الرازقي	AL-RAZAKI	محمد سعد عبد المطلب عبده الرازقي	MOHAMED SAAD ABDEL MUTTALIB ABDO AL-RAZAFI	-	-	محمد سعد عبد المطلب عبده الرازقي	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
39	شخص إرهابي	مصر	بلتاجي	BELTAGY	أحمد فؤاد أحمد جاد بلتاجي	AHMED FOUAD AHMED GAD BELTAGY	1/1/1980	-	أحمد فؤاد أحمد جاد بلتاجي	-	-	-	جواز سفر	1147218	مصر	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
40	شخص إرهابي	مصر	سليمان	SOLIMAN	أحمد رجب رجب سليمان	AHMED RAGEB RAGEB SOLIMAN	-	-	أحمد رجب رجب سليمان	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
41	شخص إرهابي	مصر	عبدالعزيز	ABDEL AZIZ	كريم محمد محمد عبد العزيز	KARIM MOHAMED MOHAMED ABDEL AZIZ	-	مصر	كريم محمد محمد عبد العزيز	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
42	شخص إرهابي	مصر	علي	ALI	علي زكي محمد علي	ALI ZAKI MOHAMMED ALI	-	-	علي زكي محمد علي	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
43	شخص إرهابي	مصر	العزولي	EZZOULI	ناجي إبراهيم العزولي	NAJI IBRAHIM EZZOULI	-	مصر	ناجي إبراهيم العزولي	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
44	شخص إرهابي	مصر	سليمان	SULEIMAN	شحاتة فتحي حافظ محمد سليمان	SHEHATA FATHI HAFEZ MOHAMMED SULEIMAN	-	مصر	شحاتة فتحي حافظ محمد سليمان	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
45	شخص إرهابي	مصر	أبو زيد	ABU ZEID	محمد محرم فهمي أبو زيد	MUHAMMAD MUHARRAM FAHMI ABU ZEID	-	مصر	محمد محرم فهمي أبو زيد	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
46	شخص إرهابي	مصر	عبدالباري	ABDEL-BARRY	عمرو عبد الناصر عبد الحق عبد الباري	AMR ABDEL NASSER ABDELHAK ABDEL-BARRY	-	مصر	عمرو عبد الناصر عبد الحق عبد الباري	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
47	شخص إرهابي	مصر	الظاهر	ABDEL-ZAHER	علي حسن إبراهيم عبد الظاهر	ALI HASSAN IBRAHIM ABDEL-ZAHER	-	-	علي حسن إبراهيم عبد الظاهر	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
48	شخص إرهابي	البحرين	السندي	AL-SINDI	مرتضى مجيد السندي	MURTADHA MAJEED AL-SINDI	-	-	مرتضى مجيد السندي	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
49	شخص إرهابي	البحرين	الدعسكي	AL-DASKI	أحمد الحسن الدعسكي	AHMED AL-HASSAN AL-DASKI	-	-	أحمد الحسن الدعسكي			-	-				-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017

50	شخص إرهابي	اليمن	اليزيدي	AL-YAZIDI	عبد الله محمد علي اليزيدي	ABDULLAH MOHAMMED AL-YAZIDI	1/1/1957	اليمن	عبد الله محمد علي اليزيدي	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (28) لسنة 2017
51	شخص إرهابي	اليمن	برعود	BAROAUD	أحمد علي أحمد برعود	AHMED ALI AHMED BAROAUD	1/1/1965	اليمن	أحمد علي أحمد برعود	-	حضرموت	-	اليمن	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (28) لسنة 2017
52	شخص إرهابي	اليمن	الدباء	AL-DABAA	محمد بكر الدباء	MOHAMMED BAKR AL-DABAA	1/8/1958	اليمن	محمد بكر الدباء	-	-	-	اليمن	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (28) لسنة 2017
53	شخص إرهابي	الكويت	العلي	AL-'ALI	حامد حمد حامد العلي	HAMID HAMAD HAMID AL-'ALI	2/17/1960	الكويت	حامد حمد حامد العلي	-	-	-	-	جواز سفر	101505554	الكويت	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (28) لسنة 2017
54	شخص إرهابي	ليبيا	أبو خزيم	BUKHAZEM	الساعدي عبد الله إبراهيم أبو خزيم	AL-SAADI ABDULLAH IBRAHIM BUKHAZEM	11/21/1981	ليبيا	الساعدي عبد الله إبراهيم أبو خزيم	-	أجدابيا	ليبيا	جواز سفر	-	-	ليبيا	9/11/2019	9/10/2025	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (28) لسنة 2017
55	شخص إرهابي	ليبيا	الحسناوي	AL-HASNAWI	أحمد عبد الجليل الحسناوي	AHMED ABD AL-JALEEL AL-HASNAWI	-	ليبيا	أحمد عبد الجليل الحسناوي	حي الشارب	أوباري	ليبيا	الرقم الموحد	54390612	ليبيا	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (28) لسنة 2017
56	شخص إرهابي	اليمن	القيسي	AL-QAYSI	نايف صالح سالم القيسي	NAYIF SALIH SALIM AL-QAYSI	1983	اليمن	نايف صالح سالم القيسي	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (45) لسنة 2017
57	شخص إرهابي	اليمن	عيدروس	AYDARUS	هاشم محسن عيدروس	HASHIM MUHSIN AYDARUS	12/12/1985	جدة - المملكة العربية السعودية	هاشم محسن عيدروس	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (45) لسنة 2017
58	شخص إرهابي	اليمن	العدني	AL-ADANI	نشوان العدني	NASHWAN AL-ADANI	1/13/1988	-	نشوان العدني	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (45) لسنة 2017
59	شخص إرهابي	اليمن	المرفدي	AL-MARFADI	خالد عبد الله المرفدي	KHALID ABDULLAH AL-MARFADI	9/4/1966	-	خالد عبد الله المرفدي	-	-	-	اليمن	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (45) لسنة 2017
60	شخص إرهابي	اليمن	الحيثي	AL-HEESHI	سيف الرب سالم الحيثي	SAIFULRAB SALIM AL-HEESHI	1/1/1978	اليمن	سيف الرب سالم الحيثي	-	-	-	اليمن	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (45) لسنة 2017
61	شخص إرهابي	اليمن	الذهباني	AL-THAHBANI	عادل عبده فاري عثمان الذهباني	ADEL ABDU FARI OTHMAN AL-THAHBANI	7/15/1963	اليمن	عادل عبده فاري عثمان الذهباني	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (45) لسنة 2017
62	شخص إرهابي	اليمن	قنان	QANAN	رضوان قنان	RADWAN QANAN	1/13/1988	اليمن	رضوان قنان	-	-	-	اليمن	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (45) لسنة 2017
63	شخص إرهابي	اليمن	اليافعي	AL-YAFI'I	والي نشوان اليافعي	WALI NASHWAN AL-YAFI'I	1984	-	والي نشوان اليافعي	-	-	-	اليمن	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (45) لسنة 2017
64	شخص إرهابي	اليمن	العبيدي	AL-UBAYDI	خالد سعيد غابش العبيدي	KHALID SA'ID GHABISH AL-UBAYDI	11/18/1986	اليمن	خالد سعيد غابش العبيدي	-	-	-	اليمن	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (45) لسنة 2017
65	شخص إرهابي	اليمن	الوافي	AL-WAFI	بلال علي الوافي	BILAL ALI AL-WAFI	-	-	بلال علي الوافي	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (45) لسنة 2017
66	شخص إرهابي	أمريكا	دياب	DIAB	خالد ناظم دياب	KHALID NAZEM DIAB	-	-	خالد ناظم دياب	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (53) لسنة 2017
67	شخص إرهابي	ليبيا	جابر	JABER	د. سالم جابر عمر علي سلطان فتح الله جابر	SALEM JABER OMAR ALI SULTAN FATHALLAH JABER	-	-	د. سالم جابر عمر علي سلطان فتح الله جابر	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (53) لسنة 2017
68	شخص إرهابي	قطر	الجبوري	AL-JUBURI	ميسر علي موسى عبدالله الجبوري	MAYSAR ALI MUSA ABDALLAH AL-JUBURI	6/1/1976	العراق	ميسر علي موسى عبدالله الجبوري	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (53) لسنة 2017
69	شخص إرهابي	الصومال	أتم	ATM	محمد علي سعيد أتم	MOHAMMED ALI SAEED ATM	-	-	محمد علي سعيد أتم	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (53) لسنة 2017
70	شخص إرهابي	البحرين	سلطان	SULTAN	حسن علي محمد جمعة سلطان	HASAN ALI MOHAMMED JUMA'A SULTAN	-	-	حسن علي محمد جمعة سلطان	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (53) لسنة 2017
71	شخص إرهابي	مصر	موسى	MOUSA	يحيى السيد إبراهيم محمد موسى	YAHIA AL SAYED IBRAHIM MOHAMED MOUSA	5/5/1984	مصر	يحيى السيد إبراهيم محمد موسى	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (53) لسنة 2017
72	شخص إرهابي	مصر	عبدالحميد	ABDELHAMEED	محمد جمال أحمد حشمت عبدالحميد	MOHAMMED GAMAL AHMED HESHMAT ABDELHAMEED	1956	مصر	محمد جمال أحمد حشمت عبدالحميد	-	-	تركيا	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (53) لسنة 2017
73	شخص إرهابي	مصر	عيسى	EISSA	السيد محمود عزت إبراهيم عيسى	ALSAYED MAHMOUD EZZAT IBRAHIM EISSA	1944	مصر	السيد محمود عزت إبراهيم عيسى	-	-	مصر - مسجون	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (53) لسنة 2017
74	شخص إرهابي	مصر	الشيخ	AL-SHAIKH	قدري محمد فهمي محمود الشيخ	QADRI MOHAMMED FAHIM MAHMOUD AL-SHAIKH	11/2/1972	-	قدري محمد فهمي محمود الشيخ	-	إسطنبول	تركيا	جواز سفر	618452	مصر	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (53) لسنة 2017
75	شخص إرهابي	مصر	السماحي	AL-SAMAHI	علاء علي علي محمد السماحي	ALAA ALI ALI MOHAMMED AL-SAMAHI	1/1/1976	مصر	علاء علي علي محمد السماحي	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (53) لسنة 2017
76	شخص إرهابي	النمسا	نيكباخت	NIKBAKHT	مسعود نيكباخت	MAS'UD NIKBAKHT	1/1/1943	-	مسعود نيكباخت	-	-	-	تأشيرة سياحية	20420040103558 27	دبي	-	-	1/20/2005	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (24) لسنة 2018
77	شخص إرهابي	إيراني	نجفبور	NAJAFPUR	سعيد نجفبور	SA'ID NAJAFPUR	-	-	سعيد نجفبور	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (24) لسنة 2018
78	شخص إرهابي	ايران	خودادي	KHODA'I	محمد حسن خودادي	MOHAMMAD HASAN KHODA'I	-	-	محمد حسن خودادي	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (24) لسنة 2018
79	شخص إرهابي	ايران	فلدزاجارد	VALADZAGHARD	محمد رضا خدمتي فلدزاجارد	MOHAMMADREZA KHEDMATI VALADZAGHARD	5/4/1986	ايران	محمد رضا خدمتي فلدزاجارد	-	-	-	جواز سفر	N35635875	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (24) لسنة 2018
80	شخص إرهابي	ايران	أميني	AMINI	مقداد أميني	MEGHDAD AMINI	5/6/1982	ايران	مقداد أميني	-	-	-	جواز سفر	U36089349	ايران	12/24/2015	12/23/2020		مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (24) لسنة 2018
81	شخص إرهابي	ايران	صالحي	SALEHI	فؤاد صالحي	FOAD SALEHI	4/28/1986	ايران	فؤاد صالحي	-	-	-	جواز سفر	25265428	ايران	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (24) لسنة 2018
82	شخص إرهابي	ايران	اوهادي	OWHADI	محمد إبراهيم أوهادي (جلال فهدي)	MOHAMMAD EBRAHIM OWHADI	1963	-	محمد إبراهيم أوهادي (جلال فهدي)	-	-	ايران	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (50) لسنة 2018
83	شخص إرهابي	ايران	زيرافي	RAZAVI	إسماعيل ريزافي (العميد ريزافي)	ESMA'IL RAZAVI	1959	-	إسماعيل ريزافي (العميد ريزافي)	-	-	ايران	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (50) لسنة 2018
84	شخص إرهابي	أفغانستان	فاروق	FAROQUI	عبدالله صمد فاروق (عبدالصمد)	ABDULLAH SAMAD FAROQUI	-	-	عبدالله صمد فاروق (عبدالصمد)										مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (50) لسنة 2018
85	شخص إرهابي	أفغانستان	مزمل	Mzml	محمد داود مزمل	MOHAMMAD DAWOOD	1/1/1983	أفغانستان	محمد داود مزمل	-	شورى كويتا	باكستان	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (50) لسنة 2018
86	شخص إرهابي	أفغانستان	منان	MANAN	عبدالرحيم منان	ABDUL RAHIM MANAN	1/1/1962	أفغانستان	عبدالرحيم منان	-	ولاية هلمند	أفغانستان	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (50) لسنة 2018
87	شخص إرهابي	أفغانستان	بارتش	BARICH	محمد نعيم بارتش	MOHAMMAD NAEEM BARICH	1/1/1975	أفغانستان	محمد نعيم بارتش	هوزار قوفيت	ولاية هلمند	أفغانستان	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (50) لسنة 2018
88	شخص إرهابي	أفغانستان	إبراهيم	IBRAHIM	سادر إبراهيم	SADR IBRAHIM	1979	أفغانستان	سادر إبراهيم	-	-	أفغانستان	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (50) لسنة 2018
89	شخص إرهابي	باكستان	زماني	ZAMANI	عبدالعزيز <حاجي عزيز شاه زماني>	ABDUL AZIZ SHAH ZAMANI	1/1/1985	باكستان	عبدالعزيز <حاجي عزيز شاه زماني>	شارع 30	كراتشي	باكستان	جواز سفر	AP1810244	باكستان	-	10/31/2026	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (50) لسنة 2018
90	شخص إرهابي	باكستان	عبدالمجيدي	ABDUL MAJEED	حفيظ عبدالمجيدي	HAFEEZ ABDUL MAJEED	1/1/1972	أفغانستان	حفيظ عبدالمجيدي	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (50) لسنة 2018
91	شخص إرهابي	سوري	الراوي	AL-RAWI	عبدالرحمن علي حسين الأحمد الراوي	ABD-AL RAHMAN 'ALI HUSAYN AL-AHMAD AL-RAWI	1983	-	عبدالرحمن علي حسين الأحمد الراوي	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (51) لسنة 2020
92	شخص إرهابي	أفغانستان	خان	KHAN	سيد حبيب أحمد خان	SAYED HABIB AHMAD KHAN	1/1/1970	أفغانستان	سيد حبيب أحمد خان	-	-	-	جواز سفر	P2502071	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (51) لسنة 2020
93	شخص إرهابي	الامارات	-	-	احمد محمد عبدالله محمد الشيبه النعيمي	AHMED MOHAMMED ABDULLA MOHAMMED ALSHAIBA ALNUAIMI	-	إمارة عجمان، الإمارات	-	-	-	-	الرقم الموحد	257451	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021
94	شخص إرهابي	الامارات	-	-	محمد صقر يوسف صقر الزعابي	MOHAMED SAQER YOUSIF SAQER AL ZAABI	-	إمارة ابوظبي، الإمارات	-	-	-	-	الرقم الموحد	10249	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021
95	شخص إرهابي	الامارات	-	-	حمد محمد رحمه حميد الشامسي	HAMAD MOHAMMED RAHMAH HUMAID ALSHAMSI	-	إمارة عجمان، الإمارات	-	-	-	-	الرقم الموحد	253981	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021
96	شخص إرهابي	الامارات	-	-	سعيد ناصر سعيد ناصر الطنيجي	SAEED NASER SAEED NASER ALTENEIJI	-	الرمس، راس الخيمة	-	-	-	-	الرقم الموحد	411483	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021
97	شخص إرهابي	لبنان	-	-	حسن حسين طباجه	HASSAN HUSSAIN TABAJA	-	لبنان	-	-	-	-	الرقم الموحد	58084207	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021
98	شخص إرهابي	لبنان	-	-	ادهم حسين طباجه	ADHAM HUSSAIN TABAJA	-	لبنان	-	-	-	-	الرقم الموحد	5207219	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021
99	شخص إرهابي	اليمن	-	-	محمد احمد مسعد سعيد	MOHAMMED AHMED MUSAED SAEED	-	اليمن	-	-	-	-	الرقم الموحد	118618863	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021
100	شخص إرهابي	اليمن	-	-	راشد صالح صالح الجرموزى	RASHED SALEH SALEH AL JARMOUZI	-	اليمن	-	-	-	-	الرقم الموحد	7000815	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021

101	شخص إرهابي	اليمن	نايف ناصر صالح الجرموزى	-	NAIF NASSER SALEH ALJARMOUZI	-	اليمن	-	-	-	-	الرقم الموحد	76107095	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021
102	شخص إرهابي	أفغانستان	ذبيح الله عبدالقاهر دوراني	-	Zubiullah Abdul Qahir Durani	-	أفغانستان	-	-	-	-			-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021
103	شخص إرهابي	اليمن	سليمان صالح سالم عبولان	-	Suliman Saleh Salem Aboulan	-	اليمن - سيئون	-	-	-	-	جواز سفر يمني	8890725	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021
104	شخص إرهابي	اليمن	عادل أحمد سالم عبيد علي بادره	-	Adel Ahmed Salem Obaid Ali Badrah	-	اليمن - سيئون	-	-	-	-	جواز سفر يمني	7772452	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021
105	شخص إرهابي	السعودية	علي ناصر عسيري	-	Ali Nasser Alaseeri	-	السعودية	-	-	-	-	جواز سفر سعودي	11879	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021
106	شخص إرهابي	اليمن	فضل صالح سالم الطيابى	-	FADHL SALEH SALEM ALTAYABI	-	اليمن - البيضاء	-	-	-	-	جواز سفر يمني	2879473	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021
107	شخص إرهابي	اليمن	عاشور عمر عاشور عبيدون	-	Ashur Omar Ashur OBAIDOON	-	اليمن	-	-	-	-	جواز سفر يمني	7777531	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021
108	شخص إرهابي	سوري	حازم محسن الفرحان + حازم محسن فرحان	-	HAZEM MOHSEN FARHAN + HAZEM MOHSEN AL FARHAN	-	سوريا	-	-	-	-	الرقم الموحد	73739119	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021
109	شخص إرهابي	إيراني	مهدى عزيز اله كياستى	-	MEHDI AZIZOLLAH KIASATI	-	إيران	-	-	-	-	الرقم الموحد	143729561	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021
110	شخص إرهابي	إيراني	فرشاد جعفر حاكم زاده	-	FARSHAD JAFAR HAKEMZADEH	-	إيران	-	-	-	-	الرقم الموحد	117728897	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021
111	شخص إرهابي	إيراني	سيد رضا سيد محمد قاسمى	-	SEYYED REZA MOHMMAD GHASEMI	-	إيران	-	-	-	-	الرقم الموحد	67981903	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021
112	شخص إرهابي	إيراني	محسن حسن كاركرحجت	-	MOHSEN HASSAN KARGARHODJAT ABADI))	-	إيران	-	-	-	-	الرقم الموحد	46809739	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021
113	شخص إرهابي	إيراني	ابراهيم محمود احمد محمد	-	IBRAHIM MAHMOOD AHMED MOHAMMED	-	إمارة عجمان، الإمارات	-	-	-	-	الرقم الموحد	261216	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021
114	شخص إرهابي	سوريا	اسامه حسين دغيم	-	OSAMA HOUSEN DUGHAEM	-	سوريا	-	-	-	-	الرقم الموحد	39396225	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021
115	شخص إرهابي	نيجيري	عبدالرحمن أدو موسى	-	ABDURRAHAMAN ADO MUSA	-	ياكاساي نيجيريا	-	-	-	-	الرقم الموحد	170211735	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021
116	شخص إرهابي	نيجيري	صالح يوسف أدامو	-	SALIHU YUSUF ADAMU	-	كانو نيجيريا	-	-	-	-	الرقم الموحد	119145993	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021
117	شخص إرهابي	نيجيري	بشير علي يوسف	-	BASHIR ALI YUSUF	-	كانو نيجيريا	-	-	-	-	الرقم الموحد	154101359	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021
118	شخص إرهابي	نيجيري	محمد إبراهيم عيسى	-	MUHAMMED IBRAHIM ISA	-	كانو نيجيريا	-	-	-	-	الرقم الموحد	47171720	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021
119	شخص إرهابي	نيجيري	إبراهيم علي الحسن	-	IBRAHIM ALI ALHASSAN	-	كانو نيجيريا	-	-	-	-	الرقم الموحد	39624466	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021
120	شخص إرهابي	نيجيري	سوراجو أبوبكر محمد	-	SURAJO ABUBAKAR MUHAMMAD	-	ريفي نيجيريا	-	-	-	-	الرقم الموحد	175020687	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021
121	شخص إرهابي	سوري	علاء خنفورة أو علاء عبدالرزاق علي خنفورة أو علاء الخنفورة	-	Alaa khanfurah - Alaa abdulrazzaq ali khanfurah - Alaa Alkhanfurah	-	سوريا	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021
122	شخص إرهابي	بريطانيا	فادي سعيد كمار، فادي سعيد قمر	-	FADI SAID KAMAR	-	دمشق - سوريا	-	-	-	-	الرقم الموحد	100038025	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021
123	شخص إرهابي	سانت كيتس - نافيس	وليد كامل عوض	-	WALID KAMEL AWAD	-	دمشق - سوريا	-	-	-	-	الرقم الموحد	30797785	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021
124	شخص إرهابي	سانت كيتس - نافيس	خالد وليد عوض	-	KHALED WALID AWAD	-	دمشق - سوريا	-	-	-	-	الرقم الموحد	112338165	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021
125	شخص إرهابي	روسيا	عماد خالق كوندا كزى	-	IMAD KHALLAK KANTAKDZHI	-	سوريا	-	-	-	-	الرقم الموحد	122879693	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021
126	شخص إرهابي	الأردن	محمد ايمن تيسير رشيد المراياتى	-	MOUHAMMAD AYMAN TAYSEER RASHID MARAYAT	-	الأردن	-	-	-	-	الرقم الموحد	33652035	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021
127	شخص إرهابي	لبنان	حسن أحمد مقلد	Moukalled	Hassan Ahmed Moukalled	17/02/1967	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (9) لسنة 2023
128	شخص إرهابي	لبنان	راني حسن مقلد	Moukalled	Rani Hassan Moukalled	29/10/1998	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (9) لسنة 2023
129	شخص إرهابي	لبنان	ريان حسن مقلد	Moukalled	Ryyan Hassan Moukalled	25/10/1993	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (9) لسنة 2023
130	شخص إرهابي	الحالية: السويد السابقة: ليبيريا	يوسف حسن أحمد الملا		YOUSEF HASSAN AHMAD AL MULLA	1/7/1984	الشارقة - الإمارات					جواز السفر	146957	ليبيريا				مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (1) لسنة 2025
131	شخص إرهابي	تركيا	سعيد خادم أحمد بن طوق المري		SAEED KHADEM AHMED BINTOUQ ALMARRI	1/4/1960	دبي - الإمارات					جواز السفر	تركي رقم: U24171753 إماراتي رقم: NZ9Y56591	تركيا و الإمارات				مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (1) لسنة 2025
132	شخص إرهابي	الإمارات	إبراهيم أحمد إبراهيم علي الحمادي		IBRAHIM AHMED IBRAHIM ALI ALHAMMADI	1/1/1958	الفجيرة - الإمارات					جواز السفر	السويد رقم: 35482622 إماراتي رقم: A2649673	السويد و الامارات				مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (1) لسنة 2025
133	شخص إرهابي	السويد	إلهام عبدالله أحمد الهاشمي		ELHAM ABDULLA AHMAD ALHASHEMI	20/12/1963	دبي - الإمارات					جواز السفر	A2569896	الإمارات				مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (1) لسنة 2025
134	شخص إرهابي	الإمارات	جاسم راشد خلفان راشد الشامسي		JASEM RASHED KHALFAN RASHED ALSHAMSI	30/12/1968	الشارقة - الإمارات					جواز السفر	2106900	الإمارات				مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (1) لسنة 2025
135	شخص إرهابي	الإمارات	خالد عبيد يوسف بوعتابه الزعابي		KHALID OBAID YOUSIF BUATABA ALZAABI	19/06/1989	أبوظبي - الإمارات					جواز السفر	C47F92116	الإمارات				مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (1) لسنة 2025
136	شخص إرهابي	الإمارات	عبدالرحمن حسن منيف عبدالله حسن الجابري		ABDUL RAHMAN HASAN MUNIF A. ALJABERI	20/05/1989	أبوظبي - الإمارات					جواز السفر	2454612	الإمارات				مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (1) لسنة 2025
137	شخص إرهابي	الإمارات	حميد عبدالله عبدالرحمن الجرمن النعيمي		HUMAID ABDULLA ABDULRAHMAN J. ALNUAIMI	9/8/1974	دبي - الإمارات					جواز السفر	2535370	الإمارات				مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (1) لسنة 2025
138	شخص إرهابي	الإمارات	عبدالرحمن عمر سالم باجبير الحضرمي		ABDELRAHMAN OMAR SALIM BAJUBAIR ALHADHRAMI	27/02/1987	الشارقة - الإمارات					جواز السفر	إماراتي رقم: FNJR81768 بريطاني رقم: 760001649	الإمارات و بريطانيا				مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (1) لسنة 2025
139	شخص إرهابي	الإمارات	علي حسن علي حسين الحمادي		ALI HASAN ALI HUSAIN ALHAMMADI	1/1/1959	الشارقة - الإمارات					جواز السفر	2363886	الإمارات				مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (1) لسنة 2025
140	شخص إرهابي	اليمن	محمد علي حسن علي الحمادي		MOHAMED ALI HASSAN ALI ALHAMMADI	5/1/1982	الشارقة - الإمارات					جواز السفر	2333890	الإمارات				مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (1) لسنة 2025
141	شخص إرهابي	**الصومال**	حسن أبشر حور		Hasaan Abshir Xuuroow	1983												مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (44) لسنة 2025
142	شخص إرهابي	**الصومال**	آدن يوسف سعيد إبراهيم		Aadan Yusuf Saciid Ibrahim	1988												مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (44) لسنة 2025
143	شخص إرهابي	**الصومال**	مؤمن ديري		Mumin Dheere	1985												مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (44) لسنة 2025
144	شخص إرهابي	**الصومال**	ماكالين برهان		Macalin Burhan	1982												مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (44) لسنة 2025
145	شخص إرهابي	**الصومال**	علي أحمد حسين		Ali Ahmed Hussein	1980												مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (44) لسنة 2025
146	شخص إرهابي	**الصومال**	مكسمات كالي		Maxamed Cali	1984												مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (44) لسنة 2025
147	شخص إرهابي	**الصومال**	أحمد كبادي		Ahmed Kabadhe	1979												مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (44) لسنة 2025
148	شخص إرهابي	**الصومال**	سيات أيوتو		Siyaat Ayuto	1982												مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (44) لسنة 2025
149	شخص إرهابي	**الصومال**	حسن ياريسو آدم		Hassan Yariisow Aadan	1990												مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (44) لسنة 2025
150	شخص إرهابي	**الصومال**	سعيد عبدالله آدم		Siciid Abdullahi Aadan	1998												مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (44) لسنة 2025
151	شخص إرهابي	**الصومال**	محمد عبدالله حيري		Mohamed Abdullah Hirey	1954												مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (44) لسنة 2025
152	شخص إرهابي	**الصومال**	كبدي روبوي		Cabdi Roobow	1981												مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (44) لسنة 2025
153	شخص إرهابي	**الصومال**	شيخ آدم أبوبكر مالايلي		Shiek Aadan Abuukar Malayle	1962												مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (44) لسنة 2025
154	شخص إرهابي	**الصومال**	آدم جيس		Aadan Jiss	1977												مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (44) لسنة 2025

155	شخص إرهابي	الصومال			Cumar Guhaad	1972												مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (44) لسنة 2025
156	شخص إرهابي	لبناني	علي محمد كرنيب	Ali Mohammed Karneeb	فبراير 1987م 21	لبنان									رقم الهوية اللبنانية: 000004783501			مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (63) لسنة 2026
157	شخص إرهابي	لبناني	ناصر حسن نصر	Nasser Hassan Nasr	إبريل 1963م 20	لبنان									رقم جواز السفر اللبناني: 1730241 رقم الهوية اللبنانية 288030510000000:			مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (63) لسنة 2026
158	شخص إرهابي	لبناني	حسن شحاده عثمان	Hassan Shehadeh Osman	يونيو 1979م 29	لبنان									رقم الهوية اللبنانية 3571577:			مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (63) لسنة 2026
159	شخص إرهابي	لبناني	سامر حسن فواز	Samer Hassan Fawaz	نوفمبر 1974م 28	لبنان									رقم جواز السفر اللبناني: LR3018026			مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (63) لسنة 2026
160	شخص إرهابي	لبناني	احمد محمد يزبك	Ahmed Mohammed Yazbek	ديسمبر 1971م 01	لبنان									رقم الهوية اللبنانية 473548:			مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (63) لسنة 2026
161	شخص إرهابي	لبناني	عيسى حسين قصير	Isa Hussein Qasir	يوليو 1977م 21	دولة الكويت									رقم جواز السفر اللبناني: RL2923703 رقم الهوية اللبنانية 000004334212:			مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (63) لسنة 2026
162	شخص إرهابي	لبناني	ابراهيم علي ضاهر	Ibrahim Ali Daher	يوليو 1964م 04	لبنان									رقم الهوية اللبنانية 2562031:			مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (63) لسنة 2026
163	شخص إرهابي	لبناني	عباس حسن غريب	Abbas Hassan Ghareeb	سبتمبر 1969م 25	لبنان									رقم جواز السفر اللبناني: RL3408611			مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (63) لسنة 2026
164	شخص إرهابي	لبناني	عماد محمد بزي	Emad Mohammed Bazzi	يونيو 1978م 29	لبنان									رقم جواز السفر اللبناني: LR0993984 رقم الهوية اللبنانية 000025755618:			مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (63) لسنة 2026
165	شخص إرهابي	لبناني	عزت يوسف عكر	Ezzat Yousef Akr	نوفمبر 1967م 01	لبنان									الرقم الموحد اللبناني: 67598594			مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (63) لسنة 2026
166	شخص إرهابي	لبناني	وحيد محمود سبيتي	Wahid Mahmud Sbeiti	فبراير 1961م 23	لبنان									رقم الهوية اللبنانية 473548:			مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (63) لسنة 2026
167	شخص إرهابي	لبناني	مصطفى حبيب حرب	Mustafa Habib Harb	أغسطس 1973م 06	لبنان									رقم الهوية اللبنانية: 00006234426			مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (63) لسنة 2026
168	شخص إرهابي	لبناني	محمد سليمان بدير	Mohammed Suleiman Badir	يوليو 1975م 14	لبنان									رقم الهوية اللبنانية: 000002245367			مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (63) لسنة 2026
169	شخص إرهابي	لبناني	عادل محمد منصور	Adel Mohammad Mansour	مايو 1966م 18	لبنان									رقم جواز السفر اللبناني: RL3181020			مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (63) لسنة 2026
170	شخص إرهابي	لبناني	علي احمد كريشت	Ali Ahmed Krisht	يوليو 1977م 17	لبنان									رقم الهوية اللبنانية 000040120529:			مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (63) لسنة 2026
171	شخص إرهابي	لبناني	نعمة أحمد جميل	Nima Ahmad Jamil	أغسطس 1970م 08	لبنان									رقم الهوية اللبنانية 000010757716:			مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (63) لسنة 2026

التنظيمات المدرجة في قائمة الإرهاب المحلية			
أولاً- المعلومات الرئيسية		ثانيًا: الأسماء المعرفة للمدرج	سادسًا- معلومات
#	التصنيف	الاسم الكامل (بالحروف اللاتينية)	الاسم	معلومات أخرى
1	تنظيم إرهابي	MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN THE UAE	جماعة الإخوان المسلمين الإماراتية دعوة الإصلاح (جمعية الإصلاح)	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
2	تنظيم إرهابي	KHALAYA AL JIHAD AL-EMIRATI (UAE JAHADIST CELLS)	خلايا الجهاد الإماراتي	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
3	تنظيم إرهابي	OMMAH PARTY	أحزاب الأمة في الخليج	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
4	تنظيم إرهابي	AL QAEDA (AQ)	تنظيم القاعدة	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
5	تنظيم إرهابي	ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND THE LEVANT (ISIS)	الدولة الإسلامية في العراق والشام (داعش)	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
6	تنظيم إرهابي	AL-QA'IDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA	تنظيم القاعدة في شبه الجزيرة العربية	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
7	تنظيم إرهابي	ANSAR AL-SHARIA(SUPPORTERS OF SHARIA LAW) IN YEMEN	أنصار الشريعة (اليمن)	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
8	تنظيم إرهابي	THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD	تنظيم وجماعة الإخوان المسلمين	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
9	تنظيم إرهابي	ISLAMIC GROUB IN EGYPT	الجماعة الإسلامية في مصر	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
10	تنظيم إرهابي	ANSAR BAIT AL-MAQDIS (WILAYAT SINAI- PROVINCE OR STATE IN THE SINAI)	جماعة أنصار بيت المقدس المصرية	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
11	تنظيم إرهابي	AJNAD MISR	جماعة أجناد مصر	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
12	تنظيم إرهابي	MAJLIS SHURA AL-MUJAHIDEEN FI AKNAF BAYT AL-MAQDIS (THE MUJAHEDEEN SHURA COUNCIL IN THE (ENVIRONS OF JERUSALEM	مجلس شورى المجاهدين أكناف بيت المقدس	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
13	تنظيم إرهابي	THE HOUTHI MOVEMENT IN YEMEN	حركة الحوثيين في اليمن	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
14	تنظيم إرهابي	HEZBOLLAH AL-HIJAZ IN SAUDI ARABIA	حزب الله السعودي في الحجاز	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
15	تنظيم إرهابي	HEZBOLLAH IN THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL	حزب الله في دول مجلس التعاون الخليجي	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
16	تنظيم إرهابي	AL-QAIDA ORGNAISATION IN IRAN	تنظيم القاعدة في إيران	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
17	تنظيم إرهابي	BADER ORGANISATION IN IRAQ	منظمة بدر في العراق	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
18	تنظيم إرهابي	ASAAIB AHL AL-HAQ (LEAGUE OF THE RIGHTEOUS) IN IRAQ	عصائب أهل الحق في العراق	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
19	تنظيم إرهابي	HEZBOLLAH BRIGADE IN IRAQ	كتائب حزب الله (العراق)	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
20	تنظيم إرهابي	LIWA ABU AL-FADL AL-ABBAS IN SYRIA	لواء أبو فضل العباس في سوريا	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
21	تنظيم إرهابي	AL-YOUM AL-MAOUD BRIGADE IN IRAQ	كتائب لواء اليوم الموعود (العراق)	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
22	تنظيم إرهابي	OMAR BIN YASSER BRIGADE IN SYRIA	لواء عمر بن ياسر (سوريا)	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014

23	تنظيم إرهابي	ANSAR AL-ISLAM	جماعة أنصار الإسلام العراقية	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
24	تنظيم إرهابي	AL-NUSRAH FRONT IN SYRIA	جبهة النصرة في سوريا	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
25	تنظيم إرهابي	HARAKET AHRAR ASHAM IN SYRIA (ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF THE FREE MAN OF THE LEVENT)	حركة أحرار الشام في سوريا	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
26	تنظيم إرهابي	THE ARMY OF ISLAM IN PALESTINE	جيش الإسلام في فلسطين	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
27	تنظيم إرهابي	ABDALLAH AZZAM BRIGADES	كتائب عبد الله عزام	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
28	تنظيم إرهابي	FATAH AL ISLAM IN LEBANON	حركة فتح الإسلام اللبنانية	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
29	تنظيم إرهابي	ASBAT AL-ANSAR IN LEBANON	عصبة الأنصار في لبنان	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
30	تنظيم إرهابي	AL QAIDA IN THE LAND OF THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB	تنظيم القاعدة في بلاد المغرب الإسلامي	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
31	تنظيم إرهابي	ANSAR AL-SHARIA IN LIBYA	كتيبة أنصار الشريعة في ليبيا	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
32	تنظيم إرهابي	ANSAR AL-SHARI'A IN TUNISIA	جماعة أنصار الشريعة في تونس	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
33	تنظيم إرهابي	MUJAHIDEEN YOUTH MOVEMENT IN SOMALIA(HARAKET AL-SHABAAB AL-MUJAHIDEEN IN SOMALIA)	حركة شباب المجاهدين الصومالية	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
34	تنظيم إرهابي	BOKO HARAM IN NIGERIA	جماعة بوكو حرام في نيجيريا	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
35	تنظيم إرهابي	ALMOURABITOUN GROUB IN MALI(THE SENTINELS)	كتيبة المرابطون في مالي	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
36	تنظيم إرهابي	ANSAR AL-DINE IN MALI	حركة أنصار الدين في مالي	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
37	تنظيم إرهابي	THE HAQQANI NETWORK IN PAKISTAN	شبكة حقاني الباكستانية	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
38	تنظيم إرهابي	LASHKAR E-TAYYIBA	جماعة لشكر طيبة الباكستانية	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
39	تنظيم إرهابي	EAST TURKISTAN MOVEMENT IN PAKISTAN	حركة تركستان الشرقية في باكستان	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
40	تنظيم إرهابي	JAISH-I-MOHAMMED IN PAKISTAN	جيش محمد في باكستان	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
41	تنظيم إرهابي	JAISH-E-MOHAMMED (THE ARMY OF MOHAMMAD IN PAKISTAN AND INDIA)	جيش محمد في باكستان والهند	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
42	تنظيم إرهابي	AL-MUJAHIDEEN AL-HONOUD IN KASHMIR/INDIA (THE INDIAN MUJAHIDEEN)	المجاهدين الهنود في الهند/ كشمير	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
43	تنظيم إرهابي	CAUCASUS EMIRATE	إمارة القوقاز الإسلامية (الجهاديين الشيشانيين)	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
44	تنظيم إرهابي	THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF UZBEKISTAN	الحركة الإسلامية الأوزبكية	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
45	تنظيم إرهابي	ABU SAYYAF GROUP	جماعة أبوسياف الفلبينية	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
46	تنظيم إرهابي	TAHRIK-E TALIBAN PAKISTAN	حركة طالبان باكستان	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
47	تنظيم إرهابي	ABU-DHAR AL-GHIFARI BATTALION IN SYRIA	كتيبة أبو ذر الغفاري في سوريا	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014

48	تنظيم إرهابي	AL-TAWHEED BRIGADE IN SYRIA(BRIGADE OF UNITY,OR MONOTHEISM)	لواء التوحيد في سوريا	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
49	تنظيم إرهابي	AL-TAWHID WAL-EMAN BATTALION IN SYRIA	كتيبة التوحيد والإيمان في سوريا	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
50	تنظيم إرهابي	KATIBAT AL-KHADRA IN SYRIA(THE GREEN BATTALTION)	كتيبة الخضراء في سوريا	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
51	تنظيم إرهابي	ABU BAKR AL-SIDDIQ BRIGADE IN SYRIA	سرية أبو بكر الصديق في سوريا	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
52	تنظيم إرهابي	TALHA BIN OBAIDULLAH BRIGADE IN SYRIA	سرية طلحة بن عبيد الله في سوريا	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
53	تنظيم إرهابي	AL-SARIM AL-BATTAR BRIGADE IN SYRIA	سرية الصارم البتار في سوريا	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
54	تنظيم إرهابي	ABDULLAH IBN MUBARAK BRIGADE IN SYRIA	كتيبة عبد الله بن مبارك في سوريا	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
55	تنظيم إرهابي	CONVOYS OF MARTYRS BRIGADE IN SYRIA	كتيبة قوافل الشهداء في سوريا	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
56	تنظيم إرهابي	ABU-OMER BRIGADE IN SYRIA	كتيبة أبو عمر في سوريا	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
57	تنظيم إرهابي	AHRAR SHAMMAR BRIGADE IN SYRIA	كتيبة أحرار شمر في سوريا	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
58	تنظيم إرهابي	SARIYAT AL-JABAL BRIGADE IN SYRIA	كتيبة سارية الجبل في سوريا	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
59	تنظيم إرهابي	AL-SHAHBA BRIGADE IN SYRIA	كتيبة الشهباء في سوريا	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
60	تنظيم إرهابي	ALQAQAA BRIGADE IN SYRIA	كتيبة القعقاع في سوريا	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
61	تنظيم إرهابي	SUFIAN AL-THAWRI BRGADE IN SYRIA	كتيبة سفيان الثوري في سوريا	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
62	تنظيم إرهابي	EBAD AL-RAHMAN BRIGADE IN SYRIA(BRIGADE OF SOLDIERS OF ALLAH)	كتيبة عباد الرحمن في سوريا	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
63	تنظيم إرهابي	OMAR IBN AL-KHATTAB BATTALION IN SYRIA	كتيبة عمر بن الخطاب في سوريا	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
64	تنظيم إرهابي	AL-SHAYMA BATTALTION IN SYRIA	كتيبة الشيماء في سوريا	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
65	تنظيم إرهابي	KATIBAT AL-HAQ IN SYRIA (BRIGADE OF THE RIGHTEOUS)	كتيبة الحق في سوريا	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
66	تنظيم إرهابي	BENGHAZI DEFENSE BRIGADES	سرايا الدفاع عن بنغازي (ليبيا)	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
67	تنظيم إرهابي	AL-ASHTAR BRIGADES	سرايا الأشتر (البحرين)	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
68	تنظيم إرهابي	FEBRUARY 14 COALITION	إتلاف 14 فبراير (البحرين)	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
69	تنظيم إرهابي	THE POPULAR RESISTANCE BRIGADES IN BAHRAIN	سرايا المقاومة (البحرين)	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
70	تنظيم إرهابي	BAHRAINS HEZBOLLAH	حزب الله البحريني (البحرين)	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
71	تنظيم إرهابي	SARAYA AL-MUKHTAR	سرايا المختار (البحرين)	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017
72	تنظيم إرهابي	BAHRAIN FREEDOM MOVEMENT	حركة أحرار البحرين (البحرين)	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017

73	تنظيم إرهابي	BENGHAZI REVOLUTIONARIES SHURA COUNCIL	مجلس شورى ثوار بنغازي	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (28) لسنة 2017
74	تنظيم إرهابي	AL-SARAYA MEDIA CENTER	مركز السرايا للإعلام	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (28) لسنة 2017
75	تنظيم إرهابي	RAFALLAH AL-SAHATI BRIGADE	كتيبة راف الله السحاتي	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (28) لسنة 2017

الكيانات المدرجة في قائمة الإرهاب المحلية								
أولاً- المعلومات الرئيسية			ثانياً- الأسماء المعرفة للمدرج	ثالثاً- الوثائق			رابعاً- معلومات	
#	التصنيف	الاسم الكامل (باللغة العربية)	الاسم الكامل (بالحروف اللاتينية)	الاسم	رقم الرخصة	انتهاء الترخيص	المقر	ملاحظات	معلومات أخرى
1	كيان إرهابي	-	AL-KARAMA ORGANISATION	منظمة الكرامة	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
2	كيان إرهابي	-	THE COUNCIL ON AMERICAN ISLAMIC RELATIONS (CAIR)	مجلس العلاقات الأمريكية الإسلامية (كير)	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
3	كيان إرهابي	-	MUSLIM AMERICAN SOCIETY (MAS)	الجمعية الإسلامية الأمريكية (ماس)	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
4	كيان إرهابي	-	INTERNAIONAL UNION OF MUSLIM SCHOLARS (IUMS)	اتحاد علماء المسلمين	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
5	كيان إرهابي	-	FADERATION OF ISLAMIC ORGANISATION IN EUROPE	اتحاد المنظمات الإسلامية في أوروبا	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
6	كيان إرهابي	-	UNION OF ISLAMIC ORGANISATION OF FRANCE (UOIF)	اتحاد المنظمات الإسلامية في فرنسا	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
7	كيان إرهابي	-	MUSLIM ASSOCIATION OF BRITAIN (MAB)	الرابطة الإسلامية في بريطانيا	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
8	كيان إرهابي	-	ISLAMIC COMMUNITY OF GERMANY	التجمع الإسلامي بألمانيا	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
9	كيان إرهابي	-	ISLAMIC ASSOCIATION OF DENMARK	الرابطة الإسلامية في الدنمارك	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
10	كيان إرهابي	-	ISLAMIC ASSOCIATION IN BELGIUM	الرابطة الإسلامية في بلجيكا (رابطة مسلمي بلجيكا)	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
11	كيان إرهابي	-	ISAMIC ASSOCIATION OF ITALY	الرابطة الإسلامية في إيطاليا	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
12	كيان إرهابي	-	ISLAMIC ASSOCIATION OF FINLAND	الرابطة الإسلامية في فنلندا	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
13	كيان إرهابي	-	ISLAMIC ASSOCIATION OF SWEDEN	الرابطة الإسلامية في السويد	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
14	كيان إرهابي	-	ISLAMIC ASSOCIATION OF NORWAY	الرابطة الإسلامية في النرويج	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
15	كيان إرهابي	-	ISLAMIC AID	منظمة الإغاثة الإسلامية في لندن	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
16	كيان إرهابي	-	THE CORDOBA FOUNDATION	مؤسسة قرطبة في بريطانيا	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
17	كيان إرهابي	-	ISLAMIC RELETIEF WORLD WIDE	هيئة الإغاثة الإسلامية التابعة لتنظيم الإخوان المسلمين الدولي	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014
18	كيان إرهابي	-	ALRAHMA FOUNDATION FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT	مؤسسة الرحمة الخيرية	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (28) لسنة 2017
19	كيان إرهابي	-	BOSHRA NEWS AGENCY	وكالة بشرى الإخبارية	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (28) لسنة 2017
20	كيان إرهابي	-	ALNABAA TV	قناة النبأ	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (28) لسنة 2017
21	كيان إرهابي	-	TANASUH FOUNDATION FOR DAWA,CULTURE AND MEDIA	مؤسسة التناصح للدعوة والثقافة والإعلام	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (28) لسنة 2017
22	كيان إرهابي	-	AL KHAYR SUPERMARKET	سوبر ماركت الخير	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (45) لسنة 2017
23	كيان إرهابي	-	INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC COUNCIL	المجلس الإسلامي العالمي "مساع"	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (53) لسنة 2017
24	كيان إرهابي	-	INTERNATIONAL UNION OF MUSLIMS SCHOLARS	الاتحاد العالمي لعلماء المسلمين	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (53) لسنة 2017
25	كيان إرهابي	-	RASHED EXCHANGE	راشد للصرافة	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (24) لسنة 2018
26	كيان إرهابي	-	JAHAN ARAS KISH	جهان أراس كيش	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (24) لسنة 2018
27	كيان إرهابي	-	KHEDMATI AND COMPANY JOINT PARTNERSHIP	خدمتي وشركاؤه	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (24) لسنة 2018
28	كيان إرهابي	-	TAWASUL COMPANY	شركة تواصل	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (51) لسنة 2020
29	كيان إرهابي	-	AL HARAM EXCHANGE	شركة الهرم الصرافة	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (51) لسنة 2020
30	كيان إرهابي	-	AL KHALIDI EXCHANGE	شركة الخالدي للصرافة	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (51) لسنة 2020
31	كيان إرهابي	-	NEJAAT SOCIAL WALFARE ORGANIZATION (NEJAAT)	منظمة نجاة للرعاية الاجتماعية	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (51) لسنة 2020
32	كيان إرهابي	شركة اثار الأشعة للتجارة	RAY TRACING TRADING CO LLC	-	576485	12/26/2018	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021
33	كيان إرهابي	شركة م ح الحمرية ارزو الدولية م م ح	H F Z A ARZOO INTERNATIONAL F Z E	-	1235	6/14/2021	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021
34	كيان إرهابي	شركة حنان للملاحة	HANAN SHIPPING L.L.C	-	246003	4/4/2022	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021
35	كيان إرهابي	شركة فور كورنرز بتروليوم	FOUR CORNERS TRADING EST	-	208202	3/15/2021	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021
36	كيان إرهابي	شركة ساسكو لوجستيك	SASCO LOGISTIC L.L.C	-	535215	6/23/2021	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021
37	كيان إرهابي	شركة الجرموزي للتجارة العامة	ALJARMOUZI GENERAL TRADING LLC	-	525824	4/21/2021	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021

38	كيان إرهابي	شركة الجرموزي للشحن والتخليص (ش.ذ.م.م)	AL JARMOOZI CARGO & CLEARING (L.L.C)	-	546318	6/20/2021	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021
39	كيان إرهابي	شركة الجرموزي لنقل المواد بالشاحنات الثقيلة والخفيفة (ش.ذ.م.م)	AL JARMOOZI TRANSPORT BY HEAVY & LIGHT TRUCKS (L.L.C	-	618449	1/11/2021	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021
40	كيان إرهابي	شركة ناصر الجرموزي للتجارة العامة (ش.ذ.م.م)،	NASER ALJARMOUZI CENERAL TRADING (L.L.C)	-	641142	6/19/2021	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021
41	كيان إرهابي	شركة ناصر الجرموزي للشحن والتخليص ش ذ م م	NASER ALJARMOUZI CARGO & CLEARING LLC	-	644103	8/30/2021	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021
42	كيان إرهابي	ويف تك للكمبيوتر ذ م م	WAVE TECH COMPUTER LLC	-	117826	4/30/2021	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021
43	كيان إرهابي	ان واي بي أي تريدينج- م م ح	NYBI TRADING - FZE	-	13045	12/20/2017	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021
44	كيان إرهابي	كي سى ال جنرال تريدنج م م ح	KCL GENERAL TRADING F Z E	-	9639	12/21/2017	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021
45	كيان إرهابي	مجموعة الانماء	Alinma group	-	خارج الدولة	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021
46	كيان إرهابي	شركة العمقي وإخوانه للصرافة	AL-OMGY & BROS MONEY EXCHANGE	-	خارج الدولة	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021
47	كيان إرهابي	العالمية إكسبرس للصرافة والتحويلات المالية	AlAlameya Express Company for Exchange & Remittance	-	-	-	صنعاء - اليمن	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (13) لسنة 2022
48	كيان إرهابي	شركة الحظاء للصرافة	Al Hadha Exchange Co	-	-	-	صنعاء - اليمن	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (13) لسنة 2022
49	كيان إرهابي	معاذ عبدالله دائل للإستيراد و التصدير	MOAZ ABDULLA DAEL FOR IMPORT AND EXPORT	-	-	-	صنعاء - اليمن	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (13) لسنة 2022
50	كيان إرهابي	بيريدوت للتجارة والشحن ذ م م	PERIDOT SHIPPING AND TRADING LLC	-	-	-	الهند	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (13) لسنة 2022
51	كيان إرهابي	لايت مون	LIGHT MOON	-	-	-	-	(IMO 9109550)	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (13) لسنة 2022
52	كيان إرهابي	-	CTEX EXCHANGE	-	2061281 - لبنان	-	لبنان	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (9) لسنة 2023
53	كيان إرهابي	-	CAMBRIDGE EDUCATION AND TRAINING CENTER LTD	أحمد محمد عبدالله محمد الشيبة النعيمي	8961546	-	المملكة المتحدة	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (1) لسنة 2025
54	كيان إرهابي	-	IMA6INE LTD		9881248	-	المملكة المتحدة	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (1) لسنة 2025
55	كيان إرهابي	-	WEMBLEY TREE LTD		15167935	-	المملكة المتحدة	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (1) لسنة 2025
56	كيان إرهابي	-	WASLAFORALL	عائشة احمد محمد الشيبة النعيمي	11617032	-	المملكة المتحدة	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (1) لسنة 2025
57	كيان إرهابي	-	FUTURE GRADUATES LTD	محمد صقر يوسف صقر الزعابي	9448340	-	المملكة المتحدة	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (1) لسنة 2025
58	كيان إرهابي	-	YAS FOR INVESTMENT AND REAL ESTATE	عبدالرحمن حسن منيف عبدالله حسن الجابري	10720363	-	المملكة المتحدة	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (1) لسنة 2025
59	كيان إرهابي	-	HOLDCO UK PROPERTIES LIMITED		15745822	-	المملكة المتحدة	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (1) لسنة 2025
60	كيان إرهابي	-	NAFEL CAPITAL		15672268	-	المملكة المتحدة	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (1) لسنة 2025
61	كيان إرهابي	بيت مال المسلمين	Bayt Al-Mal ALMuslimeen		**رقم الوحدة** (141)		لبنان		مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (63) لسنة 2026
62	كيان إرهابي	جمعية مؤسسة القرض الحسن	AL-Qard AL-Hassan Association		**رقم الرخصة** (217/ ا . د)		لبنان		مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (63) لسنة 2026
63	كيان إرهابي	شركة التسهيلات ش.م.م	AL Tasheelat Company		**رقم التسجيل** (2008980)		لبنان		مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (63) لسنة 2026
64	كيان إرهابي	المدققون للمحاسبة والتدقيق	The Auditors for Accounting and Auditing		**رقم التسجيل** (278)		لبنان		مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (63) لسنة 2026
65	كيان إرهابي	الخبراء للمحاسبة والتدقيق والدراسات	AL-Khobara For Accounting, Auditing, and studies		رقم التسجيل (81396) رقم الرخصة (5083663376)		لبنان		مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (63) لسنة 2026

الأفراد المرفوعة أسمائهم من قائمة الإرهاب المحلية																			
أولاً- المعلومات الرئيسية						ثانيا: الأسماء المعرفة للمدرج	ثالثًا- العنوان			رابعًا- الوثائق					خامساً- معلومات	
#	التصنيف	الجنسية	اسم العائلة (بالحروف العربية)	اسم العائلة (بالحروف اللاتينية)	الاسم الكامل (بالحروف العربية)	الاسم الكامل (بالحروف اللاتينية)	تاريخ الميلاد	مكان الميلاد	الاسم	الشارع	المدينة	الدولة	النوع	رقم الوثيقة	جهة الإصدار	تاريخ الإصدار	تاريخ الانتهاء	قرار الإدراج	قرار رفع الإدراج
1	شخص إرهابي	قطر	السقطري	AL-SEQATRI	محمد سعيد بن حلوان السقطري	MOHAMMAD SAEED BIN HELWAN AL-SEQATRI		-	محمد سعيد بن حلوان السقطري	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017	رفع الإدراج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (88) لسنة 2023
2	شخص إرهابي	قطر	الربان	AL-RABBAN	خليفة بن محمد الربان	KHALIFA BIN MOHAMMAD AL-RABBAN	1959	-	خليفة بن محمد الربان	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017	رفع الإدراج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (88) لسنة 2023
3	شخص إرهابي	قطر	آل ثاني	AL-THANI	عبد الله بن خالد حمد بن عبد الله آل ثاني	ABDULLAH BIN KHALID BIN HAMAD BIN ABDULLAH AL-THANI	1956	-	عبد الله بن خالد حمد بن عبد الله آل ثاني	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017	رفع الإدراج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (88) لسنة 2023
4	شخص إرهابي	قطر	الحرام	AL-HARAM	عبد الرحيم أحمد الحرام	ABDUL RAHIM AHMAD AL-HARAM		-	عبد الرحيم أحمد الحرام	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017	رفع الإدراج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (88) لسنة 2023
5	شخص إرهابي	قطر	العجي	AL-AJJI	مبارك بن محمد العجي	MUBARAK MOHAMMAD AL-AJJI	-	-	مبارك بن محمد العجي	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017	رفع الإدراج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (88) لسنة 2023
6	شخص إرهابي	قطر	المري	AL-MARRI	جابر بن ناصر المري	JABIR BIN NASSER AL-MARRI	-	-	جابر بن ناصر المري	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017	رفع الإدراج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (88) لسنة 2023
7	شخص إرهابي	قطر	السليطي	AL-SULAITI	محمد جاسم السليطي	MOHAMMED JASSIM AL-SULAITI	-	-	محمد جاسم السليطي	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017	رفع الإدراج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (88) لسنة 2023
8	شخص إرهابي	قطر	السويدي	AL-SUWAIDI	علي بن عبد الله السويدي	ALI BIN ABDALLAH AL-SUWAIDI	-	-	علي بن عبد الله السويدي	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017	رفع الإدراج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (88) لسنة 2023
9	شخص إرهابي	قطر	العوضي	AL-AWADHY	هاشم محمد صالح عبد الله العوضي	HASHIM SALEH ABDULLAH AL-AWADHY	-	-	هاشم محمد صالح عبد الله العوضي	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017	رفع الإدراج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (88) لسنة 2023
10	شخص إرهابي	قطر	المري	AL-MARRI	حمد عبد الله الفطيس المري	HAMAD ABDULLAH AL-FUTTAIS AL-MARRI		-	حمد عبد الله الفطيس المري	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017	رفع الإدراج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (88) لسنة 2023
11	شخص إرهابي	قطر	البوعينين	AL-BOUNEIN	خالد سعيد فضل راشد الرومي البوعينين	KHALID SAEED AL-BOUNEIN	1/1/1968	-	خالد سعيد فضل راشد الرومي البوعينين	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (28) لسنة 2017	رفع الإدراج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (88) لسنة 2023
12	شخص إرهابي	قطر	الشهواني	AL-SHAHWANI	شقر جمعة الشهواني	SHAQER JUMMAH AL-SHAHWANI	-	-	شقر جمعة الشهواني									مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (28) لسنة 2017	رفع الإدراج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (88) لسنة 2023
13	شخص إرهابي	قطر	الكواري	AL-KUWARI	صالح بن أحمد الغانم الكواري	SALEH BIN AHMED AL-GHANIM AL-KUWARI	-	-	صالح بن أحمد الغانم الكواري									مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (28) لسنة 2017	رفع الإدراج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (88) لسنة 2023
14	شخص إرهابي	قطر	الحيدر	AL-HAYDAR	محمد سليمان حيدر محمد الحيدر	MOHAMMED SULAIMAN HAIDAR MOHAMMED AL-HAYDAR	1/1/1956	قطر	محمد سليمان حيدر محمد الحيدر	-	-	-	جواز سفر	01030941	قطر	26/03/2012	3/25/2017	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (53) لسنة 2017	رفع الإدراج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (88) لسنة 2023
15	شخص إرهابي	العراق	-	-	حيدر حبيب علي	HAYDER HABEEB ALI	-	العراق	-	-	-	-	الرقم الموحد	3899559	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021	رفع الإدراج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (88) لسنة 2023
16	شخص إرهابي	العراق	-	-	باسم يوسف حسين الشغانبي	BASIM YOUSUF HUSSEIN ALSHAGHANBI	-	العراق	-	-	-	-	الرقم الموحد	44907857	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021	رفع الإدراج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (88) لسنة 2023
17	شخص إرهابي	اليمن	-	-	شريف احمد شريف باعلوي	SHARIF AHMED SHARIF BA ALAWI	-	اليمن	-	-	-	-	الرقم الموحد	43260201	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021	رفع الإدراج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (88) لسنة 2023
18	شخص إرهابي	الهند	-	-	مانوج ساباروال او براكاش	MANOJ SABHARWAL OM PRAKASH	-	الهند	-	-	-	-	الرقم الموحد	4415541	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (83) لسنة 2021	رفع الإدراج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (24) لسنة 2024
19	شخص إرهابي	اليمن	-	-	عبده عبد الله دائل احمد	ABDO ABDULLAH DAEL AHMED	9/13/1979	تعز المخا	-	-	-	-	جواز سفر	8948884	اليمن	6/4/2020	6/4/2026	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (13) لسنة 2022	رفع الإدراج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (48) لسنة 2024

الكيانات المرفوعة أسمائها من قائمة الإرهاب المحلية								
أولاً- المعلومات الرئيسية			ثانياً- الأسماء المعرفة للمدرج	ثالثاً- الوثائق		رابعاً- معلومات		
#	التصنيف	الاسم الكامل (باللغة العربية)	الاسم الكامل (بالحروف اللاتينية)	الاسم	رقم الرخصة	انتهاء الترخيص	المقر	ملاحظات	قرار الادراج	قرار رفع الإدراج
1	كيان إرهابي	-	CANVAS : CENTER FOR APPLIED NONVIOLENT ACTION AND STRATEGIES	منظمة كانفاس في صربيا/ بلجراد	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (41) لسنة 2014	رفع الإدراج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (88) لسنة 2023
2	كيان إرهابي	-	QATAR VOLUNTEER CENTER	مركز قطر للعمل التطوعي (قطر)	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017	رفع الإدراج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (88) لسنة 2023
3	كيان إرهابي	-	DOHA APPLE	شركة دوحة أبل (شركت إنترنت ودعم تكنولوجي (قطر)	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017	رفع الإدراج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (88) لسنة 2023
4	كيان إرهابي	-	QATAR CHARITY	قطر الخيرية (قطر)	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017	رفع الإدراج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (88) لسنة 2023
5	كيان إرهابي	-	EID CHARITY	مؤسسة الشيخ عيد آل ثاني الخيرية (قطر)	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017	رفع الإدراج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (88) لسنة 2023
6	كيان إرهابي	-	SHEIKH THANI BIN ABDULLAH FOUNDATION FOR HUMANITARIAN SERVICE	مؤسسة الشيخ ثاني بن عبد الله للخدمات الإنسانية (قطر)	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (18) لسنة 2017	رفع الإدراج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (88) لسنة 2023
7	كيان إرهابي	-	AL-BALAGH CHARITABLE FOUNDATION	مؤسسة البلاغ الخيرية	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (28) لسنة 2017	رفع الإدراج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (88) لسنة 2023
8	كيان إرهابي	-	AL-IHSAN CHARITABLE SOCIETY	جمعية الإحسان الخيرية	-	-	-	-	مدرج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (28) لسنة 2017	رفع الإدراج بموجب قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (88) لسنة 2023

Exhibit 11

An official website of the United States Government Here's how you know



Two-Year Anniversary of October 7th Attack

PRESS STATEMENT

MARCO RUBIO, SECRETARY OF STATE

OCTOBER 7, 2025

Today marks two years since the attacks of October 7, when Hamas murdered more than 1,200 innocent men, women, and children — including 46 Americans — in the most brutal terrorist attack in Israel's history. Alongside these killings, Hamas took 254 hostages, among them 12 Americans. To this day, 48 hostages remain in Hamas captivity, including the remains of American citizens Itay Chen and Omer Neutra.

The United States reaffirms its unwavering support for Israel's right to exist, to defend itself, and to ensure the safety of its people. As the United States marks this tragic anniversary and honors the victims, we renew our resolve to prevent such evil from ever taking place again.

Under President Trump's leadership, America is leading the effort to secure the release of all hostages, end Hamas's rule in Gaza, and advance a durable peace that ensures not only Israel's security, but generational peace and prosperity for the region. This vision of stability, security, and a future free from terror is at the heart of the President's 20-Point Plan.

Since October 7, 2023, we have also witnessed a troubling surge in antisemitism threatening Jewish communities worldwide. As I have said, there can be

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with antisemitism. We continue to condemn all acts of terrorism and antisemitism against Israel, and we call on the international community to stand with Israel during this painful anniversary.

TAGS

Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs | Israel | Office of the Spokesman | The Secretary of State

Exhibit 12





The Path to October 7: How Iran Built Up and Managed a Palestinian 'Axis of Resistance'

DECEMBER 2023, VOLUME 16, ISSUE 11

Authors:
PHILLIP SMYTH

PDF

Categories:
IRAN / ISRAEL / PALESTINE / OPERATIONS, PLOTS & ATTACKS / STRATEGY, HISTORY, & GOALS / HAMAS / PALESTINIAN ISLAMIC JIHAD

SHARE VIA:

Abstract: *Since October 7, in the wake of the "al-Aqsa Flood" terrorist attacks by Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and other Palestinian factions from across the ideological spectrum, Iran's aid to and strategic management of these groups has taken on a new level of relevance. The methods Iran has used to cultivate and maintain influence and control over disparate Palestinian groups follows the same pragmatic carrot-and-stick formula it has used across the Middle East with other proxies, with incentives that include financial aid, weapons, and training. The use of sticks was particularly important in Tehran's restoration of influence over Hamas and PIJ after the Syrian civil war drove a wedge between Palestinian groups and Iran. The withholding of funds and a divide-and-rule approach helped Tehran get these groups back in line. More generally, Iran has worked to create and leverage splinter groups, particularly from the Palestinian Authority's dominant Fatah Movement, to grow its influence in Gaza and the West Bank. Tehran has also strived to build influence among leftist Palestinian groups to create a broad coalition of partners. And it uses umbrella groups and joint operations rooms to try to bolster the unity and coherence of its Palestinian network.*

On the morning of October 7, 2023, rocket barrages from the Gaza Strip consisting of around 2,000[1]-5,000[a] rockets began to hit targets in southern Israel. Armed motorized paragliders and gunmen in trucks, on motorbikes, and technicals streamed through holes blown through Israel's once-vaunted border fence and began firing on a mixture of civilian and military targets.[2] Seaborn divers and small boats attacked other targets on Israel's coast.[3] Around 1,200 Israelis were killed and around 3,500 wounded; over 240 were taken hostage.[4] There were many reports of rape, beheadings, and torture.[5]

Most of the fighters who crossed into Israel were members of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), but they were joined by gunmen from numerous smaller Palestinian factions. The scope, brutality, and audacity of the attacks, along with the weapons systems used, revealed a level of planning, destructiveness, and capability that surprised many analysts both in and out of government.[6]

One common thread linking the attackers were their extensive financial, military, and political connections to the Islamic Republic of Iran. As this article will outline, these associations were the product of extensive cultivation and management of a Palestinian "Axis of Resistance" by Tehran over many years.

Along with spreading the Islamic Revolution, one of the main goals of the late Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini was the destruction of Israel.[7] In fact, once Iran's Shah was deposed, it was Khomeini who then invited Palestine Liberation

Iran currently lacks the conventional military capability for a heads-on confrontation with Israel. Proxy forces have allowed Iran to maintain some level of plausible deniability, while asymmetrically supplying Tehran with a means to effectively strike Israel or apply pressure to it. Furthermore, Iran's creation of proxy forces has facilitated the spread of Iranian Islamist ideology.

As yet, no 'smoking gun' has emerged of direct Iranian involvement in or greenlighting of the October 7 attacks.[11] This may reflect the opacity of many proxy-related activities by Iran and Tehran's deliberate pursuit of plausible deniability. Alternatively, it may reflect the fact that while Iran cocked the gun, it was its Palestinian proxies that pulled the trigger. While praising those who carried out the October 7 attack, Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has repeatedly denied Iran played any direct role.[12] Likewise on November 3, 2023, Hezbollah Secretary General, Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, claimed the attack was "100 percent Palestinian" and that those who carried it out "kept it hidden … from everyone."[13]

In his November 3 speech, Nasrallah also stated that Iran has "always been openly adopting and supporting resistance factions in Lebanon, Palestine, and in the region. However, they [Iran] do not exercise any form of control over these factions or their leadership."[14] This claim should not be taken at face value. As this article will outline, Iran has made many efforts over the years to maintain influence and control over what is calls the "Axis of Resistance," and while it has not always succeeded in getting groups to do its bidding, it has always maintained significant sway over its network.

From around the time of the Syrian civil war, Iran has worked hard to cultivate new and old Palestinian proxies. As it did with Iraqi Shi`a militias in confronting U.S. forces in Iraq in the years after 2003,[15] Iran has used Lebanese Hezbollah as a key go-between in creating and maintaining relationships with Palestinian groups. Given the large Palestinian refugee population in Lebanon, geographic proximity to the conflict zone, and Hezbollah's loyalty and reputation as a leader within the "Islamic Resistance" against Israel, Iran has been able to rely on Hezbollah as a strong agent of influence. Further proxy-building efforts by Tehran among Palestinian groups have involved heavy financial incentivization,[16] supplying weapons,[17] assistance with propaganda,[18] and the formation of unified umbrella groups to foment greater cooperation between Iran's proxies.[19]

Yet, Iran has not only utilized carrots in its dealings with its Palestinian allies; it has also made clear that those benefits can be taken away as quickly as they were introduced if these groups do not toe the line. Among the sticks Iran has brandished is the crafting of splinter groups to apply pressure against organizations that are or have become unaligned with Tehran.

In order to set the stage for analyzing Iran's relationships with its Palestinian proxies, this article first examines Tehran's attempt to create loyalist splinter groups in Iraq out of insufficiently dependable Shi`a groups such as Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army to advance its interests. Next, the article outlines how after the Syrian civil war created a wedge between Tehran and Palestinian groups, Iran used carrots and sticks to restore influence over Hamas and PIJ. The third part of the article outlines how Iran has leveraged splinters, particularly from the Palestinian Authority's dominant Fatah Movement. These groups formed a potent addition to Hamas and PIJ's power in Gaza and allowed for a broader cross section of influence within Palestinian ranks. Tehran viewed Fatah as an entity to both neutralize and utilize. Fighters that had split from Fatah formed one element of the larger Hamas-led attack on October 7.

Iran did not just focus on Fatah. As outlined in the fourth part of the article, it has also engaged leftist Palestinian groups. These partnerships and efforts at proxy building have demonstrated Tehran's desire to act to build a coalition of a wide cross-section of Palestinian armed groups.

The fifth part of the article outlines how Iran has followed-up on its new relationships with Islamist and leftist groups by reworking them into umbrella structures and joint operations rooms to boost the unity and coherence of its network. The final section then offers some conclusions. In the appendix, the author has included a table with details on the main Palestinian armed Islamist groups, the Fatah splinters, and Palestinian leftist armed groups.

Part One: Iran's Use of Splinters in Iraq

Recruiting and utilizing splinters from other larger more dominant groups, often from groups that oppose Iran, has been a key Iranian strategy when it comes to the cultivation of proxy groups and networks.[20] For Iran, this formula has worked particularly well over the years with Iraqi Shi`a militias. Iran's formulaic approach, proven with these Shi`a militias, was then replicated for use with Palestinian factions.

Iran's attempts to splinter more dominant and/or oppositional groups in Iraq is instructive with what it has attempted to do in the Palestinian context and particularly with Fatah. During the Iraq War (2003-2011) when radical Shi`a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr was leading his Mahdi Army (Jaysh al-Mahdi), numerous splits within the group began to develop due to his leadership and strategy. Al-Sadr had a mixed relationship with Iran, sometimes aligning with it[21] and at other times opposing Tehran.[22] In 2006, a group known as Asa`ib Ahl al-Haqq (League of the Righteous) split from al-Sadr's ranks and soon received Iranian aid.[23] Asa`ib Ahl al-Haqq's then and current leader, Qais al-Khazali, was a founding member of Muqtada al-Sadr's powerful Office of the Martyr Sadr and a close aide to al-Sadr.[24] But he became fed up with al-Sadr's management style and began working to build his own network.[25] In so doing, he took advantage of his contacts with Iran's IRGC-QF and numerous leading clerics that he had established during his prior visits to Iran with al-Sadr.[26] This was exploited by Iran, which offered cash, training, and weapons.[27] Asa`ib Ahl al-Haqq has since grown into a major player within Iraqi politics and within the Iraqi government funded and recognized al-Hashd al-Sha'abi (the Popular Mobilization Forces) militia umbrella group.[28]

Other proxy networks were also carved out of al-Sadr's ranks by Iran. When al-Sadr opposed sending additional Shi`a fighters to the Syrian War, some Sadrist leaders and their networks disagreed with his decision.[29] Tehran exploited that division by facilitating the transfer of Shi`a militiamen belonging to these networks to Syria and supplying the know-how to build separate groups.[30] From 2013-2016, the Iranians fostered the growth of groups such as Kata'ib al-Imam Ali (the Imam Ali Battalions), led by Shibl Zaydi, a former Mahdi Army commander.[31] An additional Sadrist splinter was Jaysh al-Muwwamal, led by another former commander of Jaysh al-Mahdi's successor group, Saraya al-Salam.[32] All of these efforts have provided Iran with a growing influence in Iraq and larger forces to draw on to serve Iranian interests. In addition, the pressure and threats of pressure Iran exerted on al-Sadr often forced him into more conciliatory positions vis-à-vis Iran because of concern over the loyalty of his own ranks.[33]

In 2012, when internal leadership issues arose within the Iraqi Shi`a militia group Kata'ib Hezbollah, instead of discarding a wide network of experienced personnel, Iran allowed the splinter group Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada to form the following year.[34]

pressure points on the original groups to stay in line.[b] This was especially the case with Harakat Hizballah al-Nujaba's relationship with Asa`ib Ahl al-Haqq when reports emerged that the latter was not always obeying instructions from Tehran.[37] From 2020-2021, when Asa`ib Ahl al-Haqq reportedly engaged in using front groups to launch rocket and UAV attacks against U.S. targets that had not been sanctioned by Iran, Harakat Hizballah al-Nujaba was brought forward to claim leadership of all front groups used to attack U.S. facilities and forces as well as domestic adversaries in Iraq.[38] The effort was likely a move to reestablish Iran's control and maintain a façade of unified Iranian control.

Part Two: How Iran Used Carrots and Sticks to Restore Influence Over Hamas and PIJ

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Hamas and PIJ form the two largest and most important Palestinian proxies for Iran.[39] The two groups pioneered the use of suicide bombings by Palestinian organizations in the 1990s-2000s,[40][c] with the former taking over Gaza in 2007. Both groups have built themselves into strong military and terrorist actors over a period of decades. With its closer ideological links and long relationship with Iran, PIJ has been Iran's main proxy for much of its activities among the Palestinians.[41] However, Hamas as the much stronger group was hard for Iran to ignore, and it actively cultivated the organization.[42] For example, Hamas leader Khaled Meshal was hosted by Lebanese Hezbollah in January 2010 and met Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah.[43] That same month, Israel reportedly killed a Hamas leader involved in smuggling Iranian rockets to the group in Gaza.[44] By 2010, a year before the outbreak of the war in Syria produced tensions between Tehran and Hamas that were eventually surmounted, estimates of Iranian funding to Hamas exceeded $20-$30 million a year.[45]

With such cash injections, it appeared that Iran had secured influence for years to come. Yet, in 2013, the war in Syria presented Iran with new challenges for its relationship with various Palestinian proxies. Tehran deployed Shi`a militias with a history of sectarian animosity toward Sunnis to prop up the Assad regime. These forces were cast as "defenders of the [Shi`a] shrines" and the "Shi`a resistance."[46] Any foe of Iran or Hezbollah in Syria was branded "takfiri,"[47] a term used to describe ultra-hardline Islamist extremists.[d] But in reality, the forces they were fighting on the ground were at times Syrian Muslim Brotherhood affiliates from similar ideological streams as Hamas.[48] From 2013-2015, there were claims of current and former Hamas members joining and training Syrian rebel groups.[49] In 2015, one leader from Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiyyah, a Syrian Sunni Islamist group, claimed he had received videos from Gaza to assist in tunnel repairs in Syria.[50]

Palestinian camp-turned-neighborhoods, particularly Yarmouk, south of Damascus, were hotbeds of rebel and Sunni extremist activity and directly abutted Shi`a zones.[51] This created discomfort for Sunni Palestinian groups such as Hamas and PIJ in their relations with Tehran. Advances made by Syrian rebel groups[52] and growing sectarianism within the Palestinian territories added to the tensions.[53] Furthermore, the wholesale destruction occurring in Palestinian areas within Syria[54] resulted in many former proxies of Iran cooling their enthusiasm for Tehran or outright opposing it. With Tehran waging a sectarian war against fellow Sunnis in Syria,[e] for Hamas, the 13-month long presidency of the Muslim Brotherhood's Muhammad Morsi in Egypt from June 2012 to July 2013 opened up the possibility of replacing the patronage of Tehran with that of Cairo.[55]

From 2012-2013, Tehran froze most of its funding to Hamas due to the group's support for Sunni Islamist rebel groups in Syria and its open disapproval of Iran's intervention in the conflict.[56] In June 2013, the deputy minister of foreign affairs for Hamas in Gaza told Reuters, "Things are not easy … and we are trying to overcome the problem."[57] For its part, Hamas began courting Turkey and Qatar to fill the financial hole left by the Islamic Republic.[58] Yet, the financial issues were taking their toll on the group. By 2014, Hamas sent signals to Tehran that it was seeking some form of rapprochement.[59]

Palestinian Islamic Jihad, for its part, maintained a more neutral position on the war in Syria, but like other Iranian-backed factions, it mostly escaped being penalized by Tehran for this decision.[60] However, in 2015, when the group did not give messaging support to the Iranian-backed Ansar Allah (also referred to as the Houthis) in Yemen, the group reportedly lost for a period of time its Iranian funding.[61] "Iran wants all the factions it considers its allies and gives money to support all the political and military positions that [Iran] executes in the region," said one unnamed PIJ official in January 2016. "The [Palestinian] Islamic Jihad movement did not support the Iranian military and political positions, so relations became tense and it got bad."[62]

Just like it had in Iraq to rein in group such as Asa`ib Ahl al-Haqq, Iran encouraged a group to splinter off PIJ, using this as a form of stick to put pressure on it. Peeled from the ranks of the PIJ in 2014,[63] Harakat Sabireen was small by comparison to Hamas and its PIJ parent group. According to a March 2019 report by Al-Monitor, Iran had, "shifted much of its financial support instead to Sabireen."[64] However, Harakat Sabireen made up for its small size by its speedy assembly, increased funding by Tehran, flashy marketing, and its resilience even when Hamas made attempts to shutter the group.[65] The group, numbering only around 300, also had leadership elements in Iran.[66] Sabireen even adopted Lebanese Hezbollah-style iconography to further make clear its true loyalties.[67][f] Harakat Sabireen also actively disobeyed Hamas' strictures when it launched rockets into Israel.[68]

By 2019, due in part to Iran's withholding of funds and splinter group strategy, Hamas and PIJ had fully returned to the Iranian fold. Iran subsequently allowed Harakat Sabireen to fade and Hamas moved in to begin fully dismantling the group the same year.[69] For Tehran, fallowing Sabireen was likely a minor sacrifice to rebuild links and more direct control over the larger and far more influential and powerful PIJ and Hamas. Carrots then further helped to surmount the tensions caused by the Syrian civil war. In 2023, Iranian funding for Hamas was reported to be around $100 million a year.[70] This tripling of funding compared to 2010 only underlines Iran's drive to keep Hamas' rule of Gaza afloat.

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Gunmen from Saraya al-Quds, the armed wing of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, are pictured on April 8, 2022, during an anti-Israel protest in the city of Khan Yunis in the southern Gaza Strip. (Yousef Masoud /SOPA Images/Sipa USA)(Sipa via AP Images)

Part Three: Iran's Efforts to Splinter Fatah

In the Palestinian arena, Tehran applied the same concepts when dealing with Fatah, the most dominant member of the PLO and within the Palestinian Authority (PA). This does not mean that Iran has not tried to build close relations with the PLO and Fatah directly[8]—it has. But Tehran's fundamental differences with the PLO and by extension the Palestinian Authority's role and relationship with Israel has regularly set the two at loggerheads, making such attempts difficult.[71] Thus, Iran has focused significant efforts toward exploiting internal divisions within the PLO/Fatah/PA and encouraging disgruntled members to splinter off and, ideally, ally more closely with Iran.

Following the 2007 Hamas-Fatah War, Hamas stripped the Palestinian Authority and particularly Fatah's leadership of their control and power in the Gaza Strip. Prior to that bout of violence, some Fatah members had had their own tensions with the Palestinian Authority under Mahmoud Abbas. These figures would later lead factions that often identified as Fatah, but often did not follow Abbas's leadership.[72] Others separated themselves from Fatah, or operated in an opaque sphere where Iranian aid could still flow to them while they maintained their links with Fatah and the Palestinian Authority.[73]

Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades Splinters

One part of Fatah that Iran has tried to create splinter groups from is the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (Kata'ib Shuhada al-Aqsa), an Islamist military formation formed in 2000 by members of Fatah. Ostensibly, the group is still to this day a Fatah-controlled entity.[74] Working to suck in splinters from the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade made sense for Tehran. Support for Palestinian Islamist groups, namely PIJ and Hamas, has long been a hallmark of Iranian policy. Ali Khamenei, the current Supreme Leader, has noted that "the foundations of this resistance rest on Palestinian *jihad groups* [emphasis by the author] and all faithful and steadfast Palestinians living inside and outside Palestine."[75]

Following the destruction of the Palestinian Authority and by extension Fatah's influence in Gaza, factions within the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade gravitated toward commanders who more often promoted violence than their "political" Fatah counterparts and who favored partnerships with Hamas or PIJ.[76]

Jaysh al-Asifa and Other Splinters

In 2012, one faction of al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, Jaysh al-Asifa (The Storm Army) was announced by the Palestinian Authority to no longer have no connections to it or Fatah.[77] Jaysh al-Asifa had initially been known as the Martyr Imad Mughniyeh Groups,[78] a Lebanese Hezbollah commander responsible for the deadly bombings of the U.S. embassy and Marine Corps barracks in Beirut in 1983, along with other hijackings, kidnappings, and murders throughout the 1980s.[79] However, Jaysh al-Asifa still promoted itself as an entity associated with Fatah.[80] Its leader, Salem Thabit (Abu al-'Abd), told Raya Media Network in April 2014 that he wanted to unify Fatah military factions.[81] Thabit worked to coordinate and organize the joint Hamas-al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade March 2004 double suicide bombing of the port of Ashdod.[82] He also promoted strong relations with Hamas.[83] The group did little to hide its links to Lebanese Hezbollah, telling the pro-Hezbollah daily Al-Akhbar in 2014 that "the relationship [between the Jaysh al-Asifa and Lebanese Hezbollah] had a major role in transferring experiences of the resistance from Lebanon to Gaza."[84] In 2015, Thabit spoke of further moves to "unify arms [of his faction and Hamas] against the enemy [Israel]."[85] By 2020, operating primarily in Gaza, the group had undertaken joint operations with the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP).[86]

By 2013, other elements of al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade were thanking Lebanese Hezbollah and Iran for supplies of "weapons and equipment," adding that the "main supporters for the Palestinian resistance" were Bashar al-Assad's Syria, Hezbollah, and Iran.[87] In 2015, Gazan sections of the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade openly asked Iran for money on television.[88] One subgroup of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade—the Martyr Nidal Amoudi Brigade (Liwa al-Shahid Nidal al-Amoudi)—demonstrated its links to Iran by featuring Iranian weaponry, particularly with the Iranian-made AM-50 .50 caliber anti-material rifle.[89]

Additionally, al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade's Gaza factions actively and increasingly participated in operations with Hamas, PIJ, and other Iranian-backed organizations. In the West Bank, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades as a whole was increasingly seen as a stalking horse for Iran. In 2023, an unnamed Palestinian Authority security source told *The Jerusalem Post* that the group was being paid by Iran via PIJ.[90]

By October 7, factions that emerged from the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, including Jaysh al-Asifa and Liwa al-Shahid Nidal al-Amoudi, ceased posting regular updates on platforms such as Telegram. In fact, Liwa al-Shahid Nidal al-Amoudi stopped

Skip to content

Israeli).[95]

Harakat al-Mujahideen

While many elements of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades maintained their outwardly Fatah-affiliated branding, other elements within Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades grew into separate organizations with their own branding and structure. A case in point is the Harakat al-Mujahideen (Holy Warrior Movement), a Palestinian fighting group that participated in the October 7 attacks. The group released a video of "leadership inspecting [the group's] forces" inside an Israeli village[96] and of beheaded Israeli troops at the Fajah military base near Gaza in an October 8 video release.[97]

Harakat al-Mujahideen's founder, Umar Atiya Abu Shari'ah, was also one of the founders of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade in Gaza.[98] Beginning in 2000, during the so-called Second or al-Aqsa Intifada, the precursor networks based along the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade's began to coalesce under Shari'ah's leadership.[99] While elements of the Harakat al-Mujahideen have been established in the West Bank, its main powerbase has been in Gaza.[100] In 2021, Asa'ad Abu Shari'ah, the group's secretary general, stated there was "requirement for national unity" that would "bring together all of the leaders of [the Palestinian armed] factions."[101] After thanking God for the group's development, he thanked "the Islamic Republic of Iran and Lebanese Hizballah as the main supporters of the Palestinian resistance,"[102] demonstrating the group's pro-Tehran orientation.

Other Fateh Splinters

The Popular Resistance Committees

Harakat al-Mujahideen were not the only splinter from Fatah to grow into a new organization. Another group that grew out of Fatah was the Popular Resistance Committees (PRC). The group claimed it worked with Hamas and other Palestinian groups in carrying out the October 7 attack "killing or capturing a large number of Zionist soldiers and settlers."[103] On the day of the attack, the group also posted images of captured Israeli equipment, IDs and credit cards belonging to an Israeli soldier.[104]

The PRC's leader, Jamal Abu Samhadana, earlier in his militant career had gained a reputation for being a popular Fatah military leader in the Rafah area of Gaza. But despite his deep familial and personal links with Fatah, he claimed to be deeply influenced by PIJ founder Fathi Al-Shaqaqi.[105] According to the Hezbollah-linked al-Mayadeen news outlet, by 1995, Samhadana was secretly working with PIJ and Hamas' early armed formations.[106] From 2000-2004, working closely with Hamas, Samhadana founded and developed the Popular Resistance Committees (PRC). Samhadana claimed to be inspired by the success of Lebanese Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and the resulting Israeli pullout from the area in May 2000.[107] The group adopted new tactics with small arms, rockets, and improvised explosive devices.[108] In 2005, the PRC went so far as to gun down Yasir Arafat's cousin Musa Arafat, a Gaza-based advisor to Mahmoud Abbas, and kidnapped his son.[109] One Fatah representative told AFP the attack was "a very powerful blow to the [Palestinian] Authority."[110]

It has been claimed that the PRC introduced RPG-7 type grenade launchers into the Gaza Strip.[111] In 2006, the former head of Israel's Shin Bet said Samhadana was a "criminal and a hired killer by the Hamas."[112] The PRC also worked with other Palestinian factions (particularly Hamas), resulting in the PRC, Hamas, and Jaysh al-Islam (the Army of Islam) orchestrating the June 2006 capture of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit.[113] The operation would later result in Lebanese Hezbollah launching its own kidnapping operation that would trigger the 2006 Hezbollah-Israel War.[114]

By 2021, the PRC openly lauded its direct links to Iran, commemorating the late IRGC-QF commander Qassem Soleimani's aid to the group in what would become known as the May 2021 Battle of the Sword of Jerusalem (Sayf al-Quds). The PRC's military spokesman noted, "there was outside support [for the group and during the fighting], most notably the support of Hajj Qasim Suleimani."[115] Lebanese Hezbollah's Al-Manar news outlet noted the spokesman emphasized "the Palestinian resistance relies on the Islamic Republic and Lebanese Hizballah … They are the largest and only supporters over the past decade for Gaza and the resistance."[116]

Harakat al-Ahrar al-Falastinia

Another Fatah splinter group is Harakat al-Ahrar al-Falastinia (the Palestinian Freedom Movement), which was founded in Gaza in 2007 by Khaled Abu Hilal, a former Fatah leader. The group, which is also known as Fatah al-Yasir (Yasir Arafat's Fatah), began as a more Islamist-focused oppositional element to Fatah[117] with Hilal building close links to Hamas and PIJ.[118] In a 2007 interview with *The New York Times*, he claimed that what he had created was "pure Fatah, Fatah before Oslo," a reference to the 1993 Oslo Accords. He also railed against Fatah's corruption and said he was pushing for stronger links with Hamas.[119] By the time Hilal founded Harakat al-Ahrar al-Falastinia, he had already built up significant support among Gazan members of al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade who had issues with Fatah leadership at the time. In 2006, some 800 of the group's members had pledged their allegiance to Hilal and voiced their approval for Hamas.[120]

In 2011, Hilal voiced his support for Iran and pushed for further cooperation with the Islamic Republic due to its support for the "right of Palestinian resistance."[121] In 2016, when Iran promised $30,000 for Palestinians whose homes were destroyed and $7,000 to the family of every "martyr," the Palestinian Authority voiced its disapproval of these funds, considering them "interference."[122] Hilal responded to the PA by stating that accepting the Iranian money was as "a duty for the [Palestinian] nation and not interference."[123]

Harakat al-Ahrar al-Falastinia's military section, Kata'ib al-Ansar (the Brigade of the Supporters), also stepped up their activities with combined operations with Hamas and PIJ, in addition to their own attacks against Israeli targets.[124] In May 2021, Khaled Abu Hilal resigned as secretary general of the Palestinian Freedom Movement and joined Hamas.[125] It is not clear if Harakat al-Ahrar al-Falastinia played a role in the October 7 attack. Its last post on its website was on October 3, 2023.[126] The group did celebrate the October 7 attacks, however. It also claimed the deaths of movement leaders as a result of Israeli airstrikes on October 9[127] and another "martyr" following an Israeli strike on Khan Younis in Gaza on October 12.[128]

Iran's recruitment of Fatah's assets demonstrates that the elements of the Palestinian Authority are duplicitous, not in control of their own forces, or a mixture of both. This recruitment owed much to particular commanders' need for a benefactor for their groups. Iran and its proxies also provided many of these factions with media assistance. The geographic isolation of Gaza, separated from other Palestinians in the West Bank, along with Hamas' and PIJ's dominance in Gaza served as a further exploitable elements for Tehran.[i] Iran's cultivation of splinters from Fatah and its provision of funding and weapons to these groups not only strengthened PIJ's and Hamas' positions in Gaza and the West Bank, but also provided the Iranians with more

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Part Four: Iran's Outreach to Leftist Palestinian Groups

Due to the political threat Communism posed to the power of Iran's Islamic Revolution, and its atheism, there is little doubt regarding Ayatollah Khomeini's hatred of Marxism. From 1982-1983, Khomeini sought to arrest and execute communist opponents in Iran's leftist Tudeh Party.[130] In his 1989 letter to Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev, the Supreme Leader noted, "it is clear to everyone that Communism should henceforth be sought in world museums of political history."[131]

However, the Islamic Republic has acted far more pragmatically vis-à-vis leftist Palestinian groups, pulling them from history's dustbin and reestablishing them as viable proxies. The collapse of the Soviet Union combined with the onset of the 1993 Oslo Accords marked a dire time for Palestinian leftist organizations. Left without their communist benefactors, suffering from a sense of ideological failure and decades of combat and intra-political losses due to factional infighting, and held back by an aging leadership apparatus, many of these groups faced the stark choice of (re)joining Arafat's PLO and later the Palestinian Authority, attempting to maintain some level of militancy with an extremely diminished capability to execute any attacks, or merely fading into obscurity. Iran's attempts to acquire the loyalty of leftist groups stemmed from these weaknesses.

Regardless of the clear baseline ideological differences, there are commonalities between the Palestinian leftist groups and Iran's *modus operandi*. Many of the numerous Palestinian "Popular Front"-style Marxist factions that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s were no shrinking violets when it came to violent actions and terrorist attacks. One of the earliest and most powerful organizations of the period, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) were pioneers when it came to hijacking civilian airliners and supplied fighters that countered numerous U.S. allies and moderate Arab states.[132]

The tactics and strategy of many Palestinian leftist groups were often in line with the notion that violence was the only way to achieve a Palestinian state.[133] [j] This meshed well with the violent 'Islamic Resistance' ideology Iran pushed for its Shi`a Islamist proxies such as Lebanese Hezbollah.[134] As more violent behaviors became commonplace to the Palestinian arena, there were more hardline groups from which Iran could recruit. Moreover, politically speaking, many leftist groups either vehemently opposed the 1993 Oslo Accords or maintained ambiguous stances on them. Iran and its proxies stood in opposition to the process, creating alignment on the issue. Speaking to *Egypt Today* in 2017, Abu Ahmed Fouad, the Damascus-based deputy director of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), stated, "The [Popular] Front [for the Liberation of Palestine] is a triangle of strength opposing the political approach represented by the powerful leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority."[135] The PFLP was seen by Iran as a means to influence Palestinian affairs and as a potential counter to Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas.[136] The PFLP and its military section, Kata'ib al-Shahid Abu Ali Mustafa (The Martyr Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades), which advanced into Israel during the October 7 attacks[137] was and is the strongest Palestinian leftist group courted by Iran.[138] However, it is also important to understand the nuance of Iranian proxy-building among smaller and more overlooked leftist organizations, many of which emerged from the PFLP. This article focuses significant attention on them.

The PFLP-GC: Iran's First Leftist Proxy

In more recent years, the late IRGC-QF commander Qassem Soleimani has been given credit by Palestinian leftist groups for the Iranian embrace of ideologically diffuse Palestinian factions. In a 2021 interview with Hezbollah's official Al-Ahed magazine, PFLP deputy director Abu Ahmed Fouad stated that "the martyr Soleimani totally removed issues of bias when he stated, 'We will put aside any ideological differences and share one goal, resistance to remove the cancerous entity [Israel].'"[139] Soleimani was building on Iranian attempts to make progress with Palestinian leftist groups.

Iran's first attempt to pull a Palestinian leftist group under its wing concerned the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC). Formed in 1968 by Ahmed Jibril after a split with the PFLP, the group became well known for its numerous advanced terrorist attacks.[140] Jibril ruled the PFLP-GC with an iron fist until his death in 2021; splinters from his group were often killed in retribution for disloyalty.[141] At the time, the PFLP-GC favored violent action and looked down on more intellectually focused endeavors, such as writing papers on leftist theory, that were swirling around many leftist Palestinian groups.[142] This led the organization to pull off some audacious terrorist and guerrilla attacks in the 1970s and 1980s. In 1987, one of these attacks involved the use of two motorized hang gliders and resulted in the deaths of six Israeli soldiers. It likely served as a form of inspiration for the use of motorized hang gliders and paragliders by Hamas on October 7, 2023. In fact, on October 10, the pro-Hezbollah al-Mayadeen published an article commemorating the PFLP-GC attack.[143] The use of these recreational vehicles as weapons was also adopted by elite units of the IRGC, which, for example, displayed their use in 2019.[144]

The PFLP-GC maintained close links to Syrian leader Hafez al-Assad and later his son Bashar al-Assad, and acted as a proxy for Syria throughout the 1970s and 1980s, particularly during intra-Palestinian fighting.[145] Adam Dolnik has noted that "the group's relationship with Syria was a key factor why Jibril never achieved the level of prominence that one might expect based on his military excellence and a touch for spectacular attacks."[146] The group's violence against fellow Palestinian groups and willingness to bend to accommodate to the will of Syria led some Palestinian critics to brand Ahmed Jibril and the PFLP-GC as having embraced "revolutionary nihilism."[147]

Beginning in the 1990s, through Lebanese Hezbollah, Iran increased its contacts with the PFLP-GC. According to Gary Gambill, "a few hundred PFLP-GC guerrillas were permitted to operate against Israel in conjunction with Hezbollah throughout the 1990s."[148] Gambill has noted that the group lacked functional command and control structures in Lebanon and was reliant on performing operations with Lebanese Hezbollah.[149] Starting in 2000, the PFLP-GC began to attempt arms smuggling operations to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza.[150]

In the 1990s and 2000s, several factors gave Iran opportunities to gain more influence among Palestinian leftist groups. One was Syria's deepening links with Iran during the 1990s and 2000s. A second factor was Damascus' dominance over the PFLP-GC and other "Popular Front" groups. A third factor was the ability of Damascus to grant Palestinian leftist groups staging areas in Syria and in the then Syrian-occupied Lebanon. Fourthly, groups such as the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), PFLP, and PFLP-GC all have their headquarters in Damascus. Writing in 1997, Harold Cubert, a chronicler of the PFLP, noted that "with its headquarters located in Damascus, and its very existence currently dependent upon Syria's goodwill, the PFLP is in no position to carry out its strategy against Israel and the West, unless its host allows it."[151] As Iranian influence in Syria has grown since 2013 due to propping up the Assad regime, the DFLP, PFLP, and PFLP-GC have undoubtedly had to increasingly answer to and work with Tehran.[152]

Skip to content

was deep and its violent acts against fellow Palestinians became so numerous that sections of the PFLP-GC based outside Syria and Lebanon actively opposed Jibril and his group. A former member of the group's Gaza politburo told Al-Monitor that the PFLP-GC had performed a "deplorable and completely unacceptable act" when the organization shelled the Palestinian neighborhood of Yarmouk south of Damascus in 2012.[154] Nevertheless, the PFLP-GC maintained its pro-Assad positions. And despite its unpopularity in Palestinian circles, Iran maintained its links to the group. Iran even utilized a nucleus of members from the PFLP-GC to create another pro-Assad militia group in Syria, Liwa al-Quds.[155]

Named after Ahmed Jibril's son, Muhammad Jihad Jibril, who was killed in a 2002 car bombing, Kata'ib Shahid Jihad Jibril (The Martyr Jihad Jibril Brigades) became a new militant wing for the PFLP-GC in the West Bank and Gaza.[156] Kata'ib Shahid Jihad Jibril subsequently claimed small arms attacks, including a 2004 shooting attack against Israelis near Hebron[157] and one in 2005 against Israeli troops in Nabulus.[158] Yet, these attacks were minor and representative of a group with little reach.

Kata'ib Shahid Jihad Jibril remained obscure, but by 2018 and particularly in Gaza, it was showing off new capabilities. Despite the PFLP-GC's actions against other Palestinians in Syria and limited influence in Palestinian areas outside Lebanon and Syria, it appeared the group had not only gained new young members, but also more advanced weaponry. In November 2018, its members were photographed with a MANPADS.[159] During the October 7 "al-Aqsa Flood" attacks, in which it claimed it participated, Kata'ib Shahid Jihad Jibril claimed the loss of two members.[160] Given its overt links to Bashar al-Assad's Syria, without some form of Iranian backing and Hamas and PIJ allowing it to grow, it is highly doubtful the group could have been able to produce these results organically, particularly in Gaza.[k]

The PFLP-GC was an obvious group for Tehran to utilize in Gaza. The Assad regime already had an high degree of control over the group, facilitating Iranian influence.[161] In Lebanon, the PFLP-GC had to get acquiescence from Lebanese Hezbollah in order to pull off any military attacks against Israel.[162] The group's diehard membership, history of supporting and working with Lebanese Hezbollah, and hardcore militarism made it an attractive partner to Iran.

The DFLP: Tehran's Other Popular Front

Originally founded as the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine in 1969, the DFLP resulted from a split from its fellow leftist group the PFLP. Led by Jordanian-Palestinian Christian Nayef Hawatmeh, the small group earned an early reputation for a strong communist intellectual base.[163] According to Jillian Becker, the DFLP had "especially close ties with the Soviet Union."[164] The DFLP often acted as a go-between for radical leftist groups and the Fatah-dominated PLO. The group carried out a number of deadly attacks, including the 1974 Ma'alot Massacre in which over 20 school children were killed.[165] However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, negotiations between the PLO and Israel, and eventually with Yasir Arafat's signing of the 1993 Oslo Accords, the DFLP ran into hard times.

Due to increasing PLO negotiations with Israel and then the Oslo Accords, an internal split led by Yasir Abd Rabo (Abu Bashar) took more of the DFLP's followers away from Hawatmeh's camp.[166] In 1993, the DFLP rejected the Oslo Accords and wavered in its support for PLO chairman Yasir Arafat.[167] By the late 1990s, the DFLP was floundering. It continued some violent attacks through the 2000s, but they were piecemeal, hardly comparable to successful terrorist attacks launched by Palestinian rivals, and unrepresentative of the group's capabilities during its height in the 1970s.[168]

However, by the 2010s, the group was in increasing contact with Iran and its proxies. In 2011, the DFLP's 11th congress was held in Beirut and included a speech by Lebanese Hezbollah parliamentarian Nawaf al-Musawi.[169] During al-Musawi's speech, it was reported that he "stressed the need for the Palestinian factions to overcome their political differences, so that they could be [better] able to confront the Israeli aggression."[170] Meetings, events, and other forms of coordination with Lebanese Hezbollah persisted. In 2013, Lebanese Hezbollah utilized the DFLP to assist in distributing food to Palestinian refugees displaced from fighting in Syria. This particular initiative backfired. Given many of the refugees had just seen their neighborhoods destroyed by pro-Assad forces, they burned the food in protest against the gesture from Lebanese Hezbollah.[171]

In 2012, the DFLP attempted to maintain a position similar to that of PIJ regarding the fighting in Syria. In conjunction with Fatah and the small Jabhat al-Nidal al-Sha'abi al-Falastini [Palestinian Popular Struggle Front], the DFLP pushed for neutrality for Palestinians living in Syria.[172] While there were no reports of the DFLP taking part in fighting on either side of the Syrian War, the group did maintain a relatively pro-Assad stance. In 2021, Nayef Hawatmeh even offered his congratulations to Bashar al-Assad when he was re-elected to his position as president.[173] Meetings between the DFLP and Lebanese Hezbollah also continued well into 2023, with a DFLP delegation congratulating Lebanese Hezbollah in July of that year for its "July victory," a reference to the 2006 Hezbollah-Israel War, saying it was part of the "path to Palestinian victory and liberation."[174]

The most dynamic portion of DFLP-Iranian cooperation took place in the Gaza Strip. Established in 2000, the DFLP's armed section known as Kata'ib al-Muqawama al-Wataniyah – Quwet al-Shahid Umar al-Qasim (The National Resistance Brigades – Martyr Umar al-Qasim Forces), or KMW, has offered one of the clearest examples of Iranian influence within the DFLP. Initially formed around cellular structures in the West Bank and Gaza,[175] with Iranian assistance, the KMW was reformed into a more cohesive armed structure and slightly rebranded with a more modern facade.[176]

By 2019, the DFLP's KMW was sporting new capabilities in Gaza. In one parade, the group demonstrated it had access to MANPADS, possibly of Iranian origin.[l] In 2021, the DFLP posted photos of the group's fighters using the Iranian-made AM-50 .50 caliber anti-material rifle.[177] KMW also likely received assistance from Iran related to its media profile, launching a Telegram channel in 2019 for more advanced media propaganda. Signs of Iranian influence could even be spotted in the type of music used in propaganda videos.[178][m] From 2019-2022, the group claimed more armed activity, particularly via the use of mortars and rocket munitions.[179] These activities would also include other Iranian proxies. In May 2022, the group claimed a joint operation that included the PIJ and al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade in Gaza.[180]

Moreover, the DFLP publicized its role of maintaining loyalty to the Iranians. The January 3, 2020, death of IRGC-QF commander Qassem Soleimani was memorialized on their social media. The group posited that Soleimani's death would "only increase our determination to follow the same path of [that] martyr commander."[181] Around two weeks later, the DFLP posted material that sent slightly more subtle signs of loyalty to Tehran. During a January 2020 ceremony to honor a freed Palestinian

Skip to content

support. From access to newer Sinai arms to heavier weapons and new alliances with more powerful groups in Gaza, the DFLP's KMW displayed them with gusto. Nevertheless, the DFLP's political wing, particularly via social media, did not receive the same attention from Iran, appearing to still use old messaging techniques and lacking the flashy imagery, uniforms, and attention allotted to KMW.

Part Five: Tehran's Strategy of Crafting Unity and Coherence Through Umbrella Groups and Joint Operations Rooms

Umbrella groups and joint operations rooms have been a regular feature within the Palestinian arena for decades and were regularly crafted by various Palestinian actors.[n] In fact, the PLO itself operated as an umbrella group. Some had shorter lifespans than others. In more recent times, umbrella groups containing outfits part of Iran's Palestinian proxy network in Gaza, point to some level of Iranian influence and direction. Iran has regularly demonstrated a desire to craft umbrellas for its proxies to organize ideologically and religiously different groups it exerts various levels of control over.

Not all umbrella type groupings and organizations crafted by Tehran are equal, but the end effect of them tends to be demonstration of Iranian management, control, and better armed organization for the groups included within them. The patronage supplied by Iran and its more loyal proxies have stood as a symbol to other groups that it would not only be in their interest to fight under Iranian direction, but that this would offer a better prospect of political and military success.

Before discussing Iran's use of umbrellas in the Palestinian context, it is useful to discuss Tehran's previous use of this strategy in other locations. In 1997, Lebanese Hezbollah created the Lebanese Resistance Brigades (Saraya al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniya), a non-sectarian militia auxiliary to Lebanese Hezbollah's main Shi`a-staffed forces. Its purpose also extended to becoming a middleman between Lebanese Hezbollah and by extension Iran, and other anti-Israel armed groups in Lebanon. According to Chris Zambelis, the group would "forge operational ties with non-Islamist militias that subscribe to a host of different ideologies but nevertheless act under the rubric of resistance. This includes militants that promulgate secular, nationalist, socialist, and leftist ideologies."[183]

While the Lebanese Resistance Brigades was not necessarily an umbrella group itself, it allowed Hezbollah to craft informalized umbrella structures with groups that held their own ideologies and levels of autonomy. As a partial result of these networking advances, in May 2008, when Lebanese Hezbollah's telecom network was threatened with closure by Lebanese authorities, primarily from parties opposed to Hezbollah, Hezbollah not only mobilized sectarian allies such as Harakat Amal, but also secular groups such as the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP). These groups then stormed into Beirut.[184] In 2013, units from the SSNP coordinated with and fought alongside Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi Shi`a militias in Syria. The relationship deepened to such a degree that the secular SSNP adopted the sectarian rhetoric of Lebanese Hezbollah.[185]

In Iraq, the Popular Mobilization Forces (al-Hashd al-Sha'abi) serves as another example for Iranian umbrella network construction. According to one former al-Hashd al-Sha'abi commander, Iran's thinking was that tensions between different groups could be controlled, defused, and utilized by Iran with the "correct loyal men" leading the organization.[186] Since the 2014 formation of al-Hashd al-Sha'abi in Iraq, it has been overwhelmingly dominated by Iranian-backed Shi`a militia groups and commanders.[187] Yet, Hashd al-Sha'abi also included members that were loyal to factions that clashed with Iranian interests and ideology.[188] o

As already noted, extremely loyal groups to Iran, such as the Badr Organization, make up the largest contingent of al-Hashd al-Sha'abi's forces. Many commanders of al-Hashd al-Sha'abi arose from the ranks of another loyal Iranian proxy group, Kata'ib Hezbollah.[189] Over time, some Hashd al-Sha'abi groups were dropped by the Iranians over issues ranging from loyalty, potential unacceptable levels of criminality, or because they had openly opposed Iran.[190] The Hashd al-Sha'abi promoted pro-Iranian messaging and heavily promoted factions more loyal to Iran.[191] This demonstrated Iran's influence over various Shi`a militias and its ability to build a core of effective partners within different factions.

Turning to the Palestinian context, in the hopes of crafting various Fatah-splinter, leftist, and Islamist groups into a more loyal, militarily cohesive, and politically responsive network, it was in Iran's interest to form new umbrellas for its ideologically heterodox web of Palestinian proxies. One early example includes the Ten Resistance Organization, created in 1991 at the Iranian-run World Conference in Support of the Islamic Revolution in Palestine.[192] Hamas and leftist Palestinian groups created the umbrella group as a protest against negotiations between Israel and the PLO.[193]

In September 2023, Hamas and PIJ also started a joint operations room in Beirut. According to the official Iranian Islamic Republic News Agency, Iran's foreign minister praised the group and "underlined the need for unity among all the Palestinian groups."[194]

Another joint operations room, which was functional by 2021, primarily included Lebanese Hezbollah and Hamas.[195] This joint operations room utilized Lebanese Hezbollah as a coordinator between Iran, other Iranian proxies in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, and the Palestinian groups.[196] Ibrahim al-Amin, a writer with the pro-Hezbollah Al-Akhbar, told Hezbollah's Al-Manar that in 2021 Beirut-based joint operations room included Palestinian factions other than Hamas, utilized Hezbollah to smuggle Hamas field operatives in Gaza to Beirut, and that IRGC-QF commander Ismail Qaani made two visits to the group's offices during the two weeks of fighting between Palestinian forces in Gaza and the West Bank in May of that year.[197]

Iran's main Palestinian umbrella project grew wings in Gaza and the West Bank has been the Joint Operation Room for the Palestinian Factions of Resistance (al-Ghurfa al-Mushtrakat li-Fasa'il al-Muqawama al-Falistinia, or JOR). Initially, the JOR began as a partnership between Hamas and PIJ in 2006.[198] Ten other armed organizations including Islamist Fatah splinters and leftist groups were added to the umbrella JOR grouping between January 2017 and July 2018.[p] In November 2018, Yahya al-Sinwar, Hamas' Gaza lead and prominent military commander, referred to the JOR as a body that would form the "nucleus of the army of liberation."[199] By December 2018, the PFLP, particularly through its Abu Ali al-Mustafa Brigades, also began deferring to the JOR for how it would execute armed decision-making.[200] The JOR reared its head in a more militant fashion with rocket attacks against Israeli targets in November 2018[201] and a round of rocket attacks from Gaza in 2019.[202] New marketing material, including iconography, propaganda, and promotional material, was also displayed by the JOR starting in 2020.[203]

All of the groups involved with the JOR had high levels of Iranian backing and were ostensibly marketed as a more unified force. "With the strength of God, we fight together and [will] win together," a December 2020 communique by JOR read.[204] In December 2020, JOR announced a new series of armed exercises "to enhance cooperation and joint actions … [to]

Skip to content

were later utilized in the October 7 attacks. Citing Hamas, the analyst Joe Truzman noted the training operation was "the first of its kind and is an effort to ready Palestinian militant groups against a potential military conflict against Israel."[208] Much of the propaganda and statements produced for the JOR followed models that utilized filming, graphics, and even text used by Iran that had also been used for other regional Iranian proxies.[209] q

Following the May 2023 clashes involving the JOR and Israel, IRGC-QF commander Ismail Qaani singled out the JOR with special greetings to the umbrella group, adding that their operations "proved once again that by relying on almighty God, firm determination, and wise management, [these forces were] capable of breaking the enemy's power."[210] In a form mirroring earlier unveilings of newly minted Iranian proxies,[r] Iranian and other proxy/proxy-supporting publications granted the JOR regular coverage and high praise.[211] Yet, by September 2023, a month before the so-called Al-Aqsa Flood operations, the JOR seemed to cease activity. No posts emerged from its Telegram, and coverage withered. It is possible this was for reasons of operational security or for other reasons relating to the impending October 7 attack. Almost all the constituent groups of the JOR assisted in the attacks from Gaza into Israel in October and did so in a mutually supportive manner.[s] It remains to be seen whether the JOR will be revived in the coming months.

Conclusion

It is possible that Iran was surprised by the catastrophic success of the October 7 attacks. Tehran may not have expected the attacks to have dealt as deadly a blow to Israel as they did. However, there is little doubt that Iran's financial aid, structuring of its proxies into more cohesive armed factions and then into umbrella organizations, and assistance through the supply of weapons increased the deadliness and extremism of its Palestinian proxies. It is also quite clear that without Iranian assistance and nurturing, these groups would not have been in a position to strike Israel, as they did on October 7 with as much success as they showed.

Armed capabilities supplied by Iran, such as a variety of UAV designs, rockets, demolition charges, and other munitions, were smuggled into Gaza and used to deadly effect in the October 7 attack in which Israeli vehicles, buildings, civilian houses, and observation posts were all targeted.[212] Iranian assistance allowed its Palestinian proxies to amass the firepower, messaging know-how, and much of the hi-tech equipment necessary to carry out and propagandize the attack. Financial aid provided by Iran did more than keep Hamas operating as a governing body in Gaza; it was also directly piped into Hamas' terror and military apparatus.[213]

Training provided to Hamas fighters and the other proxies also honed their abilities to execute the October 7 attacks. As PFLP-GC secretary general Talal Naji told Iran's al-Alam in August 2021, "Sometimes the training took place in the Islamic Republic of Iran, sometimes in Syria, and sometimes in Lebanon with the brothers in Hezbollah who are waging jihad." While it is currently unknown how Hamas or fighters from other groups traveled to Iran, Lebanon, and Syria, it can be assumed to be via the wide network of Gaza's smuggling tunnels,[214] by sea,[t] or from flights Gazans could take originating outside of Israel.[215]

Naji also stressed that "as you know, we are an axis, an axis of resistance. [IRGC-QF commander Qassem Soleimani] used to supervise himself," adding that Iranian-supplied weapons, such as the Russian-made laser-guided Kornet anti-tank missile, strengthened their capabilities.[216] u

Iran allows for a level of autonomy among its proxies, but as this article has outlined, Tehran has moved to punish insufficiently obedient groups, allowing them to wither on the vine, or has engineered splinters to weaken them or pressure them into line.

Hamas' takeover of Gaza served as the means for Iran to absorb splintered factions of Fatah into its orbit. Even if those factions could not be fully controlled, creating a reliance on Iran's weapons, money, and other forms of political support facilitated their reformation into Iran's umbrella. By cultivating ties with militant factions with differences with Abbas' Fatah, Iran was able to recruit manpower to its "Axis of Resistance" and create a pressure point within Fatah. Furthermore, the continued presence of Fatah splinter fighters in Gaza has given Iran leverage to ensure the obedience of Hamas and PIJ. Small and less popular groups such as the PFLP, PFLP-GC, and DFLP were cultivated by Iran as part of a larger umbrella of Tehran-aligned groups, but likely simultaneously served other roles, including countering the Palestinian Authority and if necessary to put pressure on Hamas and PIJ.

As the Israeli offensive continues in Gaza, it is possible some armed Palestinian groups may be forced to shift their center of gravity to Lebanon. This would expose them to even deeper Iranian influence. On December 4, 2023, Hamas' Lebanon section released a statement calling for the creation and recruitment for the Vanguards of the al-Aqsa Flood (Taliy'ah Tufan al-Aqsa), a group focused on "resisting [Israeli] occupation."[217] Given any armed activities by Hamas in Lebanon would have to be coordinated with Lebanese Hezbollah, these activities would also be subject to a degree of control by the Iranian decision makers that exert influence over Hezbollah. As previously seen with the PFLP, DFLP, and PFLP-GC, groups dependent on using Lebanon or Syria as staging areas have only become more beholden to their masters in Damascus or Tehran.

Even if Hamas and PIJ are militarily defeated in Gaza in the months ahead, Iran would still have many options to work with in both Gaza and the West Bank. As Eurasia Group's Ian Bremmer stated in an October 31 piece, "The war is radicalizing far more Palestinians than Hamas propaganda ever could."[218] Iran will likely attempt to rebuild its network in Gaza from newly radicalized Palestinians, including among leftist actors, Islamists, and smaller factions they can more strongly control.

In this scenario, it should be expected that Iran will also continue to splinter off groups from Fatah/the Palestinian Authority. On November 5, a mysterious group claiming to represent members within the Palestinian Authority-affiliated security services emerged. Called the Sons of Abu Jandal, the group demanded that Mahmoud Abbas and the PA security forces engage in violence against Israel or revolt against Abbas.[219] While no link to Iran has yet been established and the group has since gone quiet, it is these types of splinters that have been exploited by Tehran in the past.

In the months ahead, it is likely that Iran will continue to use the carrots (e.g., funding) and sticks (e.g., fostering splinter groups) in order to maintain and deepen control over its Palestinian "Axis of Resistance." As Israel's military campaign in Gaza puts these groups under increasing pressure, Iran's leverage will only grow. Given Iran has aimed to provide support to a wide range of new and well-established groups, particularly those with more violent dispositions, the radicalizing effect of the war on Palestinians provides fertile terrain for Tehran. **CTC**

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Appendix: Iran-Backed Palestinian Organizations

Color Key
Green: Main Islamist organizations (2)
Gray: Leftist groups (3)
Yellow: Islamist Fatah splinters (7)
Light Green: PIJ splinter/Shi`a Islamist (1)



Main/Political Group	Military Section/Sub-Organization	Details	Ideological/Political Background	JOR Affiliate	Oct. 7 Participant
Hamas	The Martyr Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades (Kata'ib al-Shahid Izz al-Din al-Qassam)	In the 1990s and early 2000s, Hamas was active in planning and orchestrating suicide bombings. Hamas is the largest faction in Gaza and currently leads the area's governing apparatus. The group promotes Muslim Brotherhood style Islamism.	Mainstream Islamist	✓	✓
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (Harakat al-Jihad al-Islamiyyah fi Falastine or PIJ)	The Quds Brigade (Saraya al-Quds)	With close links to Khomeinist ideology, PIJ has primarily focused on violent activities in the Palestinian territories and Israel. In the 1990s-2000s, the group carried out dozens of suicide bombings. PIJ is the second largest faction in Gaza after Hamas, in terms of size and weapons supplies.	Mainstream Islamist	✓	✓
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (or PFLP	The Martyr Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades (Kata'ib al-Shahid Abu Ali Mustafa)	The leftist PFLP group pioneered airline hijacking attacks in the 1970s. Despite occasionally working with the Palestinian Authority, the Marxist group has often rejected peace negotiations with Israel and has continued its militancy.	Leftist	✓	✓
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (or PFLP-GC)	The Martyr Ahmed Jibril Brigades (Kata'ib al-Shahid Ahmed Jibril)	Primarily based in Syria and Lebanon, the leftist PFLP-GC's heyday was in the 1970s-80s. It often engaged in fratricidal conflicts with other Palestinian groups in that period. It is a close ally and proxy of the Assad regime in Damascus with a more limited presence in the Palestinian territories.	Leftist	✓	✓
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (or DFLP)	The National Resistance Brigades - Forces of the Martyr Umar al-Qasim (Kata'ib al-Muqawama al-Wataniа - Quwat al-Shahid Umar al-Qasim)	Splitting from the PFLP, the DFLP is a smaller Marxist group with a presence in Gaza and the West Bank. The DFLP has had a mixed relationship with the Palestinian Authority and has often worked against it.	Leftist	✓	✓
The Popular Resistance Committees (Lijan al-Muqawama al-Shabiyah or PRC)	The Nasir Salah al-Din Brigades (Alwiya al-Nasir Salah al-din)	Formed out of a splinter from the Gaza-based sections of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade. The PRC has been involved in major operations including the 2005 assassination of Palestinian Authority advisor Musa Arafat and the 2006 kidnapping of Gilad Shalit.	Islamist Fatah Splinter	✓	✓
Palestinian Freedom Movement (Harakat al-Ahrar al-Falastini)	Brigade of the Supporters (Kata'ib al-Ansar)	A splinter from the Fatah Movement, the Palestinian Freedom Movement is primarily based in Gaza and was formed out of pro-Hamas Islamist militant elements of Fatah and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade linked to Khaled Abu Hilal.	Islamist Fatah Splinter	✓	Unclear
al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (Kata'ib Shuhada al-Aqsa)	Storm Forces/Army (Quwat/Jeysh al-Asifa)	An element that emerged into the public in the 2010s from the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade in Gaza. Despite claiming to be representative of Fatah, the Storm Forces were officially cast as splinters by the Fatah Movement.	Islamist Fatah Splinter	✓	Unclear/Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade Did Participate
al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (Kata'ib Shuhada al-Aqsa)	Martyr Abd al-Qader al-Husayni Brigades (Kata'ib al-Shahid Abd al-Qader al-Husyani)	One of the factions of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade with ties to Iran. The group operates in the West Bank, but is its primary area of operations has been in Gaza.	Islamist Fatah Splinter	✓	Unclear/Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade Did Participate
al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (Kata'ib Shuhada al-Aqsa)	The Martyr Nidal Anouri Brigades (Kata'ib/Liwa al-Shahid Nidhal al-Anouri)	With a presence in the West Bank and Gaza, this section of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade transcends its links to Fatah, despite the 2007 PA Presidential Decree to disarm all militia groups. In 2021, the group rallied on the Palestinian Authority security services to target Israeli forces.	Islamist Fatah Splinter	✓	Unclear/Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade Did Participate
al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (Kata'ib Shuhada al-Aqsa)	Groups of the Martyr Ayman Jawda (Majmuat al-Shahid Ayman Jawda)	An element of the Gaza-based al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. In 2005, the group vowed to continue suicide bombings in Israel.It has maintained close links to Hamas and PIJ.	Islamist Fatah Splinter	✓	Unclear/Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade Did Participate
Holy Warrior Movement (Harakat al-Mujahideen)	The Holy Warrior Brigades (Kata'ib al-Mujahideen)	Officially founded in 2006 from splinter elements from Fatah and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade. The group filmed its members with the beheaded bodies of Israeli soldiers on October 7, 2023.	Islamist Fatah Splinter	✓	✓
The Movement of the Patient (Harakat Sabireen)		Splintered from PIJ in 2014-2015, the Gaza-based Shi`a Islamist group caused ire for Hamas and PIJ. It received increased funding from Iran, just as PIJ and Hamas lost their Iranian funding. The Movement launched small rocket attacks against Israeli targets and was generally repressed by Hamas.	PIJ Splinter/Shi`a Islamist		

Substantive Notes

[a] Hamas claimed it launched 5,000 rockets. See "Why the Palestinian group Hamas launched an attack on Israel? All to know," Al Jazeera, October 7, 2023.

[b] It is important to note that following AAH's use of reportedly unapproved front groups to attack U.S. interests, Harakat Hizballah al-Nujaba leader Akram Kaabi was publicly utilized as a means to demonstrate overall Iranian control. In December 2021, Kaabi posed in front of flags belonging to a multitude of the established front groups and behaved as a spokesman for them, signifying he—and by extension, Iran—was in control of all elements. See al-Muqawama al-Islamiyyah Harakat al-Nujaba, Telegram, December 9, 2021.

[c] The Bus 405 suicide attack (albeit, not a bombing) is considered "the first Palestinian suicide attack, despite the fact that … [the perpetrator] survived." It was launched by Palestinian Islamic Jihad in September 1989. From 2000-2005, Both Hamas and PIJ were also responsible for 65.5 percent of suicide bombings by Palestinian groups. See Efraim Benmelech and Claude Berrebi, "Attack Assignments in Terror Organizations and The Productivity of Suicide Bombers," Working Paper 12910, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2007, pp. 5-7.

[d] This is term is used, often pejoratively, to describe ultra-hardline Islamist extremists who regard those who do not follow their approach as guilty of apostacy and deserving of death.

[e] The sectarian nature of the war in Syria and increased Iranian Shi`a proselytizing in Gaza became major issues for Hamas. In 2011, Hamas was attempting to maintain links with Tehran and more quietly deal with Iranian proselytizing. See "Shiite Militancy Makes Inroads in Sunni Gaza," Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor 8:24 (2011). In January 2012, Hamas attacked Gaza's small community of Shi`a Muslims. See Avi Issacharoff, "Hamas Brutally Assaults Shi'ite Worshippers in Gaza," Haaretz, January 17, 2012. In June 2013, a salafi mob, in part inspired by Muslim Brotherhood-encouraged anti-Shi`a sectarianism, led to the lynching of Shaykh Hassan Shehata and three other Egyptian Shi`a. See "Egypt: Lynching of Shia Follows Months of Hate Speech," Human Rights Watch, June 27, 2013. In turn, Shehata's death was used as a recruitment tool by Iranian Shi`a militias for Syria. See Phillip Smyth, "Liwa'a 'Ammar Ibn Yasir: A New Shia Militia Operating in Aleppo, Syria," Hizballah Cavalcade, Jihadology, July 20, 2013.

[f] Harakat Sabireen incorporated a mix of Sunni and primarily Iranian Shi`a Islamist ideology into its structure. Harakat Sabireen founder Hisham Salem is a Shi`a religious shaykh and was originally a commander within the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. His early networks that eventually grew into Harakat Sabireen included extensive support from Iranian-linked Shi`a charities and his Harakat Sabireen membership has included former PIJ members who converted to Shi`a Islam. Avi Issacharoff, "Hamas, beholden to Iran, lets Shiite group operate in Gaza," *Times of Israel*, May 12, 2015; author conversations, Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi`a militia commander, August-September 2019; Hassan Abbas, "Al-Sabireen: an Iran-Backed

Near East Policy, May 1, 2002.

[h] While the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade subunit could not be identified, the kidnapper's headband included, "Liwa" or brigade. This may point to a link to Liwa al-Shahid Nidhal al-Amoudi.

[i] It is important to note that in 2015, Jaysh al-Asifa's head noted that it was "not easy for the fighters of Fatah to carry weapons in the Gaza Strip after the Hamas movement took over." See Amar Abu Shebaab, "Qa'id jaysh al-'asifa li 'raya': tawhid miqatli fatah lays 'asira w al-'alaqa mah al-qassam taybeh," Raya, April 20, 2014.

[j] It should be noted that the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), a violent splinter from the PFLP, was considered more moderate than its other "Popular Front" cohorts. In the 1970s, when most groups adopted the "Rejectionist" approach to achieve the full destruction of the State of Israel, the DFLP posited that a unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state on any amount of "liberated land" (through armed conflict or negotiations) was a preferrable option. For the DFLP, this territory could serve as a springboard for the future "liberation of Palestine." See Muhammad Y. Muslih, "Moderates and Rejectionists within the Palestine Liberation Organization," *Middle East Journal* 30:2 (1976), pp. 127-128.

[k] The PFLP-GC had already suffered splits inside the Palestinian Territories due to issues some members had with its actions during the Syrian Civil War. In fact, in Syria, the PFLP-GC suffered a split that resulted in some fighters forming the short-lived Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-Free Command. See "27 2 Damascus Ugarit dimashq, i'alan tashkil al-jebha al-sha'abia al-tahrir falastin al-qa'ida al-hurr al-mishaqa 'an jebha ahmed Jibril," Ugarit News, YouTube, February 27, 2013.

[l] The MANPADS in the photo appears to be an SA-7 Strela-type system. If Iranian, it is likely a Misagh-type MANPADS. KMW's official Telegram channel, Telegram, December 13, 2019.

[m] The background instrumental music is a song called "Ya Wa'ad Allah" by Lebanese Hezbollah band Firqat al-Fajr and was released after the 2006 Hezbollah-Israel War. Different versions (including instrumental styles) have been used by various Iranian supported groups. See "Ya Wa3d Allah … New Version YA-Lubnan.com," Daily Motion, 2008. In Bahrain, the song was used by Iranian-backed Bahraini militants and another version was made for Iraq's Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq. See Phillip Smyth, "Singing Hizballah's Tune In Manama: Why Are Bahrain's Militants Using the Music of Iran's Proxies?" Hizballah Cavalcade, Jihadology, May 5, 2014.

[n] One example is the 2021 "Joint Operations Room." See Adnan Abu Amar, "Ghurfa al-'amliat al-mushtarkat lilmuqawama fi gaza nuwat li 'jaysh al-tahrir,'" Al Jazeera, May 28, 2021.

[o] A number of these groups later broke off. Muqtada al-Sadr's Saraya al-Salam began operating with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, and many factions loyal to Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani formed their own network in 2020. See Suadad al-Salhy, "Iran and Najaf struggle for control over Hashd al-Shaabi after Muhandis's killing," Middle East Eye, February 16, 2020.

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[q] Similar markers can be seen with videos produced for the Iranian-backed Iraqi front group Saraya Thawrat al-Ashreen al-Thania. See Saraya Thawrat al-Ashreen al-Thania official Telegram Channel, Telegram, July 5, 2020. JOR statements also match a model used by the Iranian-backed Bahraini group Saraya al-Mukhtar: JOR official Telegram channel, Telegram, May 10, 2021, and Saraya al-Mukhtar Official Telegram Channel, Telegram, Telegram, February 20, 2017. At times, even the same fonts were utilized in these posts.

[r] When Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq and Kata'ib Hezbollah's first videos of attacks on U.S. forces were released from 2005-2007, Lebanese Hezbollah's Al-Manar was often the first to run them or run them as exclusives. Author observation. See also "Iraqi shia resistance:asaeb ahlu alhaq," archive.org, April 11, 2008.

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Exhibit 12-1

The Path to October 7: How Iran Built Up and Managed a Palestinian 'Axis of Resistance'

By Phillip Smyth

Since October 7, in the wake of the "al-Aqsa Flood" terrorist attacks by Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and other Palestinian factions from across the ideological spectrum, Iran's aid to and strategic management of these groups has taken on a new level of relevance. The methods Iran has used to cultivate and maintain influence and control over disparate Palestinian groups follows the same pragmatic carrot-and-stick formula it has used across the Middle East with other proxies, with incentives that include financial aid, weapons, and training. The use of sticks was particularly important in Tehran's restoration of influence over Hamas and PIJ after the Syrian civil war drove a wedge between Palestinian groups and Iran. The withholding of funds and a divide-and-rule approach helped Tehran get these groups back in line. More generally, Iran has worked to create and leverage splinter groups, particularly from the Palestinian Authority's dominant Fatah Movement, to grow its influence in Gaza and the West Bank. Tehran has also strived to build influence among leftist Palestinian groups to create a broad coalition of partners. And it uses umbrella groups and joint operations rooms to try to bolster the unity and coherence of its Palestinian network.

On the morning of October 7, 2023, rocket barrages from the Gaza Strip consisting of around 2,000[1]-5,000[a] rockets began to hit targets in southern Israel. Armed motorized paragliders and gunmen in trucks, on motorbikes, and technicals streamed through holes blown through Israel's once-vaunted border fence and began firing on a mixture of civilian and military targets.[2] Seaborn divers and small boats attacked other targets on Israel's coast.[3] Around 1,200 Israelis were killed and around 3,500 wounded; over 240 were taken hostage.[4] There were many reports of rape, beheadings, and torture.[5]

Most of the fighters who crossed into Israel were members of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), but they were joined by gunmen from numerous smaller Palestinian factions. The scope, brutality, and audacity of the attacks, along with the weapons systems used, revealed a level of planning, destructiveness, and capability that surprised many analysts both in and out of government.[6]

One common thread linking the attackers were their extensive financial, military, and political connections to the Islamic Republic of Iran. As this article will outline, these associations were the product of extensive cultivation and management of a Palestinian "Axis of Resistance" by Tehran over many years.

Along with spreading the Islamic Revolution, one of the main goals of the late Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini was the destruction of Israel.[7] In fact, once Iran's Shah was deposed, it was Khomeini who then invited Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasir Arafat to Iran, where he was allowed to take over office space in the former Israeli embassy.[8] Arafat himself told a crowd of Iranians that with Khomeini in power and the Islamic Revolution established, "the road to Palestine now leads through Iran."[9] Since that time, Tehran has never abandoned the goal of Israel's destruction.[10]

Iran currently lacks the conventional military capability for a heads-on confrontation with Israel. Proxy forces have allowed Iran to maintain some level of plausible deniability, while asymmetrically supplying Tehran with a means to effectively strike Israel or apply pressure to it. Furthermore, Iran's creation of proxy forces has facilitated the spread of Iranian Islamist ideology.

As yet, no 'smoking gun' has emerged of direct Iranian involvement in or greenlighting of the October 7 attacks.[11] This may reflect the opacity of many proxy-related activities by Iran and Tehran's deliberate pursuit of plausible deniability. Alternatively, it may reflect the fact that while Iran cocked the gun, it was its Palestinian proxies that pulled the trigger. While praising those who carried out the October 7 attack, Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has repeatedly denied Iran played any direct role.[12] Likewise on November 3, 2023, Hezbollah Secretary General, Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, claimed the attack was "100 percent Palestinian" and that those who carried it out "kept it hidden ... from everyone."[13]

In his November 3 speech, Nasrallah also stated that Iran has "always been openly adopting and supporting resistance factions in Lebanon, Palestine, and in the region. However, they [Iran] do not exercise any form of control over these factions or their leadership."[14] This claim should not be taken at face value. As this article will outline, Iran has made many efforts over the years to maintain influence and control over what is calls the "Axis of Resistance," and while it has not always succeeded in getting groups to do its bidding, it has always maintained significant sway over its network.

a Hamas claimed it launched 5,000 rockets. See "Why the Palestinian group Hamas launched an attack on Israel? All to know," Al Jazeera, October 7, 2023.

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From around the time of the Syrian civil war, Iran has worked hard to cultivate new and old Palestinian proxies. As it did with Iraqi Shi`a militias in confronting U.S. forces in Iraq in the years after 2003,[15] Iran has used Lebanese Hezbollah as a key go-between in creating and maintaining relationships with Palestinian groups. Given the large Palestinian refugee population in Lebanon, geographic proximity to the conflict zone, and Hezbollah's loyalty and reputation as a leader within the "Islamic Resistance" against Israel, Iran has been able to rely on Hezbollah as a strong agent of influence. Further proxy-building efforts by Tehran among Palestinian groups have involved heavy financial incentivization,[16] supplying weapons,[17] assistance with propaganda,[18] and the formation of unified umbrella groups to foment greater cooperation between Iran's proxies.[19]

Yet, Iran has not only utilized carrots in its dealings with its Palestinian allies; it has also made clear that those benefits can be taken away as quickly as they were introduced if these groups do not toe the line. Among the sticks Iran has brandished is the crafting of splinter groups to apply pressure against organizations that are or have become unaligned with Tehran.

In order to set the stage for analyzing Iran's relationships with its Palestinian proxies, this article first examines Tehran's attempt to create loyalist splinter groups in Iraq out of insufficiently dependable Shi`a groups such as Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army to advance its interests. Next, the article outlines how after the Syrian civil war created a wedge between Tehran and Palestinian groups, Iran used carrots and sticks to restore influence over Hamas and PIJ. The third part of the article outlines how Iran has leveraged splinters, particularly from the Palestinian Authority's dominant Fatah Movement. These groups formed a potent addition to Hamas and PIJ's power in Gaza and allowed for a broader cross section of influence within Palestinian ranks. Tehran viewed Fatah as an entity to both neutralize and utilize. Fighters that had split from Fatah formed one element of the larger Hamas-led attack on October 7.

Iran did not just focus on Fatah. As outlined in the fourth part of the article, it has also engaged leftist Palestinian groups. These partnerships and efforts at proxy building have demonstrated Tehran's desire to act to build a coalition of a wide cross-section of Palestinian armed groups.

The fifth part of the article outlines how Iran has followed-up on its new relationships with Islamist and leftist groups by reworking them into umbrella structures and joint operations rooms to boost the unity and coherence of its network. The final section then offers some conclusions. In the appendix, the author has included a table with details on the main Palestinian armed Islamist groups, the Fatah splinters, and Palestinian leftist armed groups.

Part One: Iran's Use of Splinters in Iraq

Recruiting and utilizing splinters from other larger more dominant groups, often from groups that oppose Iran, has been a key Iranian strategy when it comes to the cultivation of proxy groups and networks.[20] For Iran, this formula has worked particularly well over the years with Iraqi Shi`a militias. Iran's formulaic approach, proven with these Shi`a militias, was then replicated for use with Palestinian factions.

Iran's attempts to splinter more dominant and/or oppositional groups in Iraq is instructive with what it has attempted to do in the Palestinian context and particularly with Fatah. During the Iraq War (2003-2011) when radical Shi`a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr was leading his Mahdi Army (Jaysh al-Mahdi), numerous splits within the group began to develop due to his leadership and strategy. Al-Sadr had a mixed relationship with Iran, sometimes aligning with it[21] and at other times opposing Tehran.[22] In 2006, a group known as Asa`ib Ahl al-Haqq (League of the Righteous) split from al-Sadr's ranks and soon received Iranian aid.[23] Asa`ib Ahl al-Haqq's then and current leader, Qais al-Khazali, was a founding member of Muqtada al-Sadr's powerful Office of the Martyr Sadr and a close aide to al-Sadr.[24] But he became fed up with al-Sadr's management style and began working to build his own network.[25] In so doing, he took advantage of his contacts with Iran's IRGC-QF and numerous leading clerics that he had established during his prior visits to Iran with al-Sadr.[26] This was exploited by Iran, which offered cash, training, and weapons.[27] Asa`ib Ahl al-Haqq has since grown into a major player within Iraqi politics and within the Iraqi government funded and recognized al-Hashd al-Sha'abi (the Popular Mobilization Forces) militia umbrella group.[28]

Other proxy networks were also carved out of al-Sadr's ranks by Iran. When al-Sadr opposed sending additional Shi`a fighters to the Syrian War, some Sadrist leaders and their networks disagreed with his decision.[29] Tehran exploited that division by facilitating the transfer of Shi`a militiamen belonging to these networks to Syria and supplying the know-how to build separate groups.[30] From 2013-2016, the Iranians fostered the growth of groups such as Kata'ib al-Imam Ali (the Imam Ali Battalions), led by Shibl Zaydi, a former Mahdi Army commander.[31] An additional Sadrist splinter was Jaysh al-Muwwamal, led by another former commander of Jaysh al-Mahdi's successor group, Saraya al-Salam.[32] All of these efforts have provided Iran with a growing influence in Iraq and larger forces to draw on to serve Iranian interests. In addition, the pressure and threats of pressure Iran exerted on al-Sadr often forced him into more conciliatory positions vis-à-vis Iran because of concern over the loyalty of his own ranks.[33]

In 2012, when internal leadership issues arose within the Iraqi Shi`a militia group Kata'ib Hezbollah, instead of discarding a wide network of experienced personnel, Iran allowed the splinter group Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada to form the following year.[34]

A similar issue related to control and influence arose within Asa`ib Ahl al-Haqq, when one of its former leaders, Akram Ka'abi, split off and was allowed to form Harakat Hizballah al-Nujaba.[35]

The creation of these new groups from established organizations not only created groups more loyal to Tehran but also created pressure points on the original groups to stay in line.[36] This was especially the case with Harakat Hizballah al-Nujaba's relationship with Asa`ib Ahl al-Haqq when reports emerged that the latter was not always obeying instructions from Tehran.[37][b] From 2020-2021, when Asa`ib Ahl al-Haqq reportedly engaged in using front groups to launch rocket and UAV attacks against U.S. targets that had not been sanctioned by Iran, Harakat Hizballah al-Nujaba was brought forward to claim leadership of all front groups used to attack U.S. facilities and forces as well as domestic adversaries in Iraq.[38] The

b It is important to note that following AAH's use of reportedly unapproved front groups to attack U.S. interests, Harakat Hizballah al-Nujaba leader Akram Kaabi was publicly utilized as a means to demonstrate overall Iranian control. In December 2021, Kaabi posed in front of flags belonging to a multitude of the established front groups and behaved as a spokesman for them, signifying he—and by extension, Iran—was in control of all elements. See al-Muqawama al-Islamiyyah Harakat al-Nujaba, Telegram, December 9, 2021.

effort was likely a move to reestablish Iran's control and maintain a façade of unified Iranian control.

Part Two: How Iran Used Carrots and Sticks to Restore Influence Over Hamas and PIJ

Hamas and PIJ form the two largest and most important Palestinian proxies for Iran.[39] The two groups pioneered the use of suicide bombings by Palestinian organizations in the 1990s-2000s,[40] [c] with the former taking over Gaza in 2007. Both groups have built themselves into strong military and terrorist actors over a period of decades. With its closer ideological links and long relationship with Iran, PIJ has been Iran's main proxy for much of its activities among the Palestinians.[41] However, Hamas as the much stronger group was hard for Iran to ignore, and it actively cultivated the organization.[42] For example, Hamas leader Khaled Meshal was hosted by Lebanese Hezbollah in January 2010 and met Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah.[43] That same month, Israel reportedly killed a Hamas leader involved in smuggling Iranian rockets to the group in Gaza.[44] By 2010, a year before the outbreak of the war in Syria produced tensions between Tehran and Hamas that were eventually surmounted, estimates of Iranian funding to Hamas exceeded $20-$30 million a year.[45]

With such cash injections, it appeared that Iran had secured influence for years to come. Yet, in 2013, the war in Syria presented Iran with new challenges for its relationship with various Palestinian proxies. Tehran deployed Shi`a militias with a history of sectarian animosity toward Sunnis to prop up the Assad regime. These forces were cast as "defenders of the [Shi`a] shrines" and the "Shi`a resistance."[46] Any foe of Iran or Hezbollah in Syria was branded "takfiri,"[47] a term used to describe ultra-hardline Islamist extremists.[d] But in reality, the forces they were fighting on the ground were at times Syrian Muslim Brotherhood affiliates from similar ideological streams as Hamas.[48] From 2013-2015, there were claims of current and former Hamas members joining and training Syrian rebel groups.[49] In 2015, one leader from Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiyyah, a Syrian Sunni Islamist group, claimed he had received videos from Gaza to assist in tunnel repairs in Syria.[50]

Palestinian camp-turned-neighborhoods, particularly Yarmouk, south of Damascus, were hotbeds of rebel and Sunni extremist activity and directly abutted Shi`a zones.[51] This created discomfort for Sunni Palestinian groups such as Hamas and PIJ in their relations with Tehran. Advances made by Syrian rebel groups[52] and growing sectarianism within the Palestinian territories added to the tensions.[53] Furthermore, the wholesale destruction occurring in Palestinian areas within Syria[54] resulted in many former proxies of Iran cooling their enthusiasm for Tehran or outright opposing it. With Tehran waging a sectarian war against fellow Sunnis in Syria,[e] for Hamas, the 13-month long presidency of the Muslim Brotherhood's Muhammad Morsi in Egypt from June 2012 to July 2013 opened up the possibility of replacing the patronage of Tehran with that of Cairo.[55]

"From 2012-2013, Tehran froze most of its funding to Hamas due to the group's support for Sunni Islamist rebel groups in Syria and its open disapproval of Iran's intervention in the conflict."

From 2012-2013, Tehran froze most of its funding to Hamas due to the group's support for Sunni Islamist rebel groups in Syria and its open disapproval of Iran's intervention in the conflict.[56] In June 2013, the deputy minister of foreign affairs for Hamas in Gaza told Reuters, "Things are not easy ... and we are trying to overcome the problem."[57] For its part, Hamas began courting Turkey and Qatar to fill the financial hole left by the Islamic Republic.[58] Yet, the financial issues were taking their toll on the group. By 2014, Hamas sent signals to Tehran that it was seeking some form of rapprochement.[59]

Palestinian Islamic Jihad, for its part, maintained a more neutral position on the war in Syria, but like other Iranian-backed factions, it mostly escaped being penalized by Tehran for this decision.[60] However, in 2015, when the group did not give messaging support to the Iranian-backed Ansar Allah (also referred to as the Houthis) in Yemen, the group reportedly lost for a period of time its Iranian funding.[61] "Iran wants all the factions it considers its allies and gives money to support all the political and military positions that [Iran] executes in the region," said one unnamed PIJ official in January 2016. "The [Palestinian] Islamic Jihad movement did not support the Iranian military and political positions, so relations became tense and it got bad."[62]

Just like it had in Iraq to rein in group such as Asa`ib Ahl al-Haqq, Iran encouraged a group to splinter off PIJ, using this as a form of stick to put pressure on it. Peeled from the ranks of the PIJ in 2014,[63] Harakat Sabireen was small by comparison to Hamas and its PIJ parent group. According to a March 2019 report by Al-Monitor, Iran had, "shifted much of its financial support instead to Sabireen."[64] However, Harakat Sabireen made up for its small size by its speedy assembly, increased funding by Tehran, flashy marketing, and its resilience even when Hamas made attempts

c The Bus 405 suicide attack (albeit, not a bombing) is considered "the first Palestinian suicide attack, despite the fact that … [the perpetrator] survived." It was launched by Palestinian Islamic Jihad in September 1989. From 2000-2005, Both Hamas and PIJ were also responsible for 65.5 percent of suicide bombings by Palestinian groups. See Efraim Benmelech and Claude Berrebi, "Attack Assignments in Terror Organizations and The Productivity of Suicide Bombers," Working Paper 12910, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2007, pp. 5-7.

d This is term is used, often pejoratively, to describe ultra-hardline Islamist extremists who regard those who do not follow their approach as guilty of apostacy and deserving of death.

e The sectarian nature of the war in Syria and increased Iranian Shi`a proselytizing in Gaza became major issues for Hamas. In 2011, Hamas was attempting to maintain links with Tehran and more quietly deal with Iranian proselytizing. See "Shiite Militancy Makes Inroads in Sunni Gaza," Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor 8:24 (2011). In January 2012, Hamas attacked Gaza's small community of Shi`a Muslims. See Avi Issacharoff, "Hamas Brutally Assaults Shi'ite Worshippers in Gaza," Haaretz, January 17, 2012. In June 2013, a salafi mob, in part inspired by Muslim Brotherhood-encouraged anti-Shi`a sectarianism, led to the lynching of Shaykh Hassan Shehata and three other Egyptian Shi`a. See "Egypt: Lynching of Shia Follows Months of Hate Speech," Human Rights Watch, June 27, 2013. In turn, Shehata's death was used as a recruitment tool by Iranian Shi`a militias for Syria. See Phillip Smyth, "Liwa'a 'Ammar Ibn Yasir: A New Shia Militia Operating in Aleppo, Syria," Hizballah Cavalcade, Jihadology, July 20, 2013.



Gunmen from Saraya al-Quds, the armed wing of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, are pictured on April 8, 2022, during an anti-Israel protest in the city of Khan Yunis in the southern Gaza Strip. (Yousef Masoud /SOPA Images/Sipa USA)(Sipa via AP Images)

to shutter the group.[65] The group, numbering only around 300, also had leadership elements in Iran.[66] Sabireen even adopted Lebanese Hezbollah-style iconography to further make clear its true loyalties.[67][f] Harakat Sabireen also actively disobeyed Hamas' strictures when it launched rockets into Israel.[68]

By 2019, due in part to Iran's withholding of funds and splinter group strategy, Hamas and PIJ had fully returned to the Iranian fold. Iran subsequently allowed Harakat Sabireen to fade and Hamas moved in to begin fully dismantling the group the same year.[69] For Tehran, fallowing Sabireen was likely a minor sacrifice to rebuild links and more direct control over the larger and far more influential and powerful PIJ and Hamas. Carrots then further helped to surmount the tensions caused by the Syrian civil war. In 2023, Iranian funding for Hamas was reported to be around $100 million a year.[70] This tripling of funding compared to 2010 only underlines Iran's drive to keep Hamas' rule of Gaza afloat.

Part Three: Iran's Efforts to Splinter Fatah

In the Palestinian arena, Tehran applied the same concepts when dealing with Fatah, the most dominant member of the PLO and within the Palestinian Authority (PA). This does not mean that Iran has not tried to build close relations with the PLO and Fatah directly[g]—it has. But Tehran's fundamental differences with the PLO and by extension the Palestinian Authority's role and relationship with Israel has regularly set the two at loggerheads, making such attempts difficult.[71] Thus, Iran has focused significant efforts toward exploiting internal divisions within the PLO/Fatah/PA and encouraging disgruntled members to splinter off and, ideally, ally more closely with Iran.

Following the 2007 Hamas-Fatah War, Hamas stripped the Palestinian Authority and particularly Fatah's leadership of their control and power in the Gaza Strip. Prior to that bout of violence, some Fatah members had had their own tensions with the Palestinian Authority under Mahmoud Abbas. These figures would later lead factions that often identified as Fatah, but often did not follow Abbas's leadership.[72] Others separated themselves from Fatah, or operated in an opaque sphere where Iranian aid could still flow to them while they maintained their links with Fatah and the Palestinian Authority.[73]

Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades Splinters

One part of Fatah that Iran has tried to create splinter groups from is the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (Kata'ib Shuhada al-Aqsa), an Islamist military formation formed in 2000 by members of Fatah.

f Harakat Sabireen incorporated a mix of Sunni and primarily Iranian Shi`a Islamist ideology into its structure. Harakat Sabireen founder Hisham Salem is a Shi`a religious shaykh and was originally a commander within the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. His early networks that eventually grew into Harakat Sabireen included extensive support from Iranian-linked Shi`a charities and his Harakat Sabireen membership has included former PIJ members who converted to Shi`a Islam. Avi Issacharoff, "Hamas, beholden to Iran, lets Shiite group operate in Gaza," *Times of Israel*, May 12, 2015; author conversations, Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi`a militia commander, August-September 2019; Hassan Abbas, "Al-Sabireen: an Iran-Backed Palestinian Movement in the Style of Hezbollah," March 14, 2018; Salah Qashta, "'al-Sabireen' ..al-halif al-falastini al-awal li-airan 'ala qa'ima al-irhab al-amrikani," Irfaa Sawtak, February 2, 2018.

g One example is Iran's shipment of tons of arms to Yasir Arafat-controlled elements of the PLO via the Karine A cargo ship in 2002. Robert Satloff, "The Peace Process at Sea: The Karine-A Affair and the War on Terrorism," Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 1, 2002.

Ostensibly, the group is still to this day a Fatah-controlled entity.[74] Working to suck in splinters from the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade made sense for Tehran. Support for Palestinian Islamist groups, namely PIJ and Hamas, has long been a hallmark of Iranian policy. Ali Khamenei, the current Supreme Leader, has noted that "the foundations of this resistance rest on Palestinian *jihad groups* [emphasis by the author] and all faithful and steadfast Palestinians living inside and outside Palestine."[75]

Following the destruction of the Palestinian Authority and by extension Fatah's influence in Gaza, factions within the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade gravitated toward commanders who more often promoted violence than their "political" Fatah counterparts and who favored partnerships with Hamas or PIJ.[76]

Jaysh al-Asifa and Other Splinters

In 2012, one faction of al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, Jaysh al-Asifa (The Storm Army) was announced by the Palestinian Authority to no longer have no connections to it or Fatah.[77] Jaysh al-Asifa had initially been known as the Martyr Imad Mughniyeh Groups,[78] a Lebanese Hezbollah commander responsible for the deadly bombings of the U.S. embassy and Marine Corps barracks in Beirut in 1983, along with other hijackings, kidnappings, and murders throughout the 1980s.[79] However, Jaysh al-Asifa still promoted itself as an entity associated with Fatah.[80] Its leader, Salem Thabit (Abu al-'Abd), told Raya Media Network in April 2014 that he wanted to unify Fatah military factions.[81] Thabit worked to coordinate and organize the joint Hamas-al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade March 2004 double suicide bombing of the port of Ashdod.[82] He also promoted strong relations with Hamas.[83] The group did little to hide its links to Lebanese Hezbollah, telling the pro-Hezbollah daily Al-Akhbar in 2014 that "the relationship [between the Jaysh al-Asifa and Lebanese Hezbollah] had a major role in transferring experiences of the resistance from Lebanon to Gaza."[84] In 2015, Thabit spoke of further moves to "unify arms [of his faction and Hamas] against the enemy [Israel]."[85] By 2020, operating primarily in Gaza, the group had undertaken joint operations with the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP).[86]

By 2013, other elements of al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade were thanking Lebanese Hezbollah and Iran for supplies of "weapons and equipment," adding that the "main supporters for the Palestinian resistance" were Bashar al-Assad's Syria, Hezbollah, and Iran.[87] In 2015, Gazan sections of the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade openly asked Iran for money on television.[88] One subgroup of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade—the Martyr Nidal Amoudi Brigade (Liwa al-Shahid Nidal al-Amoudi)—demonstrated its links to Iran by featuring Iranian weaponry, particularly with the Iranian-made AM-50 .50 caliber anti-material rifle.[89]

Additionally, al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade's Gaza factions actively and increasingly participated in operations with Hamas, PIJ, and other Iranian-backed organizations. In the West Bank, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades as a whole was increasingly seen as a stalking horse for Iran. In 2023, an unnamed Palestinian Authority security source told *The Jerusalem Post* that the group was being paid by Iran via PIJ.[90]

By October 7, factions that emerged from the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, including Jaysh al-Asifa and Liwa al-Shahid Nidal al-Amoudi, ceased posting regular updates on platforms such as Telegram. In fact, Liwa al-Shahid Nidal al-Amoudi stopped posting on October 5.[91] Instead, pages generically belonging to the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade placed these groups back under the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade moniker and claimed responsibility for attacks launched by them on October 7. These included the videotaped kidnapping of an Israeli citizen,[92] [h] small arms attacks on Israeli civilian structures,[93] the capture and destruction of Israeli civilian and military vehicles,[94] and one member of the group stomping on a dead body (presumably an Israeli).[95]

Harakat al-Mujahideen

While many elements of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades maintained their outwardly Fatah-affiliated branding, other elements within Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades grew into separate organizations with their own branding and structure. A case in point is the Harakat al-Mujahideen (Holy Warrior Movement), a Palestinian fighting group that participated in the October 7 attacks. The group released a video of "leadership inspecting [the group's] forces" inside an Israeli village[96] and of beheaded Israeli troops at the Fajah military base near Gaza in an October 8 video release.[97]

Harakat al-Mujahideen's founder, Umar Atiya Abu Shari'ah, was also one of the founders of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade in Gaza.[98] Beginning in 2000, during the so-called Second or al-Aqsa Intifada, the precursor networks based along the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade's began to coalesce under Shari'ah's leadership.[99] While elements of the Harakat al-Mujahideen have been established in the West Bank, its main powerbase has been in Gaza.[100] In 2021, Asa'ad Abu Shari'ah, the group's secretary general, stated there was "requirement for national unity" that would "bring together all of the leaders of [the Palestinian armed] factions."[101] After thanking God for the group's development, he thanked "the Islamic Republic of Iran and Lebanese Hizballah as the main supporters of the Palestinian resistance,"[102] demonstrating the group's pro-Tehran orientation.

Other Fateh Splinters

The Popular Resistance Committees

Harakat al-Mujahideen were not the only splinter from Fatah to grow into a new organization. Another group that grew out of Fatah was the Popular Resistance Committees (PRC). The group claimed it worked with Hamas and other Palestinian groups in carrying out the October 7 attack "killing or capturing a large number of Zionist soldiers and settlers."[103] On the day of the attack, the group also posted images of captured Israeli equipment, IDs and credit cards belonging to an Israeli soldier.[104]

The PRC's leader, Jamal Abu Samhadana, earlier in his militant career had gained a reputation for being a popular Fatah military leader in the Rafah area of Gaza. But despite his deep familial and personal links with Fatah, he claimed to be deeply influenced by PIJ founder Fathi Al-Shaqaqi.[105] According to the Hezbollah-linked al-Mayadeen news outlet, by 1995, Samhadana was secretly working with PIJ and Hamas' early armed formations.[106] From 2000-2004, working closely with Hamas, Samhadana founded and developed the Popular Resistance Committees (PRC). Samhadana claimed to be inspired by the success of Lebanese Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and the resulting Israeli pullout from the area in May

h While the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade subunit could not be identified, the kidnapper's headband included, "Liwa" or brigade. This may point to a link to Liwa al-Shahid Nidhal al-Amoudi.

2000.[107] The group adopted new tactics with small arms, rockets, and improvised explosive devices.[108] In 2005, the PRC went so far as to gun down Yasir Arafat's cousin Musa Arafat, a Gaza-based advisor to Mahmoud Abbas, and kidnapped his son.[109] One Fatah representative told AFP the attack was "a very powerful blow to the [Palestinian] Authority."[110]

It has been claimed that the PRC introduced RPG-7 type grenade launchers into the Gaza Strip.[111] In 2006, the former head of Israel's Shin Bet said Samhadana was a "criminal and a hired killer by the Hamas."[112] The PRC also worked with other Palestinian factions (particularly Hamas), resulting in the PRC, Hamas, and Jaysh al-Islam (the Army of Islam) orchestrating the June 2006 capture of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit.[113] The operation would later result in Lebanese Hezbollah launching its own kidnapping operation that would trigger the 2006 Hezbollah-Israel War.[114]

By 2021, the PRC openly lauded its direct links to Iran, commemorating the late IRGC-QF commander Qassem Soleimani's aid to the group in what would become known as the May 2021 Battle of the Sword of Jerusalem (Sayf al-Quds). The PRC's military spokesman noted, "there was outside support [for the group and during the fighting], most notably the support of Hajj Qasim Suleimani."[115] Lebanese Hezbollah's Al-Manar news outlet noted the spokesman emphasized "the Palestinian resistance relies on the Islamic Republic and Lebanese Hizballah ... They are the largest and only supporters over the past decade for Gaza and the resistance."[116]

Harakat al-Ahrar al-Falastinia

Another Fatah splinter group is Harakat al-Ahrar al-Falastinia (the Palestinian Freedom Movement), which was founded in Gaza in 2007 by Khaled Abu Hilal, a former Fatah leader. The group, which is also known as Fatah al-Yasir (Yasir Arafat's Fatah), began as a more Islamist-focused oppositional element to Fatah[117] with Hilal building close links to Hamas and PIJ.[118] In a 2007 interview with *The New York Times*, he claimed that what he had created was "pure Fatah, Fatah before Oslo," a reference to the 1993 Oslo Accords. He also railed against Fatah's corruption and said he was pushing for stronger links with Hamas.[119] By the time Hilal founded Harakat al-Ahrar al-Falastinia, he had already built up significant support among Gazan members of al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade who had issues with Fatah leadership at the time. In 2006, some 800 of the group's members had pledged their allegiance to Hilal and voiced their approval for Hamas.[120]

In 2011, Hilal voiced his support for Iran and pushed for further cooperation with the Islamic Republic due to its support for the "right of Palestinian resistance."[121] In 2016, when Iran promised $30,000 for Palestinians whose homes were destroyed and $7,000 to the family of every "martyr," the Palestinian Authority voiced its disapproval of these funds, considering them "interference."[122] Hilal responded to the PA by stating that accepting the Iranian money was as "a duty for the [Palestinian] nation and not interference."[123]

Harakat al-Ahrar al-Falastinia's military section, Kata'ib al-Ansar (the Brigade of the Supporters), also stepped up their activities with combined operations with Hamas and PIJ, in addition to their own attacks against Israeli targets.[124] In May 2021, Khaled Abu Hilal resigned as secretary general of the Palestinian Freedom Movement and joined Hamas.[125] It is not clear if Harakat al-Ahrar al-Falastinia played a role in the October 7 attack. Its last post on its website was on October 3, 2023.[126] The group did celebrate the October 7 attacks, however. It also claimed the deaths of movement leaders as a result of Israeli airstrikes on October 9[127] and another "martyr" following an Israeli strike on Khan Younis in Gaza on October 12.[128]

"Iran's recruitment of Fatah's assets demonstrates that the elements of the Palestinian Authority are duplicitous, not in control of their own forces, or a mixture of both."

Iran's recruitment of Fatah's assets demonstrates that the elements of the Palestinian Authority are duplicitous, not in control of their own forces, or a mixture of both. This recruitment owed much to particular commanders' need for a benefactor for their groups. Iran and its proxies also provided many of these factions with media assistance. The geographic isolation of Gaza, separated from other Palestinians in the West Bank, along with Hamas' and PIJ's dominance in Gaza served as a further exploitable elements for Tehran.[i] Iran's cultivation of splinters from Fatah and its provision of funding and weapons to these groups not only strengthened PIJ's and Hamas' positions in Gaza and the West Bank, but also provided the Iranians with more armed proxies for its shadow war against Israel and supplied Tehran's Palestinian allies with a further domestic pressure point against Fatah. As has been outlined, many of the Iranian-sponsored splinter sections of Fatah participated in the October 7 attacks, with elements of the al-Aqsa Martyr's Brigade claiming it had launched rockets and sent fighters into Israel, possibly taking Israeli hostages.[129] Their participation served as a force multiplier for Hamas and PIJ.

Part Four: Iran's Outreach to Leftist Palestinian Groups

Due to the political threat Communism posed to the power of Iran's Islamic Revolution, and its atheism, there is little doubt regarding Ayatollah Khomeini's hatred of Marxism. From 1982-1983, Khomeini sought to arrest and execute communist opponents in Iran's leftist Tudeh Party.[130] In his 1989 letter to Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev, the Supreme Leader noted, "it is clear to everyone that Communism should henceforth be sought in world museums of political history."[131]

However, the Islamic Republic has acted far more pragmatically vis-à-vis leftist Palestinian groups, pulling them from history's dustbin and reestablishing them as viable proxies. The collapse of the Soviet Union combined with the onset of the 1993 Oslo Accords marked a dire time for Palestinian leftist organizations. Left without their communist benefactors, suffering from a sense of ideological failure and decades of combat and intra-political losses due to factional infighting, and held back by an aging leadership apparatus, many of these groups faced the stark choice of (re) joining Arafat's PLO and later the Palestinian Authority, attempting

i It is important to note that in 2015, Jaysh al-Asifa's head noted that it was "not easy for the fighters of Fatah to carry weapons in the Gaza Strip after the Hamas movement took over." See Amar Abu Shebaab, "Qa'id jaysh al-'asifa li 'raya': tawhid miqatli fatah lays 'asira w al-'alaqa mah al-qassam taybeh," Raya, April 20, 2014.

to maintain some level of militancy with an extremely diminished capability to execute any attacks, or merely fading into obscurity. Iran's attempts to acquire the loyalty of leftist groups stemmed from these weaknesses.

Regardless of the clear baseline ideological differences, there are commonalities between the Palestinian leftist groups and Iran's *modus operandi*. Many of the numerous Palestinian "Popular Front"-style Marxist factions that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s were no shrinking violets when it came to violent actions and terrorist attacks. One of the earliest and most powerful organizations of the period, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) were pioneers when it came to hijacking civilian airliners and supplied fighters that countered numerous U.S. allies and moderate Arab states.[132]

The tactics and strategy of many Palestinian leftist groups were often in line with the notion that violence was the only way to achieve a Palestinian state.[133] [j] This meshed well with the violent 'Islamic Resistance' ideology Iran pushed for its Shi`a Islamist proxies such as Lebanese Hezbollah.[134] As more violent behaviors became commonplace to the Palestinian arena, there were more hardline groups from which Iran could recruit. Moreover, politically speaking, many leftist groups either vehemently opposed the 1993 Oslo Accords or maintained ambiguous stances on them. Iran and its proxies stood in opposition to the process, creating alignment on the issue. Speaking to *Egypt Today* in 2017, Abu Ahmed Fouad, the Damascus-based deputy director of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), stated, "The [Popular] Front [for the Liberation of Palestine] is a triangle of strength opposing the political approach represented by the powerful leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority."[135] The PFLP was seen by Iran as a means to influence Palestinian affairs and as a potential counter to Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas.[136] The PFLP and its military section, Kata'ib al-Shahid Abu Ali Mustafa (The Martyr Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades), which advanced into Israel during the October 7 attacks[137] was and is the strongest Palestinian leftist group courted by Iran.[138] However, it is also important to understand the nuance of Iranian proxy-building among smaller and more overlooked leftist organizations, many of which emerged from the PFLP. This article focuses significant attention on them.

The PFLP-GC: Iran's First Leftist Proxy

In more recent years, the late IRGC-QF commander Qassem Soleimani has been given credit by Palestinian leftist groups for the Iranian embrace of ideologically diffuse Palestinian factions. In a 2021 interview with Hezbollah's official Al-Ahed magazine, PFLP deputy director Abu Ahmed Fouad stated that "the martyr Soleimani totally removed issues of bias when he stated, 'We will put aside any ideological differences and share one goal, resistance to remove the cancerous entity [Israel].'"[139] Soleimani was building on Iranian attempts to make progress with Palestinian leftist groups.

Iran's first attempt to pull a Palestinian leftist group under its wing concerned the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC). Formed in 1968 by Ahmed Jibril after a split with the PFLP, the group became well known for its numerous advanced terrorist attacks.[140] Jibril ruled the PFLP-GC with an iron fist until his death in 2021; splinters from his group were often killed in retribution for disloyalty.[141] At the time, the PFLP-GC favored violent action and looked down on more intellectually focused endeavors, such as writing papers on leftist theory, that were swirling around many leftist Palestinian groups.[142] This led the organization to pull off some audacious terrorist and guerrilla attacks in the 1970s and 1980s. In 1987, one of these attacks involved the use of two motorized hang gliders and resulted in the deaths of six Israeli soldiers. It likely served as a form of inspiration for the use of motorized hang gliders and paragliders by Hamas on October 7, 2023. In fact, on October 10, the pro-Hezbollah al-Mayadeen published an article commemorating the PFLP-GC attack.[143] The use of these recreational vehicles as weapons was also adopted by elite units of the IRGC, which, for example, displayed their use in 2019.[144]

The PFLP-GC maintained close links to Syrian leader Hafez al-Assad and later his son Bashar al-Assad, and acted as a proxy for Syria throughout the 1970s and 1980s, particularly during intra-Palestinian fighting.[145] Adam Dolnik has noted that "the group's relationship with Syria was a key factor why Jibril never achieved the level of prominence that one might expect based on his military excellence and a touch for spectacular attacks."[146] The group's violence against fellow Palestinian groups and willingness to bend to accommodate to the will of Syria led some Palestinian critics to brand Ahmed Jibril and the PFLP-GC as having embraced "revolutionary nihilism."[147]

Beginning in the 1990s, through Lebanese Hezbollah, Iran increased its contacts with the PFLP-GC. According to Gary Gambill, "a few hundred PFLP-GC guerrillas were permitted to operate against Israel in conjunction with Hezbollah throughout the 1990s."[148] Gambill has noted that the group lacked functional command and control structures in Lebanon and was reliant on performing operations with Lebanese Hezbollah.[149] Starting in 2000, the PFLP-GC began to attempt arms smuggling operations to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza.[150]

In the 1990s and 2000s, several factors gave Iran opportunities to gain more influence among Palestinian leftist groups. One was Syria's deepening links with Iran during the 1990s and 2000s. A second factor was Damascus' dominance over the PFLP-GC and other "Popular Front" groups. A third factor was the ability of Damascus to grant Palestinian leftist groups staging areas in Syria and in the then Syrian-occupied Lebanon. Fourthly, groups such as the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), PFLP, and PFLP-GC all have their headquarters in Damascus. Writing in 1997, Harold Cubert, a chronicler of the PFLP, noted that "with its headquarters located in Damascus, and its very existence currently dependent upon Syria's goodwill, the PFLP is in no position to carry out its strategy against Israel and the West, unless its host allows it."[151] As Iranian influence in Syria has grown since 2013 due to propping up the Assad regime, the DFLP, PFLP, and PFLP-GC have undoubtedly had to increasingly answer to and work with Tehran.[152]

In the case of the PFLP-GC, their powerbase was limited to a

j It should be noted that the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), a violent splinter from the PFLP, was considered more moderate than its other "Popular Front" cohorts. In the 1970s, when most groups adopted the "Rejectionist" approach to achieve the full destruction of the State of Israel, the DFLP posited that a unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state on any amount of "liberated land" (through armed conflict or negotiations) was a preferrable option. For the DFLP, this territory could serve as a springboard for the future "liberation of Palestine." See Muhammad Y. Muslih, "Moderates and Rejectionists within the Palestine Liberation Organization," *Middle East Journal* 30:2 (1976), pp. 127-128.

"As Iranian influence in Syria has grown since 2013 due to propping up the Assad regime, the DFLP, PFLP, and PFLP-GC have undoubtedly had to increasingly answer to and work with Tehran."

series of Palestinian camps primarily in Syria and to a lesser extent in Lebanon. In Lebanon, the heavy influence of Hezbollah allowed for further Iranian influence over the group. In Syria, the PFLP-GC has continued to act as a loyal servant of the Assad regime, acting as a proxy for both Assad and Iran against Syrian Sunni jihadi, rebel, and oppositional Palestinian groups.[153] During the Syrian War, the PFLP-GC's loyalty to Assad was deep and its violent acts against fellow Palestinians became so numerous that sections of the PFLP-GC based outside Syria and Lebanon actively opposed Jibril and his group. A former member of the group's Gaza politburo told Al-Monitor that the PFLP-GC had performed a "deplorable and completely unacceptable act" when the organization shelled the Palestinian neighborhood of Yarmouk south of Damascus in 2012.[154] Nevertheless, the PFLP-GC maintained its pro-Assad positions. And despite its unpopularity in Palestinian circles, Iran maintained its links to the group. Iran even utilized a nucleus of members from the PFLP-GC to create another pro-Assad militia group in Syria, Liwa al-Quds.[155]

Named after Ahmed Jibril's son, Muhammad Jihad Jibril, who was killed in a 2002 car bombing, Kata'ib Shahid Jihad Jibril (The Martyr Jihad Jibril Brigades) became a new militant wing for the PFLP-GC in the West Bank and Gaza.[156] Kata'ib Shahid Jihad Jibril subsequently claimed small arms attacks, including a 2004 shooting attack against Israelis near Hebron[157] and one in 2005 against Israeli troops in Nabulus.[158] Yet, these attacks were minor and representative of a group with little reach.

Kata'ib Shahid Jihad Jibril remained obscure, but by 2018 and particularly in Gaza, it was showing off new capabilities. Despite the PFLP-GC's actions against other Palestinians in Syria and limited influence in Palestinian areas outside Lebanon and Syria, it appeared the group had not only gained new young members, but also more advanced weaponry. In November 2018, its members were photographed with a MANPADS.[159] During the October 7 "al-Aqsa Flood" attacks, in which it claimed it participated, Kata'ib Shahid Jihad Jibril claimed the loss of two members.[160] Given its overt links to Bashar al-Assad's Syria, without some form of Iranian backing and Hamas and PIJ allowing it to grow, it is highly doubtful the group could have been able to produce these results organically, particularly in Gaza.[k]

The PFLP-GC was an obvious group for Tehran to utilize in Gaza. The Assad regime already had an high degree of control over the group, facilitating Iranian influence.[161] In Lebanon, the PFLP-GC had to get acquiescence from Lebanese Hezbollah in order to pull off any military attacks against Israel.[162] The group's diehard membership, history of supporting and working with Lebanese Hezbollah, and hardcore militarism made it an attractive partner to Iran.

The DFLP: Tehran's Other Popular Front

Originally founded as the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine in 1969, the DFLP resulted from a split from its fellow leftist group the PFLP. Led by Jordanian-Palestinian Christian Nayef Hawatmeh, the small group earned an early reputation for a strong communist intellectual base.[163] According to Jillian Becker, the DFLP had "especially close ties with the Soviet Union."[164] The DFLP often acted as a go-between for radical leftist groups and the Fatah-dominated PLO. The group carried out a number of deadly attacks, including the 1974 Ma'alot Massacre in which over 20 school children were killed.[165] However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, negotiations between the PLO and Israel, and eventually with Yasir Arafat's signing of the 1993 Oslo Accords, the DFLP ran into hard times.

Due to increasing PLO negotiations with Israel and then the Oslo Accords, an internal split led by Yasir Abd Rabo (Abu Bashar) took more of the DFLP's followers away from Hawatmeh's camp.[166] In 1993, the DFLP rejected the Oslo Accords and wavered in its support for PLO chairman Yasir Arafat.[167] By the late 1990s, the DFLP was floundering. It continued some violent attacks through the 2000s, but they were piecemeal, hardly comparable to successful terrorist attacks launched by Palestinian rivals, and unrepresentative of the group's capabilities during its height in the 1970s.[168]

However, by the 2010s, the group was in increasing contact with Iran and its proxies. In 2011, the DFLP's 11th congress was held in Beirut and included a speech by Lebanese Hezbollah parliamentarian Nawaf al-Musawi.[169] During al-Musawi's speech, it was reported that he "stressed the need for the Palestinian factions to overcome their political differences, so that they could be [better] able to confront the Israeli aggression."[170] Meetings, events, and other forms of coordination with Lebanese Hezbollah persisted. In 2013, Lebanese Hezbollah utilized the DFLP to assist in distributing food to Palestinian refugees displaced from fighting in Syria. This particular initiative backfired. Given many of the refugees had just seen their neighborhoods destroyed by pro-Assad forces, they burned the food in protest against the gesture from Lebanese Hezbollah.[171]

In 2012, the DFLP attempted to maintain a position similar to that of PIJ regarding the fighting in Syria. In conjunction with Fatah and the small Jabhat al-Nidal al-Sha'abi al-Falastini [Palestinian Popular Struggle Front], the DFLP pushed for neutrality for Palestinians living in Syria.[172] While there were no reports of the DFLP taking part in fighting on either side of the Syrian War, the group did maintain a relatively pro-Assad stance. In 2021, Nayef Hawatmeh even offered his congratulations to Bashar al-Assad when he was re-elected to his position as president.[173] Meetings between the DFLP and Lebanese Hezbollah also continued well into 2023, with a DFLP delegation congratulating Lebanese Hezbollah in July of that year for its "July victory," a reference to the 2006 Hezbollah-Israel War, saying it was part of the "path to

k The PFLP-GC had already suffered splits inside the Palestinian Territories due to issues some members had with its actions during the Syrian Civil War. In fact, in Syria, the PFLP-GC suffered a split that resulted in some fighters forming the short-lived Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-Free Command. See "27 2 Damascus Ugarit dimashq, i'alan tashkil al-jebha al-sha'abia al-tahrir falastin al-qa'ida al-hurr al-mishaqa 'an jebha ahmed Jibril," Ugarit News, YouTube, February 27, 2013.

Palestinian victory and liberation."[174]

The most dynamic portion of DFLP-Iranian cooperation took place in the Gaza Strip. Established in 2000, the DFLP's armed section known as Kata'ib al-Muqawama al-Wataniyah – Quwet al-Shahid Umar al-Qasim (The National Resistance Brigades – Martyr Umar al-Qasim Forces), or KMW, has offered one of the clearest examples of Iranian influence within the DFLP. Initially formed around cellular structures in the West Bank and Gaza,[175] with Iranian assistance, the KMW was reformed into a more cohesive armed structure and slightly rebranded with a more modern facade.[176]

By 2019, the DFLP's KMW was sporting new capabilities in Gaza. In one parade, the group demonstrated it had access to MANPADS, possibly of Iranian origin.[l] In 2021, the DFLP posted photos of the group's fighters using the Iranian-made AM-50 .50 caliber anti-material rifle.[177] KMW also likely received assistance from Iran related to its media profile, launching a Telegram channel in 2019 for more advanced media propaganda. Signs of Iranian influence could even be spotted in the type of music used in propaganda videos.[178][m] From 2019-2022, the group claimed more armed activity, particularly via the use of mortars and rocket munitions.[179] These activities would also include other Iranian proxies. In May 2022, the group claimed a joint operation that included the PIJ and al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade in Gaza.[180]

Moreover, the DFLP publicized its role of maintaining loyalty to the Iranians. The January 3, 2020, death of IRGC-QF commander Qassem Soleimani was memorialized on their social media. The group posited that Soleimani's death would "only increase our determination to follow the same path of [that] martyr commander."[181] Around two weeks later, the DFLP posted material that sent slightly more subtle signs of loyalty to Tehran. During a January 2020 ceremony to honor a freed Palestinian prisoner, Alaa Abu Jazar, the event was replete with DFLP members posing with weapons in front of "martyrdom" posters devoted to members of Harakat Sabireen.[182]

It was the military rather than political wings of Palestinian leftist groups such as DFLP that received makeovers and increased support. From access to newer small arms to heavier weapons and new alliances with more powerful groups in Gaza, the DFLP's KMW displayed them with gusto. Nevertheless, the DFLP's political wing, particularly via social media, did not receive the same attention from Iran, appearing to still use old messaging techniques and lacking the flashy imagery, uniforms, and attention allotted to KMW.

Part Five: Tehran's Strategy of Crafting Unity and Coherence Through Umbrella Groups and Joint Operations Rooms

Umbrella groups and joint operations rooms have been a regular feature within the Palestinian arena for decades and were regularly crafted by various Palestinian actors.[n] In fact, the PLO itself operated as an umbrella group. Some had shorter lifespans than others. In more recent times, umbrella groups containing outfits part of Iran's Palestinian proxy network in Gaza, point to some level of Iranian influence and direction. Iran has regularly demonstrated a desire to craft umbrellas for its proxies to organize ideologically and religiously different groups it exerts various levels of control over.

Not all umbrella type groupings and organizations crafted by Tehran are equal, but the end effect of them tends to be demonstration of Iranian management, control, and better armed organization for the groups included within them. The patronage supplied by Iran and its more loyal proxies have stood as a symbol to other groups that it would not only be in their interest to fight under Iranian direction, but that this would offer a better prospect of political and military success.

Before discussing Iran's use of umbrellas in the Palestinian context, it is useful to discuss Tehran's previous use of this strategy in other locations. In 1997, Lebanese Hezbollah created the Lebanese Resistance Brigades (Saraya al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniya), a non-sectarian militia auxiliary to Lebanese Hezbollah's main Shi`a-staffed forces. Its purpose also extended to becoming a middleman between Lebanese Hezbollah and by extension Iran, and other anti-Israel armed groups in Lebanon. According to Chris Zambelis, the group would "forge operational ties with non-Islamist militias that subscribe to a host of different ideologies but nevertheless act under the rubric of resistance. This includes militants that promulgate secular, nationalist, socialist, and leftist ideologies."[183]

While the Lebanese Resistance Brigades was not necessarily an umbrella group itself, it allowed Hezbollah to craft informalized umbrella structures with groups that held their own ideologies and levels of autonomy. As a partial result of these networking advances, in May 2008, when Lebanese Hezbollah's telecom network was threatened with closure by Lebanese authorities, primarily from parties opposed to Hezbollah, Hezbollah not only mobilized sectarian allies such as Harakat Amal, but also secular groups such as the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP). These groups then stormed into Beirut.[184] In 2013, units from the SSNP coordinated with and fought alongside Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi Shi`a militias in Syria. The relationship deepened to such a degree that the secular SSNP adopted the sectarian rhetoric of Lebanese Hezbollah.[185]

In Iraq, the Popular Mobilization Forces (al-Hashd al-Sha'abi) serves as another example for Iranian umbrella network construction. According to one former al-Hashd al-Sha'abi commander, Iran's thinking was that tensions between different groups could be controlled, defused, and utilized by Iran with the "correct loyal men" leading the organization.[186] Since the 2014 formation of al-Hashd al-Sha'abi in Iraq, it has been

l The MANPADS in the photo appears to be an SA-7 Strela-type system. If Iranian, it is likely a Misagh-type MANPADS. KMW's official Telegram channel, Telegram, December 13, 2019.

m The background instrumental music is a song called "Ya Wa'ad Allah" by Lebanese Hezbollah band Firqat al-Fajr and was released after the 2006 Hezbollah-Israel War. Different versions (including instrumental styles) have been used by various Iranian supported groups. See "Ya Wa3d Allah ... New Version YA-Lubnan.com," Daily Motion, 2008. In Bahrain, the song was used by Iranian-backed Bahraini militants and another version was made for Iraq's Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq. See Phillip Smyth, "Singing Hizballah's Tune In Manama: Why Are Bahrain's Militants Using the Music of Iran's Proxies?" Hizballah Cavalcade, Jihadology, May 5, 2014.

n One example is the 2021 "Joint Operations Room." See Adnan Abu Amar, "Ghurfa al-'amliat al-mushtarkat lilmuqawama fi gaza nuwat li 'jaysh al-tahrir,'" Al Jazeera, May 28, 2021.

overwhelmingly dominated by Iranian-backed Shi`a militia groups and commanders.[187] Yet, Hashd al-Sha'abi also included members that were loyal to factions that clashed with Iranian interests and ideology.[188] o

As already noted, extremely loyal groups to Iran, such as the Badr Organization, make up the largest contingent of al-Hashd al-Sha'abi's forces. Many commanders of al-Hashd al-Sha'abi arose from the ranks of another loyal Iranian proxy group, Kata'ib Hezbollah.[189] Over time, some Hashd al-Sha'abi groups were dropped by the Iranians over issues ranging from loyalty, potential unacceptable levels of criminality, or because they had openly opposed Iran.[190] The Hashd al-Sha'abi promoted pro-Iranian messaging and heavily promoted factions more loyal to Iran.[191] This demonstrated Iran's influence over various Shi`a militias and its ability to build a core of effective partners within different factions.

Turning to the Palestinian context, in the hopes of crafting various Fatah-splinter, leftist, and Islamist groups into a more loyal, militarily cohesive, and politically responsive network, it was in Iran's interest to form new umbrellas for its ideologically heterodox web of Palestinian proxies. One early example includes the Ten Resistance Organization, created in 1991 at the Iranian-run World Conference in Support of the Islamic Revolution in Palestine.[192] Hamas and leftist Palestinian groups created the umbrella group as a protest against negotiations between Israel and the PLO.[193]

In September 2023, Hamas and PIJ also started a joint operations room in Beirut. According to the official Iranian Islamic Republic News Agency, Iran's foreign minister praised the group and "underlined the need for unity among all the Palestinian groups."[194]

Another joint operations room, which was functional by 2021, primarily included Lebanese Hezbollah and Hamas.[195] This joint operations room utilized Lebanese Hezbollah as a coordinator between Iran, other Iranian proxies in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, and the Palestinian groups.[196] Ibrahim al-Amin, a writer with the pro-Hezbollah Al-Akhbar, told Hezbollah's Al-Manar that in 2021 Beirut-based joint operations room included Palestinian factions other than Hamas, utilized Hezbollah to smuggle Hamas field operatives in Gaza to Beirut, and that IRGC-QF commander Ismail Qaani made two visits to the group's offices during the two weeks of fighting between Palestinian forces in Gaza and the West Bank in May of that year.[197]

Iran's main Palestinian umbrella project grew wings in Gaza and the West Bank has been the Joint Operation Room for the Palestinian Factions of Resistance (al-Ghurfa al-Mushtrakat li-Fasa'il al-Muqawama al-Falistinia, or JOR). Initially, the JOR began as a partnership between Hamas and PIJ in 2006.[198] Ten other armed organizations including Islamist Fatah splinters and leftist groups were added to the umbrella JOR grouping between January 2017 and July 2018.[p] In November 2018, Yahya al-Sinwar, Hamas' Gaza lead and prominent military commander, referred to the JOR as a body that would form the "nucleus of the army of liberation."[199] By December 2018, the PFLP, particularly through its Abu Ali al-Mustafa Brigades, also began deferring to the JOR for how it would execute armed decision-making.[200] The JOR reared its head in a more militant fashion with rocket attacks against Israeli targets in November 2018[201] and a round of rocket attacks from Gaza in 2019.[202] New marketing material, including iconography, propaganda, and promotional material, was also displayed by the JOR starting in 2020.[203]

All of the groups involved with the JOR had high levels of Iranian backing and were ostensibly marketed as a more unified force. "With the strength of God, we fight together and [will] win together," a December 2020 communique by JOR read.[204] In December 2020, JOR announced a new series of armed exercises "to enhance cooperation and joint actions ... [to] permanently and continuously raise their combat readiness."[205] JOR posted highly polished propaganda surrounding the exercises that included launching rockets, simulating taking an IDF hostage from a tank, raiding small structures, deploying what was likely an Iranian-made Misagh MANPADS, and using an Iranian-made AM 50.[206] In other videos from the drill, combat divers simulated raiding coastal targets and JOR fighters interdicted mock Israeli seaborn forces.[207] All of these tactics were later utilized in the October 7 attacks. Citing Hamas, the analyst Joe Truzman noted the training operation was "the first of its kind and is an effort to ready Palestinian militant groups against a potential military conflict against Israel."[208] Much of the propaganda and statements produced for the JOR followed models that utilized filming, graphics, and even text used by Iran that had also been used for other regional Iranian proxies.[209] q

Following the May 2023 clashes involving the JOR and Israel, IRGC-QF commander Ismail Qaani singled out the JOR with special greetings to the umbrella group, adding that their operations "proved once again that by relying on almighty God, firm determination, and wise management, [these forces were] capable of breaking the enemy's power."[210] In a form mirroring earlier unveilings of newly minted Iranian proxies,[r] Iranian and other proxy/proxy-supporting publications granted the JOR regular coverage and high praise.[211] Yet, by September 2023, a month before the so-called Al-Aqsa Flood operations, the JOR

o A number of these groups later broke off. Muqtada al-Sadr's Saraya al-Salam began operating with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, and many factions loyal to Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani formed their own network in 2020. See Suadad al-Salhy, "Iran and Najaf struggle for control over Hashd al-Shaabi after Muhandis's killing," Middle East Eye, February 16, 2020.

p Hamas' Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades; PIJ's al-Quds Brigades; the PFLP's Martyr Abu Ali al-Mustafa Brigades; the DFLP's KMW; the PFLP-GC's Martyr Jihad Jibril Brigades; the Palestinian Freedom Movement's Brigade of the Supporters; the Popular Resistance Committee's Nasir Salah al-Din Brigades; the Palestine Mujahideen Movement's Mujahideen Brigade; Fatah-splinter/Al-Aqsa Martyr's Brigade's Groups of the Martyr Ayman Jawda; The Martyr Nidal Amoudi Brigade; Martyr Abd al-Qader al-Husayni Brigades; and Storm Army.

q Similar markers can be seen with videos produced for the Iranian-backed Iraqi front group Saraya Thawrat al-Ashreen al-Thania. See Saraya Thawrat al-Ashreen al-Thania official Telegram Channel, Telegram, July 5, 2020. JOR statements also match a model used by the Iranian-backed Bahraini group Saraya al-Mukhtar: JOR official Telegram channel, Telegram, May 10, 2021, and Saraya al-Mukhtar Official Telegram Channel, Telegram, Telegram, February 20, 2017. At times, even the same fonts were utilized in these posts.

r When Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq and Kata'ib Hezbollah's first videos of attacks on U.S. forces were released from 2005-2007, Lebanese Hezbollah's Al-Manar was often the first to run them or run them as exclusives. Author observation. See also "Iraqi shia resistance:asaeb ahlu alhaq," archive.org, April 11, 2008.

seemed to cease activity. No posts emerged from its Telegram, and coverage withered. It is possible this was for reasons of operational security or for other reasons relating to the impending October 7 attack. Almost all the constituent groups of the JOR assisted in the attacks from Gaza into Israel in October and did so in a mutually supportive manner.[s] It remains to be seen whether the JOR will be revived in the coming months.

Conclusion

It is possible that Iran was surprised by the catastrophic success of the October 7 attacks. Tehran may not have expected the attacks to have dealt as deadly a blow to Israel as they did. However, there is little doubt that Iran's financial aid, structuring of its proxies into more cohesive armed factions and then into umbrella organizations, and assistance through the supply of weapons increased the deadliness and extremism of its Palestinian proxies. It is also quite clear that without Iranian assistance and nurturing, these groups would not have been in a position to strike Israel, as they did on October 7 with as much success as they showed.

Armed capabilities supplied by Iran, such as a variety of UAV designs, rockets, demolition charges, and other munitions, were smuggled into Gaza and used to deadly effect in the October 7 attack in which Israeli vehicles, buildings, civilian houses, and observation posts were all targeted.[212] Iranian assistance allowed its Palestinian proxies to amass the firepower, messaging know-how, and much of the hi-tech equipment necessary to carry out and propagandize the attack. Financial aid provided by Iran did more than keep Hamas operating as a governing body in Gaza; it was also directly piped into Hamas' terror and military apparatus.[213]

Training provided to Hamas fighters and the other proxies also honed their abilities to execute the October 7 attacks. As PFLP-GC secretary general Talal Naji told Iran's al-Alam in August 2021, "Sometimes the training took place in the Islamic Republic of Iran, sometimes in Syria, and sometimes in Lebanon with the brothers in Hezbollah who are waging jihad." While it is currently unknown how Hamas or fighters from other groups traveled to Iran, Lebanon, and Syria, it can be assumed to be via the wide network of Gaza's smuggling tunnels,[214] by sea,[t] or from flights Gazans could take originating outside of Israel.[215]

Naji also stressed that "as you know, we are an axis, an axis of resistance. [IRGC-QF commander Qassem Soleimani] used to supervise himself," adding that Iranian-supplied weapons, such as the Russian-made laser-guided Kornet anti-tank missile, strengthened their capabilities.[216 u]

Iran allows for a level of autonomy among its proxies, but as this article has outlined, Tehran has moved to punish insufficiently obedient groups, allowing them to wither on the vine, or has engineered splinters to weaken them or pressure them into line.

Hamas' takeover of Gaza served as the means for Iran to absorb splintered factions of Fatah into its orbit. Even if those factions could not be fully controlled, creating a reliance on Iran's weapons, money, and other forms of political support facilitated their reformation into Iran's umbrella. By cultivating ties with militant factions with differences with Abbas' Fatah, Iran was able to recruit manpower to its "Axis of Resistance" and create a pressure point within Fatah. Furthermore, the continued presence of Fatah splinter fighters in Gaza has given Iran leverage to ensure the obedience of Hamas and PIJ. Small and less popular groups such as the PFLP, PFLP-GC, and DFLP were cultivated by Iran as part of a larger umbrella of Tehran-aligned groups, but likely simultaneously served other roles, including countering the Palestinian Authority and if necessary to put pressure on Hamas and PIJ.

As the Israeli offensive continues in Gaza, it is possible some armed Palestinian groups may be forced to shift their center of gravity to Lebanon. This would expose them to even deeper Iranian influence. On December 4, 2023, Hamas' Lebanon section released a statement calling for the creation and recruitment for the Vanguards of the al-Aqsa Flood (Taliy'ah Tufan al-Aqsa), a group focused on "resisting [Israeli] occupation."[217] Given any armed activities by Hamas in Lebanon would have to be coordinated with Lebanese Hezbollah, these activities would also be subject to a degree of control by the Iranian decision makers that exert influence over Hezbollah. As previously seen with the PFLP, DFLP, and PFLP-GC, groups dependent on using Lebanon or Syria as staging areas have only become more beholden to their masters in Damascus or Tehran.

Even if Hamas and PIJ are militarily defeated in Gaza in the months ahead, Iran would still have many options to work with in both Gaza and the West Bank. As Eurasia Group's Ian Bremmer stated in an October 31 piece, "The war is radicalizing far more Palestinians than Hamas propaganda ever could."[218] Iran will likely attempt to rebuild its network in Gaza from newly radicalized Palestinians, including among leftist actors, Islamists, and smaller factions they can more strongly control.

In this scenario, it should be expected that Iran will also continue to splinter off groups from Fatah/the Palestinian Authority. On November 5, a mysterious group claiming to represent members within the Palestinian Authority-affiliated security services emerged. Called the Sons of Abu Jandal, the group demanded that Mahmoud Abbas and the PA security forces engage in violence against Israel or revolt against Abbas.[219] While no link to Iran has yet been established and the group has since gone quiet, it is these types of splinters that have been exploited by Tehran in the past.

In the months ahead, it is likely that Iran will continue to use the carrots (e.g., funding) and sticks (e.g., fostering splinter groups) in order to maintain and deepen control over its Palestinian "Axis of Resistance." As Israel's military campaign in Gaza puts these groups under increasing pressure, Iran's leverage will only grow. Given Iran has aimed to provide support to a wide range of new and well-established groups, particularly those with more violent dispositions, the radicalizing effect of the war on Palestinians provides fertile terrain for Tehran. CTC

s While it is unclear whether Harakat al-Ahrar al-Falastinia participated and which specific Gaza-based factions of al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade were involved, all of the other elements of the JOR have claimed roles in the October 7, 2023, attack. (See Figure 1.)

t In one 2013 case, smugglers brought in a dismantled Hyundai Sonata from Egypt into Gaza. "Hamas polices seas as tunnel smuggling suffers," Reuters, November 11, 2013.

u The missiles were also used on the first day of the curent Gaza war. See Seth J. Frantzman, "Overwhelmed: The IDF's first hours fighting the terror waves on Oct 7," *Jerusalem Post*, October 16, 2023. Hamas has since claimed the use of the weapon against Israeli soldiers. See Iran Observer, "Hamas released a footage of the Kornet missile hitting the Israeli APC …," X, October 28, 2023.

Appendix: Iran-Backed Palestinian Organizations

Color Key

Green: Main Islamist organizations (2)
Gray: Leftist groups (3)
Yellow: Islamist Fatah splinters (7)
Light Green: PIJ splinter/Shi`a Islamist (1)

Main/Political Group	Military Section/Sub-Organization	Details	Ideological/Political Background	JOR Affiliate	Oct. 7 Participant
Hamas	The Martyr Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades (Kata'ib al-Shahid Izz al-Din al-Qassam)	In the 1990s and early 2000s, Hamas was active in planning and orchestrating suicide bombings. Hamas is the largest faction in Gaza and currently leads the area's governing apparatus. The group promotes Muslim Brotherhood style Islamism.	Mainstream Islamist	✓	✓
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (Harakat al-Jihad al-Islamiyyah fi Falistine or PIJ)	The Quds Brigade (Saraya al-Quds)	With close links to Khomeinist ideology, PIJ has primarily focused on violent activities in the Palestinian territories and Israel. In the 1990s-2000s, the group carried out dozens of suicide bombings. PIJ is the second largest faction in Gaza after Hamas, in terms of size and weapons supplies.	Mainstream Islamist	✓	✓
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (or PFLP	The Martyr Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades (Kata'ib al-Shahid Abu Ali Mustafa)	The leftist PFLP group pioneered airline hijacking attacks in the 1970s. Despite occassionally working with the Palestinian Authority, the Marxist group has often rejected peace negotiations with Israel and has continued its militancy.	Leftist	✓	✓
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (or PFLP GC	The Martyr Ahmed Jibril Brigades (Kata'ib al-Shahid Ahmed Jibril)	Primarily based in Syria and Lebanon, the leftist PFLP-GC's heyday was in the 1970s-80s. It often engaged in fratricidal conflicts with other Palestinian groups in that period. It is a close ally and proxy of the Assad regime in Damascus with a more limited presence in the Palestinian territories.	Leftist	✓	✓
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (or DFLP)	The National Resistance Brigades - Forces of the Martyr Umar al-Qasim (Kata'ib al-Muqawama al-Watania - Quwet al-Shahid Umar al-Qasim)	Splitting from the PFLP, the DFLP is a smaller Marxist group with a presence in Gaza and the West Bank. The DFLP has had a mixed relationship with the Palestinian Authority and has often worked against it.	Leftist	✓	✓
The Popular Resistance Committees (Lijan al-Muqawama al-Sha'abiyah or PRC)	The Nasir Salah al-Din Brigades (Alawia al-Nasir Salah al-din)	Formed out of a splinter from the Gaza-based sections of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade. The PRC has been involved in major operations including the 2005 assassination of Palestinian Authority advisor Musa Arafat and the 2006 kidnapping of Gilad Shalit.	Islamist Fatah Splinter	✓	✓
Palestinian Freedom Movement (Harakat al-Ahrar al-Falastinia)	Brigade of the Supporters (Kata'ib al-Ansar)	A splinter from the Fatah Movement, the Palestinian Freedom Movement is primarily based in Gaza and was formed out of pro-Hamas Islamist militant elements of Fatah and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade linked to Khaled Abu Hilal.	Islamist Fatah Splinter	✓	Unclear
al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (Kata'ib Shuhada al-Aqsa)	Storm Forces/Army (Quwet/Jaysh al-Asifa)	An element that emerged into the public in the 2010s from the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade in Gaza. Despite claiming to be representative of Fatah, the Storm Forces were officially cast as splinters by the Fatah Movement.	Islamist Fatah Splinter	✓	Unclear/Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade Did Participate
al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (Kata'ib Shuhada al-Aqsa)	Martyr Abd al-Qader al-Husayni Brigades (Kata'ib al-Shahid Abd al-Qader al-Husyani)	One of the factions of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade with ties to Iran. The group operates in the West Bank, but is its primary area of operations has been in Gaza.	Islamist Fatah Splinter	✓	Unclear/Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade Did Participate
al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (Kata'ib Shuhada al-Aqsa)	The Martyr Nidal Amoudi Brigades (Kata'ib/Liwa al-Shahid Nidhal al-Amoudi)	With a presence in the West Bank and Gaza, this section of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade trumpets its links to Fatah, despite the 2007 PA Presidential Decree to disarm all militia groups. In 2021, the group called on the Palestinian Authority security services to target Israeli forces.	Islamist Fatah Splinter	✓	Unclear/Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade Did Participate
al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (Kata'ib Shuhada al-Aqsa)	Groups of the Martyr Ayman Jawda (Majmuat al-Shahid Ayman Jawda)	An element of the Gaza-based al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. In 2005, the group vowed to continue suicide bombings in Israel.It has maintained close links to Hamas and PIJ.	Islamist Fatah Splinter	✓	Unclear/Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade Did Participate
Holy Warrior Movement (Harakat al-Mujahideen)	The Holy Warrior Brigades (Kata'ib al-Mujahideen)	Officially founded in 2006 from splinter elements from Fatah and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade. The group filmed its members with the beheaded bodies of Israeli soldiers on October 7, 2023.	Islamist Fatah Splinter	✓	✓
The Movement of the Patient (Harakat Sabireen)		Splintered from PIJ in 2014-2015, the Gaza-based Shi`a Islamist group caused ire for Hamas and PIJ. It received increased funding from Iran, just as PIJ and Hamas lost their Iranian funding. The Movement launched small rocket attacks against Israeli targets and was generally repressed by Hamas.	PIJ Splinter/Shi`a Islamist		

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Exhibit 13

The New York Times https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/24/world/middleeast/hamas-official-interview-attack-israel.html

Hamas Official Expresses Reservations About Oct. 7 Attack on Israel

Mousa Abu Marzouk, the head of Hamas's foreign relations office, said he would not have supported such an attack on Israel had he known of the devastation it would wreak on Gaza.

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By Adam Rasgon
Reporting from Jerusalem

Feb. 24, 2025

For months, leaders of Hamas have defended the militant group's decision to launch the Oct. 7, 2023, attack on Israel, even though it ignited a devastating Israeli offensive that has killed tens of thousands of Palestinians in Gaza and reduced the territory to rubble.

Hamas has declared "victory" over Israel, and some of its officials have vowed that their fighters will carry out more Oct. 7-style attacks in the future.

But now one of Hamas's top officials is publicly expressing reservations about the assault, which also touched off a humanitarian crisis that displaced nearly two million and led to critical shortages of food and health care.

Mousa Abu Marzouk, the Qatar-based head of Hamas's foreign relations office, said in an interview with The New York Times that he would not have supported the attack if he had known of the havoc it would wreak on Gaza. Knowing of the consequences, he said, would have made it "impossible" for him to back the assault.

Mr. Abu Marzouk has said that he was not informed about the specific plans for the Oct. 7 attack, in which roughly 1,200 people were killed and about 250 taken hostage, but that he and other Hamas political leaders had endorsed its overall strategy of attacking Israel militarily.

“If it was expected that what happened would happen, there wouldn’t have been Oct. 7,” as far as he was concerned, he said.

He also suggested that there was some willingness within Hamas to negotiate the future of the group’s weapons in Gaza — which has been a sticking point in negotiations with Israel — taking a position that other Hamas officials have rejected. A compromise might help Hamas and Israel avoid a renewal of the war, analysts say. Israel has said that it wants Hamas to dismantle its military capabilities.

Mr. Abu Marzouk, 74, the first leader of Hamas’s political office in the 1990s, made the remarks in a phone interview on Friday.

It’s unclear to what extent Mr. Abu Marzouk’s views on Oct. 7 are shared by other Hamas leaders, or if they were an attempt to influence negotiations with Israel or put pressure on fellow leaders within the militant group. Other Hamas leaders, especially those closely connected to Iran and the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah, have tended to take a harder line.

In a statement posted after publication, Hamas said that the comments The Times attributed to Mr. Abu Marzouk were “incorrect” and taken out of context. It also said the senior Hamas official called the Oct. 7 attack “an expression of our people’s right to resistance and of its rejection of the siege, occupation and settlement building.”

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The statement added that Mr. Abu Marzouk affirmed the group's position that "the weapons of the resistance" can't be given up as long as "there is an occupation of our land."

Tents housing Palestinians in northern Gaza. Mousa Abu Marzouk, the Qatar-based head of Hamas's foreign relations office, said it was "impossible" that he would have supported the Oct. 7 attack had he known of the havoc it would wreak on the territory. Saher Alghorra for The New York Times

His comments suggest that there are differences among Hamas officials over the party line on Oct. 7 and its consequences. They also indicate that the frustrations of Palestinians in Gaza who say the attack has made them endure extraordinary suffering are having some impact within the Hamas leadership.

Mr. Abu Marzouk's comments were similar to those made by Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, in the aftermath of the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah. The scale of the destruction in that conflict led Mr. Nasrallah to concede

that his group would not have kidnapped and killed several Israeli soldiers at the time had it known it would set off such a strong response.

In the coming days, Israel and Hamas are expected to start a discussion about the second phase of the cease-fire in Gaza, which calls for a permanent end to the fighting, a full Israeli withdrawal, and the release of more Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners. But delays in starting those talks coupled with disputes over the implementation of the first phase have reinforced fears that the truce could fall apart and the war could restart.

Mr. Abu Marzouk, who spent years living in the United States, has long been seen as one of the more pragmatic figures in Hamas. The war has exacted a heavy price on his family, with his 77-year-old brother, Yousef, killed in the fighting.

“He’s not a nihilist,” said Stanley Cohen, a lawyer and longtime friend of Mr. Abu Marzouk based in New York. “He would not support any action that he believed would bring unprecedented, wholesale retaliation by anyone on the people.”

A hostage release on Saturday. Israel and Hamas are expected to start discussing the second phase of a cease-fire, which calls for a permanent end to the fighting, full Israeli withdrawal, and the release of more Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners. Saher Alghorra for The New York Times

Mr. Abu Marzouk said that Hamas's survival in the war against Israel was itself a "kind of victory." He also likened Hamas to an average person fighting Mike Tyson, the former heavyweight boxing champion: if the untrained novice survived Mr. Tyson's punches, people would say he was victorious, he said.

In absolute terms, he said it would be "unacceptable" to claim Hamas won, especially considering the scale of what Israel inflicted on Gaza.

"We're talking about a party that lost control of itself and took revenge against everything," he said, referring to Israel. "That is not a victory under any circumstances."

The Israeli military has claimed that it has conducted its air and ground campaigns in Gaza in accordance with international law, and that it was carrying out attacks against Hamas, which the United States and other countries have designated a terrorist group. But legal experts have accused Israel of using force in a way that resulted in the deaths of too many civilians.

Mr. Abu Marzouk also suggested there is some openness within the Hamas leadership to negotiate the future of the group's weapons in Gaza, a thorny issue that other Hamas officials have said is off limits.

People gather around a fire at a shelter in the rubble in Jabalia, Gaza, this month. Saher Alghorra for The New York Times

"We are ready to speak about every issue," he said, when asked about the weapons. "Any issue that is put on the table, we need to speak about it."

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel has insisted that his country will not end the war with Hamas without dismantling the group's governing and military capabilities. While Hamas has expressed readiness to concede civilian governance in Gaza, it has refused to give up its weapons.

Mr. Abu Marzouk's remarks appeared to contradict those of Osama Hamdan, another Hamas official, who told a conference in Doha, Qatar, in the middle of this month that "the weapons of the resistance" were not up for discussion, seeming to rule out a compromise.

When asked about Mr. Hamdan's statements, Mr. Abu Marzouk said that no one leader could set the agenda on their own.

Ibrahim Madhoun, an analyst close to Hamas, said there were multiple views within the group about important issues, but when its institutions made a decision, everyone stood behind it.

Since the cease-fire first came into effect on Jan. 19, Hamas fighters have been parading around Gaza with rifles — sending a message to Israel, the international community and Palestinians that the group was still in control.

Mr. Abu Marzouk declined to answer specific questions about possible compromises on the issue of Hamas's weapons. Those compromises might include Hamas's storing its weapons in internationally supervised facilities, agreeing to forgo rebuilding its tunnel network and rocket arsenal, or stopping the recruitment of fighters. Disarmament, experts say, is unlikely.

As the talks over the second phase of the cease-fire have been held up, Israeli and American officials have increasingly spoken about extending the first phase.

Liberated Palestinian prisoners returning to Gaza this month. Saher Alghorra for The New York Times

Releasing some more hostages and prisoners during an extension of the first phase, Mr. Abu Marzouk added, could be discussed. But he clarified that, under any circumstances, Hamas would demand far more prisoners in exchange for each hostage because the group considers the remaining Israeli hostages to be soldiers. He mentioned 500 and 1,000 prisoners as possible figures for each hostage.

During the first phase, hundreds of Palestinian prisoners have been released, but the number of prisoners released per hostage has generally not exceeded 50.

Mr. Abu Marzouk said Hamas was also open to releasing all hostages at the same time, if Israel was willing to free the thousands of Palestinians in its prisons, end the war and withdraw from Gaza.

“We’re ready to have a comprehensive deal,” he said.

Israeli officials have previously dismissed proposals to exchange all hostages for all prisoners.

Abu Bakr Bashir contributed reporting to this article.

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
Exhibit 14

US-Israeli hostage reunites with family after being freed by Hamas

12 May 2025

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Freed US-Israeli hostage Edan Alexander reunites with family

Israeli-American hostage Edan Alexander has been reunited with his family in Israel after being held captive by Hamas in Gaza for 19 months.

The 21-year-old had been serving in the Israeli army on the border of Gaza when he was captured by Hamas militants on 7 October 2023.

On Monday, Israel paused its military operations in Gaza for a few hours to facilitate the transfer. A senior Hamas official told the BBC the release was intended as a goodwill gesture and as part of efforts to reach a new ceasefire deal ahead of US President Donald Trump's visit to the Middle East on Tuesday.

Mr Alexander is thought to be the last US citizen held by Hamas who was still alive.

President Trump offered "congratulations" to his family on his release.

Television pictures show Edan Alexander smiling as he embraces his parents and siblings at an Israeli military base.

In a statement, his family thanked the US president but also urged the Israeli government and negotiators to continue working to free the 58 remaining hostages.

Mr Alexander is the first hostage to be freed by Hamas since Israel restarted its military offensive on 18 March, after a two-month ceasefire came to an end.

On Monday, he was seen with masked Hamas fighters as they handed him over to Red Cross workers in the southern Gaza city of Khan Younis.

He was then transferred to Israeli authorities in Gaza before being reunited with his family in southern Israel. The Israeli military said it provided a "safe corridor" for Mr Alexander's release.

A video shared on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's X account showed Yael Alexander speaking to her son over the phone.

"You are strong. You are protected. You are home," she said in the video.



Supporters in Tel Aviv gathered to watch and celebrate Edan Alexander's release

Netanyahu called Mr Alexander's return a "very moving moment" - and thanked Trump for his support.

The release had been made possible because of military pressure on Hamas and "the political pressure exerted by President Trump", Netanyahu said.

He added that Israel intended to continue with plans to intensify its military actions in Gaza and that there would be no ceasefire.



Mr Alexander's family members have urged further efforts to release the remaining hostages.

Hamas had earlier said Mr Alexander's release was intended to facilitate a deal for the entry of humanitarian aid into the enclave.

Israel has blocked the entry of all food, medication and other humanitarian supplies into Gaza for 70 days, which aid agencies say amounts to a policy of starvation and could be a war crime, and renewed its aerial bombardment and other military operations there in mid-March.

Hamas has previously said it will only agree to a deal that includes the end of the war. This has been repeatedly rejected by Netanyahu.

Trump is due to arrive in the Middle East on Tuesday, and Israel has vowed to expand its military offensive against Hamas if no deal is reached by the end of his visit.

Israeli officials have said the plans for their expanded offensive include seizing all of Gaza indefinitely, forcibly displacing Palestinians to the south, and taking over aid distribution with private companies

despite opposition from the UN and its humanitarian partners, who say they will not co-operate because it appears to "weaponise" aid.

Israel is due to send representatives to Qatar on Tuesday to discuss a proposal on further hostage releases.

Qatar and Egypt said that Mr Alexander's release was an encouraging sign of potential new truce talks.

Born in Tel Aviv but raised in New Jersey, Mr Alexander had been serving in an elite infantry unit on the Gaza border when he was captured by Hamas militants during the 7 October 2003 attack.

About 1,200 people were killed and 251 hostages taken. Some 58 hostages remain, up to 23 of whom are believed to be alive.

Five of the captives held in Gaza are believed to have US citizenship. Mr Alexander is thought to be the last American still alive.

Israel's military campaign has killed 52,829 people in Gaza, according to the Hamas-run health ministry, including 2,720 Palestinians killed since March.

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Why are Israel and Hamas fighting in Gaza?
Who are Israeli hostages released and rescued from Gaza?

Israel-Gaza war Israel Hamas

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Exhibit 15

SUBCOMMITTEE ON FEDERAL COURTS, OVERSIGHT, AGENCY ACTION, AND FEDERAL RIGHTS

Hidden in Plain Sight: Confronting the Muslim Brotherhood Network in America



Open in New Window

Subcommittee Hearing

Date: Wednesday, August 5th, 2026

Time: 02:30pm

Location: Dirksen Senate Office Building Room 226

Witnesses

Lara Burns

Retired FBI Special Agent/ Senior Research Fellow
George Washington University Program on Extremism
Washington, DC

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Arielle F. Klepach

Senior Litigation Counsel
National Jewish Advocacy Center
Miami, FL

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Kyle Shideler

Senior Analyst for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism
Center for Security Policy
Nashville, TN

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UNOFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary
Subcommittee on Federal Courts, Oversight, Agency Action, and Federal Rights

Hidden in Plain Sight: Confronting the Muslim Brotherhood Network in America

Date: Wednesday, August 5, 2026
Time: 2:30 p.m.
Location: Dirksen Senate Office Building, Room 226
Presiding: Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Tex.), Chairman
Witnesses: Lara Burns (George Washington University Program on Extremism); Arielle Klepach (National Jewish Advocacy Center); Kyle Shideler (Center for Security Policy)

Note: *This is an unofficial auto-generated transcript. It is not certified. Filler words ("uh," "um") and repeated words have been removed, and misrecognized names and terms have been corrected. Bracketed words were added for readability. Timestamps refer to the YouTube video of the Senate Hearing, posted by CBN News (LIVE: Confronting the Muslim Brotherhood Network in America | Senate Judiciary Committee)*

[0:00] **SEN. CRUZ:** Good afternoon. This hearing is called to order. This hearing is focused on Hidden in Plain Sight: Confronting the Muslim Brotherhood Network in America. You may notice that there are empty chairs on the Democrat side of the dais. The American people should ask themselves why not a single member of the minority decided that a hearing on terrorism was worth their time. It is an embarrassment and a disservice to the thousands of American victims of the Muslim Brotherhood, including most recently the dozens of Americans who died on October 7th at the hand of Gaza's Muslim Brotherhood branch, Hamas.

Beginning in the 1990s, America has endured a litany of terrorist attacks that we must never forget: the first World Trade Center bombing, the Khobar Towers bombing, the East Africa embassy bombings, the bombing of the USS Cole, and of course, September 11th. Yet, as America prepared to confront Muslim jihadist terrorists overseas, a different challenge was already emerging, one that did not seek to conquer America through military force, but through a long-term influence campaign from within.

In 1991, the Muslim Brotherhood drafted what became known as the Explanatory Memorandum, discovered by FBI investigators in 2004 in Annandale, Virginia, just across the river from where we sit today. The memorandum described what it called, quote, a "civilizational jihadist process" in North America, and it explained that process in unmistakable terms. It

declared that the Brotherhood's work in America was, quote, "a grand jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and sabotaging its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers." But the memorandum did not stop at simply describing an objective. It also explained how to get there. It called on the Brotherhood to, quote, "master the art of coalition building" and to, quote, "absorb, contain, and cooperate with the existing Islamic organizations" in order to advance its mission in North America.

History has taught Americans the danger of dismissing determined jihadist movements because their ambitions seem too extreme to be real. The present members of this subcommittee will look at two questions: first, how the Muslim Brotherhood built its network in America, and second, what that network looks like today.

The Muslim Brotherhood spawned Hamas, influenced the ideology of al-Qaeda, and gave rise to multiple terrorist organizations. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and now the United States have all designated the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization; one of President Trump's most important national security accomplishments and the culmination of a decade-long effort that I've been proud to lead in Congress through repeated legislative measures. But what is less known is the Muslim Brotherhood's network right here in the United States.

In 2008, the Holy Land Foundation, then the largest Muslim charity in America, was convicted on 108 counts of funneling money to Hamas, laundering funds, and tax fraud. Five of its leaders received sentences of up to 65 years. Let me say that again: the largest Muslim charity in America in 2008 funded Hamas. The same Hamas that murdered over 1,200 innocent Israelis as well as civilians from 52 other countries on October 7th. The same Hamas that kidnapped children, that raped women and little girls, that held innocents hostage, including dozens of Americans.

The Holy Land Foundation trial produced an extraordinary body of evidence: wiretaps, internal memos, organizational charts, meeting transcripts, laying bare the Brotherhood's sprawling American infrastructure. Most importantly, prosecutors identified what they alleged was a broader network of organizations operating within the United States. That list included the Islamic Society of North America, the North American Islamic Trust, and most notably, the Council on American-Islamic Relations, CAIR. These organizations did not appear overnight.

They began on college campuses in the 1960s. They were built patiently over decades through exactly the kind of institution building and coalition building described in the Explanatory Memorandum.

Now let's look at the Muslim Brotherhood network today and its influence in the United States today. In fact, just yesterday, Abdul El-Sayed, the son-in-law of a leading member of several Brotherhood groups, won Michigan's Democrat primary for U.S. Senate. Perfect timing for this hearing. Probably explains why no Democrats are here and none intend to attend, because their campaign is now openly embracing terrorist organizations waging war on America.

Behind El-Sayed's political rise sits a much older and more entrenched institutional network. At the center of this sprawling network is the Council on American-Islamic Relations. CAIR was founded in 1994 by Brotherhood affiliates. Omar Ahmad and Nihad Awad, two of CAIR's founders, were both captured on FBI wiretaps at the 1993 Philadelphia meeting where Brotherhood leaders plotted to undermine the Oslo peace process and rally broad support for Hamas in the States. Months later, CAIR emerged as a nonprofit.

Many people associated with CAIR have actively aided terrorism and criminal efforts. For example, senior CAIR official Ghassan Elashi was sentenced to 65 years for funneling over $12 million to Hamas. Randall Royer, a former CAIR communications specialist, served 13 years for helping friends join the Taliban. Bassem Khafagi, CAIR's former community affairs director, was deported after pleading guilty to fraud. And Muthanna al-Hanooti, former CAIR-Michigan director, was convicted in 2011 for violating U.S. sanctions.

This pattern is not a coincidence. The Holy Land Foundation prosecution revealed that these organizations did not operate in isolation. They functioned as part of a broader Muslim Brotherhood ecosystem. When one organization collapses, another quickly emerges, often led by many of the same individuals. Consider the Islamic Association for Palestine, or IAP, one of the original Brotherhood organizations identified during the Holy Land Foundation trial. After IAP was driven into bankruptcy through civil liability for supporting terrorism, its leadership did not disappear. They simply reappeared elsewhere. Rafeeq Jaber, IAP's former president, became a founding board member of CAIR. Osama Abuirshaid, once employed by two Brotherhood organizations, including IAP, now leads American Muslims for Palestine, or AMP. Salah

Sarsour worked for IAP before later joining AMP's board. He was recently arrested by ICE. The names change, the nonprofits change, but the people and the mission remain remarkably consistent.

The UAE rightly designated CAIR as a terrorist organization in 2014, more than a decade ago. My home state of Texas has done the same. Today, this network sustains itself through interlocking nonprofit organizations, advocacy groups, litigation, political organizing, and taxpayer-funded grant programs. They file lawsuits. They lobby legislatures. They train activists. They organize on college campuses. They challenge school curricula and school policies. They conduct media campaigns and public advocacy, and they win statewide Democrat primaries, as recently as just yesterday.

Consider how CAIR's leaders responded after October 7th, when Hamas murdered more than 1,200 innocent people in Israel, the deadliest massacre of Jews since the Holocaust. CAIR's executive director and co-founder Nihad Awad declared publicly that he was happy to see people breaking the siege. Happy at that horrific terrorist attack. Children murdered in their cribs, and Nihad Awad was, quote-unquote, "happy." I can't even share the photos and video footage that I have watched of what transpired on October 7th, because watching it will make you physically sick.

On the very day that Hamas carried out its massacre, Zahra Billoo, executive director of CAIR's San Francisco chapter, celebrated the attacks by posting, quote, "We are witnessing decolonization." Months later, she referred to Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh as a martyr. CAIR-California CEO Hussam Ayloush said, quote, "Israel should be attacked."

Understand, terrorists slaughtered entire families, kidnapped children and grandparents, raped women, and burned civilians alive in their homes. How do we know this? Because they recorded it themselves. In many instances, the terrorists took video footage of their heinous acts, gleefully screaming "Allahu Akbar." They were proud of their barbarism, and CAIR supported the attacks on Israel. CAIR did not merely issue statements. They assisted the broader Muslim Brotherhood network as it coordinated legal support and strategic guidance for the violent campus encampments and riots at over 100 campuses around the country.

The stories on college campuses were horrific. At the University of Washington, the granddaughter of Holocaust survivors was called names, spit at, laughed at, and told to, quote, "Go back to the gas chambers." Not a lot of subtlety and nuance in that one. At Columbia, when Jewish students were engaged in a patriotic display of waving the American flag and the Israeli flag, an extremist posed with a poster saying, "Al-Qassam's next target." Al-Qassam is the military arm of Hamas, responsible for conducting its terrorist organizations. Extremists are literally calling and advocating for the death of Jewish students on campus. And by the way, the extremist who was in that photograph was not from the Middle East. She was not Palestinian. She was a pretty blonde girl from Georgia who went to Columbia to be radicalized by zealots who hate America.

The situation got so bad that the Orthodox rabbi on campus, Rabbi Elie Buechler, had to make this public statement. Quote, "The events of the last few days have made it clear that Columbia University's public safety and the NYPD cannot guarantee Jewish students' safety in the face of extreme antisemitism and anarchy. I would strongly recommend you return home." That is a university that is failing its most basic mission, which is to protect the safety of the students enrolled at that university.

The events we witnessed on college campuses after October 7th did not emerge from nowhere. They were not spontaneous. They were not organic. They were the product of an organized network that has spent decades building influence inside the United States. Just look at this dais. My Democrat colleagues have chosen not to participate. That's their right. But an oversight hearing that one of the two major parties refuses even to see is exactly the outcome these organizations that we're discussing have spent 40 years working to produce. My promise to the American people is to hold accountable those who finance and support terrorism on American soil, no matter how many tax exemptions, charitable registrations, or civil rights letterheads they hide behind.

Now, we're going to turn to the witnesses who are here today. Our first witness is Lara Burns. Lara Burns is the head of terrorism research at the Program on Extremism at the George Washington University. She is a distinguished attorney and retired federal agent with more than 23 years of experience leading teams in complex international terrorism investigations. At the outset of her career as an FBI special agent, Ms. Burns led the Department of Justice's largest

terrorism financing prosecution, United States v. Holy Land Foundation, which led to the conviction of some of Hamas's top fundraisers in America. She was later hand-selected to serve as an FBI Special Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Northern District of Texas, assigned to the National Security Section, where she litigated a variety of federal criminal cases. Ms. Burns was then appointed as an FBI supervisory special agent and the international terrorism program coordinator for the FBI's Dallas office counterterrorism program in 2015. She retired from the FBI in April 2023 and joined the Program on Extremism in May of 2024.

Our second witness is Arielle Klepach. Arielle Klepach currently serves as senior litigation counsel at the National Jewish Advocacy Center. Through her work, she has studied Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated entities in the United States, their tactics and their activities, to best understand how to curb the influence of this nefarious network. Prior to her current role, Ms. Klepach was an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the special prosecutions section of the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida. Before joining the U.S. Attorney's Office, Ms. Klepach was an Assistant District Attorney at the Manhattan District Attorney's Office. Ms. Klepach earned her law degree from Columbia Law School, where she graduated as a James Kent Scholar and a Harlan Fiske Stone Scholar. She received her undergraduate degree from the University of Pennsylvania, where she graduated magna cum laude with a B.A. in international relations and a minor in international development.

And our third witness is Mr. Kyle Shideler, who is the director and senior analyst for homeland security and counterterrorism at the Center for Security Policy, where he conducts research and analysis on domestic threats to the U.S. homeland, with an emphasis on the doctrines which fuel terrorism and shape the variety of kinetic and non-kinetic threats to America's security. He has briefed senior U.S. government personnel, members of Congress, and federal, state, and local law enforcement officers, and he has testified before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, the Subcommittee on the Constitution, and the Canadian Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defense. Mr. Shideler served as an expert witness in the first federal terrorism trial against members of Antifa. He is the author of *Modern Minutemen: Vital Considerations to Secure America's States in the 21st Century* and *Understanding Black Identity Extremism: Considerations for Law Enforcement.* And he is the editor of Unmasking Antifa: Five Perspectives on a Growing Threat and a contributing author to Saudi Arabia and the

Global Islamic Terrorist Network. Finally, Mr. Shideler is a graduate of Boston University and was a Lincoln Fellow with the Claremont Institute.

And Ms. Burns, we'll start with you. You are recognized for your opening statement.

[20:17] **MS. BURNS:** Chairman Cruz, members of the committee—

[20:21] **SEN. CRUZ:** And actually, let me stop you for a moment. I want to ask each of you to rise and be sworn in. If you'd each stand and raise your right hand. Do you swear that the testimony you're about to give before this subcommittee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

[20:42] [Witnesses respond affirmatively.]

[20:42] **SEN. CRUZ:** All of you have answered affirmatively. You may be seated. And Ms. Burns, you may give your opening statement.

[20:49] **MS. BURNS:** Chairman Cruz and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify. My name is Lara Burns, and I am a retired FBI special agent and a senior research fellow with George Washington University's Program on Extremism.

A dangerous myth about foreign terrorist organizations persists in the United States: that the infrastructure supporting them exists only overseas. In reality, these support infrastructures have existed inside the U.S. for decades. They operate through financial, propaganda, and organizational support networks and commonly hide under the cover of charity, advocacy, or activism.

The 2008 trial and conviction of the Holy Land Foundation and its officials exposed a broader, long-running network in the United States tied to Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood. Evidence presented at the HLF trial included documents and wiretaps collected by the FBI for over a decade. It outlined a structured Palestine Committee, originally made up of front groups such as the HLF, the IAP, and the UASR, which worked together to provide financial, media, and political support to Hamas.

In 1993, leaders of the Palestine Committee held a meeting known as the 1993 Philadelphia meeting, which was lawfully wiretapped by the FBI. There, members of the

Palestine Committee defined the scope of the conspiracy, which included supporting Hamas abroad and infiltrating universities, media, and politics here in the U.S. Why? To begin normalizing Hamas and Muslim Brotherhood extremist ideology in American society. They stated, quote, "War is deception," when plotting to lie to Americans. They also noted their intent to cleanse the curriculum in U.S.-based K through 12 schools because, quote, "We don't want our children growing up surrendering to the idea of peace with Jews." Their words. They recognized Hamas would be designated a terror organization, and they risked exposure. They agreed to continue to pursue their agenda by cloaking themselves under the cover of legitimacy.

Evidence emerged at the trial that showed it was out of this conspiratorial meeting that CAIR was created to protect the other elements of the Hamas support network. The network vigorously pursued its agenda. Each part had its own role. The HLF's role in the conspiracy, before it was designated as a terror front in 2001, was to send money to Gaza and the West Bank to support the Hamas social infrastructure. The IAP's role was to disseminate Hamas propaganda here. And CAIR's role in the conspiracy was to defend and protect the other elements of the Hamas support network and to pressure others to adopt its narratives or remain quiet.

Regarding the last point, in the 1993 Philadelphia meeting, this network of individuals in effect plotted to silence the free speech of those who disagreed with them via intimidation. Specifically, meeting attendees agreed that they must, quote, "pressure others to adopt their narratives or remain neutral." It should be noted that a co-founder of CAIR, Nihad Awad, was an active participant in this conspiratorial meeting, and he remains the executive director of CAIR to date.

Elements within this network have evolved and rebranded, and CAIR's pressure tactics are still in play. CAIR and other elements of this network appear to have continued their acts in furtherance of the conspiratorial agenda, as detailed extensively in my written testimony today. For decades, narratives have been intentionally seeded into public discourse that portray terrorist organizations as resistance movements, excuse acts of violence, and intimidate critics into silence. On college campuses, in activist spaces, and across social media, slogans and rhetoric that once existed on the fringes have become normalized. And too often, people who raise concerns are immediately labeled hateful, intolerant, or extremists themselves.

But free societies cannot function when intimidation replaces debate. The First Amendment protects speech. It protects dissent. It protects protest. But it does not protect material support to terrorism. It does not protect criminal conspiracies. And it does not require Americans to ignore evidence introduced in federal court simply because that evidence is politically uncomfortable. The history of this network is not in question. It was made public decades ago, but few paid attention. Now is the time to pay attention and understand the facts.

The lesson from history is clear. Terrorist organizations do not survive on violence alone. They survive through networks that raise money, shape narratives, recruit supporters, and legitimize extremism. If we fail to recognize how those networks evolve and adapt, we will continue fighting yesterday's threats while tomorrow's are being built in plain sight. Our greatest vulnerability is not a lack of information. It is a failure to act on what decades of evidence have already revealed. Thank you very much.

[25:44] **SEN. CRUZ:** Thank you, Ms. Burns. Ms. Klepach, you're recognized for your opening statement.

[25:49] **MS. KLEPACH:** Thank you, Chairman Cruz and members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. My name is Arielle Klepach, and I am senior litigation counsel at the National Jewish Advocacy Center and a former federal prosecutor.

When someone tells you who they are, believe them. The Muslim Brotherhood told us their strategy for the West. But don't take my word for it. They put it on paper. In 2004, the FBI seized a memorandum from the home of Muslim Brotherhood member and Hamas U.S.-based archivist Ismail Elbarasse. The memo, written in 1991, described the work of the Muslim Brotherhood in the United States as, and I quote, "a kind of grand jihad in eliminating and destroying Western society from within."

In 1993, after the announcement of the Oslo Peace Accords, a peace agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians, Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas members met in Philadelphia to discuss their plan to thwart the agreement. The FBI wiretapped the meeting, where the participants suggested the creation of a neutral-sounding organization for the purpose of deceiving Americans. That organization is the Council on American-Islamic Relations, or CAIR. Thirty-five years later, their plan is working just as designed. This is not a relic of the 1990s. It is

a foreign terror-supporting movement on American soil targeting our Constitution and our founding principles.

I would ask you to remember three things. These organizations are dangerous. They are in our schools. And they hide by abusing the very legal system they are working to dismantle.

CAIR and its officials platform and maintain relationships with designated terrorists. Not then, but today. Here are just a few examples. One, in 2025, the executive director of CAIR-Ohio moderated an event that featured a member of Hamas. CAIR called it an oversight. Two, the International Union of Muslim Scholars, or IUMS, founded by the now-designated foreign terrorist organization the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, amplifies CAIR's work. This amplification is ongoing. This is the CAIR content that is on the IUMS website today. Three, CAIR's current executive director and 1993 meeting participant Nihad Awad has appeared at events, eulogized a U.S.-designated terrorist who was also Osama bin Laden's spiritual leader, and openly celebrated Hamas's murder of civilians.

Second, they are in our schools. CAIR-New Jersey pushed their revisionist version of a 9/11 curriculum to nearly 30 public school districts that reframed the attacks as a predictable consequence of U.S. foreign policy. Imagine the kids in all those school districts walking around learning and believing that 9/11 was our fault. Other CAIR curricula warned teachers not to say "radical Islamic terrorism." And CAIR boasts of its partnership with Chicago Public Schools, one of the largest in the country. Indoctrinating our children into believing that terrorism is justified resistance is the antithesis of everything this country stands for.

Third, they abuse the legal system to shield themselves from discovery. For example, in Texas, where CAIR is challenging its terrorist designation, they have repeatedly resisted turning over discovery the judge has ordered them to produce. The state has had to file four different motions to compel the discovery that CAIR was already ordered to produce by the judge. When a former board member publicly exposed that CAIR was receiving foreign funding through the Washington Trust Foundation and hiding it from its own board, CAIR sued her for defamation, then dropped the suit the moment discovery turned to its donor records. And in Virginia, CAIR's affiliate organization, American Muslims for Palestine, was held in civil contempt for defying the Virginia Attorney General in a fraud investigation. In Illinois, the same lawyers were ordered

to pay attorneys' fees for engaging in, quote, "baseless discovery disputes" in litigation that they have already dragged on for nearly 20 years.

So, what can we do? Thankfully, most of what is needed is simply to enforce the laws we already have: Treasury sanctions, material support and racketeering investigations, and IRS review of these so-called charities that were never legitimate in the first place. Those steps are detailed extensively in my written testimony. But if I leave you with one legislative fix, let it be this: close the successor organization loophole. When the Boim family won a $156 million judgment for Hamas's murder of their American teenage son, the defendants dissolved and reappeared within a year under a new name. An entity found liable for material support should not escape by renaming itself, forcing both terror victims and the courts to play whack-a-mole for decades before achieving accountability.

The Muslim Brotherhood told us who they are. They told us that they wanted to infiltrate American universities, media outlets, and research centers. And that is exactly what they've done. They teach our kids that 9/11 was our fault. They legitimize terrorism as justified resistance. And they abuse our legal process so that those who seek to expose them for who they really are, Muslims included, are silenced. We haven't been listening, and Americans pay that cost every day. We have the tools to fix this, and we must continue to act. Thank you.

[31:01] **SEN. CRUZ:** Thank you. Mr. Shideler, you're recognized for your opening statement.

[31:05] **MR. SHIDELER:** Chairman Cruz, distinguished senators, I'd like to thank you for the opportunity to testify today. Because our court system is built on certain fundamental principles, including trial by jury, the government's burden of proof in criminal matters, and the right to confront one's accusers, courts, both civil and criminal, have been at the center of revelations of great consequence to our republic and its national security. Examples include the Chambers–Hiss case and its famous Pumpkin Papers, exposing the role of the Communist Party of the United States in Soviet espionage, or the 1957 Apalachin, New York, raids, which convinced federal law enforcement of the existence of the American Mafia. To these we must add United States v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, prosecuted almost two decades ago, which exposed the existence and extensive reach of the Muslim Brotherhood in America since its arrival in 1962. Evidence submitted during that trial demonstrated that not only was the Muslim

Brotherhood operating in America, but that the Brotherhood played a singularly important role in providing indoctrination, financing, and political protection for jihadist terrorism.

Founded in Egypt by Hassan al-Banna in 1928, from its very beginning, the Muslim Brotherhood has operated as a clandestine organization which engages in the creation of public front groups, cultivates agents of influence, seeks control over religious institutions, and engages in acts of political subversion, as well as creating deniable sub-organizations devoted to terrorism, all in pursuit of their ultimate goal: the overthrow of governments and the reestablishment of a worldwide caliphate operating under Islamic law.

It is worth recalling that the government demonstrated that the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood, like all Brotherhood branches worldwide, created and funded Hamas support networks known as Palestine Committees at the direction of the International Muslim Brotherhood beginning in 1983. The most infamous Palestine Committee organization in the United States, CAIR, was so significant that its creation and bylaws received the explicit approval of the Muslim Brotherhood leadership in Egypt. HLF documents and related cases reveal that at one time, one in every four American mosques was under the influence of the Hamas-linked North American Islamic Trust. Brotherhood members, including some convicted of terrorism charges, such as Sami Al-Arian and Abdurahman Alamoudi, regularly worked to influence leaders of both American political parties. Organizations affiliated with the Brotherhood have recruited and trained chaplains for American prisons and the American military. Brotherhood organizations operate on nearly every college campus in the United States and have regularly recruited young American Muslims and led them to commit acts of terrorist violence.

In short, the issue of the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood is not merely a counterterrorism issue, but it is also a systemic counterintelligence challenge, and, even more broadly, it is a challenge to the fabric of the United States and its ability to seek assimilation and social cohesion.

In the HLF case, the United States government achieved an unparalleled intelligence coup, and yet almost none of this information was put to substantive further use. HLF would be the last domestic Muslim Brotherhood charity designated by the U.S. Treasury Department. There were no further prosecutions for material support. It was the equivalent of cracking the Enigma code in 1939 and then never decoding another Nazi message. In 2008, the U.S.

government had in its possession the name and rank of most leading Muslim Brotherhood figures in the United States. I would encourage the senators to demand, in an appropriate classified setting, that U.S. intelligence deliver the same levels of insight into Brotherhood operations today.

The federal government's disinterest in the challenge of the Muslim Brotherhood has largely been answered by private efforts at the local and state level. These have included educational efforts, but also legislative and judicial responses. More than half a dozen state legislatures have passed resolutions condemning CAIR. Two states, Florida and Texas, have publicly declared the group a terrorist organization. Some state attorneys general are currently pursuing investigations into Brotherhood-linked entities. There have been efforts in federal court to enforce federal court judgments against elements of the Palestine Committee, as well as lawsuits seeking to expose the role of foreign funding in CAIR. Unfortunately, in multiple cases, as was already outlined, Brotherhood affiliates have successfully utilized lawfare to avoid complying with discovery.

Critics will claim that the data derived from the HLF case and related cases are decades old. This is true, but it's also misleading. When studying clandestine networks, one must realize that they are established over many decades as trained cadre move through positions of trust in the network's various fronts. Such individuals are not easily replaced, and they will regularly reappear. A historic snapshot of such a network and the players in it, far from being irrelevant, is a crucial piece of the puzzle, prized by both intelligence practitioners and historians. In conclusion, it is those who insist that the Brotherhood is a leopard who has somehow changed its spots who should be the ones required to meet the burden of proof, because the U.S. government has already proved beyond a reasonable doubt what the Muslim Brotherhood is. Thank you.

[36:05] **SEN. CRUZ:** Thank you to each of you for your testimony, which was highly enlightening. Ms. Burns, I want to start with you. Thank you for your work defending the safety of all Americans. We are indebted to you for your 23 years of service. As the lead investigator and prosecutor in the Holy Land Foundation investigation and prosecution, you have become deeply knowledgeable on the Muslim Brotherhood network operating in America. I want to start with a fundamental question: What should Americans be worried about about the Muslim Brotherhood?

[36:43] **MS. BURNS:** Thank you for the question. I think Americans need to understand the extent of the threat that this movement poses and the extent of their ability to achieve their goals and their patience in obtaining success in this. The strategy that they have set in place involves the erosion of our democratic principles. It involves the erosion of our personal freedoms. It involves the erosion of the very principles upon which this country was created. And the individuals within this network do not have a deadline. If it takes them a hundred years to achieve this goal, they will steadily pursue it. That is something that I think in general Americans have a hard time understanding: the stamina that this network possesses and the lethality that exists within it, because ultimately their goal is to erode our society and turn it into something that none of us want or need.

[37:48] **SEN. CRUZ:** In the Holy Land Foundation prosecution, how many entities did the government identify as unindicted co-conspirators and joint venturers?

[37:59] **MS. BURNS:** I don't remember the exact number, but it was hundreds.

[38:05] **SEN. CRUZ:** Do you believe some of these groups were likely providing material support to terrorists?

MS. BURNS: I do.

[38:13] **SEN. CRUZ:** And are some of these groups still in existence today?

MS. BURNS: Yes, sir. They are.

[38:18] **SEN. CRUZ:** Do you believe they are still actively members of the Muslim Brotherhood network?

MS. BURNS: I do.

[38:24] **SEN. CRUZ:** Is the conspiracy under which the Holy Land Foundation was prosecuted still in existence today?

MS. BURNS: I believe that it is.

[38:33] **SEN. CRUZ:** To understand what got left on the table after the Holy Land Foundation prosecution, we have to look at who was in the room at that Philadelphia meeting in 1993. CAIR was named as an unindicted co-conspirator in the Holy Land Foundation prosecution, correct?

MS. BURNS: Yes, it was.

[38:52] **SEN. CRUZ:** Has CAIR, to your knowledge, ever formally disavowed the Holy Land Foundation?

MS. BURNS: No, they have not.

[39:01] **SEN. CRUZ:** CAIR was founded by Omar Ahmad and Nihad Awad. Both men were captured on FBI wiretaps at that infamous meeting where Hamas operatives discussed strategy on U.S. soil. Is that right?

[39:16] **MS. BURNS:** That's correct.

[39:17] **SEN. CRUZ:** Nihad Awad is still the executive director of CAIR today. Is that right?

MS. BURNS: He is.

[39:24] **SEN. CRUZ:** So when CAIR tells this Congress it has no ties to Hamas, the documented record says otherwise. Is that correct?

[39:34] **MS. BURNS:** That is correct.

[39:36] **SEN. CRUZ:** Agent Burns, if you were still an active FBI agent today, with the evidence you developed in the Holy Land Foundation prosecution, would CAIR be on your list of organizations warranting further investigation?

MS. BURNS: It would.

[39:53] **SEN. CRUZ:** Ms. Burns, this is a letter that I sent to the FBI requesting the release of non-classified materials seized during the 2004 search of Ismail Elbarasse's home in Annandale, Virginia. To date, I have not received those documents. This letter was sent on April 16th, 2026. Ms. Burns, are you aware of anything unusual with the search of Elbarasse's home that you would like to share with this committee?

[40:30] **MS. BURNS:** The search of Elbarasse's home revealed a massive amount of documentation, what we call the archives of Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood in the United States. The documents and video and audio tapes, as seen in exhibits that were put forth in the Holy Land Foundation trial, were groundbreaking in the understanding of this Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas network here. And they are key to understanding the extent and scope of this network.

[41:00] **SEN. CRUZ:** And am I correct that CAIR showed up during the search of Elbarasse's home and attempted to obstruct the seizure of the documents?

[41:10] **MS. BURNS:** Yes, sir, [they] did.

[41:12] **SEN. CRUZ:** If the FBI released the non-classified documents tomorrow from the search, would the public understand this network better than it does today?

[41:23] **MS. BURNS:** I believe that the release of those documents would provide the ability for those of us who understand this network to conduct a full analysis, and that we could use that to provide education to the general public about what this network really is.

[41:41] **SEN. CRUZ:** All right, Mr. Shideler, let's turn to you. How long have you studied the history and activities of the Muslim Brotherhood?

[41:48] **MR. SHIDELER:** Since about 2007, 2008. Actually, with the rise of the Holy Land Foundation trial, it really piqued my interest, and it's fair to say it changed my entire career trajectory.

[42:00] **SEN. CRUZ:** Do you believe that there is a Muslim Brotherhood branch operating in the United States?

MR. SHIDELER: Yes.

[42:06] **SEN. CRUZ:** Are there ever instances where the Brotherhood groups in America engage in acts of violence?

[42:13] **MR. SHIDELER:** Yes, there are. I would include individuals associated with Brotherhood-linked mosques who have engaged in acts of terrorism. I would include individuals

associated with Muslim Students Associations, dozens of which have committed acts of terrorism. I would also include the role in the promotion of rioting and civil disorder conducted by groups like Students for Justice in Palestine and the Palestinian Youth Movement.

[42:41] **SEN. CRUZ:** What you've described is exactly why I introduced the Stop FUNDERS Act, which would add rioting to the RICO predicate offenses so that the Justice Department can reach the entities that fund and coordinate these riots. Do Brotherhood groups in America also participate in electoral and coalition politics?

MR. SHIDELER: Yes, sir. They do.

[43:05] **SEN. CRUZ:** Is that consistent with the tamkeen framework described in the Explanatory Memorandum, working through existing institutions rather than displacing them?

[43:17] **MR. SHIDELER:** Yes, sir. As you described, it is a process of settlement by which they are creating and seizing control of institutions which they can then use to continue to build their efforts.

[43:27] **SEN. CRUZ:** Does Abdul El-Sayed's candidacy for Senate in Michigan concern you?

MR. SHIDELER: Yes, sir, it does.

SEN. CRUZ: Why is that?

[43:34] **MR. SHIDELER:** Well, to begin with, I look at the connections that his father-in-law, Jukaku Tayeb, has to Brotherhood-linked groups. This includes being the president at one time of CAIR-Michigan, [and] also his presence on the Islamic Society of North America Founders Committee, which is only for those most exclusively devoted to ISNA and [who] provide a significant amount of funding. There are other known Brotherhood members on that committee. I would also look at El-Sayed's ties to a group called Emgage, which purports to be a Muslim sort of get-out-the-vote or candidate recruitment organization, but it has close ties to CAIR. It was created by a former CAIR member who at one time was on a terror watch list and was also a consultant to convicted terrorist Sami Al-Arian.

[44:25] **SEN. CRUZ:** Do you believe the Islamic Society of North America, or ISNA, is an ongoing part of the Muslim Brotherhood network in the United States?

[44:34] **MR. SHIDELER:** Yes, sir, I do. There were some HLF documents that reflected hesitation by the Brotherhood, [in] that they thought perhaps they were losing control of ISNA at one point, but they appear to have rectified that. As far as I can tell, there are still individuals associated with the Muslim Brotherhood who are in high leadership positions with that organization, and they have never repudiated their ties to the organization.

[44:56] **SEN. CRUZ:** Does the Muslim Brotherhood also partner with political groups such as the Democratic Socialists of America?

[45:03] **MR. SHIDELER:** Yes, sir. They do.

SEN. CRUZ: Would you agree that this alliance between the Muslim Brotherhood and the DSA, otherwise known as the Red-Green Alliance, is based on a shared hatred of America, Israel, Western civilization at large, capitalism, and democracy?

[45:26] **MR. SHIDELER:** Yes, sir, I would. And I would go further as to say it's also united around a revolutionary objective, advocating for the overthrow of the U.S. Constitution.

[45:37] **SEN. CRUZ:** Ms. Klepach, let's move to you. Thank you for being with us today, and thank you for your work confronting the contemporary Muslim Brotherhood network in court. The historical record is damning, but I'd like to turn to what's being done about it today. The Muslim Brotherhood's ties to terrorism are ongoing today, not just historical. Is that right?

MS. KLEPACH: Yes, that's right.

[46:05] **SEN. CRUZ:** And yet, Brotherhood groups still meet with members of Congress and are treated as a civil rights organization. Is that right?

[46:14] **MS. KLEPACH:** Yes.

[46:15] **SEN. CRUZ:** In your litigation work, have you found that Brotherhood-affiliated entities share leadership, funding, or infrastructure across organizations that hold themselves out to the public as separate and unrelated?

[46:29] **MS. KLEPACH:** That's correct. For example, the Islamic Association for Palestine, after it was sued and a judgment of $156 million was entered against it, shut down, and the same

leaders created a new organization called American Muslims for Palestine. Another example is CAIR and its relationship with the Washington Trust Foundation. The Washington Trust Foundation, back in 1994, was originally incorporated as CAIR, and now the Washington Trust Foundation serves essentially as a real estate holding entity that, per its own 990s, exists for the purpose of supporting the CAIR Foundation today.

[47:08] **SEN. CRUZ:** Well, and that's why I introduced the SPONSOR Act, which would hold tax-exempt fiscal sponsors liable for what their sponsored entities do. The loopholes and the manipulation of our tax code need to end. Ms. Klepach, since approximately 2022, have state and federal grant programs become a primary source of financial support for significant portions of the CAIR ecosystem?

[47:39] **MS. KLEPACH:** That's correct. I believe it was about $54 million in federal grant money that was received by CAIR-California. There has been testimony in other Senate Judiciary subcommittees relating to that funding and CAIR's misuse of that funding.

[47:54] **SEN. CRUZ:** You mentioned CAIR-California. In 2024 IRS filings, CAIR-California reported distributing more than $4 million in subgrants to 39 other organizations. Is that right?

[48:14] **MS. KLEPACH:** Yes.

[48:15] **SEN. CRUZ:** Roughly $185,000 of that went to California chapters of the Muslim American Society, an organization that George Washington University's Program on Extremism identifies as a Brotherhood legacy group. Is that right?

[48:29] **MS. KLEPACH:** That's right. And federal prosecutors also called the Muslim American Society the overt arm of the Muslim Brotherhood in the United States.

[48:38] **SEN. CRUZ:** And the American taxpayer is effectively footing the bill for this?

MS. KLEPACH: That's right.

[48:44] **SEN. CRUZ:** So the taxpayer funds it, and then the taxpayer is told it's none of his business what is done with that money. Let's talk about what happens when someone actually tries to look. Do you believe Brotherhood affiliates have developed effective tactics for obstructing any investigation into their activities?

MS. KLEPACH: Yes, they have.

[49:06] **SEN. CRUZ:** Let's discuss a real-world example. Is it true that more than two years after the Virginia Attorney General issued its civil investigative demands into AMP in October of 2023, AMP has still not complied with substantial portions of those demands?

[49:24] **MS. KLEPACH:** That's correct.

[49:26] **SEN. CRUZ:** That kind of stonewalling is not unique to AMP. It's the Brotherhood playbook. In your estimation, do you believe Treasury should investigate CAIR for maintaining relationships with designated terrorists?

[49:44] **MS. KLEPACH:** I do.

[49:46] **SEN. CRUZ:** And do you believe that when the Founders drafted the First Amendment, propping up and shielding the Muslim Brotherhood from scrutiny is what they had in mind?

[49:56] **MS. KLEPACH:** No. The rights afforded under the First Amendment are not absolute. And the Supreme Court has said in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project that speech at the direction of or in coordination with a terrorist organization can constitute material support for terrorism under the statute.

[50:14] **SEN. CRUZ:** Mr. Shideler, in your judgment, why should Americans be worried about the Muslim Brotherhood network in America?

[50:22] **MR. SHIDELER:** Oh, I would point to the influence that the Muslim Brotherhood has had in elements of our foreign policy, including key Brotherhood members playing a role in lobbying the United States, leading us into the intervention in the Libyan civil war and in the Syrian civil war, [and] interventions which resulted in, for example, using Yusuf al-Qaradawi in Qatar as an intermediary for our negotiations with the Taliban. They have had a tremendously negative effect on our foreign policy and also on our domestic counterterrorism policy, looking at influence with law enforcement and the like, preventing the investigation into their friends in the Muslim Brotherhood.

[51:06] **SEN. CRUZ:** Is the Muslim Brotherhood network in America a foreign threat, a domestic threat, or both?

MR. SHIDELER: It's both. They both operate at the direction of individuals overseas, as well as having now, at this point, multiple generations of Brotherhood members who have grown up as American citizens and are U.S. persons.

[51:27] **SEN. CRUZ:** Ms. Burns, based on your decades of investigative experience, is the threat of the Muslim Brotherhood in America growing or shrinking?

[51:36] **MS. BURNS:** It is growing.

[51:40] **SEN. CRUZ:** Ms. Klepach, to what degree has the Muslim Brotherhood infiltrated the American education system? Should parents sending their children to American public schools and universities be worried about the Muslim Brotherhood?

[51:55] **MS. KLEPACH:** I believe they should be. In addition to the CAIR-New Jersey curriculum that I mentioned in my opening statement, CAIR has also attempted to or initiated relationships with other public school districts, such as in Philadelphia, I believe, [and] also in Delaware. As I mentioned, they also boast of their partnership with Chicago Public Schools. The type of rhetoric that is being taught and promoted in their curriculum is incredibly dangerous and antithetical to Western values.

[52:23] **SEN. CRUZ:** In your work, have you seen this network specifically target young Americans because they're easier to influence than adults?

[52:31] **MS. KLEPACH:** Yes, of course. If you teach an elementary schooler about 9/11 and teach them that it was our fault, they're not going to know any better. And of course, as has already been testified by the other witnesses on the panel, we've seen the infiltration of the Muslim Brotherhood network on college campuses, exactly as the Muslim Brotherhood set out to do in that 1993 meeting, when they said that they would infiltrate American universities.

[52:55] **SEN. CRUZ:** Specifically, Ms. Klepach, following the letter that Senator Cotton and Representative Stefanik sent to the Department of Treasury in October 2025 requesting an investigation into CAIR's ties to Hamas, CAIR responded by claiming that a federal appeals court had ruled the government's identification of these groups as co-conspirators was unconstitutional. Is that characterization accurate?

[53:21] **MS. KLEPACH:** No. In fact, I believe the language of the district court in the ruling upholding the unindicted co-conspirator list was that there was ample evidence to support both CAIR and NAIT and other organizations' inclusion on that list, and that ruling was upheld, I believe, by the Fifth Circuit.

[53:39] **SEN. CRUZ:** In fact, as you just noted, the Fifth Circuit did the opposite, affirming the district court's decision to deny CAIR's motion to strike its name from the unindicted co-conspirator list. Is that right?

MS. KLEPACH: Yes.

[53:53] **SEN. CRUZ:** And that ruling, finding sufficient evidence of CAIR's involvement in the conspiracy as the successor organization to the Islamic Association for Palestine, has never been reversed. Is that right?

[54:05] **MS. KLEPACH:** I believe that is the ruling that found that CAIR's inclusion on the unindicted co-conspirator list was valid and not unconstitutional. I don't believe that that has ever been overturned.

[54:13] **SEN. CRUZ:** So when CAIR tells the public and tells Congress that a federal court vindicated it, that claim is a lie, is it not?

MS. KLEPACH: It is.

[54:29] **SEN. CRUZ:** Agent Burns, CAIR and other Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated groups have long referred to the convicted Holy Land Foundation defendants as political prisoners, implying that they were imprisoned for their beliefs. Based on the trial record you helped build, is that an accurate description?

[54:49] **MS. BURNS:** It is completely inaccurate. Labeling prisoners as political prisoners does, as you say, imply that there was no due process, that people are imprisoned because of their beliefs or merely because of their speech. And in this instance, the Holy Land Foundation and five of its officers were tried by a jury of 12 jurors who were hand-selected by the prosecution and the defense, and the jurors found beyond a reasonable doubt that these individuals and the organization committed the crime of providing material support to terrorism under 18 U.S.C. §

2339B. And then the defense appealed that judgment on many grounds to the Fifth Circuit. And the Fifth Circuit examined all of those issues and wrote a lengthy, almost 100-page opinion addressing those issues and affirming the convictions. And then the defendants applied for certiorari with the Supreme Court, which denied it. Therefore, they received exactly what our Constitution provides, due process, and expended all of their efforts challenging that. So I would say that that is an absolute mischaracterization of those individuals and that entity.

[56:12] **SEN. CRUZ:** And isn't it true that those men were convicted by a jury on all counts after weeks of testimony, wiretaps, [and] financial records establishing that they knowingly funneled money to a designated terrorist organization?

[56:26] **MS. BURNS:** Yes.

SEN. CRUZ: Mr. Shideler, how important is the Brotherhood network operating inside the United States to the Brotherhood's global agenda?

[56:37] **MR. SHIDELER:** I would say it's probably central to their efforts. While they have influence in other countries that is perhaps more significant, the importance of influencing the United States is preeminent.

[56:51] **SEN. CRUZ:** Let's turn to the American Muslims for Palestine. Ms. Klepach, there are serious allegations that AMP is effectively the alter ego of the Islamic Association for Palestine, the original Hamas propaganda front in the United States. Is there evidentiary support for that?

[57:10] **MS. KLEPACH:** Yes, there is. That case is currently in litigation and scheduled to go to trial in February of next year. The district court judge in that case ruled against AMP in multiple motions to dismiss claiming that there was insufficient evidence of alter ego status.

[57:31] **SEN. CRUZ:** Mr. Shideler, are there individuals who moved directly from IAP, UASR, or HLF into leadership roles at AMP?

[57:41] **MR. SHIDELER:** Yes, there are, as you named some of them. Osama Abuirshaid, who was not just at IAP, but he was also at the United Association for Studies and Research, which was really the Hamas think tank of its time. It was created by Hamas foreign affairs leader Abu Marzook and led by Ahmed Yousef, who was sort of the Hamas political consultant.

[58:04] **SEN. CRUZ:** And isn't it true that AMP's current executive director, Osama Abuirshaid, previously worked for both IAP and the United Association for Studies and Research, which were two of the original Hamas-linked organizations in America?

MR. SHIDELER: Yes, that's correct.

[58:22] **SEN. CRUZ:** And in April 2024, Mr. Abuirshaid stood on George Washington University's campus at a student protest and said, in substance, that the movement would take back these colleges like it will take back America, like it will take back Palestine. Mr. Shideler, does rhetoric like that also inform how we should understand Hamas's own intent for the network it built here in America?

[58:48] **MR. SHIDELER:** Yes, it does.

[58:51] **SEN. CRUZ:** We were talking about Abdul El-Sayed, now the Democrat nominee for U.S. Senate in the state of Michigan. Among other things, Mr. El-Sayed has campaigned alongside Hasan Piker, a radical left-wing Islamist who has said, among other things, America deserved 9/11. Mr. El-Sayed was very proud to stand next to Hasan. I want to ask each of the three witnesses: Do you believe America deserved 9/11?

[59:32] **MS. BURNS:** No, sir, it did not. Al-Qaeda committed the acts that we saw on 9/11. Al-Qaeda hijacked commercial airliners and flew them into the World Trade Center and into the Pentagon, and attempted to fly another plane and kill more civilians. They killed 3,000 civilians. And for anyone to claim that any one of those civilians or individuals who died in that atrocious terrorist attack deserved it is shameful.

[1:00:01] **SEN. CRUZ:** Ms. Klepach?

MS. KLEPACH: Absolutely not. And the reframing of 9/11 as something that is a consequence of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East is an incredibly dangerous rhetorical tool that the Brotherhood has used. And we've seen that rhetorical tool extend even beyond, to Mr. El-Sayed's statements about even the recent terrorist attack against a preschool in Michigan.

[1:00:23] **SEN. CRUZ:** Mr. Shideler?

MR. SHIDELER: I have to concur. It's a horrific statement.

SEN. CRUZ: Final question. What does it say to you that today's Democrat Party is proudly supporting Mr. El-Sayed as a Michigan U.S. Senate candidate and will funnel money, support, and advocacy behind his candidacy, notwithstanding his willingness to embrace someone like Hasan, who says America deserved 9/11? Mr. Shideler?

[1:01:04] **MR. SHIDELER:** Well, I would say it shows the success of the Muslim Brotherhood network over multiple decades, that they achieved what they said they were going to achieve, which was to normalize support for Hamas and normalize support for terrorism.

[1:01:18] **SEN. CRUZ:** Ms. Klepach?

MS. KLEPACH: I would concur with that. The classification of this hearing and this endeavor as Islamophobic says a lot about the failure of one party in this country to confront the terrorist threat that faces our nation. I would say that the most Islamophobic or racist thing about this endeavor is the fact that the Democrats can't look at terrorists because they purport that it reflects all Muslims.

[1:01:48] **SEN. CRUZ:** Ms. Burns?

MS. BURNS: I would say that embracing Muslim Brotherhood rhetoric and furthering the Muslim Brotherhood's agenda in this country will result in the erosion of our government, the erosion of the fabric of our society, and it poses a threat to our national security and should be treated as such.

[1:02:14] **SEN. CRUZ:** Well, I want to thank each of the witnesses for your testimony. It was highly enlightening, and I hope that the administration listens to your testimony carefully, and I hope we see real action from the Department of Justice, the Department of Treasury, the FBI, and elsewhere following up and protecting the American people from what I believe is a clear and present danger to our safety and security. This concludes our hearing. Written questions can be submitted for the record until Tuesday, August 12th at 5:00 p.m., and I will ask the witnesses to answer and return any questions to the committee by August 26th at 5:00 p.m. And with that, this hearing is adjourned.

[1:02:55] [Hearing adjourned.]

Exhibit 16



HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT: CONFRONTING THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD NETWORK IN AMERICA

Lara L. Burns

PROGRAM ON EXTREMISM The George Washington University

Hidden in Plain Sight: Confronting the Muslim Brotherhood Network in America

Written Testimony of

Lara L. Burns

Senior Research Fellow, Program on Extremism

The George Washington University

Committee on the Judiciary

U.S. Senate

August 5, 2026

Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Whitehouse, esteemed members of the Committee:

Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the topic of confronting the Muslim Brotherhood network in America.

Introduction

In a 2008 federal trial[1], the Texas-based Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF) and five of its officials were convicted of providing material support to Hamas. At that trial, the government introduced extensive evidence about the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, and that evidence is part of the public record today. The prosecution identified a decades-long conspiracy involving numerous individuals in the United States and abroad, to support Hamas via front organizations in the United States. Those front organizations held different roles in the conspiracy, but all worked cohesively to support Hamas. One of the individuals implicated in the conspiracy, Ismail Elbarasse, was the subject of a federal search warrant in 2004 (hereinafter the *Elbarasse Search)* wherein the FBI discovered and seized an archive of US Muslim Brotherhood records, many of which were admitted as evidence at the HLF trial. I have intimate knowledge about this network as I am a retired FBI Special Agent who worked counterterrorism matters for over 22 years and led the HLF investigation between 2001-2008.

The Muslim Brotherhood's presence in the United States began in the 1960s, and quickly evolved into a sophisticated structure which will be discussed more fully herein. The United States Muslim Brotherhood's Palestine Committee served as the original Hamas infrastructure in the United States, initially consisting of the HLF (the fundraising arm), the Islamic Association

[1] In 2007, the *United States v. HLF* trial took place and ended in a mistrial after the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict on all counts. The case was retried in 2008, ending in convictions of all defendants.

for Palestine (IAP, the propaganda arm), and the United Association for Studies and Research (UASR, the think tank). At the trial, still today the largest successful terrorism financing prosecution in American history, the IAP and UASR were identified as unindicted co-conspirators/joint venturers as was the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR).[2] Further, many key unindicted individuals and entities in the U.S. were also identified at the trial in witness testimony, search-warrant derived documents, and FBI wire-taps. It is important to note that the HLF and the five officers were convicted in that trial by a jury, a conviction that the defendants appealed on numerous grounds. The convictions were affirmed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals[3] and *certiorari* was denied by the Supreme Court.[4] Allies of this network falsely labeled the HLF defendants as political prisoners, implying they were wrongly imprisoned merely for their beliefs and without acknowledging they were afforded due process, a fair trial with a jury whom their attorneys helped select, a substantial appellate court record and affirmation of the guilty verdicts.[5]

On October 14, 2025, Senator Tom Cotton and Representative Elise Stefanik sent a letter to the Department of Treasury, requesting that Treasury initiate an investigation into CAIR, for any potential ties between CAIR and Hamas (the "Congressional Letter"). CAIR responded with a letter of its own wherein it stated, "CAIR is not and has never been an agent, affiliate, offshoot, subsidiary, supporter, partner, funder, representative, supporter, or pen pal of any militant group." CAIR attacked the "Bush administration's improper listing of over 250 organizations as unindicted coconspirators in the deeply flawed and widely criticized trial of the Holy Land Foundation." In its letter, CAIR stated the government's identification of these groups as co-conspirators was ruled "unconstitutional" by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. That statement is false as the Fifth Circuit made no such ruling.[6] Consistently but falsely, on its website, CAIR disputes its involvement in the conspiracy under "Urban Legend #1: CAIR is part of a conspiracy, sometimes alleged to be a plot hatched by the Muslim Brotherhood, to infiltrate the U.S. government and subvert the U.S. Constitution."[7]

Background

To properly understand the activities and functions of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) in the U.S., it is essential to examine their origins, goals, and their evolution from Hamas' founding in 1987 through the present. Key events occurred in the early

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[2] *United States v. El-Mezain*, 664 F.3d 467, 486 (5th Cir. 2011).
[3] *United States v. El-Mezain, et al.* 664 F. 3d 467, 484 (5th Cir. 2011).
[4] *El-Mezain v. United States*, 568 U.S. 977 (2012).
[5] "Nida Abu Baker on the Holy Land 5: 'They put these men in prison because they don't want you in the streets today protesting a genocide,'" *Samidoun: Palestinian Prisoner Solidarity Network*, August 11, 2024 https://samidoun.net/2024/08/nida-abu-baker-on-the-holy-land-5-they-put-these-men-in-prison-because-they-dont-want-you-in-the-streets-today-protesting-a-genocide/
[6] Barry Jonas and Lara Burns, "CAIR's Familiar Dance: Denial and Deflection in the Face of Scrutiny," George Washington University, Program on Extremism, October 2025, https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2025-10/CAIR%E2%80%99s%20Familiar%20Dance.pdf
[7] https://www.cair.com/dispelling-rumors-about-cair/; https://cairtx.org/dispelling-rumors-about-cair/

1990s, when U.S-based Hamas leaders solidified their plan to infiltrate politics, media and universities on behalf of Hamas and to begin seeding a pro-terror, anti-Semitic, anti-Western narrative to the U.S. public. Understanding this evolution is imperative to recognizing how certain current organizations and individuals are intentionally driving pro-terror agendas in the U.S. today.

Short History of the Muslim Brotherhood

A discussion of the activities and functions of Ḥarakat al-Muqāwamah al-ʾIslāmiyyah, the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), warrants examining its mother movement. The Muslim Brotherhood, al-Ikwan al-Muslimin, is arguably the most influential modern-day Islamist movement in the world.[8] Its ideology is based, in large part, on the belief that all aspects of life, society and government should be administered according to a specific, strict interpretation of Islamic law. It should be noted here that Islam is a religion while Islamism is a political ideology;[9] they are not the same and should not be confused.

The Muslim Brotherhood's foundation lies in its grass roots efforts to spread its ideology and win the hearts and minds of a population through a combination of proselytization and the provision of social services (sometimes referred to as *da'wa).*[10] Although the Muslim Brotherhood utilizes the da'wa to further its agenda, it does not reject violence and in certain circumstances supports the use of violent jihad. [11]

The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928 in Egypt by Hassan al-Banna and quickly spread through the Arab world, including the Gaza Strip. The cornerstone of what began as the Muslim Brotherhood's civilian infrastructure in Gaza was Al-Mujama Al-Islami (also known as the Islamic Center or the Islamic Complex), founded by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin in 1973.[12] Other key leaders of Al-Mujama Al-Islami included Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi, Ibrahim al-Yazuri, and Mahmud al-Zahar[13] – all of whom would become senior leaders of Hamas. Al-Jam'iya Al-Islamiyah (also known as the Islamic Society or Islamic Association of Gaza) was another key entity founded by Sheikh Yassin that emerged out of Al-Mujama Al-Islami in 1976.[14] The Muslim Brotherhood in

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[8] Lorenzo Vidino, *The Muslim Brotherhood in the United Kingdom,* George Washington University, Program on Extremism, December 2015. https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/downloads/MB%20in%20the%20UK.pdf

[9] Soner Cagaptay, "Muslims vs. Islamists," The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 8, 2016, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/muslims-vs-islamists

[10] Lorenzo Vidino, *The Muslim Brotherhood in the United Kingdom*, George Washington University, Program on Extremism, December 2015. https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/downloads/MB%20in%20the%20UK.pdf https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/downloads/MB%20in%20the%20UK.pdf

[11] Ziad Abu-Amr, Hamas: A Historical and Political Background, *Journal of Palestine Studies XXII*, no. 4 (Summer 1993) ("Hamas"),

[12] Shaul Mishal & Avraham Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence* (Columbia University Press, 2000 ("*The Palestinian Hamas*"), pp. 18-19.

[13] *See also* Ziad Abu-Amr, *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza* (Indiana University Press, 1994) ("*Fundamentalism*"), p. 16.

[14] Mishal & Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas*, p. 20.

Gaza thrived and spread under Yassin's guidance, and by the early 1980s, it had assumed control over the Islamic University of Gaza.[15]

By the early 1960s, the Muslim Brotherhood had built a presence in the U.S., where its members functioned primarily through student unions on college campuses, most particularly through the Muslim Students Association (MSA).[16] The Muslim Brotherhood in the U.S. evolved quickly and by the late 1980s, had a formalized structure, an elected decision making body (the shura council), a presiding official (the Masul El-Am), and numerous covert front organizations whose ostensible purpose was to aid, support, and celebrate the U.S.'s Arab and Muslim community, but were stealthily designed to seed an Islamist narrative and radicalize others.[17]

An Arabic document, drafted by senior U.S. Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohamed Akram (also known as Mohamed Akram Adlouni, hereinafter Mohamed Akram) and entitled "Preliminary Vision for Preparing Future Leadership," was seized in the abovementioned *Elbarasse Search* and introduced as evidence in the HLF trial. The document identified key U.S. Muslim Brotherhood leaders as of 1988. It contained a chart (hereinafter *The 1988 Chart)* of the leadership and their roles.[18] It also contained the names of various front organizations including but not limited to the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), North American Islamic Trust (NAIT), the Muslim Arab Youth Association (MAYA), and the Muslim Students Association (MSA).

[15] *See also* Abu-Amr, *Hamas*, p. 7.
[16] Ilyas Ba-Yunus and Kassim Kone, *Muslims in the United States* (Greenwood Press, 2006); Steve A. Johnson, "The Muslims of Indianapolis," in Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Jane Idleman Smith, eds., *Muslim Communities in North America* (State University of New York Press, 1994);
Government Exhibit Elbarasse Search-2, *United States v. Holy Land Foundation et al.*, 3:04-cr-240-G (N.D. Tex. 2008) ("HLF"), https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2025-12/elbarasse_search_2_.pdf
[17] Government Exhibit Elbarasse Search-2, *United States v. Holy Land Foundation et al.*, 3:04-cr-240-G (N.D. Tex. 2008) ("HLF"), https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2025-12/elbarasse_search_2_.pdf
[18] Government Exhibit Elbarasse Search-4, *United States v. Holy Land Foundation et al.*, 3:04-cr-240-G (N.D. Tex. 2008) ("HLF"), https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2025-12/elbarasse_search_4.pdf

Bate #ISE-SW 1B41/0000858

(*Chart of the capability of the present leadership and the size of task distribution*)

The Apparatuses				THE NAMES									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
	2	1	(7*)	(5*)	(5*)	3	1	1	3	4	3	1	1
(1)The Shura	Al-Qadi	Al-Jabri	Subani	Tariq	Mousa	Gaddour	Jaghlit	Talal	Walid	Nasr	Hani	Khalil	Ghani
(2)The office	Al-Qadi	Mousa	Subani	Gaddour	Nazim								
(3)Gaf Dha Ta	Gaddour	Akram	Nasr	Abd-al-Mannan	Al-Haydar								
(4)Institutions	Subani	Bassam	Tariq	Zaki	Hamid	Shawki							
(5)Financial	Nazim	Al-Haydar	Salah	(IL)	Alamoudi								
(6)Political													
(7) The sisters	Abd-al-Mannan	1	2	3									
(8) The planning	Akram	Tariq	Subani	Hani	Nasr								
(9) Legal	Walid	Mousa											
(10) The court	Hanooti	Elmezain	Adam										
(11) Special Committee	Jamal	Bassam	Mousa	Subani	Akram	Tariq							
(12) Social	Elmezain	Sadoun	Hamid										
(13) Curricula	Tariq	Akram	Subani	Hanooti									
(14)Security	Izzat	Khalil	M. Salah	Darwish									
(15) Capabilities	Wisam	Walid	Safwat	Husayn									
(16) Palestine C	Mousa	Subani	Akram	Yasir	Hammud	Isam							
(17) D. Regions	Hani	Nasr	Safwan	Husayn	Safwat	Bashir	Elmezain	Talal					
(18) ISNA	Zaki	Dawud	Imtiyaz	Siddiq	Mraywid	Faysal	Idris	Anwar	Qutbi				
(19) MAYA	Hattab	Shukri	Husayn	Haddad	'Izzat	Al-Sa'id	Rasid	Al-Mashad					
(20) MSA	Ghulam	Riyad	Sati	'Isam	Hamid	Harmush	Farhat	'Abd-al-'Azim	Abd-al-Rahman				
(21) MSG	Husni	Adrus	Abd-al-Latif	'Irfan	Elmezain								
(22) NAIT	Bassam	Jamal	Zaki	Sabir	Masrur	Jabir	Qutbi						
(23) MYNA	Badiyya	Abu Karam	Nidal	Nurashma	Abd-al-Jabbar	Jihad Fahmy	(IL)						
(24) AMSS	Abu Solayman												
(25)AMSE	Barluma												
(26)IMA	Wahhaj Ahmad												
N} Schools and Education													
E} Communities and Centers													
W} Youth													
Economic C													
	* Tasks size												

(IL)
Usras

United States v. Holy Land Foundation et al., Gov't Exhibit Elbarasse Search-4, Page 5[19]

The U.S. Muslim Brotherhood's agenda was memorialized in a 1991 document entitled "Explanatory Memorandum," (hereinafter *The Explanatory Memorandum*) and written by Mohamed Akram, who is also listed as a senior leader in *The 1988 Chart* and will be discussed further herein. The *Explanatory Memorandum* outlined a strategy, a "Grand *jihad*," to sabotage Western society from within "so that it is eliminated." Attached to it was a list of U.S.-based organizations who could contribute to that mission. Many of those organizations were also included in the *1988 Chart* above, including NAIT, ISNA, MSA, and MAYA among others.


[19] https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2025-12/elbarasse_search_4.pdf

4- Understanding the role of the Muslim Brother in North America:
The process of settlement is a "Civilization-Jihadist Process" with all the word means. The Ikhwan must understand that their work in America is a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and "sabotaging" its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated and God's religion is made victorious over all other religions. Without this level of understanding, we are not up to this challenge and have not prepared ourselves for Jihad yet. It is a Muslim's destiny to perform Jihad and work wherever he is and wherever he lands until the final hour comes, and there is no escape from that destiny except for those who chose to slack. But, would the slackers and the Mujahedeen be equal.

United States v. Holy Land Foundation at al., Excerpt from Gov't Exhibit Elbarasse Search 3.[20]

Attached to *The Explanatory Memorandum* was a list in English entitled, "A list of our organizations and the organizations of our friends."

[20] https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2025-12/Elbarasse%20Search%203.pdf



Bate #ISE-SW 1B10/ 0000427

Attachment number (1)

A list of our organizations and the organizations of our friends
[Imagine if t they all march according to one plan!!!]

1- ISNA = ISLAMIC SOCIETY OF NORTH AMERICA
2- MSA = MUSLIM STUDENTS' ASSOCIATION
3- MCA = THE MUSLIM COMMUNITIES ASSOCIATION
4- AMSS = THE ASSOCIATION OF MUSLIM SOCIAL SCIENTISTS
5- AMSE = THE ASSOCIATION OF MUSLIM SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS
6- IMA = ISLAMIC MEDICAL ASSOCIATION

7- ITC = ISLAMIC TEACHING CENTER
8- NAIT = NORTH AMERICAN ISLAMIC TRUST
9- FID = FOUNDATION FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
10- IHC = ISLAMIC HOUSING COOPERATIVE
11- ICD = ISLAMIC CENTERS DIVISION
12- ATP = AMERICAN TRUST PUBLICATIONS
13- AVC = AUDIO-VISUAL CENTER
14- IBS = ISLAMIC BOOK SERVICE
15- MBA = MUSLIM BUSINESSMEN ASSOCIATION
16- MYNA = MUSLIM YOUTH OF NORTH AMERICA
17- IFC = ISNA FIQH COMMITTEE
18- IPAC = ISNA POLITICAL AWARENESS COMMITTEE
19- IED = ISLAMIC EDUCATION DEPARTMENT

20- MAYA = MUSLIM ARAB YOUTH ASSOCIATION
21- MISG = MALASIAN [sic] ISLAMIC STUDY GROUP
22- IAP = ISLAMIC ASSOCIATION FOR PALESTINE
23- UASR = UNITED ASSOCIATION FOR STUDIES AND RESEARCH
24- OLF = OCCUPIED LAND FUND
25- MIA = MERCY INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION

26- ICNA = ISLAMIC CIRCLE OF NORTH AMERICA
27- BMI = BAITUL MAL INC
28- IIIT = INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR ISLAMIC THOUGHT
29- IIC = ISLAMIC INFORMATION CENTER

32

United States v. Holy Land Foundation et al., Excerpt from Gov't Exhibit Elbarasse Search-3, Page 18[21]

Muslim Brotherhood Created Hamas

In 1987, an uprising occurred in the Palestinian territories and became known as the *First Intifada*. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and its leader Yasser Arafat were seen as leaders of the uprising, but the Muslim Brotherhood recognized it must act or miss an opportunity. It was out of the international Muslim Brotherhood movement that Hamas emerged in the early days of

[21] https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2025-12/Elbarasse%20Search%203.pdf

the First Intifada.[22] In 1988, Hamas published its Covenant, also referred to as its charter.[23] The Covenant revealed Hamas's ultimate goal of destroying the country of Israel through violent jihad. In its preamble, Hamas quoted Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna saying, "…Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it, just as it obliterated others before it." In Article 13, the Covenant states "there is no solution for the Palestinian question except through Jihad."

Although violent jihad was its ultimate goal, Hamas founded its agenda upon its social infrastructure model whose job it was to radicalize the population through a weaponized combination of social welfare services and Hamas propaganda, in order to radicalize and inspire the population to join the fight. In fact, these activities began prior to the start of the Intifada, in the heart of the original Gaza-based Muslim Brotherhood social and religious institutions mentioned above. In addition to seeking the destruction of Israel, another goal of their hybrid model of violence, propaganda, and welfare was to eliminate and/or sideline other competing Palestinian factions.[24]

Hamas in the United States

The Palestine Committee

In 1988, the International Muslim Brotherhood tasked its chapters, including the Muslim Brotherhood's United States chapter, to form a Palestine Committee in support of Hamas.[25] At the time, a primary leader of the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood was Mousa Abu Marzook who was a college student in Louisiana. Marzook was included in *The 1988 Chart* shown above. From the U.S., he oversaw the operation of the first three U.S.-based Hamas front organizations under the U.S.-Muslim Brotherhood's Palestine Committee as he rose to the senior-most leadership position within Hamas worldwide- the Chief of the Hamas Political Bureau. Marzook remains a leader in the Hamas Political Bureau today.

The Palestine Committee effectively became the U.S.-based Hamas infrastructure. The three key front organizations were the Occupied Land Fund (soon to be renamed the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development and hereinafter referred to as the HLF), the IAP (which existed prior to the formation of the Palestine Committee), and the UASR.[26] Each organization had a specific

[22] Testimony of John Pistole, Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Terrorist Financing Operations Section, Before the House Committee on Financial Service Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 108th Congress, Sept. 24, 2003, https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/testimony/the-terrorist-financing-operations-section

[23] Government Exhibits Hamas Charter 1 and Hamas Charter 2, *United States v. Holy Land Foundation et al.*, 3:04-cr-240-G (N.D. Tex. 2008) ("HLF").

[24] *See, e.g.*, Matthew Levitt, *"Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad,"* (Yale University Press 2006), Chapter 1.

[25] *United States v. El-Mezain*, eat al, 664 F.3d 467, 486 (5th Cir. 2011).

[26] Lorenzo Vidino, *The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West* (Columbia University Press 2010).

purpose, but they were to operate in conjunction with each other to achieve the goal of supporting Hamas with media, money and political support.






United States v. HLF et al., Gov't Exhibit Elbarasse Search-5:[27] *Identifies when Hamas was formed; the Muslim Brotherhood ordered the Creation of the "Palestine Committee" in the US to support it through three organizations, the HLF (OLF) IAP, and UASR.*

A document seized by the FBI in the *Elbarasse Search*, among a cache of U.S. Hamas and Muslim Brotherhood documents, revealed a great deal about the U.S. infrastructure. One of those documents is captured below and is the group's own snapshot of the infrastructure in 1991, including its organizations and leaders, written by Mohamed Akram, the author of *The 1991 Explanatory Memorandum* who is also listed in *The 1998 Chart*.


[27] https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2025-02/Elbarasse_Search_5__1__0.pdf



United States v. Holy Land Foundation et al., Gov't Exhibit Elbarasse Search-10, page 1[28]

Pages three and four of the HLF trial exhibit Elbarasse Search 10, referred to herein as *The 1991 Palestine Committee List*, provided the names of 28 men who were leaders in the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood's Palestine Committee as of 1991. Among these men were Marzook (#1), Elbarasse(#3), leaders of the HLF, leaders of the IAP, the leader of the UASR, and a man named Abdel Haleem Ashqar (#5) who will be described in more detail below.

[28] https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2026-04/Elbarasse%20Search%2010.pdf



Hate #ISE-SW 1B72/0000801

Chart Outline for Palestinian Action Aspects

1. The Administrative Aspect Committee secretary	Mousa Akram	1. Chairman 2. Secretariat Committee	(Mousa) (Hamoud)	1 Mousa 2 Akram 3 Elbrasse 4 Elmezain 5 Al-Ashqar
		3. Vice chairman	6 Ahmad	
				7 Yasser
2. Financial Aspect		1. Financial Apparatus	(Ismail)	8 Hamroud
	Ismail	2. Investment Committee	9 Rashid	
				10 Jamal
3. Media & Political Aspect	UASR	1. Media Office	(Ghassan)	11 Shukri
	Ahmad	2. Studies & Research Office	(Ahmad)	12 Sobani
		3. Political Office (Mohamed Abbas)		13 Omar Yehya
				14 Ghassan Dahduli
4. Charitable & Humanitarian Aspect		1. Occupied Land Fund	(Shukri)	15 Hassan Sabri
	Elmezain	2. Medical Organization	(Agha)	16 Ayman Sharawi
		3. Palestinian Student's Fund		17 Ismail Jaber
				18 Basman Elashi
5. Popular & Public Aspect		1. Islamic Association for Palestine	(Omar)	19 Salah Diwoud
	Yasser	2. Palestinian Woman's Association	(Basman)	20 Ziyad Hamdan
		3. Palestinian Youth League	(Hazim)	21 Issam al-Saraj
		4. Artistic Association		22 Mohamed Abbas
				23 Izzat Mansour
6. Organizational Aspect	[IL] Abdel Halim Rashid	1. Rehabilitation & Training Committee	(Rashid)	24 Fawaz Mushtaha
				25 Munzir Taleb
				26 Ismail Khalaf
7. Artistic Aspect	Fawaz	1. Artistic Foundation	(Munzir)	27 Mohamed al-Hanouti
				28 Badi Ali

Committee Chairman
Palestinian Action Aspects

Central Com	Shura	Executive
1 Mousa		1 Yasser
2 Akram		2 Omar Yehya
3 Yousif		3 Ghassan Dahduli
4 Ibraise		4 Hassan Sabri
5 Mezain		5 Fawaz
6 Ashqar		6 Elbrasse
7 Yasser		7 Ismail Jaber
8 Hamroud		

9 Shukri 14 Abdel Azim
10 Sobani 15 Ibraisi
11 Rashid
12 Jamal
13 Dahduli

HLF Gov't Exhibit Elbarasse Search-10, pages 3 and 4 (hereinafter referred to as "The 1991 Palestine Committee List")[29]

During the First Intifada (1987-1993), the HLF and IAP held and participated in festivals in the United States wherein Hamas was praised, violent jihad was encouraged, and Mufid Abdulqader (an IAP band member and HLF fundraiser) performed skits on stage wherein he pretended to kill a Jewish person to the delight of the audience that was often filled with children.[30] Many of these fundraising events were captured on videotapes and later seized by the FBI in various search warrants. Some of the videotapes were found buried in Fawaz Mushtaha's yard in Northern Virginia (Mushtaha was a member of the IAP and #24 on *The 1991 Palestine Committee List)*. The HLF raised money at these events and used it to fund Hamas' social infrastructure in Gaza and the West Bank, including the funding of the above-mentioned Al Mujamma Al-Islami, the Islamic Society in Gaza, and the Islamic University in Gaza.[31] They funded schools where children were taught to hate Jewish people and that violence was the only solution.[32]

In the early years of the *First Intifada*, the IAP's information office in Dallas, TX published an Arabic newspaper *Ila Filistine*, wherein it promoted Hamas-related calls for support and *jihad* and

[29] https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2026-04/Elbarasse%20Search%2010.pdf
[30] Government Exhibits Elbarasse Search-32, HLF Search 114, Mushtaha Search-1, *United States v. Holy Land Foundation et al.*, 3:04-cr-240-G (N.D. Tex. 2008) ("HLF").
[31] Government Exhibits Payments to IC Gaza, https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2026-06/payments_to_ic_gaza.pdf and Payments to IS Ass. Gaza, https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2026-06/payments_to_is_assoc._gaza.pdf, *United States v. Holy Land Foundation et al.*, 3:04-cr-240-G (N.D. Tex. 2008) ("HLF").
[32] *United States v. El-Mezain, et al*, 664 F.3d 467, 486 (5th Cir. 2011).

even Hamas communiques that were followed by adds solicitating donations to the HLF after a call to perform *"jihad* with your money" (in the early years, the HLF was still named OLF). One of the issues even included a poem by HLF leader Shukri Abu Baker who said, "we will not accept other than Hamas."[33] The IAP's information office also published the *Muslim World Monitor*, which was a periodical written in English and served the broader Muslim population providing news on Islamist movements around the world, along with articles by senior Muslim Brotherhood leaders.

While overseeing this US-based network and operating Hamas' Political Bureau, Marzook also began courting the Iranian regime for fiscal sponsorship of Hamas in 1990, which was apparently secured by 1992.[34]

In December 1992, Hamas kidnapped and murdered an Israeli border guard, and in response, Israel deported over 400 Hamas and PIJ members to Marj El Zahour, Lebanon.[35] Among the deportees were senior Hamas leaders like Abdel Aziz Rantisi (now deceased) and Mahmoud Zahar (Zahar remains a senior leader in Hamas Political Bureau as of 2026. In the *First Intifada*, Zahar attended festivals with the IAP and HLF and was on a list of HLF overseas fundraisers that was seized in 2001). The HLF responded by financially supporting the deportees.[36]

Mohamed Salah

In early 1993, a Chicago-based man named Mohamed Salah, who was on *The 1988 Chart* under the "Security" Committee, was arrested in Israel for allegedly bringing money to assist Hamas.[37] According to a *New York Times* article from February 1993, Salah identified Marzook, the HLF, and UASR as part of the Hamas network in the United States.[38] [Salah was designated as a Specially Designated Terrorist in August of 1995, but that designation was removed 17 years later.][39]

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[33] Government Exhibits Ila Filistine 1-5, *United States v. Holy Land Foundation et al.*, 3:04-cr-240-G (N.D. Tex. 2008) ("HLF").
[34] Government Exhibits Ashqar Search 7, *United States v. Holy Land Foundation et al.*, 3:04-cr-240-G (N.D. Tex. 2008) ("HLF"); Lorenzo Vidino and Lara Burns, *How Hamas' Early Ties with Iran Were Brokered from the US*, George Washington University Program on Extremism, October 2024, https://extremism.gwu.edu/how-hamas-early-ties-iran-were-brokered-us
[35] Shaul Mishal & Avraham Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence* (Columbia University Press, 2000 ("*The Palestinian Hamas*"), pp. 96-97
[36] Government Exhibits Infocom Search 25, *United States v. Holy Land Foundation et al.*, 3:04-cr-240-G (N.D. Tex. 2008) ("HLF").
[37] "U.S. Protests to Israelis on 3 Jailed Americans," Associated Press, Feb. 8, 1993, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1993/02/08/014493.html?pageNumber=7
[38] Judith Miller, "Israel Says That a Prisoner's Tale Links Arabs in U.S. to Terrorism," *New York Times*, Feb. 17, 1993, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1993/02/17/650893.html?pageNumber=6
[39] "Chicago and Washington, D.C., area men among three indicted in racketeering conspiracy in U.S. to finance Hamas terror abroad," U.S. Department of Justice Press Release, Aug. 20, 2004, https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2004/August/04_crm_571.htm; Terrorist Assets Report 2001, https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/8431/download?inline, p. 4 n.4 (Tab 5).

The Philadelphia Meeting

In 1993, the PLO and Israel entered into the Oslo Accords, which served as a road map for peace, a two-state solution, and Palestinian self-rule. Hamas opposed the Oslo Accords.[40] Leaders of the U.S.-based Hamas infrastructure (the Palestine Committee) reacted and planned a meeting among the U.S.-based leaders to discuss how to proceed in light of the developments. This meeting was to be the cornerstone of an agenda they would pursue over decades.

The Palestine Committee leaders held the meeting in Philadelphia in October 1993 (hereafter the *1993 Philadelphia Meeting),* which was wire-tapped by the FBI, to discuss how they would continue to support Hamas and seek to derail the Oslo Accords, while operating under the cover of legitimacy to avoid law enforcement scrutiny. In the meeting, they discussed how Hamas, which they referred to as "Samah," (Hamas spelled backwards) would likely be designated as a terrorist organization by the U.S. government. The leaders declared that "War is deception" and planned to deceive the American public about their motives, while remaining true to their ideologies when addressing the Palestinian and Arab populations.[41]

In the *1993 Philadelphia Meeting*, the attendees discussed their foreign and domestic agendas. When discussing their foreign agenda, they identified the need to continue supporting jihad and undermine the Palestinian Authority and Arafat. At the meeting, one of the attendees lamented that people in Gaza and the West Bank were happy about the Oslo Accords. One attendee wondered what would happen if the Palestinian State started and things "settled down," to which the group replied in unison, "God forbid."[42] They discussed which Gaza and West Bank-based charitable entities, hospitals, schools, and universities they had influence in and/or control over and those where they needed more control.[43]

They also discussed their domestic agenda in the United States. They expressed their intent to infiltrate media outlets, and they focused heavily on their need to infiltrate the U.S.'s leading universities.[44] Specifically, the following excerpt is a statement during the *1993 Philadelphia Meeting* by Omar Ahmad (#13 on *The 1991 Palestine Committee List*), who would go on to co-found CAIR months later:

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[40] Shaul Mishal & Avraham Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence* (Columbia University Press, 2000 ("*The Palestinian Hamas*"), pp. 66-69.
[41] Government Exhibits Philly Meeting 1-16, *United States v. Holy Land Foundation et al.*, 3: 04-cr-240-G (N.D. Tex. 2008) ("HLF"), https://extremism.gwu.edu/legal-documents.
[42] Government Exhibit Philly Meeting 9E, *United States v. Holy Land Foundation et al.*, 3:04-cr-240-G (N.D. Tex. 2008) ("HLF").
[43] Government Exhibits Philly Meeting 1-16, *United States v. Holy Land Foundation et al.*, 3:04-cr-240-G (N.D. Tex. 2008) ("HLF"), https://extremism.gwu.edu/legal-documents.
[44] Government Exhibits Philly Meeting 1-16, *United States v. Holy Land Foundation et al.*, 3:04-cr-240-G (N.D. Tex. 2008) ("HLF"), https://extremism.gwu.edu/legal-documents.

Om: This is also one of the long-term goals but we have started to do some things about it. This can be achieved by infiltrating the American media outlets, universities and research centers as we previously said.

Excerpt from United States v. HLF, Gov't Exhibit Philly Meeting-4[45]

One of the leaders stated at the meeting that it was a catastrophe that the universities that produce the U.S. government's next leaders had Jewish influence, and they decided to identify potential professors to help solve that problem. The attendees further discussed the need to cleanse the curriculum in K-12 schools because they did not want their children to grow up with the idea of "surrendering to peace with Jews."[46]

seminars... Of course, all of these are suggested activities. As for the young people's level an educational material ought to be prepared to be taught in Islamic curricula. We don't want the children of the community who are raised here in schools and in Islamic schools and non-Islamic schools to grow up surrendering to the issue of peace with Jews and... I mean, we don't see in ten years the growing generations in America surrendering to peace with Jews. Therefore, there must be curricula and teaching materials which spread in Islamic schools and in weekend schools, the ones which teach children who attend American schools. Curricula ought to be put together to prepare them. Another thing is


Excerpt from United States v. HLF, Gov't Exhibit Philly Meeting-5[47]

As stated herein, Hamas pursues its agenda through a lethal combination of violence, propaganda, and charity. Likewise, when discussing their goals in *The 1993 Philadelphia Meeting*, HLF leader Shukri Abu Baker- the head of an ostensible charity organization- discussed the potential goals of the IAP's periodicals, *Al Zaytonia* and the *Muslim World Monitor*, which ranged from violence to funding. In his conversation, it is clear the periodicals were not published to merely provide the news. He asked the group:

"…What do we want from,…from the reader of Al Zaytouna and the reader of the Monitor and from the guy who owns a store in Chicago? Do I want him to go fight or do I want to earn

[45] https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2025-02/Philly%20Meeting%204.pdf
[46] Government Exhibits Philly Meeting 1-16, *United States v. Holy Land Foundation et al.*, 3:04-cr-240-G (N.D. Tex. 2008) ("HLF"), https://extremism.gwu.edu/legal-documents
[47] https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2025-02/Philly_Meeting_5.pdf

his sympathy so he could donate to me or do I want him to have a knowledgeable political culture? We have to specify what we want from people, honestly, ***otherwise we keep working and publishing a newspaper becomes a goal in itself….****"*[Emphasis added by author].



programs. Before..., before all of that talk we should ask ourselves a question; is America a confrontation front? And what do we want from..., from the reader of Al Zaytouna and the reader of the Monitor and from the guy who owns a store in Chicago? Do I want him to go fight or do I want to earn his sympathy so that he could donate to me or do I want him to have a knowledgeable political culture? We have to specify what we want from people, honestly, otherwise we keep working and publishing a newspaper becomes a goal in itself without finding out what effect does the newspaper have on people. I believe

Excerpt from United States v. HLF, Gov't Exhibit Philly Meeting 5[48]

A list of meeting attendees was used as a demonstrative exhibit at the HLF trial, and identified evidentiary items that established the various attendees' presence at the *1993 Philadelphia Meeting.*

[48] Government Exhibits Philly Meeting 5, *United States v. Holy Land Foundation et al.*, 3:04-cr-240-G (N.D. Tex. 2008) ("HLF"), https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2025-02/Philly_Meeting_5.pdf.

PHILADELPHIA MEETING October 2-3, 1993

Attendees	Organizations	HLF AMEX Records-Flights (exh: Amex1, Amex2)	Marriott Hotel Records (exh: Marriott)	Speaker at Conference (exh: Philly Meeting 1-18)	Surveillance Photos (exh: Philly Pictures 1-6)	Planning Phone Calls (exh: Ashqar Wire Tap 1-6)
Shukri Abu Baker	PC, HLF, IAP	√	√	√	√	√
Ghassan Elashi	PC, HLF, IAP	√	√	√	√	
Mufid Abdulqader	HLF, Al Sakra Band		√			
Haitham Maghawri	HLF	√	√		√	
Akram Kharoubi	PC, HLF, IAP			√		√
Omar Ahmad	PC, IAP	√	√	√		√
Ismail Elbarasse	PC, IAP				√	√
Abdel Haleem Ashqar	PC, AEF			√	√	√
Ghassan Saleh Dahduli	PC, IAP	√	√	√		
Muin Shabib	PC		√			√
Abdul Rahman Barakji	IAP	√	√	√		
Sharif Battikhi	HLF	√		√		
Riad Ahmed			√			
Hassan Sabri	IAP		√	√		√
Abdul Jabar Hamdan	HLF		√			
Ayman Sharawi	PC		√	√		
Jawad al Hamad	Palestine Section			√		√
Abdel Salam				√		
Nihad Awad	PC, CAIR			√		√
Osama	IAP			√		
Abu Ahmad				√		
Mohamed El-Mezain	PC, HLF		√			√
Mohamed Al Hanooti	PC					√
Salah						√
Issam Siraj	PC					√
Yasser Bushnaq	PC, IAP					√
Mohamed Abbas	PC					√

GOVERNMENT EXHIBIT
Philly Meeting Summary
3:04-CR-240-G
U.S. v. HLF, et al.

United States v. Holy Land Foundation et al., Gov't Exhibit Philly Meeting Summary[49]

The meeting attendees further plotted to create an organization in Washington, D.C. that would appear legitimate, but that would serve the purpose of defending the other front organizations if they were scrutinized by the U.S. government and media. Documents and testimony in the HLF trial revealed this new organization was CAIR, which was co-founded by two senior IAP leaders who attended the conspiratorial Philadelphia meeting.[50] Those individuals were Omar Ahmad (IAP, CAIR) and Nihad Awad (IAP, CAIR). CAIR purports to be the largest Muslim civil rights/advocacy organization in America, and Nihad Awad remains CAIR's Executive Director today.[51] Notably, during the same portion of the conversation at the *1993 Philadelphia Meeting*, CAIR co-founder Omar Ahmad also discussed opening the new ostensibly independent organization in Washington D.C. (that would become CAIR) and identified a problem of staffing it with unexposed people and the difficulty in **hiding their true agenda**:

[49] https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2025-02/philly-meeting-summary.pdf
[50] Testimony of FBI Special Agent Lara Burns,
United States v. Holy Land Foundation et al., 3:04-cr-240-G (N.D. Tex. 2008) ("HLF").
[51] https://www.cair.com/about_cair/national-board-of-directors/

> *"…Do we have hidden faces we now bring up to light? We have what we have. I mean, we don't really have available people whom we could dedicate for the work we want to hide…"*[52]

In the same meeting, attendees agreed that "we must pressure [others] and embarrass them by various means until they adhere to our position or, at least, remain neutral."[53] To that end, from its outset, CAIR pursued a mission of intimidation. CAIR aggressively denounced media and law enforcement actions against elements of the U.S.-based Hamas infrastructure, knowingly and falsely labeling those as acts of "Islamophobia" and alleging the war on terror was a war on Muslims.[54] Nihad Awad and Omar Ahmad, the co-founders of CAIR, were intrenched in the U.S.-based Islamist network, yet their narratives, which will be discussed herein, often falsely portrayed actions against Islamist movements as actions against the religion of Islam.

Palestine Committee Membership List

In 1994, the FBI executed a covert search on Ashqar's home (hereinafter the *Ashqar Search*) (Ashqar was #5 on *The 1991 Palestine Committee List* and a speaker at the *1993 Philadelphia Meeting).* Many documents identified in the *Ashqar Search* were admitted in various trials. One of those documents as entitled, "Important phone and fax numbers (Palestine Section/America)" (hereinafter *Palestine Section America).*[55] First on the *Palestine Section America* list was Hamas leader Mousa Abu Marzook (#1 on *The 1991 Palestine Committee List*) and the second on the list was Mohamed Akram (#2 on *The 1991 Palestine Committee List* and author of *The Explanatory Memorandum).* Included on the *Palestine Section America* list were senior leaders of the HLF, IAP, and UASR, along with Mohamed Salah (arrested in Israel in 1993) and Ismail Elbarasse (#3 on the *1991 List)* from whose home many of the referenced documents were seized. The *Palestine Section America* list included the two co-founders of CAIR, Nihad Awad (#32) and Omar Ahmad (#25).

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[52] Government Exhibit Philly Meeting 7, *United States v. Holy Land Foundation et al.*, 3:04-cr-240-G (N.D. Tex. 2008) ("HLF"), pages 4-6.
[53] Government Exhibit Philly Meeting-4, *United States v. Holy Land Foundation et al.*, 3:04-cr-240-G (N.D. Tex. 2008) ("HLF"), p. 16 https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2025-02/Philly%20Meeting%204.pdf
[54] https://www.cair.com/press_releases/islam-oped-war-on-terror-rhetoric-sounds-like-war-on-islam/
[55] Government Exhibit Ashqar Search-1, *United States v. Holy Land Foundation et al.*, 3:04-cr-240-G (N.D. Tex. 2008) ("HLF"), p. 4 https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2025-02/701.pdf

ASH185

Important phone and fax numbers (Palestine section/America)

Name	City/Country	Fax	Phone
1. Mousa Abou Marzouk	RUSTON	318-255-6102	3182555534
2. Mohamed Akram	CHICAGO	312-434-3462	312-563-0937
3. Ahmad Yousif	CHICAGO	312-434-3462	312-594-3967
4. Yasser Bushnaq	DALLAS	214-490-4969	214-490-4969
5. Mohamed Elmezain	NWE JERSY	201-279-6362	201-279-3574
6. Ismail Elbrasse	WASHINGTON, D.C.	703-922-8730	703-922-7859
7. Ghassan Dahduli	TUOCSAN	602-886-8387	602-325-5121
8. Ghassan Elashi	L.A.	213-391-0095	213-838-7255
9. Issam Al Siraj	WASHINGTON		703-931-0211
10. Omar Al Sobani	EAST LANSING		517-332-2163
11. Ismail Jaber	CHICAGO	312-434-3462	312-423-6089
12. Mohamed Abbas			801-583-3325
13. Fawaz Mushtaha	WASHINGTON		703-786-7705
14. Izzat Mansour	RUSTON	318-255-6102	318-255-7038
15. Hamoud Salem	STILLWATER		405-744-1150
16. Nader Jawad	WASHINGTON		703-430-2353
17. Rashid Qurman	ALABAMA		205-837-0450
18. Shukri Abou Baker	INDPOLS	317-839-1840	317-243-9520
19. Mohamed Abou Amaria	L.A.	213-8390436	213-839-4851
20. Jamal Said	CHICAGO	Fax 4305235	312-599-5313
21. Ghassan Al Karmi	CHICAGO		312-561-2940
22. Mohamed Salah			
23. Ayman Siraj Eddin	WASHINGTON, D.C.	7655569	703-237-9529
24. Ahmad Agha	OKLAHOMA		405-762-7732
25. Omar Yehya	C.A.		408-984-1254
26. Akram Al Kharoubi			
27. Walid Abou Sharkh	COLUMBIA, MO.		314-874-5973
28. Walid Ranu			215-977-0689
29. Ayman Sharawi	CANADA		416-391-0324
30. Hazim Elashi	L.A.		213-202-1198
31. Basman Elashi	L.A.		213-838-7255
32. Nihad Awad	MINAPOLIS		602-378-3086
33. Mohamed Al Jaghlit	WISCONSON		715-835-0513
34. Nabil Al Sadoun	TULSA	9188363911	918-836-7404
35. Mohamed Al Hanooti	NEW JERSY		201-392-0573

1-9-2

United States v. Holy Land Foundation et al. Gov't Exhibit Ashqar Search-1, page 4[56]


Page 2 of that same document was entitled *Palestine Section/Outside America* and contained the names of senior Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood leaders abroad including several leaders in the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and the now-designated Hamas leader Majeed Al-Zeer who will be discussed more fully herein. Another individual on the *Palestine Section/Outside America* was Izzat Al Rishq who is believed to be a current senior leader of Hamas' Political Bureau in Qatar.[57]

[56] https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2025-02/701.pdf

[57] https://mugtama.com/articles/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%B4%D9%82_%D9%84%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%85_%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3_%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%B1_%D9%84%D9%83%D9%85_%D8%B9%D9%86_%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%82_%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%A7_%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AA%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%86%D8%A7_%D8%A8%D9%83%D9%85; https://www.mohsensaleh.net/2020/01/30/%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B7/. See also Izzat al Risheq, European Council on Foreign Relations, https://ecfr.eu/special/mapping_palestinian_politics/izzat_al_risheq/.

In March 1994, Nihad Awad (#32 on *Palestine Section America*, speaker at the *1993 Philadelphia Meeting*, leader of the IAP and co-founder of CAIR), spoke at Barry University and told an audience, "'I'm in support of Hamas movement more than the PLO, not because Hamas is destructive and involved in violence."[58] When later questioned about his position under oath in a 2003 deposition, Nihad Awad stated he was not aware Hamas had taken credit for acts of violence at the time.

As of 1994, the four U.S.-based Hamas front organizations were the HLF, IAP, UASR, and CAIR. A document seized in the Elbarasse Search was a memorandum regarding the Palestine Committee's meeting in July 1994 that included the names of all four of those organizations.[59] It memorialized what was discussed in the meeting, including the participants' need to disrupt normalization between Arab and Muslim countries and Israel. They noted that if they did not disrupt this normalization process, "we become the only ones who are 'extremists' and radical…"[60]



Bate #ISE-SW 1B64/ 0000412

In the name of God, the Beneficent, the Merciful

Meeting Agenda for the Palestine Committee 7/30/1994

1- √ Latest news and developments of the Cause of Palestine.
2- √ Reviewing resolutions of previous Committee meeting.
3- √ Reviewing reports of the working organizations and it includes:
- Reviewing work report of the previous stage.
-Financial situation.
- Future suggestions to develop work of the following organizations:
IAP HLF UASR
Coordination CAIR

4- Discussing the paper of activation of the role of the sons of the Levant which includes the latest developments of the American Islamic Society.

5- Discussing the paper of the Zionist infiltration of Islamic organizations.

6- Discussing the suggestion to establish a financial investment company that is specialized and independent.

7- A follow-up of the Palestine activism and its development in the following main regions: Canada, New York-New Jersey, Chicago, Los Angeles, Latin America, South America

8- Conclusion.

GOVERNMENT EXHIBIT Elbarasse Search - 19 3:04-CR-240-G U.S. v. HLF, et al.

ISE-SW 1B64/ 0000412

Screenshot of Government Exhibit Elbarasse Search-19 Pages 1 and 6 (the translation of page 1)[61]

It should be noted that another event of relevance occurred in 1994 and involved a dispute between Ashqar (#5 on *The 1991 Palestine Committee List* and speaker at the *1993 Philadelphia Meeting*) and the HLF over a US fund-raising trip by Jamil Hammami (a senior leader in Hamas in the West

[58] Deposition of Nihad Awad on October 22, 2003, *Boim, et al. v. Quranic Literacy Institute*, et al., 1:17-cv-03591 (N.D. Ill.), pp. 57-60

[59] Government Exhibit Elbarasse Search-19, *United States v. Holy Land Foundation et al.*, 3:04-cr-240-G (N.D. Tex. 2008) ("HLF"), https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2025-02/Elbarasse_Search_19.pdf.

[60] Government Exhibit Elbarasse Search-19, *United States v. Holy Land Foundation et al.*, 3:04-cr-240-G (N.D. Tex. 2008) ("HLF"), https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2025-02/Elbarasse_Search_19.pdf.

[61] https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2025-02/Elbarasse_Search_19.pdf

Bank at the time).[62] Ashqar wanted the funds raised by Hammami to go to an educational initiative he had started, while the HLF wanted the proceeds. Ultimately, CAIR co-founder Omar Ahmad (# 13 on *The 1991 Palestine Committee List*) called for a meeting to resolve the dispute, and that call was wire-tapped by the FBI.[63] Weighing in on the discussion were Ismail Elbarasse (#3 on *The 1991 Palestine Committee List* and subject of the *Elbarasse Search)*, and various HLF and IAP leaders. The dispute was resolved in favor of the HLF after Hamas leader Mousa Abu Marzook (#1 on *The 1991 Palestine Committee List*) wrote a letter to the Palestine Committee ordering Ashqar to suspend his activity.[64]

Hamas is Designated

In 1994, in its efforts to derail the Oslo Accords, Hamas embarked upon a brutal suicide bombing campaign targeting civilians that lasted for years and resulted in the deaths of hundreds, including US citizens.

In 1995, Hamas and Marzook[65] were designated by the US government as Specially Designated Terrorists (SDTs), and Hamas was designated a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) in 1997. In 1995, Marzook was arrested in the U.S. pending extradition proceedings to Israel for the murders committed by Hamas. In CAIR's 1996 publication, *The Status of Muslim Civil Rights in the United States 1996: The Price of Ignorance*, they labeled Marzook's arrest as an instance of anti-Muslim bias.[66] This is one of the first cases of the typical dynamic seen today: CAIR framing as Islamophobia a clear counterterrorism measure that legally targets a senior Islamist militant.

The Israeli government ultimately withdrew its extradition request and the U.S. government deported Marzook to Jordan in 1997 where he joined other Hamas leaders like Khalid Mishal, the half-brother of IAP member/HLF fundraiser Mufid Abdulqader who was convicted in the 2008 HLF trial. The Hamas leadership, including Marzook and Mishal, were ousted from Jordan in 1999.[67] The HLF, IAP, UASR and CAIR continued operations in the United States.

Omar Abdel Rahman

CAIR did not limit its inaccurate framing of counterterrorism measures to the members of the Palestine Committee. In its 1996 publication referenced above, CAIR discussed Omar Abdel

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[62] Matthew Levitt, "*Shut Down Hamas,*" Baltimore Sun, Jan. 22, 2004, reprinted at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/shut-down-hamas. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/shut-down-hamas.

[63] Government Exhibit Shabib Wiretap-2, *United States v. Holy Land Foundation et al.*, 3:04-cr-240-G (N.D. Tex. 2008) ("HLF").

[64] Government Exhibit Ashqar Wiretap-4, *United States v. Holy Land Foundation et al.*, 3:04-cr-240-G (N.D. Tex. 2008) ("HLF").

[65] Marzook was subsequently designated as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) in 2003, https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20030821.

[66] American-Muslim Research Center- CAIR, *The Status of Muslim Civil Rights in the United States 1996: The Price of Ignorance*, 1996, https://www.cair.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/1996-The_Status_of_Muslim_Civil_Rights_in_the_United_States_1996.pdf

[67] "*Clamp Down on Hamas,"* Policy Watch #226, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (October 6, 1999).

Rahman's trial. CAIR's publication contained an article that implied Omar Abdel Rahman did not receive a fair trial because he was not allowed to call a religious scholar to testify in his defense and specifically stated:

> *"Lawyers defending Shaykh Omar Abdel Rahman complain that his trial was far from free and fair. One particularly troubling aspect of the trial was the judge's decision on July 7, 1995, to deny a request by the defense team to call experts in Islamic jurisprudence to testify. The judge's reasoning was that the trial was about terrorism, not about religion."*

Omar Abdel Rahman was indicted and convicted of various charges including seditious conspiracy relating to the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center as well as conspiracy to commit murder. Omar Abdel Rahman was identified in the case as the leader of the conspiracy whose purpose was "*jihad…against God's enemies.*"[68] Omar Abdel Rahman began his journey toward *jihad* by studying the works of Muslim Brotherhood leaders like Sayyid Qutb.[69] According to Andrew McCarthy(the government's prosecutor in Omar Abdel Rahman's case), by 1973, Omar Abdel Rahman was the leader of an Egyptian jihadist group called Gama'at Al-islamia, considered a "spinoff of the Muslim Brotherhood."[70] By the time he settled in the United States in 1990, he was advocating for *jihad* against the United States.[71]

CAIR's narrative about the nature of Omar Abdel Rahman's trial is a consistent theme that will be documented further herein. Omar Abdel Rahman was arrested in the summer of 1993 for his numerous deadly plots against US targets in America. Several months later, in the *1993 Philadelphia Meeting*, when discussing how "you could be destroyed by the media,"[72] CAIR co-founder Omar Ahmad lamented that Shiekh Omar Abdel Rahman was identified in the media before he was charged by the government in the terrorism case. Omar Ahmad stated, in part,

> *"…it was the media which accused him before he was legally charged…The media is overwhelming, that is. So, what I can say is that our problem at the [Islamic] Association [for Palestine]is the following…if you want the Americans, you lose the Muslims. If you address the Muslims, it means that you cannot reveal your address to the Americans…"* [73]

Another participant responded and said:

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[68] *United States v. Rahman*, 189 F.3d 88, 104 (2d Cir.1989).
[69] Andrew McCarthy, *"Omar Abdel Rahman, the 'Blind Sheikh,' Is Dead,"* National Review, February 18, 2017. https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/02/blind-sheikh-dies-terrorist-evangelist/
[70] Andrew McCarthy, *"Omar Abdel Rahman, the 'Blind Sheikh,' Is Dead,"* National Review February 18, 2017. https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/02/blind-sheikh-dies-terrorist-evangelist/
[71] Andrew McCarthy, *"Omar Abdel Rahman, the 'Blind Sheikh,' Is Dead,"* National Review February 18, 2017. https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/02/blind-sheikh-dies-terrorist-evangelist/
[72] Government Exhibit Philly Meeting 7, *United States v. Holy Land Foundation et al.*, 3:04-cr-240-G (N.D. Tex. 2008) ("HLF"), pages 4-6, https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2025-02/Philly%20Meeting%207.pdf.
[73] Government Exhibit Philly Meeting 7, *United States v. Holy Land Foundation et al.*, 3:04-cr-240-G (N.D. Tex. 2008) ("HLF"), pages 4-6, https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2025-02/Philly%20Meeting%207.pdf.

> *"I won't be naïve to the point of telling the Americans 'It is my right to enslave your daughter' and…like what Omar Abdel Rahman did in Detroit and said that 'America will be a plunder for us.' His words are correct…"*

The participants in the *1993 Philadelphia Meeting* then laughed as seen in the transcript below:

> Om: But, you still cannot show the legal position to the Americans...UI.
>
> UM1: No, my brother. There are things I can warn against such as... I won't be naive to the point of telling the American "It is my right to enslave your daughter and...", like what Omar Abdel Rahman did in Detroit and said that "America will be a plunder for us". His words are correct [*Laughter and UI brief group comments*]. No, really. It was wrong.

The meeting participants continued to discuss Omar Abdel Rahman at various points, with one participant saying, "I mean we shouldn't mess up like Omar Abdel Rahman…", seemingly referencing his overt speech in support of violence and death against the United States, rather than his actual participation in violent plots and bombings.[74]

At no point in the discussion did the *1993 Philadelphia* meeting participants condemn the 1993 WTC bombing, nor the other crimes for which Omar Abdel Rahman would go on to be convicted.

The Continuation of the Conspiracy

Throughout the 1990s until late 2001, the HLF continued to provide support to the Hamas social infrastructure in Gaza and the West Bank, including schools where young children were radicalized to hate Jewish people and believe violence was the only solution.[75] The IAP continued its festivals and the publication of its newspaper which drove pro-Hamas propaganda.

CAIR expanded its operations by creating local chapters in various states. The first Texas - based chapter was co-founded by Ghassan Elashi[76], a leader of the HLF who was later convicted of various terrorism-related charges, including dealing illegally in the funds of SDT Marzook, as will be discussed herein.

During the HLF trial, two calls in 1999 were played for the jury. The calls involved CAIR co-founder Omar Ahmad (#13 on *The 1991 List*), who led the *1993 Philadelphia Meeting* and was

[74] Government Exhibit Philly Meeting 16, *United States v. Holy Land Foundation et al.*, 3:04-cr-240-G (N.D. Tex. 2008) ("HLF"), page 10, https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2025-06/philly_meeting_16.pdf
[75] Government Exhibit ICS Hebron 12; Testimony of Government Expert witness "Avi," *United States v. Holy Land Foundation et al.*, 3:04-cr-240-G (N.D. Tex. 2008) ("HLF"), https://extremism.gwu.edu/legal-documents.
[76] Council of American-Islamic Relations, Office of the Secretary of State of Texas, Articles of Incorporation, filed Sept. 29, 1998.

the Chairman of CAIR from 1994-2005.[77] During the calls, Ahmad, who had no official position within the HLF, directed HLF officers regarding HLF expenditures.[78]

These wire-taps demonstrated that a senior leader of an ostensibly independent civil rights organization, CAIR, was directing expenditures of a Hamas fundraising organization. In line with the Palestine Committee's stated agenda to deceive Americans, as stated during the Philadelphia Meeting ("War is deception"), Ahmad, during a May 2003 civil deposition, denied any role with the HLF.[79]

In 2000, the *Second Intifada* began with Hamas, PIJ and other terror groups launching a barrage of attacks against Israeli civilians.

The IAP's "Fourth Annual Conference" was held in November 2000 in the Chicago area and was entitled, "All Palestine is Sacred"[80] echoing the 1988 Hamas Charter which states, "The Islamic Resistance Movement believes that the land of Palestine is an Islamic Waqf consecrated for future Moslem generations until Judgement Day."[81] The flyer for the event noted the IAP board included Hasan Sabri (#15 on *The 1991 Palestine Committee List*), Rafeeq Jaber (a third co-founder of CAIR), Imad Sarsour (discussed herein), HLF Chicago leader Kifah Mustafa and others, while the Preparation Committee consisted of Jaber, Mustapha, Sarsour, and Osama Abuirshaid among others.

One of the HLF's overseas fundraisers was a man named Yousef Al Qaradawi[82], who was a popular Islamist leader and widely considered to be the spiritual guide for the Muslim Brotherhood, who advocated for the killing of Jews.[83] Qaradawi was a senior leader in the Union of Good[84], an entity designated as a Hamas front in November 2008.[85] Qaradawi died in 2022 but will be discussed further herein.

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[77] "CAIR Board Elects New Chairman," CAIR Press Release, May 19, 2005, https://www.cair.com/press_releases/cair-board-elects-new-chairman/

[78] See Government Exhibits Baker Wiretap-5, https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2026-06/baker_wiretap-5.pdf, and Baker Wiretap-33, https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2026-06/baker_wiretap-33.pdf, *United States v. Holy Land Foundation et al.*, 3:04-cr-240-G (N.D. Tex. 2008) ("HLF"). *See also* Burns Testimony, September 30, 2008, pp. 24-35, *United States v. Holy Land Foundation et al.*, 3:04-cr-240-G (N.D. Tex. 2008) ("HLF").

[79] Deposition of Omar Ahmad, *Boim, et al. v. Quranic Literacy, et al.*, 1:00-cv-02905 (N.D. Ill. May 27, 2003).

[80] https://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/438/iap-fourth-annual-convention-program.pdf

[81] Government Exhibit Hamas Charter 1, Article 11, *United States v. Holy Land Foundation et al.*, 3:04-cr-240-G (N.D. Tex. 2008) ("HLF").

[82] Government Exhibit HLF Search 87, *United States v. Holy Land Foundation et al.*, 3:04-cr-240-G (N.D. Tex. 2008) ("HLF").

[83] Testimony of Robert Miranda, *United States v. Holy Land Foundation et al.*, 3:04-cr-240-G (N.D. Tex. 2008) ("HLF"). See also Government Exhibit HLF Search 126.

[84] https://www.terrorism-info.org.il//Data/pdf/PDF1/FEB22_05_680981780.pdf

[85] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/hp1267

In 2001, the HLF was designated as an SDT for its support for Hamas.[86] CAIR and related groups denounced the designation and called on President Bush to "reconsider what we believe is an unjust and counterproductive move that can only damage America's credibility with Muslims in this country…"[87] Several weeks later, the IAP held its 5th Annual Convention in Chicago which featured a number of speakers including Ahmed Yousef (#6 on *The 1991 Palestine Committee List)*, Jamal Said (#10 on *The 1991 Palestine Committee List)*, Ziad Hamdan (#20 on *The 1991 Palestine Committee List)*, Osama Abuirshaid, Hatem Bazian, and others referenced herein.[88] Within a few years, Ahmed Yousef (#6 on the *1991 Palestine Committee List*) shuttered the UASR and moved to Gaza to advise Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh.[89] Haniyeh (now deceased) was designated as Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) in 2018 by the U.S. State Department.[90]

It should be noted that another Texas-based business, Infocom, was located across the street from the HLF and operated by the Elashi brothers whose cousin, Nadia, was married to Marzook. Some of the five Elashi brothers - Ghassan Elashi, Basman Elashi, Bayan Elashi, and Hazim Elashi,[91] - held positions at the HLF and IAP. Infocom had financial transactions with Marzook in violation of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). In 2001, Infocom was sanctioned by the Department of Commerce,[92] an action which CAIR and other related entities called the government's action an "anti-Muslim witch hunt."[93] The Elashi brothers were later charged and convicted of various terrorism-related crimes, including dealing in the property of SDT Marzook.[94]

The IAP continued to publish its Al-Zaytouna periodical wherein pro-Hamas articles painted the terror attacks of the *Second Intifada* as "the right of resistance," often highlighting Israeli military responses to the terror without acknowledging the terror that led to them. In one issue, an article was published highlighting that in the summer of 2003, CAIR witnessed a large number of university students who came to Washington, D.C. to train at CAIR in the areas of media and

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[86] "Shutting Down the Terrorist Financial Network," U.S. Department of the Treasury, December 4, 2001, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/po841

[87] "Freeze On Group's Assets Questioned by U.S. Muslims," IslamiCity, December 4, 2001, https://www.islamicity.org/1645/freeze-on-groups-assets-questioned-by-u-s-muslims-2/

[88] Islamic Association of Palestine (IAP) Flyer, "(IAP) 5th Annual Convention: American Muslims: A Bridge of Understanding & Cooperation," Chicago, 21-25 December 2001 Holiday Inn, O'Hare International," https://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/1114-iap-5th-annual-convention-chicago-2001.pdf

[89] Ahmed Yousef, Personal Info, https://all4palestine.org/ModelDetails.aspx?gid=14&mid=77738&lang=en#:~:text=Information,Palestinian%20Prime%20Minister%20Ismail%20Haniyeh, *archived at* https://archive.is/wip/rVeby.

[90] https://2017-2021.state.gov/state-department-terrorist-designations-of-ismail-haniyeh-harakat-al-sabireen-liwa-al-thawra-and-harakat-sawad-misr-hasm/

[91] Government Exhibit Demonstrative 6, *United States v. Holy Land Foundation et al.*, 3:04-cr-240-G (N.D. Tex. 2008) ("HLF"), https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2026-06/demonstrative_6_pdf.pdf.

[92] Infocom Corporation, https://www.opensanctions.org/entities/NK-E5cfzKNcsX7sAkbvbxzkcB/

[93] "Raid on Texas Business is 'Anti-Muslim' Witch Hunt say Muslim Leaders," IslamiCity, September 6, 2001, https://www.islamicity.org/1212/raid-on-texas-business-is-anti-muslim-witch-hunt-say-muslim-leaders/.

[94] "Brothers Found Guilty of Supporting Terrorism," Associated Press, April 14, 2005, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna7496068

politics,[95] echoing CAIR co-founder Nihad Awad's idea on bringing students for internships to further their agenda in *The 1993 Philadelphia Meeting.*[96]

During the same time period, civil litigation was filed in federal court in the matter of *Boim v. Quranic Literacy Institute, et al.*, wherein the HLF, IAP, UASR and others were sued for the Hamas murder of U.S. citizen David Boim in Israel in 1996.[97] In 2004, the court found the HLF and IAP, among others, liable for the death based on their Hamas support. The judgment exceeded $150 million. The IAP, located in Palos Hills, Illinois, closed its doors.[98]

In November 2008, a jury found the HLF and five of its officers guilty of conspiring to support HAMAS. The verdicts were affirmed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.[99] CAIR labeled the HLF verdicts as based on "fear-mongering."[100]

American Muslims for Palestine

By 2006, American Muslims for Palestine (AMP)[101] had emerged in Palos Hills, Illinois. AMP operates as a 501(c)(3) under the name AJP Educational Foundation.[102] AMP was founded by Hatem Bazian, a man credited with founding the first chapter of the Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP, discussed herein).[103] The Boim family filed a federal lawsuit against AMP and the Americans for Justice in Palestine Educational Foundation (AJP) alleging them to be the alter ego of the IAP, and the allegations survived a motion to dismiss by the defendants with the Court finding the amended complaint[104] set forth sufficient allegations to set forth a claim.[105] The case is set for trial in 2027.[106] The AMP was staffed with former IAP leaders to include Osama Abuirshaid (IAP/UASR), Rafeeq Jaber (IAP/CAIR), and Salah Sarsour (IAP).[107] According to congressional testimony, in 1998, Salah Sarsour's brother Jamil Sarsour was captured by the government of Israel for Hamas-related activities and confessed that his brother Salah Sarsour was

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[95] Al-Zaytounah, June 13, 2003
[96] Government Exhibit Philly Meeting 7, p. 16, *United States v. Holy Land Foundation et al.*, 3:04-cr-240-G (N.D. Tex. 2008) ("HLF"), https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2025-02/Philly%20Meeting%207.pdf
[97] Memorandum Opinion and Order, *Boim, et al. v. Quranic Literacy Institute, et al.*, 1:00-cv-02905 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 31, 2012), https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.ilnd.96451/gov.uscourts.ilnd.96451.883.0.pdf
[98] https://mlfa.org/united-we-stand/#:~:text=These%20organizations%20were%20drained%20financially,unable%20to%20prove%20this%20claim.
[99] *United States v. El-Mezain*, 664 F.3d 467, 486 (5th Cir. 2011).
[100] https://www.cair.com/press_releases/cair-says-hlf-verdict-based-on-fear-mongering/
[101] https://www.jns.org/judge-finds-evidence-linking-amp-to-hamas-supporters-for-lawsuit-to-proceed/
[102] https://www.ampalestine.org/about-amp
[103] https://canarymission.org/professor/Hatem_Bazian
[104] First Amended Complaint, *Boim, et al. v. American Muslims for Palestine et al.* 1:17-cv-03591 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 17, 2019), https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.ilnd.339873/gov.uscourts.ilnd.339873.179.0_2.pdf
[105] Notice of docket entry, *Boim, et al. v. American Muslims for Palestine et al.* 1:17-cv-03591 (N.D. Ill. June 30, 2026), https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.ilnd.339873/gov.uscourts.ilnd.339873.647.0.pdf..
[106] First Amended Complaint, *Boim, et al. v. Quranic Literacy Institute*, et al., 1:17-cv-03591 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 17, 2019), https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.ilnd.339873/gov.uscourts.ilnd.339873.179.0_2.pdf
[107] https://www.ampalestine.org/about-amp/our-team

involved in financing Hamas from the US.[108] On April 2, 2026, Salah Sarsour was detained for immigration violations. An official Department of Homeland Security press release stated that Salah Sarsour had previously been convicted in Israel of throwing Molotov cocktails at the Israeli army.[109] The press release also stated the following:

> "*Today, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced that U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), in conjunction with the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS), conducted a targeted operation in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, to arrest Salah Salem Sarsour, a criminal illegal alien from Jordan* ***suspected of funding terror organizations*** *and* ***lying on immigration forms."*** [110] (emphasis in original).

Osama Abuirshaid is the current Executive Director of AMP.[111] Abuirshaid, who operated the IAP's newspaper before the IAP closed and served as a research fellow with the UASR before it closed, has consistently propagated false narratives related to this network. In a film produced by Al Jazeera network about the HLF trial, Abuirshaid stated that the U.S. government "did not have a single American document condemning the Holy Land Foundation."[112] He further asserted, "the only evidence was Israeli and these documents were forged."[113] However, this false narrative is contradicted as the government admitted hundreds of documents, wiretaps, and videos that were seized from the HLF offices, the Infocom office, the *Elbarasse Search*, the *Ashqar Search*, as well as documents obtained from multiple U.S. financial institutions including NAIT (Listed in the *1988 Chart* and the *1991 Explanatory Memorandum*).

Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP) is a student organization that operates on U.S. campuses and purports to promote pro-Palestinian activism, but whose agenda appears aligned with pro-terror narratives that label terrorist acts as legitimate "resistance" and falsely label Israel as committing genocide. Their first chapter was reportedly created by AMP founder Hatem Bazian in the 1990s or early 2000s at UC Berkeley.[114] AMP helped found the National Students for Justice in Palestine (NSJP) in 2010, where, together, their pro-Hamas campus activism significantly escalated.[115] The

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[108] https://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/021202se.pdf
[109] https://www.dhs.gov/news/2026/04/02/dhs-law-enforcement-arrests-jordanian-national-previous-conviction-throwing-molotov
[110] "DHS Law Enforcement Arrests Jordanian National with Previous Conviction for Throwing a Molotov Cocktail at the Homes of Israeli Forces," Department of Homeland Security Press Release, April 2, 2026, https://www.dhs.gov/news/2026/04/02/dhs-law-enforcement-arrests-jordanian-national-previous-conviction-throwing-molotov
[111] https://www.ampalestine.org/about-amp
[112] https://www.aljazeera.com/video/al-jazeera-world/2016/10/5/the-holy-land-five
[113] https://www.aljazeera.com/video/al-jazeera-world/2016/10/5/the-holy-land-five
[114] The Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy (ISGAP), "National Students for Justice in Palestine: Antisemitism, Anti-Americanism, Violent Extremism and the Threat to North American Universities," 2024, p. 17, https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/SJP_Report.pdf . *See also* Alan Blinder, "Inside the Pro-Palestinian Group Protesting Across College Campuses," *New York Times*, Nov. 17, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/17/us/students-justice-palestine-campus-protests.html
[115] *See* https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounder/students-justice-palestine-sjp and https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounder/american-muslims-palestine-amp. *See also* The Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy (ISGAP), "National Students for Justice in Palestine: Antisemitism, Anti-

SJP/NSJP are not an official incorporated entity. Also in 2010, the AMP hosted a conference for SJP wherein campus activism was the topic and the recognition of the need "to engage other groups and form connections that will benefit the universal fight for justice and self-identity- tenets that are central to SJP's work."[116]

Post Conviction

Despite the HLF convictions in 2008, other elements of the network appeared to continue their activities in furtherance of the conspiracy. They hosted joint events that drove false narratives and subtly seeded pro-terror narratives in collaboration with other entities, some of whom have been designated as terror fronts. Some of those activities are discussed below.

In the late 2010s, CAIR hosted events and marches with groups like AMP. CAIR began to also partner with propaganda organizations aligned with the leftists/Marxist FTO Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) like Samidoun (now designated as an SDT for its role in supporting the PFLP).[117] In May 2021, CAIR, AMP, and Samidoun, among others, hosted a National March for Palestine in Washington D.C., where they called for sanctions against Israel.[118] In a City University of New York (CUNY) commencement speech, an SJP activist reportedly defended the HLF defendants as mere political prisoners and predicted the fall of not only Israel, but also of the United States.[119] In May 2023, an event was held in Brooklyn, New York, where participants advocated for "*Palestine will be free by any means necessary!,*" a reference to the annihilation of Israel through violence. That event was co-sponsored by AMP, SJP and other groups like Samidoun.[120]

With the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020, progress was made in establishing peace in the Middle East with several countries normalizing relations with Israel.[121] Hamas, however, vehemently opposed the Abraham Accords.[122] According to a report by the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), AMP's Abuirshaid appeared on Al Hilwar TV with other Muslim Brotherhood leaders for an interview in Arabic about those Accords and furthered narratives

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Americanism, Violent Extremism and the Threat to North American Universities," 2024, https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/SJP_Report.pdf

[116] https://web.archive.org/web/20110110054323/http://www.ampalestine.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1496:students-gather-at-amp-conference-to-network-organize-regional-activism-efforts-&catid=96:articles.

[117] *See e.g.*, https://www.cair.com/press_releases/cair-community-media-advisory-join-the-national-march-for-palestine-in-washington-d-c-on-saturday-may-29-sanctionisrael/

[118] https://www.cair.com/press_releases/cair-community-media-advisory-join-the-national-march-for-palestine-in-washington-d-c-on-saturday-may-29-sanctionisrael/

[119] https://www.memri.org/tv/sjp-activist-fatima-mohammed-cuny-law-school-commencement-speech-america-israel-empire-destruction

[120] https://www.memri.org/tv/brooklyn-nakba-day-rally-support-palestine-resistance-any-means-necessary

[121] Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), "Five Years On: Are the Abraham Accords Here to Stay?," INSS Insight No. 2035, September 16, 2025, https://www.inss.org.il/publication/abraham-accords-5-years/

[122] https://www.timesofisrael.com/four-years-on-abraham-accords-are-strained-by-gaza-war-but-prove-resilient/

consistent with those of Hamas.[123] Abuirshaid discussed how Hamas still sought the annihilation of Israel, even if it had to lie about that publicly in furtherance of its agenda. Abushaid (in Arabic) reportedly said the following:

> *Did Hamas talk about a two-state solution or did it not? We don't call it a two-state solution. We call it a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, but what does it mean? Am I supposed to accept that Hamas does not believe in Palestine from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea? Absolutely not! Hamas does believe in Palestine from the River to the Sea, but it has the principled position on the one hand and the political position on the other. The political position adapts with the constraints of reality, but it does not mean that Hamas has abandoned its principles*.[124]

Recent International Affiliations

International Union of Muslim Scholars

CAIR's Executive Director, Nihad Awad, traveled internationally and was identified through Arabic websites at meetings with the Qatar-based International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) between 2012 and at least 2022, and was received by IUMS Secretary General Ali Qaradaghi.[125] The IUMS was founded by now-deceased senior Muslim Brotherhood leader Yusuf Al-Qaradawi who led IUMS through 2018,[126] an unindicted co-conspirator in the HLF trial who was an HLF "overseas" fundraiser along with a number of Hamas leaders like Mahmud Zahar and Mohammed Siam.[127] In the early 2000s, Qaradawi issued *Fatwas* (religious rulings) calling for violent *jihad* against Jews and legitimized suicide bombings as acts of martyrdom.[128]

An archived internet site depicts a photograph of Nihad Awad on a panel with Qaradawi in a 2012 IUMS event.[129] The topic of the article was a Qatari company planning to spend a billion dollars on films telling the story of their prophet Muhammad in the best possible manner. Despite Nihad

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[123] MEMRI, "Muslim Brotherhood Intellectuals Debate Whether Hamas Should Be Untruthful About Its Goals When Addressing The West," De. 24, 2020. https://www.memri.org/tv/muslim-brotherhood-intellectuals-debate-hamas-untruthful-about-goals-talking-to-west, also posted at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AG4Iv7Q93EI

[124] MEMRI, "Muslim Brotherhood Intellectuals Debate Whether Hamas Should Be Untruthful About Its Goals When Addressing The West," January 5, 2021, Special Dispatch No. 9122, https://www.memri.org/tv/muslim-brotherhood-intellectuals-debate-hamas-untruthful-about-goals-talking-to-west, also posted at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AG4Iv7Q93EI

[125] https://iums.me/2484; https://alqaradaghi.com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B1%D9%87-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%BA%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A8%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%B6-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A/, https://iumsonline.org/ar/ContentDetails.aspx?ID=25105, (accessed August 3, 2026).

[126] Sergio Altuna, *Beyond Islamic Guidance: Qatar-based IUMS as an Agitator in the Israel-Hamas War*, George Washington University, Program on Extremism, December 2023, https://extremism.gwu.edu/beyond-islamic-guidance.

[127] Testimony of Robert Miranda, *United States v. Holy Land Foundation et al.*, 3:04-cr-240-G (N.D. Tex. 2008) ("HLF"). See also Government Exhibit HLF Search 126.

[128] https://www.arabnews.jp/en/middle-east/article_81246/

[129] https://archive.ph/KwaHx

Awad proclaiming to the American public that he opposes violence against all civilians, when Qaradawi died in 2022 (after he had issued *fatwas* authorizing suicide bombings and *jihad*), Nihad Awad posted a photograph of Qaradawi on X and said that Qaradawi was "the most influential contemporary Muslim scholar."[130]

In 2017, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates labeled the IUMS as a terrorist.[131]

Another prominent founder of the IUMS was (now deceased) Sheikh Abdul Majeed al-Zindani[132] who was designated as a terrorist by the U.S. government in February 2004 for his support for Al Qaeda and Usama bin Laden.[133] Abdl al Majid al-Zindani was also a board member of the designated Hamas front, the Union of Good,[134] of which the HLF was a part. A Facebook post, reportedly from Nihad Awad on the date of al-Zindani's death in 2024 said (in Arabic):

> *"The Muslim umma has lost one of its greatest figures and leaders with the passing of the esteemed scholar and activist, Sheikh Abdul Majeed al-Zindani, who dedicated his life to serving the Quran and elucidating its limitless miracles. He remained steadfast and resolute in the face of challenges, trials, pressures, and labels until he met his Lord. Condolences to his family, to Yemen, and to our umma.*[135]
>
> *We ask God, the most gracious, the most merciful, the most forgiving, to have mercy on him, forgive him, and reward him on behalf of the umma with the best of rewards."*

In the wake of the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel, the IUMS issued two *fatwas*, or religious rulings. One of those appeared aligned with Hamas' narrative that the October 7 atrocities were legitimate, and stated, in part:

> *"What the people of Gaza and Palestine are doing is a legitimate jihad that is obligatory for them…supporting the people of Gaza and Palestine is a legal duty for the people of Islam."*[136]

IUMS has additional ties to Hamas leadership, including now-deceased SDGT Ismail Haniyeh. In 2024, Haniyeh attended the IUMS's conference in Qatar entitled, "The Al-Aqsa Flood and the

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[130] http://archive.today/cRiaJ
[131] "Arab states blacklist Islamist groups, individuals in Qatar boycott," Reuters, November 22, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/world/arab-states-blacklist-islamist-groups-individuals-in-qatar-boycott-idUSKBN1DM2XJ/.
[132] International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS), "The Union extends its condolences on the passing of Sheikh Abdul-Majid bin Aziz Al-Zindani, April 23, 2024, https://web.archive.org/web/20250421114355/https://iumsonline.org/en/ContentDetails.aspx?ID=34989.
[133] "United States Designates bin Laden Loyalist," U.S. Department of the Treasury Press Release, February 24, 2004, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/js1190
[134] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/hp1267
[135] Nihad Awad Facebook post, April 23, 2024, https://archive.ph/JUXoy#
[136] Sergio Altuna, *Beyond Islamic Guidance: Qatar-based IUMS as an Agitator in the Israel-Hamas War*, George Washington University, Program on Extremism, December 2023, p. 11, https://extremism.gwu.edu/beyond-islamic-guidance.

Role of the Islamic Nation."[137] "Al-Aqsa Flood" is the name Hamas branded its October 7 atrocities.[138]

Notably, historical reports also reveal IUMS has ties to the original US-based Hamas and Muslim Brotherhood infrastructure. Arab media reports indicate Mohamed Akram (author of *The Explanatory Memorandum,* #2 on the *1991 List*, #2 on the *Palestine Section America* list along with Nihad Awad, and also on the *1988 Chart*) via his role as Secretary General of the "Jerusalem International Foundation" collaborated with Qaradawi and the IUMS as early as 2007.[139] Further Mohamed Akram appears to have been a signatory along with Qaradaghi on a 2020 *Fatwa* issued by IUMS "prohibiting peace and normalization with the occupiers of Al-Aqsa, Jeruslaem, and Palestine."[140] Other signatories on that *Fatwa* who were an opposition to the Abraham Accords (which Hamas vehemently opposed), included CAIR-affiliate Omar Shaheen.[141] Further, Mohamed Akram reportedly appeared in a November 2020 virtual conference with IUMS representatives entitled, "Jerusalem is a trust, normalization is treason," that featured SDGT Ismail Haniyeh.[142]

It is worth stating here that CAIR posts on its websites about "Urban Legends" and denies connections to the Muslim Brotherhood; likewise, the CAIR Texas chapter, co-founded by convicted Hamas supporter Ghassan Elashi, addresses *The Explanatory Memorandum* on its website as a document that "lays out one man's preposterous proposal for Islam in America."[143] The post goes on to state, "[*The Explanatory Memorandum*] appears to have been written as a plea to the Muslim Brotherhood leadership for action, by an author we know little about, Mohamed

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[137] https://iumsonline.org/ar/ContentDetails.aspx?ID=32131&

[138] https://palinfo.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/OurNarrative.pdf, archived at https://archive.is/74G1p. See also https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D9%88%D8%AB%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D8%AD%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%B7%D9%88%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B5-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84 https://www.aa.com.tr/ar/%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84/%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%83%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A8%D9%8B%D8%A7-%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%B6%D8%AD-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%AD%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%B7%D9%88%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%89/3115051

[139] https://palinfo.com/news/2009/09/08/235870/

[140] https://www.iumsonline.org/ar/ContentDetails.aspx?ID=12334 (accessed May 17, 2026).

[141] https://www.iumsonline.org/ar/ContentDetails.aspx?ID=12334 (accessed May 17, 2026).

[142] https://shehabnews.com/post/72288/%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%B3-%D8%A3%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D8%AE%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A3%D8%B6%D8%AE%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%A4%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B1-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%8A-%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B5%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%B3

[143] https://www.cairtx.org/about-us/dispelling-rumors-about-cair

Akram."[144] That "one man," Mohamed Akram, was a senior leader in the US Muslim Brotherhood, a leader in the US Muslim Brotherhood's Palestine Committee, on a list with CAIR co-founders Nihad Awad and Omar Ahmad entitled *Palestine Section America* found in a 1994 FBI cover search, and he continues his work through at least 2020 via collaboration with the IUMS, an entity with whom CAIR Executive Director Nihad Awad is affiliated.

In June 2026, another IUMS official, Mohammed Al-Sagheer, reportedly stated that "Anyone who demands that Hamas surrender its weapons is a traitor…" and called for Allah to destroy Trump, Netanyahu and all their supporters.[145]

Popular Conference for Palestinians Abroad

AMP's Executive Director Osama Abuirshaid has collaborated with the Popular Conference for Palestinians Abroad (PCPA) as discussed below. On January 21, 2026, the U.S. Treasury Department designated the PCPA, stating in part:[146]

> *The PCPA is also clandestinely acting on behalf of Hamas. As a front organization for Hamas, it operates in accordance with Hamas directives and was established and managed by operatives from Hamas's Bureau of International Relations, which at the time was led by* ***Mussa Abu Marzouk****…"*[147]
>
> *On April 19, 2018,* ***Ismail Haniyeh*** *signed a letter addressed to the Hamas Political Bureau that outline his guidance for how Hamas should take control over the Palestinian political process. One element of this plan was to escalate violence against Israel. The other was to boost Hamas's international outreach, with the PCPA identified as a core part of this strategy…The goal of the PCPA, and the reason behind Hamas's secret links to the organization, is for Hamas to clandestinely expand its political influence through a group that purportedly represents the interests of the Palestinian diaspora."*[Emphasis Added by Author.]

In the same announcement, the U.S. Treasury Department discussed Hamas leader Majeed Al-Zeer's role (listed in the document found in Ashqar's home- *Palestine Section/Outside America*) as a major figure in the Popular Conference for Palestinians Abroad (PCPA), and reiterated Al-Zeer's October 7, 2024 designation as a senior Hamas representative.[148]

Regarding Abuirshaid's collaboration with the PCPA, according to a website posting from 2020 that is no longer active, Abuirshaid participated in a PCPA conference in Turkey.[149] Arab media

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[144] https://www.cairtx.org/about-us/dispelling-rumors-about-cair
[145] https://www.memri.org/tv/turkey-mohammed-al-sagheer-destroy-trump-netanyahu-hamas-disarmament-traitors
[146] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0368
[147] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0368
[148] "Treasury Targets Significant International Hamas Fundraising Network," U.S. Department of the Treasury Press Release, October 7, 2024, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2632, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2632
[149] https://palabroad.org/ar/post/Z4G6?utm (accessed circa 2025).

sources indicate the Istanbul conference opened under the title "أولويات القضية الفلسطينية في المرحلة القادمة ودور فلسطينيي الخارج المنشود" ("The Priorities of the Palestinian Cause in the Coming Phase and the Desired Role of Palestinians Abroad") and identified Majeed al-Zeer as "القائم بأعمال رئيس الهيئة العامة للمؤتمر الشعبي لفلسطينيي الخارج" ("acting head of the general assembly of the Popular Conference for Palestinians Abroad").[150]

This conference was hosted by the Center for Islam and Global Affairs (CIGA), an entity directed by Sami Al-Arian[151] who was convicted of conspiring to provide support to the FTO Palestinian Islamic Jihad[152] before he was deported to Turkey. At least one other website of unknown reliability reported Al-Zeer spoke along with Sami Al Arian at this PCPA conference wherein one of the topics was reportedly: "Leaving the Oslo Accords and calling for their termination, and supporting popular resistance…and affirmation of the Palestinian people's right to resist."[153]

A now-removed photograph that was posted on the PCPA website showed Abuirshaid at the 2020 PCPA conference, next to a man who bears a striking resemblance (but unconfirmed) to the now-designated terrorist Majeed Al-Zeer.[154]

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[150] https://palinfo.com/news/2020/10/31/183358/ , https://www.aa.com.tr/ar/%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A/%D9%81%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B7%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AC-%D9%8A%D8%AC%D8%AF%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%87%D9%8A%D9%83%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B8%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1/1924951

[151] https://www.izu.edu.tr/en/ciga/about-us/director's-message

[152] "Sami Al-Arian Pleads Guilty To Conspiracy To Provide Services To Palestinian Islamic Jihad," U.S. Department of Justice, April 17, 2006, https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2006/April/06_crm_221.html

[153] https://www.odabasham.net/%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A9/118526-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A4%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%84%D9%81%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B7%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AC-901

[154] https://palabroad.org/ar (accessed May 15, 2026).



Screenshot from https://palabroad.org/ar

Further, as of 2025, the PCPA website hosted several articles by Abuirshaid, but the link is no longer active.[155]

Archived social media also indicates Abuirshaid had previously attended CIGA events. On his own Facebook account from a February 2020 post(archived), Abuirshaid stated in Arabic, "my joy will be amplified when we reclaim our national project from those who thwarted it, and my joy will be complete with the liberation of Palestine, its land and its people."[156] According to the post, he was returning from participating in a CIGA conference in Istanbul.

Further, one CAIR official recently participated in an international conference wherein Majeed Al-Zeer spoke. In October 2025, CAIR Ohio leader, Khalid Turaani, participated in a virtual conference hosted by the al-Zaytouna Center in Beirut entitled, "Palestinians Abroad and Regional

[155] https://palabroad.org/ar/author/Osama-abo-arshyd (access circa 2025).
[156] Osama Abulrshaid [note alternate spelling] Facebook post, February 4, 2020, https://archive.ph/gMuQG#selection-437.1-1540.0

and International Strategic Transformations in the Light of Al-Aqsa Flood."[157] As previously stated, Hamas branded its October 7 massacre as "Al-Aqsa Flood." The conference appeared to be a strategy session for Palestinians in the diaspora in light of the Hamas attacks. Another participant in that conference was the now-designated Majeed al-Zeer.[158] When questioned about his participation, Turaani told *The Free Press* that he had "'never participated in any panels' with al-Zaar or interacted with him…'"[159]

Post October 7, 2023

On October 7, 2023, Hamas conducted a massacre when it invaded Israel, killing approximately 1,200 people and taking over 250 people hostage. Actions taken by CAIR, AMP, SJP and others in the wake of that attack have included the reframing of the atrocities as legitimate resistance and/or, as acts of self-defense, consistent with senior Hamas leaders' messaging. For example, in October 2025, according to an Arabic media interview capture by MEMRI, Marzook publicly stated Hamas is not a terror organization and merely a "national liberation movement."[160] Likewise, Hamas leader Khaled Mishal, the half-brother of convicted HLF defendant Mufid Abdulqader (IAP/HLF), refers to Hamas violent operations as "resistance."[161]

Within days, the SJP published a graphic, detailed manual entitled "Resistance Toolkit"[162] wherein it characterized the Hamas atrocities as mere "resistance" and swore to bring the resistance to US college campuses.[163]

In November 2023, Nihad Awad gave a speech wherein he appeared to frame the massacre as an act of self-defense and said he was "happy" to see people "break the siege."[164] After the White House condemned the statements, Nihad Awad reportedly said his statements were "taken out of

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[157] Lahav Harkov, "CAIR-Ohio Leader Moderated Event Featuring Designated Terrorist," *Jewish Insider*, October 27, 2025, https://jewishinsider.com/2025/10/cair-hamas-member-majed-al-zeer-web-conference-speakers/

[158] "Treasury Targets Significant International Hamas Fundraising Network," U.S. Department of the Treasury Press Release, October 7, 2024, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2632

[159] Maya Sulkin, "CAIR Official Joins Hamas Leader at 'Al-Aqsa Flood' Event," *The Free Press*, Oct. 28, 2025, https://www.thefp.com/p/cair-official-joins-hamas-leader-al-aqsa-flood-event

[160] https://www.memri.org/tv/mousa-abu-marzouk-trump-gaza-plan-hostages-terror-free

[161] Hamas leader rejects disarmament while Israeli occupation of Gaza continues, Al Jazeera (February 2026), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/2/8/hamas-leader-rejects-disarmament-while-israeli-occupation-of-gaza-continues

[162] "Day of Resistance Toolkit," Exhibit A to the Complaint, *Parizer v. AJP Educational Foundation Inc*. 1:24-cv-00724 (E.D. Va. May 1, 2024) https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.vaed.553122/gov.uscourts.vaed.553122.1.1_1.pdf

[163] ADL Center on Extremism, "Students for Justice in Palestine Endorses Terrorism and 'Dismantling Zionism;' Plans Day of Resistance," Oct. 9, 2023, https://www.adl.org/resources/article/students-justice-palestine-endorses-terrorism-and-dismantling-zionism-plans-day

[164] https://www.memri.org/reports/cair-executive-director-nihad-awad-american-muslims-palestine-amp-convention-i-was-happy-see

context."[165] This reframing of Hamas terror attacks is consistent with Hamas' agenda to legitimize its atrocities.

In April 2024, AMP Executive Director[166] and former IAP leader Osama Abuirshaid (of IAP, UASR, AMP) led a fiery speech in a campus protest where he stated, "We will take back these colleges as we will take back America, as we will take back Palestine, as we will take back our humanity."[167]

In July 2024, Hamas leader SDGT Ismail Haniyeh was killed in Tehran, Iran.[168] Haniyeh was head of the Hamas Political Bureau when Hamas committed the October 7 attack. CAIR San Francisco leader Zahra Billoo reportedly lauded Haniyeh as a martyr and said, "Never say that those martyred in the cause of Allah are dead- in fact, they are alive…Tonight, we mourn Ismail himself but know his martyrdom is not in vain. From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free."[169] Billoo's narrative painting Haniyeh as a hero and not a terrorist responsible for the murder of 1200 people mirrored the propaganda disseminated by Hamas wherein they referred to Haniyeh as a martyr and said, "…and do not think that those who are killed in the way of God are dead. Rather, they are alive…"[170] Hamas further stated Haniyeh's "blood will not be shed in vain but will illuminate the path to liberation."[171]

CAIR and AMP have continued to co-sponsor and participate jointly in anti-Israel events wherein narratives are often twisted, and CAIR has condemned actions taken against "pro-Palestine voices" [SJP members] who violated the law and/or university codes of conduct, characterizing those universities' actions as Islamophobia.[172] Further, CAIR has financially sponsored certain SJP members who violated campus codes of conduct, claiming the students were merely "targeted for their pro-Palestinian advocacy."[173]

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[165] Peter Baker, "White House Disavows Islamic Group After Oct 7 Remarks," *New York Times*, Dec. 8, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/08/us/politics/white-house-cair-nihad-awad.html

[166] https://www.ampalestine.org/about-amp/our-team

[167] https://www.memri.org/tv/executive-director-american-muslims-palestine-osama-abuirshaid-george-washington-university-encampment-change-america-zionism-removed

[168] "Israel Confirms it Killed Hamas leader Haniyeh in Tehran," BBC, December 23, 2024. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0ewr870z23o

[169] "CAIR Leader Mourns Hamas Head Haniyeh: 'His Martyrdom is Not in Vain," *Washington Free Beacon* (July 31, 2024), https://freebeacon.com/israel/cair-leader-mourns-hamas-head-haniyeh-his-martyrdom-is-not-in-vain/.

[170] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/7/31/read-hamass-statement-on-the-killing-of-ismail-haniyeh-in-iran

[171] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/7/31/read-hamass-statement-on-the-killing-of-ismail-haniyeh-in-iran

[172] *See e.g.*,https://www.cair.com/press_releases/cairs-maryland-office-amp-to-hold-emergency-ceasefirenow-protests-for-gaza-at-offices-of-md-elected-officials/ and https://www.cair.com/press_releases/cair-designates-uc-irvine-as-a-hostile-campus-over-retaliation-against-pro-palestinian-anti-genocide-students-and-faculty/

[173] https://www.cair.com/press_releases/cair-acc-announce-new-fund-to-help-students-targeted-for-palestine-advocacy-on-college-campuses/; https://www.cair.com/press_releases/palestine-legal-cair-announce-historic-100k-settlement-from-u-of-maryland-for-unlawfully-suppressing-pro-palestinian-student-speech/

CAIR has also begun publishing a "Hostile Campus" report, labeling various US universities as "targeting anti-genocide voices."[174]

Washington Trust Foundation

Notably, on November 18, 2025, the State of Texas issued a proclamation designating CAIR as a foreign terrorist organization and in December 2025, the State of Florida also designated CAIR as a foreign terrorist organization. CAIR has brought lawsuits challenging both designations. While those designations and surrounding litigation are not the topic of this research product, a series of events involving CAIR and it's alter-ego is noteworthy. To understand these events, it is necessary to understand CAIR's various name changes.

As stated herein, CAIR was incorporated in September 1994 in Washington, D.C. under the name Council on American Islamic Relations, Inc. (D.C entity number 942995). According to D.C. filings, CAIR (D.C. entity number 942995) changed its name to "Council on American-Islamic Relations Action Network" in June 2007 but continued operating under the same business entity number, and then changed its name again to the Washington Trust Foundation (WTF) in 2013. WTF has held 501(c)3 status since August 2014 under EIN: 52-1887951, but continues operating under the original Washington, D.C. based entity (D.C entity number 942995) that began as CAIR. Meanwhile, CAIR leaders incorporated CAIR-Foundation in 2005 (D.C. entity number 250484), months after the original HLF indictments were made public. WTF's stated purpose was to support "the charitable purposed of CAIR-Foundation, Inc.[175] Across both Washington, D.C. business entities, CAIR leader Nihad Awad (aka Nehad Hammad) is a principal officer[176] and CAIR's general counsel Lena Masri[177] is WTF's registered agent.[178]

It appears CAIR may have begun to move assets after learning of the designations, and this move involved WTF and another company created by CAIR officials earlier in 2025 named Sage Foundation. In its incorporation documents, Sage Foundation says its purpose is to support CAIR-Foundation, Inc.[179] On December 23, 2025, just weeks after the Florida designation, WTF transferred the deed to CAIR's headquarters office in Washington, D.C. to Sage Foundation. Then, in February 2026, Sage Foundation transferred 45% interest in CAIR's headquarters to NAIT (listed in the *1988 Chart* and the *Explanatory Memorandum* and identified as an HLF co-conspirator/joint venturer at the HLF trial).

Specifically, at 11:27 on the morning of February 13, 2026, a deed was recorded. It handed an undivided 45% of 453 New Jersey Avenue SE, the national headquarters of the Council on American-Islamic Relations, to the North American Islamic Trust for $4,000,000. The seller was

[174] https://www.cair.com/press_releases/community-advisory-cair-launches-hostile-campuses-webpage-highlighting-campuses-known-for-targeting-anti-genocide-voices/
[175] https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/display_990/521887951/2014_12_EO%2F52-1887951_990_201312
[176] https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/521887951/202513159349304086/full
[177] https://corponline.dlcp.dc.gov/homepage/business-info
[178] https://corponline.dlcp.dc.gov/homepage/business-info
[179] blob:https://corponline.dlcp.dc.gov/f93b037d-53eb-4b05-92b7-d929811dcdc6

a nonprofit called Sage Foundation, and the man who signed for it was Eyas Abdeen.[180] Each name in that sentence connects back to CAIR. Abdeen is CAIR Foundation's treasurer, and a board member since 2021.[181] Sage Foundation was eight months old on the day of the sale: incorporated by Abdeen, Sage's registered agent is CAIR's general counsel Lena Masri, Sage's address is the headquarters building itself, and it is already listed by the District of Columbia's corporate registry as "Active, Not in Good Standing" for missing its first biennial report.[182] Sage had held the building for only seven weeks at the time of the transfer. It took title on December 23, 2025 from WTF.[183] Meaning, CAIR began the process of moving this valuable asset within weeks of the Florida designation.

A review of CAIR's website did not reveal any type of announcement regarding this significant asset transfer which begs the question of whether they were transparent with their donors.[184]

Conspiracy-Generally

The recent activities of CAIR and the AMP, discussed above, are consistent with the goals set forth by the original elements of this network in the *1993 Philadelphia Meeting* and indicate the conspiracy is on-going.

A criminal conspiracy is an agreement between two or more people to do something that is against the law.[185] [186] The agreement does not need to be formalized in writing, or even stated orally, as

[180]Special Warranty Deed, made February 3, 2026, recorded February 13, 2026, 11:27 a.m., Instrument No. 2026014277, D.C. Recorder of Deeds. Grantor: Sage Foundation. Grantees, as tenants in common: The North American Islamic Trust, Inc. (Illinois not-for-profit), undivided 45%; Sage Foundation, undivided 55%. Consideration $4,000,000.00. Property: Lot 83, Square 693 (453 New Jersey Ave SE / 50 E Street SE). Title agent: Mode Title, LLC. Copy on file; reproduced at Exhibit G. Signature page at Exhibit I.

[181] Eyas Abdeen executed the deed as "Treasurer" of Sage Foundation (Exhibit I); the same Eyas Abdeen is Treasurer of CAIR Foundation per its FY2023 and FY2024 Forms 990, a board member since 2021. ProPublica Nonprofit Explorer, CAIR Foundation Inc, EIN 77-0646756: Cair Foundation Inc - Nonprofit Explorer - ProPublica

[182] D.C. Department of Licensing and Consumer Protection, CorpOnline, entity record for SAGE Foundation, Initial File No. N00008421502 (retrieved June 10, 2026): filed May 13, 2025; address 50 E Street SE (the headquarters); incorporator Eyas Abdeen, 120 E. Broad St., Unit A, Falls Church, VA; registered agent Lena F. Masri, email Lmasri@cair.com, 453 New Jersey Ave SE; beneficial owner Malik Conn; status Active, Not in Good Standing (biennial report due Apr. 1, 2026, unfiled). Exhibit K. https://corponline.dlcp.dc.gov/

[183] Deed, Washington Trust Foundation, Inc. (grantor) to Sage Foundation (grantee), recorded December 23, 2025 as Instrument No. 2025124502, D.C. Recorder of Deeds; Square 693, Lot 83. Copy on file; reproduced at Exhibit H. Live index: Official Records Search

[184] CAIR Foundation FY2024 Form 990: revenue $9,379,629; contributions $8,758,688 (93.4%). ProPublica: Cair Foundation Inc - Nonprofit Explorer - ProPublica. No announcement of the headquarters transactions appears on CAIR's site or in its public materials as of June 10, 2026.

[185] "The essence of conspiracy is 'the combination of minds in an unlawful purpose.'" *Smith v. United States*, 568 U.S. 106, 110, (2013).

[186] "Conspiracy, in the modern law, is generally defined as a confederacy of two or more persons to accomplish some unlawful purpose" *Ocasio v. United States*, 578 U.S. 282, 287 (2016).

long as there is an understanding.[187] Depending on the nature of the conspiracy, an overt act taken by a conspirator to advance the conspiracy, may be required.[188] For terrorism conspiracies, however, such an act is not required for the criminal conspiracy to exist.[189]

In order to determine whether a conspiracy exists, and whether a specific person is a member of the conspiracy, law enforcement will often look at the statements and acts of the conspirators; whether the actions are in concert and/or the statements are directed to a common goal.[190] Not every conspirator has to commit every act of the conspiracy, [191] nor does the underlying criminal purpose need to be achieved. In other words, a bank does not have to be robbed in order for there to be a conspiracy to rob a bank.

Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, statements made by a conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy can be admitted as evidence at a trial against all the conspirators.[192] To be clear, members of a conspiracy are not criminally charged for their protected speech but instead are charged for their acts. But, as in the Miranda warnings, anything they say can be used against them.[193]

A conspirator will always be a member of a conspiracy,[194] and responsible for the acts of the other conspirators that were done in furtherance of the conspiracy, even if the member joins the conspiracy after it started.[195] In order to no longer be a member of a conspiracy a member must take affirmative steps to withdraw.[196]

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[187] "A conspiracy need not be shown by proof of an explicit agreement but can be established by showing that the parties have a tacit understanding to carry out the prohibited conduct." *United States v. Svoboda*, 347 F.3d 471, 477 (2d Cir. 2003); see also *United States v. Cooper*, No. 22-2709-CR, 2024 WL 4533335, at *2 (2d Cir. Oct. 21, 2024).
[188] Title 18, United States Code, Section 371; Section 5.08(A) Conspiracy - Overt Act Required. Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions (2023).
[189] Title 18, United States Code, Section 2339B.
[190] "In other words, Abdulqader's speech may have been protected prior to Hamas's designation as a terrorist organization, but it became relevant to proving whether he joined the conspiracy that began after the designation. By instructing the jury to consider the intent of the speech as alleged in the indictment, the charge merely permitted the jury to determine whether the Government's theory of the case was correct and did not permit conviction based solely on speech." *United States v. El-Mezain*, 664 F.3d 467, 538 (5th Cir. 2011), *as revised* (Dec. 27, 2011).
[191] "The government does not have to prove that the defendant intended to commit the underlying offense himself/herself." Instead, '[i]f conspirators have a plan which calls for some conspirators to perpetrate the crime and others to provide support, the supporters are as guilty as the perpetrators.'" *Ocasio v. United States*, 578 U.S. 282, 288 (2016) (citations omitted).
[192] Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/fre/rule_801.
[193] "It is well established under First Amendment principles that there is no prohibition on 'the evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements of a crime or to prove motive or intent.'" *United States v. El-Mezain*, 664 F.3d 467, 537 (5th Cir. 2011), *as revised* (Dec. 27, 2011), *citing Wisconsin v. Mitchell*, 508 U.S. 476, 489 (1993).
[194] "Upon joining a criminal conspiracy, a defendant's membership in the ongoing unlawful scheme continues until he withdraws." *Smith v. United States*, 568 U.S. 106, 107 (2013).
[195] "Since conspiracy is a continuing offense, a defendant who has joined a conspiracy continues to violate the law 'through every moment of [the conspiracy's] existence,' and he becomes responsible for the acts of his co-conspirators in pursuit of their common plot. Withdrawal terminates the defendant's liability for post withdrawal acts of his co-conspirators, but he remains guilty of conspiracy." *Id* at 111. (citations omitted).
[196] "[T]o avert a continuing criminality" there must be "affirmative action ... to disavow or defeat the purpose" of the conspiracy." *Id.* at 113.

There are, however, some instances where conspirators can be charged for their speech, as not all speech is protected by the First Amendment. Some speech that is designed to cause harm, either emotional or physical, such as incitement, is not protected.[197] An individual cannot scream fire in a crowded movie theatre because of the panic it would cause. A person cannot make a threat online to kill someone else because of the emotional trauma to the victim.[198] And people cannot use speech, in whatever form, to provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization if done so at the direction or control of, or in collaboration with, the terrorist organization.[199]

Conclusion

The 2008 conviction of the Holy Land Foundation (HLF) and its officials exposed a broader, long-running network in the United States tied to Hamas through individuals and organizations associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. Evidence presented at the HLF trial, including documents seized in FBI investigations, outlined a structured "Palestine Committee" originally made up of groups such as HLF, the IAP, and the UASR, which worked together to provide financial, media, and political support to Hamas. The agenda of the Palestine Committee was to support Hamas.

In the *1993 Philadelphia Meeting*, a conspiratorial meeting that was captured on FBI wiretap, members of the Palestine Committee defined the scope of the conspiracy, and it was out of that conspiratorial meeting that CAIR was created to protect the other elements of the network. That network has evolved since 1993, but elements of that network appear to be continuing the conspiracy and committing acts in furtherance thereof. Each organization and individual within this conspiracy has/had their own role. The HLF's role in this conspiracy, before it was designated as a terror front, was to send money to Gaza and the West Bank to support the Hamas radicalization of society. The IAP's role was to disseminate Hamas propaganda. CAIR's role in the conspiracy was to defend and protect the other elements of the network and to pressure others to adopt its narratives or remain quiet.

Regarding the last point, in the *1993 Philadelphia Meeting*, this network in effect plotted to silence the free speech of those who disagreed with them via intimidation. Specifically, in a discussion between CAIR co-founders Nihad Awad and Omar Ahmad, as well as others, Omar Ahmad stated they must "pressure" others to adopt their narratives or "remain neutral." The pressure tactics

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[197] "[T]he First Amendment precludes punishment, whether civil or criminal, unless the speaker's words were "intended" (not just likely) to produce imminent disorder." *Counterman v. Colorado*, 600 U.S. 66, 76 (2023).

[198] Title 18, United States Code, Section 875(c).

[199] "[S]peech itself may be criminal under certain circumstances. As relevant to the case at bar, for example, the Supreme Court recently upheld § 2339B in an as applied First Amendment challenge, holding that Congress could criminalize speech that provides material support to designated terrorists. *See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,* 561 U.S. 1, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2724, 177 L.Ed.2d 355 (2010) (stating that Congress could 'prohibit what plaintiffs want to do—provide material support to [the designated terrorist organizations] in the form of speech'). The Court held that § 2339B is not limited to prohibiting monetary support of terrorists, and the statute is tailored to reach only material support 'coordinated with or under the direction of a designated foreign terrorist organization.'" *Id.* at 2726. *United States v. El-Mezain*, 664 F.3d 467, 537 (5th Cir. 2011), *as revised* (Dec. 27, 2011).

are still in play today. CAIR and other elements of this network appear to have continued their acts in furtherance of the conspiratorial agenda. Their conduct since October 7, 2023, further suggests that they have not withdrawn from the conspiracy.

For decades, narratives have been intentionally seeded into public discourse that portray terrorist organizations as resistance movements, excuse acts of violence, and intimidate critics into silence. On college campuses, in activist spaces, and across social media, slogans and rhetoric that once existed on the fringes have become normalized. And too often, people who raise concerns are immediately labeled hateful, intolerant, or extremist themselves.

But free societies cannot function when intimidation replaces debate.

The First Amendment protects speech. It protects dissent. It protects protest. But it does not protect material support for terrorism. It does not protect criminal conspiracies. And it does not require Americans to ignore evidence introduced in federal court simply because that evidence is politically uncomfortable.

Policy Considerations

Federal Enforcement Entities

Recommend the FBI/IRS/DOJ institute criminal investigations into referenced organizations and individuals with a focus on:

a. Violations of the Foreign Agent Registration Act (FARA).
b. Violations of 18 USC §2239B, which criminalizes the provision of material support to an FTO.
c. Tax Evasion/ Tax Fraud.
d. Violations of the Racketeering Influence and Corruption Act (RICO).

Recommend IRS/DHS/DOJ institute civil/administrative investigations and proceedings for:

a. Violations of 501(c)3 requirements.
b. Violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
c. Civil/administrative audits.

Federal Legislation:

a. Enhance transparency in reporting for 501(c) 3 tax exempt organizations, with specific focus on requirements to identify foreign donors.
b. Enhance regulatory and enforcement authority for violations of 501(c) 3 requirements.
c. Update federal laws regarding the provision of material support to an FTO, specifically articulating when speech constitutes a “service” to an FTO in line with the opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project.

d. Update federal laws establishing mandatory minimum sentences for terrorism-related convictions.
e. Require K-12 schools to report foreign funding and transparency.

State Agencies:

a. Enact legislation requiring K-12 schools report foreign funding and ensure state agencies have corresponding investigative and enforcement authorities.
b. Enact legislation requiring individuals and entities register with the state if they are doing political, lobbying, public relations, or educational activities on behalf of a foreign government, a foreign entity, and/or a foreign individual.
c. Enhance reporting requirements for entities who operate within a state and receive tax benefits, state vouchers, or other state benefits.
d. Enact legislation that requires K-12 curriculum to be void of language that advocates for violence against a protected class.

Exhibit 17

Hidden in Plain Sight: Confronting the Muslim Brotherhood Network in America

Written Testimony of

Arielle F. Klepach

Senior Litigation Counsel, National Jewish Advocacy Center

Committee on the Judiciary

U.S. Senate

August 5, 2026

Chairman Grassley, Ranking Member Durbin, esteemed members of the Committee:

Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the topic of confronting the Muslim Brotherhood Network in America.

I. Introduction

The Muslim Brotherhood told us who they are and what they wish to achieve. We did not believe them.

The Muslim Brotherhood (*Ikhwan al-Muslimeen*) ("MB" or "the Brotherhood") is the world's "oldest and arguably most influential contemporary Islamist movement."[1] The Brotherhood's core tenet "views Islam as a complete and all-embracing system, governing all aspects of private and public life."[2] The Brotherhood seeks a bottom-up, gradual Islamization of society with the objective of forming a purely Islamic society and political entity.[3] The Brotherhood states its program in its own motto. "Allah is our objective; the Prophet is our leader; the Quran is our law; jihad is our way; dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope."[4] What that program means in practice appears in the words of Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the Brotherhood's

[1] Lorenzo Vidino, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Austria*, GW Program on Extremism (Aug. 1, 2017), https://extremism.gwu.edu/muslim-brotherhood-austria; see also Lorenzo Vidino, *The Hamas Networks in America: A Short History*, GW Program on Extremism (Oct. 2023), https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2023-10/hamas-networks-final.pdf.
[2] Vidino, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Austria*, supra.
[3] Vidino, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Austria*, supra.
[4] Ayaan Hirsi Ali, *The Quran Is Our Law; Jihad Is Our Way*, Wall St. J. (Feb. 18, 2011), reprinted at American Enterprise Institute, https://www.aei.org/articles/the-quran-is-our-law-jihad-is-our-way/ (quoting the Muslim Brotherhood's motto in full).

unofficial chief ideologue, who told a Muslim Arab Youth Association conference in Toledo, Ohio, in 1995 that Muslims "shall continue to fight the Jews … until the Muslims will kill them," who ruled that "martyrdom operations" against Israelis are "not in any way included in the framework of prohibited terrorism, even if the victims include some civilians," and who in 2009 called Hitler's murder of European Jews a "divine punishment" whose "next time will be at the hand of the believers."[5] Brotherhood positions on religious freedom, women's rights, and gay rights follow from the same premise.[6] The freedoms the Brotherhood's American affiliates invoke to shield themselves are the first freedoms that program abolishes.

In 1991, the Muslim Brotherhood's leadership described its work in North America as "a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within."[7] The FBI later seized that document from a senior operative's home in Virginia.[8]

Thirty-five years later, the state of the nation shows the Brotherhood is largely succeeding in its objective of infiltrating American society from within. Its named affiliates, including mosques, schools, civil-rights groups, student organizations, and legal nonprofits, are now endemic to American civic life and are the cornerstones of the Brotherhood's deliberate political strategy for the gradual establishment of Islamic governance, or *sharia*, in the West.

To grasp how deeply the Brotherhood has embedded itself here, and how it has consistently evaded legal scrutiny, this Committee must understand the tactics it employs.

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[5] Counter Extremism Project, "Yusuf al-Qaradawi," https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/yusuf-al-qaradawi (last visited July 30, 2026) (compiling al-Qaradawi's recorded statements and the underlying primary sources, including his 1995 remarks at a Muslim Arab Youth Association conference in Toledo, Ohio, his July 2003 statement on "martyrdom operations," and his January 30, 2009 statement on Hitler); "Al-Qaradhawi Speaks In Favor of Suicide Operations at an Islamic Conference in Sweden," MEMRI (July 24, 2003), https://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/914.htm; "Sheikh Yousuf Al-Qaradhawi: Allah Imposed Hitler On the Jews to Punish Them," MEMRI (Feb. 3, 2009), https://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/802/3062.htm.

[6] Vidino, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Austria*, supra (Brotherhood "positions on religious freedom, women rights, and gay rights are similarly problematic and at odds with European values").

[7] Mohamed Akram, An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America May 19, 1991, page 21, Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America. Government Exhibit 003-0085, *U.S. v. HLF*, No. 3:04-CR-240-G. United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, 2008. Available at https://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/20/an-explanatory-memorandum-on-the-general.pdf.

[8] John Rossomando, *'Explanatory Memorandum' Detractors Ignore Evidence About MB in America*, Middle East F. (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.meforum.org/islamist-watch/explanatory-memorandum-detractors-ignore-evidence.

Hamas, by the terms of its own 1988 Charter, is the Brotherhood's branch in the Palestinian territories.[9] Founding documents from the U.S. Hamas support infrastructure show that a linchpin of the network's strategy rests on the manipulation of the freedoms Americans enjoy. A Brotherhood internal document known as "The Project" directs adherents to penetrate existing institutions, build coalitions with sympathetic actors, and use the guise of civil rights and liberal democracy to shield their activities from scrutiny.[10]

It is therefore unsurprising that, in nearly every instance, MB-affiliated entities respond to legal scrutiny by invoking the First Amendment. A closer look at their nationwide litigation tactics, however, reveals that this invocation is the principal mechanism by which the network has evaded the discovery, regulatory oversight, and civil accountability the law plainly authorizes.

This testimony has two parts. The first examines what Muslim Brotherhood-linked entities have done in recent years: exploited tax-exempt status, accepted government grant funding, and embedded themselves in American schools. The second explains the litigation tactics that keep these entities one step ahead of meaningful investigation and accountability.

II. An Overview of the Muslim Brotherhood's *Modus Operandi* and the Modern Manifestations of MB Movements

The Brotherhood's strategy is no secret. Its own internal documents set out a multigenerational campaign of "civilizational jihad" to transform Western societies from within, turning democracy's strongest defenses (free speech, free association, religious liberty, and the protections of civil society) into instruments for advancing the Brotherhood's objectives.[11]

Operations in Europe and North America are guided by a deliberate political strategy for the gradual establishment of Islamic governance, or *sharia*, in the West.

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[9] Hamas, *The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement* (Aug. 18, 1988), *in* The Avalon Project, Lillian Goldman L. Libr., Yale L. Sch., https://avalon.law.yale.edu/21st_century/hamas.asp. ("The Islamic Resistance Movement is one of the wings of Moslem Brotherhood in Palestine. Moslem Brotherhood Movement is a universal organization which constitutes the largest Islamic movement in modern times.")

[10] "The Muslim Brotherhood Project: Towards a Worldwide Strategy for Islamic Policy (1982)," translated by Scott Burgess (based on the French text published in Sylvain Besson, La conquête de l'Occident: Le projet secret des islamistes (Éditions du Seuil, 2005), 193–205), first published serially in The Daily Ablution in December 2005, available as an appendix to "The Muslim Brotherhood's Strategic Entryism into the United States," Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy (ISGAP), Nov. 17, 2025, page 7, The Muslim Brotherhood's Strategic Entryism Into the United States: A Systemic Analysis. Available at https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/MB-Project-Final-251117-01.pdf.

[11] Rossomando, Explanatory Memorandum Detractors Ignore Evidence About MB in America, supra.

Two key Brotherhood internal documents set forth this plan. "The Project" (1982), laid out a multi-decadal program to expand Islamist influence through three principal means: penetrating existing institutions, building coalitions with sympathetic actors, and cultivating parallel social structures.[12] It directed adherents to make tactical use of the democratic freedoms like speech, association, and civic participation that Western societies would never knowingly extend in service of such ends.[13]

The second document, the 1991 "Explanatory Memorandum," was recovered during the FBI's investigation into the network's U.S.-based operations. It described the work to be done here in unambiguous terms: the gradual dilution and ultimate displacement of Western cultural and political influence, advanced through an organizational network spanning religious, social, and professional life.[14]

The state of U.S. civil society today makes plain that this strategy is, in many respects, succeeding. The U.S.-based Brotherhood infrastructure operates through a series of nonprofit entities whose institutional purpose, regardless of what their public-facing mission statements may say, is to advance the Brotherhood's objectives in this country.[15] For example, the Council on American-Islamic Relations ("CAIR") was born of a conspiratorial meeting of key U.S.-based Brotherhood leaders and was established as a civil-rights front, designed to lend Western legitimacy to the Palestine Committee's work on American soil.[16] American Muslims for Palestine ("AMP") is the offshoot of the Islamic Association for Palestine ("IAP"), which was

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[12] "The Muslim Brotherhood's Strategic Entryism into the United States," Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy (ISGAP), Nov. 17, 2025, page 7, The Muslim Brotherhood's Strategic Entryism Into the United States: A Systemic Analysis. Available at https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/MB-Project-Final-251117-01.pdf.

[13] "The Muslim Brotherhood Project: Towards a Worldwide Strategy for Islamic Policy (1982)," available at the Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy (ISGAP), page xiv, 2, 2025, The Muslim Brotherhood's Strategic Entryism Into the United States: A Systemic Analysis. Available at https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/MB-Project-Final-251117-01.pdf.

[14] Government's Memorandum in Support of Its Trial Brief Regarding the Admissibility of Co-Conspirator Statements, *United States v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development*, No. 3:04-CR-240-G (N.D. Tex. May 29, 2007); Lorenzo Vidino, "The Hamas Networks in America: A Short History," GW Program on Extremism, October 2023, page 7 https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2023-10/hamas-networks-final.pdf.

[15] Lorenzo Vidino, "The Hamas Networks in America: A Short History," *Program on Extremism at George Washington*, October 2023, https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2023-10/hamas-networks-final.pdf.

[16] Attachment A, List of Unindicted Co-conspirators and/or Joint Venturers, *United States v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development*, No. 3:04-CR-240-G, Doc. No. 656-2 (N.D. Tex. May 29, 2007), available at *United States v. Holy Land Foundation*, 624 F.3d 685 (5th Cir. 2010), https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-5th-circuit/1541982.html.

found liable for material support to Hamas.[17] AMP functions today as one of the Brotherhood's principal propaganda arms in the United States.[18] The broader U.S. network includes the North American Islamic Trust ("NAIT"), ICNA, ISNA, MAS, and MSA, among others.[19] This testimony focuses on the recent activities of CAIR and AMP.

Government agencies and private citizens alike have sought to uncover the full scope of these entities' activities through litigation and investigation, only to be met by reflexive First Amendment and other constitutional objections. The activities recounted below are not *just* speech, and the constitutional invocation is dishonest and doctrinally unsound.

III. CAIR's Association with Designated Terrorists and Terrorist Organizations Is Not New, and It Is Not Protected Speech.

CAIR's engagement with designated foreign terrorists is ongoing, not historical. The examples that follow document conduct that may violate U.S.

[17] American Muslims for Palestine (AMP), ADL, "American Muslims for Palestine (AMP) | ADL," ADL, November 27, 2024, American Muslims for Palestine (AMP) | ADL.; Lorenzo Vidino, "The Hamas Networks in America: A Short History," GW Program on Extremism, October 2023, page 9–14, https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2025-11/CAIR_Revisded.pdf.

[18] *See, e.g.*, *American Muslims for Palestine (AMP)*, NGO Monitor (May 10, 2025), https://ngo-monitor.org/ngos/american-muslims-for-palestine-amp/ (providing examples of AMP's propaganda).

[19] "The Muslim Brotherhood Project: Towards a Worldwide Strategy for Islamic Policy (1982)," available at the Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy (ISGAP), page 39, 2025, The Muslim Brotherhood's Strategic Entryism Into the United States: A Systemic Analysis. The organizations named are the North American Islamic Trust ("NAIT"), the Islamic Circle of North America ("ICNA"), the Islamic Society of North America ("ISNA"), the Muslim American Society ("MAS"), and the Muslim Students Association ("MSA"). ISNA, MSA, and NAIT appear in Attachment 1 to the 1991 Explanatory Memorandum, which lists them among "our organizations and the organizations of our friends." Akram, An Explanatory Memorandum, supra, Attachment 1. ISNA and NAIT also appear on the government's list of unindicted co-conspirators and/or joint venturers in the Holy Land Foundation prosecution. See Attachment A, List of Unindicted Co-conspirators and/or Joint Venturers, United States v. Holy Land Foundation, supra. NAIT holds title to mosque and school properties throughout the United States. MAS was incorporated in Illinois in 1993; a 2004 *Chicago Tribune* investigation reported that Brotherhood leaders created it as a more visible organ for their work in the United States, and its early leadership included Ahmad Elkadi, a former head of the U.S. Brotherhood branch. Noreen S. Ahmed-Ullah, Sam Roe & Laurie Cohen, "A Rare Look at Secretive Brotherhood in America," *Chicago Tribune* (Sept. 19, 2004). ICNA grew out of South Asian MSA members influenced by Abu'l A'la Mawdudi and the Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan, an allied Islamist movement organizationally distinct from the Egyptian Brotherhood. See Lorenzo Vidino, *The Muslim Brotherhood in America: A Brief History*, GW Program on Extremism (July 2025), https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2025-07/The%20Muslim%20Brotherhood%20in%20America.pdf.

sanctions law, which prohibits certain interactions with designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations ("FTOs") and Specially Designated Global Terrorists ("SDGTs").

A. CAIR Ohio's Executive Director Hosts Panel with Designated Terrorist

In October 2025, the Executive Director of CAIR's Ohio chapter chaired a virtual panel hosted by Al-Zaytouna, a Beirut-based Brotherhood-aligned institution established in 2004.[20,21] Although Al-Zaytouna describes itself as an independent research institution, this independence claim is belied by its record of platforming designated terrorists.[22] Al-Zaytouna has maintained a systematic institutional relationship with Hamas leadership, served as a publisher and distributor of Hamas's self-authored strategic narratives, provided a platform for the endorsement and active participation of multiple designated Hamas SDGTs, and reproduced Hamas's official propaganda messaging across its own publications and events.[23]

For example, Al-Zaytouna has published content authored by at least three individuals who were SDGTs at the time of the content's publication. In 2014, Al-Zaytouna published a volume entitled "Islamic Resistance Movement–Hamas: Studies of Thought and Experience" (English edition published 2017), featuring chapters authored by former Hamas Political Bureau head Khalid Mashaal,[24] Ismail

[20] Algemeiner, "CAIR-Ohio Director Moderates Event With US-Designated Hamas Terrorist," Algemeiner.com, October 28, 2025, CAIR-Ohio Director Moderates Event With US-Designated Hamas Terrorist | Algemeiner.com. Available at https://www.algemeiner.com/2025/10/28/cair-ohio-director-moderates-event-us-designated-hamas-terrorist/.

[21] Al-Zaytouna Centre, "The Centre," Al-Zaytouna Centre, May 4, 2026, https://eng.alzaytouna.net/the-centre/.

[22] Algemeiner, "CAIR-Ohio Director Moderates Event With US-Designated Hamas Terrorist," Algemeiner.com, October 28, 2025, CAIR-Ohio Director Moderates Event With US-Designated Hamas Terrorist | Algemeiner.com. Available at https://www.algemeiner.com/2025/10/28/cair-ohio-director-moderates-event-us-designated-hamas-terrorist/.

[23] *See, e.g.*, "The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas): Studies of Thoughts & Experience - Al-Zaytouna Centre," Al-Zaytouna Centre, August 31, 2020, The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas): Studies of Thoughts & Experience - AL-Zaytouna Centre; full English text available at https://mohsensaleh.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Book_Hamas_Thought_Experience_Full.pdf. (Al-Zaytouna lists Hamas official propaganda for sale on its website).

[24] "The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas): Studies of Thoughts & Experience - AL-Zaytouna Centre," Al-Zaytouna Centre, August 31, 2020, The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas): Studies of Thoughts & Experience - AL-Zaytouna Centre. ; full English text available at https://mohsensaleh.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Book_Hamas_Thought_Experience_Full.pdf ; *see also* Al-Zaytouna Centre, "New Release: Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas: Studies of Thought and Experience," August 15, 2017, https://eng.alzaytouna.net/2017/08/15/new-release-islamic-resistance-movement-hamas-studies-thought-experience; "SDGT Designations | Office of Foreign Assets Control," Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Department of the Treasury (last visited July 30, 2026), SDGT Designations | Office of Foreign Assets Control.

Haniyeh,[25] Mousa Abu Marzook[26] and Usama Hamdan.[27] Khalid Mashaal was a founding member of Hamas, the head of Hamas's external leadership, and resided in luxury outside of Gaza.[28] Mashaal's half-brother Mufid Abdulkader was a major fundraiser for Hamas and was convicted in the *Holy Land Foundation* case (the largest terror financing case in U.S. history) and sentenced to twenty years in prison.[29] Mashaal and Haniyeh were both indicted by the U.S. Department of Justice for their involvement in the October 7th attacks.[30] Ismail Haniyeh had strong ties to Iran's leadership and was the chairman of Hamas's Politburo from 2017 until his reported death in 2024 in Iran.[31] Mousa Abu Marzook was a founder of Hamas and a senior member of Hamas's political bureau.[32] The men's words published in this volume represent Hamas's own account of its ideology, strategy, and operations.

Al-Zaytouna's editorial relationship with these individuals went beyond compilation. In March 2013, Al-Zaytouna published a standalone paper by Mashaal titled "Hamas Political Thought and Stances in Light of the Arab Uprisings,"

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[25] State Department Terrorist Designations of Ismail Haniyeh, Harakat al-Sabireen, Liwa al-Thawra, and Harakat Sawa'd Misr (HASM), U.S. Department of State, January 31, 2018, https://2017-2021.state.gov/state-department-terrorist-designations-of-ismail-haniyeh-harakat-al-sabireen-liwa-al-thawra-and-harakat-sawad-misr-hasm/index.html.

[26] "Sanctions List Search," U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (last visited July 30, 2026), https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/Details.aspx?id=3754.

[27] "U.S. Designates Five Charities Funding Hamas And Six Senior Hamas Leaders as Terrorist Entities," U.S. Department of The Treasury, August 22, 2003, U.S. Designates Five Charities Funding Hamas and Six Senior Hamas Leaders as Terrorist Entities | U.S. Department of the Treasury. Available at https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/js672.

[28] "Khaled Mashal, Hamas' 'External' Leader, Is a Controversial Figure, as Documented in Documents Found by the IDF in the Gaza Strip," The Amit Terrorism and Intelligence Research Institute at the Israeli Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center, April 6, 2025, Khaled Mashal, Hamas' "external" leader, is a controversial figure, as documented in documents found by the IDF in the Gaza Strip. Available at https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/khaled-mashal-hamas-external-leader-is-a-controversial-figure-as-documented-in-documents-found-by-the-idf-in-the-gaza-strip/.

[29] "Federal Judge Hands Downs Sentences in Holy Land Foundation Case," May 27, 2009, Federal Judge Hands Downs Sentences in Holy Land Foundation Case | United States Department of Justice; "Half-brother of Hamas Leader Released From US Prison," *Israel National News*, December 13, 2024, Half-brother of Hamas leader released from US prison | Israel National News. Available at https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/federal-judge-hands-downs-sentences-holy-land-foundation-case; https://www.israelnationalnews.com/news/400695.

[30] "Justice Department Announces Terrorism Charges Against Senior Leaders," September 3, 2024, Justice Department Announces Terrorism Charges Against Senior Leaders of Hamas. Available at https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-terrorism-charges-against-senior-leaders-hamas.

[31] Justice Department Announces Terrorism Charges Against Senior Leaders of Hamas, U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra.

[32] "Moussa Mohammed Abu Marzouk," Counter Extremism Project (last visited July 30, 2026), Moussa Mohammed Abu Marzouk | Counter Extremism Project. Available at https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/moussa-mohammed-abu-marzouk.

originally presented at Al-Zaytouna's 2012 Beirut conference.[33] Al-Zaytouna's website states: "After the conference, Mashaal himself edited and updated the paper and sent it to Al-Zaytouna recently for publication,"[34] establishing direct editorial collaboration between Al-Zaytouna and a designated SDGT. Separately, Al-Zaytouna published a standalone paper by Haniyeh in May 2017, produced through what a footnote describes as "interviews conducted via e-mail by Mohsen Muhammad Saleh from Beirut, Lebanon, with Isma'il Haniyeh in Gaza, Palestine," with "correspondence [beginning] on 19/12/2013" and "the text [being] approved by Mr. Haniyeh on 11/3/2014."[35] This constitutes months of direct consultation between Al-Zaytouna's director and a designated SDGT.

The pattern continued. In January 2025, Al-Zaytouna published an Arabic translation of "Hamas: Unwritten Chapters" (343 pages), described as "a valuable addition to Hamas's self-vision," which examines Hamas's "liberation ideology" including its use of "military resistance, particularly martyrdom operations."[36] On November 7, 2023, one month after the October 7th attack, Al-Zaytouna re-promoted the 2014/2017 Hamas volume under the title "The Most Prominent and Comprehensive Reference Book on Hamas Movement (Free Download)," making the full text, including chapters by three designated SDGTs, available globally at no cost.[37] Al-Zaytouna maintains a dedicated Ismail Haniyeh author-archive page documenting at least six publications and events featuring him, including a

[33] Al-Zaytouna Centre, "Document: Khalid Mish'al: Hamas Political Thought and Stances in Light of the Arab Uprisings," AL-Zaytouna Centre, March 19, 2013 ("The document was originally a paper presented at the conference: 'The Islamists in the Arab World and the Palestinian Issue, In Light of the Arab Uprisings,' which was held by al-Zaytouna in Beirut on 28 & 29/11/2012"), Document: Khalid Mish'al: Hamas Political Thought and Stances in Light of the Arab Uprisings - AL-Zaytouna Centre. Available at https://eng.alzaytouna.net/2013/03/19/khalid-mishal-hamas-political-thought-and-stances-in-light-of-the-arab-uprisings/ (last visited July 30, 2026).

[34] Al-Zaytouna Centre, "Document: Khalid Mish'Al: Hamas Political Thought and Stances in Light of the Arab Uprisings," AL-Zaytouna Centre, March 19, 2013, Document: Khalid Mish'al: Hamas Political Thought and Stances in Light of the Arab Uprisings - AL-Zaytouna Centre. Available at https://eng.alzaytouna.net/2013/03/19/khalid-mishal-hamas-political-thought-and-stances-in-light-of-the-arab-uprisings/.

[35] Al-Zaytouna Centre, "Paper: Hamas: An Analysis of the Vision and Experience in Power … Ismail Haniyyah," AL-Zaytouna Centre, May 6, 2017, Paper: Hamas: An Analysis of the Vision and Experience in Power ... Ismail Haniyyah. Available at https://eng.alzaytouna.net/2017/05/06/paper-hamas-analysis-vision-experience-power/.

[36] Al-Zaytouna Centre, "Hamas Unwritten Chapters (Arabic)," AL-Zaytouna Centre, January 21, 2025, Hamas Unwritten Chapters (Arabic) - AL-Zaytouna Centre. Available at https://eng.alzaytouna.net/2025/01/20/hamas-unwritten-chapters-arabic/.

[37] Al-Zaytouna Centre, "The Most Prominent and Comprehensive Reference Book on Hamas Movement (Free Download)," AL-Zaytouna Centre, November 9, 2023, The Most Prominent and Comprehensive Reference Book on Hamas Movement (Free Download) - AL-Zaytouna Centre. Available at https://eng.alzaytouna.net/2023/11/07/the-most-prominent-and-comprehensive-reference-book-on-hamas-movement-free-download/.

November 3, 2021 webinar at which he presented his paper "Hamas's Future Vision for the Advancement of the Palestinian National Project."[38]

That is the institution CAIR-Ohio's Executive Director chose to promote when he participated in Al-Zaytouna's October 2025 panel. Khalid Turaani, appointed Executive Director of CAIR-Ohio in June 2024, appeared on a virtual panel convened by Al-Zaytouna titled "Palestinians Abroad and Regional and International Strategic Transformations in Light of Operation al-Aqsa Flood."[39] Operation al-Aqsa Flood is Hamas's name for the October 7th attacks.[40] Turaani moderated a panel at this event, where Majed al-Zeer, who was designated as an SDGT by the Department of the Treasury[41] thirteen months prior to the panel as Hamas's representative and fundraiser in Europe, and Sami al-Arian, who pleaded guilty in 2006 to conspiracy to provide services to Palestinian Islamic Jihad, also appeared.[42] The event adopted Hamas's operational terminology and addressed diaspora strategic repositioning.[43]

CAIR responded to this incident by issuing a press release characterizing Turaani's participation as "an oversight by an employee who unknowingly

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[38] Al-Zaytouna Centre, "Ismail Haniyyah Archives," https://eng.alzaytouna.net/tag/ismail-haniyyah/ (retrieved May 13, 2026) (Al-Zaytouna author-tag archive page listing publications and events featuring Haniyeh as a contributor, including the 2014 Arabic and 2017 English editions of *Islamic Resistance Movement–Hamas: Studies of Thought and Experience*; the November 2023 post-October 7 re-promotion of that volume; Haniyeh's May 2017 standalone paper *Hamas: An Analysis of the Vision and Experience in Power*; and Al-Zaytouna's November 3, 2021 webinar at which Haniyeh personally presented); *see also* Al-Zaytouna Centre, "Isma'il Haniyyah Presents Hamas's Future Vision for the Advancement of the Palestinian National Project in a Webinar Held by al-Zaytouna Centre," November 5, 2021, https://eng.alzaytouna.net/2021/11/05/ismail-haniyyah-presents-hamass-future-vision-for-the-advancement-of-the-palestinian-national-project-in-a-webinar-held-by-al-zaytouna-centre/.

[39] Al-Zaytouna Centre, "Panel Discussion: Palestinians Abroad and Regional and International Strategic Transformations in Light of Operation al-Aqsa Flood," AL-Zaytouna Centre, October 27, 2025, Panel Discussion: Palestinians Abroad and Regional and International Strategic Transformations in Light of Operation al-Aqsa Flood - AL-Zaytouna Centre. Available at https://eng.alzaytouna.net/2025/10/24/panel-discussion-palestinians-abroad-and-regional-and-international-strategic-transformations-in-light-of-operation-al-aqsa-flood-2/.

[40] Ambassador Alan Baker, "Israel Under Fire – the 'Al-Aqsa Flood' Slogan and the October 7 Massacre," Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, September 15, 2024, Israel Under Fire – The "Al-Aqsa Flood" Slogan and the October 7 Massacre. Available at https://jcfa.org/article/israel-under-fire-the-al-aqsa-flood-slogan-and-the-october-7-massacre/.

[41] "Majed al-Zeer," OpenSanctions.org (last visited July 30, 2026), Majed al-Zeer - OpenSanctions. Available at https://www.opensanctions.org/entities/NK-FaGTYj6GcFhX6axKxVnBde/.

[42] Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Just., No. 06-221, "Sami Al-Arian Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Provide Services to Palestinian Islamic Jihad" (Apr. 17, 2006), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2006/April/06_crm_221.html.

[43] Maya Sulkin, "CAIR Official Joins Hamas Leader at 'Al-Aqsa Flood' Event," *The Free Press* (blog), October 28, 2025, CAIR Official Joins Hamas Leader at 'Al-Aqsa Flood' Event. Available at https://www.thefp.com/p/cair-official-joins-hamas-leader-al-aqsa-flood-event.

participated in a virtual event hosted by a Lebanese think-tank. . .in his personal capacity and not as a representative of CAIR-Columbus."[44] The same press release referred to al-Zeer as "a British individual who may have been recently sanctioned by the Treasury Department," and never named him.[45]

The record contradicts each of these characterizations. The "personal capacity" claim is contradicted by Al-Zaytouna's own event listing, which identifies Turaani as session chair,[46] and by every publicly available profile, which identifies him solely as CAIR-Ohio Executive Director.[47] The characterization that al-Zeer "may have been recently sanctioned" minimizes the fact that al-Zeer was designated as an SDGT on October 7, 2024, over one year before the event, in a Treasury press release widely available in U.S. and international media.[48] Al-Zeer did not treat the designation as uncertain either. Within three days he issued his own press release rejecting the accusations as "absolutely false," told Al Jazeera the sanctions were "madness," and announced that he had retained a legal team to challenge them.[49] CAIR said nothing

[44] Khalid Turaani, "CAIR-Ohio Addressing Oversight by Employee After Personal Participation in Think-Tank Event Featuring Sanctioned Individual," CAIR-Ohio, October 29, 2025, https://cair-ohio.com/cair-ohio-addressing-oversight-by-employee-after-personal-participation-in-think-tank-event-featuring-sanctioned-individual/.

[45] Khalid Turaani, "CAIR-Ohio Addressing Oversight by Employee After Personal Participation in Think-Tank Event Featuring Sanctioned Individual," CAIR-Ohio, October 29, 2025, CAIR-Ohio Addressing Oversight By Employee After Personal Participation in Think-Tank Event Featuring Sanctioned Individual. Available at https://cair-ohio.com/cair-ohio-addressing-oversight-by-employee-after-personal-participation-in-think-tank-event-featuring-sanctioned-individual/.

[46] Al-Zaytouna Centre, Panel Discussion: Palestinians Abroad and Regional and International Strategic Transformations in Light of Operation al-Aqsa Flood, supra.

[47] *See, e.g.*, CAIR-Ohio, "Meet Our Team - CAIR-Ohio," March 5, 2026, Meet Our Team - CAIR-Ohio; Khaled Tuurani, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/turaani1/ (last visited May 18, 2026) (Tuurani's personal Facebook lists him as the Executive Director of CAIR-Ohio); Khaled Tuurani (@turaanikhalid), Instagram, https://www.instagram.com/turaanikhalid/ (last visited May 18, 2026) (Instagram biography lists Turaani as Executive Director of CAIR Ohio); Khalid Turaani, LinkedIn, https://www.linkedin.com/in/khalid-turaani-a3149342 (last visited May 18, 2026).

[48] "Treasury Targets Significant International Hamas Fundraising Network," U.S. Department of The Treasury, October 7, 2024, Treasury Targets Significant International Hamas Fundraising Network; Anna Stanley, "Influential U.K. NGO Head, Majed Al-Zeer, Finally Designated by U.S. for Links to Hamas," Middle East Forum, October 10, 2024, Influential U.K. NGO Head, Majed Al-Zeer, Finally Designated by U.S. for Links to Hamas - Middle East Forum. Available at https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2632; https://www.meforum.org/fwi/fwi-news/influential-uk-ngo-head-majed-al-zeer-finally-designated-by-u-s-for-links-to-hamas.

[49] Al Jazeera Staff, "Prominent Palestinian Activist Slams US Sanctions as 'Madness'," Al Jazeera (Oct. 11, 2024), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/11/prominent-palestinian-activist-slams-us-sanctions-as-madness (al-Zeer stating "It is madness," rejecting the accusations as "absolutely false," describing the press release he issued on October 10, 2024, and stating that he had "already begun, with the support of a legal team, the necessary legal procedures to challenge these baseless allegations"); see "Treasury Targets Significant International Hamas Fundraising Network," U.S. Dep't of the Treasury (Oct. 7, 2024), supra.

at the time. A review of CAIR's national and CAIR-Ohio press releases identifies no statement addressing the designation when it issued in October 2024, and CAIR's first public comment on al-Zeer came thirteen months later, in the press release quoted above, which declined to name him.[50] The "oversight" characterization is inconsistent with the fact that Al-Zaytouna's Hamas affiliations are evident from its own website, which includes multiple publications featuring three SDGT authors, Hamdan's homepage endorsement, and an events archive documenting Haniyeh's participation.[51]

CAIR's engagement with Al-Zaytouna is not an isolated incident, it is part of a pattern of support for designated FTOs and SDGTs.

B. CAIR's Symbiotic Relationship with the International Union of Muslim Scholars.

CAIR's engagement with the International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) follows the same pattern. IUMS is the Muslim Brotherhood's transnational scholarly authority and maintains a close relationship with the recently designated Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood ("EMB").[52]

The IUMS was founded in 2004 by Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who is viewed as the most important leader of the Global Muslim Brotherhood and the movement's "de facto spiritual leader."[53] Dr. Matthew Levitt, Director of the Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at The Washington Institute, called Qaradawi

[50] A review of CAIR's national press-release archive, https://www.cair.com/press_releases/, and CAIR-Ohio's press releases, https://cair-ohio.com/ (both last visited July 30, 2026), identifies no statement addressing al-Zeer's October 7, 2024 designation. CAIR's only located public comment concerning al-Zeer is the CAIR-Ohio release of October 29, 2025, cited supra.

[51] Al-Zaytouna Centre, "Home - AL-Zaytouna Centre," AL-Zaytouna Centre, May 4, 2026, AL-Zaytouna Centre; "The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas): Studies of Thoughts & Experience - AL-Zaytouna Centre," AL-Zaytouna Centre, August 31, 2020, The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas): Studies of Thoughts & Experience - AL-Zaytouna Centre; Al-Zaytouna Centre, "Our Authors - AL-Zaytouna Centre," AL-Zaytouna Centre, March 6, 2025, https://eng.alzaytouna.net/our-authors/.

[52] Lorenzo Vidino & Sergio Altuna, *The Egyptian Branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in America: Yesterday and Today*, Program on Extremism at Geo. Wash. U. (Jan. 2026), pages 32-33, https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2026-01/The%20Egyptian%20Branch%20of%20the%20Muslim%20Brotherhood%20in%20America.pdf.

[53] *Tariq Ramadan Center To Hold International Conference; Many Global Muslim Brotherhood Luminaries To Attend*, Campus Watch, Middle E. F. (Mar. 12, 2013), https://www.meforum.org/campus-watch/tariq-ramadan-center-to-hold-international; Influence Watch, "International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) - Influence Watch," April 27, 2026, International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) - Influence Watch; "International Union of Muslim Scholars - Global Influence Operations Report," Global Influence Operations Report (GIOR) (last visited July 30, 2026), International Union of Muslim Scholars - Global Influence Operations Report.

"one of the most public figureheads of the radical wing of the Muslim Brotherhood."[54] Qaradawi served as IUMS President from its founding until his resignation in August 2022, weeks before his death in September 2022.[55] Qaradawi's record included serving as a major shareholder in the Al Taqwa Bank, which U.S. Treasury officials described as "financing and facilitating" Hamas and al-Qaeda.[56] Qaradawi stated that suicide bombings targeting Israeli civilians qualify as "martyrdom operations" and stated: "The Israelis might have nuclear bombs, but we have the children bomb."[57]

Qaradawi's death did not change the institution. The IUMS's current Secretary-General, Ali al-Qaradaghi, a protégé of Qaradawi, is a naturalized Qatari citizen and Qatar University professor who has publicly endorsed Hamas.[58] In 2015, al-Qaradaghi stated, "We view Hamas from the perspective of the Palestinian cause. Hamas is defending the rights of the nation."[59] IUMS also maintains institutional ties to Hamas senior leadership. In 2022, IUMS Board of Trustees members hosted Ismail

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[54] Sudarsan Raghavan and Joby Warrick, "How a 91-year-old imam came to symbolize the feud between Qatar and its neighbors," *Washington Post*, June 27, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/how-a-91-year-old-imam-came-to-symbolize-feud-between-qatar-and-its-neighbors/2017/06/26/601d41b4-5157-11e7-91eb-9611861a988f_story.html (quoting Matthew Levitt of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy describing Qaradawi as "one of the most public figureheads of the radical wing of the Muslim Brotherhood"); reproduced and discussed in Counter Extremism Project, "Yusuf al-Qaradawi's Ties to Extremists," https://www.counterextremism.com/yusuf-al-qaradawi (retrieved May 13, 2026).

[55] Influence Watch, "International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) - Influence Watch," April 27, 2026, International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) - Influence Watch; "International Union of Muslim Scholars - Global Influence Operations Report," Global Influence Operations Report (GIOR) (last visited July 30, 2026), International Union of Muslim Scholars - Global Influence Operations Report. Available at https://www.influencewatch.org/organization/international-union-of-muslim-scholars-iums/; https://www.global-influence-ops.com/wiki/international-union-of-muslim-scholars/.

[56] Influence Watch, "International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) - Influence Watch," April 27, 2026, International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) - Influence Watch. Available at https://www.influencewatch.org/organization/international-union-of-muslim-scholars-iums/.

[57] Influence Watch, "International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) - Influence Watch," April 27, 2026, International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) - Influence Watch; *Yusuf al-Qaradawi's Ties to Extremism*, Counter Extremism Project, *Ali al-Qaradaghi*, Counter Extremism Project, https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/ali-al-qaradaghi (last visited May 18, 2026).

[58] *Ali al-Qaradaghi*, Counter Extremism Project, https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/ali-al-qaradaghi (last visited May 18, 2026).

[59] Hassan Obeid, "Qaradaghi: We support action against Houthis," *Al-Monitor*, April 19, 2015, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2015/04/palestine-international-union-of-muslim-scholars-alqaradaghi.html (interview with IUMS Secretary-General Ali al-Qaradaghi conducted April 12, 2015) (full quoted passage: "We view Hamas from the perspective of the Palestinian cause, which must remain the pre-eminent cause not just for the union but for all Arabs, Muslims and free humanitarians of the world. We stand against oppression, tyranny, displacement and detention tactics that Israeli occupation forces rely upon; this is a humanitarian and international stance. Hamas is defending the rights of the nation, and the nation must stand by those who defend its pre-eminent cause."), reproduced and discussed in Counter Extremism Project, "Ali al-Qaradaghi," https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/ali-al-qaradaghi (retrieved May 13, 2026).

Haniyeh at the IUMS's Istanbul premises, where they were photographed receiving him.[60] On October 7, 2023, the day of Hamas's heinous terrorist attack on Israel, the IUMS platformed Haniyeh again. He delivered an address at an IUMS online event titled "Forum of Umma Scholars in Support of Operation Aqsa Flood."[61]

On March 28, 2025, the IUMS's Ijtihad and Fatwa Committee issued a ten-point fatwa, or religious decree,[62] declaring that it is obligatory for every capable Muslim in the Islamic world to wage armed jihad against the occupation in Palestine.[63] In December 2025, the Middle East Media Research Institute ("MEMRI") documented an IUMS-published article predicting the extermination of Jews by 2033.[64]

The IUMS website (iumsonline.org) republishes CAIR press releases, Islamophobia reports, and statements by CAIR officials on an ongoing basis,

[60] Altuna Sergio, "Beyond Islamic Guidance: Qatar-based IUMS as an Agitator in the Israel-Hamas War," *George Washington University Program on Extremism*, December 2023, figure 1, https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2023-12/beyond-islamic-guidance.pdf; *see also* "Hamas chief meets International Union of Muslim Scholars in Istanbul," İLKHA (Ilke News Agency), 2022, https://ilkha.com/english/latest/hamas-chief-meets-international-union-of-muslim-scholars-in-istanbul-16822.

[61] Altuna Sergio, "Beyond Islamic Guidance: Qatar-based IUMS as an Agitator in the Israel-Hamas War," *George Washington University Program on Extremism*, December 2023, Beyond Islamic Guidance. Available at https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2023-12/beyond-islamic-guidance.pdf.

[62] "Fatwa," in *Merriam-Webster Dictionary*, April 11, 2026, FATWA Definition & Meaning - Merriam-Webster. Available at https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fatwa.

[63] International Union of Muslim Scholars, Ijtihad and Fatwa Committee, "Fatwa of the Committee for Ijtihad and Fatwa at the International Union of Muslim Scholars regarding 'The Ongoing Aggression on Gaza and the Suspension of the Ceasefire,'" March 28, 2025, https://iumsonline.org/en/archives/135549 (IUMS's own English-language publication of the ten-point fatwa, which the IUMS site dates April 1, 2025, point 1 declaring that "it is obligatory for all Muslims and Muslim nations to engage in jihad against the Zionist entity"); MEMRI translation and analysis at "Fatwa By International Union Of Muslim Scholars (IUMS), Based In And Funded By Qatar, Declares 'Armed Jihad' Against Israel Obligatory For All Muslims, Calls To Urgently Form 'Islamic Military Alliance' Against Israel," Middle East Media Research Institute, March 31, 2025, https://www.memri.org/reports/fatwa-international-union-muslim-scholars-iums-based-and-funded-qatar-declares-armed-jihad; *see also* "Muslim scholar union calls for 'armed Jihad' against Israel," *Jerusalem Post*, March 30, 2025, https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-849253; David Andrew Weinberg, "Qatar Tacitly Approves Muslim Scholars' Call for 'Armed Jihad' Against Israel," Foundation for Defense of Democracies, April 11, 2025, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/policy_briefs/2025/04/11/qatar-tacitly-approves-muslim-scholars-call-for-armed-jihad-against-israel/.

[64] "IUMS publishes antisemitic article predicting extermination of the Jews by 2033," MEMRI, December 2025, Qatar-Backed International Union Of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) Publishes Antisemitic Article Saying: Humanity Has Realized That The Jews Are A Threat To The World; They Will All Be Gone By 2033; *see also* "Algerian Muslim Brotherhood figure claims there will be no more Jews by 2033," Defend Jerusalem, December 2025, https://defendjerusalem.com/algerian-muslim-brotherhood-figure-claims-there-will-be-no-more-jews-by-2033/.

providing CAIR with a global amplification platform through a Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated institution. This occurred on at least three instances. On July 28, 2025, the IUMS's English-language website published "Wave of Attacks on U.S. Mosques Reflects Rising Islamophobia Amid Israeli Aggression on Gaza," quoting CAIR Deputy National Director Edward Ahmed Mitchell at length and republishing CAIR complaint data, including the claim that "in 2024 alone, [CAIR's] offices received over 8,600 complaints related to discrimination and attacks against Muslims, the highest number since it began documenting such cases in 1996."[65] On April 26, 2022, the IUMS English-language website published an article titled "Discrimination against Muslim Americans rose by 9% in 2021: Report," quoting CAIR Executive Director Nihad Awad and republishing findings from CAIR's Islamophobia report (including that CAIR received 6,720 complaints in 2021).[66] In July 2022, the IUMS Arabic-language website published a CAIR statement condemning a U.S. government program, quoting Deputy National Director Mitchell.[67]

The IUMS provides global distribution of CAIR's press releases, reports, and statements by named CAIR executives to its network of 90,000 member scholars.[68] The IUMS's republication of CAIR content is not incidental, as the articles are published on the IUMS's official website, attributed to CAIR by name, and quote CAIR officials by title. CAIR does not mention the IUMS in its own announcements, but the record of shared ties extends beyond the content amplification and into the organizations' personnel.

For example, in 2012, CAIR's co-founder and Executive Director Nihad Awad joined Yusuf al-Qaradawi on stage at a press conference in Qatar.[69] As described

[65] "Wave of Attacks on U.S. Mosques Reflects Rising Islamophobia Amid Israeli Aggression on Gaza," IUMS, July 28, 2025, iumsonline.org/en/archives/134246 (last visited Aug. 3, 2026). The item was originally published under the ContentDetails.aspx path; IUMS migrated to a new platform in or around December 2025 and the article is now served at the /en/archives/ path above.
[66] "Discrimination Against Muslim Americans Rose by 9% in 2021: Report," IUMS, April 26, 2022, https://iumsonline.org/en/archives/134757.
[67] "CAIR Statement Condemning U.S. Atheism Promotion Program," IUMS Arabic-language website, July 11, 2022, مجلس العلاقات الإسلامية الأمريكية (CAIR) تدين برنامجا أمريكيا يروج للإلحاد في الدول الإسلامية, iumsonline.org/archives/106951 (last visited Aug. 3, 2026) (quoting CAIR Deputy National Director Edward Ahmed Mitchell). The item was originally published under the ContentDetails.aspx path; IUMS migrated to a new platform in or around December 2025 and it is now served at the /archives/ path above.
[68] Sergio Altuna, *Beyond Islamic Guidance: Qatar-based IUMS as an Agitator in the Israel-Hamas War*, Program on Extremism at Geo. Wash. U., page 4 (Dec. 2023), https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2023-12/beyond-islamic-guidance.pdf.
[69] "The Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) | ADL," ADL, December 23, 2024, The Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR). Available at https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounder/council-american-islamic-relations-cair.

above, Al-Qaradawi was the founding president of the IUMS, affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, and expressed support for Hamas and Hezbollah.[70] Awad also eulogized Abdul-Majid al-Zindani,[71] a U.S.-designated SDGT[72] and supporter of Osama bin Laden whom the IUMS website describes as a "founding member of the IUMS."[73]

As of July 2026, all previously published CAIR content remains accessible on the IUMS website.[74] That content survived a site migration. IUMS moved to a new web platform in or around December 2025, abandoning the URL structure under

[70] Sergio Altuna, "Beyond Islamic Guidance: Qatar-based IUMS as an Agitator in the Israel-Hamas War," George Washington University Program on Extremism, December 2023, at 3–5, https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2023-12/beyond-islamic-guidance.pdf ("IUMS is the brainchild of the late Yusuf Al-Qaradawi…[h]eaded by Qaradawi until 2018," and documenting his "lifelong affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood"); Counter Extremism Project, "Yusuf al-Qaradawi's Ties to Extremists," accessed May 17, 2026, https://www.counterextremism.com/yusuf-al-qaradawi (until November 2018, "president of the International Union of Islamic Scholars (IUMS)"; "unofficial chief ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood"; documenting his support for Hamas, his chairmanship of the U.S.-designated Union of Good charity that funneled money to Hamas, and his praise for Hezbollah during the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war); Anti-Defamation League, "Sheik Yusuf al-Qaradawi: Theologian of Terror," updated May 3, 2013, https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/Sheik-Yusuf-al-Qaradawi-2013-5-3-v1.pdf (documenting Qaradawi's Muslim Brotherhood affiliation since 1942, his 1973 and 2002 refusals of the Brotherhood's General Guide position despite his role as its "premier spiritual guide," his public expressions of support for Hamas and Hezbollah, and his 2009 *Fiqh al-Jihad* legitimizing Palestinian suicide bombings against Israel).

[71] Nihad Awad, Facebook post (in Arabic), April 22, 2024, quoted and translated in "CAIR Leader Eulogizes Bin Laden's 'Spiritual Leader,'" Middle East Forum, May 2024, https://www.meforum.org/65925/cair-leader-eulogizes-bin-laden-spiritual-leader (eulogizing Abdul-Majid al-Zindani: "We belong to Allah and to Him we shall return. The Islamic nation has lost one of its biggest emblems and men with the passing of Sheikh Alam and worker Abdul Majeed Al-Zindani after he dedicated his life to the service of the Quran and the manifestation of its miracles that never cease.").

[72] "United States Designates Bin Laden Loyalist," U.S. Department of The Treasury, February 24, 2004, United States Designates bin Laden Loyalist | U.S. Department of the Treasury. Available at https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/js1190.

[73] "The Union Extends Its Condolences on the Passing of Sheikh Abdul-Majid Bin Aziz Al-Zindani," IUMS, April 23, 2024, The Union extends its condolences on the passing of Sheikh Abdul-Majid bin Aziz Al-Zindani. Available at https://iumsonline.org/en/archives/134020.

[74] "Discrimination Against Muslim Americans Rose by 9% in 2021: Report," IUMS, April 26, 2022, iumsonline.org/en/archives/134757; "Wave of Attacks on U.S. Mosques Reflects Rising Islamophobia Amid Israeli Aggression on Gaza," IUMS, July 28, 2025, iumsonline.org/en/archives/134246; "CAIR Statement Condemning U.S. Atheism Promotion Program," IUMS Arabic-language website, July 11, 2022, iumsonline.org/archives/106951 (all last visited Aug. 3, 2026). The first two items were originally published under the ContentDetails.aspx URL structure; IUMS migrated to a new platform in or around December 2025 and the items are now served at the /archives/ paths above. On the designation described in the text, see U.S. Department of State, "Terrorist Designations of Muslim Brotherhood Chapters," Jan. 13, 2026, state.gov. The blocking and transaction consequences are set by Executive Order 13224 and the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 594.201 and 594.204, ecfr.gov; OFAC's Fifty Percent Rule extends blocking to any entity owned fifty percent or more, directly or indirectly, by a blocked person.

which the CAIR items were originally published, and the items were carried onto the new site rather than dropped. On January 13, 2026, the U.S. Treasury Department designated Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood ("EMB") as an SDGT for material support to Hamas, blocking the EMB's property and interests in property within U.S. jurisdiction and prohibiting U.S. persons from dealing in them, including by providing services, under Executive Order 13224 and the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, with the same prohibitions reaching any entity the EMB owns fifty percent or more. CAIR has issued no press release, website statement, or public communication acknowledging the designation or addressing its implications for CAIR's relationship with IUMS, the institution founded by al-Qaradawi, the EMB spiritual leader whom many consider "the supreme religious and ideological authority for the Muslim Brotherhood."[75] CAIR has not publicly disavowed its participation in IUMS-hosted programming.

The EMB designation is one of a widening set of actions against the network's partners. The Treasury designated Samidoun in October 2024 and the Popular Conference for Palestinians Abroad in January 2026, and it designated the Egyptian, Jordanian, and Lebanese branches of the Muslim Brotherhood in January 2026.[76]

The absence of any responsive action to the EMB designation is significant given CAIR's institutional history and its public statement relating to the Al-Zaytouna event (*see* Section III.A *supra*). CAIR issues press releases on a continuous basis covering foreign-policy events well outside its civil-rights mandate, to include

[75] "Portrait of Sheikh Dr. Yusuf Abdallah al-Qaradawi, Senior Sunni Muslim Cleric, Affiliated With the Muslim Brotherhood," The Amit Terrorism and Intelligence Research Institute at the Israeli Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center, February 27, 2011, Portrait of Sheikh Dr. Yusuf Abdallah al-Qaradawi, senior Sunni Muslim cleric, affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood - The Amit Terrorism and Intelligence Research Institute. Available at https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/17948/.

[76] See U.S. Department of the Treasury, press release JY2646, October 15, 2024, home.treasury.gov (Samidoun); press release SB0368, January 21, 2026, home.treasury.gov (Popular Conference for Palestinians Abroad); and press release SB0357, January 13, 2026, home.treasury.gov (Egyptian and Jordanian branches of the Muslim Brotherhood); see also U.S. Department of State, Terrorist Designations of Muslim Brotherhood Chapters, January 13, 2026, state.gov. Available at https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2646; https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0368; https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0357; https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/01/terrorist-designations-of-muslim-brotherhood-chapters.

Syria,[77] settler sanctions,[78] the Assad regime's fall,[79] Israeli policies,[80] and Iran protests.[81] CAIR's silence suggests either willful disregard or a deliberate decision not to sever a relationship that provides mutual institutional benefit.

CAIR's relationship with the IUMS is one piece of a larger pattern. CAIR also provides institutional resources, organizational credibility, and fiduciary authority infrastructure to a self-admitted Muslim Brotherhood operative whose services benefit the EMB and the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, both SDGTs.

C. Self-Admitted Muslim Brotherhood Member Manages CAIR-Related Entity That Controls Nearly Five Million Dollars in CAIR Real Estate

Esam Omeish is the chairman of CAIR's Washington Trust Foundation, a separate 501(c)(3) entity whose stated mission is to "support the charitable purpose of CAIR-Foundation Inc."[82] He is also, by the formal designation of the Libyan House of Representatives, an "international member of the Muslim Brotherhood."[83]

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[77] "CAIR Press Releases: CAIR Welcomes NDAA'S Repeal of Syrian Sanctions, Calls for Removal of $600 Million+ in New Funding for Israel's Crimes," CAIR, December 11, 2025, CAIR Welcomes NDAA'S Repeal of Syrian Sanctions, Calls for Removal of $600 Million+ In New Funding for Israel's Crimes. Available at https://www.cair.com/press_releases/cair-welcomes-ndaas-repeal-of-syrian-sanctions-calls-for-removal-of-600-million-in-new-funding-for-israels-crimes/.

[78] "CAIR Press Releases: CAIR Says U.S. Should Restore Sanctions on Israeli Settlers After West Bank Olive Harvest Attack," CAIR, November 4, 2025, CAIR Says U.S. Should Restore Sanctions on Israeli Settlers After West Bank Olive Harvest Attack. Available at https://www.cair.com/press_releases/cair-says-u-s-should-restore-sanctions-on-israeli-settlers-after-west-bank-olive-harvest-attack/.

[79] "CAIR Press Releases: CAIR Reaffirms Support for Syrian Freedom From Assad Regime, Calls on U.S. to Reassess Syria Policies," CAIR, December 5, 2024, CAIR Reaffirms Support for Syrian Freedom from Assad Regime, Calls on U.S. to Reassess Syria Policies. Available at https://www.cair.com/press_releases/cair-reaffirms-support-for-syrian-freedom-from-assad-regime-calls-on-u-s-to-reassess-syria-policies/.

[80] "CAIR Press Releases: CAIR Says U.S. Must Not Allow Israel to Continue Its Slaughter in Lebanon or Derail Ceasefire," CAIR, April 8, 2026, CAIR Says U.S. Must Not Allow Israel to Continue Its Slaughter in Lebanon or Derail Ceasefire. Available at https://www.cair.com/press_releases/cair-says-u-s-must-not-allow-israel-to-continue-its-slaughter-in-lebanon-or-derail-ceasefire/.

[81] "CAIR Press Releases: CAIR Opposes Latest March to War With Iran for Israel's Benefit, Says Iranian People Must Determine Their Future Without Internal Oppression or Foreign Interference," CAIR, January 14, 2026, CAIR Opposes Latest March to War with Iran for Israel's Benefit, Says Iranian People Must Determine Their Future Without Internal Oppression or Foreign Interference. Available at https://www.cair.com/press_releases/cair-opposes-latest-march-to-war-with-iran-for-israels-benefit-says-iranian-people-must-determine-their-future-without-internal-oppression-or-foreign-interference/.

[82] *Washington Trust Foundation*, Influence Watch, https://www.influencewatch.org/non-profit/washington-trust-foundation/ (last visited May 16, 2026) (identifying Omeish as the Chairman of the Washington Trust Foundation).

From 2004 to 2008, Omeish served as national president of the Muslim American Society ("MAS").[84] Federal prosecutors described MAS as having been "founded as the overt arm of the Muslim Brotherhood in America."[85] That characterization is corroborated by MAS's own institutional history. The U.S. Brotherhood's Shura Council, then headed by Ahmed Elkadi, created MAS in a 1992 meeting attended by Mohammed Akef, the future *Murshid* (general guide) of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.[86] Shaker Elsayed, a senior MAS official, has publicly acknowledged that "Ikhwan [Brotherhood] members founded MAS, but MAS went way beyond that point of conception" and has estimated that roughly 45 percent of MAS activists are Brotherhood members.[87] Elsayed's framing reflects the strategic adaptation at the heart of the U.S. Brotherhood network: organizations that share the Brotherhood's ideology, strategy, and personnel, but have deliberately distanced themselves from the formal command structure of the Egyptian Brotherhood in order to operate with ostensible legitimacy in the West. That ideological continuity without organizational subordination is exactly what "The Project" and the 1991 Explanatory Memorandum directed. As MAS president in 2004, Omeish wrote a letter to the Washington Post: "The moderate school of thought prevalent in the Muslim

[83] "Esam S. Omeish," New Tolerance Campaign, December 1, 2025, Esam S. Omeish - New Tolerance Campaign. Available at https://www.newtolerance.org/esam-s-omeish/.

[84] "Esam S. Omeish," New Tolerance Campaign, December 1, 2025, https://www.newtolerance.org/esam-s-omeish/ (identifying Omeish as national president of the Muslim American Society from 2004 to 2008); Jewish Onliner, *Alleged Muslim Brotherhood-Linked DAWN Appoints Omar Shakir as Executive Director*, Jewish Onliner (Feb. 26, 2026), https://jewishonliner.org/p/alleged-muslim-brotherhood-linked-dawn-appoints-omar-shakir-as-executive-director (documenting Omeish's MAS presidency); "Muslim American Society President Resigns From Virginia Commission — Outed by Videos," Global Muslim Brotherhood Watch, September 28, 2007, https://www.globalmbwatch.com/2007/09/28/muslim-american-society-president-resigns-from-virginia-commission-outed-by-videos/ (contemporaneous report identifying Omeish as sitting MAS national president at the time of his September 2007 resignation from the Virginia Commission on Immigration).

[85] Brief for the United States as Appellee n.13, *United States v. Benkahla*, 530 F.3d 300 (4th Cir. 2008) (No. 07-4778) ("MAS was founded as the overt arm of the Muslim Brotherhood in America.") (citing Noreen S. Ahmed-Ullah, Sam Roe, and Laurie Cohen, "The New Face of the Muslim Brotherhood—The Muslim American Society," *Chicago Tribune*, September 19, 2004). For the same proposition in a currently retrievable filing, see Amicus Curiae Brief of the Rieders Foundation and the Middle East Forum, *Parizer v. AJP Educational Foundation, Inc.*, No. 25-2366 (4th Cir. Dec. 30, 2025), 2025 U.S. 4th Cir. Briefs LEXIS 4152 (using the phrase "overt arm of the Muslim Brotherhood in America").

[86] Lorenzo Vidino, *The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West (Columbia Univ. Press 2010)*, chapter 7 (documenting the 1992 decision by the U.S. Brotherhood's Shura Council, then led by Ahmed Elkadi, to create MAS, with Mohammed Akef—the future *Murshid* of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood—present at the founding meeting); Noreen S. Ahmed-Ullah, Sam Roe, and Laurie Cohen, "The New Face of the Muslim Brotherhood—The Muslim American Society," *Chicago Tribune,* September 19, 2004 (quoting Shaker Elsayed's acknowledgment that "Ikhwan members founded MAS," and that 45 percent of MAS activists are MB).

[87] *Id.*

Brotherhood represents a significant trend in Islamic activism in the United States and the West, and we in MAS accordingly have been influenced by that moderate Islamic school of thought."[88] In December 2016, Omeish published a Facebook tribute to the Muslim Brotherhood.[89]

In 2017, Libya's Defense and National Security Committee listed Omeish as number 29 among 75 individuals designated as terrorists, identifying him as an "international member of the Muslim Brotherhood."[90]

Omeish served as the director of the Dar al-Hijrah Islamic Center in Falls Church, Virginia.[91] In early 2001, Omeish was one of the mosque officials who hired Anwar al-Awlaki as its imam.[92] Al-Awlaki subsequently became a leading figure in al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula ("AQAP") and was linked to multiple terrorist plots, including the Fort Hood shooting and the attempted Christmas Day airline bombing. He was killed in a CIA drone strike in Yemen in 2011.[93]

[88] Esam Omeish, "MAS President Letter to the Washington Post," Muslim American Society press release, September 16, 2004, archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20090919100921/http://www.masnet.org/pressroom_release.asp?id=1664.

[89] Sam Westrop, "Dar al-Hijrah Board Member Pens Muslim Brotherhood Tribute," *Islamist Watch*, Dec. 2, 2016, https://www.meforum.org/islamist-watch/51184/dar-al-hijrah-board-member-pens-muslim (quotes the December 2016 Facebook tribute in full); *Algemeiner*, "Islamist Activist Asks Obama to Support Libyan Al Qaeda Group" (Mar. 22, 2016), http://www.algemeiner.com/2016/03/22/islamist-activist-asks-obama-to-support-libyan-al-qaeda-group/ (documents Omeish's own statements about his Brotherhood ties).

[90] "Esam S. Omeish," New Tolerance Campaign, December 1, 2025, Esam S. Omeish - New Tolerance Campaign; "The Muslim Brotherhood's Campaign Against Libyan Presidential Candidate Khalifa Haftar in the US – American Mideast Coalition for Democracy," August 15, 2022, The Muslim Brotherhood's Campaign Against Libyan Presidential Candidate Khalifa Haftar in the US. Available at https://www.newtolerance.org/esam-s-omeish/; https://americanmideast.com/2022/08/15/the-muslim-brotherhoods-campaign-against-libyan-presidential-candidate-khalifa-haftar-in-the-us/.

[91] Sam Westrop, "Dar al-Hijrah Board Member Pens Muslim Brotherhood Tribute," *Islamist Watch*, Dec. 2, 2016, https://www.meforum.org/islamist-watch/51184/dar-al-hijrah-board-member-pens-muslim (describing Omeish as Dar al-Hijrah board member); Chuck Ross, *The Omeish Family Hates Israel. And Tim Kaine Loves the Omeish Family*, Wash. Free Beacon (Nov. 8, 2023), https://freebeacon.com/democrats/the-omeish-family-hates-israel-and-tim-kaine-loves-the-omeish-family/.

[92] Caryle Murphy, "Facing New Realities as Islamic Americans," *Washington Post*, September 11, 2004, washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2004/09/12/facing-new-realities-as-islamic-americans. The original four-page version remains available; the passage relied on here is at p. 4, washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A14497-2004Sep11_4.html ("Omeish, one of the mosque officials who hired Aulaqi, said he is convinced that Aulaqi 'has no inclination or active involvement in any events or circumstances that have to do with terrorism.'"). The hiring date is at p. 3 ("In early 2001, the mosque's leaders … hired Anwar al-Aulaqi"). Anwar al-Awlaki's name is also rendered "Aulaqi" in some sources, including U.S. federal court filings, e.g., *Al-Aulaqi v. Obama*, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010); *Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta*, 35 F. Supp. 3d 56 (D.D.C. 2014).

[93] Counter Extremism Project, "Anwar al-Awlaki's Ties to Extremists," https://www.counterextremism.com/anwar-al-awlaki (documenting al-Awlaki's role as a senior AQAP

At a 2000 rally, Omeish told Washington-area Muslims to support "the jihad way."[94] Seven years later, in August 2007, Virginia Governor Timothy Kaine appointed Omeish to the Virginia Commission on Immigration. Omeish was forced to resign within a month after video footage of the 2000 remarks surfaced.[95] On October 16, 2023, nine days after the Hamas October 7th attack, Omeish posted a poem in Arabic on Facebook expressing hope that "Jihad and the Mujahideen" would be victorious.[96] Omeish is an active participant in the U.S. Council of Muslim Organizations ("USCMO"), a coalition founded in 2014 whose members include CAIR, MAS, AMP, Islamic Circle of North America ("ICNA"), and over 35 other organizations.[97] Four of USCMO's eight founding organizations, CAIR, MAS, ICNA

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figure and propagandist; his email correspondence with Major Nidal Hasan in the months preceding the November 5, 2009 Fort Hood shooting; and his operational ties to multiple terrorist plots); "Treasury Designates Anwar Al-Aulaqi, Key Leader of Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula," U.S. Department of the Treasury, July 16, 2010, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/tg779 (Treasury designation press release identifying al-Aulaqi as a key AQAP operational leader); "Al Qaeda's Anwar al-Awlaki Killed in CIA Drone Strike," ABC News, September 30, 2011, https://abcnews.com/Blotter/anwar-al-awlaki-killed-officials-yemen-confirm-al/story?id=14638303 (reporting President Obama's announcement that al-Awlaki was killed in a U.S. strike in Al-Jawf Governorate, Yemen, on September 30, 2011, and the President's statement that the killing was "a major blow to Al-Qaeda's most active operational affiliate"); National Security Archive, "The Anwar al-Awlaki File, Explained," February 14, 2025, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/2025-02-14/anwar-al-awlaki-file-explained (compiling declassified U.S. government documents on al-Awlaki's AQAP role, the Fort Hood/Hasan correspondence, and the legal and operational record culminating in the September 30, 2011 strike).

[94] Tim Craig, "Va. Muslim Activist Denies Urging Violence," *Washington Post*, September 29, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/28/AR2007092800789.html; "Esam S. Omeish," New Tolerance Campaign, December 1, 2025, Esam S. Omeish - New Tolerance Campaign.

[95] Tim Craig, "Kaine Announces Dr. Esam Omeish's Resignation," *Washington Post* Virginia Politics blog, Sept. 27, 2007, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/virginiapolitics/2007/09/kaine_announces_dr_esam_omeish.html; "Immigration official resigns after 'jihad' remark," NBC News / AP, September 27, 2007, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna21016079.

[96] https://www.facebook.com/Esamomeish/posts/10161903442357269. Chuck Ross, "The Omeish Family Hates Israel. And Tim Kaine Loves the Omeish Family," *Washington Free Beacon*, Nov. 8, 2023, freebeacon.com/democrats/the-omeish-family-hates-israel-and-tim-kaine-loves-the-omeish-family (reporting the October 16, 2023 Facebook post and translating the line as a call to "give victory to the Jihad and the Mujahideen"); "Esam S. Omeish," New Tolerance Campaign, Dec. 1, 2025, newtolerance.org/esam-s-omeish.

[97] "Founding Members," U.S. Council of Muslim Organizations, https://uscmo.org/founding_members/ (USCMO's own listing of its eight founding member organizations: American Muslims for Palestine, Council on American-Islamic Relations, Islamic Circle of North America, Muslim Alliance in North America, Muslim American Society, Muslim Legal Fund of America, Muslim Ummah of North America, and The Mosque Cares); "USCMO Council Members," U.S. Council of Muslim Organizations, https://uscmo.org/council_members/ (current full membership roster including the eight founding members alongside national organizations, local councils, relief organizations, mosques, and specialized organizations — totaling more than forty member entities as of retrieval May 13, 2026); "USCMO Delegation Meets Erdogan, Fosters Friendship Between US and Turkey," U.S. Council of Muslim Organizations, September 7, 2020,

and AMP, are part of the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood network,[98] and CAIR was named as an unindicted co-conspirator in the *Holy Land Foundation* trial.[99]

This is Omeish's public record. CAIR has entrusted him with the chairmanship of the Washington Trust Foundation. The Foundation's stated mission, in its own words to the IRS, is "to support the charitable purpose of CAIR-Foundation Inc."[100] Its 2024 return reports total assets of $21,162,467 and net assets of $6,236,291, built almost entirely on rental property income.[101,102]

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https://web.archive.org/web/20240816123515/https://uscmo.org/2020/09/07/uscmo-delegation-meets-erdogan-fosters-friendship-between-us-and-turkey/ (USCMO's own press release identifying Esam Omeish as a member of the USCMO delegation to Turkish President Erdogan); "Endowment (Waqf) Conference 2025," U.S. Council of Muslim Organizations, https://uscmo.org/etn/endowment_waqf_conference_2025/ (listing Omeish as a speaker at USCMO's November 17, 2025 Waqf Conference).

[98] US Council of Muslim Organizations, "Founding Members," uscmo.org/founding_members (listing the eight founding members as American Muslims for Palestine, the Council on American-Islamic Relations, the Islamic Circle of North America, the Muslim Alliance in North America, the Muslim American Society, the Muslim Legal Fund of America, the Muslim Ummah of North America, and The Mosque Cares). Ehud Rosen, "U.S. Islamist Organizations," in *The Spider Web: The Roots of BDS and the Campaign to Delegitimize Israel*, ch. IV, Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, Oct. 21, 2018, jcfa.org/the-spiders-web/chapter-iv-delegitimization-in-the-united-states/islamist-organizations, profiles CAIR, MAS, ICNA and AMP and describes USCMO as a coalition "most of which are affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood." That source does not address the remaining four founding members, and no count of seven is asserted here.

[99] List of Unindicted Co-conspirators and/or Joint Venturers, *United States v. Holy Land Foundation, 624 F.3d 685 (5th Cir. 2010), https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-5th-circuit/1541982.html*.

[100] Washington Trust Foundation Inc., IRS Form 990 for tax year 2024 (EIN 52-1887951), filed Nov. 11, 2025, Schedule O, Part III line 2, projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/full_text/202513159349304086/IRS990ScheduleO ("ORGANIZATION MISSION TO SUPPORT THE CHARITABLE PURPOSE OF CAIR-FOUNDATION INC (CAIR FOUNDATION), A DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA NON-PROFIT CORPORATION"). The same return is addressed in care of Esam Omeish and lists him as chairman. Full filing at projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/521887951/202513159349304086/full (last visited Aug. 3, 2026).

[101] Washington Trust Foundation Inc., IRS Form 990 for tax year 2024, *supra* note 100, Part X (reporting total assets of $21,162,467, total liabilities of $14,926,176 and net assets of $6,236,291, and rental property income of $127,411 as the organization's sole material revenue), projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/521887951/202513159349304086/full.

[102] Omeish also heads Together We Serve, a nonprofit holding roughly $4.36 million in assets that received $950,000 from CAIR in 2017. Together We Serve Inc., IRS Form 990 filings (EIN 27-3747192, Fairfax, Virginia; tax-exempt since May 2015), available via ProPublica Nonprofit Explorer, https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/273747192 (Together We Serve's IRS filings disclosing total assets of approximately $4.36 million and confirming Esam Omeish as Director and President); CAIR Foundation, Inc., IRS Form 990 for fiscal year 2017, Schedule I (Grants and Other Assistance to Domestic Organizations), available via ProPublica Nonprofit Explorer, https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/770646756 (CAIR Foundation's 2017 990 reporting a $950,000 grant from CAIR Foundation, Inc. to Together We Serve Inc.).

These positions provide Omeish with institutional resources, organizational credibility, fiduciary authority, and access to CAIR's financial infrastructure, resources that enhance his capacity to operate on behalf of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.[103] Conduct comparable in kind, such as providing services that enhance the operational capacity of a designated entity, if done so in coordination with or at the direction and control of the FTO, sustains material support liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B per *Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project*.[104]

CAIR's headquarters is no longer wholly CAIR's. On February 13, 2026, CAIR recorded a Special Warranty Deed conveying an undivided forty-five percent interest in the building to the North American Islamic Trust.[105] The same day, it recorded a Memorandum of Agreement barring the sale or financing of the remaining interest without NAIT's written consent.[106] NAIT is an Islamic endowment that federal prosecutors named on the List of Unindicted Co-conspirators in the Holy Land Foundation terrorism-financing prosecution, and the district court found "ample evidence" supporting that listing.[107] Read together, the two instruments hand a minority stake in CAIR's own headquarters to that entity and give it a veto over what happens to the rest. Both are recorded public instruments, filed in the District of Columbia and retrievable by instrument number.

CAIR's proximity to designated persons extends to its own personnel. Longtime national board member, Nabil Sadoun, was ordered deported over ties to a Hamas-linked research group he co-founded with Mousa Abu Marzook;[108] and Ismail

[103] *Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project*, 561 U.S. 1, 14–15, 39–40 (2010).
[104] *Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project*, 561 U.S. 1, 30-32 (2010).
[105] Special Warranty Deed conveying an undivided forty-five percent interest in CAIR's headquarters to the North American Islamic Trust, recorded February 13, 2026, Instrument No. 2026014277, D.C. Recorder of Deeds. Retrievable by instrument number at washington.dc.publicsearch.us (last visited Aug. 4, 2026).
[106] Memorandum of Agreement barring the sale or financing of the remaining interest in CAIR's headquarters without the written consent of the North American Islamic Trust, recorded February 13, 2026, Instrument No. 2026014278, D.C. Recorder of Deeds. Retrievable by instrument number at washington.dc.publicsearch.us (last visited Aug. 4, 2026).
[107] List of Unindicted Co-conspirators, *United States v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development*, No. 3:04-cr-240-G (N.D. Tex. May 29, 2007), investigativeproject.org. The district court found "ample evidence" supporting the listing, 2009 WL 10680203 (N.D. Tex. July 1, 2009).
[108] Scott Gordon, "Dallas Islamic Leader Deported," NBC 5 Dallas-Fort Worth, Feb. 19, 2010, nbcdfw.com/news/local/dallas-islamic-leader-deported/1885892 (reporting that Judge Anthony Rogers of the Executive Office for Immigration Review ordered Sadoun removed, that the judge "concluded Sadoun lied on government forms when he denied he was a member" of Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, that the decision "could not be appealed," and that the judge indicated there was evidence Sadoun contributed to the Holy Land Foundation). Sadoun, a longtime CAIR national board member, co-founded the United Association for Studies and Research with Hamas political leader Mousa Abu Marzook.

Royer, a CAIR communications specialist, was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment for his role in the Virginia Jihad Network.[109]

Attempts by both government agencies and private plaintiffs to generate accountability for CAIR and its sister organization, AMP, have proven largely ineffective. This ineffectiveness can be attributed to nationwide litigation tactics which seek to evade discovery into their finances, silence critics and whistleblowers, and stymie law enforcement investigations.

IV. Dilatory Litigation Tactics Are Used as a Substantive Defense Mechanism to Shield MB-Affiliated Entities' Nefarious Activities

U.S.-based Muslim Brotherhood entities have turned the litigation process itself into a tool. They use it to obstruct law enforcement investigations, obscure illicit financial activities, and silence critics.

A. Muslim Brotherhood-Affiliated Entities Use Procedural Delay as a Substantive Defense

The *Boim* litigation in the Northern District of Illinois illustrates this pattern in stark detail. In 2004, the Boim family won a $156 million Anti-Terrorism Act judgment against the Holy Land Foundation and the Islamic Association for Palestine for Hamas's murder of their teenage son David. Shortly after the district court entered judgment, IAP "announced they were closing."[110] Less than a year later, AMP emerged, populated by IAP's former leadership. The Seventh Circuit and the trial court have since allowed the Boims to proceed on the theory that AMP is a "disguised continuance"[111] of IAP and HLF, with the district court finding the Boims' complaint "replete with factual allegations" supporting alter-ego status.[112] AMP's response has been systematic discovery obstruction. The Boims have been forced to file ten separate motions to compel or enforce discovery.[113] In November 2024, the

[109] U.S. Department of Justice, "Randall Todd Royer and Ibrahim Ahmed Al-Hamdi Sentenced for Participation in Virginia Jihad Network," April 9, 2004, justice.gov (twenty-year sentence); on Royer's CAIR employment, InfluenceWatch. Available at https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2004/April/04_crm_225.htm; https://www.influencewatch.org/non-profit/council-on-american-islamic-relations-cair/.

[110] *Boim v. Am. Muslims for Palestine*, 9 F.4th 545, 555 (7th Cir. 2021). HLF shut down three years earlier after it was designated by the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Asset Control and its assets were frozen.

[111] *Boim v. Am. Muslims for Palestine*, 9 F.4th 545, 555 (7th Cir. 2021).

[112] *Boim v. Am. Muslims for Palestine*, 9 F.4th 545 (7th Cir. 2021); *Boim v. Am. Muslims for Palestine*, 17-CV-3591 (N.D. Ill.) (DE 250 at 2).

[113] *Boim v. Am. Muslims for Palestine*, (N.D. Ill.) (DE 56, 107, 272, 345, 386, 388, 405, 479, 489, 507), as well as motions to enforce existing orders — including a prior order compelling production of

magistrate judge ordered AMP to pay the Boims' fees and costs for litigating "baseless discovery disputes," citing the "prolonged course of fact discovery" and the court's "repeated warnings that it would strictly enforce Rule 37."[114] The significance of this record cannot be overstated: even where a court has already found a $156 million material support judgment, even where successor liability has been allowed to proceed, and even where the court has imposed monetary sanctions, the network's litigation strategy has continued to delay enforcement , now in its ninth year of post-pleading litigation, with a jury trial now set for February 8, 2027 to decide whether AMP is liable as the alter ego of the Islamic Association for Palestine and the Holy Land Foundation.[115]

Two lessons emerge from the *Boim* record, and both demand a congressional response. First, procedural delay has become a substantive defense. By filing serial motions, contesting every discovery request, and forcing plaintiffs to litigate the same issues across multiple courts, this network has learned that it can make accountability prohibitively expensive even when the underlying liability is clear. Second, this strategy works because federal nonprofit law lets it work. An organization adjudicated liable for material support can shutter, declare insolvency, and reconstitute as a new §501(c)(3) within months, with the same officers, the same donor base, and the same operational mission, leaving plaintiffs to relitigate alter-ego status from scratch. Until Congress closes the successor-organization loophole and creates real consequences for serial discovery obstruction in ATA cases, the *Boim* pattern will repeat.

The *Boim* litigation is not an isolated incident. In 2023, the Virginia Attorney General's Office launched an investigation into AMP's parent organization, Americans for Justice in Palestine ("AJP"), for failing to abide by the state's charitable solicitations law. Virginia's charitable solicitations law requires entities soliciting donations from within the state to submit certifications each year that "No funds have been or will knowingly be used, directly or indirectly, to benefit or provide support, in cash or in kind, to terrorists, terrorist organizations, terrorist activities, or the family members of any terrorist." Va. Code § 57-49(A1). AJP had failed to submit

AMP's donor records (DE 381–82).

[114] *Boim v. Am. Muslims for Palestine*, 17-CV-3591 (N.D. Ill.) (DE 485 at 3).

[115] A jury trial is set for February 8, 2027 to determine whether *American Muslims for Palestine* is liable as the alter ego of the Islamic Association for Palestine and the Holy Land Foundation. *Boim v. American Muslims for Palestine*, No. 1:17-cv-03591 (N.D. Ill.), Minute Entry of June 30, 2026 (Wood, J.) (DE 647) ("By agreement of the parties, jury trial set for 2/8/2027 at 9:00 AM"); see also "Judge Schedules 2027 Trial in Decades-Long Case Linking AMP to Hamas Murder of American Teen," Jewish Insider, July 2026, jewishinsider.com. Available at https://jewishinsider.com/2026/07/judge-schedules-2027-trial-in-decadeslong-case-linking-amp-to-hamas-murder-of-american-teen/.

this certification for seven years.[116] The Virginia Attorney General's Office commenced an investigation and issued civil investigative demands ("CIDs") to AMP for compliance.[117] One CID requested information regarding AMP's donors.[118]

AMP did not comply. Represented by the same lawyers who represent it in *Boim*, AMP responded with the same dilatory tactics. The Virginia AG was forced to file a Motion to Enforce the CID, which AMP again did not comply with.[119] The Richmond Circuit Court found AMP in civil contempt.[120] The court ordered AMP to pay the AG's "reasonable costs and attorney's fees" and stated that AMP's failure to comply with the Court's order would result in additional sanctions.[121]

After losing at every level in state court, AMP took the matter to federal court. Years into the state-court fight, AMP sued the Virginia Attorney General's office in federal court, raising a litany of constitutional claims that AMP said had not been properly decided in state court.[122] The federal district court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of the AG's CID because the merits of those constitutional claims had not been resolved.[123] The Virginia AG's office appealed.

The Virginia Court of Appeals rejected AMP's petition to prevent enforcement of the CID in July 2025.[124] On September 29, 2025, the Richmond Circuit Court held AMP in civil contempt and imposed $1,000-per-day coercive fines until AMP produced its donor records; AMP then obtained emergency relief from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on October 3, 2025, staying the contempt sanctions

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[116] *AJP Educ. Found. Inc. v. Miyares,* 25-CV-1617 (DE 15-1 at 12).
[117] *AJP Educ. Found. Inc. v. Miyares,* 25-CV-1617 (DE 15 at 2-8) (Virginia Attorney General's response to AMP's motion for preliminary injunction, which details procedural history of investigation and noncompliance).
[118] *AJP Educ. Found. Inc. v. Miyares,* 25-CV-1617 (DE 15 at 5).
[119] *AJP Educ. Found. Inc. v. Miyares,* 25-CV-1617 (DE 15 at 8).
[120] "American Muslims for Palestine Found in Civil Contempt of Court," Lake Gaston Gazette-Observer, September 29, 2025, American Muslims for Palestine Found in Civil Contempt of Court | News | lakegastongazette-observer.com. Available at https://www.lakegastongazette-observer.com/news/article_cdf8db9e-3b17-4476-b80b-201cd4a8afb0.html.
[121] *AJP Educ. Found., Inc. v. Miyares*, 806 F. Supp. 3d 603, 616 (E.D. Va. 2025).
[122] *AJP Educ. Found., Inc. v. Miyares*, 806 F. Supp. 3d 603, 617 (E.D. Va. 2025).
[123] *AJP Educ. Found., Inc. v. Miyares*, 806 F. Supp. 3d 603, 626 (E.D. Va. 2025) ("Without injunctive relief, AMP would have to choose between the lesser of two evils. On one hand, it could succumb to the AG's demand and disclose its donor lists before the appellate courts can rule on the constitutionality of the CID.").
[124] *In re: AJP Educational Foundation, Inc. d/b/a American Muslims for Palestine*, Va. Ct. App. (Dec. 2025) (rejecting AMP's petition to prevent immediate enforcement of the Virginia Attorney General's Civil Investigative Demand); *see also* Marc Rod, "Virginia attorney general petitions court to enforce order against American Muslims for Palestine," *Jewish Insider*, January 2025, https://jewishinsider.com/2025/01/jason-miyares-american-muslims-for-palestine-terror-ties-financial-documents/.

and enjoining enforcement of the CID to the extent it would compel disclosure of information protected by the First Amendment, in each case until the dispute is fully adjudicated through the Virginia state courts. The court explained that ruling in a memorandum opinion issued October 17, 2025.[125] On December 9, 2025, the Court of Appeals of Virginia ruled that AMP had procedurally defaulted its First Amendment arguments under Rule 5A:18, declining to reach the merits and leaving the Richmond Circuit Court judgment undisturbed.[126] AMP filed a petition for appeal at the Supreme Court of Virginia on February 6, 2026, which the Attorney General has opposed and which remains pending.[127] Virginia state courts have now twice ruled against AMP , first at the Circuit Court level and then at the Court of Appeals , and the constitutional defense that grounded the federal order has been eliminated at every level of state-court adjudication that has reached the merits. More than two and a half years after the Virginia Attorney General issued its CIDs in October 2023, AMP has not complied with substantial portions of those CIDs.[128] That federal order has never been dissolved, and no appellate court has reviewed it. The Attorney General noticed an appeal on October 31, 2025, but the Fourth Circuit withheld docketing pending the district court's disposition of the motions before it, and the appeal remains undocketed. The Attorney General's motion to dismiss, which argued that the federal court was required to abstain under *Younger v. Harris*, was argued on December 5, 2025 and taken under advisement without a ruling. The district court then moved the case into a settlement posture, closing it administratively on May 22, 2026 and directing the parties to file either a stipulation of dismissal or a joint status

[125] *Commonwealth of Virginia v. AJP Educational Foundation, Inc.*, Richmond City Circuit Court, Order (Sept. 29, 2025) (Davis, J.) (holding AMP in civil contempt and imposing $1,000-per-day coercive fines for noncompliance with the CID); *AJP Educational Foundation, Inc. d/b/a American Muslims for Palestine v. Miyares*, No. 1:25-cv-01617 (E.D. Va.), Order Granting Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Oct. 3, 2025), explained in Memorandum Opinion (Oct. 17, 2025) (Brinkema, J.) (enjoining enforcement of the Richmond Circuit Court contempt order on First Amendment associational-freedom grounds); reported in Charlotte Rene Woods, "Judge issues injunction against Miyares in probe of pro-Palestinian nonprofit," *Virginia Mercury*, Oct. 21, 2025, https://virginiamercury.com/2025/10/21/judge-issues-injunction-against-miyares-in-probe-of-pro-palestinian-nonprofit/; "Attorney General Miyares Secures Court Decision Requiring American Muslims for Palestine to Comply with Investigation," *Legal Newsline*, https://legalnewsline.com/stories/671509470-attorney-general-miyares-secures-court-decision-requiring-american-muslims-for-palestine-to-comply-with-investigation.

[126] *AJP Educ. Found. Inc. v. Miyares,* 25-CV-1617 (DE 44-1) (appending VA Court of Appeals decision finding AMP's constitutional arguments were not preserved for appeal).

[127] *See AJP Educational Foundation, Inc. v. Jones*, No. 260119 (Va.) (petition for appeal filed February 6, 2026; brief in opposition filed March 9, 2026; pending as of July 2026). The Attorney General is sued in his official capacity; Jason Miyares, who issued and litigated the civil investigative demand described above, left office in January 2026 and was succeeded by Attorney General Jay Jones, who is now the named appellee. Supreme Court of Virginia Appellate Case Management System, Record No. 260119.

[128] *AJP Educ. Found. Inc. v. Miyares,* 25-CV-1617 (DE 53) (status report and CID compliance chart, detailing CIDs that have not yet been complied with).

report on their settlement discussions. That deadline has been extended twice, most recently on July 22, 2026, and now runs to August 28, 2026. A state investigation twice sustained in Virginia's courts has therefore been suspended by a federal order no appellate court has examined, and its resolution now rests with a different Attorney General than the one who issued the demands.[129]

B. Litigation Tactics Permit Obfuscation of Finances

Terror financing is hard to trace. Terrorist networks rely on financing mechanisms outside the mainstream financial system: bulk cash, charitable fronts, informal banking channels. Those mechanisms resist the kind of paper-trail discovery that civil litigation and regulatory oversight depend on. AMP has used both the court system and the banking system to maintain that opacity for years. Based on publicly available filings, AMP has been rebranded[130] and spun off related organizations, such as Students for Justice in Palestine ("SJP"), National Students for Justice in Palestine ("NSJP"), and U.S. Council of Muslim Organizations ("USCMO").[131] Each move has had the effect of sustaining Hamas's American support network while staying ahead of legal accountability. AMP's dilatory litigation tactics in the Virginia AG's investigation are the most recent illustration: noncompliance with valid law enforcement investigations permits AMP to obscure its finances. It is a tactic other MB-affiliated entities have used.

[129] *AJP Educational Foundation, Inc. v. Miyares*, No. 1:25-cv-01617 (E.D. Va.), Dkt. Nos. 19 (order granting emergency motion; staying the September 29, 2025 Richmond Circuit Court sanctions and enjoining CID enforcement as to First Amendment-protected material, Oct. 3, 2025), 25 (memorandum opinion, Oct. 17, 2025), 29 (motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, Oct. 23, 2025), 37 (notice of appeal, Oct. 31, 2025), 39 (Fourth Circuit letter withholding docketing of the appeal, Nov. 4, 2025), 41 (reply brief attaching *Juidice v. Vail*, 430 U.S. 327, Nov. 12, 2025), 43 (minute entry taking the motion to dismiss under advisement, Dec. 5, 2025), 57 (order directing a stipulation of dismissal or a joint settlement status report, May 22, 2026), 58 (Fourth Circuit letter noting the appeal was never docketed, May 27, 2026), 61 (deadline extended to July 31, 2026, June 26, 2026), and 64 (deadline extended to August 28, 2026, July 22, 2026). The docket lists Miyares as terminated on January 30, 2026 and Attorney General Jay Jones as the defendant. Docket retrieved via LexisNexis CourtLink on July 30, 2026; the most recent entry is Dkt. No. 65, a July 23, 2026 letter to the Fourth Circuit.

[130] *Boim*, 9 F.4th at 555.

[131] AJP is the parent organization of National Students for Justice in Palestine. *See Parizer et al. v. AJP Educational Foundation, Inc. a/k/a American Muslims for Palestine and National Students for Justice in Palestine*, No. 1:24-cv-00724-RDA-IDD (DE 1 at 2) (E.D. Va. filed May 1, 2024) ("In 2010, AMP expanded its operation to American college campuses when it founded Defendant National Students for Justice in Palestine ("NSJP") to control hundreds of Students for Justice in Palestine ("SJP") chapters across the country."). AMP is a founding member of USCMO. https://uscmo.org/founding_members/.

CAIR has done the same. In Texas, CAIR sued the governor in response to its designation as a terrorist organization.[132] The case proceeded to discovery in advance of litigating CAIR's motion for preliminary injunction.[133] Rather than comply with the judge's discovery order, CAIR has engaged in a monthslong "unfortunate, but unmistakable, pattern of outright disobedience," requiring the governor to file *four* separate motions to compel discovery, the latest of which remains unresolved.[134]

In *Lori Saroya v. CAIR Foundation Inc.* (detailed below), the plaintiff, a former CAIR employee, alleged that the organization was receiving funding from foreign governments, among other misconduct, including sexual harassment.[135] The court ordered that CAIR disclose donor information because it related to the question of whether CAIR received funding from foreign governments.[136] CAIR challenged the discovery order but settled the case for an unknown sum of money before its donor records were ever revealed.[137]

C. Muslim Brotherhood–Affiliated Entities Silence Critics Through Expensive and Frivolous Lawfare

CAIR has filed defamation suits or threatened them against bloggers, authors, and former employees who have called the organization Islamist or Brotherhood-aligned.[138] CAIR's litigation against Lori Saroya is one such example. Saroya was employed by CAIR for several years, first as Executive Director of the Minnesota chapter and later as a member of the national board. During her tenure she learned of significant misconduct: CAIR had received "massive amounts of funding from international donors, information about which was kept a strict secret (even from CAIR's Board); [and] that it had been dishonest and misleading with its donors,

[132] *See generally Council on American Islamic Relations Texas Dallas Fort Worth and Council on American Islamic Relations Austin Texas v. Abbott and Paxton*, 25-CV-01878 (W.D. Tx) (2025).
[133] *See, e.g.*, *Council on American Islamic Relations Texas Dallas Fort Worth and Council on American Islamic Relations Austin Texas v. Abbott and Paxton*, 25-CV-01878 (W.D. Tx) (DE 33) (2025).
[134] *See, e.g.*, *Council on American Islamic Relations Texas Dallas Fort Worth and Council on American Islamic Relations Austin Texas v. Abbott and Paxton*, 25-CV-01878 (W.D. Tx) (DE 76 at 7) (2025).
[135] *Saroya v. CAIR Foundation, Inc.*, 24-cv-00110 (D. Minn.) (DE 1).
[136] *Saroya v. CAIR Foundation, Inc.*, 24-cv-00110 (D. Minn.), (DE 43 at 17, 22).
[137] Isabel Vincent, "Controversial Muslim Charity Accused of Links to Hamas Settles Lawsuit Rather Than Disclosing Sources of Funding," *New York Post*, March 1, 2025, Controversial Muslim charity accused of links to Hamas settles lawsuit rather than disclosing sources of funding. Available at https://nypost.com/2025/02/28/us-news/hamas-linked-organization-cair-inc-wont-reveal-where-their-funding-is-coming-from/.
[138] "The Muslim Brotherhood's Strategic Entryism Into the United States: A Systemic Analysis," *ISGAP*, 2025, pages 114-115, The Muslim Brotherhood's Strategic Entryism Into the United States: A Systemic Analysis. Available at https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/MB-Project-Final-251117-01.pdf.

whose contributions it had frequently misused for the purpose of silencing critics. . ."[139] When Saroya tried to resign, CAIR asked her to sign a separation agreement with confidentiality and non-disparagement provisions that would "surrender[] her right to speak."[140]

After leaving CAIR, Saroya posted on social media about her experience, including CAIR's receipt of international funding through its Washington Trust Foundation.[141] CAIR responded by trying to condition payment of her owed back-wages on a non-disparagement agreement that would have barred Saroya from making any statements that "characterize[d] CAIR in a negative light."[142]

Saroya refused. So CAIR sued her for defamation, tortious interference with business relationships, and misappropriation of confidential information.[143] The suit sought damages and injunctive relief that would have prevented Saroya from speaking about her experience at CAIR.[144] In discovery, Saroya sought CAIR's donor lists, which would have proven the truth of her statements relating to CAIR's foreign funding.[145] CAIR "fought tooth and nail to prevent this information from being disclosed. Clearly, CAIR had something to hide, given that it objected to producing many of these relevant documents outright, and slow-walked the production of other documents that it had previously indicated it would produce."[146] CAIR then voluntarily dismissed its own lawsuit with prejudice after several unfavorable rulings, while discovery litigation remained pending.[147]

CAIR followed up with a press release accusing Saroya of cyberstalking, which became the subject of new litigation Saroya brought against CAIR.[148] Saroya again

[139] *Saroya v. CAIR Foundation, Inc.*, Case No. 0:24-cv-00110-DWF-DTS (D. Minn. Jan. 16, 2024) (DE 1 at ¶ 25).
[140] *Saroya v. CAIR Foundation, Inc.*, Case No. 0:24-cv-00110-DWF-DTS (D. Minn. Jan. 16, 2024), (DE 1 at ¶¶ 32-35).
[141] *Saroya v. CAIR Foundation, Inc.*, Case No. 0:24-cv-00110-DWF-DTS (D. Minn. Jan. 16, 2024) (DE 1 at ¶ 42).
[142] *Saroya v. CAIR Foundation, Inc.*, Case No. 0:24-cv-00110-DWF-DTS (D. Minn. Jan. 16, 2024) (DE 1 at ¶ 49).
[143] *See CAIR Foundation, Inc., et al. v. Saroya*, Case No. 0:21-cv-01267-SRN-TNL (D. Minn.).
[144] *Saroya v. CAIR Foundation, Inc.*, Case No. 0:24-cv-00110-DWF-DTS (D. Minn. Jan. 16, 2024). (DE 1 at ¶ 52).
[145] *Saroya v. CAIR Foundation, Inc.*, Case No. 0:24-cv-00110-DWF-DTS (D. Minn. Jan. 16, 2024). (DE 1 at ¶ 57).
[146] *Saroya v. CAIR Foundation, Inc.*, Case No. 0:24-cv-00110-DWF-DTS (D. Minn. Jan. 16, 2024). (DE 1 at ¶ 58).
[147] *See CAIR Foundation, Inc., et al. v. Saroya*, Case No. 0:21-cv-01267-SRN-TNL (D. Minn.) (DE 88).
[148] *Saroya v. CAIR Foundation, Inc.*, Case No. 0:24-cv-00110-DWF-DTS (D. Minn. Jan. 16, 2024). (DE 1 at ¶¶ 68-77).

sought CAIR's donor records. CAIR refused. She filed a motion to compel.[149] The court ruled in favor of Saroya and ordered CAIR to produce the records.[150] CAIR filed Rule 72(a) objections to that order , twice , and then settled the case at a sealed February 3, 2025 settlement conference before the district judge ruled on those objections, and before CAIR was required to produce a single donor record.[151]

Saroya's case is not an outlier. CAIR has worked to silence its critics even when those critics are the Muslim Americans CAIR purports to protect. From 2006-2008, CAIR's Maryland/Virginia chapter employed Morris J. Days III as its "Resident Attorney" and "Civil Rights Manager."[152] Days represented more than 100 CAIR clients in immigration, employment, and discrimination matters.[153] Five former clients, three of them Muslim, sued CAIR. They alleged that CAIR knew or should have known Days was not a licensed attorney, that CAIR failed to report him to state bars or law enforcement, and that CAIR required complaining clients to sign confidentiality agreements with $25,000 liquidated-damages clauses to silence them.[154] The litigation ran more than nine years. Plaintiffs moved twice to compel discovery, and both times the court ordered CAIR to produce, including an August 2011 order directing CAIR to turn over non-redacted client lists. CAIR's own motion for Rule 37 sanctions against the plaintiffs was denied. The case ended in June 2019 with a dismissal with prejudice following a settlement referral, nine years and five months after it was filed.[155]

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[149] *Saroya v. CAIR Foundation, Inc.*, Case No. 0:24-cv-00110-DWF-DTS (D. Minn. Jan. 16, 2024). (DE 32).

[150] *Saroya v. CAIR Foundation, Inc.*, Case No. 0:24-cv-00110-DWF-DTS (D. Minn. Jan. 16, 2024). (DE 43).

[151] *Saroya v. CAIR Foundation, Inc.*, Case No. 0:24-cv-00110-DWF-DTS (D. Minn. Jan. 16, 2024). (DE 47, 72) (CAIR's Rule 72(a) objections to Magistrate Judge's discovery order); (DE 85) (Minute Entry, Binding Settlement Reached, Feb. 3, 2025); ECF Nos. 88, 90 (Stipulation of Dismissal and Order of Dismissal, Mar. 14, 2025).

[152] Press Release, Am. Freedom Law Ctr., *D.C. Circuit: CAIR Must Stand Trial for Massive Fraud* (June 21, 2016), https://www.americanfreedomlawcenter.org/press-release/d-c-circuit-cair-must-stand-trial-for-massive-fraud/.

[153] Ryan Abbott, "Islamic Group Called a Criminal Front," Jan. 8, 2010, *Courthouse News Service*, available at https://courthousenews.com/islamic-group-called-a-criminal-front/.

[154] *Lopez v. Council on American–Islamic Relations Action Network, Inc.*, 741 F. Supp. 2d 222 (D.D.C. 2010).

[155] Saiyed v. Council on American–Islamic Relations Action Network, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-00022-PLF-AK (D.D.C.) (consolidated with Lopez v. Council on American–Islamic Relations Action Network, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-00023-PLF), Dkt. Nos. 37 (motion to compel, June 6, 2011), 42 (memorandum order granting in part, denying in part, and deferring in part, July 13, 2011), 45 (memorandum order directing CAIR to produce non-redacted client lists, Aug. 8, 2011), 48 (motion to compel answers to interrogatories and production of documents, Sept. 27, 2011), 53 (CAIR motion for sanctions pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37, Nov. 28, 2011), 54 (memorandum order granting in part and denying in part, Dec. 2, 2011), 58 (order denying CAIR's sanctions motion, Feb. 16, 2012), 92–93 (order and opinion granting CAIR summary judgment, Jan. 29, 2015), 94 (notice of appeal, Feb. 12, 2015), 100

This strategy serves multiple purposes beyond specific case outcomes. The first is the chilling effect. As the First Amendment Encyclopedia explains, a threat of defamation can prevent people from expressing even constitutionally protected speech: "If a person fears that she can be sued for defamation. . .he or she may avoid uttering the expression."[156] The second is resource depletion. Defending even frivolous lawsuits requires substantial resources, and defamation actions are known to impose significant costs and risks on defendants. Even unsuccessful suits can bankrupt critics and chill future speech.[157] As described above, CAIR weaponizes the First Amendment protection to shield itself from criticism, while also silencing its critics, in contravention of the critics' First Amendment rights. This tactic is dishonest and hypocritical and has sharply reduced the ability of plaintiffs who have bravely stepped forth to expose CAIR's wrongdoing from achieving justice and exposing the Muslim Brotherhood's illicit tactics.

D. CAIR uses litigation and settlement tactics to infiltrate classrooms and insert anti-American curriculum.

As an initial matter, CAIR develops curriculum that it seeks to insert into American educational environments, fulfilling its co-founder Omar Ahmad's promise to "infiltrate" American education, media outlets, and research institutions.[158] A recent investigation revealed that CAIR chapters in Philadelphia, Delaware, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Florida, and Illinois are actively promoting anti-American 9/11 materials, "suggesting a coordinated nationwide effort to influence how American students learn about terrorism and Islamic extremism."[159]

The investigation revealed that CAIR's educational materials include guides that instruct teachers to avoid using terms like "Islamic jihadists" or "radical Islamic

(mandate of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, No. 15-7019, Aug. 2, 2016), 146 (order referring case for settlement, Feb. 26, 2019), and 153–154 (joint motion to dismiss with prejudice and order granting same, June 5–6, 2019). Case filed Jan. 6, 2010; terminated June 6, 2019. Docket available at courtlistener.com/docket/4497840/saiyed-v-council-on-american-islamic-relations-action-network-inc/ (last visited Aug. 4, 2026).

[156] "The Muslim Brotherhood's Strategic Entryism Into the United States: A Systemic Analysis," *ISGAP*, footnote 282, 2025, The Muslim Brotherhood's Strategic Entryism Into the United States: A Systemic Analysis. Available at https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/MB-Project-Final-251117-01.pdf.

[157] The Muslim Brotherhood's Strategic Entryism Into the United States: A Systemic Analysis, ISGAP, supra.

[158] *United States v. Holy Land Foundation, No. 04-cr-240-G ("HLF"), Government Exhibits: Philly Meeting 1-16,* https://extremism.gwu.edu/legal-documents.

[159] *CAIR Systematically Trying to Influence K-12 Education Across US, Investigation Finds*, Jewish Onliner, September 10, 2025, https://jewishonliner.org/p/cair-influence-philadelphia-911-education.

terrorists" when discussing 9/11.[160] The same investigation showed that the dissemination of this curriculum appeared to be a national strategy, and that nearly identical materials made their way into classrooms around the country.[161] CAIR also boasted about its partnership with Chicago Public Schools, one of the nation's largest school districts.[162]

In 2022, CAIR-New Jersey partnered with Teaching While Muslim and introduced a 9/11 educators' guide to nearly 30 New Jersey school districts.[163] This co-branded curriculum reads:

> "The catastrophic events of 9/11 had such a massive impact that it sparked the phrase a 'post 9/11 world.' **Directly influenced by US foreign policy**, the tragic events of 9/11 unleashed a domino effect of events that marked an aggressive shift in US domestic and foreign policy, sparking the War on Terror and an erosion of civil liberties of many Americans. Understanding the context of 9/11 and its ramifications is an essential part of understanding the world as we see it today."[164]

Other parts of the curriculum state:

- "Though 9/11 was not the first attack on the United States, it was a major event that marked an aggressive shift in how the US treated its citizens and other countries."[165]

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[160] CAIR Systematically Trying to Influence K-12 Education Across US, Investigation Finds, Jewish Onliner, supra.
[161] CAIR Systematically Trying to Influence K-12 Education Across US, Investigation Finds, Jewish Onliner, supra.
[162] CAIR Systematically Trying to Influence K-12 Education Across US, Investigation Finds, Jewish Onliner, supra.
[163] Press Release, Council on Am.-Islamic Rels., *CAIR-NJ, TWM Introduces Educators' Guide for Classroom Discussions of 9/11* (Sept. 8, 2022), https://www.cair.com/press_releases/cairnj-twm-introduces-educators-guide-for-classroom-discussions-of-9-11/.
[164] Council on American-Islamic Relations–New Jersey & Teaching While Muslim, *Muslim Studies Curriculum: The Impact of 9/11 on Muslims,* 2021, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/59f61895010027fd16153cec/t/612fb7fb363d9c67e6b25c72/1630517243495/Impact_Of911OnMuslims.pdf. (emphasis added).
[165] Council on American-Islamic Relations–New Jersey & Teaching While Muslim, *Muslim Studies Curriculum: The Impact of 9/11 on Muslims,* 2021, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/59f61895010027fd16153cec/t/612fb7fb363d9c67e6b25c72/1630517243495/Impact_Of911OnMuslims.pdf.

- "[Al Qaeda] launched the [9/11] attacks ***in response to*** America's support of Israel, their involvement in the Persian Gulf War, and the vast presence of the US military in the Middle East."[166]

This curriculum was linked in CAIR-NJ's 2025-2026 Back to School Guide.[167] Taken together, this curriculum is deeply problematic because it reframes 9/11 not as an unprovoked act of mass terrorism against innocent Americans, but as a predictable consequence of U.S. foreign policy, effectively shifting moral responsibility away from the Al-Qaeda terrorists who planned and executed the attacks and onto the United States itself. By sanitizing the ideology behind the attacks, discouraging accurate terminology like "radical Islamic terrorism," and casting America as the aggressor whose policies "unleashed" the tragedy, CAIR engages in the ideological indoctrination its co-founder promised.

Aside from the curriculum it produces and promotes, CAIR engages in affirmative litigation against educational institutions to increase its ability to influence universities, their policies, and curricula. This recent campaign is about pursuing institutional concession.

For example, in October 2025, CAIR-Chicago filed a federal class action seeking nearly $10 million in damages and an injunction against Northwestern's mandatory antisemitism prevention training. The complaint alleged two violations of federal civil-rights law and Illinois speech law: Northwestern's adoption of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition of antisemitism, and its rule that students complete the training to register for classes.[168] The district court denied plaintiffs' temporary restraining order at a hearing in October.[169] Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case in December 2025 without prejudice,

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[166] CAIR–New Jersey and Teaching While Muslim, Muslim Studies Curriculum: The Impact of 9/11 on Muslims, supra.
[167] CAIR-New Jersey, 2025–2026 Back to School Guide (2025), https://cair-nj.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/2025-26-BACK-TO-SCHOOL-GUIDE-2.pdf (last visited July 30, 2026).
[168] Complaint, *Tahboub v. Northwestern Univ.*, No. 1:25-cv-12614 (N.D. Ill. filed October 15, 2025), ECF No. 1 (Alexakis, J.). CAIR-Chicago publicized and coordinated the case. *Students Sue Northwestern Over Coercive Antisemitism Training*, CAIR-Chicago, October 15, 2025, https://www.cairchicago.org/blog/breaking-news-students-sue-northwestern-over-coercive-antisemitism-training; Danielle Cohen-Kanik, *CAIR Files Title VI Lawsuit Against Northwestern Over Antisemitism Training Video, Jewish Insider,* October 20, 2025, https://jewishinsider.com/2025/10/cair-northwestern-university-title-vi-lawsuit-antisemitism-training-video/. Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse, Case No. 47451, https://clearinghouse.net/case/47451/.
[169] *Tahboub v. Northwestern Univ.*, No. 1:25-cv-12614 (N.D. Ill) (ECF No. 29).

preserving their ability to refile.[170] The objective of the litigation, regardless of outcome, was to use Title VI as the procedural vehicle to override a university's choice about what mandatory training covers and how it is delivered.

The Pomona College matter is another illustration. CAIR was not a party here. In April 2024, the Louis D. Brandeis Center for Human Rights Under Law and the Anti-Defamation League filed a Title VI antisemitism complaint against Pomona. In December 2025, Pomona executed a Voluntary Resolution Agreement that mandates annual Title VI training for all students, faculty, and staff and creates a Civil Rights and Title VI Coordinator position.[171] Seven days after the agreement was executed, CAIR-California wrote to the college's president demanding that Pomona include Islamophobia, anti-Muslim bias, and anti-Palestinian discrimination in the mandated training and "engage [CAIR] as a partner in the development and delivery of these trainings."[172] Pomona has not publicly responded to that demand. The college's public materials describing the resolution agreement make no reference to CAIR, no announcement has been made of a CAIR role in the mandated training, and the resolution agreement has not been modified to incorporate the changes CAIR sought.[173] But the letter serves as a template. When other parties secure Title VI resolution agreements that touch on shared-ancestry discrimination, CAIR moves to convert the resulting compliance work into a partner role inside the institution.

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[170] Minute Entry Denying Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, ECF No. 21 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 20, 2025); Plaintiffs' Notice of Voluntary Dismissal (Joint), ECF No. 29 (Dec. 22, 2025); Minute Entry Dismissing Case Without Prejudice Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), ECF No. 30 (Dec. 23, 2025). Full procedural history at Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse, Case No. 47451, https://clearinghouse.net/case/47451/.

[171] Pomona College, *Resolution Agreement* (Dec. 10, 2025), https://www.pomona.edu/resolution-agreement; full agreement at https://brandeiscenter.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Pomona-Settlement-12-10-2025.pdf. The underlying Title VI complaint was filed in April 2024 by the Louis D. Brandeis Center for Human Rights Under Law and the Anti-Defamation League. CAIR was not a party.

[172] Letter from Hussam Ayloush, Executive Director, CAIR-California, to G. Gabrielle Starr, President, Pomona College, December 17, 2025, https://ca.cair.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025.12.17-LTR-from-CAIR-to-Pomona-redacted.pdf; CAIR & CAIR-LA, *CAIR, CAIR-LA Raise Concerns Regarding Pomona College's 'Harmful' Settlement Agreement with Pro-Israel Groups,* December 17, 2025, https://ca.cair.com/press-release/cair-cair-la-raise-concerns-regarding-pomona-colleges-harmful-settlement-agreement-with-pro-israel-groups-calls-on-administration-to-protect-academic-freedom/.

[173] Pomona College, *Resolution Agreement: Questions and Answers,* (page maintained by Pomona; accessed on May 16, 2026), https://www.pomona.edu/resolution-agreement. The page describes the resolution agreement's mandated training program and the Civil Rights and Title VI Coordinator position. No reference is made to CAIR or to CAIR-LA's December 17, 2025 letter. The author has located no public statement by Pomona accepting CAIR's request or modifying the resolution agreement to incorporate any of the changes CAIR sought.

The Committee should treat CAIR's civil rights filings against educational institutions as part of the record this testimony has built under *Boim* and *Saroya*: the same litigation tactic, carried into a different forum.

They told us who they are, and we did not believe them. CAIR's cofounder promised to infiltrate American media outlets, research institutions, and universities. CAIR seeks to increase its influence in universities, to insert its curriculum in K-12 schools, and to fundamentally change the way Americans think about terrorism itself, recasting political violence as resistance, criticism of that violence as bigotry, and the institutions designed to expose both as instruments of oppression.

V. Existing Statutory Authority and the Enforcement Gaps Congress Should Close

Unraveling the Muslim Brotherhood's deep web requires both the political will to enforce already-existing laws, as well as closing key enforcement gaps that permit the network to metastasize.

Start with federal funding. The FBI suspended all formal liaison with CAIR in 2009, after evidence introduced at the *Holy Land Foundation* trial linked CAIR, its founders, and the Muslim Brotherhood's Palestine Committee to Hamas.[174] Yet CAIR

[174] Letter from Assistant Director Richard C. Powers, Office of Congressional Affairs, Federal Bureau of Investigation, to Senator Jon Kyl, April 28, 2009 ("[U]ntil we can resolve whether there continues to be a connection between CAIR or its executives and HAMAS, the FBI does not view CAIR as an appropriate liaison partner."), published in 155 Cong. Rec. H6669–H6675 (June 12, 2009), https://www.congress.gov/crec/2009/06/12/CREC-2009-06-12-pt1-PgH6669-6.pdf (Congressional Record entry submitting the FBI letter and documenting the Bureau's suspension of formal contacts with CAIR following evidence introduced at the *Holy Land Foundation* trial linking CAIR, its founders, and the Muslim Brotherhood's Palestine Committee to Hamas); full text of the FBI letter reproduced in *RealClearInvestigations*, "Full FBI Letter in 2009 on Suspending Contacts With CAIR," November 8, 2023, https://www.realclearinvestigations.com/articles/2023/11/08/full_fbi_letter_in_2009_on_suspending_contacts_with_cair_991309.html.

and CAIR-affiliated entities have continued to receive federal grant funds.[175] No federal grant money should flow to any MB-affiliated entity, starting with CAIR.

The stakes are not hypothetical. In 2026 the Department of Health and Human Services opened a review of CAIR-California after an HHS official identified more than $27 million in HHS-originated funds that California had sub-granted to it, a review that could end in debarment from federal funding.[176] The Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee separately referred CAIR-California to the IRS, noting that it "assisted less than 10 percent of the proposed Afghan refugees" while sub-granting half the money to an unregistered entity operating under its own Employer Identification Number.[177]

Federal accreditation is the next problem. The Department of Justice's Executive Office for Immigration Review provided accreditation to CAIR on March 24, 2015.[178] Under that accreditation, CAIR-California and its attorneys are

[175] On the federal-grant funding flowing to CAIR and CAIR-affiliated entities despite the FBI's formal cessation, *see* Sam Westrop, "DHS Approves $100k Grant of Taxpayers' Money to CAIR," Middle East Forum, https://www.meforum.org/dhs-approves-100k-grant-to-cair (documenting October 2025 DHS Nonprofit Security Grant Program funds flowing to CAIR through a District of Columbia sub-recipient award); Sam Westrop, "DHS Approves $100k Grant of Taxpayers' Money to CAIR," Islamist Watch, https://www.meforum.org/islamist-watch/60298/dhs-approves-100k-grant-of-taxpayers-money-to-cair; H.R. 4097, 119th Congress, 2025, (proposed legislation citing CAIR's unindicted co-conspirator status in the *Holy Land Foundation* case and addressing federal-government engagement with CAIR), https://www.congress.gov/119/bills/hr4097/BILLS-119hr4097ih.htm. *See also* Biden's Afghan Parolee Program—A Trojan Horse with Flawed Vetting and Deadly Consequences: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime & Counterterrorism and the Subcomm. on Border Sec. & Immigration of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 119th Congress, 2026 (written testimony of Julie Marzouk, Esq.) (detailing federal grant moneys provided to CAIR via the State of California), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/fecf0474-ff5a-c9f7-7af8-b1dfd901a825/2026-01-14_Testimony_Marzouk.pdf.

[176] Gustav Chiarello, HHS Assistant Secretary, letter to Gov. Gavin Newsom, June 9, 2026 (citing "$27 million in HHS-originated" funds sub-granted to CAIR-California); the review followed an April 27, 2026 request by Rep. Chip Roy and thirteen House Republicans. See Middle East Forum, "HHS Launches Investigation into CAIR for Grant Abuses and Terror Links," June 11, 2026, meforum.org. The underlying request is public: Letter from Rep. Chip Roy et al. to HHS Secretary Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. (Apr. 27, 2026), roy.house.gov. Available at https://www.meforum.org/press-releases/hhs-launches-investigation-into-cair-for-grant-abuses-and-terror-links-following-mef-campaign; https://roy.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/roy-evo.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/cair-debarment_hhs-letter.pdf.

[177] Letter from Ways and Means Chairman Jason Smith to the IRS, Jan. 13, 2026 (CAIR-California "assisted less than 10 percent of the proposed Afghan refugees and instead sub-granted half of the money to CAIR-Los Angeles—an unregistered entity operating under CAIR-California's Employer Identification Number"), waysandmeans.house.gov. Available at https://waysandmeans.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/1.13.2026-Chairman-Smith-Letter-to-IRS.pdf.

[178] U.S. Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Office of Legal Access Programs, Recognized Organizations and Accredited Representatives Roster (listing Council on

permitted to provide legal services through non-attorney representatives to practice before EOIR and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).[179] In light of CAIR's illicit activities and demonstrated ties to terrorist organizations, its accreditation must not be renewed.

The Executive Branch can initiate investigations into MB-affiliated entities for their conduct that appears violative of already existing regulations. The U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC") can apply the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations ("GTSR") framework to hold MB-affiliated entities accountable for their provision of services to FTOs and SDGTs. The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") can similarly apply its enforcement tools to nonprofits operating outside their exempt purpose. The federal material support statutes, specifically 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, can sustain criminal investigations into MB-affiliated entities that provide material support to designated entities, when reasonable cause exists.

A. Applicability of the GTSR Framework to CAIR's Provision of Services to Hamas

Several of the examples above provide bases for the U.S. Treasury Department to investigate CAIR's provision of services to designated SDGTs and FTOs. Section

American-Islamic Relations as a recognized organization with an original recognition date of March 24, 2015), roster reports available at https://www.justice.gov/eoir/recognition-accreditation-roster-reports, with the current roster PDF at https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1398081/dl?inline=; *see also* U.S. Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review, "Recognition & Accreditation (R&A) Program," https://www.justice.gov/eoir/recognition-and-accreditation-program (describing the EOIR program through which non-attorney representatives of recognized nonprofit organizations are authorized to represent individuals before DHS and EOIR in immigration proceedings); on the policy implications of CAIR's continued EOIR accreditation, *see* Sam Westrop, "Trump's DOJ should stop treating CAIR as a legitimate immigration provider," *The Hill*, May 2025, https://thehill.com/opinion/immigration/5349087-3-cair-california-funding-accusations-controversy/; Press Release, Office of Rep. Chip Roy, "Roy leads congressional delegation calling to halt federal funding for CAIR," https://www.thedigitalcourier.com/news/national/roy-leads-congressional-delegation-calling-to-halt-federal-funding-for-cair/article_f54c230e-64fc-5348-9a71-7ff97072168f.html.

[179] U.S. Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review, "Recognition & Accreditation (R&A) Program," https://www.justice.gov/eoir/recognition-and-accreditation-program (describing the EOIR program under which "[a]ccredited representatives of recognized organizations are authorized to represent individuals before [the Department of Homeland Security ('DHS')], the Immigration Courts, and/or the Board of Immigration Appeals [under EOIR]"); *see also* U.S. Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review, "Recognition & Accreditation Program — Frequently Asked Questions," https://www.justice.gov/eoir/recognition-and-accreditation-program-frequently-asked-questions; 8 C.F.R. § 1292.11 *et seq.* (federal regulations governing recognition of organizations and accreditation of non-attorney representatives); on CAIR-California's specific participation, *see* Sam Westrop, "Trump's DOJ should stop treating CAIR as a legitimate immigration provider," *The Hill*, May 2025, https://thehill.com/opinion/immigration/5349087-3-cair-california-funding-accusations-controversy/ (documenting CAIR-CA's reliance on EOIR R&A accreditation to operate its immigration legal services through non-attorney representatives).

594.204 of GTSR prohibits any U.S. person from engaging in transactions or dealings that benefit persons whose property is blocked under § 594.201(a), including providing contributions of funds, goods, or services "for the benefit of" such designated persons. Although Al-Zaytouna itself is not a designated entity, the information described above shows that it operates for the benefit of Hamas (a blocked person), matching the Treasury-identified pattern of organizations that obscure their SDGT links behind a legitimate facade. Services provided to or through Al-Zaytouna should therefore qualify as services "for the benefit of" Hamas under § 594.204.

Under the GTSR framework, propaganda services, consultation services, and institutional credibility can all qualify as the provision of services "for the benefit of" Hamas or other terrorist organizations under § 594.204. CAIR-Ohio Executive Director Khalid Turaani's participation in the October 2025 Al-Zaytouna event provided exactly that. His appearance gave publicity and promotional value to the panel by associating "America's largest Muslim civil liberties organization"[180] with a Hamas-aligned institution and a designated SDGT.

This framework can similarly be applied to CAIR's affiliation with and cross-promotion with IUMS. *See* Section III.B *supra.*

Aside from the GTSR framework, the IRS is empowered to enforce the requirements of the tax code as they apply to nonprofit organizations affiliated with the MB.

B. Applicability of the IRC to MB-Affiliated Nonprofit Organizations

Section 501(c)(3) of the IRC requires that an organization be organized and operated *exclusively* for one or more tax-exempt purposes. Treasury regulations clarify that "exclusively" means "primarily," but that an organization is not operated exclusively for exempt purposes if more than an insubstantial part of its activities is not in furtherance of an exempt purpose.[181] The Washington Trust Foundation, described above, exists "to support the charitable purpose of CAIR-Foundation

[180] CAIR, "About Us," https://www.cair.com/about_cair/about-us/ (CAIR's self-description as "America's largest Muslim civil liberties organization, with regional offices nationwide" and "a grassroots civil rights and advocacy group"); *see also* CAIR, "CAIR at a Glance," https://www.cair.com/about_cair/cair-at-a-glance/.

[181] 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) ("An organization will be regarded as 'operated exclusively' for one or more exempt purposes only if it engages primarily in activities which accomplish one or more of such exempt purposes specified in section 501(c)(3). An organization will not be so regarded if more than an insubstantial part of its activities is not in furtherance of an exempt purpose."), available at https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-26/chapter-I/subchapter-A/part-1/subject-group-ECFR062882ac6495890/section-1.501(c)(3)-1.

Inc."[182] and its 2024 return reports total assets of $21,162,467 against $14,926,176 in liabilities.[183]

It reports no employees, no programs, and no grants to any outside organization in any year, and its largest single asset is a $17,388,028 construction project the return labels "CONST PROJECT 2ANDK CAIR."[184]

WTF's entire operation, as reflected in its public filings, consists of holding real estate and collecting rent. The stated educational and civil-rights-networking mission has no discernible relationship to passive ownership and leveraged development of a commercial building. An organization that functions as a real estate holding and development vehicle, with no employees, no grants, no educational programming, and no discernible charitable activity, should not enjoy 501(c)(3) status.

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[182] Washington Trust Foundation Inc., IRS Form 990 for tax year 2024 (EIN 52-1887951), filed Nov. 11, 2025, Schedule O, Part III line 2, projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/full_text/202513159349304086/IRS990ScheduleO (stating the "ORGANIZATION MISSION TO SUPPORT THE CHARITABLE PURPOSE OF CAIR-FOUNDATION INC (CAIR FOUNDATION)"); *see also* projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/521887951/202513159349304086/full (full filing, last visited Aug. 3, 2026).

[183] Washington Trust Foundation Inc., IRS Form 990 for tax year 2024 (EIN 52-1887951), filed Nov. 11, 2025, Part X (Balance Sheet), reporting total assets of $21,162,467, total liabilities of $14,926,176, and net assets of $6,236,291; Schedule D, Part IX, reporting "CONST PROJECT 2ANDK CAIR" at $17,388,028. projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/521887951/202513159349304086/full and projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/full_text/202513159349304086/IRS990ScheduleD (last visited Aug. 4, 2026). Washington Trust Foundation Inc., IRS Form 990 for tax year 2024 (EIN 52-1887951), filed Nov. 11, 2025, Part X (Balance Sheet), reporting total assets of $21,162,467, total liabilities of $14,926,176, and net assets of $6,236,291; Schedule D, Part IX, reporting "CONST PROJECT 2ANDK CAIR" at $17,388,028. projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/521887951/202513159349304086/full and projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/full_text/202513159349304086/IRS990ScheduleD (last visited Aug. 4, 2026). Washington Trust Foundation Inc., IRS Form 990 for tax year 2024 (EIN 52-1887951), filed Nov. 11, 2025, Part X (Balance Sheet), reporting total assets of $21,162,467, total liabilities of $14,926,176, and net assets of $6,236,291; Schedule D, Part IX, reporting "CONST PROJECT 2ANDK CAIR" at $17,388,028. projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/521887951/202513159349304086/full and projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/full_text/202513159349304086/IRS990ScheduleD (last visited Aug. 4, 2026).

[184] Washington Trust Foundation, Inc., IRS Form 990 (EIN 52-1887951), Fiscal Year Ending December 31, 2022, available via ProPublica Nonprofit Explorer at https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/521887951/202333129349304483/full; Washington Trust Foundation, Inc., IRS Form 990 (EIN 52-1887951), Fiscal Year Ending December 31, 2023, available via ProPublica Nonprofit Explorer at https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/521887951/202413199349304646/full; Washington Trust Foundation, Inc., IRS Form 990 (EIN 52-1887951), Fiscal Year Ending December 31, 2024, available via ProPublica Nonprofit Explorer at https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/521887951/202513159349304086/full.

Courts and the Internal Revenue Service have long recognized that nonprofit organizations must not have an illegal purpose.[185] Loss of government revenues from tax exemption is often justified on the grounds that tax-exempt organizations serve desirable public purposes and lessen the government's costs and burdens.[186] Relatedly, tax exemption is not justified when an organization serves an illegal purpose because it impliedly fails to provide a public benefit and, in fact, increases the government's costs and burdens. The illegality doctrine aims to ensure that the government is not subsidizing illegal activity. For example, in *Church of Scientology v. Commissioner*, 83 T.C. 381, 504 (1984), the Tax Court held that a church that conspired to impede an IRS investigation did not qualify as a 501(c)(3) for certain years. The court concluded that the church engaged in a conspiracy to defraud the United States, which demonstrated that the church had a "substantial illegal purpose."

Treasury Regulation Section 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) explains that an organization shall not qualify as a nonprofit if "more than an insubstantial part of its activities" further a nonexempt purpose. CAIR and AMP were created by Hamas operatives embedded in a U.S.-based Hamas support network and have maintained connections to terrorists and terrorist organizations throughout their existence. As described above, CAIR leaders and affiliates have continued to make statements that demonstrate its ongoing involvement in and commitment to the terrorist network by repackaging terror narratives and defending terrorist organizations and their objectives, showing that CAIR has never repudiated its founding agenda. CAIR and AMP's enjoyment of tax-exempt status is incompatible with the purpose of section 501(c)(3). For example, CAIR's Executive Director Nihad Awad told an American Muslims for Palestine convention that he was "happy to see" Gazans "break the siege" on October 7th.[187]

C. Material Support Statutory Framework

The Department of Justice may initiate an investigation into MB-affiliated entities for material support to a terrorist organization pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §

[185] *Bob Jones University v. United States*, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
[186] Cong. Rsch. Serv., IF12739, The Illegality Doctrine and 501(c)(3) Organizations, August 14, 2024, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12739.
[187] MEMRI TV, "CAIR Executive Director Nihad Awad at American Muslims for Palestine (AMP) Convention: I Was Happy to See the People of Gaza Break the Siege on October 7," Clip No. 10705, November 24, 2023, memri.org; see also "CAIR Executive Director 'Happy to See' Oct. 7 Hamas Terror Attack," Jewish Insider, December 2023. Available at https://www.memri.org/tv/cair-exec-director-nihad-awad-amp-happy-gaza-october-seven-victorious-israel; https://jewishinsider.com/2023/12/nihad-awad-council-american-islamic-relations-israel-gaza-terror-attacks/.

2339B, which criminalizes both providing material support and concealing "the nature, location, source, or ownership" of such support.

The Justice Department may also initiate an investigation into CAIR pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1343 for wire fraud, based on the theory that CAIR represents to its donors that it does not receive foreign funding, a representation the public record contradicts. Other Title 18 provisions that may also reach the conduct documented in this testimony include conspiracy, under 18 U.S.C. § 371; or racketeering offenses, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 *et seq*.

A further avenue lies outside Title 18. To the extent CAIR or its affiliates act in the United States at the direction of, or with funding from, a foreign principal, their failure to register may implicate the Foreign Agents Registration Act, 22 U.S.C. § 611 et seq. Yet another lies in the civil False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729: to the extent CAIR-California drew federal refugee-resettlement funds while sub-granting them to an unregistered affiliate and delivering a fraction of the services it promised, it may face treble-damages liability for false certifications.[188]

VI. Enforcement Gaps Must Be Addressed

Enforcing the existing statutory authority will lead to meaningful consequences. Addressing two enforcement gaps would facilitate the investigation and dismantling of domestic Muslim Brotherhood networks.

The first is the successor organization loophole. As described above, American Muslims for Palestine and its affiliates (including NSJP) emerged from the same series of entities that were found liable for material support to Hamas. The Boim family has spent more than twenty years pursuing justice for the murder of their son David, and the successor-organization loophole has let the same bad actors with the same objectives reconstitute into new organizations without consequence. Victims of terror are forced to play a game of whack-a-mole against organizations whose underlying liability has already been adjudicated. Congress should close the successor-organization loophole and limit the ability of nonprofit officers and directors to create and lead new nonprofits when their prior nonprofits were shut down for terrorism-related conduct. A workable framework already exists. The Immigration and Nationality Act provides for alias designation against entities that act as successor organizations to designated FTOs. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1189(b)(1). Congress should apply that premise to alias nonprofits.

[188] *See* Section V supra (HHS review of CAIR-California; the Ways and Means referral documenting the sub-grant to an unregistered affiliate operating under CAIR-California's Employer Identification Number).

The second gap is foreign funding disclosure. Congress should pass legislation requiring nonprofits to disclose the total amount and origin of foreign donations received on a separate, dedicated schedule as part of their annual IRS filings. This schedule should be made available to the public to ensure transparency and allow meaningful scrutiny of whether a 501(c)(3) is acting on behalf of foreign interests. Entities that fail to properly disclose foreign funding should have their nonprofit status immediately revoked or suspended pending IRS investigation. CAIR illustrates the gap: it has repeatedly settled litigation rather than produce its donor records,[189] even as foreign, government-owned financing of its headquarters remained absent from its public filings.

Enforcing our laws and implementing these new solutions can stem the tide of the Muslim Brotherhood's expanding influence. Western allies have repeatedly warned about the dangers posed by the MB if left unchecked, and both the American public and elected officials would be wise to heed the warnings of our allies, who have seen the impacts of MB infiltration on the fabric of their societies.

VII. Western Allies Are Warning About Muslim Brotherhood Infiltration, and the United States Must Listen

The United States is not the first country to identify this problem. Multiple allied democracies have reached the same conclusions independently, after their own intelligence and security reviews.

In May 2025, the French Interior Ministry issued a report addressing the threat the Muslim Brotherhood poses to its society.[190] The report claims that the Brotherhood is waging a covert war via local proxies to subvert France's secular values and institutions,[191] in line with the Brotherhood's stated purpose of creating a global caliphate. The report urged decisive action to halt what it described as the gradual spread of "political Islam," warning that it poses a serious threat to social cohesion. It detailed how the Islamist campaign targeted schools, mosques, and local nongovernmental organizations to influence rulemaking at both the local and

[189] *See* Section IV supra (CAIR's pattern of settling litigation to avoid producing its donor records).
[190] Juliette Jabkhiro, "Government-commissioned Report Says Muslim Brotherhood Posing Threat to French Unity," Reuters, May 21, 2025, Government-commissioned report says Muslim Brotherhood posing threat to French unity | Reuters. Available at https://www.reuters.com/world/government-commissioned-report-says-muslim-brotherhood-posing-threat-french-2025-05-21/.
[191] Juliette Jabkhiro, "Government-commissioned Report Says Muslim Brotherhood Posing Threat to French Unity," Reuters, May 21, 2025, Government-commissioned report says Muslim Brotherhood posing threat to French unity | Reuters. Available at https://www.reuters.com/world/government-commissioned-report-says-muslim-brotherhood-posing-threat-french-2025-05-21/.

national levels, particularly on issues of secularism and gender equality. Interior Minister Bruno Retailleau confirmed the report's conclusion that the Muslim Brotherhood ultimately seeks to "shift all of French society to sharia [law]."[192] On July 7, 2025, French President Emmanuel Macron announced an expansion of financial and administrative sanctions against Muslim Brotherhood–affiliated groups operating in France; the French Senate adopted implementing legislation on May 5, 2026 by a vote of 208 to 124, and the bill awaits action in the National Assembly.[193]

The United Kingdom reached a similar conclusion. In 2014, Prime Minister David Cameron commissioned an official review of the Brotherhood's activities in the UK. The review identified the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB), a Muslim civil rights group analogous to CAIR or AMP, as "dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood."[194] MAB has positioned itself as nationally representative of British Muslims and as the community's interlocutor with the state.[195] That is the same strategy the Brotherhood employs across the Western world: establish a nationally representative organization, claim to speak for an entire religious community, and use that institutional voice to seek media visibility and engagement with local and national authorities.[196] *On January 9, 2026, the United Arab Emirates announced that it would withdraw funding for Emirati citizens studying in the United Kingdom, on grounds that British campuses had become Muslim Brotherhood recruitment grounds*. [197]

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[192] Jabkhiro, Government-commissioned Report Says Muslim Brotherhood Posing Threat to French Unity, Reuters, supra.

[193] "France announces new financial, administrative sanctions against Muslim Brotherhood 'entryism,'" Anadolu Agency, July 7, 2025, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/france-announces-new-financial-administrative-sanctions-against-muslim-brotherhood-entryism/3624890; Implementing legislation has since advanced through the French Parliament: the French Senate voted 208–124 on May 5, 2026 to approve a bill introduced by former Interior Minister Bruno Retailleau implementing the Macron-announced measures, "French Senate Passes Sweeping Measures Against Islamist Infiltration," Middle East Forum, https://www.meforum.org/fwi/fwi-news/french-senate-passes-sweeping-measures-against-islamist-infiltration; the bill awaits action in the National Assembly as of the date of this testimony.

[194] "The Muslim Brotherhood in Britain: Analysis of Recent Sanctions," Counter Extremism Project, The Muslim Brotherhood in Britain: Analysis of Recent Sanctions | Counter Extremism Project. Available at https://www.counterextremism.com/blog/muslim-brotherhood-britain-analysis-recent-sanctions.

[195] The Muslim Brotherhood in Britain: Analysis of Recent Sanctions, Counter Extremism Project, supra.

[196] The Muslim Brotherhood in Britain: Analysis of Recent Sanctions, Counter Extremism Project, supra.

[197] Rimjhim Singh, "UAE Restricts Funding for UK Studies Amid Concerns Over Muslim Brotherhood," Business Standard, January 9, 2026, accessed April 29, 2026, UAE restricts funding for UK studies amid concerns over Muslim Brotherhood | World News - Business Standard. Available at https://www.business-standard.com/world-news/uae-government-funding-uk-universities-radicalisation-muslim-brotherhood-126010900280_1.html.

The UK has also warned of Muslim Brotherhood strategies towards "Islamist separatism," the deliberate attempt to cut Muslim communities off spiritually, intellectually, and culturally from the surrounding secular society.[198] One typical manifestation is the "mega-mosque" building projects that have come under scrutiny around Europe, which generally contain community-like features such as schools, libraries, and gyms. As one UK review put it, "the objective of these projects is to make clients out of the local Muslim population and decrease their interaction with, and reliance on, state and social services."[199] While other religious groups also provide various social services, the totalizing nature of the Muslim Brotherhood project and its hostile worldview towards its host country's values create "the risk of preventing people within those communities from accessing the rights accorded to them by the state. . . [.]"[200]

The American version of this pattern is EPIC City, a residential community project in North Texas, designed to be an exclusively Muslim city and branded as "the epicenter of Islam in America."[201] Four cases are currently pending relating to the building of this Islamic community due to concerns of failing to comply with Texas statutes, including the Fair Housing Act.[202] CAIR-Texas and CAIR-DFW have publicly defended EPIC City in the disputes, and CAIR's national leadership has spoken at the EPIC mosque, reflecting an active advocacy relationship between CAIR and the EPIC religious community.[203]

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[198] The Muslim Brotherhood in Britain: Analysis of Recent Sanctions, Counter Extremism Project, supra.

[199] The Muslim Brotherhood in Britain: Analysis of Recent Sanctions, Counter Extremism Project, supra.

[200] The Muslim Brotherhood in Britain: Analysis of Recent Sanctions, Counter Extremism Project, supra.

[201] Mathilda Heller, "What Is EPIC City, the Controversial Planned Muslim Residential Community in Texas?," *The Jerusalem Post | JPost.Com*, May 3, 2026, What is EPIC City, the controversial planned Muslim community in Texas? | The Jerusalem Post. Available at https://www.jpost.com/international/article-894994.

[202] *State of Texas v. East Plano Islamic Center, Inc., Community Capital Partners, LP, et al.*, Dist. Ct., Collin Cnty., Tex. (filed Dec. 5, 2025); *State of Texas v. Double R Municipal Utility District No. 2A, et al.*, Dist. Ct., Collin Cnty., Tex. (filed Feb. 2026); *State of Texas v. Double R Municipal Utility District No. 2A, et al.*, Dist. Ct., Collin Cnty., Tex. (filed May 4, 2026); *Community Capital Partners, LP v. Texas Workforce Commission*, *201st Dist. Ct., Travis Cty., Tex. (Meachum, J.) (temporary injunction entered Apr. 28, 2026; the State's plea to the jurisdiction denied Apr. 29, 2026), appeal filed,* Tex. App.—15th Dist. (May 2026).

[203] "CAIR-Texas Welcomes Court Ruling Ordering State Agency to Honor Agreement with 'EPIC City' Developers," CAIR-Texas, April 30, 2026, https://www.cair.com/press_releases/cair-texas-welcomes-court-ruling-ordering-state-agency-to-honor-agreement-with-epic-city-developers/; "North Texas Faith Leaders Condemn Abbott's EPIC City Investigations," Fox 4 Dallas–Fort Worth, April 8, 2025, https://www.fox4news.com/news/cair-condemns-abbotts-epic-city-investigations; "CAIR Exec

The Brotherhood's tactics look the same across allied democracies. Government assessments from six European countries reach a common conclusion: the political system the Brotherhood envisions is incompatible with the constitutional principles of popular sovereignty, freedom, and equality. The excerpts below are drawn from George Washington University's Program on Extremism's W*hat European Security Services Say About the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe.*[204]

Austria: "The political system aimed for [by the Muslim Brotherhood] is reminiscent of a totalitarian system, which guarantees neither the sovereignty of people nor the principles of freedom and equality. Such a fundamental position is incompatible with the legal and social norms of the Republic of Austria."[205]

Belgium: "The Muslim Brotherhood and its often highly-qualified members are found in many non-profit organisations and other groups in all areas of society. This makes it more influential and important than one would expect from its limited membership. The Muslim Brotherhood respects democratic rules and the law, and pursues supposedly legitimate goals in the short term. However, the discourse, beliefs and vision adopted internally in the longer term are contrary to the proper functioning of the constitutional order and democracy. To the State Security Service, the Muslim Brotherhood is an extremist movement."[206]

Germany: "These 'legalistic' Islamist groups represent an especial threat to the internal cohesion of our society. Among other things, their wide range of Islamist-oriented educational and support activities, especially for children and adolescents from immigrant families, are used to promote the creation and proliferation of an Islamist milieu in Germany. These endeavours run counter to the efforts undertaken by the federal administration and the Länder [states] to integrate immigrants. There is the risk that such milieus could also form the breeding ground for further

Director Nihad Awad: Working to Eliminate and Change Public School Textbooks That 'Defame' Islam and the Prophet Muhammad — In August 30, 2024 Friday Sermon at the East Plano Islamic Center in Texas," MEMRI TV, August 30, 2024, https://memri.org/tv/cair-exec-director-nihad-awad-working-eliminate-change-public-school-textbooks-defame-islam-prophet.

[204] Lorenzo Vidino, "What European Security Services Say About the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe," GW Program on Extremism, October 2023, accessed April 29, 2026, Verbatim: What European Security Services Say About the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe. Available at https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2023-09/verbatim-final_0.pdf.

[205] Lorenzo Vidino, "What European Security Services Say About the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe," GW Program on Extremism, October 2023, accessed April 29, 2026, Verbatim: What European Security Services Say About the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe. Available at https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2023-09/verbatim-final_0.pdf.

[206] Vidino, What European Security Services Say About the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe, supra.

radicalization."[207]

The Netherlands: "The Dutch Muslim Brothers are trying to gain influence in civil society. If they also participate in political decision-making without being open about their signature and thus their interests and intentions, this can lead to an undesirable solution."[208]

Spain: "In the West, the actions of the Muslim Brothers present a common modus operandi in each host country. They present an image of integration and moderation. Their leaders do not usually publicly admit membership in the Muslim Brotherhood. Their leaders manage to become representatives of the main organizations of Islamic communities in the host country. In the political sphere they try to influence state decision-making that affects the Muslim community of the host country and to make the most of the legal and economic resources offered by the states, creating associative and service networks with the help of public resources. In the educational field, it is a priority to influence the religious formation of young Muslims settled in their host country. . . The propaganda scope of its work and ideology is another of its greatest priorities, with the use of media, editorials, and online communication."[209]

Sweden: Under the leadership of Chakib Benmakhlouf, the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe (FIOE) adopted long-term, 20-year strategic plans guiding its activities across Europe. Consistent with the ideology of Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Benmakhlouf rejected distinctions between individual and society, as well as between politics and religion. He articulated this position explicitly, stating that "Islam is an indivisible whole; religion, politics, confession, worship, action, ethics and other," thereby leaving little ambiguity about FIOE's stance on individual freedom and democratic principles.[210] These alarming trends include Muslim Brotherhood members holding multiple positions in multiple civil society organizations simultaneously and often appointing relatives, from siblings to cousins, to similar positions within the ecosystem.[211]

The same pattern presents itself in the U.S.-based Brotherhood infrastructure. Familial relationship and overlapping leadership between IAP, AMP, and CAIR have been a salient fact for federal courts addressing whether successor organizations are

[207] Vidino, What European Security Services Say About the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe, supra.
[208] Vidino, What European Security Services Say About the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe, supra.
[209] Vidino, What European Security Services Say About the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe, supra.
[210] Vidino, What European Security Services Say About the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe, supra.
[211] The Muslim Brotherhood in Britain: Analysis of Recent Sanctions, Counter Extremism Project, supra.

alter-egos of the entities liable for David Boim's murder.[212]

VIII. Conclusion

In 1991, the Muslim Brotherhood committed to paper its work of "a kind of grand Jihad" by "eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within."[213] And for thirty-five years, the United States did not listen. The record now before this Committee makes that posture untenable.

CAIR leaders have shared stages and platforms with designated terrorists and FTO operatives; CAIR has moved a forty-five percent stake in its own headquarters to the North American Islamic Trust, an Islamic endowment that federal prosecutors named an unindicted co-conspirator in the Holy Land Foundation terrorism-financing case, and that now holds a veto over any sale or financing of the remainder[214]; AMP and its affiliates trace a documented continuum from the Islamic Association for Palestine through the Holy Land Foundation to the IUMS, whose 90,000-scholar network issued a March 2025 fatwa declaring armed jihad obligatory; and the Boim family has spent more than twenty years pursuing the $156 million judgment a jury awarded them for the murder of their American son.

None of this is speech. It is conduct, capital, and coordination.

The First Amendment was written to protect the dissenter from the state, not to shield organizational infrastructure from the disclosure obligations every other 501(c)(3) in this country must meet. France, the United Kingdom, the United Arab Emirates, Austria, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden have each, through independent security review, arrived at the same conclusion. The pattern is no longer contested abroad. It can no longer be ignored at home.

The statutory authority already exists. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B reaches material support. 31 C.F.R. § 594.204 reaches services rendered for the benefit of a designated terrorist. Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3) reaches charitable entities operating

[212] Boim v. American Muslims for Palestine, docket no. 1:17-cv-03591, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, CourtListener, accessed April 29, 2026, Boim v. American Muslims for Palestine, 1:17-cv-03591 – CourtListener.com. Available at https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/6063090/boim-v-american-muslims-for-palestine/.

[213] Akram, An Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group in North America, supra.

[214] Special Warranty Deed, Instrument No. 2026014277, and Memorandum of Agreement, Instrument No. 2026014278, D.C. Recorder of Deeds, supra. List of Unindicted Co-conspirators, *United States v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development*, No. 3:04-cr-240-G (N.D. Tex. May 29, 2007), supra, investigativeproject.org.

outside their exempt purpose or for an illegal purpose. And 8 U.S.C. § 1189(b)(1) supplies a workable framework for treating successor and alter-ego organizations as what they are.

This Committee should direct that no further federal grant funds flow to CAIR, that its EOIR accreditation not be renewed, that OFAC apply the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations to CAIR's documented relationship with Hamas-affiliated actors, that the IRS open 501(c)(3) examinations, and that the Department of Justice pursue the investigations supported by the public record. Congress should also close the successor-organization loophole, mandate pass-through foreign-funding disclosure with automatic revocation for noncompliance, and impose meaningful sanctions on the discovery obstruction that has turned procedural delay into a substantive defense.

Members of this body have already begun to move. Senators Cornyn and Sheehy have introduced legislation to revoke CAIR's tax-exempt status;[215] Representative Roy has introduced H.R. 8236 to designate CAIR and suspend its 501(c)(3) status;[216] and Representatives Stefanik and Cotton have asked the Treasury to investigate whether CAIR is funded or directed by a foreign terrorist organization.[217] And the sanctions Congress authorizes for discovery obstruction should be concrete, Rule 11 sanctions, fee-shifting, and civil contempt, so that delay ceases to be cost-free.

The Brotherhood told us, in writing, what it intended to do. Our allies have heard them.

The cost of continuing not to listen is no longer theoretical. The work of this Committee is to ensure that the law catches up to what the record has already shown.

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[215] Sen. John Cornyn, "Cornyn, Sheehy Introduce Bill to Revoke Tax-Exempt Status of CAIR, Groups Bankrolling Terrorists," December 18, 2025, cornyn.senate.gov. Available at https://www.cornyn.senate.gov/news/cornyn-sheehy-introduce-bill-to-revoke-tax-exempt-status-of-cair-groups-bankrolling-terrorists/.

[216] H.R. 8236, 119th Cong. (2026) (directing designation of CAIR and suspension of its 501(c)(3) status), congress.gov; Rep. Chip Roy press release, April 9, 2026, roy.house.gov. Available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/8236; https://roy.house.gov/media/press-releases/rep-roy-introduces-bill-designate-cair-specially-designated-global-terrorist.

[217] "Stefanik and Cotton Send Letter to Treasury Secretary Bessent Requesting Investigation Into the Council on American-Islamic Relations," October 14, 2025, stefanik.house.gov. Available at https://stefanik.house.gov/2025/10/stefanik-and-cotton-send-letter-to-treasury-secretary-bessent-requesting-investigation-into-the-council-on-american-islamic-relations.

Exhibit 18

Testimony of Kyle Shideler

Director and Senior Analyst for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Center for Security Policy

August 5, 2026

Before the Subcommittee on Federal Courts, Oversight, Agency Action and Federal Rights, Senate Committee on the Judiciary

Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Whitehouse, Distinguished Senators:

I would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify today on this important topic.

Because our court system is built on certain fundamental principles—including trial by jury, the government's burden of proof in criminal matters, and the right to confront one's accusers—courts both civil and criminal have been at the center of revelations of great consequences to our republic and its national security.

Examples include the Chamber-Hiss case and its famous "Pumpkin Papers" exposing the role of the Communist Party of the United States in Soviet espionage, or the trials surrounding the 1957 Apalachin, New York raid, which convinced federal law enforcement of the existence of the American Mafia. To these we must add United States v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, prosecuted almost two decades ago, which exposed the existence and extensive reach of the Muslim Brotherhood in America since its arrival in 1962.[1]

The evidence submitted during that trial demonstrated that not only was the Muslim Brotherhood operating in America, but that the Brotherhood played a singularly important role in providing indoctrination, financing, and political protection for jihadist terror.

Founded in Egypt by Hassan Al-Banna in 1928, from its very beginning the Muslim Brotherhood operated as a clandestine organization, which engaged in the creation of

[1] While individual Muslim Brothers operated in the United States prior to this date, in the 1960s a North American Brotherhood structure was developed, centered around the founding of the Muslim Students Association (MSA), which served as a front for Muslim Brotherhood organizing and recruited cadre from which future Brotherhood fronts would be created. Zeid Al-Noman, "Ikhwan in America," n.d., pp. 2–4, entered into evidence as Government Exhibit "Elbarasse Search 2," U.S. v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development et al., accessed from Ikhwan in America: The Oral History of the Muslim Brotherhood in its own words (Center for Security Policy Press, 2016), https://centerforsecuritypolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Ikhwan_in_America_20160418.pdf

public front groups, cultivated agents of influence, sought control over religious institutions, engaged in acts of political subversion, and created deniable sub-organizations devoted to terrorism, in pursuit of its ultimate goal, the overthrow of governments and the reestablishment of a worldwide caliphate operating under Islamic law, known as Sharia.[2]

It is worth recalling that the government demonstrated that the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood, like all Brotherhood branches worldwide, created and funded Hamas support networks—known as Palestine Committees—at the direction of the International Muslim Brotherhood beginning in 1983.[3]

In 2018, the U.S. government designated the Hasm Movement and Revolution Brigade (Liwa Al-Thawra), two Brotherhood-created terror groups founded to fight the Egyptian government. So this policy of forming and spinning off terror groups has remained fundamental to who the Brotherhood is to the present day.

The most infamous Palestine Committee organization in the United States is the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR).[4] So significant was CAIR's formation as an organ for political and media relations, its creation and bylaws received explicit approval by the Muslim Brotherhood leadership in Egypt.[5]

HLF documents, and related cases, reveal that at one time one in every four American mosques were under the influence of the Hamas-linked North American Islamic Trust

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[2] For more on the early formation of the Muslim Brotherhood, see Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers (Oxford University Press, 1969). Particularly worthy of note is the formation of the "secret apparatus" in 1942 (p. 30), and its participation in organizing its "Battalions" to fight against Israel in the Palestine War in 1948 (p. 57).

[3] "With the growth of the blessed Intifada and the spread of the spirit of Jihad amidst the children of Palestine and the nation, it became incumbent upon the remainder of the Ikhwan branches to play a role in attributing this Intifada and this Islamic action to Palestine. Therefore, a resolution was issued by the Guidance Office and the Shura Council of the International Movement to form 'Palestine Committees' in all the Arab, the Islamic and the Western nations whose job is to make the Palestinian cause victorious and to support it with what it needs of media, money, men and all of that." Islamic Action for Palestine: An Internal Memo (October 1992), p. 11, entered into evidence as Government Exhibit "Elbarasse Search 5," U.S. v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development et al.

[4] "Meeting Agenda of the Palestine Committee 7/30/1994" pg. 1, entered into evidence as Government Exhibit "Elbarasse Search 19," U.S. v. HLF et al.

[5] "FD-302 Interview with [Redacted] under Proffer agreement," January 6, 2005, pg. 6, accessed at Investigative Project on Terrorism, https://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/misc/847.pdf#page=6

(NAIT).[6] Muslim Brotherhood members—including some later convicted of terrorism charges such as Sami Al-Arian[7] and Abduraham Alamoudi[8]—regularly attempted to influence leaders of both American political parties. Organizations affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood recruited and trained chaplains for American prisons and the American military.[9] Brotherhood organizations operated on nearly every college campus in the United States, regularly recruiting young American Muslims and leading them to commit terrorist violence.[10] The Brotherhood ran camps where individual members were trained to wage Jihad, and organized "special work," the preferred Brotherhood euphemism for violence.[11]

In short, the issue of the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood was and is not merely a counterterrorism issue, but also a systemic counterintelligence challenge, and even more broadly, a challenge to the fabric of the United States and its ability to seek assimilation and social cohesion.

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[6] Stephen Schwartz, "Wahhabism and Islam in the United States" (testimony before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security, June 26, 2003), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Schwartz%20Testimony%20062603.pdf

[7] U.S. Department of Justice, "Sami Al-Arian Sentenced to 57 Months in Prison for Assisting Terrorist Group" (press release, May 1, 2006), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2006/May/06_crm_260.html

[8] U.S. Department of Justice, "Abdurahman Alamoudi Sentenced to Jail in Terrorism Financing Case" (press release, October 15, 2004), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2004/October/04_crm_698.htm

[9] J. Michael Waller, "Testimony" (Testimony before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, October 14, 2003), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/waller_testimony_10_14_03.pdf

[10] Patrick Poole, "The Muslim Student Association's Terror Problem," PJ Media, August 10, 2010, https://pjmedia.com/patrickpoole/2010/08/20/the-muslim-student-associations-terror-problem-n12923

[11] "The Brotherhood has always supported its members in fighting legitimate jihad in their home countries but would never support that activity after it became illegal in the United States. [Redacted] denied that he trained or had interest in explosives. When shown Exhibit 4B, [Redacted] admitted that it was a Brotherhood document that listed him having an interest in explosives, but [Redacted] does not know who wrote it or why." FD-302 Interview with [Redacted] under Proffer Agreement. See also Ikhwan in America: The Oral History of the Muslim Brotherhood in its own words (Center for Security Policy Press, 2016), pp. 11–12, https://centerforsecuritypolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Ikhwan_in_America_20160418.pdf

The United States Government achieved an unparalleled intelligence coup, yet almost none of this information was put to substantive further use. HLF would be the last domestic Muslim Brotherhood charity designated by the U.S. Treasury Department.[12]

There were no further prosecutions for material support against American Muslim Brotherhood figures. It was the equivalent of cracking the Enigma code in 1939 and then never decoding another Nazi message.

In 2008, the U.S. government had in its possession the name and rank of most leading Muslim Brotherhood members in the United States.[13] I would encourage the senators to demand, in an appropriate classified setting, that U.S. intelligence deliver the same levels of insight into U.S. Brotherhood operations today.

Since 2009, the federal government's disinterest in the challenge of the Muslim Brotherhood has largely been answered by private efforts. These have included educational efforts but also legislative and judicial responses. More than half a dozen state legislatures have passed resolutions condemning CAIR's links to terrorism. Two states, Florida and Texas, have publicly declared the group as a terrorist organization. Some state attorneys general are currently pursuing investigations into Muslim Brotherhood-linked entities.

There have been efforts in federal court to enforce federal court judgments against elements of the Palestine Committee (Boim v. IAP, Boim v. AMP), as well as lawsuits seeking to expose the role of foreign funding in supporting CAIR (Saroya v. CAIR). Unfortunately, in multiple examples, these Brotherhood-linked affiliates have successfully utilized a variety of lawfare tactics, including in some cases refusal to comply with legal discovery, in order to avoid exposure.

I would be remiss if I did not add the positive decision by the U.S. Treasury and U.S. State Department to designate the Lebanese, Egyptian, Jordanian, and Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood branches. The recent decision to designate the deputy secretary of the International Muslim Brotherhood is also a welcome development.

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[12] Eli Lake, "U.S. Stopped Blacklisting Domestic Terror Charities Under Obama," Bloomberg News, May 12, 2016, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2016-05-12/u-s-stopped-blacklisting-domestic-terror-charities-under-obama

[13] See "1991 Phone Directory," entered into evidence as Government Exhibit 003-003479, U.S. v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development et al.; attached as Appendix 1 and "1992 Phone Directory," entered into evidence as Government Exhibit 003-0079, U.S. v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development et al.; attached as Appendix 2.

I will note, however, that an approach which treats Muslim Brotherhood branches as fundamentally independent is one based on expediency and runs counter to the available public evidence, both as presented in the HLF case and also as written in the Brotherhood's by-laws openly stated as recently as 2011.[14]

Critics will claim that the data derived from the HLF case and related cases are decades old. This is true, but misleading. When studying clandestine networks, one must realize that they are established over many decades, as trained cadre move through positions of trust in the network's various fronts. Such individuals are not easily replaced, and regularly reappear.[15] A historic snapshot of such a network and the players in it, far from being irrelevant, is a crucial piece of the puzzle, prized by both intelligence practitioners and historians.

Consider, for example, Gaddour Saidi, who served on the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood Executive Office in 1992, and served as Vice President of the American Libyan Council at the time that organization lobbied for U.S. intervention in the Libyan Civil War in 2011. Or Talal Sunbulli, a U.S. Muslim Brotherhood Shura Council member in 1992, served as president of the Syrian American Council, which played an outsized role in U.S. policy as it related to supporting the Syrian rebels. Or Hani Saqr, listed as Masul (chief) of East America, who served as president of the Egyptian Americans for Democracy and Human Rights in 2013. And while some Muslim Brotherhood leaders have passed on, their roles may be taken up by their children or grandchildren, as in the case of late seminal Brotherhood figures Muhammad Al-Hanooti[16], Jamal Barzinji[17] and Taha Jabir Al-Alwani, and the front organizations they built and developed continue to operate.[18]

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[14] See also "By-laws of the International Muslim Brotherhood," Article 50. Attached as Appendix 3.

[15] As Palestine Committee member and CAIR founder Omar Ahmad said, "Registering an organization is easy. I can register 100 organizations in 100 cities in one day… go-ahead start a new organization but you won't be able to find new faces. Do we have hidden faces we now bring up to light? We have what we have." From Government Exhibit Philly Meeting 7, U.S. v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development et al.

[16] Kyle Shideler, "Major U.S. Muslim Brotherhood Leader Mohammed Al-Hanooti Dies," Center for Security Policy, June 5, 2015, https://centerforsecuritypolicy.org/major-u-s-muslim-brotherhood-leader-mohammed-al-hanooti-dies/


[17] Kyle Shideler, "Major U.S. MB Leader Jamal Barzinji Passes Away," Center for Security Policy, September 28, 2015, https://centerforsecuritypolicy.org/major-u-s-mb-leader-jamal-barzinji-passes-away/

[18] Kyle Shideler, "Influential Muslim Brotherhood Leader Taha Jabir Al-Alwani Passes Away," Center for Security Policy, March 8, 2016, https://centerforsecuritypolicy.org/influential-muslim-brotherhood-leader-taha-jabir-al-alwani-passes-away/

In conclusion, those who insist that the Brotherhood is a leopard that has somehow changed its spots are the ones who should be required to meet the burden of proof.

Because the U.S. government has already proved what the Muslim Brotherhood is, beyond a reasonable doubt.

Exhibit 19



GOVERNMENT
EXHIBIT
003-0034
3:04-CR-240-G
U.S. v. HLF, et al.

ISE-SW 1B64/ 0000011

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Case 4:26-cv-00521-MW-MAF Document 55-2 Filed 10/12/26 Page 268 of 307

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
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EXHIBIT
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U.S. v. HLF, et al.


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
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
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Members of the board of directo
ISE-SW 1B64/ 0000005
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Case 4:26-cv-00521-MWB-MAF Document 55-2 Filed 10/12/26 Page 276 of 307

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
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ISE-SW 1864 0000008

المسلمون في أرقام

MUSLIMS IN NUMBERS

1990 A.C. - 1410 A.H.



بيت المال

BMI, Inc.

for Islamic Investments in America

ISE-SW 1B64/ 0000009

Case 4:26-cv-00521-MW-MAF Document 55-2 Filed 10/12/26 Page 279 of 307

THE MISSION

BAITUL MAL INC., B.M.I. INC. was formed to meet the increasing needs of the Muslim community in North America for Islamically based and economically sound investment activities. The company carefully adheres to the rules of Sharia in its dealings and at the same time follows the sound rules of investment.

THE OBJECTIVES

Presenting an advanced model of business within the framework of Islamic Sharia by:

A. Founding an approach to business operations which carefully follows the rules of Sharia; and

B. Establishing a continuous cooperation with the Muslim community and Islamic institutions in the United States.

B.M.I.'s DIVISIONS

- **THE REAL ESTATE DIVISION** has been active since 1985 in locating, analyzing, and arranging the financing; and in managing various real estate projects in New Jersey, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan area. B.M.I.'s real estate projects are formed into either a general partnership or a limited partnership to suit the special needs of various investors for medium-term investments.

- **THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE DIVISION** was established in 1988 for those Muslims interested in short-term investments. The funds raised are used in financing genuine commercial transactions, that are performed by an experienced staff. Transactions involved are highly secured and insured by reputable insurance companies. B.M.I.'s International Trade transactions are formed into either a general partnership or a limited partnership to suit the special needs of various investors for short-term investments.

- **THE VENTURE CAPITAL DIVISION** was established in 1988. Its goal is to give an Islamic alternative for those Muslims interested in long-term investments, and to arrange the needed financing for the Muslim entrepreneur. This division studies and evaluates the business plans and management qualifications for small business projects and arranges financing.

Case 4:26-cv-00521-MW-MAF Document 55-2 Filed 10/12/26 Page 280 of 307

DEFINITIONS

Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

The total value of the final goods and services produced by residents and nonresidents within a given country during a given year. The GDP excludes the value of net income earned abroad, which is included in the GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP).

Gross National Product (GNP)

The total value of final goods and services produced both from within a given country and from external (foreign) transactions in a given year.

Per Capita Output

GNP of a country divided by the country's population. It is sometimes used to indicate the relative standard of living of a nation.

Price Index

Device for measuring the changing value of money over a given period.

Foreign Debt

Financial obligation toward foreign creditors.

Public Debt

The current outstanding debt of all periods of maturity for which the central government and its organs are obligated.

Balance of Trade

The net difference between the value of the exports and imports of a country.

SOURCES

1. *Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc.,* 1989 Britannica Book of the Year.
2. *OECD Economic Outlook,* Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Vol. 44, December 1988.
3. *World Development Report 1989,* The World Bank.
4. *The World Factbook 1988,* Central Intelligency Agency, U.S. Government Printing Office.
5. *World Economic Survey 1989,* Current Trends and Policies in the World Economy, United Nations, New York, 1989.

Note: We have excluded all countries with populations less than one million or with a GDP less than 1 billion U.S. dollars.

الغاية:

تأسست شركة بيت المال (B.M.I) ١٩٨٥م لتلبي حاجة المسلمين المتزايدة في أمريكا الشمالية الى مؤسسة مالية إسلامية تعمل طبقاً لمبادىء الشريعة الإسلامية مراعية في نفس الوقت المبادىء الاقتصادية المعتبرة للعمل الاستثماري.

الأهداف:

تهدف الشركة الى تقديم النموذج المتطور للعمل الاقتصادي في إطار الشريعة الاسلامية الغراء وذلك من خلال:

أ ـ تأسيس وتأكيد طرق العمل الاقتصادي التي تتبع بأمانة مبادىء الشريعة الإسلامية.

ب ـ إيجاد وتوثيق علاقات التعاون مع الجالية المسلمة ومؤسساتها في أمريكا الشمالية.

أقسام الشركة:

قسم الأستثمار العقاري: يعمل هذا القسم في البحث عن ودراسة جدوى مشاريع الاستثمار العقاري مع ترتيب الشكل القانوني وطرق التمويل لهذه المشاريع.

تؤسس مشروعات هذا القسم على صورة عقود المشاركة العامة والمحدودة حسب ما يناسب حاجة المستثمرين لكل مشروع.

قسم الاستثمار التجاري: بدء العمل في هذا القسم في عام ١٩٨٨ ونشاطه يتناول تمويل العمليات التجارية قصيرة المدى.

قسم تمويل المشروعات: تأسس هذا القسم عام ١٩٨٨ لتمويل المشروعات الصغيرة بطريقة إسلامية ولآجال طويلة المدى.

Case 4:26-cv-00521-MW-MAF Document 55-2 Filed 10/12/26 Page 281 of 307





31	32	33	34	35	36	37						
Sudan	Syria	Tunisia	Turkey	U.A. Emirates	Yemen	Yemen South	Total	USA	Japan	West Germany	USSR	
												الجغرافيا
2500.00	158.00	163.00	780.00	83.00	195.00	332.90	2495789	9363.00	377.00	248.00	22402.00	المساحة ١٠٠٠ كم مربع
												السكان
24.20	11.50	7.70	54.10	1.90	6.70	2.40	906.37	245.00	122.00	61.30	286.00	تعداد السكان بالمليون
37.40	16.80	10.80	73.00	2.50	11.60	3.10	1202.28	270.00	130.00	59.10	311.00	تعداد السكان المتوقع عام ٢٠٠٠
20.00	47.00	62.00	70.00	68.00	15.00	25.00		95.50	100.00	99.00	99.00	نسبة التعليم بالمائة
												الاقتصاد
4.40	20.30	9.30	58.10	22.00	3.20	1.10	704.08	4839.00	2859.00	1206.00	2356.70	إجمالي الناتج القومي بالبليون دولار أمريكي
4.40	13.50	8.60	2.20	33.90	2.00							نسبة الغاز والمعادن
31.80	27.20	13.50	18.60	2.00	20.40							نسبة الزراعة
9.00	5.30	18.70	30.00	21.50	17.30							نسبة الصناعة والبناء
54.80	54.00	59.20	49.20	42.50	60.30							نسبة الخدمات
200.00	1970.00	1230.00	1120.00	11900.00	505.00	500.00		18400.00	21820.00	14890.00	8375.00	معدل الدخل القومي لكل فرد / بالدولار الأمريكي
6.90	2.48	2.10	19.20	0.89	1.40	0.55	934.50	121.70	61.50	28.50	131.00	اليد العاملة بالملايين
68.50	30.00	22.20	48.90	5.00	59.90							نسبة العاملين في المجال الزراعي
8.40	29.00	28.30	14.00	33.20	11.40							نسبة العاملين في البناء والصناعة
23.10	41.00	49.50	37.10	61.80	28.70							نسبة العاملين في الخدمات
587.00	390.00	179.00	954.00	-	128.00	127.00		142.00	115.30	122.00	105.00	مؤشر تغير الأسعار
-422.00	-465.00	-62.00	-984.00	6486.00	-607.00	-122.00	-2758.00	-102,000	93,000	81,000	unknown	الميزان التجاري بالمليون
11.10	4.60	6.90	40.80	1.10	2.30	1.60	362.99	-	-	-	39.00	الديون الخارجية بالبليون
												المواصلات
5500.00	1997.00	2115.00	8193.00	none	none	none	64907.50	270312.00	26621.00	31800.00	145600.00	السكك الحديدية مقاسة بالكيلومتر
20.00	27.00	17.70	49.60	2.00	4.00	5.60	1155.41	6365.00	1127.00	466.30	1584.00	الطرق السريعة مقاسة بـ ١٠٠٠ كيلومتر
	16	15	30	5	9	7	882	3297	341	194	4500	عدد المطارات المدنية
												الدفاع
58.50	404.00	40.00	635.00	43.00	36.60	27.50	1839.60	2153.00	246.00	10.60	5226.00	عدد العاملين بالآلاف
2.00	22.80	3.60	4.60	5.70	10.00	17.60		8.60	1.00	2.90	12.50	نسبة ميزانية الدفاع من الدخل القومي

ISE-SW 1B64/ 0000010

App.279

Case 4:26-cv-00521-MW-MAF Document 55-2 Filed 10/12/26 Page 282 of 307



13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
Jordan	Kuwait	Lebanon	Libya	Malaysia	Mali	Mauritania	Morocco	Niger	Nigeria	Oman	Pakistan	Palestine	Qatar	Saudi Arabia	Senegal	Sierra-Leone	Somalia
91.90	17.80	10.00	1700.00	329.00	1200.00	1030.00	447.00	1267.00	923.00	212.40	803.00	6.24	11.00	2149.00	196.00	71.70	637.60
2.80	1.90	2.60	3.90	16.30	8.60	1.91	24.50	7.20	111.90	1.20	107.50	1.60	0.30	15.50	7.30	3.90	7.90
4.70	2.80	3.60	7.20	23.20	9.50	2.60	33.20	10.00	166.20	1.90	137.60	-	0.60	19.80	10.20	4.80	8.80
71.00	71.00	75.00	50.00	65.00	10.00	17.00	28.00	8.00	27.00	20.00	26.00	-	40.00	52.00	10.00	15.00	40.00
5.50	16.90	1.82	20.00	25.80	1.10	0.97	11.90	1.20	53.40	7.50	33.00	2.06	5.40	85.00	2.30	1.17	1.40
0.00	36.90		40.40	10.90			7.00		19.80	35.60	2.30		30.30	29.60			
7.20	1.00		3.60	21.10			21.30		26.60	3.20	23.70		1.30	5.40			
24.60	12.30		16.90	28.70			5.50		15.20	15.70	26.60		17.70	19.00			
68.20	42.80		36.10	40.20			48.50		38.40	45.50	47.40		50.70	46.00			
2070.00	9040.00	1636.00	5410.00	1600.00	150.00	540.00	510.00	180.00	520.00	5900.00	330.00		17070.00	6030.00	380.00	247.00	200.00
0.50	0.70	0.70	1.06	5.80	3.90	0.60	6.00	3.20	36.10	0.46	28.80	-	0.20	3.20	0.10	73.90	1.90
7.00	1.90		16.80	35.30			39.20		57.80	23.30	48.70		0.10	14.30			
20.90	28.00		39.40	22.40			24.30		20.00	30.70	19.40		39.40	30.20			
72.10	70.10		43.80	42.30			30.50		22.20	46.00	31.90		60.50	55.50			
129.00	125.60	2700.00	-	127.80	152.00	177.40	182.20	129.70	274.20	118.60	163.90	-	113.70	94.20	178.00	-	1112.00
-350.00	4414.00	-578.00	-54.00	2336.00	-111.00	-73.00	164.00	-67.00	-380.00	-966.00	-336.00	n/a	-	-9571.00	-316.00	-	
4.50	none	0.21	-	16.70	2.00	1.60	20.70	1.60	28.70	2.80	16.20	n/a	none	none	3.60	0.66	2.50
619.00	0.00	378.00	0.00	1665.00	642.00	675.00	1891.00	0.00	3.50	0.00	10097.00	0.00	0.00	800.00	1034.00	84.00	0.00
7.50	2.60	7.30	19.30	23.60	15.70	7.50	58.00	39.90	107.99	16.90	101.30	0.00	0.84	74.00	14.00	7.40	21.60
20	23	23	73	35	2	2	22	2	75	27	30	n/a	3	191	3	2	4
82.00	16.00	n/a	71.00	113.00	7.00	15.00	203.00	3300.00	94.50	21.50	480.60	n/a	7.00	72.30	9.70	3.10	65.00
17.40	6.30	n/a	17.80	3.80	2.50	6.60	6.50	0.80	1.40	24.40	6.40	n/a	46.90	24.40	2.80	0.90	6.50

Case 4:26-cv-00521-MWM-MAF Document 55-2 Filed 10/12/26 Page 283 of 307



	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
	Afghanistan	Albania	Algeria	Bahrain	Bangladesh	Brunei	Chad	Egypt	Guinea	Indonesia	Iran	Iraq
Geography												
Area in 1,000 sq km	647.00	28.75	2381.00	0.65	144.00	5.70	1284.00	1000.00	246.00	1900.50	1600.50	434.00
Demography												
Population in millions	14.50	3.15	24.20	0.41	109.90	0.30	4.70	53.50	6.90	184.10	51.90	17.50
Population projection 2000	17.00	17.00	34.40	0.47	139.70	0.31	7.30	63.90	8.80	222.80	64.90	23.80
Literacy in %	12.00	75.00	52.00	40.00	29.00	45.00	17.00	45.00	48.00	62.00	48.00	55.00
Economy												
GDP in billion $	3.08	2.70	59.00	3.77	15.60	3.60	0.82	34.00	1.70	59.00	86.00	40.00
% in oil, gas & min	0.00	0.00	17.00		0.00	50.60	0.00	2.90		11.10	14.00	24.70
% in agriculture	64.00	34.10	13.90	1.00	45.70	1.90	46.70	16.10		25.80	13.10	15.60
% in mfg & const	20.00	51.10	33.50	41.20	14.20	4.10	11.30	36.00		20.70	19.90	18.40
% in service	16.00	14.80	35.60	57.80	40.10	43.40	42.00	45.00		42.30	53.00	41.30
Per capita in US$	230.00	930.00	2600.00	8110.00	150.00	10970.00	160.00	655.00	250.00	330.00	1756.00	2400.00
Labor force in millions	3.00	0.70	3.80	0.18	29.60	0.70	1.70	12.10	2.80	63.90	11.07	4.30
% in agriculture	57.00	21.80	25.70	2.00	56.40	4.90	81.20	42.70		53.50	36.40	27.70
% in mfg & const	13.00	47.80	32.60	34.40	11.30	27.30	5.20	20.58		13.20	32.80	23.30
% in service	30.00	30.40	41.70	63.60	32.30	67.80	13.60	36.72		33.30	30.80	49.00
Price index (1980=100)	134.00	-	186.90	116.40	228.00	126.10	129.80	299.40	-	183.00	180.30	-
Balance of trade in millions	-556.00	-	-406.00	-	-309.00	-	-83.00	2705.00	-208.00	-1837.00	-	-
Foreign debt in billions	-	5.60	22.80	none	9.50	none	0.32	40.20	1.40	52.50	none	50.50
Transportation												
Railroads in km	1549.00	437.00	4146.00	0.00	2892.00	13.00	0.00	4857.00	1045.00	6964.00	4601.00	2710.00
Highways in 1,000 km	21.00	4.98	80.00	0.23	7.24	1.09	31.32	47.02	30.10	119.50	136.30	25.30
Civil air (aircraft)	8	-	37	3	15	3	3	47	10	70	52	15
Defense												
Active duty personnel in thousands	50.00	42.00	139.00	2.80	101.50	4.00	17.00	445.00	9900.00	284.00	604.00	1000.00
Budget as % of GNP	7.70	5.30	2.50	4.00	1.70	5.80	1.90	14.20	3.20	2.50	7.20	42.50

Case 4:26-cv-00521-MWB-MAF Document 55-2 Filed 10/12/26 Page 284 of 307

Bate #**ISE-SW 1B64/ 000003**

[This page is in English].

Bate #**ISE-SW 1B64/ 000004**

[Arabic header]

Members of the Board of Directors

Bate #**ISE-SW 1B64/ 0000005**

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R. BESHIR
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The Plains →	NURIDIN GIAYASH H: (918) 663-2839 O: (918) 627-1040 F: (918) 663-7467
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South Pacific →	G. AL-JUMAILY H: (714) 539-3377 O: T: (714) 596-4284
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Matters that Concern You

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No.	Name	Home Phone	Work Phone

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These search terms are highlighted: **is an international muslim body which seeks to establish** Text-only version

IKHWANWEB
The Muslim Brotherhood's Official English web site



Founded by Khairat el Shater, Deputy Chairman of the MB

Breaking News

11 :32 Al-Akhbar Paper: Re-opening of investigation into Al-Salam 98 ship, which sank, killing tens on their way back from Saudi Arabia ***New***

00 :10 Six articles to be looked into as Committee commences amendments to the constitution Wednesday ***New***

20 :05 MB confirms it will take part in Friday's Victory Celebration in Tahrir Square ***New***

18 :19 Al-Azhar's top cleric Ahmed Al Tayeb calls on gov't to conduct elections to determine his post rather than by appointment ***New***

18 :10 Egypt's Central bank decides continued closure of banks until the beginning of next week ***New***

16 :17 Egypt's ruling military council hopes to hand over power to civilian rulers, including elected president, by August 2011

16 :12 Mounir Thabet, brother of former First Lady Suzanne Mubarak has been accused of monopolizing transportation of US military and economic aid to Egypt over past few decades

16 :10 Ghad Party leader Ayman Nour confirms he will run in upcoming presidential elections

16 :08 Policemen stage demonstrations calling for execution of former Interior Minister Habib Al-Adly for citing corruption incidents across the board

16 :05 Egypt's caretaker government announces new cabinet ministers will be announced within next few days

19:25 **Military Announces Constitutional Committee**



Bylaws of the International Muslim Brotherhood

The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in Dhul Hijjah 1347 AH / June, 1928 AD. Its headquarters is in Cairo and may only be transferred under exceptional circumstances by the Shura Council's decision if the Guidance Office is unable to do so.

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09:04 Swiss Banks to Disclose Ousted Mubarak's Assets
23:38 Ikhwanweb Publishes Details of Mubarak's Final Hours
22:13 Military Announces Constitutional Committee
21:51 Ousted Mubarak's son runs up provocative bill partying in London over weekend
19:24 National Council for Human Rights Calls for the Release of Al-Shater and Malek
19:08 Egypt's Military appoints Judge Tareq El Bishri as head of panel to amend constitution
18:53 Egypt's military calls on US and EU to freeze assets of ousted Mubarak's aides
16:49 An Appeal to The Military Supreme Council and The Prosecutor General A Policy for Information Access, Transparency
16:12 Statement by the Forum of Independent Human Rights Organizational Long Live the Egyptian Popular Revolution - Roadmap
10:13 MB will apply to become party when time is right

All

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Values Added: Euphoria in Cairo

Uprising in Tunisia

State Department's Hypocritical Silence on Egypt's Regime against MB and Opposition

EGYPT: Muslim Brotherhood explains why it's bucking boycott to take part in elections

Egypt's Upcoming Elections: Boycotts, Campaigns, and Monitors

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Monday, January 18,2010 11:42

IkhwanWeb

"In the name of Allah, the Merciful"
The Muslim Brotherhood's Guidelines

Part I:

The Group's Headquarters

Article (1):

The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in Dhul Hijjah 1347 AH / June, 1928 AD. Its headquarters is in Cairo and may only be transferred under exceptional circumstances by the Shura Council's decision if the Guidance Office is unable to do so.

Chapter II:

Objectives and means

Article (2):

The Muslim Brotherhood, **is an international Muslim Body, which seeks to establish** Allah's law in the land by achieving the spiritual goals of Islam and the true religion which are namely the following:

A– The need to inform the masses, Muslims and non-Muslims of Islamic teachings, explaining the signs in detail to those who understand the pure human nature upon which Allah Has created man.

Distinguish the universality of Islam, in addition to refuting fallacy.

B – Endeavor to purify the hearts and souls of men from evil and sin. Unify humankind into the fundamental principles of Islam and bringing closer the viewpoints of the Islamic sects.

C – Make efforts to raise the standard of living of marginalized people and contribute to the further growth and development of the nation's wealth.

D – Achieve social justice and expand social insurance to cover every citizen. Fight poverty, disease, ignorance, hunger, depravity, encourage, and invite others towards virtue, righteousness and piety.

E – Insist to liberate the Islamic nation from the yoke of foreign rule, help safeguard the rights of Muslims everywhere and unite Muslims around the world.

E – The need to work on establishing the Islamic State, which seeks to effectively implement the provisions of Islam and its teachings. Defend the nation against the internal enemies, try to present the true teachings of Islam and communicate its ideas to the world.

G – The sincere support for a global cooperation in accordance with the provisions of the Islamic Sharia, which would safeguard the personal rights, freedom of speech for active and constructive participation towards building a new basis of human civilization as is ensured by the overall teachings of Islam.

Article (3):

The Muslim Brotherhood in achieving these objectives depends on the following means:

A– Preaching to Islam, this can only be achieved by promoting it through

Poll

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Vote

Torture Other Views



Habib Al-Adli Accused of Deliberately Killing Demonstrators

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- Tunisia's Al-Nahda's Islamist opposition Call for RCD to Dissolve
- Egypt's Regime Orders Ministers to Avoid Giving Provocative Statements on Subsidizing
- Tunis in Transition
- Activists Call for National Strike in Front of the Egyptian Presidential Palace on January 25
- Ghannouchi to Al Jazeera: I Will Return to Tunisia and Call for Dissolution of Parliament
- MB calls on Arab nations to support Tunisians

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Elbaradei Campaign



Security Threats for Activists Hours before the Egyptian Day of Rage

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Prisoners of Conscience



Libya: Writer detained after calling for demonstrations

MB Headquarters Raided and Activists and Journalists Arrested

Appeal for MB Deputy Chairman Al-Shater Postponed to February 8

EOHR Calls for Re-Trials of International MB Networking

When reporting becomes activism

various means such as radio and television, pamphlets, bulletins, newspapers, magazines, books, publications and preparing the delegations and missions at home and abroad.

B –Teach the movement's younger members to flourish with these principles and demonstrate the true meaning of religiousness as individuals and families. Through teaching decent behaviour to young children ideologically according to the Qur'aan and Sunnah, mentally with knowledge and spiritually with moral virtue, and physically through practicing sport. They endeavor to sow the seed of the true meaning of fraternity, full integration and genuine cooperation among them for international Islamic consensus aiming to create a new generation to understand Islam correctly acting in accordance with its provisions.

C – Guidance and admonition which is sound approach suitable for Muslims in the fields of education, legislation, judiciary, administration, military life, economy, health and governance. This may be aimed at by presenting thorny issues to the competent authorities in order to persuade the world's legislative and executive bodies to follow through with the original conceptual thinking and the tactical implementation with the necessity to work hard to refine the media guided by Islam.

D– Make every effort for the establishment of educational, social, economic and scientific institutions and the establishment of mosques, schools, clinics, shelters, clubs as well as the formation of committees to regulate zakat affairs and alms. Seeking to bring reconciliation between Allah, individuals, families and resist succumbing to social ills, harmful habits, drugs, alcohol, gambling by guiding young people to the right path filling their leisure time with positive activities by creating independent sections in accordance with special regulations.

E –The Islamic nation must be fully prepared to fight the tyrants and the enemies of Allah as a prelude to establishing an Islamic state.

Chapter III:

Terms of Membership

Article (4):

A –A candidate for the movement's membership must serve at least one year on probation. If he performs his duties well and is aware of missionary purposes and pledges to respect the rules espoused by achieving its sublime goals approved by the authority, he will become a regular member for three years.

B – In these three years if he proves to be an active member, by performing the duties of his office he is entitled to be accepted as an active member pledged to lead the allegiance to the Brotherhood's Chairman as follows: -

(I pledge allegiance to the Almighty Allah to constantly uphold and safeguard the principles of Islam, to fight in the cause of Allah, to adhere to the terms and duties of the Brotherhood's membership, showing as much as possible obedience to the just leaders in sorrow and in joy as long as it does not involve disobedience to Allah, I pay allegiance and may Allah be my witness . He may take the oath as a member before the Brotherhood's Controller-General or his representative if it could not be given directly to the MB Chairman.

Article (5):

Political Experts: MB Sentences a Settling of Scores
Muslim Brotherhood's Statement on MB International Networking Case
Five MB Leaders Served Sentences Ranging up to Eight Years Despite Previous Acquittals
Human Rights: Al-Shater and Malek Are Regime's Abductees
UPDATED: Fifth Hearing of International MB Networking Case Despite Previous Court Acquittals
43 MBs arrested overnight with the approach of elections
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Each member must pay monthly or annually a full subscription fee according to the country's financial regulations. This does not exclude the possibility of contributing to the Dawa's expenses with donations, financial endowments, will, etc. The missionary work also obligates the wealthy to pay their Zakat on the profit earned.

Article (6):

If the member fails to accomplish some of his duties or neglects it, disciplinary or penal action may be taken against him according to the country's penal system, including the exemption from the movement.

Article (7):

Each member has the right to express his/ her opinion according to the etiquette of Islam and the group's organizational structure.

Article (8):
Every member of the organization is entitled to offer various proposals.

Article (9):

Each member has the right to file suits against other members and make appeals.

Article (10):

The Member also has the right to attend and to give his vote and his peers must express solidarity with him as ordained by Islam.

Chapter IV:

The Muslim Brotherhood's main administrative bodies

Article (11):

The Group's principal bodies are:

i. Chairman
ii. Guidance Office
iii. The General Shura Council

First: Chairman:

Article (12):

The Brotherhood's Chairman is the movement's overall leader who heads the Executive Guidance Bureau and the General Shura Council and undertakes the following tasks:

A- He is expected to supervise the entire group's units, give advice, guidance and direct officials and hold them accountable for every fault, failure, corruption, deviation or disregard and neglect of rules according to the group's regulations.

B – He has the right to represent the group in all matters having managerial responsibility on behalf of the organization.

C – He is also permitted to mandate any one to undertake some duties.

D – He is entitled to invite Controller-General representing their countries to meet, if necessary.

Article (13):

Whoever wants to run as a general guide must meet the following conditions:

A) – He must be at least forty years of age.

B) – He must have at least 15 years of creditable service.

C) – He must have decent manners, an administrative ability and religious knowledge (particularly Islamic jurisprudence) that would qualify him to assume the duties and lead the movement.

Article (14):

The Brotherhood's Chairman must be chosen according to the following stages:

A – Members of the Guidance Bureau, after consultation with the executive offices in the countries, Controller-General one-third of the Shura Council members to nominate more popular and acceptable by people once consensus does appear to have been reached for a particular candidate meets the conditions mentioned in article (13).

B – Accordingly, by a decision from the Guidance Office, First deputy to the Chairman asks members of the General Shura Council for a meeting within at least one week to elect the new Chairman scheduling the time and, place. They must be notified at least a month ahead of the scheduled date.

C – It is permissible to convene meetings of the Shura Council under the presidency of First deputy to the Chairman. If he is the nominee, the oldest person in attendance can represent him in electing the Chairman who must meet two thirds of Council members (a quorum of at least two-thirds). If they fail, the meeting is postponed to a later date not less that one month, and not more than two months for a week in which they elect the new Chairman by an absolute majority attendance of Council members.

Article (15):

The Muslim Brotherhood's General Guide to take the oath if assigned by the Shura Council as follows:

(I pledge allegiance to Allah Almighty constantly upholding the sublime principals of the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of His Messenger (peace be upon him) and commitment to the Brotherhood's platform to act promptly in implementing the decisions entrusted to me as much as possible even if I disagree with the decisions.

Members of the Shura Council sworn in before the General Guide perceiving ten elements of allegiance:

(I pledge allegiance to Allah Almighty constantly upholding and safeguarding the principles of Islam, fighting in the cause of Allah, adhering with terms and duties of the Brotherhood's membership, showing as much as possible obedience to the just leaders in sorrow and in joy as long as that does not involve disobedience to Allah, I pay allegiance and Allah be my witness).

Article (16):

The Chairman immediately undertakes his responsibilities after his election and should therefore resign from his private business and devote himself to the task that he is entrusted to as long as he is qualified to do so.

Article (17):

The Chairman is not allowed to engage in the management of a business or economic activities relating to the movement's interests, its objective is to protect his reputation, save his leisure time and effort but he is legitimized to engage in religious, scientific, or literary activities approved by the Guidance Office.

Article (18):

The movement bears the travel and living expenses of the chairman according to the Financial Regulations of full time employees.

Article (19):

The Chairman's mandate expires in the following cases:

A- If he violates his duties or loses legibility, members of the Shura Council must analyze the situation and make the appropriate decision. If the reason is acceptable he may be relieved from office, a meeting must be immediately called dedicated to that with a majority of two thirds of the Council members.

B - If the chairman submits his resignation, he should call the Guidance Office and the Advisory Council to study the cause and take the appropriate decision. His resignation becomes fait accompli by absolute majority of Council members if he insists to do so.

C- If the Chairman dies during his term of office, the vice-Chairman becomes acting president and new procedures are to be taken in accordance with Article (13) of this Regulation.

Article (20):

The Chairman can choose one or more deputies from the members of the Guidance Bureau.

Article (21):

The Chairman's term in office is 6 years, subject to renewal, with the exception of the current general guide.

Article (22):

The Chairman after the end of his term holds his membership of the Shura Council for life unless the mandate not subject in paragraph (a) of Article (19) of the Rule that provides he breaches his duties or loses eligibility.

Second: The General Guidance Office:

Article (23):

The newly elected Guidance Bureau is the Brotherhood's senior executive and administrative board as well as watchdog authorized to conduct the policy-oriented management plans and mechanisms which would form the basis of the group.

Article (24):

The Muslim Brotherhood's Guidance Office with its leader the General Guide is composed of 14 members is to be selected according to the following basis:

A - Eight members to be elected by members of the Shura Council from the chairman's country.

B- Five members elected by the Shura Council members and regional representation should be taken into account.

C – General Guide chooses from among members of the Guidance Bureau Treasurer and Secretary.

Article (25):

Any individual who intends to run for membership of the General Guidance Office must meet the following conditions:

A- He must be a member of the Shura Council.
B – He must be at least 30 years of age.
C – He must devote himself to the Office.

Article (26):

In the event that members of the Guidance Bureau have been elected, they must swear to the following:

(I pledge allegiance to Allah Almighty constantly upholding with sublime principals of the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of His Messenger (peace be upon him) and commitment to the Brotherhood's platform act to promptly implement the decisions entrusted to me as much as possible even if I am in disagreement with it. I pledge to struggle in order to achieve the group's highest goals as soon as possible and I pay allegiance and Allah be my witness).

Article (27):

The term of office for the Guidance Bureau is four lunar years and the member may be chosen more than once. In the event a seat of an elected member becomes vacant before the specified period, it shall be assumed by the next highest receiver of votes. If member of the Guidance Bureau serves as MB General-controller, his people must choose another alternative.

Article (28):

A member of the Guidance office must acknowledge the country's interests, constantly attend its meetings, preserve the confidentiality of its internal deliberations and commit to implementing the decisions even if it goes against what he believes. Has no right to criticize or challenge the decisions as long as they are issued legally. He must completely accomplish tasks assigned to him. If the member breaches his duties, Member of the Guidance Office are entitled to reprimand, warn or suspend his membership for not more than a month or exempt him from office and he must be taken to the Shura Council at a meeting attended by the members in which he explains his arguments.

Article (29)

General Guidance Office performs the following tasks:

A– Explain the group's intellectual and political attitude with regards to worldly affairs to those who are related to its policy that affect its interests in any state due to a work plan established by the Shura Council taking into account the provisions of Article (50) of chapter 6. He must assume responsibility or delegate someone else to compose sermons, issue bulletins and regulations and ensure that the movement's Platform is explained .

B – Set up a watchdog authorized to conduct, guide and implement the provisions of the General Rules and hold accountable those responsible for the tasks entrusted to them.

C – They must take the necessary steps to implement the resolutions of the Shura Council in all branches.

D – They must form specialized committees, adopt internal regulations and hold officials accountable.

E –The need to develop a general plan and bring up for discussion and approval of the Shura Council.

F- Prepare the annual general report on the work of leadership, the movement's circumstances and present its financial situation to the Shura Council.

G – Election of inspector not belonging to members of the Shura Council.

Article (30):

The Bureau's meetings must be periodically designated by the Chairman in which every member is bound to attend regularly. The members of the Executive Bureau can meet at any time if necessary on the Chairman's, deputy or consent of four executive members' request. Its meetings can be legalized if attended by an absolute majority of the members, its decisions are valid when issued by an absolute majority of those present and if votes are equal, giving preference to the Chairman.

Article (31):

The Chairman's, deputy or the oldest member of the bureau has the right to chair meetings of the Executive Office in the case of his absence or inability to perform his duties, read minutes of the former meeting and examine to be ratified. The movement's agenda must be discussed precisely and the decision taken is not valid in the absence of the Chairman and his deputy.

Article (32):

The movement's Secretary-General completely represents the Guidance Bureau in all affairs except special cases where members of the Executive Office believe the need to recruit another member for a legal decision.

Article (33):

The General Secretary of the executive body chaired by the Secretary-General resides in the country of the general guide, and may assume its duties from

outside if necessary to do so.

Article (34):

The task of the secretary General is to follow up the implementation of the guidance decisions and control its many aspects of activity. He may ask assistance from other members or staff but is principally responsible of the Executive Office and what is assigned to them. In the case of his absence or neglect, members of the governing body appoint from among its members a candidate to temporarily replace him.

Article (35):

The financial secretary's primary task is to control its finances and record input and output, closely monitoring all accounting and financial activities, supervising all financial activities in accordance with the Financial Regulations and not take not the Executive Bureau at more frequent intervals. He may have the staff member's assistance fall under his direct responsibility. In the event of his absence or inability to fulfill his assigned duties, they can assign others to temporarily do his work.

Third: the Shura Council:

Article (36):

The Shura Council is the Brotherhood's legislative authority and its decisions are binding. The term of office for the Shura Council is four lunar years.

Article (37):

A- Shura Council is composed of at least thirty members representing the Brotherhood organization adopted in various countries and are selected from among the members of the country's Shura councils.

B –The Shoura Council may annex five specialist members

C - Any Brotherhood formation can be represented in the Shura Council if adopted by the Brotherhood's General Executive Office.

D - Regulations provide that as long as the Controller-General for the Muslim Community is one person, it is obligatory he have one representative in the General Shura Council. If he has more than one delegate, the Controller-Genera must be the one if he can not participate as a permanent member, they may elect another.

Article (38):

Whoever is chosen for the Shura Council must meet the following criteria:

A– He should be an active member w ho previously served in the Executive Office or the Shura Council in his country.

B – At least thirty years of age.

C - He must have been an active member for at least five years.

D – He must have good manners and administrative ability that would qualify him to assume his duties.

E– Has not received any warrant suspension of his membership during the previous five years.

Article (39):

The General Shura Council responsible for the following tasks:

A– Right to vote on General Guide and members of the Executive Bureau in accordance with articles (14), (24).

B– Adhere to the group's sublime goals and its policies and explain its stance on various issues and other parties.

C- Endorse the movement's general plan and necessary means.

D – Discuss and approve the inspector general's report on the annual financial report of the movement and approve the New Year's budget.

E– Members of the Supreme Court specialized to hear cases brought directly to them must be chosen by the Chairman and members of the Guidance Office or the Shura Council.

F – Hold the entire members of the general guidance Bureau accountable for the mistakes and must be approved by an absolute majority of all the Shura Council deputies.

G– Relieve the Chairman of his post or accept his resignation in accordance with Article (19) of these Regulations.

H – Amend the bylaws to be on a proposal submitted by the Chairman or the Guidance Office or submit a proposal approved by eight members of the Shura Council. Furthermore, members must be informed of the resolution to be considered for at least one month and is modified with the consent of two thirds of the members.

The Bureau's meetings must be periodically designated by the Chairman in which every member is bound to attend meetings regularly as members of Executive Bureau can meet in any time if necessary at the Chairman's request or his deputy or one of its members, with the consent of four. Its meetings can be legalized if attended by an absolute majority of the members, its decisions are valid when issued by an absolute majority of those present and if votes are equally, gives preference to the Chairman.

Article (40):

The Shura Council meets regularly every six months on a date set by the Chairman, his first deputy, members of the governing body or at the request approved by one-third of the members of the Shura Council. Meeting can be valid unless attended by an absolute majority only in cases where the quorum required in particular. If they did not have the required number, the meetings are postponed to another date members renewing the call for the convening of the Council raising the same subject on the agenda again. If there is no quorum has once again been accomplished, they apply Article (43) of these Regulations.

Resolutions can be valid only if issued with the consent of an absolute majority

of those present only in cases when special quorum is required.

Article (41):

Members of the Shura Council must be informed in advance of meetings by at least one month accompanied with an agenda except in cases of emergency.

Article (42):

In the event a member is relieved from his position in accordance with the country's rules of procedure in which he belongs, they must inform the General Guidance Office immediately.

Article (43):

The General Guidance Office shall exercise all the powers and authority of the the General Shura Council except for amendment of the Regulations or exempt general guide so as to facilitate the meeting of the Council if meeting becomes impossible.

Article (44):

The General Shura Council shapes a Supreme Court to determine its terms of reference in a special regulation and members of the Shura Council have the right to form arbitration committees if necessary.

Article (45):

If a member of the Shura Council ignores his duties or has violated the terms of membership as stated, the Chairman exhorts him and they must refer him to the Supreme Court, if he constantly repeats the same acts. If he is a member of the Executive Office, this also applies to him as provided in Article (39).

Article (46):

By a decision taken by majority vote of members of the Shura Council or the Supreme Court, member's term of office expires the Brotherhood's Chairman is entitled to suspend his term of office immediately by the competent authority for discussion, then he may complain to the supreme guide.

Article (47):

The General Shura Council is composed of temporary and standing committees designated to examine every aspect of activity and produce bylaw is approved by the Shura Council.

Article (48):

The proposed sections and committees can be increased or decreased as required by the group's activity.

Chapter V:

Terms and Conditions of nation's membership in the international organization (IO):

Article (49):

Any member of national regulation to be approved in the international organization must meet the following conditions:

A– International Guidance Bureau must approve its rules of procedure, which includes the establishment of at least Shura Council and an Executive Office as well as the Controller-General.
B– They must adopt the group's approach.
C– They have a significant Islamic impact in his country.
D– Other national branches must be approved by the General Guidance Bureau after investigating the conditions set forth in each of the (a, b, c) paragraphs.

Chapter VI:

Regulation of the relationship between Egypt 's mother branch and leaders of the other branches

Article (50):

The relationship between the movement's higher leadership and leaders of the other branches is determined within the following frameworks:

A– Leaders of the other branches "secretary generals" must abide by the higher leadership's decisions represented in the guide, the Guidance Bureau and the Shura Council and include the following:

1– Committing to the fundamental principles reported in these Regulations and adhering to the approach endorsed by the General Shura Council.

2– Commitment to promoting dialogue and understanding Islam is derived from two sources: the Qur'aan and Sunnah set out in the twentieth principals.

3– Adhering to the movement's policies and attitudes toward public issues, as defined by the International Guidance Bureau as well as the International Shura Council.

4– Obligation to get approval of the General Guidance Office prior to making any important political decision.

B– Second, leaders of the other branches must make consultations and hold agreements with the Guide, and Guidance Office before making a decision in all domestic key issues that may affect the Intentional Organization's future.

C– Third, leaders of the other branches act freely and send a report to the general guidance office at the first opportunity or in its annual report compiled by the Controller General and include the following:

1–All the Brotherhood’s plans in the branch, its activities and its expansion abroad
2– The movement's political positions in local issues that do not affect the group's future in the other branches is subject to its general attitudes.

3– Legitimate means adopted by the country to achieve the objectives and principles in the light of its particular conditions and circumstances.

Article (51):

Every branch has the right to develop its own bylaw regulating its activities and consistent with domestic circumstances, taking into account the compatibility of

its provisions with the General Regulations and should be endorsed by the General Guidance Office before it becomes effective.

Article (52):

Each Controller-General must submit an annual report on the progress of work, activities and the proposals for the organization's benefits in its territory to the Guidance Office prior to the regular meeting of the Shura Council.

Article (53):

Each branch must pay an annual subscription in which its amount is determined by an agreement with the General Guidance Office in order to contribute to easing the financial burden.

Article (54):

The Brotherhood emigrants should be subject to the movement's leaders in the State wherein they reside.

Glory and praise be to You, Allah! I bear witness that there is no god but You

(1 By (the Token of) Time (through the ages), 2 Verily Man is in loss, 3 Except such as have Faith, and do righteous deeds, and (join together) in the mutual teaching of Truth, and of Patience and Constancy) "Al-'Asr"
Allah is greatest and all Praise is for Him.

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