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Mapping the CVE Research Landscape Workshop

Report

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Science and Technology

HOMELAND SECURITY UNIVERSITY PROGRAMS
TODAY'S RESEARCH & EDUCATION, TOMORROW'S SECURITY

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Acknowledgement

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Background

The Mapping the CVE Research Landscape workshop was developed and supported by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate under the sponsorship of Georgia Harrigan, Office of University Programs, and Dr. Richard Legault, Resilient Systems Division, Homeland Security Advanced Research Project Agency (HSARPA).

DHS S&T develops multidisciplinary, customer-driven, homeland security science and technology solutions and helps train the next generation of homeland security experts. The Office of University Programs streamlines access to the expertise of the nation's colleges and universities to address pressing homeland security needs through the Centers of Excellent (COE) program. The COE network is an extended consortium of hundreds of universities conducting groundbreaking research to address homeland security challenges. DHS COEs produce substantial analysis and research on trends in homegrown violent extremism, domestic terrorism, and terrorist propaganda to support federal, state, local, territorial, and tribal officials in identifying and mitigating violent extremist threats to the homeland. COE partners include academic institutions; industry; national laboratories; DHS operational components; S&T divisions; other federal agencies; state, local, tribal, and territorial homeland security agencies; and first responders.

The Mapping the CVE Research Landscape workshop featured the work conducted at two DHS S&T Centers of Excellence that focus on countering violent extremism (CVE).

- *National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)*, led by the University of Maryland, provides policy makers and practitioners with empirically grounded findings on the human elements of the terrorist threat and informs decisions on how to disrupt terrorists and terrorist groups.
- *National Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (CREATE)*, led by the University of Southern California, develops advanced tools to evaluate the risks, costs, and consequences of terrorism.

The Resilient Systems Division (RSD), one of five divisions within HSARPA, is tasked with rapidly developing and delivering innovative solutions that enhance the resilience of individuals, communities, and systems. RSD explores solutions that enable the whole community to prevent and protect against threats, mitigate hazards, effectively respond to disasters, and expedite recovery.

The primary objective of the workshop was to ensure that DHS S&T COE research aligns with the operational priorities of DHS practitioners. The workshop facilitated a conversation between practitioners and academic researchers to compare practitioner requirements to existing CVE research in order to identify gaps in knowledge that could be addressed by future research. Because DHS S&T research should be practitioner-driven, this report is careful to distinguish between practitioner-driven needs and academic-suggested research topics. However, all discussion conducted during the workshop was not for attribution, except for designated

speakers and presenters, so individuals are identified in this report as either a practitioner or an academic researcher to maintain anonymity.

In addition to the primary objective identified above, the workshop began to address its secondary objective of mapping the CVE research landscape by evaluating a draft CVE framework developed by Dr. Richard Legault from DHS S&T Resilient Systems Division. DHS S&T's long-term goal is to define a practitioner-oriented research agenda and to map the details of that agenda to a CVE research framework with the intent to efficiently advance and transition critical knowledge to homeland security practitioners.

It should be noted that this report captures the suggestions, insights, and discussion of academics and practitioners. Some of the suggested research topics may be outside the scope of federal authority—particularly as it related to first amendment issues and the right of individuals to hold and express radical beliefs. However, these topics remain in the report to help provide the broadest understanding of the threats faced and the challenges for the Department of Homeland Security and other state and federal agencies in responding to them.

Creating a Practitioner-Driven Research Agenda

Overwhelmingly, practitioners and researchers applauded the workshop and felt it was a good investment of time and effort. Many expressed hope that the workshop would be the first of a series that would serve to 1) create open lines of communication and understanding between the research and academic communities, 2) develop a strong DHS S&T research portfolio based on practitioner requirements, and 3) refine the definition of countering violent extremism (CVE) to one that aligns with activities across DHS, the interagency, and at the state, local, and community levels. The word "momentum" was frequently used by participants to emphasize the importance of workshops like this in creating a practitioner-driven research agenda, a strong community of interest, and useful insights that can be used by federal, state, local, and community entities in the struggle against violent extremism.

> *The workshop was an "excellent restart of the process. We need to build more momentum to further empower the CVE practitioner with more bandwidth and tools to be more effective." – DHS practitioner*
>
> *The workshop was "over the top and I truly found it helpful." – DHS practitioner*
>
> *The workshop was "a highly useful enterprise and the organizers should be commended." – CVE researcher*
>
> *"Exercises like this workshop are helpful and should be repeated on an annual basis as a means of checking in on what the priorities are for both the practitioners and researchers." – DHS practitioner*

During the workshop, practitioners were asked to identify priority research areas. This refers to knowledge that practitioners need to effectively conduct their work but currently lack either because there has been little research conducted in the area (e.g., understanding the effect on homeland security of returning foreign fighters), the topic is relatively new (e.g., social media as a recruitment tool), or the research exists but is not easily accessible or digestible by practitioners (i.e., the vast and disparate research on the roots of radicalization).

Nevertheless, the workshop highlighted research priorities exclusively driven by practitioner requirements. While this list is not comprehensive, it does represent a good starting point for future conversations that can be shared and vetted not only within DHS but also with other CVE stakeholders from across federal, state, local, and community entities.

Practitioner-Driven Research Priorities

Research priorities outlined below are grouped according to the components of Dr. Richard Legault's draft CVE framework[1] (see Figure 1), which was used to structure the workshop discussion. The workshop focused primarily on Radicalization & Diversion and Preparation & Prevention, although suggestions for Attack & Mitigation and Recovery & Resilience were also captured. Additionally, although not the primary purpose of the workshop or this report, participant feedback regarding the framework is provided in the "High Level Feedback" section of this report.



Figure 1 Draft CVE Framework (Dr. Richard Legault, RSD)

Radicalization & Diversion

Respondents expressed the most interest in the Radicalization and Diversion component of the CVE framework, suggesting it is fundamental to the understanding of CVE and the development of methods, tools, and knowledge to support DHS practitioners. The bulk of DHS S&T funded research related to CVE has been conducted in this area. Practitioner research interests are listed below according to frequency of mention.

[1] The draft CVE Framework was an attempt to broadly define countering violent extremism in an effort to better direct research, engage the practitioner community, and facilitate interagency and interorganizational cooperation. It was used to guide the discussion and should not be considered an official or final framework.

Radicalization

- The role of social media in radicalization
- Foreign fighter recruitment and radicalization
- Understanding what makes individuals or groups move from radical beliefs to violent actions
- Identifying what makes individuals vulnerable to radicalization
- Psychology or neuroscience of "cognitive openings"[2]

Diversion

- Lessons from public health campaigns that can be applied to the diversion of radicalization
- Importance of diverting "to" something positive rather than diverting "from" radicalization
- Development of resilient communities
- The role of NGOs in diverting radicalization
- Counter-ideology
- Counter-narratives
- Evaluation of the effectiveness of programs
- Determining whether elements of successful programs, such as the Lost Angeles Pilot Program, can be scaled up

Preparation & Prevention

There were far fewer suggestions for research shedding light on how individuals and groups prepare for an attack and how attacks can be prevented. The suggestions below came from only two sources.

- Indicators of preparation for attacks
- Measuring prevention capacity
- Lessons learned in attack prevention
- The role of industry partners in attack prevention
- Enhancing communication within and among fusion teams[3]

Attack & Mitigation

By design, this component of the CVE framework was only discussed briefly during the workshop. The workshop organizers recognized that Attack and Recovery & Response might fall outside the areas traditionally considered countering violent extremism. Broadly defined, this component might include comparative studies of various violent extremist organizations (VEOs), actions of foreign fighters, and

[2] One academic described cognitive opening as an individual's psychological readiness or vulnerability to radicalizing messages.

[3] State and major urban area fusion centers serve as focal points within the state and local environment for the receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing of threat-related information between the federal government and state, local, tribal, territorial (SLTT) and private sector partners on issues such as law enforcement and terrorism. For more information, see http://www.dhs.gov/state-and-major-urban-area-fusion-centers.

studies emerging from various DHS S&T supported databases like the Global Terrorism Database. Practitioners identified two primary areas of concern, listed below.

- Relationship between criminal behavior and violent extremist behavior
- Determination of whether foreign fighters differ from those of other extremists in terms of backgrounds, general characteristics, motivations, processes of radicalization, and precursor behaviors

Response & Recovery

While Response & Recovery was not directly addressed during the workshop, it was frequently mentioned during the Radicalization & Diversion discussion. During the workshop, participants used "Response & Recovery" to refer to a community's ability to help its members resist radicalization as well as reintegrate non-violent extremists back into the community. It also refers to how law enforcement and other responders reinstitute a sense of safety and security in the community after a violent extremist event. Three practitioners stated research priorities.

- Determination of why foreign fighters come home and whether they are disillusioned when they do
- Reintegration of foreign fighters
- De-radicalization prior to and after an individual has committed violence
- Law enforcement crisis response plans
- Enhancing trust between CVE practitioners and local communities

Programmatic CVE Concerns

In addition to specific research priorities, practitioners frequently mentioned programmatic needs that help them understand 1) the state of knowledge in specific topic areas, 2) which programs, tools, and methodologies are most effective for the types of activities they engage in, 3) how to scale-up successful programs, and 4) how to make sense of the CVE field in a rigorous, systematic way. These concerns are briefly addressed below. While the topics in this section were driven by practitioner needs, the content has been augmented by academic responses as well.

Communicating What We Know

Some of the priority research topics suggested are not new; there are many topics where at least some research has already been done. However, practitioners felt that the findings are not easily accessible for a variety of reasons: 1) the reports, tools, databases, etc. are not centrally located on one information-sharing platform, 2) findings from the reports may not have been packaged in a way that is easily digestible and relevant to practitioners across multiple practitioner types (e.g., law enforcement, first responders, policy makers, analysts, etc.), and 3) the report may not have indicated how the research conducted fits into the CVE landscape. Participants suggested a number of solutions:

- Solution 1: Conduct a concise review of all CVE DHS S&T research that is updated annually and designed to be easily understood by practitioners.

- Solution 2: Post all DHS S&T final research products on a single information-sharing platform that is accessible to all CVE practitioners ranging from community groups to policy makers (preferably online and without a password).
- Solution 3: Require all DHS S&T funded research to include a literature review or clearly describe how the research findings fit into the broader body of knowledge on the specific topic. This facilitates integration of the new findings into the existing knowledge base.
- Solution 4: Create a strong community of interest (COI) so that practitioners know and are familiar with CVE researchers and feel comfortable reaching out to them regarding specific topics of concern.

What Works?

Related to the topic of what is already known in the field of CVE, some practitioners suggested that more needs to be done to evaluate and assess CVE research and programs. Practitioners and researchers acknowledged that more needs to be done to ensure research and programs are rigorous, effective, and suited to practitioner needs. Specifically, workshop participants expressed a need to focus on the following areas.

- Assess what makes effective CVE programs successful
- The importance of control groups for measuring effectiveness
- Rigorous evaluation of CVE research and programs
- Ensure deliverables are customized to the needs of various end-users

Workshop participants noted that evaluation metrics are not frequently built into DHS research proposals or pilot programs. This leads to questions about the soundness of the research and the effectiveness of programs. Participants expressed a desire to see these components considered with regard to future research efforts or CVE programs.

How Do We Scale Up?

In the past, when a CVE effort has achieved some level of success, it has often done so at the micro, or city/community, level. One example of this is the Los Angeles Pilot Program.[4] Workshop practitioners felt that it is not always clear how to scale successful programs to other communities—or whether programs are scalable at all. Participants suggested that a study should be done to evaluate which elements or which community practices are scalable and which tend to be unique to particular communities. This kind of comparative study could provide valuable insight on how to implement best practices.

How Do We Make Sense of it All?

A framework is a simplification of a complex idea or phenomenon frequently used to coordinate, communicate, or organize multi-layered or interdisciplinary efforts. Participants expressed a need for some kind of organizing framework to facilitate conversation and cooperation across federal, state,

[4] For more information, please watch this video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YPM3M5qee7M&feature=youtu.be

local, community, and academic entities as well as to guide ongoing DHS S&T funded research in the most effective way possible. Dr. Richard Legault's draft CVE framework could serve these purposes (see Figure 1). While not the focus of the workshop, participants expressed support for, and offered constructive criticism of, the CVE framework, which is described in the "High Level Feedback" section.

Mapping the CVE Landscape

As mentioned previously, the workshop moderator used the CVE framework to guide a discussion about mapping the CVE landscape. The moderator asked practitioners and academics to list the main sub-components of each of the four sections of the framework: Radicalization & Diversion, Preparation & Prevention, Attack & Mitigation, and Recovery & Response. The purpose of this exercise was to develop an understanding of the activities associated with each of the components as well as the kind of mechanisms used to counter extremist threats. Mapping the landscape can help practitioners identify areas in need of further research as well as provide a way to measure progress of knowledge in particular areas of CVE.

While practitioners and academics did list a number of sub-components during discussions and in the written survey, responses were biased by the jobs, interests, and experiences of the particular participants at this initial workshop. In order to gain a more comprehensive mapping of the CVE landscape, a knowledgeable third party might be required to systematically identify the various components and sub-components of CVE both within the DHS purview and the CVE community writ large. The visualization in "Appendix A: Mapping the CVE Research Landscape" is an initial attempt to merge the CVE framework with feedback provided by workshop participants to create an initial, simplified model of the DHS S&T CVE research landscape.

Components of the CVE Landscape

There are four main components of the landscape proposed by Dr. Legault's CVE framework (see Figure 1): Radicalization & Diversion, Preparation & Prevention, Attack & Mitigation, and Response & Recovery. Based on the discussion at the workshop and the survey responses, radicalization was the main area of concern for practitioners. Throughout the workshop, the conversation frequently returned to radicalization issues. It was also the area of most research depth according to workshop participants from the academic community. The second area of interest seemed to be Response & Recovery, which bleeds into diversion of radicalization because, as some participants argued, the most effective counter- and de-radicalization efforts need to take place at the community level with local, state, and federal governments playing a supporting role. Violence prevention and mitigation of attack effects were also considered by participants to be important, but were recognized as perhaps the least well defined areas of the research landscape.

Radicalization & Diversion

Radicalization is a process by which an individual or group comes to adopt increasingly extreme political, social, or religious ideals and aspirations that (1) reject or undermine the status quo or (2) reject and/or

undermine contemporary ideas and expressions of freedom of choice.[5] Diversion refers to the act of turning individuals or groups aside from the radicalization process.

For the purposes of this effort, radicalization comprises four sub-components: grievance, motivation, ideology, and mobilization. Priority research areas identified by practitioners are listed below as well as knowledge gaps identified by both academics and practitioners. Research questions proposed by the participants are also listed below.

It is important to note that the research questions suggested by participants are not directly mapped to practitioner research priorities in this section because the priorities were practitioner driven and the research questions were largely submitted by academics. They are separated to ensure that the questions do not imply an operational priority, but may identify gaps in knowledge. "Appendix A: Mapping the CVE Research Landscape" seeks to bridge the gap by merging the priorities with the proposed research questions.

Motivation & Grievances

While the draft CVE framework suggested Motivation and Grievance as separate sub-components of radicalization, participants suggested these sub-components are so closely related that they should be grouped together. Participants generally defined grievance as a real or imagined wrong that generates a sense of unfair treatment. Motivation refers to the actions, desires, and needs that explain an individual's or group's behavior. So while the original model stipulated grievance as a core sub-component of radicalization, it seemed clear from the discussion that grievance is just one form of motivation. This subcomponent explores the experiences that drive individuals towards a radicalization pathway.

Grievances and Motivation differ from "cognitive opening," a recommended new sub-component discussed in the next section, in that they refer to tangible experiences (or triggering events) that generate a sense of unease or disgruntlement that generate a cognitive opening. Participants defined cognitive opening as the psychological vulnerability of individuals to radicalizing messages and ideology. It can also be understood as the questioning of established beliefs.

Participants suggested several experiences that could create a grievance that could act as a motivating trigger.

- Government policies that are perceived to harm a person's identity group at home or abroad
- Group grievance (inequality experienced at the societal or group level—of social services, essential services like education, income, opportunity, discrimination, etc.)
- Personal grievance (the actual experience of injustice, inequality, discrimination, etc.)
- Trauma (the witnessing of violence or acts of gross discrimination against an identity group associated with the individual. Some evidence suggests individuals can be traumatized remotely via video of atrocities online as well as witnessing traumatic events first hand)

[5] This is not an official definition of radicalization.

Research Questions

- Empirical research on the causes of radicalization conducted over the past decade has left many convinced that it is nearly impossible to predict who will or will not be radicalized. However, case studies and field experience suggest that in many cases there was a specific personal event or factor that triggered the radicalization process. What is it about a potential extremist's personal life, life experiences, or community that may render him or her more or less vulnerable to radicalization?
    - Are there common risk factors across radicalization pathways?
    - Are community or government policies and actions a source of radicalization or deradicalization?
- Given that an individual or community is vulnerable to radicalization, are there radicalization "off ramps" that can be used to avert completion of the process?
- Are deradicalization or radicalization prevention programs that direct individuals toward opportunities or alternative modes of thinking more or less effective than those that focus on diverting individuals away from radicalization?
- What role do sacred values have on grievance generation and radicalization?
- What can neuroscience tell us about the importance of emotion in radicalization? The emotions of shame, motivation, anger, and outrage move people in ways that rational choice theorizing does not cover. Additionally, what roles does emotion play in understanding what kind of social media or Internet meme goes viral?

Cognitive Opening

The workshop moderator asked the participants whether cognitive opening was a more inclusive term than "grievance" or "motivation" as suggested by the CVE framework. Cognitive opening is a term used by researchers at START as one component of radicalization in the framework they developed. Participants were comfortable with the use of the term "cognitive opening" but also approved of the term "motivation." Since motivation was covered in the framework, the moderator encouraged the audience to explore the concept of cognitive opening. Cognitive opening is an individual's psychological readiness or vulnerability to radicalizing messages. It can also refer to an individual's questioning of established beliefs. An individual level grievance or sympathy with a group level grievance that may result in an individual becoming cognitively open, which is then filled by an ideology that is socialized with others on something like social media that then mobilizes the individual towards violence. Additionally, using cognitive opening incorporates other reasons as to why people engage in violent extremism other than simply having a grievance that provides a motivation to rectify that grievance.

Participants identified some potential sources of cognitive opening.

- Family and peer influence
- Social media and cyber influence
- Mental health
- Thrill and status seeking

- Social disconnection
- Neurobiology of radicalization
- Emotions

Participants identified some ways to close an individual's cognitive opening.

- Divert "to" instead of divert "from"
- Community engagement
- Love
- De-securitization of CVE
- Identify individuals vulnerable to extremism as early as possible (first responders, medical professionals, law enforcement, etc.)

Research questions:

- How do community groups run CVE programs to engage, prevent, intervene, rehabilitate, and reintegrate individuals vulnerable to extremist beliefs? What types of community intervention programs are most effective?
- What is it about an individual's biology and personality that renders him or her more likely to be radicalized or engage in other forms of anti-social behavior? How can neuroscience inform the discussion of why some individuals are vulnerable to extremist messaging?
- How do emotions influence violent and non-violent actions?
- What is the role of arts and humanities in the diversion of radicalization? For example, can music or art be used as a form of expression rather than buying into an extremist ideology?
- How can radicalization be prevented in US prisons?

Ideology

Ideology refers to a system of ideas or beliefs. Ideology may be transmitted through narratives—conveyed either by individuals of trust or, more recently, though social media and cyber communications. Some participants argued that without the inclusion of ideology in the definition of violent extremism, the discussion devolves to one about terrorist practices and tactics.

Participants identified several components they believe are associated with communication of radicalizing ideology.

- Narratives
- Social media and information technology
- Person-to-person contact
- Radicalization in prisons

Research questions:

- Is it possible for outside agents to counter extremist ideology? For example, can voices outside Islam counter Islamist extremist ideology? Is there such a thing as a "true" message of Islam that

stands in opposition to radicalism to the degree that those exposed to that message are less vulnerable to others to radicalization, or are changes in individual circumstances, community circumstances, national circumstances, or international circumstances more likely to counter violent extremist ideology?

  - What are the essential elements of effective countermessaging? Are counternarratives effectives in stemming radicalization? How? Does countermessaging work? What messaging will really resonate at the local level to divert radicalization?

- Narratives and counternarratives
  - How do extremist groups use narratives to engender sympathy from a targeted population and to radicalize vulnerable individuals?
  - What are the elements that maximize effective narratives/counternarratives?
  - Which ideological components encourage violent behavior?
  - What are the most common narratives or counternarratives used to recruit individuals and engender sympathy support of a target population?
  - Which counternarratives should be paired with which audiences?
  - How does a lone wolf find his or her identity and shared narrative online?
- Social media
  - How does extremist propaganda, particularly using social media, work to radicalize sympathetic populations or individuals? How do influence mechanisms work online?
  - In what ways is social media generating and amplifying violent extremism?
  - How does virtual recruitment differ from face-to-face recruitment? Is one more successful than the other? How do online networks relate to real world networks?
  - Do social media and information technologies speed up the radicalization timeline?
  - How do ideological groups use social media in efforts to radicalize individuals? How does the *process* of radicalizing occur as opposed to understanding the content of social media used to radicalize?
- How can marketing techniques be used to establish an empirical understanding of value and behavioral change among extremist groups and the communities from which they originate?
- What are extremist organizations such as ISIS, AQAP, and others doing to radicalize and recruit individuals, and how are mechanisms such as social media being employed to do this?
- What can successful (or unsuccessful) public health campaigns tell us about how to divert radicalization?
- How can we learn from campaigns like "Think Again, Turn Away?"

Mobilization

Mobilization means to actively assemble or prepare (usually for war, but in this case for ideologically- or politically-driven violence by a non-state actor). This factor was the least discussed of the four subcomponents. While ideology deals with beliefs, mobilization deals with actions.

Participants identified several subcomponents of mobilization.

- Community sympathy and support

- Financial support
- Other tangible sources of support (safe haven, etc.)
- Travel and training

Participants also suggested several ways to counter mobilization.

- Develop reporting mechanisms for parents, schools, religious leaders, community members, medical personnel, first responders, and law enforcement
- Community disengagement mechanisms/intervention programs
- Stigma mitigation

Research questions:

- What is the basis of radical behavior?
- How do we understand the relationship between radical beliefs and radical behaviors? How does an individual move from radicalization to violence?
- How does foreign fighter radicalization compare to non-foreign fighter radicalization?
- What is the difference between disengagement and deradicalization? What are the elements of a successful program?
- How is radicalization to criminal acts different than radicalization to terrorist acts?
- How can mobilization be prevented through cyber communications/online?
- How important is the role of community passive support or sympathy for the successful mobilization of radicalized individuals or groups?
- How do we use recent advances in neuroscience to identify the "catalytic" factors that caused some individuals to be recruited or radicalized?
- How does mobilization to violence differ from other forms of social movement mobilization (to non-violent protest/action)?
- Does the LA pilot program work? We need an empirical study to evaluate its effectiveness in preventing mobilization.

Preparation & Prevention

Violence preparation generally refers to a process of getting ready to commit a specific ideologically- or politically-driven attack. Violence preparation differs from mobilization (a subcomponent of radicalization) in that it is a process of getting ready to conduct a specific attack—not just the expressed willingness to take some kind of action in general. This component veers into criminology because the violent act an individual or group is preparing for is almost certainly a crime as well as an expression of violent extremism. Therefore, the main sub-components suggested for violent preparation emerge from criminology literature (e.g., routine activity theory): lack of capable guardianship, motivated offender, and suitable target. The only other subcomponent suggested in addition to the three already listed was capabilities. The suggestion to append capabilities to the three aforementioned sub-components was met with either agreement or benign indifference. Several researchers suggested, however, that the sub-components of prevention are too crime- or counterterrorism-oriented and do not fit well into a

model of CVE. One participant cautioned others not to think of this component of CVE as prevention of an attack as that is too limiting. Instead, he suggested we think of it in terms of preventing "events or actions."

Components of preparation and prevention include

- lack of capable guardianship,
- suitable target,
- motivated offender, and
- capabilities.

Participants listed a number of high-level research questions relating to preparation and prevention.

- Looking at previous attacks (successful and unsuccessful), what are the indicators or data that would suggest attack preparation was underway? What do preparations for various kinds of attacks have in common?
    - How much time does an individual or group take to prepare? Does it differ across types of attacks?
- How do networks facilitate attacks in terms of mentorship, training, advice, bringing the right people together, financing, etc.?
- Is it possible to detect targeting, planning, and other aspects of attack preparation by violent extremists from their use of modern information technology and communication?
- Why do some radicalized individuals or groups decide to take violent action? What are the tipping points between radicalization and mobilization?
- How do we measure prevention? How can we arm ourselves with more proof that CVE activities and engagements are effective and actually working?
- What are some lessons learned from past experiences in attack prevention? What have been successful or unsuccessful interventions to prevent attacks?
- Who are industry partners that could have a stake in alerting officials about potential attacks?
- How do other fields, such as medicine, conduct evaluation of preventative programs?

Lack of Capable Guardianship

Lack of capable guardianship refers to the inadequate protection of a target by authorities charged to secure it. It refers to the human element of protection and not the hardening of a target, which is covered by the "suitable target" sub-component. Participants identified several areas to assure capable guardianship: effective training, knowledge transition to guardians, and international collaboration.

Research Question

While these areas are not particularly well suited to academic research, it highlights the importance of making sure knowledge generated by DHS S&T research is easily understandable to first responders and law enforcement as well as the importance of actively transitioning knowledge to them. Only one participant had a question relating to capable guardianship:

- How can we bolster strong communication on fusion teams?

Motivated Offender

Motivated offenders are individuals willing and able to commit a violent extremist act. They differ from radicalized individuals in their intent to commit an actual act of crime or violence as opposed to simply holding radical beliefs. Some participants pointed out that some individuals support VEOs for practical motivations—not ideological ones—including source of income, coercion, lack of alternatives, etc. While these non-ideological motivations should be explored more carefully, the ideology-driven motivations make this sub-component closely linked to the radicalization component.

Participants identified several research questions.

- How does deterrence theory apply to violent extremism on the individual and sub-national levels?
- How can one tell the difference between (or identify) a motivated offender vs. a radicalized individual?
- How can motivated offenders be diverted from engaging in violent behavior? How can things like community programs, individual services, or media be used to divert potential extremists from violent behavior? How can social media be used to divert an individual or group from violent extremism?
- How is social media or information technology used to inspire radicalized individuals to become motivated offenders?
- What role does mental illness play, if any, in the understanding of motivated offenders? How can the mental health community identify, report, or intervene to prevent a suspected motivated offender from taking action?
- How do motivated violent extremist offenders differ from motivated criminal offenders especially with regard to hate crimes or anarchy?
- Is there a role for the government or NGOs to prevent motivated offenders or is this primarily a community responsibility?
- Can an effective checklist for government and nongovernment entities be developed to identify vulnerable persons? We need to know not only the common factors, but also base rates of sympathy among innocent populations so that the signal/noise rates are useful.

Suitable Target

Suitable targets refer to an object, place, or person that is seen as attractive and vulnerable to attack. In general, the way to protect a suitable target is through hardening: making a target less vulnerable to attack usually through protective/enhanced security measures.

Participants offered two research questions.

- If you examine the characteristics of previous attacks, what are the characteristics of the most vulnerable or often attacked targets?

- Which hardening techniques seem to be effective in preventing attacks? What are the implications for future attacks?

Capability

Several participants suggested capability as another sub-component that should be considered under prevention and several participants agreed. An individual can have the will to conduct an attack against a vulnerable target, but without the capability, the attack cannot commence. However, at least one participant noted that the barrier to conducting an attack is now so low (e.g., How to Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom), that anyone can have the capability to conduct some kind of attack.

Participants offered two questions relating to capabilities.

- What skills and training are necessary to carry out certain kinds of attacks?
- Do most violent extremists go abroad and train before returning to commit attacks in the homeland?

Attack & Mitigation

By design, this component of CVE was discussed very little during the workshop. The workshop organizers recognized that Attack and Recovery & Response might fall outside the areas traditionally considered combatting violent extremism. However, if one defines this category as understanding extremist organizations, quite a bit of research has been conducted in this field. This component would include the Global Terrorism Database that seeks to provide aggregated, empirical data on attacks committed by terrorist organizations. Another example of this type of research was a study conducted by Dr. Gina Ligon at University of Nebraska, Omaha, which used the Leadership of the Extreme and Dangerous for Innovative Results (LEADIR) dataset to evaluate the leadership and organizational practices that make the so-called Islamic State a durable violent extremist organization. These kinds of studies shed light on how extremist organizations work in terms of leadership, attack styles, objectives, etc. and are particularly useful for comparative studies.

Sub-components

- Group-level knowledge of VEOs' leadership, modus operandi, etc.
- Comparative analysis
- Foreign fighters
- Database development

Research Questions:

- How valuable are CVE efforts from an economic perspective? For example, how much does the USG spend to study or implement CVE programs compared to the negative economic consequences of a typical attack in the US at the current rate and scale of attacks?
- How can GIS technology be used to provide greater insight into how violent extremist groups operate in terms of where foreign fighters come from, where finances come from and go to, etc.

There is a great need for a GIS-based, domestic model of violence extremism. This would be particularly useful for fusion centers and law enforcement.

- How have VEOs innovated attack methods to overcome challenges?
- How does violent extremism differ from other related areas (gangs, hate groups, lone actors, juvenile offenders, and right and left wing groups)?
    - Are there different footprints for different ideological groups: right wing, left wing, etc.?
    - Can we apply best practices from these fields (particularly gangs) to extremist groups?
    - How long do these groups take to go from preparation to attack?
- Foreign fighters
    - How did ISIL become the destination of choice for foreign fighters?
    - How does foreign fighter recruitment and radicalization occur in the United States compared with other countries?
    - What role do facilitators play?
    - Are returnees a threat or an asset?
- What are the indicators of preparation for an attack that law enforcement, first responders, and the medical community should be aware of? How should these individuals, particularly first responders and medical communities, report suspicions?

Response & Recovery

Like "Attack & Mitigation," Response & Recovery was intentionally not a major focus of the workshop because the conference organizers felt it fell outside the traditional CVE area. However, it was addressed in part, and those observations and suggestions are listed here. Response & Recovery refers to the government's ability to effectively respond to an attack, mitigate its effects, and encourage community resilience.

Sub-components

- Community resilience
- Government response

Research Questions

- What can we learn from recovery periods to prevent future attacks?
- How can we develop contingency plans to ensure that the USG, local law enforcement, and communities can rapidly capitalize on a crisis when it occurs? The ability to respond rapidly is essential.
- How can law enforcement, government officials, etc. best communicate about the response to attacks or the prevention of an attack?
- How do we measure and enhance trust between operators and communities? In other words, how do we recognize the utility and benefit of equipping front line responders with an expanded knowledge base, which will assist with engagement and avoiding false positives?
- What type of community intervention program is most effective? Empirically based evaluation programs are needed.

- How can virtual communities be used to construct new identities? This requires an interdisciplinary model drawing from social psychology, cognitive psychology, and sociology.
- What makes communities resilient to radicalization pressures?
- How can NGOs engage communities to prevent radicalization?
- How can we reintegrate returning foreign fighters who have not committed acts of violence abroad?
- How does the de-radicalization process work both prior to and after an individual commits violence?
- We need to evaluate how other community practices have successfully (or unsuccessfully) been scaled up to the regional or national level.

High Level Feedback

Workshop participants offered additional comments on high level topics addressing needs, gaps, and suggestions outside the scope of specific research priorities, but highly relevant to the management, oversight, and direction of the DHS S&T CVE research effort. These contributions are discussed below.

Evidence-Based Research

Regardless of the research conducted, several practitioners emphasized the importance of funding primarily evidence-based analysis. Part of this requires significant and sustained investment in the development of databases to facilitate the conduct of empirically based research.

Information Sharing

Many participants felt that DHS S&T has a role in facilitating information sharing and knowledge transfer between the academic community and the practitioner community. While START and CREATE have mechanisms for sharing research findings, there is no US government-wide information-sharing platform. The Countering Violent Extremism and Active Shooter Web Portal[6] is one place to share information, but the portal is password protected, making it difficult for academics or members of the community to find and use the portal. The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) is hoping to develop a CVE Hub where information can be exchanged among practitioners and researchers. But the effort has not yet been funded. In general, participants thought that more could be done to share information with non-government entities including parents, community groups, religious institutions, schools, etc. There was a demand for a single, completely public, web-based platform for information sharing on CVE.

Product Delivery

Academic research findings need to be customized to end user needs. Intelligence analysts welcome in-depth, academic papers, but DHS practitioners in the field, such as representatives from the fusions cells, need a concise 1-2 page "so what" summary of the key findings. Deliverables could also include 5-10 minutes video recording of the findings by the paper's authors that could be incorporated into state

[6] www.dhs.gov/cveas-portal

and local training of first responders and law enforcement officials. At the community level, these academic findings need to be easily understood and relevant to parents, community groups, religious institutions, schools, etc. The larger CVE community would benefit from a careful consideration of end user requirements by academics when submitting their final results.

Opening the Aperture

Participants cautioned DHS S&T against too narrowly defining CVE in terms of its research agenda. One academic felt there was a clear bias towards research conducted on groups operating inside the United States. He argued that from an academic standpoint, there is much to be learned from the experiences of other countries. Additionally, participants argued that too much attention is paid to individuals and groups that incite violence, but we also have to be concerned about the individuals and communities that implicitly or explicitly offer sympathy and support to radicalized individuals. CVE is not always an act of terrorism; it could be a crime or an act of support. CVE should be focused on all kinds of violent extremism including hate crimes, eco-terrorism, animal rights violent activism, critical infrastructure and cyber attacks, etc.

Bridging the Academic/Practitioner Divide

Researchers and practitioners strongly felt that workshops like this are essential to bridge the academic/practitioner divide and strongly supported the idea of regular workshops or meetings to bring the two communities closer together. An active and ongoing relationship between the two communities should result in more targeted analysis, better research designs, and deliverables customized to end user requirements. This is a method used effectively at DARPA to enhance the relevance and impact of its research on the operational community.

Terminology & Definitions

Participants submitted many comments regarding the terms and definitions used during the workshop. Many agreed that some of the differences were a matter of semantics, but acknowledged that a commonly agreed upon lexicon is important for effective research and utilization of research.

Participants felt there was a particular need for a single definition of CVE across the USG. DHS defines violent extremists as "individuals who support or commit ideologically-motivated violence to further political goals." The DHS approach to countering violent extremism addresses all forms of violent extremism, regardless of ideology, and focuses not on radical thought or speech but instead on preventing violent attacks. During the workshop participants loosely defined CVE as both violent and non-violent crime that advances an ideological goal. Some participants felt that the definition should specifically mention extremist beliefs, which they said is essential if you want the community to engage in the pre-criminal space and address extremist beliefs in addition to extremist behaviors. However, beliefs are largely protected by first amendment rights and the federal government has no authority to influence beliefs—although understanding how beliefs shape actions is important.

Other participants argued that the definition of CVE should include mention of communities. One participant suggested that perhaps two definitions of CVE could be created as it related to the DHS S&T research agenda: one geared toward federal, state, and local government personnel and one geared

toward communities and NGOs. This would allow a government definition that focused on violence and non-violent crime and a second that included extremist beliefs designed specifically to engage communities. There was concern that without the inclusion of ideology, CVE becomes primarily counterterrorism (CT).

Framework

The CVE Framework presented by Dr. Richard Legault, Resilient Systems Divisions, was a preliminary attempt to define the CVE field. He acknowledged that the framework is a work in progress and participants unanimously applauded the effort. A framework is critical for creating a research agenda, integrating key findings, cooperating with interagency partners, etc. However, participants did offer a number of suggestions to improved the framework. These are listed below.

First, as was made clear by Dr. Legault, the framework was designed to be broad and included items many academics consider counterterrorism. While this was by design, some academics felt there would be some push back from the CVE practitioner and research community if the framework were officially adopted by DHS.

Second, some academics felt that the terms "Diversion" and "Prevention" used in the framework might be misunderstood because they are derived from the field of criminology, not CVE. In the CVE community, prevention refers to preventing radicalization, not preventing the preparation for a specific attack. By using the term prevention in relation to "preparation," it could give the impression that DHS is attempting to securitize CVE. Communities are critical to the success of CVE programs and they may feel threatened by the equation of CVE and security programs such as hardening, surveillance, etc. If so, their willingness to participate in DHS programs would be limited. Furthermore, the term "Prevention" as defined in the framework is not consistent with how CVE is discussed in White House strategy nor in how the National Combatting Terrorism Center, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Department of Justice generally approach the issue. The term "Prevention" seems more in line with the counterterrorism and law enforcement domain. One researcher stated that breaking CVE out as a research domain separate from counterterrorism is a good thing in that it allows the research agenda to focus on an important and growing area of concern. It also signifies that CVE is different from the myriad issues and research requirements in the overall counterterrorism area.

One academic suggested replacing the terms "Response and Recovery" with "Rehabilitation and Reintegration," which is more aligned with DHS doctrine and highlight the important role communities play in countering violent extremism.

While some might consider the terms used by the framework an issue of semantics, participants believed that difficulties would arise if the vocabulary does not align with existing CVE terminology. This will create interoperability issues within the interagency and between DHS and local, state, and community entities.

Several other suggestions were made.

- The framework should be broad enough so that it does not seem focused around a violent attack. There are other forms of CVE that focus on non-violent aspects of violent extremism like preventing material support. Furthermore, opportunistic hate crime does not always include precursor acts as suggested by the model.
- One academic noted that resilience is a hugely important concept and suggested that perhaps it should be the central rhetorical idea of this CVE framework. Community-level outreach experts have started using the term community resilience instead of CVE to minimize pushback. They do this for three reasons: it is "all hazards," it does not stigmatize communities the same way the term violent extremism does, and it provides space for educations, mental health professionals, and others to get involved without "securitizing" their engagement effort.
- Overreliance on criminology theory is a problem, according to some participants. An alternative model could juxtapose risk factors with protective resources. It could have the goal of minimizing risk factors and enhancing protective resources at the individual, family, community, and societal level.[7]
- Because grievance, motivation, and cognitive opening are so closely related, it might make sense to merge them into one factor for the purposes of the framework.

Conclusion

The Mapping the CVE Research Landscape workshop took the first step towards creating a practitioner-driven research agenda with a focus on creating a real community of interest between practitioners and researchers. Ongoing cooperation between these two groups will ensure that DHS S&T funded research continues to meet practitioner requirements. As this community of interest matures and a framework of CVE emerges, DHS S&T will play a role in mapping not only the research effort, but also the findings to the CVE framework, which will effectively advance and transition knowledge from the academic community to homeland security practitioner.

[7] See Steve Weine's work from Minneapolis-St. Paul on the START website, as well as the NYT 0p-Ed on "Prevention Science " from the last few days.

Appendix A: Mapping the CVE Research Landscape

To map practitioner needs and research gaps to the CVE landscape, we created a straw man visualization (see Figure 2 below).[8] It differs from Dr. Legault's CVE Framework in that it is designed specifically to organize and guide DHS-specific research while the CVE Framework is designed to map out the entire CVE field, broadly defined. This is the first iteration of a CVE research landscape visualization, which will require further refinement over time.

The visualization is circular to show that knowledge about all stages of violent extremism (the blue quadrants) can inform one another. It is not deterministic; individuals can move between stages and many, perhaps the majority, will never choose to engage in violence. The white boxes represent sub-components of each stage of violent extremism. The sub-components listed should not be considered comprehensive—they reflect suggestions by the workshop participants and will require further evaluation. The green circle represents that the process of knowledge discovery (data collection) and transition (contextual knowledge) occurs at every stage of violent extremism research. Finally, the red line separates beliefs and actions that occur before an incidence of violence to beliefs and actions after an incidence of violence.



[8] Much more work needs to be done to create a rigorous, comprehensive, well-defined visualization of the CVE Research Landscape, which is outside the scope of this effort. This is simply an attempt to take one step down this very important road.

Figure 2 Visualization of DHS CVE Research Landscape

This section will map operational priorities and proposed research questions to the visualization of the CVE research landscape. Please keep in mind that in addition to the suggestion of research priorities, practitioners asked that DHS S&T consider following programmatic requirements when establishing new research efforts:

- understanding where new research fits into the body of existing knowledge;
- incorporating evaluation metrics; and
- considering the appropriate delivery format of findings to various DHS stakeholders.

In the section below, the **text in bold** indicates practitioner-generated research priorities. All other text refers to research questions or sub-components of violent extremism put forward by researchers.

Radicalization

Based on workshop participant feedback, radicalization comprises four basic sub-components: grievance and motivation, cognitive opening, ideology, and mobilization.

Grievance and Motivation

- **Identifying what makes individuals vulnerable to radicalization**
    - Empirical research on the causes of radicalization conducted over the past decade has left many convinced that it is nearly impossible to predict who will or will not be radicalized. However, case studies and field experience suggest that in many cases there was a specific personal event or factor that triggered the radicalization process. What is it about a potential extremist's personal life, life experiences, or community that may render him or her more or less vulnerable to radicalization?
        - Are there common risk factors across radicalization pathways?
        - Are community or government policies and actions a source of radicalization or deradicalization?
- **Importance of diverting "to" something positive rather than diverting "from" radicalization**
    - Given that an individual or community is vulnerable to radicalization, are there radicalization "off ramps" that can be used to avert completion of the process?
    - Are deradicalization or radicalization prevention programs that direct individuals toward opportunities or alternative modes of thinking more or less effective than those that focus on diverting individuals away from radicalization?
- Sacred values
    - What role does sacred values have on grievance generation and radicalization?
- Neuroscience of emotion
    - What can neuroscience tell us about the importance of emotion in radicalization? The emotions of shame, motivation, anger, and outrage move people in ways that rational choice theorizing does not cover. Additionally, what roles does emotion play in understanding what kind of social media or Internet meme goes viral?

Cognitive Opening

- **Psychology or neuroscience of "cognitive openings"**
  - What is it about an individual's biology and personality that renders him or her more likely to be radicalized or engage in other forms of anti-social behavior? How can neuroscience inform the discussion of why some individuals are vulnerable to extremist messaging?
  - How do emotions influence violent and non-violent actions?
- **Lessons from public health campaigns that can be applied to the diversion of radicalization**
- The role of the community in narrowing cognitive openings
  - How do community groups run CVE programs to engage, prevent, intervene, rehabilitate, and reintegrate individuals vulnerable to extremist beliefs? What types of community intervention programs are most effective?
- Nontraditional tools to narrow cognitive openings
  - What is the role of arts and humanities in the diversion of radicalization? For example, can music or art be used as a form of expression rather than buying into an extremist ideology?

Ideology

- **Use of social media in radicalization**
  - How does extremist propaganda, particularly using social media, work to radicalize sympathetic populations or individuals? How do influence mechanisms work online?
    - How important and in what ways is social media in generating and amplifying violent extremism?
    - How does virtual recruitment differ from face-to-face recruitment? Is one more successful than the other? How do online networks relate to real world networks?
    - Do social media and information technologies speed up the radicalization timeline?
  - What are extremist organizations such as ISIS, AQAP, and others doing to radicalize and recruit individuals, and how are mechanisms such as social media being employed to do this?
- **Counter-ideology**
  - Is it possible for outside agents to counter extremist ideology? For example, can voices outside Islam counter Islamist extremist ideology? Is there such a thing as a "true" message of Islam that stands in opposition to radicalism to the degree that those exposed to that message are less vulnerable to others to radicalization, or are changes in individual circumstances, community circumstances, national circumstances, or international circumstances more likely to counter violent extremist ideology?

        - What are the essential elements of effective countermessaging? Are counternarratives effective in stemming radicalization? How? Does countermessaging work? What messaging will really resonate at the local level to divert radicalization?
    - How can marketing techniques be used to establish an empirical understanding of value and behavioral change among extremist groups and the communities from which they originate?
- **Counternarratives**
    - How do extremist groups use narratives to engender sympathy from a targeted population and to radicalize vulnerable individuals?
    - What are the elements that maximize effective narratives/counternarratives?
    - Which ideological components encourage violent behavior?
    - What are the most common narratives or counternarratives used to recruit individuals and engender sympathy support of a target population?
    - Which counternarratives should be paired with which audiences?
- **Countermessaging**
    - What can successful (or unsuccessful) public health campaigns tell us about how to divert radicalization?
    - How can we learn from campaigns like "Think Again, Turn Away?"

Mobilization

- Relationship between beliefs and behaviors
    - What is the basis of radical behavior?
    - How do we understand the relationship between radical beliefs and radical behaviors?
    - How does an individual move from radicalization to violence?
- Sources of mobilization
    - How can mobilization be prevented in US prisons?
    - How important is the role of community passive support or sympathy for the successful mobilization of radicalized individuals or groups?
    - How does mobilization to violence differ from other forms of social movement mobilization (to non-violent protest/action)?
- Neuroscience
    - How do we use recent advances in neuroscience to identify the "catalytic" factors that caused some individual to be recruited or radicalized?
- Community resilience
    - Does the LA pilot program work? We need an empirical study to evaluate its effectiveness in preventing mobilization.
- Travel & training
    - How does foreign fighter radicalization compare to non-foreign fighter radicalization?
- Cyber
    - How can mobilization be prevented through cyber communications and online?

Mobilization to Violence

Mobilization to violence refers to a specific stage in the violent extremism cycle where an individual or group commits to carrying out illegal activities or violence. Mobilization to violence differs from mobilization (a subcomponent of radicalization) in intent: the process of getting ready to conduct a specific attack or provide illicit support for a specific attack—not just the expressed willingness to support the goals of a particular group or ideology in general.

Intent

Intent refers to the process of deciding to provide illicit support for a specific act of violent extremism.

- **Understanding what makes individuals or groups move from radical beliefs to violent actions**

Preparation

Action or preparation refers to actions taken in support of the planning of an attack or illicit behavior. This could include financial support for acts of violent extremism, planning a specific instance of illicit violent extremism, and travel with the intent training for or actually taking part in a violent extremist act.

- **Foreign fighter recruitment and radicalization**
    - How did ISIL become the destination of choice for foreign fighters?
    - How does foreign fighter recruitment and radicalization occur in the United States compared with other countries?
    - What role do facilitators play?
    - Are returnees a threat or an asset?
- **Indicators of preparation for attacks**
    - What are the indicators of preparation for an attack that law enforcement, first responders, and the medical community should be aware of? How should these individuals, particularly first responders and medical communities report suspicions?
- **Measuring prevention capacity**
    - How do we measure prevention? How can we arm ourselves with more proof that CVE activities and engagements are effective and actually working?
- **Lessons learned in attack prevention**
    - How does violent extremism preparation differ from other related areas (gangs, hate groups, lone actors, juvenile offenders, and right and left wing groups)?
        - Are there different footprints for different ideological groups: right wing, left wing, etc.?
        - Can we apply best practices from these fields (particularly gangs) to extremist groups?
        - How long do these groups take to go from preparation to attack?
- **The role of industry partners in attack prevention**
- **Enhancing communication within and among fusion teams**

Operations

Operations refers to the study of lone actor and extremist group beliefs, organizational structure, and actions in support of violent extremism. An essential component of this kind of research is the development of databases of extremist behavior to support empirically grounded research. These kinds of studies shed light on how extremist organizations work in terms of leadership, attack styles, objectives, etc. and are particularly useful for comparative studies.

Development of Databases

- How can GIS technology be used to provide greater insight into how violent extremist groups operate in terms of where foreign fighters come from, where finances come from and go to, etc. There is a great need for a GIS-based, domestic model of violence extremism. This would be particularly useful for fusion centers and law enforcement.

Comparative Studies

- **Do foreign fighters differ from those of other extremists in terms of backgrounds, general characteristics, motivations, processes of radicalization, and precursor behaviors?**
- **Are there similarities between criminal behavior and violence extremist behavior?**
    - How is radicalization to criminal acts different than radicalization to terrorist acts?
- How have VEOs innovated attack methods to overcome challenges?
- How valuable are CVE efforts from an economic perspective? For example, how much does the USG spend to study or implement CVE programs compared to the negative economic consequences of a typical attack in the US at the current rate and scale of attacks?

Resilience

Resilience as it relates to DHS mission areas refers to the government's ability to effectively respond to an attack, mitigate its effects, and build strong communities. Community resilience feeds back into radicalization because most participants believed that the community has the primary role in countering extremism.

Government (Federal, State, Local, Law Enforcement)

- **Evaluation of the effectiveness of successful programs, such as the LA Pilot Program, and whether successful local programs can be scaled up**
- **De-radicalization prior to and after an individuals has committed violence**
- **Law enforcement crisis response plans**
    - What can we learn from recovery periods to prevent future attacks?
    - How can we develop contingency plans to ensure that the USG, local law enforcement, and communities can rapidly capitalize on a crisis when it occurs? The ability to respond rapidly is essential.
    - How can law enforcement, government officials, etc. best communicate about the response to attacks or the prevention of an attack?

Community

- **Development of resilient communities**
  - What type of community intervention program is most effective? Empirically based evaluation programs are needed.
  - How can virtual communities be used to construct new identities? This requires an interdisciplinary model drawing from social psychology, cognitive psychology, and sociology.
  - What makes communities resilient to radicalization pressures?
  - We need to evaluate how other community practices have successfully (or unsuccessfully) been scaled up to the regional or national level.
- **The role of NGOs in diverting radicalization**
  - How can NGOs engage communities to prevent radicalization?
- **Reintegration of foreign fighters**
  - What is the difference between disengagement and deradicalization? What are the elements of a successful program?
  - How can we reintegrate returning foreign fighters who have not committed acts of violence abroad?
  - How does the de-radicalization process work both prior to and after an individual commits violence?
  - **Why do foreign fighters come home? Are they disillusioned when they do?**
- **Enhancing trust between CVE practitioners and local communities**
  - How do we measure and enhance trust between operators and communities? In other words, how do we recognize the utility and benefit of equipping front line responders with an expanded knowledge base, which will assist with engagement and avoiding false positives?