



~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20320108~~  
 NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
 CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE  
 FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

4 September 2007

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD

THRU: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)

SUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Report to the Intelligence Oversight Board on NSA  
 Activities - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U//~~FOUO~~) Except as previously reported to you or the President or otherwise stated in the enclosure, we have no reason to believe that any intelligence activities of the National Security Agency during the quarter ending 30 June 2007 were unlawful or contrary to Executive Order or Presidential Directive and thus required to be reported pursuant to Section 1.7.(d) of Executive Order 12333.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Inspector General and the General Counsel continue to exercise oversight of Agency activities by means of inspections, surveys, training, review of directives and guidelines, and advice and counsel. These activities and other data requested by the Board or members of the staff of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight) are described in the enclosure.

GEORGE ELLARD  
 Inspector General

VITO T. POTENZA  
 General Counsel

(U//~~FOUO~~) I concur in the report of the Inspector General and the General Counsel and hereby make it our combined report.

KEITH B. ALEXANDER  
 Lieutenant General, U. S. Army  
 Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Encl:  
 Quarterly Report

Approved for Release by NSA on 12-19-2014, FOIA Case # 70809 (Litigation)

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This Memorandum is Unclassified  
 Upon Removal of Enclosure

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1. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Intelligence, counterintelligence, and intelligence-related activities that violate law, regulation, or policy substantiated during the quarter, as well as any actions taken as a result of the violations.

(U) Intelligence Activities

(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ Unintentional collection against United States (U.S.) persons. [redacted] instances in which Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) analysts inadvertently collected communications to, from, or about U. S. persons while pursuing foreign intelligence tasking were reported this quarter. [redacted]

[redacted]

~~(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [redacted]

[redacted]

P.L. 86-36  
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024(i)

~~(S//SI)~~ Action taken. Selectors for the collection were detasked from information collection systems [redacted] and the data was removed from storage systems. Corrective actions taken to lessen the risk of recurrence included additional training and education and changes to internal controls.

(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~(S//SI)~~ Unintentional dissemination of U.S. identities. During this quarter, [redacted] SIGINT products were cancelled because they contained the identities of U.S. persons, organizations, or entities. In all instances, the reports were either not reissued or were reissued with the proper minimization.

~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) collection. There are [redacted] FISA collection incidents to report for this quarter. In [redacted] of the collection incidents

[redacted]

[redacted] All collection was terminated, and the intercepts were deleted or destroyed as required by USSID SP0018.

~~(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [redacted]

[redacted]


(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36  
(b) (3)-18 USC 798  
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024(i)

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52  
Dated: 20070108  
Declassify On: 20320108

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(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36  
(b) (3)-18 USC 798  
(b) (3)-50 USC 3024(i)



~~(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [redacted] branch learned that [redacted] had accompanied the [redacted] to the United States on [redacted]. The selectors for [redacted] were detasked and the associated records deleted [redacted].


(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ An analyst incorrectly added [redacted] selectors associated with a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court order to the wrong [redacted]. The error, found by another analyst, resulted in [redacted] instances of collection. The collection was deleted from the [redacted] database when the violation was identified on [redacted].

(b) (1)  
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ There were [redacted] instances whereby National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) analysts learned that telephone numbers authorized for collection [redacted].



(U) Counterintelligence Activities.  
Nothing to report.

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~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20320108~~**(U) Intelligence-related Activities**~~(S//SI//NF)~~

**(U) Misuse of the U.S. SIGINT System.** While teaching a class on analyzing communication networks, the instructor purposely entered the phone number of his friend, who was neither a U.S. person nor living in the United States. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The instructor was counseled on the restrictions on NSA authorities and was mandated to attend training on USSID SP0018, which he completed in July 2007.

2. **(U//FOUO) Intelligence Oversight Inspections.** During this quarter, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) reviewed various intelligence activities of the NSA/CSS to determine whether they were conducted in accordance with applicable statutes, Executive Orders, Attorney General procedures, and Department of Defense and internal directives. With few exceptions, the issues presented were routine and indicated that the operating elements understand the restrictions on NSA/CSS activities.

~~(S//SI)~~ **(U//FOUO)**

[REDACTED]. Although [REDACTED] is diligently working to improve its Intelligence Oversight program, procedures fall short of the minimum required to ensure that all employees receive required intelligence oversight training. Although the understanding of NSA authorities in relation to collection, minimization, and dissemination is poor, no intelligence oversight-related concerns were noted within operations. Intelligence oversight training is not managed effectively or efficiently, and no internal controls ensure training compliance. At best, the procedures to make certain that the right people receive the required training are confusing and difficult to track. The NSA/CSS Inspector General will track these deficiencies and will relay in a future report when they are rectified.

3. **(U) Substantive Changes to the NSA/CSS Intelligence Oversight Program.**

(U) Nothing to report.

4. **(U) Changes to NSA/CSS published directives or policies concerning intelligence, counterintelligence, or intelligence-related activities and the reason for the changes.** Nothing to report.

5. **(U) Procedures governing the activities of Department of Defense (DoD) intelligence components that affect U.S. persons (DoD Directive 5240.1-R, Procedure 15) Inquiries or Matters Related to Intelligence Oversight Programs.** Nothing to report.

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