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(U/FOUO) National Security Agency Response to Congressionally Directed Action: Report of Annual Review Pursuant to Section 702(1) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act for Period 9/1/2015 through 8/31/2016

- (U) Subsection 702(I)(3) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, as amended by the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA), requires the head of an agency conducting acquisitions pursuant to section 702 of the FISA to conduct an annual review to determine whether there is reason to believe that foreign intelligence has been or will be obtained from the acquisitions authorized under subsection 702(a) of the FISA and to use the review to evaluate the adequacy of minimization procedures used by that agency as well as to evaluate the application of the minimization procedures to a particular acquisition, as appropriate, authorized under subsection 702(a) of the FISA.
- (U) The statutory provision requires that the review shall provide, with respect to acquisitions authorized under subsection 702(a) of the FISA: (i) an accounting of the number of disseminated intelligence reports containing a reference to a U.S. person identity; (ii) an accounting of the number of U.S. person identities subsequently disseminated by the National Security Agency (NSA) in response to requests for identities that were not referred to by name or title in the original reporting; (iii) the number of targets that were later determined to be located in the United States and, to the extent possible, whether communications of such targets were reviewed; and (iv) a description of any procedures developed by the head of such element of the Intelligence Community (IC) and approved by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to assess, in a manner consistent with national security, operational requirements, and the privacy interests of U.S. persons, the extent to which the acquisitions authorized under subsection 702(a) of the FISA acquire communications of U.S. persons, and the results of any such assessment. Subsection 702(l)(3)(C) of the FISA further provides that this review shall be provided to: the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), the Attorney General (AG), the DNI, the congressional intelligence committees, and the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Senate.
- (U) The Director of NSA has conducted an annual review of NSA acquisitions authorized under subsection 702(a) of the FISA and hereby provides the results of this review conducted in accordance with subsection 702(l)(3) of the FISA for the 12-month period ending on 31 August 2016.

(U) Foreign Intelligence Obtained

(CAE) During the period covered by this res	port, NSA has acquired foreign intelligence information under
separate certifications authorized by the AG and the I	
separate certifications audiorized by the AG and the I	AVI,
(TS//SI//NF/FISA) NSA acquired valuable for	oreign intelligence information during the period covered by this
annual review that enabled NSA	to disseminate approximately intelligence
	the information acquired during this reporting period include:
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^{1 (}U) These reports were based either in whole or in part on information acquired pursuant to subsection 702(a) of the FISA.

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(S/NF) As of 31 August 2016, NSA continued to acquire information pursuant to referenced above, and this information continues to provide valuable foreign intelligence information. Given the wealth of valuable foreign intelligence information acquired during this reporting period, there is every reason to believe that acquisition pursuant to FISA section 702 is and will continue to be one of the most valuable sources for foreign intelligence available to NSA.
(U) Adequacy of Minimization Procedures
(U) NSA continually evaluates the minimization procedures applicable to the information that is acquired pursuant to subsection 702(a) of FISA and the application of the minimization procedures to particular acquisitions (i.e., the certifications cited above). These are minimization procedures that the AG, in consultation with the DNI, has adopted and that the FISC has approved for application to NSA's FISA subsection 702(a) data acquisitions. NSA will continue to evaluate its minimization procedures to ensure they protect the privacy interests of U.S. persons while affording the IC timely access to foreign intelligence information.
i. (U) Number of Disseminated Intelligence Reports Containing a Reference to a U.S. Person Identity
(S/NF) During the period of this report, NSA disseminated 4,032 intelligence reports that contained one or more references to U.S. persons. NSA does not maintain records that allow it to readily determine, in the case of a report that includes information from several sources, from which source a reference to a U.S. person was derived. Accordingly, the references to U.S. person identities may have resulted from collection pursuant to subsection 702(a) of the FISA or from other authorized signals intelligence activity conducted by NSA that was reported in conjunction with information acquired under section 702.3
ii. (U) Accounting of U.S. Person Identities Disseminated in Response to Requests for Information
(U/FOUC) During the period of this report, after concluding that the requirements of its minimization procedures had been satisfied, NSA disseminated U.S. person identities that were not referred to by name or title in the original
² (S/NF) The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) does not conduct acquisitions under subsection 702(a) of the FISA. The CIA, however, and disseminates information based on those communications. The CIA provided the following information to NSA for inclusion in this report.
(C/NE)
(S/NF) For the previous reporting period, NSA reported that 4,318 intelligence reports contained one or more references to U.S. persons.

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reporting.4 The majority of these requests were received from elements of the U.S. IC or from Federal law enforcement agencies.

iii. (U) Accounting of the Number of Targets Later Determined to be in the United States

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) NSA targets persons under subsection 702(a) by tasking their means of communications (e.g., email addresses, telephone numbers) in order to acquire foreign intelligence information; these targets do not include known U.S. persons. When conducting acquisitions of foreign intelligence information pursuant to Section 702, NSA follows targeting procedures that were adopted by the AG, in coordination with the DNI in accordance with the statutory requirements of subsection 702(d) of the FISA. NSA's 702 targeting procedures are reasonably designed to ensure that any acquisitions under subsection 702(a) are limited to targeting non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States. In order to comply with limitations contained in subsection 702(b), NSA to determine whether NSA's targets of 702 collection may have subsequently entered uses the United States. (S/NF) During the period of this report, NSA tasked for collection an average of approximately individual means of communications under subsection 702(a) of the FISA (approximately communications accounts and approximately telephone numbers) at any given time. During the period of this report, NSA determined that there were cocasions when NSA no longer had a reasonable belief that the non-U.S. person targeted was located outside the United States. In most cases, the determination that the target's means of communication were not being used by persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States was made through a - used by NSA to inform the continued validity of its reasonable belief that its combination of targets are outside the United States - and the review of the substance of the communications acquired by NSA. In other cases, the determination that the target's means of communication were not being used by persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States was made only through iv. (U) Description of Any Procedures Developed during the Reporting Period U.S. persons beyond the procedures referenced within this annual report. NSA believes that existing targeting and minimization procedures and related safeguards, as implemented and overseen internally by NSA and externally by the Department of Justice, the DNI, and the FISC, together provide assurances that subsection 702(a) authorities are being

(U) During the period of this report, no additional procedures were developed by NSA and approved by the DNI to assess the extent to which the acquisitions authorized under subsection 702(a) of FISA acquire the communications of executed reasonably and with due care. To the extent that communications of U.S. persons or persons in the United States are acquired in the conduct of NSA's targeting persons outside the United States who are not U.S. persons, the communications are treated in accordance with applicable legal and policy requirements in order to safeguard the privacy interests of U.S. persons and persons in the United States.

SHREL TO USA, FVEY) Of note, approxim	nately 34% of these disseminated U.S. person identities were proper name	s or title
dividuals. In the majority of instances, the re	leased identity information consisted of	
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⁵ (U) This report has referenced targeting and minimization procedures adopted by the AG in consultation with the DNI, and approved by the FISC.

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