

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The proposed LAB revisions shift the focus away from FLETC's target audience. This is not a community briefing for the general public; this presentation is specifically for trained law enforcement officers. This is not about reeducating officers on their job or getting into specifics with regards to movements. Many of the slides added to the LAB came from the Community Awareness Briefing (CAB) and the comments are relevant to a presentation for community leaders and not law enforcement. The objective of the presentation is to provide state and local law enforcement officers an increased awareness of the threats posed to them and the communities they work in. Through developing a local prevention framework, law enforcement and the community can collaborate to potentially prevent an act of terrorism or targeted violence within their community. Below are some examples of the shift away from the target audience or an increased emphasis on a specific domestic violent extremist movement:

- Slide 6: Added approximately 2 pages of notes changing generalized discussion to focused discussion on (b)(7)(E)  
(b)(7)(E)
  - Replaced one slide (#16 in FLETC lab) with three slides (#18-20). FLETC slide provided a generalized overview of (b)(7)(E) (a concept LEO audiences are already familiar with). DHS slides detail 31 individual social media sites/apps. 14 of the listed sites/apps just have descriptors of the services provided. (b)(7)(E)  
(b)(7)(E)  
(b)(7)(E) (These slides were directly copied from the CAB.)
  - Slide 21: The DHS revision deleted FLETC slide 18 (b)(7)(E)  
(b)(7)(E) and FLETC slide 19 (b)(7)(E)  
(b)(7)(E) The revision replaces them with slide 21 (b)(7)(E)  
(b)(7)(E)
  - (b)(7)(E)
  - 
  -
- This is not a necessary training point for a first-responder audience.
- Slide 43: Replaced FLETC slide 35 (which was a focused discussion on the “coalition of forces” used by law enforcement officers in community policing efforts) with the CRCL “Whole of Society Engagement” graphic. This graphic (along with the 6 pages of associated notes) was copied directly from the CAB and completely misses the LEO


target audience with discussions of engagement with sectors such as “Arts and Entertainment” and “Charitable Giving.”

- Slide 55: School Attack #1. Interesting case study; however, there is no direct nexus to LEO intervention opportunities. Additional case studies are a good thing, but it would make more sense to provide examples where law enforcement was (or should have been involved) to make it more relatable to the audience.
- Slide 56: School Attack #2. Same issue as previous slide.

Slide 1



Slide 2



Today's discussion:

- Mass violence
- Specifically, behaviors associated with attackers who commit this type of violence
- Also, strategies to attempt to prevent future mass violence and manage potential attackers

For our purposes, we're focusing on attacks that appear to be random and spontaneous; so excluding things like gang violence, drug-related violence, domestic violence, etc.

This type of violence typically takes place at 4 types of locations:

- Schools
- Places of Worship
- Workplace
- Other Public Spaces (concerts, sports, outdoor spaces)

### Slide 3

| 2019 Active Shooter Incidents     |
|-----------------------------------|
| • 28 Incidents                    |
| • 16 States                       |
| • 97 Killed                       |
| • 150 Wounded                     |
| • 30 Shooters (29 Male, 1 Female) |

#### Caveats:


- This info includes only gun violence; additional types of mass attacks could be perpetrated using other weapons

- Great variation with these numbers when compared to interest group numbers, due to definitions; Some report more than 400 incidents in same year

- FBI definition excludes self-defense, gang violence, domestic disputes, controlled barricade/hostages, crossfire, etc.

SOURCE: fbi.gov

### Slide 4



## USSS National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC)

*A US Secret Service Analysis of Targeted School Violence (2019)*

*Mass Attacks in Public Spaces (2019)*

- *"The mission of the National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC) is to provide guidance on threat assessment and training, both within the Secret Service and to its law enforcement, public safety, and academic partners. Through the Presidential Threat Protection Act of 2000, Congress formally*

*authorized NTAC to provide assistance in the following areas:*

- Research threat assessment and various types of targeted violence*
- Provide training on threat assessment and targeted violence to law enforcement officials, school personnel, and others with protective and public safety responsibilities*
- Consult on complex threat assessment cases or programs*
- Promote the standardization of federal, state, and local threat assessment and investigations*
- Facilitate information-sharing among agencies with protective and/or public safety responsibilities*

*NTAC will lead the development of evidence-based threat assessment techniques to prevent rare, non-random violent acts that impact both local and international communities. Conducting a unique blend of cutting-edge behavior-based research, practical training, and operational guidance, NTAC will serve as the leading resource on ways to assess threats and identify indicators of targeted violence.” SOURCE: NTAC website*

Slide 5




# National Behavioral Intervention Team Association (NaBITA)

*An  
Exploration  
of the Risk,  
Protective,  
and  
Mobilization*

# *Factors Related to Violent Extremism in College Populations (2017)*

- *“The National Behavioral Intervention Team Association (NaBITA) is an organization for the support and professional development of behavioral intervention team members. NaBITA is committed to providing education, resources, and support to those who endeavor every day to make their campuses and workplaces safer through caring prevention and intervention.”*  
SOURCE: NaBITA website

Slide 6




# Association of Threat Assessment Professionals (ATAP)

## *Risk Assessment Guideline Elements for Violence (AKA “RAGE-V”) (2006)*

- *“The Association of Threat Assessment Professionals (ATAP) was founded in 1992 as a non-profit organization comprised of law enforcement, prosecutors, mental health professionals, corporate security experts, probation and parole personnel and others involved in the area of threat and violence risk assessment. The*

*purpose of ATAP is to afford its members a professional and educational environment to exchange ideas and strategies to address such issues as stalking, threats, and homeland security. The primary focus of this organization is to provide the necessary knowledge, tools, and support to better prepare our membership to handle these types of situations. Our commitment is to expertly address these issues through seminars and training and networking with other professionals working in this field.” SOURCE: ATAP website*

Slide 7



## Federal Bureau of Investigation Behavioral Threat Assessment (BTAC)

*Lone Offender, A Study of Lone Offender Terrorism in the United States (1972 – 2015) (2019)*

*“The FBI’s Behavioral Threat Assessment Center (BTAC), established in 2010, is a national-level multi-disciplinary and multi-agency threat assessment and management team.*

*The BTAC provides operational support to FBI field offices and our law enforcement partners on some of the most complex, concerning, and complicated threat cases related to terrorism and targeted violence. The BTAC also conducted extensive research on prior acts of terrorism and targeted violence to learn from past events, to enhance and improve prevention capabilities, and to train the community and other stakeholders involved in this space.”* SOURCE: Lone Offender: A Study of Lone Offender Terrorism in the United States (1972-2015)

## Slide 8



## Terminology

Behavioral Threat Assessment, Violence Assessment and Risk Assessment are most often interchangeable

Terms refer to:

- process used to identify and evaluate behaviors and other factors associated with an individual to attempt to prevent violent acts

Today, we'll discuss factors used in the assessment process and how to build a team to move forward with that process

## Slide 9

### Threat Assessment Goals

- Prevent Violence
- Identify/Reduce Risk Factors
- Identify/Promote Protective Factors
- Create a **Starting Point**
- Provide Resources/Management Strategy

Discussion about TA often leads to argument that not all violence can be predicted...our focus is to PREVENT, not predict

TA process aims to:

- Identify risk factors, which increase the likelihood of engagement in violent behavior

- Identify protective factors, which decrease the likelihood of engagement in violent behavior

After identification, the process continues to:

- Employ resources to attempt to reduce risk factors and promote protective factors

TA creates a STARTING POINT for management strategy

- Process and findings are dynamic

- Based on individual and environment characteristics – constantly changing

- Needs to be constantly evaluated

TA process should be used to match resources with people who need them; goal is not necessarily to discipline or arrest

- My experience has been that often if a behavior is identified that may be inappropriate or unusual, LEOs may not pursue investigation because behavior didn't meet the elements of a crime...but that's not what we're looking for in TA...must step outside of the traditional LE "box"

NOTES:

- The goal of threat assessment is prevention, not prediction.  
SOURCE: Challenges of Prediction Research, Dr. Cornell
- *“A threat assessment is not a final product, but the beginning of the management process. It guides a course of action to mitigate a threat of potential violence; merely identifying that someone is of moderate or higher concern, without developing a management strategy, does not complete this process and is not recommended.”*  
SOURCE: Making Prevention a Reality: Identifying, Assessing, and Managing the Threat of Targeted Attacks
- “Predicting lone offender terrorism incidents is not possible, but prior research and operational experience support the conclusion that acts of targeted violence, including lone offender terrorist attacks, may be preventable through early recognition and reporting of concerning behavior.”  
SOURCE: Lone Offender – A Study of Lone Offender Terrorism in the United States (1972-2015)
- Cornell also makes these points:  
“Another shift in the risk assessment field is a move away from static measures of risk toward recognition of the role of dynamic and situational factors. The risk of violence is more situational and transitory than risk scores imply (Borum, Bartel, & Forth, 2003)”. He also writes that “risk is not a

personal trait but a dynamic function of individual and environmental characteristics.”

- The judgment the team makes is always for a specific time period. It’s NOT a decision or determination that can stand in perpetuity, because there are so many variables that can affect the direction of a person’s psyche and life, and their ability to cope

## Slide 10

**Risk Factors**

- Any characteristic, illness, or experience that might, alone or together with other risk factors, predispose a person to behave violently
- May also be referred to as...
  - Risk Elements
  - Predisposing Factors
  - Pre-Incident Indicators

When we talk about risk factors, we’re talking about any characteristic, illness, or experience that might, alone or together with other risk factors, predispose a person to behave violently. Sometimes risk factors are called risk elements, predisposing factors or pre-incident indicators, but whatever the term used, it’s referring to things that may indicate an increased risk of violent behavior.

One goal of TA is to identify risk factors and reduce them.

### NOTES:

“Risk Elements are individual experiences, behaviors, attitudes, and environment that increases vulnerability to extremism and risk of violent action.” SOURCE: <https://www.nabita.org/resources/eris/>

## Slide 11

### **Risk Factors**

- Weapons Use for Emotional Release
- Drug Use
- Head Trauma
- Criminal History
- Prior Commitments
- Past Suicide Attempts, Suicidal Ideations

Risk factors may be very specific to an individual, but here we've listed some common risk factors.

Weapons use, particularly connected to emotional release

Drug use, specifically methamphetamines, cocaine, alcohol and/or steroids

History of head trauma

Criminal History

Prior commitments (voluntary or involuntary) for mental health issues

Past suicide attempts or ideations

### NOTES:

- SOURCE: Risk Assessment Guideline Elements for Violence: Considerations for Assessing the Risk of Future Violent Behavior (Page 7)
- Note about mental health: "Although many offenders appeared to experience mental health stressors, most offenders were not diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder. Research in the violence risk assessment field has shown that a psychiatric diagnosis is not independently predicative of an individual's risk for future violence. Instead, severe mental health issues in combination with co-occurring risk factors, such as substance abuse, can impact risk." SOURCE: Lone Offender – A Study of Lone Offender Terrorism in the United States (1972-2015)
- Note about suicidal ideation: "...the rate of prior suicidal ideation (35%)

among offenders was higher than general population lifetime prevalence estimates (15.6%). These higher rates indicate areas for future research.” SOURCE: Lone Offender – A Study of Lone Offender Terrorism in the United States (1972-2015)

- Note about drug use: “Prior drug use rates among offenders are roughly equal to estimates of drug use in the general population. However, more than a third of offenders experienced employment, interpersonal, or legal issues stemming from problems with substance abuse. In considering substance use, threat assessors should look for information about how drug use impacts a subject’s behavior and note any significant changes in usage.” SOURCE: Lone Offender – A Study of Lone Offender Terrorism in the United States (1972-2015)
- Note about fear, anger, paranoia, and violence: In December 2008, psychiatrist Suzanne Yang wrote (Psychiatric Times, Volume 25, Issue 14) that “the MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study demonstrated that fear and anger are 2 of the strongest predictors of violence”. It has been argued that the core of paranoia is fear and that persecutory delusions often lead to feelings of anger (if this is true, persecutory paranoia combines both of these risk factors). A study in the UK that supports this idea, “Paranoid Ideation and Violence: Meta-analysis of Individual Subject

Data of 7 Population Surveys (Jeremy W. Coid, et al)", was published in Schizophrenia Bulletin. 2016 Jul; 42(4): 907–915, and its authors discuss both (paranoid ideation and persecutory ideation and their associations with violence). An anecdotal example of this involves Creigh Deeds (VA state senator and former VA gubernatorial candidate) whose son, Gus, nearly stabbed him to death in late 2013. Prior to being diagnosed with bipolar disorder, Gus attended William and Mary and was apparently an accomplished musician who gamely assisted his dad in his campaign for governor. An article about Gus (written on ABC NEWS.go.com on 11/21/13 by Abby D. Phillip, et al) said this: "'Eventually it got to the point where everyone... you couldn't ignore it. It was obvious he was going through a difficult time,' Tony Walters, who has been friends with Gus since they were children in Bath County, Va., told ABC News on Wednesday. 'I don't know where they ended up taking him but he was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and did get treatment for a while and I know he was on medication.' The details of what happened Nov. 19 in the home Gus shared with his father and stepmother are still sketchy. But it appears that in an altercation outside of their rural Virginia home, Gus stabbed his father brutally in the head and chest before taking his own life with a rifle. But for those who knew Gus, they never imagined that the kind, big-hearted

young man could take a violent turn. Yet he was clearly deeply troubled. **In the fall of 2010, the signs were all there: paranoia, deep suspicions about schemes to undermine or conspire against him, manic highs and deep lows. 'He seemed very sort of scattered, very different. He had strange paranoid,' Walters said. 'And he was imagining different schemes against him; suspicions of people around him...it really seemed like he was going through a very difficult time.'**"

## Slide 12

### Risk Factors

- Impaired Social/Emotional Functioning
- Social Withdrawal
- Depressed Mood
- Easily Enraged/Angry Outbursts
- Hypersensitivity to Criticism
- Adverse Responses to Authority and Limits

Some other common risk factors include

Impaired social/emotional functioning

Social Withdrawal

Depressed Mood

Becoming easily enraged and/or displaying angry outbursts

Being hypersensitive to criticism

Displaying adverse responses to authority and limits

### NOTES:

- *"...information about behaviors or warning signs that may have appeared prior to the plotted attack those signs can include one or more of the following: **impaired social/emotional functioning, social withdrawal, depressed mood, easily enraged, hypersensitivity to criticism.** The most common warning signs were depressed mood and social*

*withdrawal.”* (SOURCE: Preliminary Report on the ASV Database)

- *“Signs of distress include **angry outbursts, verbal or physical aggression, inappropriate behavior, dropping out of a program, losing a job, or suing the institution.**”* (SOURCE: Comparison of Averted and Completed School Attacks)
- “The Other Side of Anger: If You’re Often Angry or Irritable, You May Be Depressed” an article by Nell Greenfield-Boyce that appeared on Npr.org on 2/4/19 (article contains quotes from psychiatrist and Harvard professor Dr. Maurizio Fava, as well as a link to this research that appeared in JAMA Psychiatry November 2013, Volume 70, Number 11: “Overt Irritability/Anger in Unipolar Major Depressive

## Slide 13

### Risk Factors

- Perceptions of Injustice
- Verbal or Physical Aggression
- Inappropriate Behavior
- Dropping out of a Program/Losing a Job
- Suing the Institution

In addition,

Perceptions of injustice or insolvable problems  
Becoming or increasing verbal and/or physical aggression  
Displaying inappropriate behavior  
Dropping out of an academic program or losing a job  
Suing an educational or employment institution

Again, this list is certainly not all-encompassing, but it identifies some

of the most common risk factors observed.

## Slide 14

**Mitigation Factors**

- Any characteristic, attribute, and/or circumstance that is likely to limit someone's ability and/or desire to behave in a dangerous manner
- May also be referred to as...
  - Protective Elements
  - Protective Inhibitors
  - Stabilizers

I mentioned protective or mitigating factors earlier, and what I mean by that is any characteristic, attribute, and/or circumstance that is likely to limit someone's ability and/or desire to behave in a dangerous manner. Some terms that are used interchangeably for mitigation factors are protective elements, protective inhibitors, or stabilizers.

One goal of TA is to identify mitigation factors and increase them.

### NOTES:

- Inhibitors: *"Beliefs, relationships, injuries, lack of resources, or abilities that can limit whether a person is likely to follow through with dangerous conduct."* SOURCE: Risk Assessment Guideline Elements for Violence: Considerations for Assessing the Risk of Future Violent Behavior (Page 6)
- "Protective Elements are individual experiences, behaviors, attitudes, and environment that decrease

vulnerability to extremism and protect against risk of violent action.” SOURCE: <https://www.nabita.org/resources/eris/>

## Slide 15

| Mitigation Factors                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Mental Health Treatment</li><li>• Positive Family Support/Relationships</li><li>• Social Support</li><li>• Spiritual/Religious Beliefs</li><li>• Professional Satisfaction/Recognition</li><li>• Academic Achievement</li></ul> |

Just like risk factors, mitigation factors may be very specific to an individual, but today we’re talking about some of the most common mitigation factors, which include...

Mental health treatment availability and utilization...along with past receptivity to mental health treatment  
Positive family support and relationships  
Other social support like friends, coworkers, and neighbors  
Spiritual or religious beliefs that oppose violence  
Professional satisfaction and/or recognition  
Academic history

SOURCE: Risk Assessment Guideline Elements for Violence: Considerations for Assessing the Risk of Future Violent Behavior (Page 8)

- Mitigation factors like close relationships with family and friends could also be risk factors if those close relationships espouse the same beliefs and/or they urge

or condone a violent response to some perceived injustice

## Slide 16

**Mobilization Factors**

- Any event, stressor and/or circumstance that prompts increased risk of impending dangerous behaviors
- May also be referred to as...
  - Triggers
  - Catalysts

Mobilization factors are any event, stressor and/or circumstance that prompts increased risk of impending dangerous behaviors. Mobilization factors may also be referred to as triggers or catalysts. You may have heard them referred to as “the last straw” or “the straw that broke the camel’s back.”

### NOTES:

- “Many of the offenders had personal experiences, motives, and life stressors that co-mingles with their violent ideologies and their reasons for carrying out an attack.”  
SOURCE: Lone Offender – A Study of Lone Offender Terrorism in the United States (1972-2015)
- “...mobilization factors, which are behaviors, experiences, and attitudes indicating a risk of mobilization toward violent action.” SOURCE:  
<https://www.nabita.org/resources/eris/>

## Slide 17

| <b>Mobilization Factors</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Pending Perceived Negative Job Event</li><li>• Rejection/Abandonment</li><li>• Increased Psychosis</li><li>• Civil or Criminal Justice System Events</li><li>• Disruption of Support System</li><li>• Financial Problems</li></ul> |

Just like risk and mitigation factors, mobilization factors may be very specific to an individual. Some of the more common mobilization factors include:

Pending perceived negative job event  
(EX: pending job loss; being passed over for a promotion)

Rejection/abandonment (EX: end of romantic relationship; divorce initiation or finalization)

Increased psychosis (EX: discontinuation of medication)

Civil or Criminal Justice System Events  
(EX: pending loss or loss of child custody; child support changes)

Disruption of Support System (EX: death of primary or other important supporter; divorce)

Financial Problems (EX: loss of income; increased child support/alimony; living outside means)

NOTES:

SOURCE: Risk Assessment Guideline  
Elements for Violence: Considerations

## for Assessing the Risk of Future Violent Behavior (Page 8)

Loss of social status, may at least in part, underlie the mental trauma associated with several of the factors (negative life events, e.g., pending perceived negative job event) listed on the slide. Writing in *Psychology Today* on 1/2/14 (“Coping With Status Loss: The Hidden Cost of Unemployment”) psychologist Mark Van Vugt cites esteemed epidemiologist Michael Marmot’s 10-year “Whitehall” studies and discusses “the **Status Syndrome**, the idea that status determines your physical and mental health.” He explains that biologist Robert Sapolsky found that lower-status baboons and “low status human populations” had “increased” levels of cortisol, and he proceeds to report that “there is also a relationship between low status and mental health.” “Status losses” he says, “for instance through the unemployment also leads to a reduced concentration of serotonin in the brain.” Explaining further, he writes that “There are at least two main psychological factors involved in the status syndrome. One is the loss of key **social relationships**. Research shows that social relationships with co-workers are extremely important for the well-being of the worker, both on and off the job. Even if the contents of the work are not very rewarding the contacts are. Thus, being unemployed means a greater risk of feeling socially isolated. Second, **unemployed people experience a loss of control over their lives**. If you have a job then it does not matter so much

that your washing machine is broken or the car does not start. But if you do not have the money to make the necessary repairs then your autonomy is being affected and ultimately your health will suffer.”

## Slide 18

| Motivations |                  |
|-------------|------------------|
| • Grievance | • Delusion       |
| • Suicide   | • Revenge        |
| • Political | • Entitlement    |
| • Fame      | • Grandiosity    |
| • Martyrdom | • Social Justice |
| • Respect   | • Religion       |

Motivations may again be specific to the individual. They can be real or imagined. The important factor is the individual’s perception.

### NOTES:

- Motivational Factors: Delusion, Fanatical Beliefs, Revenge, Entitlement, Grandiosity, Need to Force Closure (SOURCE: Risk Assessment Guideline Elements for Violence: Considerations for Assessing the Risk of Future Violent Behavior)
- “...most offenders were categorized as primarily carrying out their attack for the following ideological causes:
  - Anti-government violent extremism
  - Racially-motivated violent extremism advocating for the superiority of the white race
  - Radical Islamist violent extremism
  - Pro-life violent extremism

- Racially-motivated violent extremism using force or violence in response to real or perceived racism and injustice in American society
  - Environmental violent extremism
- “Violent action is rarely taken for a single reason and is more often the result of a combination of psychological and social issues impacting a subject. Instead of focusing solely on ideology as the driving force behind a trajectory toward targeted violence, threat assessors should examine all potential warning signs, risk factors, and triggers that indicate a subject may engage in violence.” SOURCE: Lone Offender – A Study of Lone Offender Terrorism in the United States (1972-2015)
  - “...operational experience has noted instances in which offenders felt the necessity to obtain a certain number of casualties or choose particularly vulnerable victims in order to gain the desired amount of media attention. In addition to providing an accessible outlet for offenders’ messaging, online platforms can provide a sense of community and engagement for individuals who otherwise feel marginalized or not well-represented offline or among more mainstream online platforms. Threat assessors should stay familiar and up to date with current social media and messaging platforms and applications.” SOURCE: Lone Offender – A Study

of Lone Offender Terrorism in the  
United States (1972-2015)

Slide 19



Date: July 20, 2012

Shooter: James Holmes, age 24

Location: Century Aurora 16 Multiplex  
Theater; Aurora, CO

Victims: 12 dead; 70 injured

Summary: Holmes went into a theater during a midnight showing of a Batman movie. He left the theater and propped open the exit door, returned dressed in ballistic gear and a gas mask. He threw tear gas canisters into the theater and then started shooting at the ceiling and the crowd. Holmes surrendered to police outside the theater. Holmes' apartment was filled with more than 30 homemade grenades and 10 gallons of gas.


Background: As a child, Holmes had difficulty making friends and was described as socially awkward but intellectually gifted. He had a bachelor's degree in neuroscience and was a student in a doctoral student. Holmes had a history of mental illness. He had been reported to police by his psychiatrist as possibly dangerous based on statements he made during their sessions. It was discovered after

the shooting that he sent a written plan of attack in a notebook to his psychiatrist, which hadn't been delivered before the attack.

Shortly before the attack, Holmes was dumped by his first girlfriend. He also was struggling as a doctoral student and dropped out of his program about six weeks before the attack.

Holmes said committing the attack was to increase his self worth and committing the murders got him out of his depression and gave him a purpose. He said he was not smart enough to make a significant contribution to the world of science, and suicide was the answer.

Slide 20



Date: May 23, 2014

Shooter: Elliot Rodger, age 22

Location: Multiple locations – Santa Barbara

Victims: 6 dead; 13 injured

Summary: Rodger drove to a sorority house near the campus of UC Santa Barbara. He knocked on the door but no one answered. He then shot three women on the lawn. Two of those women died. He led police on a car chase, during which there were several exchanges of gunfire. It ended when he crashed and started firing randomly at people, and then killed himself. It was later discovered he also stabbed to death three young men in his apartment.

Background: Before the attack, Rodger posted videos and posts to social media, including a video on YouTube called "Elliot Rodger's retribution." It described what he was about to do and saying that women deserved it for rejecting him. He said, in part, "I take great pleasure in slaughtering all of you. You will finally see that I am, in truth, the superior one, the true alpha male." Rodger's parents had warned police several weeks before the attack about his erratic behavior and the concerning content of videos he posted, including talking about suicide and killing people. Officers who conducted a welfare check on him described him as polite and courteous and said he had problems with his social life but downplayed them. A 141-page manifesto said he was almost discovered when those officer conducted the welfare check. He said he was glad his apartment wasn't searched because officers would have found guns and his writings.

In one of his videos, Rodger said, "For the last eight years of my life, since I hit puberty, I've been forced to endure an existence of loneliness, rejection and unfulfilled desires, all because girls have never been attracted to me...girls gave their affection and sex and love to other men, never to me."

Rodger had a history of mental illness and had been seeing multiple therapists. In addition, a social worker had contacted police about him. He had 3 other previous law enforcement contacts for domestic assault and the "citizen's arrest" of his roommate.

He struggled in school and frequently enrolled for classes but dropped them.

The overall theme of his videos and posts is that he wanted to punish women who rejected them and kill men who had sexual relationships with women because he was jealous of them. He hated women and couples.

Slide 21



Date: August 4, 2019

Shooter: Connor Betts, age 24

Location: Ned Peppers Bar, Dayton OH

Victims: 9 dead; 17 injured

Summary: After spending time at Ned Peppers bar with his sister and another friend, Betts left the bar and returned about an hour later, opening fire. He fired 41 rounds in less than 30 seconds. He killed nine people, including his sister, and injured 17 others. The shooting was stopped almost immediately by officers who happened to be nearby and shot Betts. He was shot by officers 32 seconds after he fired his first shot.

Background: Former high school classmates said Betts had been suspended from high school because he made lists of students he wanted to rape and/or kill. Another classmate said Betts had been bullied and planned to do a school shooting.

Around the time of the shooting, he was performed in a music group that

was known for gore, violence and necrophilia. The performed music with dark themes including sexual violence. His high school girlfriend said Betts had a history of visual and auditory hallucinations, and he was afraid he would develop schizophrenia. There were also allegations he had been physically violent with previous girlfriends.

Investigation revealed Betts show interest in violence and mass shootings. At the time of the shooting, he was wearing body armor, and he had cocaine, alcohol and Xanax in his system and cocaine on his person.

## Slide 22

*"I was not surprised at all when I heard his name on the news...We predicted he would do this 10 years ago."*

– Former Classmate of Connor Betts

Slide 23

*"There were so many chances where they could have stopped him before the shooting...He was screaming out that there was something wrong."*


– Mother of Friend of Nikolas Cruz

Slide 24

*"I think everyone had in their minds if anybody was going to do it, it was going to be him."*

– Student at Marjory Stoneman High School

Slide 25



Terminology

Both threat assessment teams and behavioral intervention teams are multi-disciplinary groups who work together to evaluate behavior and identify resources for managing that behavior. The main difference between the two is that threat assessment teams are typically associated with evaluating individuals' potential for violent behavior, while behavioral intervention teams can be used not only for identifying individuals' potential for violent behavior, but also for general crisis

intervention and/or special needs-related behaviors.

Slide 26

**Crisis Intervention Teams,  
Threat Assessment Teams &  
Behavioral Intervention Teams**

- Identify
- Assess
- Manage
- Prevent



**CITs:** CIT “gold standard” is Memphis, TN PD (developed nation’s first CIT program, in ’88, with U. of Memphis, U. of Tenn., and local NAMI chapter, after police shot and killed a mentally ill man in Sept. ’87 and public outcry followed); well-functioning CITs receive mental health training, work with the mental health professionals in their jurisdictions on a daily basis, and have established relationships with mental health professionals in their community; they’re the first choice for first responders when there are calls for service involving a person or persons in mental health crisis; some states (VA is one) have legislation concerning CITs and mandates that CIT members receive CIT-tailored training; VA code 9.1 – 187 even identifies what the goals of CITs in VA should be, listing out 13 of them.

**TATs/BITs:**

**Workplace TATs/BITs**

--Be familiar with OSHA guidelines, particularly with OSHA’s 1998 149-

page Workplace Violence Prevention guide

--**When establishing a TAT/BIT at your workplace, consider as members** management/directors in human resources, legal, ethics/compliance, and facilities management; security director; in-house attorney(s); union representatives (commit union to assisting in maintaining a successful workplace violence prevention program and to providing assistance from its employee-members); state/local law enforcement; counselors/psychologists or employees with a background in counseling/psychology; in-house medical staff; employees with any other special skills/backgrounds that could be useful to/leveraged by team; "ad hoc" members (e.g., manager most familiar with situation currently under review)

--**Corporate actions:** train ALL employees (probably the most important because they'll be most likely to see problems first) to report concerning behaviors of co-workers (warning signs) and the existence of any protective/restraining orders, because violent attacks also occur outside of the home; train management (their training should exceed subordinate employees'); review physical security plans; review policies regarding employee assistance programs (e.g., are there formal or mandated referrals for risk assessment?), drug and alcohol policies, protective/restraining orders, the employee/employer agreements that new employees review and sign upon hire, etc.; review existing workplace violence prevention

program (OSHA advocates for a “well-written and implemented...program...”)

#### **School TATs/BITs**

--**When establishing your TAT/BIT, consider as members** one or more representatives from law enforcement, in-house mental health professionals (these professionals can come from outside the institution, if necessary), student affairs, human resources, legal counsel, and civilian, non-law enforcement school security officers. Team members might also include risk and safety management personnel; employee relations personnel; the supervisor of the school department that manages fitness for duty paperwork for school employees (this member would participate in TAT meetings and actions related only to school employees); dean of students; and provost or vice provost.

#### **Suggestions for both school AND workplace TATs/BITs**

--Establish a working relationship with your local police agency’s Crisis Intervention Team, if one exists, as well as the police supervisors responsible for your area

--Train ALL students/employees, not just supervisors, in statements and behaviors of concern to listen and look for, and make available multiple channels for reporting, even anonymously

--If the team is lucky enough to have a professional analyst (e.g., crime analyst, intelligence analyst) at its disposal, make use of this person’s professional expertise to mine data (e.g., Internet and social media searches) for the TAT/BIT

--Ensure that one or more team members (or ad hoc members) is familiar with state/local/federal weapons and firearms laws, commitment laws and procedures, and, possibly, even computer forensics (in educational or business settings, in the event there is a need to examine a student or employee's work/school-issued electronic devices)

--Be familiar with and leverage the expertise and resources of entities like the U.S. Secret Service's NTAC; the FBI's Behavioral Threat Assessment Center; your local police agency and its Crisis Intervention Team; your state's fusion center; the U.S. Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Assistance; other already-established TATs/BITs in your area, in school and workplace settings; and any and all other agencies and professionals with expertise in threat management

--**Develop and maintain a relationship with one or more respected mental health professionals outside your team**, to provide your team with an outside, unbiased opinion regarding your subject and the team's proposed course of action

--**Obtain membership in one or more professional organizations involved in threat assessment**, such as NaBITA (National Behavioral Intervention Team Association); ATAP (Association of Threat Assessment Professionals); ASIS (American Society for Industrial Security) International; and Society for Human Resource Management (SHRM)


--**Create your own consent forms** for reviewing educational and/or medical records, etc. that FERPA/HIPAA and

your state's laws would not otherwise permit you to review without legal process (e.g., court order). Obtain assistance through your agency's attorney(s), confirm with the school/medical facility that your forms meet their legal requirements, and determine to whom legal process would need to be directed at those facilities, during work hours as well as after hours. **Make attempting to obtain signed consent forms a part of each subject interview.**

--Be familiar with HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act) and/or FERPA (Family Education Rights and Privacy Act)

--**Consider using technological tools:** software like GAGGLE, which constantly searches a user's work/school-issued computer for certain keywords and then sends keyword hit information to the software owner for follow up response (website indicates intent is to identify warning signs of suicide, possible sexual exploitation, etc.); other automated text analytics (for linguistic markers of radical violence) like Threat Triage, which is a web-based software tool

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“The core concept of these teams brings stakeholders and subject matter experts together to accurately and holistically assess threats and to devise effective and appropriate threat management strategies.”

SOURCE: Lone Offender – A Study of Lone Offender Terrorism in the United States (1972-2015)

**Colleges/Universities** – Likely to employ significant numbers of people, so TAT/BIT should have some members who participate in TAT only when the TAT is addressing member’s concern (student or employee)

TAT members should include campus police rep(s) and local PD/SO rep(s) with concurrent jurisdiction; dean, provost (or their designees); human resource supervisor; in-house mental health professionals (these professionals also can come from outside the institution, if necessary); student affairs; legal counsel; risk and safety management personnel; employee relations personnel; the supervisor of the department that manages fitness for duty paperwork for school employees (this member would participate in TAT meetings and actions related only to school employees)

**Primary/Secondary Schools** – generally same as above, except for inclusion of one or more civilian, non-law enforcement school security officers (SSOs)

**Local/State/Federal LE** – all TATs should establish relationships with their local PD/SO and CITs, and if

possible, with local federal LE agencies who may be able to provide assets, guest speakers, and offer professional opinions/expertise

**Local Officials**—establish relationships w/them because they can help educate the community about reporting and its role in threat mitigation; TAT/BIT can also leverage the trust with the community that the official has developed (e.g., assist TAT/BIT in arranging a meeting with parents in community to reinforce their children's need to report info of concern)

**Private Industry/Workplace**—local businesses may have TATs/BITs of their own who can share their experiences with TATs/BITs, in schools or workplaces, that are forming or already established, and all can benefit from one another's knowledge and experience

TAT/BIT may be composed of management/directors in human resources, legal counsel, ethics/compliance, and facilities management; security director; in-house attorney(s); union representatives (commit union to assisting in maintaining a successful workplace violence prevention program and to providing assistance from its employee-members); state/local law enforcement; counselors/psychologists or employees with a background in counseling/psychology; in-house medical staff; employees with any other special skills/backgrounds that could be useful to/leveraged by team;

“ad hoc” members (e.g., manager most familiar with situation currently under review)

**Mental Health Resources**—in-house or from the outside; local PD’s/SO’s CIT can help establish relationship with local mental health professionals; having mental health professionals trained in threat assessment/threat management is best

**Prosecutorial/Legal Resources**—relationships with local LE can help to establish relationship with local prosecutor’s office; TAT/BIT should have legal counsel among its members, even if it’s only ad hoc or solely on an “advisory” basis

**Intelligence Analyst (or Crime Analyst)** – if one or more are available to TAT/BIT, TAT/BIT should make use of this person’s professional expertise to mine data (e.g., Internet and social media searches)

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- **Most School Attacks Averted because Students Reported**

- “The main lesson learned about students is that most school attacks are averted because students report their concerns about another student’s threat, plot, or other concerning behavior.” (Preliminary Report on the ASV Database)

- “The primary difference between the two case examples is that in the averted shooting, multiple people reported their concerns, but in the completed shooting, no one who was concerned about a possible attack contacted either the school or local law enforcement. Communication is the key to preventing mass attacks. To improve communication, communities need to be trained to recognize warning signs and to know what to do when they encounter them.”  
(Comparison of Averted and Completed School Attacks)

**Encourage Reporting**

- Open Lines of Communication
- Build Positive Relationships Based on Trust
- Create Awareness of Importance of Reporting
- Educate about Reportable Behaviors

**To Open Lines of Communication,  
Build Positive Relationships**

- “...schools can open lines of communication by building positive relationships with all students and expressing the importance of reporting their concerns to a trusted adult. These efforts also include making a distinction between ‘snitching’ (which is reporting to get somebody in trouble) and reporting a concern (which is intended to help others).’ (Preliminary Report on the ASV Database)

**Make available an app** (e.g., LiveSafe, Safe2Talk) to report (anonymously, if the reporters wish) their concerns.

Regular meetings of the TAT/BIT, education (training) of the school population or workforce, use of reporting app or some other reporting mechanism, anonymous reporting, and the **TAT/BIT’s multi-disciplinary nature** all open up lines of communication. At VCU, when Kendall Plageman was hired to coordinate the school’s TAT and Student Affairs, she was given a desk at VCU PD and had to perform her work there 2 days a week, which, she says, enabled her to meet and get to know VCU PD officers and better understand them and their challenges (created empathy for them). If the local PD or SO already has an established CIT, a newly formed TAT/BIT would be well-served in meeting with the CIT and in having the CIT introduce the TAT/BIT’s members to the CIT’s contacts in the


mental health community and elsewhere. Treat the CIT or its supervisors to lunch...(use some reciprocity)

For **“building positive relationships based on trust”**, the TAT/BIT needs to follow through on addressing the reported behavior, truly following through on Dr. Cornell’s advice on **creating “zero tolerance” alternatives and focusing on prevention (reducing the risk factors and increasing the inhibiting ones)**, which is far less likely to result in expulsion, loss of employment, or criminal charges.

**Address awareness of the importance of reporting and reportable behaviors with training--the entire school population or workforce.** People in higher positions of authority and responsibility for personnel should get more training than their subordinates, but EVERYONE (e.g., students, “silent staff”) should get at least some training. Training should involve a discussion of warning signs, the dangerousness and consequences of intentional false reporting, the difference between snitching and sharing a sincere concern, how to report one’s sincere concerns (there should be multiple channels for reporting), and the need to culturally shift from revenge to reconciliation. In the case of Nikolas Cruz, there was enough unreported information to fill a 69-page report (12 pages were pictorial but almost the entire remainder of the report--50 pages in all—was dedicated solely to narratives of unreported concerning statements and behavior). Had more been known

about him before his attack, it would likely have resulted in far greater intervention with him, far sooner. The most salient finding of the ASV 51 averted, 51 carried out attacks, was that in the averted attacks, concerns were reported (USSS NTAC also reports that this is key)

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


- Mention that specific examples are used not to Monday morning quarterback or second guess, but to identify areas for improvement
- Cruz's unreported behavior known to people before the shooting:
  - Animal Cruelty/Killing: 7
  - Knife/Bullet/Firearm seen in Cruz's possession: 19
  - Statements of hatred toward a group or person: 8
  - Statements of desire to hurt or kill people: 11
  - Specific statement to shoot school: 3

SOURCE:

<http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/MSDHS/Meetings/November-Meeting-Documents/Nov-13-145pm-Cruz-Behavior-Chris-Lyons.aspx>

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"Just as important as early recognition by bystanders is the need to have well-trained, skilled, and competent receivers of that reporting – individuals who can assess potential threats and share information with other stakeholders so that they can gather additional information, further assess the threat, and take action to mitigate that threat." SOURCE: Lone Offender – A Study of Lone Offender Terrorism in the United States (1972-2015)

TAT/BIT members should have threat assessment training (risk factors, mitigating factors, mobilization factors, and actions to take); mental health training; familiarity with/training regarding HIPAA and/or FERPA, firearms laws, and any "red flag" law in the state in which the TAT/BIT is operating; and an earnest desire to be a part of the TAT/BIT and faithfully do its work

#### Challenges to Identifying Behaviors

- Balancing Personal Rights vs. Public Safety
- Information Disconnect between Entities
- Lack of Reporting
  - Don't Want to Get Involved
  - Afraid of Being Wrong
  - Those with Most Access to S -> Least Likely to Report
  - "Code of Silence"
  - Threat Not Taken Seriously
- False Reports

Balancing Personal Rights vs. Public Safety – How Far Does Investigation Need To Go?

Information Disconnect between Entities

Lack of Reporting

Don't Want to Get Involved  
Afraid of Being Wrong  
Those with Most Access to S -  
> Least Likely to Report  
"Code of Silence"  
Threat Not Taken Seriously

Motivations for False Reports

- **Code of Silence**

- The FBI identified the "code of silence" in their 2000 assessment of school shooters. The report stated the code of silence "represents students' hesitancy in reporting a fellow student's threats, plot, or other concerning behavior...since Columbine, interviewees believed that the code of silence has been diminished but still exists to some extent." "Few feel they can safely tell teachers or administrators if they are concerned about another student's behavior or attitudes. Little trust exists between students and staff." (Preliminary Report on the ASV Database)

- **Threat Not Taken Seriously**

- *“...the primary reason students gave for not reporting their concerns about another student was that they did not take the threat seriously.”*  
(Preliminary Report on the ASV Database)

- **Motivations for False Reports:**  
Revenge; Students attempting to disrupt classes; Military personnel attempting to manipulate the system **[Add more]**

**Balancing personal rights with public safety**—school/employer policies and state and federal laws will dictate some of this, but both how the reported concerning behavior(s)/statement(s) and how the subject of the concerns are addressed is important; known facts obviously impact this—if facts are established that subject has recently leaked homicidal intentions and is known to be awaiting completion of a NICS check to acquire a firearm, response should be swift and concerns about embarrassing the subject should be low, but if a few co-workers have reported that their normally sanguine co-worker has been quick to anger lately and muttered under his breath that someone needs to do something to these bastards in management, a different, probably more measured approach, with consideration of how, who, where, and when TAT members address the subject, should be taken. If there's little or nothing to substantiate the reported concern, then maybe no action is taken. If the reported concern is determined to be

well-founded, then further action is taken until the team's concerns are allayed.

At VCU, sometimes first contact with the subject was made by non-law enforcement TAT members, without the law enforcement rep physically present (though that person was aware of when and where the contact was occurring) because the TAT was concerned about embarrassing the subject and prematurely elevating the situation to something that it wasn't.

**Information disconnect between entities**—results largely from a lack of knowledge and understanding of another's responsibilities and challenges (e.g., school administrator's concerns are fundamentally different from a law enforcement officer's), but by **having a TAT/BIT with wide representation (multi-disciplinary)**, each different rep, with his/her own expertise, comes to know the other reps and appreciate their perspectives (they develop empathy for one another) and each rep can serve as THE point of contact from everyone in the same professional community who may not have developed the same empathy for all of the TAT/BIT reps; for this same reason, it's **also important that TAT establishes a database (repository) for the information reported to it and that it has collected itself, so it can acquire and connect the dots**

**Challenges to Obtaining Information**

- Information may not be Available in a Timely Manner
- Information may be Protected from Disclosure
- Information may not be Legally Attainable

SOURCE: Risk Assessment Guideline Elements for Violence: Considerations for Assessing the Risk of Future Violent Behavior (Page 11)

**Information May Not be Available in a Timely Manner** (e.g., any information sought with legal process, though sometimes the entities with that info will begin gathering it while they wait for the legal process that permits them to release it; the entities that have the information sought are closed for the day; apparent immediate sources of information refuse to speak with TAT and/or cooperate)

**Information May be Protected from Disclosure** -- TAT and its members may lack the legal justification at the present time, or period, for certain records under FERPA, telephone subscriber and call detail records, cell telephone cell tower data, social media account info, email addresses and email content, cell tracking or vehicle tracking devices, info regarding mail, bank records, etc.)

**Information May not be Legally Attainable** (same as above; TAT can't get it period because with the information that they have, they lack the legal justification)

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### What Should Teams be Doing on an Ongoing Basis?

- Meet
- Monitor Local, State and Federal Laws
  - Firearms
  - Protective Orders
  - Mental Health Commitments
- Establish and Maintain Relationships

## Meeting!!

Keeping abreast of changes in local/state/federal laws and practices regarding firearms, protective orders, and mental health commitments

Establishing and maintaining relationships with LE, other TATs, mental health community, community leaders, etc. to build trust/cohesiveness

- **Identify Local Laws**
  - “...educators, mental health professionals, and others should be familiar with the laws in their states and report threatening behavior to law enforcement.”  
(Comparison or Averted and Completed School Attacks)
- “Relationships need to be established between law enforcement and school personnel, including ‘silent staff’ such as custodians and cafeteria employees. Relationship building should include ongoing engagement and training to prepare for emergency response situations. In addition to relationships among professionals, it is also important for school personnel and specifically school-based police officers to establish positive relationships with students, creating a positive school climate with trust and respect so students will feel comfortable reporting concerns about a possible

threat.” (Preliminary Report on the ASV Database)

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**What Should Teams be Doing on an Ongoing Basis?**

- Develop and Maintain Resources
  - Shelters, Mental Health Facilities, Veterans' Facilities, Housing Authorities, etc.
- Continue Education and Training
- Create and Review Forms
- Assess and Revise Team Members' Roles as Necessary

Developing/Maintaining resources (e.g., shelters, mental health facilities, Veterans facilities, housing authorities)

Increasing team's threat assessment knowledge through education and training (e.g., reviewing scientific journals, arranging for research-based training, monitoring recent attacks to learn from them)

Creating and reviewing forms repository in consultation with team's legal counsel

- “...law enforcement and other threat assessors need to be familiar with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), which provides exceptions to patient confidentiality in situations where there is an identified threat of violence. Pre-establishing communication between law enforcement and mental health practitioners can enable a faster response in emergency situations. Operational experience indicates that such proactive communication and

team-building between law enforcement and community-based mental health practitioners has greatly enhanced threat mitigation efforts.” SOURCE: Lone Offender – A Study of Lone Offender Terrorism in the United States (1972-2015)

**EX: Shelters, Mental Health, Veterans, Housing...: Establish a relationship with one or more local victim/witness assistance**

**professionals**, so that your team is able to provide immediate assistance to targets/potential targets of your subject, and possibly even to your subject. These professionals will be familiar with myriad victim/witness resources in your community and able to provide you with resources’ contact information. To connect your team with one of these professionals, consider contacting your local FBI, ATF, and HSI office; all of these agencies employ victim/witness professionals and have robust victim/witness programs. U.S. Attorney’s Offices also employ victim/witness professionals.

**Educate Regarding HIPAA and FERPA:**

**FERPA** applies only to schools that receive U.S. Department of Education funding, so some parochial schools, for example, are not be subject to FERPA; “Under FERPA, a school or school district may disclose personally identifiable information (PII) from education records without consent to **threat assessment team members** who are not employees of the school or school district if they qualify as “school officials” with “legitimate educational interests”; and training

and guidance from the TAT's/BIT's in-house legal counsel is strongly recommended. Loudoun County SO Lt. Tricarico and Glynn County School Police Chief Ellis both cited FERPA as a significant stumbling block in investigating school incidents (sometimes even the school system's attorney is the hindrance Lt. Tricarico actually said that it was the county schools' attorney who was the greatest hindrance, so an outside FERPA legal expert may need to be consulted. "Directory info" can also be released without consent, provided that the legal adult student or minor student's parents have not opted out of allowing the school to freely release (e.g., to law enforcement) directory info about the student.

**HIPAA:** TAT/BIT ought to get its training and guidance from its legal counsel; if your state's laws regarding disclosure of medical information are more restrictive than HIPAA, they'll supercede it (HIPAA allows a health care provider to disclose protected health info if the provider believes that the disclosure is necessary to prevent or lessen a "serious and imminent" threat to the safety of a person or the public AND the disclosure is to a person or persons reasonably able to prevent or lessen the threat.) GA has no statutory duty to warn, only legal precedence for a duty to protect, so the aforementioned HIPAA exception is not something that a mental health professional in GA can avail herself of --she would need to have exhausted all other steps to protect her client and his privacy before she could safely

make the kind of 3<sup>rd</sup> party disclosure that HIPAA allows. For FL's professionals, it's "permissive", so they can disclose, but if they want to cover themselves, they need to be extra judicious in making that decision

**Create Forms Repository**—because of concerns that forms can create legal liability, proceed with input from TAT/BIT's legal advisor. Civil legal liability in this instance relates to a failure of "duty to care" (if the forms aren't completed and something happens, this can be an argument that the TAT's/BIT's failed in its duty to care). CITs should be less concerned about this. Counter opinion is that TATs/BITs creation and use of well-conceived and exhaustive forms demonstrates TAT's/BIT's firm commitment to taking seriously all threats and fulfilling its duty to care. Dr. Cornell's CSTAG is a good starting point for the creation of one's own forms. Whether forms are created and used or not, the team should collect from subjects of concern as much information as possible; subjects of concern aren't always going to be candid about themselves and their intentions.

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