

~~TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON/NOFORN//MR~~

Document: [REDACTED] 09 NOV 2005
Subject: EYES ONLY FOR [REDACTED] - DESTRUCTION OF [REDACTED] VIDEO TAPES

ACTION: [REDACTED]
EYES ONLY, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

FOR: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY FOR [REDACTED] - DESTRUCTION OF [REDACTED] VIDEO TAPES

REF: A [REDACTED]
B. [REDACTED]

TEXT:

[REDACTED]

1. ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

2. PER REF A, ALL 92 [REDACTED] VIDEO TAPES WERE DESTROYED ON 09 NOVEMBER. DESTRUCTION ACTIVITY WAS INITIATED AT 0910HRS AND COMPLETED AT 1230HRS.

3. FILE: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

CABLETYPE: [REDACTED]

END OF MESSAGE [REDACTED]
.....

Document: [REDACTED] 08 NOV 2005
Subject: EYES ONLY FOR [REDACTED] - DDO APPROVAL TO DESTROY [REDACTED] VIDEO TAPES

~~TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON/NOFORN//MR~~

2007-8808-IG001867

000611

~~TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON/NOFORN//MR~~

CONF: [REDACTED]

STAFF 081855ZNOV05 [REDACTED]

TO: [REDACTED]

FROM: DDO [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY FOR [REDACTED] - DDO APPROVAL TO DESTROY [REDACTED]
VIDEO TAPES

REF: [REDACTED]

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: RESPONSE TO REF A.

2. DDO APPROVES REF A REQUEST TO DESTROY [REDACTED] VIDEO TAPES AS
PROPOSED REF A AND FOR THE REASONS CITED THEREIN (THERE IS NO
LEGAL OR OIG REQUIREMENT TO CONTINUE TO RETAIN THE TAPES.)
REQUEST THAT [REDACTED] ADVISE WHEN DESTRUCTION HAS BEEN COMPLETED.
APPRECIATE STATION ASSISTANCE.

3. FILE: [REDACTED]

CABLETYPE: [REDACTED]

END OF MESSAGE
[REDACTED]

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00061z

2007-8806-IG001868

[REDACTED]
END OF MESSAGE

Document: [REDACTED] 08 NOV 2005
Subject: EYES ONLY FOR [REDACTED] - REQUEST APPROVAL TO DESTROY [REDACTED]
VIDEO TAPES

ACTION: [REDACTED]

CITE [REDACTED]

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

FOR: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY FOR [REDACTED] - REQUEST APPROVAL TO DESTROY
[REDACTED] VIDEO TAPES

REF: [REDACTED]

TEXT:

[REDACTED]

1. ACTION REQUIRED: REQUEST APPROVAL FOR [REDACTED] TO FOLLOW THROUGH ON REF ORIGINAL AUTHORITY TO DESTROY REF [REDACTED] VIDEO TAPES.

2. FOR THE REASONS CITED IN REF, THE FACT THAT THE INSPECTOR GENERAL HAD ADVISED [REDACTED] THAT REF VIDEO TAPES WERE NO LONGER REQUIRED FOR HIS INVESTIGATION AND THE DETERMINATION BY THE OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL THAT THE [REDACTED] CABLE TRAFFIC ACCURATELY DOCUMENTED

[REDACTED] ACTIVITIES RECORDED ON VIDEO TAPE; [REDACTED] REQUESTS HQS AUTHORIZATION FOR [REDACTED] TO DESTROY REF [REDACTED] VIDEO TAPES. PENDING HQS APPROVAL, [REDACTED] WILL OVERSEE [REDACTED] DESTRUCTION OF [REDACTED] VIDEO TAPES. ON COMPLETION OF THE

DESTRUCTION, A CABLE WILL BE FORWARDED TO HQS NOTING THE DATE/TIME OF THE VIDEO TAPE DESTRUCTION.

3. FILE: NONE.

[REDACTED]

CABLETYPE: [REDACTED]

END OF MESSAGE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

12/20/2007 10:54 AM

To [REDACTED]

cc [REDACTED]

Subject Fw: ATTENTION: OIG Additional Cables Related to Videotape Destruction

[REDACTED] asked me to pull up the cables highlighted in red below, but, you are the only one with access to them. Can you pls. do the honors? Thank you, [REDACTED]

Forwarded by [REDACTED] on 12/20/2007 10:52 AM



[REDACTED]

12/20/2007 10:41 AM

To [REDACTED]

cc [REDACTED]

Subject ATTENTION: OIG Additional Cables Related to Videotape Destruction

[REDACTED]

Please see below documents from [REDACTED] list that you provided yesterday. We were able to access most. Some are controlled by [REDACTED] and I have asked [REDACTED] to provide them to you. Others that we have no access to are owned by [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Please see three cables in blue with red parenthesis comment to you below as [REDACTED] owns access to those cable. Please provide to [REDACTED] Thanks!

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


appears to be [REDACTED] could not find the cable in its searches.

[REDACTED] (19Aug03)
[REDACTED] (19Aug03)
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET// [REDACTED] 01//ORCON/NOFORN//MR~~




~~TOP SECRET// [REDACTED] 01//ORCON/NOFORN//MR~~

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2007-5808-IG001872

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


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000617

2007-8808-IG001873



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TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON//NOFORN//MR

000018
2007-8808 16001874


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



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000619
2007-8808-1G001875




TOP SECRET//S1//ORCON/NOFORN//MR



TOP SECRET//S1//ORCON/NOFORN//MR

000620
2007-8808-10001876


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000621
2007-8808-IG001877


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00062c
2007-8808 IG001878


TOP SECRET/ [REDACTED] SI//ORCON/NOFORN//MP



TOP SECRET/ [REDACTED] SI//ORCON/NOFORN//MR

000623
2007-8608-IG001879

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2007-8808-IG001880

[SEPARATOR PAGE]

SECRET//MR

11/10/2005 07:25 PM

To: Dusty Fogg

cc:

Subject: short backgrounder - part 2

Dusty - ok - on the Zabaydah tapes - - I am no longer feeling comfortable. While I understand Jose's 'decision' (and believe the tapes were bad news) I was just told by Rizzo that [REDACTED] DID NOT concur on the cable - it was never discussed with him (this is perhaps worse news, in that we may have 'improperly' destroyed something). In fact, it is unclear now whether the [REDACTED] did as well. Cable was apparently drafted by [REDACTED] and released by Jose; they are only two names on it, so I am told by Rizzo. Either [REDACTED] lied to Jose about 'clearing' with [REDACTED] and IG (my bet) or Jose misstated the facts. (It is not without relevance that [REDACTED] figured prominently in the tapes, as [REDACTED] was in charge of [REDACTED] at the time and clearly would want the tapes destroyed.) Rizzo is clearly upset, because he was on the hook to notify Harriet Miers of the status of the tapes because it was she who had asked to be advised before any action was taken. Apparently, Rizzo called Harriet this afternoon and she was livid, which he said was actually unusual for her. Rizzo does not think this is likely to just go away. Rizzo has advised [REDACTED] of this latest 'wrinkle.' Sounds like we will regroup on Monday.

SECRET//MR

000819

2007-8808-IG000075

~~SECRET//MR~~

Attachment classified as above. Classification of transmittal document (when separated from attachment): ~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
11/10/2005 05:48 PM

To: Dusty Foggo [REDACTED]
cc:
Subject: short backgrounder.

Dusty - at both the DO update and right after the G-7 the issue of the Abu.Zubaydah tapes were discussed. You may recall these concern the tapes which were made during his interrogations at [REDACTED] and being held by the [REDACTED] of that country. It was recommended to previous DO management that the tapes be destroyed. This was after the [REDACTED] had reviewed them and deemed that transcripts were an accurate reflection of what happened and they were no longer needed from their perspective [REDACTED]. For whatever reason it seems, previous DO asked [REDACTED] (nfi) someone (nfi) downtown and as a result got cold feet and did not order them destroyed. Current [REDACTED] not wanting - smartly - to continue to be custodian of these things was advised to send in a cable asking for guidance. He did so. Guidance just sent - cleared by [REDACTED], DDO and [REDACTED] - told him to destroy. He did so. Rizzo found out today this had occurred as was upset - apparently because he had not been consulted - not sure if there was another reason. He raised at DO update but was 'calmed' (only slightly) when told [REDACTED] had approved. Jose raised with Porter and myself and [REDACTED] after G-7 and explained that he (Jose) felt it was extremely important to destroy the tapes and that if there was any heat he would take it. (PG laughed and said that actually, it would be he, PG, who would take the heat) PG, however, agreed with the decision. As Jose said, the heat from destroying is nothing compared to what it would be if the tapes ever got into public domain - he said that out of context, they would make us look terrible; it would be 'devastating' to us. All in the room agreed but noted that we needed to find out Rizzo's concern and whether it was substantive or just being 'left out.' Jose was going to pursue this. Believe this is end of it, but in case it comes up, you need the background. [REDACTED]

~~SECRET//MR~~

000820
2007-8808-IG000074

[SEPARATOR PAGE]

[REDACTED]

To [REDACTED]
 cc [REDACTED]
 bcc [REDACTED]
 Subject Fw: Video Tapes

10/05/2007 02:31 PM

----- Forwarded by [REDACTED] on 10/05/2007 02:31 PM -----

To [REDACTED]
 cc [REDACTED]
 Subject Video Tapes

09/25/2007 03:44 PM

Below is the information for the cable granting approval to destroy the [REDACTED] tapes.

DIRECTOR [REDACTED]
 Document Date: 08 NOV 2005
 File Number: [REDACTED] - No clue about this file number, searched in [REDACTED] with zero returns.
 Subject: EYES ONLY FOR [REDACTED] - DDO APPROVAL TO DESTROY [REDACTED] VIDEO TAPES

[REDACTED]

[SEPARATOR PAGE]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

12/03/2007 09:12 AM

[REDACTED]


Subject Re: Fw: Potential Statement-Videotapes Story [icon]


[REDACTED]


[REDACTED]


First, and most obvious, Jay Bybee's 1 Aug 2002 memo to John Rizzo stated, in part, "Moreover, you have also orally informed us that although some of these techniques may be used with more than once, that repetition will not be substantial because the techniques generally lose their effectiveness after several repetitions." (p. 2) and again, "You have indicated that these acts will not be used with substantial repetition, so that there is no possibility that severe physical pain could arise from such repetition." (p. 11). The OIG review determined that Abu Zubaydah was subjected to [REDACTED] waterboard sessions, consisting of at least 83 separate exposures [REDACTED] assured us that he gave regular updates to DoJ (i.e., John Yoo [REDACTED] at OLC) during this time frame, and DoJ was aware of the real numbers, but we were never able to verify this with DoJ, as INV management at the time elected not to interview witnesses outside the building. In addition to the disparity in numbers, the method of water application as recorded on the tapes was at odds with the Bybee opinion.


[REDACTED]

















[SEPARATOR PAGE]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~/NOFORN//MR~~

[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]
12/10/2007 11:10 AM

Subject Trip Report

[REDACTED]
FYI, Attached is your very fine summary
summary table was subsequently refined

[REDACTED] One note—the attached
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~/NOFORN//MR~~

03/17/09 TCG 8417

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] 187 Trip Report [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (OIG) staff
conducted interrogation
review work [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] that the
interrogations, including the application of enhanced
interrogation techniques (EITs), were in compliance with
applicable statutes and Department of Justice legal
opinions. [REDACTED] intended to interview all
personnel who had assisted [REDACTED]
related to
supporting an interrogation field operation. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] related to the medical effects of techniques and
methods applied. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Zubaydah's initial debriefings
application of EITs, and his final debriefings. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Interviews were

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

conducted of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

waterboard applications.

81


[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] work conducted
included interviewing three [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



[REDACTED] Regarding the interviews conducted
[REDACTED] reinforced the need to have a consistent approach
to the interrogation process. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] the EIT methods employed, including the waterboard,
posed no real threat to the physical well being of the
detainees, [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]



~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

Summary of Abu Zubaydah Waterboard Exposures



[SEPARATOR PAGE]

~~SECRET/ [REDACTED] /NOFORN//MR~~

Subject: DCI meeting on Disposition of AZ Tapes

From the Desk of [REDACTED]

We have set up a meeting for 1340 hours on Friday 10 Jan to discuss the disposition of the AZ tapes. In advance of that meeting, request CTC draft a short paper for the DCI that will describe our proposed plan of action. The paper will need to lay out our decision to move forward with the destruction of the tapes, and our plan to ensure that both the Hill and NSC will support this decision. If I can have the paper by COB Thurs, I will try to get it to the DCI to read in advance of the meeting. Many thanks! [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET/ [REDACTED] /NOFORN//MR~~

000871

[SEPARATOR PAGE]


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(S) [REDACTED] Timeline Regarding Destruction of Abu Zubaydah Videotapes

30 November 2002 (S) OGC attorney [REDACTED] review the videotapes [REDACTED]

9 January 2003 (S) OGC attorney drafts MFR concluding that the cable traffic accurately described the interrogation methods employed and that the methods conform to the applicable legal and policy guidance.

1 April 2004:




11 May 2004 (S) [REDACTED] GC attends meeting at the White House and is told by Addington and Gonzales not to destroy the tapes (NFI).

4 November 2005 (S) [REDACTED] At ODDO request, CTC [REDACTED] drafts language to be included in a cable from [REDACTED] requesting DDO approval to destroy the tapes. CTC [REDACTED] sends the language to [REDACTED] and the ODDO front office, as well as OGC for approval. The plan was for [REDACTED] to cut and paste the text into a cable and send it to HQs for approval.

5 November 2005 (S) [REDACTED] sends cable requesting approval to destroy the tapes.

8 November 2005 (S) [REDACTED] DDO releases cable authorizing the destruction of tapes.

10 November 2005 (S) [REDACTED] CTC [REDACTED] sends a note to [REDACTED] saying he has gotten [REDACTED] concurrence on the language for the cable. He also says that he understands [REDACTED] is



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going to call [REDACTED] with the language for the cable rather than email it to him.

(TS/[REDACTED] receives the note and replies that the exchange with [REDACTED] has already taken place. He phoned the language to [REDACTED] sent the cable. He notes that DDO already approved the destruction of the tapes.

(TS/[REDACTED] AGC learns that the tapes were destroyed and contacts DCIA Chief of Staff. AGC notes that DNI and Harriet Miers as recently as a few months ago opposed the idea of destroying the tapes. He states they need to be notified of the destruction as well as others.

[SEPARATOR PAGE]

Interview Questions for [REDACTED]

1. Provide background on your assignment to CTC and responsibilities related to interrogations.
2. Provide history of interrogation program from your perspective including legal authorities and approval of use of Enhanced Interrogation Techniques (EIT) including any parameters for EIT use.
3. What interrogation methods were employed at [REDACTED]
4. How were the interrogation methods used at [REDACTED] reviewed and vetted?
5. What was the process for ensuring compliance with the DOJ opinion?
6. What were your impressions of the [REDACTED] operation including management of the facility, care of the detainees, and methods used by the interrogators?
7. Were there any [REDACTED]
8. What is the background related to the decision to videotape interrogations [REDACTED]
9. What are your views regarding whether the tapes should be destroyed?
10. What was the rationale for transferring responsibility for interrogations from [REDACTED]
11. What interrogation methods were employed [REDACTED]
12. How were the interrogation methods used [REDACTED] reviewed and vetted?

13. What was the process for ensuring compliance with the DOJ opinion?
14. What were your impressions of the [REDACTED] operation including management of the facility, care of the detainees, and methods used by the interrogators?
15. Are there any [REDACTED]?
16. Were you aware that the "Hard Takedown" technique was used [REDACTED]?
17. [REDACTED]
18. [REDACTED]
19. What interrogation methods were employed [REDACTED]?
20. How were the interrogation methods used [REDACTED] reviewed and vetted?
21. What was the process for ensuring compliance with the DOJ opinion?
22. What were your impressions of the [REDACTED] operation including management of the facility, care of detainees, and methods used by the interrogators?
23. Are there any [REDACTED]?
24. Were you aware of the specific EIT used on Nashiri?
25. What were your communications with the interrogation teams at [REDACTED]?
26. When did you first become aware of [REDACTED]?
27. Provide background [REDACTED]

28. What is your working relationship with [REDACTED]
29. What are your responsibilities related to the screening process for people going to the field?
30. What policies and procedures have been provided for interrogations?
31. What controls are in place to prevent future problems?
32. How can the interrogation program be improved?
33. What training is now being provided?

[SEPARATOR PAGE]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NOFORN//X1~~

THE
CIA
INTERROGATION
OF
ABU ZUBAYDAH

March 2001 - Jan. 2003

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NOFORN//X1~~

00297

2007-8808-IG010443
000274

CIA Interrogation Techniques: Abu Zubayda.

~~(TS)~~ Abu Zubaydah: Terrorist Activities

- Abu Zubaydah was born a Palestinian and now holds Saudi citizenship. He was a senior lieutenant to Bin Ladin.
- At the time of his capture in Pakistan, he was heavily involved in al-Qa'ida's operational planning, and had previously been an external liaison and logistics coordinator.
- Taking him out of circulation has hurt al-Qa'ida operations in key nodes and helped disrupt a number of ongoing plots.

~~(S//NF)~~ Injuries at Time of Capture

- Abu Zubaydah was hit by two bullets during the arresting operation. [REDACTED]
A second bullet caused a large wound in his leg.
- [REDACTED]
- Abu Zubaydah was provided adequate and appropriate medical care.
- The medical treatment the Agency provided to Abu Zubaydah saved his life. He should now be considered healthy, other than some leg and knee pain.

~~(S//NF)~~ Highlights from Reporting by Abu Zubaydah

- Information from Abu Zubaydah—who was captured in late March—led to the capture of other operatives, and continues to provide some of our most valuable insights into the inner workings of al-Qa'ida. Over time, he has become more willing to cooperate on many issues, and his extensive familiarity with other al-Qa'ida terrorists and their methodologies daily helps us identify ways to exploit other detainees and to assess the credibility of reporting from a variety of sources.

- Abu Zubaydah identified Jose Padilla and Binyam Muhammad as al-Qa'ida operatives who had plans to detonate a uranium-topped "dirty bomb" in either Washington, DC, or New York City. Both have been captured. [REDACTED]
- In addition, Abu Zudbaydah indentified [REDACTED] senior al Oa'iada operator in [REDACTED]


[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

- As of mid-December 2002, Abu Zubaydah had been the source of over [REDACTED] disseminated counter-terrorism intelligence reports.

(TS)

[REDACTED]



~~(S)~~ Interrogation Techniques Used on Abu Zubaydah

- The Agency used both routine and enhanced interrogation techniques against Abu Zubaydah.
- After consulting with the NSC and DOJ, CTC, [REDACTED] originally approved 24-48 hours of sleep deprivation.

In April 2002, CTC [REDACTED] learned that due to a misunderstanding that time frame had been exceeded.

- However, CTC [REDACTED] advised that since the process did not have adverse medical effects or result in hallucination (thereby disrupting profoundly Abu Zubaydah's senses or personality) it was within legal parameters.
- After first using routine interrogation techniques, the interrogation team concluded that Abu Zubaydah continued to withhold critical threat information, including the identities of al Qaida operatives in the US, that in order to elicit those identities the use of more aggressive techniques was required and that the use of those techniques would not engender lasting and severe mental or physical harm.
- Abu Zubaydah has employed a host of resistance techniques. He is the author of a seminal al Qaida manual on resistance to interrogation methods.
- The Agency sought and received Department of Justice approval for the following [REDACTED] enhanced techniques, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] the waterboard.
- Specific interrogation team members may request prior approval from Headquarters to employ any or all of the enhanced techniques.
- Where a specific time period was allowed for a particular technique, a timekeeper was used to ensure that the techniques was only employed within the timeframes authorized.
- Agency employees engaged in the interrogation are complemented by expert personnel who possess extensive experience, gained within the Department of Defense, on the psychological and physical methods of interrogation (SERE) and the resistance techniques employed as countermeasures to such interrogation. These expert medical personnel were present throughout the interrogations.
- It is not and has never been the Agency's intent to permit Abu Zubaydah to die in the course of interrogation and appropriately trained medical

personnel have been on-site in the event an emergency medical situation arises.

- DOJ approval for use of the enhanced techniques in specific instances relies on our representation that those techniques, when applied by appropriately trained personnel, should not produce severe mental or physical pain or suffering.
- Indeed, DOJ concluded that the use of enhanced techniques carefully applied by appropriate personnel pursuant to prior Headquarters approval would not have the "specific intent" to inflict severe mental or physical pain or suffering, and therefore would not violate the law.
- For these reasons, we fully document in advance any decision to employ any enhanced techniques, along with the criteria that have been employed in making those decisions.
- The use of enhanced interrogation techniques proved productive; Abu Zubaydah provided additional useful information.
- Medical evaluations were conducted on Abu Zubaydah before and during the interrogations. In addition, a psychological profile was conducted on him before the interrogations began.

(S)

[REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]


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
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
- o [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] Videotapes. In [REDACTED] 2002 an experienced OGC attorney [REDACTED] review interrogation videotapes of Abu Zubaydah and another detainee to confirm that the cable traffic accurately described the interrogation methods employed and that the methods conformed to the applicable legal and policy guidance.
 - o [REDACTED] the OGC attorney, who had not previously been involved in this matter, reviewed the applicable legal and policy guidance governing the permissible interrogation methods and the cable traffic, and interviewed CTC and [REDACTED] personnel knowledgeable about the matter.
 - o The attorney [REDACTED] inventoried the interrogation materials—videotapes, logbook, notebook, and psychologist's notes— [REDACTED] and reviewed the videotapes.
 - o The attorney concluded that the cable traffic did in fact accurately describe the interrogation methods employed and that the methods conformed to the applicable legal and policy guidance.
 - o After this review, the General Counsel advised the DCI that OGC had no objection to the destruction of the videotapes, but strongly recommended that the new leadership of the committees first be notified about the existence of the tapes and the reasons why the Agency has decided to destroy them.
- Guidelines. CTC [REDACTED] drafted "Guidelines on Interrogation Standards" and "Guidelines on Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees". The guidelines are being coordinated. Once approved, all Agency personnel involved in interrogations or detentions will review these guidelines and acknowledge in writing that they have read and understand them.
- Training. CIA has established an interrogation program to train interrogators on techniques generally, enhanced techniques specifically, facilities, security, and the approval process.

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
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- ~~(S//NF)~~ Abu Zubaydah (AZ) was born a Palestinian and now holds Saudi citizenship.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ AZ was a senior lieutenant to UBL. At the time of his capture in Pakistan he was heavily involved in Al Qa'ida's operational planning, and had previously been an external liaison and logistics coordinator.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ AZ has corroborated intelligence on key Al Qa'ida planners and facilitators, and has provided information on Al Qa'ida's CBRN program and on individuals associated with that program. Information from AZ was instrumental in the capture near Chicago of Jose Padilla, a "dirty bomb" plotter, explosives expert, and terrorist trainer at Qandahar. AZ also identified [REDACTED] a senior Al Qa'ida operator in [REDACTED]
- ~~(S//NF)~~ AZ was hit by two bullets during the arresting operation. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] AZ should be considered healthy, other than some leg and knee pain.

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