

STATE OF MICHIGAN

Michigan Supreme Court

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

V,

Pamela Jean Taylor,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

SC: 168814

COA: 375391

Osceola CC: 24-006382-FH

Brief of the People

As Ordered by May 17, 2026 Order

"ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED"

Anthony Badovinac P42376

Osceola County Prosecutor

301 West Upton Avenue

Reed City, Michigan 49677

231 832 3226

prosecutor@osceolacountymi.gov

June 16, 2026

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 People v Duke unpublished 4/12/2016 #32473 Mich App (2016)
 People v Dunbar 264 Mich App 240; 690 NW2d 476 (2004)
 People v Lewis 503 Mich 162,168; 926 NW2d 796 (2018)
 People v Lloyd 284 Mich App 703; 774 NW2d 347 (2009)
 People v McFall 309 Mich App 377; 873 NW2d 112 (2015)
 People b McGraw 484 Mich 120,126; 771 NW2d 655 (2009)
 People v Jackson 483 Mich 271,290; 769 NW2d 630 (2009)
 People v Peltola 489 Mich 174,185; 805 NW2d 140 (2011)

Statutes

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STATE OF JURISDICTION

This Court has Jurisdiction over this appeal by leave granted and Order of Abeyance vacated by Michigan Supreme Court Order of May 27, 2026, SC 168814

ATTACHMENTS

JUDGMENT OF SENTENCE 01/15/2025	Exhibit 1
TRANSCRIPT OF SENTENCING 10/25/2025	Exhibit 2
SCAO FORM 222	Exhibit 3
SUPREME COURT ORDER P V IVEY 03/06/2026	Exhibit 4
MINIMUM STANDARDS	
#8 FOR INDIGENT CRIMINAL DEFENSE	Exhibit 5
REGISTER OF ACTIONS	Exhibit 6

Statement of Questions Presented

First Question

1. 1. Whether attorney fees can be assessed against an indigent criminal defendant?

Defendant-Appellant answers: No

Trial Court: did not answer

People Answers: Yes

Second Question

2. . Whether the trial court in this case made adequate factual findings to support the fees imposed?

Defendant-Appellant answers : No

Trial Court: did not answer

People answers: No

Third Question

3. Whether the trial court is required to hold an evidentiary hearing to assess the factual basis for the fee or the defendant's ability to pay?

Defendant-Appellant answers: Yes

Trial Court; did not answer

People answers: yes to factual basis

People answers: no to ability to pay until triggered

Introduction

Indigent defendants in Michigan are by law afforded services, including court appointed attorneys, if they are found to be indigent. Several somewhat convoluted statutes, regulations and precedents have attempted to deal with the fees that are charged to indigent defendants. Most problematic are attorney fee recoupments paid to court-appointed attorneys, often ordered by the sentencing judge. Over the years many judges have ordered repayment of all or a portion of court-appointed attorney fees in an attempt to keep the courts functioning and solvent.

Several issues surround the recoupment including what legislative mandate allows it; how are fees calculated, who oversees the billing process, and ultimately who pays for the fees. For years the authority cited was MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii) as it authorizes;

(iii) Until December 31, 2026, any cost reasonably related to the actual costs incurred by the trial court without separately calculating those costs involved in the particular case, including, but not limited to, the following:

- (A) Salaries and benefits for relevant court personnel.
- (B) Goods and services necessary for the operation of the court.
- (C) Necessary expenses for the operation and maintenance of court buildings and facilities.

Historically courts have cited the “without separately Calculating...” clause of MCL 769.1k (1)(b)(iii) to include MCL 7691k(1)(b)(iv) which reads (iv) The expenses of providing legal assistance to the defendant. But this Court in People v Lewis 503 Mich 162; (2018) held (iii) to be differentiated from (iv);

“ We agree that the inclusion of the language "without separately calculating those costs involved in the particular case" under Subparagraph (iii) evidences the Legislature's intent that the provision apply only to that subparagraph.” With (iv) not brought under the umbrella of section MCL 769.1k (1)(b)(iii), the trend is to argue that judges must “calculate attorney fees” after determining a defendant is indigent.” That is the very issue this Court seeks clarification on.

Finally, the Ormsbee matter currently before this Court argues in its brief, that the Court should not be used as a collection system in alleged violation of the Distinct Statement Clause and The Separation of Powers (page 10 of brief filed on 3/23/2026) mandates of the law. And People v Ivey (Docket No. 168000) has been settled by stipulation between the prosecution and the defendant, with this Court ordering that the attorney fees assessed to the defendant be vacated. (Supreme Court Order of March 6, 2026 #168000). (copy attached, exhibit # 4) Even the statute MCL 769.k1(1)(b)(iii) seems by its very language, to contemplate a “sunset” provision regarding other costs, since it mandates; “Until December 31, 2026...”. MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii).

Thus, thoroughly triangulated by competing laws, statute, court rule and trend, we turn to the issues presented.

FACTS

The defendant pled guilty to Possession of Controlled Substance (MCL 333.74032A5), a 4 year felony, and was sentenced on 10/25/2024 to 366 days. Defendant was ordered to pay \$68.00 in State minimum fees, Crime Victim fee of \$130.00, Court costs of \$250.00, a fine of \$250.00 **and attorney fees of \$1420.00.** (COPY OF JUDGMENT ATTACHED 1/15/2025, exhibit#1) It is the aforesaid assessment of attorney fees, the determination of those fees, the authority to impose attorney fees, and the determination of indigency, which the Court wants to be addressed by brief.

ISSUE #1

1. whether attorney fees can be assessed against an indigent criminal defendant;

The Court has authority to assess fees per MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii) and (iv); MCR 6.005(C);

MCL 769.1k. Imposition of fine, cost, or assessment; availability of information to defendant; reports; nonpayment of costs.

Sec. 1k.

(1) If a defendant enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or if the court determines after a hearing or trial that the defendant is guilty, both of the following apply at the time of the sentencing or at the time entry of judgment of guilt is deferred by statute or sentencing is delayed by statute:

(a) The court shall impose the minimum state costs as set forth in section 1j of this chapter.

(b) The court may impose any or all of the following:

(i) Any fine authorized by the statute for a violation of which the defendant entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or the court determined that the defendant was guilty.

(ii) Any cost authorized by the statute for a violation of which the defendant entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or the court determined that the defendant was guilty.

(iii) Until December 31, 2026, any cost reasonably related to the actual costs incurred by the trial court without separately calculating those costs involved in the particular case, including, but not limited to, the following:

- (A) Salaries and benefits for relevant court personnel.
- (B) Goods and services necessary for the operation of the court.
- (C) Necessary expenses for the operation and maintenance of court buildings and facilities.

(iv) *The expenses of providing legal assistance to the defendant.*

(v) Any assessment authorized by law.

(vi) Reimbursement under section 1f of this chapter.

“If a defendant is able to pay part of the cost of a lawyer, the court may require contribution to the cost of providing a lawyer and may establish a plan for collecting the contribution.” MCR 6.005(C). “If a defendant is able to pay part of the cost of a lawyer, the court may require contribution to the cost of providing a lawyer and may establish a plan for collecting the contribution.” MCR 6.005(C).

That statutory authority to impose fees, is buttressed by decisions like People v Lloyd 284 Mich App 703; 774 NW2d 347 (2009) which held that the authority of the Court exceeded the awarding of costs over and above those authorized by the statute, including attorney fees when it held; “the Legislature, presumably aware of the rule of law requiring statutory authority to award costs in criminal cases, enacted MCL 769.1k and MCL 769.34(6) that expressly granted the trial court authority, when sentencing, to order a defendant to pay court costs. The plain language of these statutes evidences that trial courts have the authority to award, costs, fines, and assessments.” id 704-705

Likewise the Michigan Supreme Court has determined that the U.S. Constitution does not require that defendant's foreseeable ability to pay be considered before a defendant can be directed to pay reimbursement for appointed counsel. People v Jackson, 483 Mich 271, 290; 769 NW2d 630 (2009). But "[t]he public would not be profited if relieved of paying costs of a particular litigation only to have imposed on it the expense of supporting the person thereby made an object of public support." Adkins v E I DuPont de Nemours & Co, 335 US 331, 339; 69 S Ct 85; 93 L Ed 43 (1948).

Therefore the Court has authority to charge attorney fees under either MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii) or (iv) and MCR 6.005. Having located the authority to impose attorney fees, the next question is; how is indigency determined?

Determination of Indigency

MCL 6.005 requires the court to investigate if the defendant wants an attorney and if so, whether the defendant is financially unable to retain one.

Obviously a determination of the meaning of "indigent" seems necessary to adequately answer the question posed. There is of course, many factors which must be considered by the Court in making that determination;

MCL 6.005 (B) Questioning Defendant About Indigency.

If the defendant requests a lawyer and claims financial inability to retain one, the court must determine whether the defendant is financially unable to retain one.

Those factors include;

- (1) present employment, earning capacity and living expenses;
 - (2) outstanding debts and liabilities, secured and unsecured;
 - (3) whether the defendant has qualified for and is receiving any form of public assistance;
 - (4) availability and convertibility, without undue financial hardship to the defendant and the defendant's dependents, of any personal or real property owned;
 - (5) the rebuttable presumptions of indigency listed in the MIDC's indigency standard; and
 - (6) any other circumstances that would impair the ability to pay a lawyer's fee as would ordinarily be required to retain competent counsel. The ability to post bond for pretrial release does not make the defendant ineligible for appointment of a lawyer. The court reviews an appointing authority's determination of indigency de novo and may consider information not presented to the appointing authority.
- (C) Partial Indigency. If a defendant is able to pay part of the cost of a lawyer, the court may require contribution to the cost of providing a lawyer and may establish a plan for collecting the contribution.

Application

Hear, of course the defendant was provided appointed defense counsel following the standard protocol required by SCAO Form 222, (Copy attached, exhibit #3) and MCR 6.005, MCL 769.1K, MCL 769.16a which was signed by the attorney for the defendant after the factors were considered by the magistrate. So the Court had authority to determine indigency and it did so and the Court had the authority to impose attorney fees and it did so. The Circuit Court, having followed logically, the determination by the district court magistrate, of the defendant's indigency, continued to treat the defendant as indigent.

Conclusion #1

The court had authority to charge attorney fees and the authority to determine indigency, both of which it did.

ISSUE #2**2. whether the trial court in this case made adequate factual findings to support the fees imposed;**

The Circuit Court having a long history with defense counsel, Robert Hackett, and knowing Hackett's propensity to charge less than other defense attorneys approved the requested bill of \$1420.00. The prosecution notes and the Register of Actions (ROA) (Copy attached, exhibit #6) show multiple Court appearances: including but not limited to 3 pre-trials, (a preliminary hearing turned into a pretrial), a show cause hearing, bench warrant issuance, plea hearing, bond violation hearing, bond revoked twice with subsequent hearings, postponed sentencing appearance because defendant indicated she had used, re-set sentencing held etc.. It is unknown what amount of time or the hourly rate charged by Mr. Hackett but assuming 13 hours of time at \$110 per hour to justify his billing would be about right. (The \$110 per hour is taken from the MIDC Standard #8) (Copy attached, exhibit #5).

The Minimum Standards for Indigent Criminal Defense Services (2023) (copy attached, exhibit #5) through the Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs (LARA) required all trial court funding units to submit plans for compliance with the approved standards no later than April 22, 2024. And the fees allowed to be charged by defense attorneys were also laid out;

Standard 8 (B). Attorney hourly rates shall be at least \$100 per hour for misdemeanors, \$110 per hour for non-life offense felonies, and \$120 per hour for life offense felonies. These rates must be adjusted annually for cost of living increases consistent with economic adjustments made to State of Michigan employees' salaries. Counsel must also be reimbursed for case-related expenses as specified in Section E. To protect funding units, courts and attorneys alike, local systems should establish expected hourly thresholds for additional scrutiny. Assigned counsel should scrupulously track all hours spent preparing a case to include with invoice submission.

In this case, the discussion of attorney fees, albeit minimal, can be found in the sentencing transcript of 10/25/2024 (copy attached, exhibit # 2) which reads as follows;

Pg 8, line 19-22

19 "So her financial obligations will be as follows.
20 Crime victim's assessment in the amount of \$130. Court costs
21 in the amount of \$250. A fine of \$250. Attorney fees in the
22 amount of \$1,480. State costs in the amount of \$68.

pg9, lines 20-23;

20

20 \$1,480 for attorney fees? I just want to make sure

21 I got it right,

22 (Attorney Hackett) \$1420

23 Oh I'm sorry \$1,420. I'm sorry.
 24 (attorney Hackett) It's okay
 25 I just want to make sure I got the

Pg 10 line 1

1 right number.

Notwithstanding all of the aforesaid this Court in *People v Lewis* 503 Mich 162; 926 NW2nd 797 (2018) broached the subject of imposing attorney fees without a finding of support prior to imposing them :

At issue is whether a sentencing court may impose attorney fees upon a defendant under MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iv) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, MCL 760.1 et seq., without first making findings of fact in support of that amount. The Court held that;

“The instant issue previously appeared before the Court of Appeals in *People v Duke*, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued April 12, 2016 (Docket No. 325473), 2016 Mich. App. LEXIS 716. That panel held that the trial court was required to establish the cost of legal representation for the specific defendant when assessing attorney fees pursuant to MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iv). 2016 Mich. App. LEXIS 716 at *2. The panel explained:

[W]hile language in MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii) authorizes the trial court to assess costs without separately calculating the costs for the particular case, the attorney fee provision in MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iv) does not include that same language. Compare MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii) ("any cost reasonably related to the actual costs incurred by the trial court *without separately calculating those costs*

involved in the particular case" (emphasis added)), with MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iv) ("*[t]he expenses of providing legal assistance to the defendant.*" (emphasis added)). When the legislature includes language in one part of a statute that it omits in another, it is assumed that the omission was intentional. *People v McFall*, 309 Mich App 377; 873 N.W.2d 112 (2015), quoting *People v Peltola*, 489 Mich 174, 185; 803 N.W.2d 140 (2011). Thus, the trial court must establish the cost of providing legal services to the specific defendant at issue when assessing attorney fees under MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iv). [*Duke*, 2016 Mich. App. We agree that the inclusion of the language "without separately calculating those costs involved in the particular case" under Subparagraph (iii) evidences the Legislature's intent that the provision apply only to that subparagraph . Inclusion of average-costs language in Subparagraph (iii)—rather than the Subdivision (b) umbrella—further suggests that the Legislature intended to create an exception to the default rule of Subdivision (b); if the exception permits costs *without* separate calculation, then logically the default rule must require that costs be separately calculated for the particular case.

Moreover, MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii) does not include attorney fees in its list of the kinds of costs that do not have to be separately calculated for the particular defendant, namely: "[s]alaries and benefits for relevant court personnel," "[g]oods and services necessary for the operation of the court," and "[n]ecessary expenses for the operation and maintenance of court buildings and facilities." Although this list is nonexclusive, the costs of providing legal assistance to a defendant are logically distinguishable from the costs enumerated in Subparagraph (iii), in part because to include legal-assistance costs among Subparagraph (iii) costs would be to render Subparagraph (iv) surplusage. See *People v McGraw*, 484 Mich 120, 126; 771 N.W.2d 655 (2009) ("In interpreting a statute, we avoid a construction that would render part of the statute surplusage or nugatory."). Moreover, the costs laid

out under Subparagraph (iii) are all fairly standard expenses for a court's operations, tend not to vary significantly by case, and are not affected by any particular case. In contrast, attorney fees can vary greatly among defendants depending on a variety of circumstances, such as the nature and number of the criminal charges.

Under 769.1k(1)(b)(iv) it would seem, on its face, therefore that a specific finding of facts in support of the amount of attorney fees would be warranted in this matter.

However, one could make the argument that a cursorial review of the submitted attorney fees was completed by the trial court, taking into consideration of the billing history of attorney Hackett, the determination by the district court magistrate of indigency, and the number of Court and non-court appearances, enough facts were documented to support the fees awarded, without more costly investigation.

Anyone could have predicted that without oversight, attorney fees would explode under the MIDC mandate with no enforced oversight and the human nature of a number of defense attorneys, the recent emphasis to insure oversight could have been prophetically predicted as could the eventual concern about same. Why the MIDC is not policing that matter speaks volumes about its ineptitude or at least its non-concern about costs. Indeed the MIDC Standard 8 requires overview by the Commission on attorney bills; all in an attempt to lessen the burden on judges:

8 (F). Payments. Vouchers submitted by assigned counsel and contract defenders should be reviewed by an administrator and/or her and his staff,

who should be empowered to approve or disapprove fees or expenses. This is efficient, ensures the independence of counsel, and relieves judges of the burden of this administrative task. It also helps to equalize fees through a centralized fee-approval system. Vouchers should be approved in a timely manner unless there is cause to believe the amount claimed is unwarranted. In lengthy cases, periodic billing and payment during the course of representation should be allowed.

Frankly both the MIDC and the judge should review and approve the billing after making findings in support.

That is obviously not being done and now notwithstanding the MIDC mandates. It seems like both the MDIC and the Court dropped the ball and no in-depth review of the billing was done.

Conclusion #2

Was there enough fact finding done by the trial court to support the fees imposed; probably not, given the aforesaid mandates requiring more than cursorial examination of a submitted number and consideration of the defense attorney's past. Both the MIDC and the Court need to comply with actual fact finding regarding the attorney fees charged.

ISSUE #3

3. whether the trial court is required to hold an evidentiary hearing to assess the factual basis for the fee or the defendant's ability to pay.

FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE FEE

As is cited earlier herein and repeated hereunder the findings of precedents mandate the necessity of an evidentiary hearing to assess basis for the fee, to wit;

People v McFall, 309 Mich App 377; 873 N.W.2d 112 (2015), quoting *People v Peltola*, 489 Mich 174, 185; 803 N.W.2d 140 (2011). Thus, the trial court must establish the cost of providing legal services to the specific defendant at issue when assessing attorney fees under MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iv). [*Duke*, 2016 Mich. App. We agree that the inclusion of the language "without separately calculating those costs involved in the particular case" under Subparagraph (iii) evidences the Legislature's intent that the provision apply only to that subparagraph . Inclusion of average-costs language in Subparagraph (iii)—rather than the Subdivision (b) umbrella—further suggests that the Legislature intended to create an exception to the default rule of Subdivision (b); if the exception permits costs *without* separate calculation, then logically the default rule must require that costs be separately calculated for the particular case.

ABILITY TO PAY

The answer to this issue was determined in *People v Jackson* 483 Mich 271; 769 NW2d 630 (2009) wherein the Court held;

“This case presents us with several questions regarding the process by which Michigan trial courts impose attorney fees on convicted criminal defendants who have used court-appointed attorneys. Specifically, we first asked whether *People v Dunbar*, 264 Mich App 240; 690 NW2d 476 (2004), correctly decided that, before imposing a fee for a court-appointed attorney, a trial court must make a presentence articulation of its conclusion that the defendant has a foreseeable ability to pay the fee. We conclude that *Dunbar* was incorrect to the extent that it required a court to conduct an ability-to-pay analysis before imposing a fee for a court-appointed attorney, and we hold that such an analysis is only required once the imposition of the fee is enforced. Further, we hold that once an ability-to-pay assessment is triggered, the court must consider whether the defendant remains indigent and whether repayment would cause manifest hardship.

Finally, we conclude that remittance orders of prisoner funds, under MCL 769.11, generally obviate the need for an ability-to-pay assessment with relation to defendants sentenced to a term of imprisonment because the statute is structured to only take monies from prisoners who are presumed to be non-indigent.”

Therefore the ability to pay decision is already made as part of the statutory system already in place and only needs to be considered only once the imposition of the fee is enforced. Then the Court must consider the ability to pay. If however, the remittance comes from prisoner funds, no such examination is needed, since such individuals are presumed non-indigent.

Conclusion #3


The court (as overseen by MIDC) must hold an evidentiary hearing to assess the basis for the fees charged. The ability to pay must be considered once an ability-to-pay assessment is triggered, the court must consider whether the defendant remains indigent and whether repayment would cause manifest hardship. However, that hearing is not necessary if the remittance comes from prisoner funds, since that very status of being a prisoner, assumes non-indigency.

Conclusion

The Court has authority to impose attorney fees on indigent defendants. The Court (and MIDC) are required to factually verify the accuracy of attorney fees. The Court must hold an evidentiary hearing to determine, indigency, factual basis for the fees, and the ability to pay, once each issue becomes relevant throughout the criminal proceedings as herein discussed.

Date

6-18-26



Anthony Badovinac,

Osceola County Prosecutor

Word count 3978

EXHIBIT 1

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STATE OF MICHIGAN 49TH CIRCUIT COURT OSCEOLA COUNTY	JUDGMENT OF SENTENCE COMMITMENT TO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AMENDED	CASE NO. and JUDGE 2024 000000 6382-FH BOOHER K.
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COURTHOUSE, 301 W. UPTON
REED CITY, MI 49677

(231) 832-3261

ORI MI-670025J Police Report No. 694024624

THE PEOPLE OF	
☒ The State of Michigan	
☐	
Prosecuting attorney's name ANTHONY J. BADOVINAC	Bar no. 42376

V

Defendant's name, address, and telephone no. PAMELA JEAN TAYLOR 16369 VONDRA RD THOMPSONVILLE, MI 49683 231/871-8827		
CTN/TCN 672400027301	SID 2503354H	DOB 05/02/1961
Defendant attorney's name ROBERT S. HACKETT		Bar no. 49968

OSCEOLA
COUNTY CLERK
JAN 15 2025
CIRCUIT COURT

THE COURT FINDS:

1. The defendant was found guilty on 08/19/2024 of the crime(s) stated below.
Date

Count	CONVICTED BY			DISMISSED BY*	CRIME	CHARGE CODE(S) MCL Citation/PACC Code
	Plea*	Court	Jury			
01				D	CS/DELIVER MFG METH CS-2ND OR SUB OFF-DOUBLE	333.74012B1-A
02				D	CONT SUB-POSS SCH/LIB MET CS-2ND OR SUB OFF-DOUBLE	333.74104-F
03	NC				CONT. SUB. - POSSESS LESS	333.74032A5

*Insert "G" for guilty plea, "NC" for nolo contendere, or "MI" for guilty but mentally ill, "D" for dismissed by court, or "NP" for dismissed by prosecutor/plaintiff.

☒ 2. The conviction is reportable to the Secretary of State under MCL 257.625(21)(b).

MI T460676385336

Defendant's driver's license number

☐ 3. ☐ HIV testing is required and has been completed.

☐ Sex offender registration is required and has been completed.

☐ 4. The defendant has been fingerprinted according to MCL 28.243.

☐ 5. A DNA sample is already on file with the Michigan State Police from a previous case. No assessment is required.

IT IS ORDERED:

☐ 6. Probation is revoked.

7. Participating in a special alternative incarceration unit is ☐ prohibited. ☐ permitted.

8. The defendant is sentenced to custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections. This sentence shall be executed immediately.

Count	SENTENCE DATE	MINIMUM			MAXIMUM			DATE SENTENCE BEGINS	JAIL CREDIT		OTHER INFORMATION
		Years	Mos.	Days	Years	Mos.	Days		Mos.	Days	
03	10/25/2024			366	4			10/25/2024		33	

☐ 9. Sentence(s) to be served consecutively to (If this item is not checked, the sentence is concurrent.)

☐ each other. ☐ case numbers

10. The defendant shall pay:

Approved, SCAO
Form CC 219b, Rev. 6/23
MCL 600.4803, MCL 765.15(2), MCL 769.1k, MCL 769.16a, MCL 775.22,
MCL 780.766, MCR 6.427

Distribute form to:
Court
Corrections
Corrections (for return)
Michigan State Police CJIC
Defendant
Prosecutor

STATE OF MICHIGAN 49TH CIRCUIT COURT OSCEOLA COUNTY	JUDGMENT OF SENTENCE COMMITMENT TO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS	CASE NO. and JUDGE 2024 000000 6382-FH BOOHER K.
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COURTHOUSE, 301 W. UPTON
 REED CITY, MI 49677

(231) 832-3261

IT IS ORDERED: (continued)

10. (continued)

State Minimum	Crime Victim	Restitution	DNA Assess.	Court Costs
\$68.00	\$130.00			\$250.00

Attorney Fees	Fine	Other Costs	Total
\$1420.00	\$250.00		\$2118.00

The due date for payment is 10/25/2024. Fine, costs, and fees not paid within 56 days of the due date are subject to a 20% late penalty on the amount owed.

☐ 11. The defendant is subject to lifetime monitoring under MCL 750.520n.

12. Court recommendation:

Sentencing hearing held. Mr. Badovinac present from the PA office.
 Mr. Hackett present on behalf of the Defendant. Def present in person
 from the OSCJ. The one time 20% late penalty is waived. Def
 received/acknowledged her appellate rights. Def provided payment plan
 information. ***Amended to reflect the correct attorney fee amount of
 \$1420.00.


 Judge signature KIMBERLY L. BOOHER

01/15/2025
 Date

I certify that this is a correct and complete abstract from the original court records. The sheriff shall, without needless delay, deliver the defendant to the Michigan Department of Corrections at a place designated by the department.

(SEAL)


 Deputy court clerk signature department.
 TERRI VANBELZEN

01/15/2025
 Date

Approved, SCAO
 Form CC 219b, Rev. 6/23
 MCL 600.4803, MCL 765.15(2), MCL 769.1k, MCL 769.16a, MCL 775.22,
 MCL 780.766, MCR 6.427

Distribute form to:
 Court
 Corrections
 Corrections (for return)
 Michigan State Police CJIC
 Defendant
 Prosecutor

EXHIBIT 2

STATE OF MICHIGAN

THE 49TH CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF OSCEOLA

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN

v

File No: 24-6382-FH

PAMELA JEAN TAYLOR,

DEFENDANT.

SENTENCING

BEFORE THE HONORABLE KIMBERLY L. BOOHER, CIRCUIT JUDGE

Reed City, Michigan - Friday, October 25, 2024

APPEARANCES:

For the People:

ANTHONY BADOVINAC
Osceola County Prosecutor's Office
410 W. Upton Avenue
Reed City, Michigan 49677
(231) 832-3226

For the Defendant:

ROBERT S. HACKETT (P49968)
P.O. BOX 3514
Grand Rapids, Michigan 49501
(616) 633-7974

TRANSCRIBED BY:

Aaron Wilkinson, CER 16063
Certified Electronic Recorder
(231) 592-8303

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WITNESSES:

None

EXHIBITS

None

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Reed City, Michigan

Friday, October 25, 2024 - 10:24 a.m.

THE COURT: We are going to go on the record in the case of *The People of the State of Michigan versus Pamela Jean Taylor*, 24-6382-FH.

Appearing on behalf of the Prosecutor's office, please?

MR. BADOVINAC: Anthony Badovinac, Osceola County Prosecutor.

MR. HACKETT: Robert Hackett, appearing on behalf of Ms. Taylor, who is seated to my left.

THE COURT: Alright, and you are Pamela Taylor, is that correct?

MS. TAYLOR: Yes.

THE COURT: Move her just this way, her mouth is -- there we go -- there we go.

Alright, today is the time and date set for sentencing in this matter. Mr. Badovinac, is there any reason we should not proceed with sentence?

MR. BADOVINAC: No, Judge.

THE COURT: Mr. Hackett?

MR. HACKETT: No, Judge.

THE COURT: Ms. Taylor, is there any reason I should not sentence you here today?

MS. TAYLOR: No.

1 THE COURT: Alright, Mr. Badovinac, have you
2 reviewed the report and recommendation? Do you have any
3 additions or corrections?

4 MR. BADOVINAC: I have received it and have no
5 additions or corrections, Judge.

6 THE COURT: Mr. Hackett?

7 MR. HACKETT: No additions or corrections, Judge.

8 THE COURT: Alright, allocution, Mr. Badovinac?

9 MR. BADOVINAC: Incurrigibility comes to mind here,
10 Judge. Ms. Taylor is unable to comply with the law in any
11 way, shape, or form. She showed a positive test for meth on
12 9-27 this year. August her bond was revoked, didn't test.
13 September bond revoked, didn't test. Last time we brought up
14 27, she said, no, I'm going to test positive, so there's no
15 point in going through with it.

16 I don't see any alternative for some type of MDOC
17 sentence. I ask you to so order.

18 THE COURT: Thank you.

19 Mr. Hackett?

20 MR. HACKETT: Judge, I'm going to ask you to follow
21 the recommendation, which is 180 days with 33 days credit.
22 It's obvious that Ms. Taylor has a significant drug problem,
23 just like her wife, who came before her. Her guidelines are
24 two to 17, judge, intermediate sanction cell. The presumption
25 is no jail or prison.

1 THE COURT: Thank you.

2 Ms. Taylor, what would you like me to know before I
3 proceed with the sentence?

4 MS. TAYLOR: I'm just sorry that this all happened.
5 I quit doing it before for five years. She was my probation
6 officer, and I did very well, and I can do it again. I've got
7 a hold of a rehab center, too, that will take me right away.
8 I've never been to rehab. I don't know anything about it, but
9 I take responsibility, and this 30 days that you gave me
10 really opened my eyes.

11 THE COURT: Well, you know that 30 days that I've
12 had you sitting there, I was hoping that it would be helpful
13 to you, because we had to play a lot of games to get you here.

14 MS. TAYLOR: I never missed court.

15 THE COURT: But let's not -- remember I had told you
16 when we were on Zoom, I told you to get to the courthouse. It
17 took you hours to get to the courthouse from a couple blocks.
18 Remember that?

19 And then I let you back out, and then you stopped
20 reporting again, right? Or you came in and tested positive.

21 MS. TAYLOR: No, you violated me because my
22 paperwork was a day late.

23 I'm not trying to -- I just want to let her know.

24 THE COURT: I want to make sure that we have it
25 correct. You failed to drug test as required.

1 MS. TAYLOR: Yes. Right.

2 THE COURT: Yes.

3 MS. TAYLOR: Not when I was out, no.

4 MR. HACKETT: I thought she was talking about
5 failing to turn in her PSI packet, which was one of the issues
6 at one point.

7 THE COURT: Yes, but I didn't violate her for -- I
8 didn't do a warrant for that. I revoked her bond for failing
9 to do her drug testing in September. And then in October, is
10 that when you came in and you tested positive or said you were
11 going to be positive? Which one?

12 MS. TAYLOR: Yes, I said I was.

13 THE COURT: You said you were going to be positive.
14 You wouldn't test. We tried to test. Is that right?

15 MS. TAYLOR: No, I told you I would be positive, so
16 we didn't test.

17 THE COURT: All right.

18 MS. TAYLOR: But you violated me for -- I don't know
19 why, because my paperwork was in a day late. But 30 days did
20 do me good. I had a lot of time to think, so I guess it's all
21 good. I apologize for the delay.

22 THE COURT: I'm also looking -- it looks like there
23 was a report put in place in August. I just want to make sure
24 that we have all of the history correct, because there was a
25 warrant in August, on August 16th, done for her failing to do

1 her drug requirements. And then that's when you entered your
2 plea on August 19th, and then I gave you a PR bond when you
3 entered your plea. And then we went out -- then you were out.

4 Then I did another warrant on September 23rd for not
5 doing your drug testing, so that's probably when you're
6 talking about that it was in a day late or something.

7 Is that correct?

8 MS. TALYOR: All right.

9 THE COURT: All right.

10 And then you showed up and you told me that you were
11 going to be positive.

12 All right.

13 Anything further that you would like me to know?

14 MS. TALYOR: No.

15 THE COURT: All right.

16 So, the court will note that the Defendant in this
17 case is 63 years of age, has three prior felonies, five prior
18 misdemeanors, guidelines of two to 17.

19 However, again, she has problems, as Mr. Badovinac
20 indicated, following even the rules of being on bond. So,
21 this court is concerned that she will not be able to follow
22 any sort of probationary rules.

23 I do know what the recommendation is. The
24 recommendation in this case is for 180 days with credit for 33
25 days of jail, but I don't think that that is sufficient. I

1 don't think that she is a good candidate for community
2 supervision.

3 So, your sentence is going to be as follows. I am
4 going to send her to the Michigan Department of Corrections
5 for a period of one year and one day credit to four years
6 credit for 33 days already served.

7 And again, that is based on the fact that we had to
8 do a warrant in August. We had to then do -- I let her out of
9 jail after she entered her plea. She then -- I had to revoke
10 it again based on not testing. And then when we did get her,
11 finally, get her here on the day of her sentencing, she
12 indicated that she would be positive for methamphetamines.

13 So, I placed her in jail and adjourned her
14 sentencing for 30 days to decide what I wanted to do. And
15 during that 30-day period, my decision was that she was going
16 to go to the Michigan Department of Corrections based on her
17 behavior and her inability to follow the rules. She is not a
18 good candidate for community supervision.

19 So, her financial obligations will be as follows.
20 Crime Victims Assessment in the amount of \$130. Court costs
21 in the amount of \$250. A fine of \$250. Attorney fees in the
22 amount of \$1,480. State costs in the amount of \$68.

23 I'll waive the 20 percent penalty because it is a
24 prison recommendation. I believe I have imposed all of the
25 financial obligations because this was not a prison

1 recommendation.

2 Have I missed anything? Mr. Hackett?

3 MR. HACKETT: No, Judge.

4 THE COURT: All right.

5 This is a final sentence of the court, and you do
6 have appeal rights. If you'd like to appeal the sentence that
7 I've imposed today, you must fill out and return to the court
8 within 42 days the forms that I'm going to hand to Mr.
9 Hackett, he will hand to you.

10 I'm also going to give you a letter in regards to
11 who you need to contact once you get out of the prison system
12 to set up a payment plan.

13 All right.

14 Do you acknowledge your appeal rights?

15 MS. TAYLOR: Yes.

16 THE COURT: All right.

17 Then we'll be off the record.

18 MR. HACKETT: Thank you.

19 THE COURT: Good luck.

20 \$1,480 for attorney fees? I just want to make sure
21 I got it right.

22 MR. HACKETT: \$1,420.

23 THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry. \$1,420. I'm sorry.

24 MR. HACKETT: It's okay.

25 THE COURT: I just wanted to make sure I got the

1 right number.

2 (At 10:36 a.m., proceedings concluded.)

I certify that this transcript, consisting of 11 pages, is a complete, true, and accurate record of the proceedings and testimony taken in this case as recorded on Friday, October 25, 2024.

Date: 11/27/2024

Aaron Wilkinson

Aaron Wilkinson, CER 16063
49th Circuit Court
400 Elm Street
Big Rapids, Michigan 49307
(231) 592-8303

EXHIBIT 3

06-27-24
JUN 14 2024
COURT CLERK
CIRCUIT COURT

STATE OF MICHIGAN JUDICIAL DISTRICT JUDICIAL CIRCUIT	REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT OF ATTORNEY AND ORDER	CASE NO. and JUDGE 24-29207FY
--	--	----------------------------------

ORI Court address Court telephone no.
MI-

THE PEOPLE OF ☐ The State of Michigan ☐	v Defendant's name, address, and telephone no. Pamela Taylor Thompsonville MI 16369 Vondra Rd. 49683 E-mail address 231-871-8827
---	--

REQUEST

The defendant requests the appointment of an attorney and submits the following information:

1. CHECK ALL THAT APPLY ☐ I am under the age of 18. ☐ I am currently serving a sentence in jail or prison.		☐ I receive public assistance. ☐ I am receiving residential treatment in a mental health or substance abuse facility.	
2. CHARGE <u>Controlled Substance - delivery of</u> ☐ Misdemeanor ☒ Felony ☐ Paternity <u>meth</u> Next hearing: <u>5/9/24 @ 9:15am - PCC</u> Date <u>5/16/24 @ 1:30pm - PE</u> Bail amount: \$ <u>RR medical</u> ☐ Bond posted		3. RESIDENCE ☐ Rent ☐ Own ☐ Live with relative(s) ☐ Room/Board	
5. INCOME Employer name and address		4. MARITAL STATUS ☐ Single ☐ Divorced ☐ Dependents: _____ Number ☐ Married ☐ Separated	
Length of employment _____ Average take-home pay \$ _____ ☐ weekly ☐ monthly ☐ every two weeks		Other Income State monthly amount and source (MDHHS, VA, rent, pensions, spouse, unemployment, etc.).	
6. ASSETS* State value of car, home, bank deposits, inmate accounts, bonds, stocks, etc.			
7. OBLIGATIONS* Itemize monthly rent, installment payments, mortgage payments, child support, etc.			
8. ATTORNEY COSTS I understand that a decision will be made on whether I can afford an attorney. I understand that I may be required to contribute to the cost of an attorney. I understand that I may contest my ability to pay any ordered costs if the court attempts to collect any costs for an attorney, and the court must determine whether and how much, if any amount, I would be required to pay based on my ability to pay at that time. Date: _____ Signature: _____			

*Use other side for additional information/comments.

Request for Appointment of Attorney and Order (12/21)
Page 2 of 2

Case No. 24-29207 fy

ORDER

☐ 9. The request is denied because:

☐ 10. The defendant is referred to the local appointing authority for indigency screening and appointment of an attorney, if appropriate.

☐ 11. The defendant is financially unable to retain an attorney and is referred to the local appointing authority for appointment of an attorney.

☐ 12. _____ is appointed to represent the defendant
Name Bar no.
in this paternity action.

Daniel E. Clisby Jr.
Judge signature and date

Per the Osceola County MIDC Plan, Robert Hackett p. 49968
is appointed to represent defendant in this action.

OSCEOLA
COUNTY
JUN 14 2024
DISTRICT COURT

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EXHIBIT 4

Order

Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan

March 6, 2026

168000 & (45)

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v

DONELL WILLIE-TERRELL IVEY,
Defendant-Appellant.

SC: 168000
COA: 366838
Macomb CC: 2022-001910-FC

Megan K. Cavanagh
Chief Justice

Brian K. Zahra
Richard H. Bernstein
Elizabeth M. Welch
Kyra H. Bolden
Kimberly A. Thomas
Noah P. Hood
Justice

By order of October 31, 2025, the Court directed argument on the application for leave to appeal the November 18, 2024 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, pursuant to MCR 7.305(I)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we VACATE our October 31, 2025 order and, upon stipulation of the parties, we REMAND this case to the Macomb Circuit Court, which shall vacate the attorney fees assessed to the defendant.



t0304

I, Elizabeth Kingston-Miller, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

March 6, 2026

Elizabeth Kingston-Miller
Clerk

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EXHIBIT 5

4. *The MIDC Act focuses on qualifications that relate to counsel's ability, training and experience. Other non-merit based qualifications that relate to counsel's membership in a bar association or maintaining a local business address shall not be given undue weight.*
5. *The MIDC discourages imposing a geographic limitation on counsel's practice area; so long as counsel can meet with a client on an as-needed basis without hardship to the client and can appear in court when required.*
6. *The appointing authority should maintain a list of qualified counsel, but has the discretion to reach outside of the list of locally qualified attorneys when required in order to appoint counsel with the ability, training and experience to match the nature and complexity of the case to be assigned.*

Standard 8**Attorney Compensation (Economic Disincentives or Incentives)**

NEW: Read an Overview of attorney compensation in FY26 and a spreadsheet [Excel document] of payment structures for every system in Michigan.

Read the MIDC's report: Incentivizing Quality Indigent Defense Representation

LARA Order approving Standard 8 dated October 28, 2022

Attorneys must have the time, fees, and resources to provide the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed to indigent criminal defendants by the United States and Michigan Constitutions. The MIDC Act calls for a minimum standard that provides: "Economic disincentives or incentives that impair defense counsel's ability to provide effective representation shall be avoided." MCL 780.991(2)(b). Fair compensation for assigned counsel may optimally be achieved through a public defender office, and the MIDC recommends an indigent criminal defender office be established

where assignment levels demonstrate need, together with the active participation of a robust private bar. MCL 780.991(1)(b). In the absence of, or in combination with a public defender office, counsel should be assigned through a rotating list and be reasonably compensated.

Contracted services for defense representation are allowed, so long as financial disincentives to effective representation are minimized. This standard attempts to balance the rights of the defendant, defense attorneys, and funding units, recognizing the problems inherent in a system of compensation lacking market controls.

The MIDC proposes the following minimum standard regarding economic incentives and disincentives:

A. Rates of Payment for Salaried Public Defenders. Reasonable salaries and benefits and resources should be provided to indigent defense counsel. The rates paid by the Michigan Attorney General for ~~Special~~ Assistant Attorneys General, or other state offices serve as guidance for reasonable compensation.

B. Compensation and Expenses for Assigned Counsel. Assigned counsel should receive prompt compensation at a reasonable rate and should be reimbursed for their reasonable out-of-pocket, case-related expenses. Assigned counsel should be compensated for all work necessary to provide quality legal representation. Activities outside of court appearances, such as directing an investigation, negotiating, or tactical planning, etc., require no less legal skill and expertise than in-court appearances, and are equally important to quality representation.

Attorney hourly rates shall be at least \$100 per hour for misdemeanors, \$110 per hour for non-life offense felonies, and \$120 per hour for life offense felonies. These rates must be adjusted annually for cost of living increases consistent with economic adjustments made to State of Michigan employees' salaries. Counsel must also be reimbursed for case-related expenses as specified in Section E.

To protect funding units, courts and attorneys alike, local systems should establish expected hourly thresholds for additional scrutiny. Assigned

counsel should scrupulously track all hours spent preparing a case to include with invoice submission. All receipts or documentation for out-of-pocket and travel-related expenses actually incurred in the case qualifying for reimbursement should be preserved. Fee requests which exceed expected hourly thresholds should not be paid until an administrative review indicates that the charges were reasonably necessary.

Event based, capped hourly rates, and flat fee payment schemes are discouraged unless carefully designed to minimize disincentives and provide compensation reasonably expected to yield an hourly rate of compensation equivalent to the required minimum rate. If utilized, these alternative schemes must be based on a compensation system that realistically assesses the cost of providing competent representation, including the costs of trial, investigation, expert assistance, and extraordinary expenses, and should take into consideration objective standards of representation consistent with those set forth in other minimum standards for indigent defense. They should also follow all expense reimbursement guidelines in Section E.

C. Contracting for Indigent Defense Services. The terms of any indigent defense contract should avoid any actual or apparent financial disincentives to the attorney's obligation to provide clients with competent legal services. Contracts may only be utilized if:

- (1) They are based on reliable caseload data, and in conjunction with a method, specified in the contract, for compensation to account for increases or decreases in caseload size;
- (2) They are based on a compensation system that realistically assesses the cost of providing competent representation as described above in Section B;
- (3) They provide for regular, periodic payments to the indigent defense organization or attorney;
- (4) They include a mechanism to seek reimbursement for case-related expenses;

EXHIBIT 6

Caseload Dsp: GP

Crt: C 49 67 Jur: BOOHER
Case: 2024 0000006382 FH
Atty: HACKETT
File: 6/14/2024 Dispose: 8/19/2024 Reopen:
X-Reference: 24-29207FYRef: STATE OF MI V PAMELA TAYLOR
Worker:
Close: 10/25/2024
Microfilm Number:

CLOSE Pub

D 001 PAMELA JEAN TAYLOR
16369 VONDRA RD
THOMPSONVILLE, MI 49683 SID: 2503354H
DOB: XX/XX/XXXX Gender: F Race: WHITE AMERICAN
DLN: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX ST: XXTCN: P824124815A CTN: 672400027301 PIN: 694024624
OFFENSE DATE: 03/31/2024 ARRAIGNMENT: 04/29/2024 INCARCERATION: 04/29/2024
LC: D 772 67 DC PRELIM: 06/14/2024 WAIVED
ATTORNEY: (Appointed) ROBERT S HACKETT
P 49968 Ph#: 616/633-7974
PROSECUTOR: ANTHONY J BADOVINAC P 42376

Charge History

NUM	TYPE	Offense	ASC Description	DISP	DFR
01		CUR:333.74012B1-A NTC:333.74132-A	CS/DELIVER MFG METH CS-2ND OR SUB OFF-DOUBLE	DIS	
02		CUR:333.74104-F NTC:333.74132-A	CONT SUB-POSS SCH/LIB MET CS-2ND OR SUB OFF-DOUBLE	DIS	
03		CUR:333.74032A5	CONT. SUB. - POSSESS LESS	NOC	

Financial Order History

Ct	Assessment Description	Payer	J/ S	Order Amount	Paid Amount	F Q	Balance
	ATTORNEY FEES	D	001 N	1480.00			1420.00
	CRIME VICTIM RIGHTS	D	001 N	130.00	86.75		43.25
	HAM COURT COSTS	D	001 N	250.00	18.74		231.26
	LATE FEE	D	001 N	1.00			
	FINES	D	001 N	250.00			250.00
	STATE MINIMUM COSTS	D	001 N	68.00	68.00		
	Totals:			2179.00	173.49		1944.51

Bond History

Party	NUM	Amount	Type	Posted Date	Status
PAMELA JEAN TAYLOR			PERSONAL R		Closed
Last Action: BOND REVOKED		Amount:		Balance:	.00
PAMELA JEAN TAYLOR			PERSONAL R		Closed
Last Action: BOND REVOKED		Amount:		Balance:	.00

Events, Actions, and Judgments

NUM	Date	Jurist	Chg/Party	Clerk
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REGISTER OF ACTIONS

6/08/26 11:35:43

Pg: 2

Caseload Dsp: GP

Crt: C 49 67 Jur: BOOHER

Ref:

CLOSE Pub

Case: 2024 0000006382 FH

STATE OF MI V PAMELA TAYLOR

1 06/14/2024 D 001 ESB
BOND SET

2 06/14/2024 D 001 ESB
POST PERSONAL RECOGNIZANCE BOND

3 06/14/2024 D 001 ESB
FELONY BIND OVER/TRANSFER AFTER PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION

4 06/14/2024 D 001 ESB
FELONY INFORMATION
Proof of Service via email to Def's atty

5 06/14/2024 D 001 ESB
WAIVER OF ARRAIGNMENT/ELECTION TO STAND MUTE OR ENTER NOT GUILTY PLEA

6 06/24/2024 VK
SET CASE ON CALENDAR
SET NEXT DATE: PTC 07/19/2024 9:00 AM BOOHER COURTROOM: CC09
TO BE HELD BY ZOOM. ZOOM NO.: 349 279 0264

7 06/24/2024 D 001 GAMBROWS
PROOF OF SERVICE
RE; PRETRIAL CONFERENCE FRIDAY JULY 19, 2024 AT 9:00AM VIA ZOOM

8 07/19/2024 D 001 TLV
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE
RESULT: AARON WILKINSON CER#16063
Pretrial Conference held off the record.

9 07/19/2024 D 001 TLV
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE SUMMARY AND ORDER
Emailed to PA, DA and Scheduling Clerk.

10 07/23/2024 VK
SET CASE ON CALENDAR
SET NEXT DATE: FNSC 08/16/2024 10:00 AM BOOHER COURTROOM: CC09
TO BE HELD VIA ZOOM. ZOOM NO.: 349 279 0264

11 07/23/2024 VK
SET CASE ON CALENDAR
REMOVED ON 2024-08-28 BY BABCOCKE01
SET NEXT DATE: TRLJ 09/03/2024 9:00 AM BOOHER COURTROOM: CC09
TWO DAY JURY TRIAL TO BE HELD IN PERSON SEPT. 3, 2024-SEPT. 4, 2024

12 07/23/2024 D 001 AMY
PROOF OF SERVICE
RE: FINAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE 08/16/2024 @ 10:00 AM VIA ZOOM

13 07/23/2024 D 001 AMY
PROOF OF SERVICE
RE: JURY TRIAL 09/03/2024 @ 9:00 AM - TWO DAY JURY TRIAL TO BE HELD
IN PERSON SEPT. 3, 2024 - SEPT. 4, 2024

14 08/16/2024 D 001 TLV
MISCELLANEOUS HEARING
RESULT: ELLEN GRUBAUGH #8538
Miscellaneous hearing held. Mr. Badovinac present from the PA office.
Mr. Hackett present on behalf of the Defendant. Def present via zoom
without audio. Crt requested Def appear in person; Def has until noon
to appear at the courthouse. Def has not been drug testing; a bench
warrant will be issued if Def fails to appear. If Def appears, she
will need to drug test. Crt is off the record at 11:06am.

15 08/16/2024 VK
SET CASE ON CALENDAR
SET NEXT DATE: STAT 08/19/2024 1:00 PM BOOHER COURTROOM: CC09
TO BE HELD IN PERSON. *DF LODGED*

RECEIVED by MSC 6/18/2026 2:46:58 PM

Caseload Dsp: GP

Crt: C 49 67 Jur: BOOHER
Case: 2024 0000006382 FHRef:
STATE OF MI V PAMELA TAYLOR

CLOSE Pub

16 08/16/2024 D 001 TLV
COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS PROGRAM BOND VIOLATION
Def FTC with drug testing requirements.

17 08/16/2024 D 001 TLV
ORDER REVOKING RELEASE AND FORFEITING BOND, NOT OF INTENT TO ENTER JU
Mailed USPS to Def.

18 08/16/2024 D 001 AMY
PROOF OF SERVICE
RE: STATUS CONFERENCE 08/19/2024 @ 1:00 PM TO BE HELD IN PERSON
DF LODGED

19 08/16/2024 D 001 TLV
REVOKED

20 08/16/2024 D 001 AMY
PROOF OF SERVICE
RE: JURY TRIAL 09/03/2024 @ 9:00 AM - TWO DAY JURY TRIAL TO BE HELD IN
PERSON SEPT. 3, 2024 - SEPT. 4, 2024

21 08/16/2024 D 001 GAMBROWS
PROOF OF SERVICE
RE; STATUS CONFERENCE MONDAY AUGUST 19, 2024 AT 1:00PM IN PERSON

22 08/19/2024 03 D 001 TLV
REARRAIGNMENT
DISP: NOLO CONTENDERE
RESULT: ELLEN GRUBAUGH #8538
Status Conference/Plea hrg held. Mr. Badovinac present from the PA
office. Mr. Hackett present on behalf of the Defendant. Def present in
person from the OSCJ. Badovinac places the plea on the record. Def
plg No Contest to added count 3 (333.74032A5). PA agrees to dismiss
all other charges and Habitual 3rd. There is no sentencing agreement.
Def sworn. Def was not on probation/parole at the time of the offense.
Crt goes over charge and possible penalties. Def pleads No Contest.
Rights given. Advice of Rights signed by Def. The reason for the
No Contest plea is civil liability. Def does not object to Crt
reading the police report. Crt established elements. Crt finds a
sufficient factual basis exists to satisfy the elements of a No
Contest plea. Sentencing is to be scheduled for 4 - 6 weeks from
today. Def to be released on a PR bond.

23 08/19/2024 D 001 TLV
ADVICE OF RIGHTS

24 08/19/2024 01 D 001 TLV
REARRAIGNMENT
DISP: DISMISSED

25 08/19/2024 02 D 001 TLV
REARRAIGNMENT
DISP: DISMISSED

32 08/19/2024 D 001 TLV
BOND SET

33 08/19/2024 D 001 TLV
POST PERSONAL RECOGNIZANCE BOND

26 08/20/2024 VK
SET CASE ON CALENDAR
SET NEXT DATE: SENT 09/27/2024 9:15 AM BOOHER COURTROOM: CC09
TO BE HELD IN PERSON. ATTY TO APPEAR AT 8:30AM/DF TO APPEAR AT 8:45AM

27 08/20/2024 D 001 GAMBROWS
PROOF OF SERVICE

RECEIVED by MSC 6/18/2026 2:46:58 PM

REGISTER OF ACTIONS

6/08/26 11:35:43

Pg: 4

Caseload Dsp: GP

Crt: C 49 67 Jur: BOOHER

Ref:

CLOSE Pub

Case: 2024 0000006382 FH

STATE OF MI V PAMELA TAYLOR

28 08/23/2024 D 001 SENTENCING FRIDAY SEPTEMBER 27, 2024 AT 9:15AM HELD IN PERSON
AMENDED FELONY INFORMATION ESB
Proof of Service via email to Def's atty.

29 09/23/2024 D 001 TLV
COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS PROGRAM BOND VIOLATION
Judge authorized bond revocation and bench warrant.

30 09/23/2024 D 001 TLV
MOTION, AFFIDAVIT AND BENCH WARRANT
Emailed to PA, DA and CC. Forwarded to OCSD for lein entry.

34 09/23/2024 D 001 TLV
REVOKED

31 09/24/2024 D 001 TLV
ORDER REVOKING RELEASE AND FORFEITING BOND, NOT OF INTENT TO ENTER JU
Mailed USPS to Def.

35 09/27/2024 D 001 TLV
MISCELLANEOUS ACTION BY JUDGE
RESULT: AARON WILKINSON CER#16063
Sentencing is to be adjourned 4 weeks.

36 09/30/2024 VK
SET CASE ON CALENDAR
SET NEXT DATE: SENT 10/25/2024 9:15 AM BOOHER COURTROOM: CC09
TO BE HELD IN PERSON. ATTY TO APPEAR AT 8:30AM/*DF LODGED*
ADJ. FROM 9/27/24

37 09/30/2024 D 001 GAMBROWS
PROOF OF SERVICE
RE; SENTENCING FRIDAY OCTOBER 25, 2024 AT 9:15AM HELD IN PERSON

38 10/02/2024 D 001 TLV
BENCH WARRANT RETURNED

39 10/25/2024 03 D 001 TLV
SENTENCING
Concurrent BEGINS: 10/25/2024
Prison LOCATION: MDOC
MINIMUM TERM: 366 Days
MAXIMUM TERM: 4 Years
CREDIT TERM: 33 Days
RESULT: AARON WILKINSON CER#16063
Sentencing hearing held. Mr. Badovinac present from the PA office.
Mr. Hackett present on behalf of the Defendant. Def present in person
from the OSCJ. The one time 20% late penalty is waived. Def
received/acknowledged her appellate rights. Def provided payment plan
information.
STATE MINIMUM COSTS 68.00
CRIME VICTIM RIGHTS 130.00
HAM COURT COSTS 250.00
FINES 250.00
ATTORNEY FEES 1420.00
LATE FEE 0.00

40 10/25/2024 D 001 TLV
FINAL ORDER/JUDGMENT
Emailed to PA, DA and MDOC. Forwarded to the OCSD.

41 10/25/2024 D 001 TLV
ORDER TO REMIT PRISONER FUNDS FOR FINES, COSTS AND ASSESSMENTS
In the amount of \$2126. Emailed to MDOC.

RECEIVED by MSC 6/18/2026 2:46:58 PM

REGISTER OF ACTIONS

6/08/26 11:35:43

Pg: 5

Caseload Dsp: GP

Crt: C 49 67 Jur: BOOHER
Case: 2024 0000006382 FHRef:
STATE OF MI V PAMELA TAYLOR

CLOSE Pub

42	10/25/2024	D	001	TLV
	SENTENCING INFORMATION REPORT			
43	10/28/2024	D	001	TLV
	ELECTRONIC JUDGMENT CHR SENT			
45	10/28/2024	D	001	TLV
	NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPELLATE REVIEW AND REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT OF ATY			
	Request for Appellate Review and JOS forwarded to T. Pontz.			
46	11/14/2024	D	001	TLV
	ORDER REGARDING APPOINTMENT OF APPELLATE COUNSEL AND TRANSCRIPT			
	Certificate of Service.			
47	11/14/2024	D	001	TLV
	REPORTER/RECORDER CERTIFICATE OF ORDERING TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL			
	Re: The complete transcript of proceedings taken before Judge			
	Kimberly Booher on 08/16/24, 08/19/24 and 10/25/24. Filed by Aaron			
	Wilkinson Cer #16063.			
48	11/18/2024	D	001	TLV
	NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPELLATE REVIEW AND REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT OF ATY			
	Second request from Def. Receipt of Notice dated 10/25/24.			
49	11/18/2024	D	001	TLV
	REPORTER/RECORDER CERTIFICATE OF ORDERING TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL			
	Re: The complete transcript of proceedings before Judge Kimberly			
	Booher on 08/16/24, 08/19/2024 and 10/25/24. Filed by Ellen			
	Grubaugh #8538.			
50	11/22/2024	D	001	TLV
	NOT OF FILING OF TRANSCRIPT AND AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING			
	Re: A portion of the transcript of the total proceedings taken before			
	Judge Kimberly Booher on 08/16/24 and 08/19/24. Filed by Ellen			
	Grubaugh #8538.			
51	11/22/2024	D	001	TLV
	TRANSCRIPT			
	Re: Plea hearing held before Judge Kimberly Booher on 08/16/24.			
	Recorded/transcribed by Ellen Grubaugh #8538.			
52	11/22/2024	D	001	TLV
	TRANSCRIPT			
	Re: Plea hearing held before Judge Kimberly Booher on 08/19/24.			
	Recorded/transcribed by Ellen Grubaugh #8538.			
53	11/27/2024	D	001	ESB
	NOT OF FILING OF TRANSCRIPT AND AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING			
	Re: A portion of the transcript taken before Judge Kimberly L. Booher			
	on 10/25/2024. Filed by Aaron Wilkinson #16063.			
54	11/27/2024	D	001	ESB
	TRANSCRIPT			
	Re: Sentencing hearing held 10/25/2024 before Judge Booher;			
	Transcribed by Aaron Wilkinson CER# 16063.			
55	01/15/2025	D	001	TLV
	CORRESPONDENCE			
	From Def re: atty fees and paying fines/costs.			
56	01/15/2025	D	001	TLV
	AMENDED JUDGMENT OF SENTENCE			
	Emailed to PA, DA's, MDOC. Mailed USPS to Def.			
57	01/15/2025	D	001	TLV
	ORDER TO REMIT PRISONER FUNDS FOR FINES, COSTS AND ASSESSMENTS			
	Amended - forwarded to MDOC.			
58	05/28/2025	D	001	TC

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VANBELZT01 UCCVPFK

Mecosta/Osceola

Rel2106

REGISTER OF ACTIONS

6/08/26 11:35:43

Pg: 6

Caseload Dsp: GP

Crt: C 49 67 Jur: BOOHER

Ref:

CLOSE Pub

Case: 2024 0000006382 FH

STATE OF MI V PAMELA TAYLOR

ORDER

Application for leave to appeal is DENIED.

**** END OF SUMMARY ****

*** END OF REPORT ***

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