



**Homeland
Security**



**National Threat Evaluation
and Reporting Program**

National Threat Evaluation and Reporting (NTER) Program

*BEHAVIORAL THREAT ASSESSMENT
INTEGRATION*

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


Agenda


- NTER's Role in DHS I&A
- Who We Are & What We Do
- Master Trainer Program (MTP)
- Next Steps



NTER's Role within the Office of Intelligence & Analysis (I&A)



NTER's Behavioral Threat Assessment & Integration (BTAI)





BTAI Beginnings

- Working Group in 2019
 - Composed of experts in the field of threat assessment and targeted violence
 - Extensive partner outreach, after action report, readings, and trainings
- Utilized evidence-based prevention model from FBI, USSS, Defense Science Board
- Created our Master Trainer Program
- Piloted the program with experts from USSS, USCIS, NCSBI BeTA, TSA, CISA, OCSO
- Created our own multi-disciplinary team




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What Does NTER's BTAI Team Do?

Targeted Violence Prevention

- Master Trainer Program (MTP)
- Certification
- Technical Support & Information Sharing
- Training & Continuing Education



MTP Technical Support & Information Sharing

- Network of Master Trainers Across the Country
- Toolkits
- Long-Term Assist in Setting Up Threat Assessment Units



Assessing Anonymous Threatening Communications

Challenges

Anonymous threatening communications (ATCs) pose a unique challenge for threat assessment professionals and investigators. Threat assessment relies on witness accounts, or ATCs, which typically do not have a known source or are received in an ATC. Despite the absence of these factors, every case should utilize routine application of a threat assessment process. Identifying procedural steps to use in analyzing ATCs should be a priority for risk reduction efforts.

How much effort was employed to derive the information? (e.g., did the sender use a burner phone?)

How important is the information to the threatener?

How much risk did the subject take when he or she submitted the threat?

Threatening Communications Toolkit

- Is there an identifiable grievance against the target? What details are available concerning any personal or professional history and conflicts experienced by the target?
- Are there identifiable addresses in the communication which could assist in the investigation of the writer?
- Is this a single, isolated communication or part of a series of communications?
- Are there indicators of a possible relationship or prior contact between the writer and the author of the communication?
- Is it feasible for the writer to carry out the threatener's ATC?

More case observations regarding the threat evaluation and response process are available in a further document located in the document evaluation of the tool [Threatening Communications Toolkit](#).

Triaging Threatening Communications

Challenges

Threat assessment professionals face a unique challenge for threat assessment: how to triage ATCs. ATCs are typically received in a long distance setting, often from a burner phone or a payphone. The use of these communication methods may be made, however, when receiving threatening communications. The use of these communication methods may be made, however, when receiving threatening communications.

How much effort was employed to derive the information? (e.g., did the sender use a burner phone?)

How important is the information to the threatener?


How much risk did the subject take when he or she submitted the threat?

Threatening Communications Toolkit

- Is there an identifiable grievance against the target? What details are available concerning any personal or professional history and conflicts experienced by the target?
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Training & Continuing Education



Threat Evaluation and Reporting Course (TERC) Variations

Title	Course Length	Audience
Threat Evaluation & Reporting Course (TERC)	3 days	F/SLTT partners tasked with the vetting and analysis of tips and leads
Basic Threat Evaluation & Reporting Course (B-TERC)	1 day	F/SLTT partners who may encounter suspicious behaviors while on duty
Threat Evaluation and Reporting Overview (TERO)	2-3 hours	Specific audiences who play a role in raising awareness about targeted violence

Training & Continuing Education (cont'd)

- Quarterly Bulletin—Research in Focus
- Quarterly Webinars on Hot Topics in Threat Assessment



Our Progress Thus Far & Next Steps

- First Cohort of Master Trainers – September 2020
- Second Cohort of Master Trainers—December 2020
- First two cohorts—green light to train this week



- Three cohorts planned by end of FY21



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Questions

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