

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**Introduction To The
FBI**Bureau Operations**

(U) The FBI is America's lead terrorism federal investigative/law enforcement agency. It conducts many and varied investigations that are derived primarily through Congressional Legislation or authorization. The Bureau also assists state and local entities when help is requested.

(U) Terrorism investigations [redacted]
[redacted]. The investigation can be opened as a result of a complaint or other information. The TFO may [redacted] to investigate or collect information relating to National Security [redacted] the 415 policy (i.e., Case Classification for Terrorist Investigation) are [redacted]. The SSA can authorize [redacted]. The SAC can authorize [redacted] after that FBIHQ has to authorize [redacted].

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QUIT :: PREVIOUS :: NEXT

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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**Introduction To The
FBI**Bureau Operations (Con't)**

(U) [redacted] Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG) predicate the type of investigative techniques authorized [redacted] Every investigation has its own case identification (ID) number. The first part of the case ID is a numeric classification and an alphabetic sub-classification. This numeric classification code stands for a distinct type of investigation. Common case classifications involved with JTTFs are 266 (Domestic Terrorism) and 415 (International Terrorism). Examples are 266H = Anarchist Extremist and 415 [redacted]. Each case ID also has a two-letter Field office designation. For example: NY indicates the New York Field Office or Division. Finally, a case ID has a unique computer generated number. Example: 123456.

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(U) An International Terrorism investigation originating out of the New York Office with an [redacted] nexus would look like: 415 [redacted]-NY-123456. Field Offices have pocket size, hard copies of this FBI Investigative Classifications for investigators and staff. The updates to the hard copy are made on a yearly basis.

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FBI**Bureau Operations (Con't)**

(U) Investigations within the Bureau are commonly referred to as cases. JTTF cases are opened to investigate or collect information relating to threats to National Security. Opening of a case usually involves a communication, most often the Bureau's standardized Electronic Communication (EC). This gives information regarding the predating offense, information regarding subjects of the case, and other administrative information. The case agent drafts this communication and receives the appropriate approvals. An FBI support employee opens the case in the Bureau's Automated Case Support (ACS) computerized case management system, and assigns a case number.

(U) There are several other terms regarding a case that need to be explained:

- Pending
- Pending Inactive
- Closed

QUIT :: PREVIOUS :: NEXT

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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
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FBI**Bureau Operations (Con't)**

(U) Pending indicates that the case is open and being worked by the FBI. There are occasions when a case is pending, but no investigation or other activity on the case is expected to occur for an extended period of time. These investigations may be placed in Pending Inactive (PI) status by the SSA.

(U) A case is closed upon successful resolution of the investigation, prosecution, or exhausting of all investigative avenues. Closing of the case is documented on an EC.

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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**Introduction To The
FBI**Module Review****(U) FBI Priorities:**

- List of ten priorities of the Bureau – with the number one being preventing a terrorist attack on the United States.

(U) The FBI has a long and extensive history of fighting crime and the new emphasis on the ten priorities.

(U) The FBI is divided into Headquarters and Field Divisions:

- There are many Headquarters divisions and entities and 56 Field Offices
- Foreign FBI Offices are known as Legats.

(U) Bureau investigations are known as cases. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A case can also [REDACTED]

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(U) The FBI has its own language demonstrated by the use of abbreviations and case classifications.

PREVIOUS :: FINISH MODULE

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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

FBI Written
Communications And
Administrative Details

Overview Of Instructional Goal And Objectives

(U) Goal: The goal of this module is to introduce the new task force member to the types of written communications, and administrative policies and procedures employed by the FBI in the fight against domestic and international terrorism.

(U) Objectives:

1. Read and review the types of written communications used within the FBI.
2. Gain a basic understanding of the FBI's administrative policies and procedures.

EXIT MODULE :: NEXT

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JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE (JTTF) ORIENTATION

FBI Written
Communications And
Administrative Details

Operational And Investigative Writing

(U) Electronic Communication

(U) The Electronic Communication (EC) is the Bureau's standardized internal communication for investigative tasking (leads) and disseminating information. ECs are how JTTF agents and Field Offices receive and send important case information. An EC must be written when an investigation is opened. An EC is a macro (an automated template) that can be accessed from the Corel WordPerfect software application icon found on the computer desktop.

- Importance of Setting Leads
- Drafting an EC
- Approvals
- Uploading an EC
- FD-302
 - Example
- Drafting an FD-302
- Approval
- Procedure for Indexing ACS

QUIT :: PREVIOUS :: NEXT

PAGE: 2 OF 14

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Internet Explorer window titled "JTTF CBT - Windows Internet Explorer". The address bar shows "D:\jttf\2\module2\m2_010.htm". The page content includes the "JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE (JTTF) ORIENTATION" header, a "Importance of Setting Leads" section, and a list of topics such as "Operational", "Electronic", "Importance", "Drafting", "Approvals", "Uploading", "FD-302", "Example", "Drafting an FD-302", "Approval", and "Procedure for Indexing ACS". The page also features a "Support Desk" link and a "Page Safety" icon.

JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE (JTTF) ORIENTATION

Importance of Setting Leads

(U) It is necessary to set leads so that other Field Offices or FBI HQ Divisions can assist with the investigation of the case or track outgoing communications from your office.

Operational

(U) Electronic

(U) The Electro. Investigative tool receive and send is a macro (an icon found on t

ed internal communication for e how JTTF agents and Field Offices n when an investigation is opened. An EC Corel WordPerfect software application

My Computer 100%

System

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 10-14-2011 BY 65179 DMH/ stp/ lsg

Internet Explorer window titled "JTTF CBT - Windows Internet Explorer". The address bar shows "D:\jtf\j2\module2\m2_010.htm". The page content includes the "JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE (JTTF) ORIENTATION" header, a "Drafting an EC" section, and a list of topics: Importance, Drafting an EC, Approvals, Uploading, FD-302, Example, Drafting an FD-302, Approval, and Procedure for Indexing ACS. The page also features a "FBI Written Communications And Administrative Details" sidebar and a "My Computer" taskbar at the bottom.

JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE (JTTF) ORIENTATION

Drafting an EC

Information on how to draft an EC can be found in the [Electronic Communication Reference Guide](#).

Operational

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Investigative tas
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- Importance
- Drafting an
- Approvals
- Uploading
- FD-302
- Example
- Drafting an FD-302
- Approval
- Procedure for Indexing ACS

FBI Written Communications And Administrative Details

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n when an investigation is opened. An EC
Corel WordPerfect software application

My Computer 100%

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Internet Explorer window titled "JTTF CBT - Windows Internet Explorer". The address bar shows "D:\JTF\JTFmodule2\m2_010.htm". The page title is "JTTF CBT".

The page content includes a header with the FBI seal and the text "JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE (JTTF) ORIENTATION". Below this, there is a section titled "Approvals" with the following text:

The EC macro has an Approved Information prompt that reflects the official Bureau name(s) of Individual(s) responsible for approving the EC. There are lines for multiple approvals that may be necessary.

On the left side, there is a section titled "Operational" with the following text:

(U) Electronic C...
(U) The Electro...
investigative ta...
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is a macro (an i...
icon found on t...

Below this, there is a list of links:

- Important
- Drafting a...
- Approvals
- Uploading
- FD-302
- Example
- Drafting an FD-302
- Approval
- Procedure for Indexing ACS


On the right side, there is a section titled "Internal communication for" with the following text:

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n when an investigation is opened. An EC
Corel WordPerfect software application

The bottom of the window shows a taskbar with various icons and a system clock displaying "9:18 AM".

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Internet Explorer window titled "JTTF CBT - Windows Internet Explorer" showing a page titled "JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE (JTTF) ORIENTATION". The page includes a header with the FBI seal and the text "FBI Written Communications and Administrative Details". The main content area is titled "FD-302" and describes the form's purpose: "The FD-302 is a form used to record the results of any investigative activity that may result in testimony being given. The purpose of the FD-302 is to provide an accurate and complete record of all evidence developed during an investigation." The page also lists "Operational" procedures, including "Electronic" and "The Electronic" methods. A sidebar on the left contains a list of links: "Importance", "Drafting an FD-302", "Approvals", "Unloading", "FD-302", "Example", "Drafting an FD-302", "Approval", and "Procedure for Indexing ACS". The bottom of the page shows a taskbar with various application icons.

JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE (JTTF) ORIENTATION

FD-302

The FD-302 is a form used to record the results of any investigative activity that may result in testimony being given. The purpose of the FD-302 is to provide an accurate and complete record of all evidence developed during an investigation.

Operational

(U) Electronic

(U) The Electronic

ed Internal communication for
e how JTTF agents and Field Offices
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Corel WordPerfect software application

- Importance
- Drafting an
- Approvals
- Unloading
- FD-302
- Example
- Drafting an FD-302
- Approval
- Procedure for Indexing ACS

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support@redesk

JTTF CBT - Windows Internet Explorer

D:\JTF\W2\module2\m2_010.htm

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help

Favorites FBI Intranet

JTTF CBT

JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION

FBI Written
Communications And
Administrative Details

Example

The FD-302 can be used to document the results of the following investigative activity:

- When accepting or providing evidence
- Interviews
- Surveillance results
- Subpoena results
- Trash cover results
- Arrests

Click here to see an example of an FD-302

Done

Operational

(U) Electronic

(U) The Electronic Investigative tool receive and send is a macro (an icon found on the

- Importing
- Drafting an
- Approvals
- Uploading
- FD-302
- Example
- Drafting an FD-302
- Approval
- Procedure for Indexing ACS

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n when an investigation is opened. An EC
Corel WordPerfect software application

My Computer 100%

start

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- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 06/02/2006

JOHN D. SMITH, white male, born: January 1, 1975, SSAN:
123-45-6789, 123 First Street, Anytown, N.C. 54321, (704) 987-6543,
was advised of the identity of the investigating agent and the
purpose of the interview. He provided the following information:

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXX.

Investigation on 06/01/2006 at Anytown, N.C.

File # 266H-CE-123456

Date dictated _____

by SA JANE C. DOE

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JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE (JTTF) ORIENTATION

Drafting an FD-302

One FD-302 is written for each investigative action.

There should be no more than five working days between the date of obtaining the information and the date the FD-302 is written.

Information on how to prepare an FD-302 can be found on the FBI Intranet at: <http://home.fbinet.fbi/forms/fd302>


Operational

(U) Electronic

(U) The Electronic Investigative Task Force (ITF) receives and sends a macro (an icon found on the desktop) to the JTTF CBT.

- Important
- Drafting an FD-302
- Approvals
- Uploading
- FD-302
- Example
- Drafting an FD-302
- Approval
- Procedure for Indexing ACS

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n when an investigation is opened. An EC
Corel WordPerfect software application



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Internet Explorer window titled "JTTF CBT - Windows Internet Explorer" showing a page titled "JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE (JTTF) ORIENTATION". The page includes a navigation bar with "FBI Written Communications And Administrative Details" and a main content area with a "Approval" section. The "Approval" section states: "A Task Force Officer's Supervisory Special Agent on the JTTF approves the FD-302." Below this, there is a list of topics: "Operational", "(U) Electronic", "(U) The Electro", "investigative tar", "receive and sen", "is a macro (an", "icon found on t". A list of topics is also visible: "Importance", "Drafting a", "Approvals", "Unloading", "FD-302", "Example", "Drafting an FD-302", "Approval", "Procedure for Indexing ACS". The page also mentions "ed internal communication for", "e how JTTF agents and Field Offices", "n when an investigation is opened. An EC", and "Corel WordPerfect software application". The browser's taskbar shows "My Computer" and "JTTF CBT...".

JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE (JTTF) ORIENTATION

Approval

A Task Force Officer's Supervisory Special Agent on the JTTF approves the FD-302.

Operational

(U) Electronic

(U) The Electro

investigative tar

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n when an investigation is opened. An EC

Corel WordPerfect software application

Importance

Drafting a

Approvals

Unloading

FD-302

Example

Drafting an FD-302

Approval

Procedure for Indexing ACS

JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION

Procedure for Indexing ACS

The Indexing Guidelines can be found on the FBI Intranet at:
<http://home.fbi.net/fbi/DO/OGC/LB/ESIDU20Documents/EC-Uploading-Indexing-Documents.pdf>.

This document is maintained by the Office of the General Counsel.

Operational

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- Drafting al
- Approvals
- Uploading
- FD-302
- Example
- Drafting an FD-302
- Approval
- Procedure for Indexing ACS

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n when an investigation is opened. An EC
Corel WordPerfect software application

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 06/12/2009

To: All Divisions

From: Records Management

RPAS/5334

Contact: [REDACTED]

Approved By: Murphy Timothy P
Hooton William L

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Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: 319W-HQ-A1487624

Title: RECORDS MANAGEMENT MATTERS
UPLOADING AND INDEXING DOCUMENTS

Synopsis: Reiterates current policy regarding the indexing of subjects and references. The current policy will remain in effect until such time that Sentinel is at full operating capacity with automated indexing (anticipated in FY2010).

Details: The Manual of Administrative Operations and Procedures (MAOP), Part 2, Section 2-3, requires the indexing of subjects and references of FBI investigations. This communication reiterates the MAOP policy for indexing and reinforces the need to upload FBI-generated documents.

The purpose of indexing is to record individual names; non-individual names, such as corporations; and property which are relevant to FBI investigations so that this information can be retrieved to support an efficient and effective case management system for current and future investigations.

Indexing of subjects and references into the Automated Case Support (ACS) system's Universal Indices (UNI) application creates a central repository of file information that can be searched to identify relevant records. UNI is the only searchable source that contains information about both paper and electronic records. Full text queries of the ACS system's Electronic Case File (ECF) only searches for information that is available electronically.

Properly indexing new records is a critical step in using and managing FBI information on an enterprise level. Many legacy applications still use UNI searches as the basis for identifying relevant records in support of both internal and external investigations. Failure to properly index new records compromises the

To: All Divisions From: Records Management
Re: 319W-HQ-A1487624, 06/12/2009

FBI's ability to identify all administrative and case information connected with an individual or organization. Information missed during a search is often referred to as a false negative result.

To illustrate the importance of a complete records index, Executive Branch agencies request name searches against UNI as a part of their investigations to determine suitability for employment; trustworthiness for access to classified information by U.S. government employees, contractors, licensees, grantees, military personnel and other individuals with an officially determined need for access; or, in the case of aliens, eligibility to remain in the United States. Therefore, failure to properly index subjects and references could produce a false negative search result that is then communicated to other federal agencies. Internally, false negative results may compromise investigations, analytical work, and the FBI's Freedom of Information/Privacy Act operation.

Recipients of this communication are advised to consult MAOP Part 2, Section 2-3, for specific indexing criteria, guidelines and requirements. In addition, the Indexing Guidelines located at

provide specific guidance on searching and entering data into UNI.

In order to be searchable, retrievable, and shareable through automated means, the text of FBI-generated documents must be uploaded into the ECF component of ACS. Computer-generated documents (WordPerfect, Microsoft Word, Excel, etc.), are capable of being uploaded into ACS. Delays in the uploading of documents may impede the progress of related investigations or delay the FBI's ability to comply with Executive Orders or statutes governing the use and reporting of FBI information. In addition, uploaded documents are readily available to all authorized personnel and eliminates the need for the originating office to provide copies or summaries of the document(s). Monthly reports summarizing the efforts of each division, field office, and Legat regarding uploading activity can be found on the Information Technology Operations Division's (ITOD) website at

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Offices are advised that uploading a document into ACS does not negate the originator's responsibility to index subjects and references into UNI. While the text of uploaded documents may be searched, such queries will not identify any paper records relevant to the search criteria. Indexing and uploading are accomplished through the use of ACS or Web-based ACS.

The indexing capability in Sentinel will not be available until the end of fiscal year 2010. Therefore, all FBI employees must continue to adhere to the current indexing policy, criteria, guidelines, and requirements using ACS or Web-based ACS.

To: All Divisions From: Records Management
Re: 319W-HQ-A1487624, 06/12/2009

For records related to Confidential Human Sources,
recipients are directed to the Directorate of Intelligence and the
website at: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] derived from the updated Attorney
General Guidelines of December 2006. [REDACTED]

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Uploading the text of documents and proper indexing saves
time, money, and personnel resources, and provides immediate access of
data to collaborating partners through the information sharing
initiative. RMD appreciates the effort of all offices in ensuring
that the FBI's records are accurately indexed and uploaded making them
readily identifiable and available as needed.

To: All Divisions From: Records Management
Re: 319W-HQ-A1487624, 06/12/2009

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

Advise all employees of the contents of this communication.

♦♦

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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

FBI Written
Communications And
Administrative Details

Overview Of Instructional Goal And Objectives

(U) Inserts

(U) An Insert is a blank sheet for recording the results of investigative activity that is not testimonial. The purpose of an Insert is to document an investigation in a manner suitable for being included (inserted) into a report.

(U)[Click here to see an example.](#)

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The following investigation was conducted by SA
[redacted] at Inkster, Michigan:

On February 3, 2004, a review of the DOWNRIVER SHERATON
HOTEL guest registry for December 20, 2003, revealed no
information identifiable with [redacted]
[redacted] or [redacted].

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On February 6, 2004, a records check at the INKSTER
POLICE DEPARTMENT revealed [redacted] received a traffic
citation for a minor traffic violation in [redacted].


On February 6, 2004, a records check at the INKSTER
POLICE DEPARTMENT revealed no information identifiable with [redacted]
[redacted] or [redacted].

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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

FBI Written
Communications And
Administrative Details

Overview Of Instructional Goal And Objectives



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"It is the responsibility of the FBI to share terrorism intelligence and it is mandated by the National Security Act of 1947, Executive Order 12333, the USA Patriot Act, the Homeland Security Act of 2002, and the Attorney General's Guidelines of FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection."



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[Click here to see an example.](#)

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JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE (JTTF) ORIENTATION

FBI Written
Communications And
Administrative Details

Overview Of Instructional Goal And Objectives

(U) Letter Head Memo (LHM)

(U) The purpose of LHM is to notify various departments, including the Department of Justice, Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) and FBIHQ, of the intent to open an intelligence case. An Opening EC must accompany the initial LHM. An LHM is used:

- In those instances when it is not necessary to conceal the FBI as a source;
- When the field furnishes information to FBIHQ in the belief that it is of possible interest to other government agencies and when it is desired to provide a communication suitable for dissemination other than an investigative report;
- In applicant (except Bureau applicant), Office of Personnel Management security referral (140A and 140C), and security-type cases, to report the reliability and evaluation of sources;
- To set fourth information necessary for conducting investigations abroad;
- To transmit information to [redacted] and
- To submit significant data to FBIHQ in nonprosecutable espionage and nationalistic tendency cases (65 and 105 classifications).

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(U) [Click here to see an example.](#)

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U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Newark, N.J. 07101
May 17, 2002

UNKNOWN SUBJECT;
THREAT TO BOMB
WASHINGTON HIGH SCHOOL,
SPRINGFIELD, NEW JERSEY,
MAY 1, 2002

Start typing the text here.

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1-U.S. Secret Service, Newark, NJ
1-Newark (174-550)
JJS/def
(2)
(THE COPY COUNT AND BELOW NOTATION GO ON NEWARK'S COPY ONLY)

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UNKNOWN SUBJECT;
THREAT TO BOMB
WASHINGTON HIGH SCHOOL,
SPRINGFIELD, NEW JERSEY;
May 1, 2002

Continue typing text here.

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UNKNOWN SUBJECT;
THREAT TO BOMB
WASHINGTON HIGH SCHOOL,
SPRINGFIELD, NEW JERSEY;
May 1, 2002

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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

FBI Written
Communications And
Administrative Details

Overview Of Instructional Goal And Objectives



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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

FBI Written
Communications And
Administrative Details

Overview Of Instructional Goal And Objectives



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JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE (JTTF) ORIENTATION

FBI Written
Communications And
Administrative Details

Overview Of Instructional Goal And Objectives

(U) FD-515 and FD-542

(U) The FD-515 is an Accomplishment Report used by personnel to claim statistics on arrests, indictments, convictions, disruptions and dismantlements of Organized Crime/Drug Program organizations, Violent Crime and Major Offender criminal enterprises, and Domestic and International Terrorism Investigations.

Click here to see an FD-515 example.

(U) The FD-542 is an Investigative Accomplishment Report macro used by personnel to claim investigative accomplishments involved in the counterintelligence or counterterrorism investigative process.

(U) Click here to see an FD-542 example.

QUIT :: PREVIOUS :: NEXT

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DATE 10-14-2011 BY 65179 DMH/ stp/ lsg

FD-515 (Rev. 8-30-2010)

Accomplishment Report

Date Prepared _____

☐ Squad supervisor approval
(please Initial)(Accomplishment must be reported and loaded into
ISRAA within 30 days from date of accomplishment)

Date Loaded _____

Date Loader's Initials _____

Accomplishment involves: (check all that apply)	
Drugs	☐
A Fugitive	☐
Bankruptcy Fraud	☐
Computer Fraud/Abuse	☐
Corruption of Public Official	☐
Money Laundering	☐
Sub Invest Asst by FO(s)	☐

Asst. FO(s)
A. B. C. D.

Task Force

Assisting Agencies X •
1. _____
2. _____

File Number

Stat Agent Soc. Sec. No.

Stat Agent Name

RA Squad

Assisting Agents Soc. Sec. No. X

1. _____

Name: _____

2. _____

Name: _____

Investigative Assistance or Technique Used

- | | |
|---------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. Used, but did not help | 3. Helped, substantially |
| 2. Helped, minimally | 4. Absolutely essential |
- For Sub. Invest. Assist. by other FO(s) indicate A, B, C, D for corresponding FO

Rate	FO	IAT	Rate	FO	IAT	Rate	FO	IAT	Rate	FO	IAT
	Fin. Analyst			Lab. Field Sup			UCO - NatLBack			Vict-Win Coor	
	Aircraft Asst.			Pen Registers			NCAVC/ VI-CAP			IO Wanted Flyer	
	Computer			Photo Cover			Crim/NS Intel Asst			SARs	
							Crim/NS - Fed			CART	
	ELSUR / FISC			Search Warrant			Crisis Neg - Local			Asset Forl Prog	
	ELSUR / T. III			Show Money			ERT Asst.			Forl Support Proj	
	Eng. Field Spt.			SOG Asst.			Butte - OSC			TFOS/CTD	
	Eng. Tape Ex.			Swat Team			Sav - OSC			CXS/CTD	
	Legals Asst.			Tech. Ag/Equip.			Poc - SC			InfraGard/CyD	
	Evid. Purchase			Phone Toll Rec			Tech Resp Unit			OFC/CID	
	Int/CW Info			UCO - Group I			For. Lang Asst.			PPP	
	Lab. Dir. Exam			UCO - Group II			Non FBI Lab Ex			Fusion Centers	

A. Complaint / Information / Indictment	
☐ Federal ☐ Local ☐ International	
Complaint Date: _____	
Check if Civil Rico Complaint ☐	
Information Date: _____	
Indictment Date: _____	

B. Locate / Arrest	
☐ Federal ☐ Local ☐ International	
Subject Priority: ☐ A ☐ B ☐ C	
Locate Date: _____	
Arrest Date: _____	
☐ Subject Resisted Arrest	
☐ Subject Arrested was Armed	

C. Summons Date: _____	
☐ Federal ☐ Local	

D. Recovery / Restitution / PELP X	
☐ Federal ☐ Local ☐ International	
Recovery Date: _____	
Code * _____ Amount \$ _____	
Code * _____ Amount \$ _____	
Restitution Date: _____	
☐ Court Ordered ☐ Pretrial Diversion	
Code * _____ Amount \$ _____	
PELP Date: _____	
Code * _____ Amount \$ _____	

E. Hostages(s) Released Date: _____	
Released by: ☐ Terrorist ☐ Other	
Number of Hostages: _____	

F. Conviction	
☐ Federal ☐ Local ☐ International	
Conviction Date: _____	
Subject Description Code _____ * (_____) *	
For 6F, G, H-Include Agency Code	
☐ Felony or ☐ Misdemeanor	
☐ Plea or ☐ Trial	
State: _____ Judicial District: _____	

G. U.S. Code Violation		
Required for sections A, B, F and J (Federal Only)		
Title	Section	# Counts
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

H. Sentence Date: _____	
Sentence Type: _____ *	
In Jail: _____ Years _____ Months	
Suspended: _____ Years _____ Months	
Probation: _____ Years _____ Months	
Fines: \$ _____	

I. Disruption/Dismantlement: ☒	
Disruption Date: _____	
Dismantlement Date: _____	
Completion of FD-515a Side 2 Mandatory	

J. Civil Rico Matters Date: _____	
Also complete "Section G"	
Other Civil Matters Date: _____	
Judgment _____ *	
Judicial Outcome _____ * x	
Amount \$ _____	
Suspension: Years _____ Months _____	

K. Administrative Sanction Date: _____	
Subject Description Code _____ *	
Type: _____ Length: _____	
☐ Suspension ☐ Permanent	
☐ Debarment or	
☐ Injunction Year _____ Months _____	

L. Asset Seizure Date: _____	
Asset Forfeiture Date: _____	
CATS # Mandatory	
Circle below one of the three asset forfeiture:	
Admin, Civil Judicial, or Criminal	
Do not indicate \$ value in Section D	

M. Acquittal/ Dismissal/ Pretrial Diversion	
(Circle one) Date: _____	

N. Drug Seizures ☒ Date: _____	
Drug Code * _____	
Weight _____ Code * _____	
FDIN _____	
Do not indicate \$ in Section D	

O. Child Victim Information	
Child located / identified Date: _____	
☐ Living ☐ Deceased	

P. Subject Information - Required for all blocks excluding block D (Recovery/PELP), blocks E, I, L and N

Name	Race *	Sex	Date of Birth	Social Security No. (if available)
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

For Indictments/Convictions only:

- ☐ Subject related to an LCN, Asian Organized Crime (AOC), Italian Organized Crime (IOC), Russian/Eastern European, Caribbean, or Nigerian Organized Crime Group - Complete FD-515a, Side 1 Blocks A-E mandatory, F-H as appropriate.
- ☐ Subject related to an OC/Drug organization, a VCMO Program National Gang Strategy target group, or a VCMO Program National Priority Initiative target group - Complete FD-515a, Side 1 Blocks A-C only.

x Additional information may be added by attaching another form or a plain sheet of paper for additional entries.

• See codes on reverse side.

✓ Requires that an explanation be attached and loaded into ISRAA for recovery over \$1 m and PELP over \$5 m, disruption, dismantlement, and drug seizures.

Serial No. of FD-515

ACLURM020865

FBI020656

For Further Instructions See: MAOP, Part II, Sections 3-5 thru 3-5.3.
Revised 12-19-2006

PROPERTY CODES

01 Cash
02 Stocks, Bonds or Negot. Instruments
03 General Retail Merchandise
04 Vehicles
05 Heavy Machinery & Equipment
06 Aircraft
07 Jewelry
08 Vessels
09 Art, Antiques or Rare Collections
11 Real Property
20 All Other

SENTENCE TYPES

CP Capital Punishment
JS Jail Sentence
LP Life Parole
LS Life Sentence
NS No Sentence (Subject is a Fugitive, Insane, has died, is a Corporation or must pay fine only)
PB Probation
SJ Suspension of Jail Sentence
YC Youth Correction Act

PELP CODES

22 Counterfeit
Stocks/Bonds/Currency/
Negotiable Instruments
23 Counterfeit/Faked Sound
Recordings or Motion Pictures
24 Bank Theft Scheme Aborted
25 Ransom, Extortion or Bribe
Demand Aborted
26 Theft From or Fraud Against
Government Scheme Aborted
27 Commercial or Industrial
Theft Scheme Aborted
30 All Other

RACE CODES

A Asian/Pacific Islander
B Black
I Indian/American
U Unknown
W White
X Nonindividual

ORGANIZED CRIME SUBJECTS

1F Boss
1G Underboss
1H Consigliere
1J Acting Boss
1K Capodecina
1L Soldier

KNOWN CRIMINALS

2A Top Ten or I.O. Fugitive
2B Top Thief
2C Top Con Man

FOREIGN NATIONALS

3A Legal Alien
3B Illegal Alien
3C Foreign Official W/out
Diplomatic Immunity
3D U.N. Employee W/out
Diplomatic Immunity
3E Foreign Student
3F All Others

TERRORISTS

4A Known Member of a
Terrorist Organization
4B Possible Terrorist Member
or Sympathizer

AGENCY CODES

AFOSI Air Force Office of Special Investigations
ACIS Army Criminal Investigative Service
BATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms
BIA Bureau of Indian Affairs
CBP Customs and Border Protection
DCAA Defense Contract Audit Agency
DCIS Defense Criminal Investigative Service
DEA Drug Enforcement Administration
DOC Department of Corrections
DOI Dept. of Interior
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FDA Food and Drug Administration
HHS Dept. of Health & Human Services
HUD Dept. of Housing & Urban Development
ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement
IRS Internal Revenue Service
NASA Nat'l Aeronautics & Space Admin
NBIS Nat'l Narcotics Border Interdiction
NCIS Naval Criminal Investigative Service
RCMP Royal Canadian Mounted Police
SBA Small Business Administration
USCG U.S. Coast Guard
USDS U.S. Department of State
USMS U.S. Marshals Service
USPS U.S. Postal Service
USSS U.S. Secret Service
USTR U.S. Treasury
LOC Local
CITY City
COUNTY County
ST State
OTHER Other

JUDGMENT CODES

CJ Consent Judgment
CO Court Ordered Settlement
DF Default Judgment
DI Dismissal
JN Judgment Notwithstanding
MV Mixed Verdict
SJ Summary Judgment
VD Verdict for Defendant
VP Verdict for Plaintiff

SUBJECT DESCRIPTION CODES

UNION MEMBERS

5D President
5E Vice-President
5F Treasurer
5G Secretary/Treasurer
5H Executive Board Member
5I Business Agent
5J Representative
5K Organizer
5L Business Manager
5M Financial Secretary
5N Recording Secretary
5P Office Manager
5Q Clerk
5R Shop Steward
5S Member
5T Trustee
5U Other

GOVERNMENT SUBJECTS (6F, 6G, 6H- Include Agency Code)

6A Presidential Appointee
6B U.S. Senator/Staff
6C U.S. Representative/Staff
6D Federal Judge/Magistrate
6E Federal Prosecutor
6F Federal Law Enforcement Officer
6G Federal Employee - GS 13 & Above
6H Federal Employee - GS 12 & Below
6I Governor
6K Lt. Governor
6L State Legislator
6M State Judge/Magistrate

JUDICIAL OUTCOME

AG Agreement
BR Barred/Removed
CC Civil Contempt
DC Disciplinary Charges
FI Fine
PI Preliminary Injunction
PR Temporary Restraining Order
PS Pre-filing Settlement
RN Restitution
SP Suspension
VR Voluntary Resignation
UI Other

SUBJECT PRIORITY

A Subject wanted for crimes of violence
(i.e., murder, manslaughter, forcible rape)
against another individual or convicted of
such a crime in the past five years.
B Subject wanted for crimes involving loss
or destruction of property valued in excess
of \$25,000 or convicted of such a crime
in the past five years.
C All other subjects.

DRUG CODES

COC Cocaine
HER Heroin
HSH Hashish
KAT Khat
LSD LSD
MAR Marijuana
MDM Methylenedioxymethamphetamine
MET Methamphetamine
MOR Morphine
OPM Opium
OTD Other drugs

DRUG WEIGHT CODES

GM Gram(s)
KG Kilogram(s)
L Liter(s)
ML Milliliter(s)
P Plant(s)
DU Dosage Unit(s)

Continuation of GOVERNMENT SUBJECTS

6N State Prosecutor
6P State Law Enforcement Officer
6Q State - All Others
6R Mayor
6S Local Legislator
6T Local Judge/Magistrate
6U Local Prosecutor
6V Local Law Enforcement Officer
6W Local-All Others
6X County Commissioner
6Y City Councilman

BANK EMPLOYEES

7A Bank Officer
7B Bank Employee

OTHERS

8A All Other Subjects
8B Company or Corporation

CHILD PREDATORS

9A Child Care provider
9B Clergy
9C Athletic Coach
9D Teacher/Aide
9E Law Enforcement Personnel
9F Counselor
9G Relative
9H Stranger
9I Other

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 09/10/2004

To: XXXXXX

From: XXXXXX

Squad CT-3

Contact: SA XXXXXX XXXXXX, 000-000-0000

Approved By: XXXXXX XXXXXX X

Drafted By: XXXXX XXXXXX X:ced

Case ID #: XXXB-XX-XXXXXX (Pending)

Title: CIVIL AVIATION MATTERS;
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT(IA)Synopsis: Document operational activity at International Airport
and claim statistical accomplishments.

Details: On 08/26/2004, a day long security operation was implemented at IA. The writer and SA XXXX XXXXX, with assistance from SA's XXXX XXXXX and XXXX XXXXX, CT-3, supported the following agencies which have various levels of search authority at the airport: Port Authority Police Department (PAPD); the Transportation Security Administration (TS); US Customs and Border Protection (CBP); and US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). The operation targeted both pedestrian and vehicular entrances for employees. Passenger screening checkpoints were not within the scope of the security sweep.

Aside from a number of motor vehicle summons which were issued by PAPD, along with a number of airport identification/airport escort violations (called "breach of rules" or "B-O-R's" by the Port Authority), there were two reported instances of rampside employees taking prohibited knives onto the ramp. Both items, of course, were seized. Most noteworthy, however, were two reported instances of airport employees escorting either other employees or contract employees onto the ramp to board flights, without having gone through mandatory security screening. Both of these instances were brought to the attention of TSA investigators.

Several NCIC checks of truck drivers, without airport IDs making rampside deliveries, revealed drivers with felony convictions; however, these drivers are permitted access to the ramp area with airport-approved escorts.

To: XXXXX From: XXXXXX
Re: XXXB-XX-XXXXXX, 09/10/2004

A large number of immigration status checks were performed by CBP personnel, however, no airport employees were found to be here in the US illegally.

Although PAPD and CBP and TSA personnel perform occasional searches as individual agencies, no such multi-agency security operation has been undertaken in the seven years that this writer has been assigned to IA. All involved agencies were in agreement that the operation had been "successful" in terms of demonstrating tighter security enforcement at both the pedestrian and vehicular entrances. It was further agreed that such security sweeps should be conducted on a regular basis. Writer notes that although the FBI had only a support role in the operation, the Bureau presence was not only appropriate, but also contributory.

To: XXXXX From: XXXXXX
Re: XXXB-XX-XXXXXX, 09/10/2004

Accomplishment Information:

Number: 1
Type: OPERATIONALLY CONTROLLED MEETING
ITU: LIAISON WITH OTHER AGENCY
ITU: LIAISON WITHIN FBI
ITU: SEARCH (NON-CONSENSUAL)
ITU: WMD COUNTERMEASURES
Claimed By:
SSN: XXXXXXXXXX
Name: XXXX XXXXXX
Squad: CT3

Number: 1
Type: WMD RELATED LIAISON
ITU: LIAISON WITH OTHER AGENCY
ITU: LIAISON WITHIN FBI
ITU: WMD COUNTERMEASURES
Claimed By:
SSN: XXXXXXXXXX
Name: XXXX XXXXXX
Squad: CT3

Number: 1
Type: WMD PREPAREDNESS CONTACT DEVELOPED
ITU: LIAISON WITH OTHER AGENCY
ITU: LIAISON WITHIN FBI
ITU: WMD
ITU: WMD COUNTERMEASURES
Claimed By:
SSN: XXXXXXXXXX
Name: XXXX XXXXXX
Squad: CT3

Number: 1
Type: WMD - ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO LOCAL/STATE/FEDERAL AGENCY
ITU: LIAISON WITH OTHER AGENCY
ITU: LIAISON WITHIN FBI
ITU: WMD
ITU: WMD COUNTERMEASURES
Claimed By:
SSN: XXXXXXXXXX
Name: XXXX XXXXXX
Squad: CT3

Number: 1
Type: PREVENT/INTERDICT CRIMINAL ACT
ITU: LIAISON WITH OTHER AGENCY
ITU: LIAISON WITHIN FBI

To: XXXXX From: XXXXXX
Re: XXXB-XX-XXXXXX, 09/10/2004

Claimed By:
SSN: XXXXXXXXXX
Name: XXXX XXXXXX
Squad: CT3

Number: 20
Type: POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE (DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE FBI)
ITU: AGENT INTERVIEW
ITU: LIAISON WITH OTHER AGENCY
ITU: LIAISON WITHIN FBI
Claimed By:
SSN: XXXXXXXXXX
Name: XXXX XXXXXX
Squad: CT3

Number: 1
Type: PARTICIPATE IN DEVELOPMENT OF OPERATIONAL PLAN
ITU: LIAISON WITH OTHER AGENCY
ITU: LIAISON WITHIN FBI
Claimed By:
SSN: XXXX XXXXXX
Name: XXXX XXXXXX
Squad: CT3

♦♦

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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

FBI Written
Communications And
Administrative Details

Administrative Details

(U) Time Utilization and Record Keeping (TURK) Requirements/Registers

(U) TURK is a system for tracking Agent work effort by program.

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QUIT :: PREVIOUS :: NEXT

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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

FBI Written
Communications And
Administrative Details

Administrative Details

(U) Introduction to Basic Overtime Reimbursement Procedures

(U)

b7E

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JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE (JTTF) ORIENTATION

FBI Written
Communications And
Administrative Details

Administrative Details

(U) DIOG

(U) The Domestic Investigatives and Operations Guide (DIOG) has been designed to assist investigative employees in the performance of their duties. Its purpose is to standardize policy so that criminal, national security, and foreign intelligence investigative activities are accomplished in a consistent manner. The DIOG is divided into seventeen parts:

- Scope and Purpose
- General Authorities and Principles
- Core Values, Roles and Responsibilities
- Privacy and Civil Liberties and Least Intrusive Methods
-  b7E
- Foreign Intelligence
- Sensitive Investigative Matter / Academic Nexus
- Investigative Methods
- Assistance to Other Agencies
- Extraterritorial Provisions
- Retention and Sharing of Information
- Intelligence Analysis and Planning
- Undisclosed Participation
- Otherwise Illegal Activity

(U) The DIOG can be found on the FBI Intranet at: 

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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**FBI Written
Communications And
Administrative Details**Administrative Details****(U) MAOP**

(U) The Manual of Administrative Operations and Procedures (MAOP) is divided into two parts:

- Part 1 contains rules and regulations pertaining to personnel issues.
- Part 2 contains information pertaining to the administrative operations of a Field Office and contains some instructions for FBI Headquarters.

(U) The MAOP can be found on the FBI Intranet at:

b7E

(U) The MAOP is in the process of being reviewed and replaced by Corporate Policy Office (CPO) Directives and Policy Implementation Guides, as mandated by EC 319W-HQ-A1487698, Serial 451. As new policy documents are approved, the appropriate sections of the MAOP will be updated in the CPO Policy and Guidance Library. Superseded sections will be maintained in the CPO Policy and Guidance Archive.

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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

FBI Written
Communications And
Administrative Details

Administrative Details

(U) National Foreign Intelligence Program Manual (NFIPM)

(U) The NFIPM details the FBI's National Foreign Intelligence program.

(U) ~~(S)~~ The NFIPM can be found on the FBI Intranet at:

[Redacted]

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JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE (JTTF) ORIENTATION

FBI Written
Communications And
Administrative Details

Module Review

(U) This module introduced the new JTTF Task Force Officer to the following written types of communication used within the FBI:

- Electronic Communication
- FD-302
- Inserts
- [REDACTED]
- Letter Head Memo
- [REDACTED]
- FD-515 and FD-542
- Administrative details including TURK, Basic Overtime Reimbursement Procedures, the MIOP, MAOP and NFIPM were also introduced.

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PREVIOUS :: FINISH MODULE

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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Security Briefing

Overview Of Instructional Goal And Objectives

(U) Goal: The goal of this orientation is to introduce the new task force member to security requirements, classification types, and levels of access and security interviews.

(U) Objectives:

1. Read and review the importance of protecting national security information.
2. Gain a basic understanding of the FBI's document classification types and other security concerns.
3. Read of the importance of a security exit interview.

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EXIT MODULE :: NEXT

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JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE (JTTF) ORIENTATION


Security Briefing

Security Overview

(U) Safeguarding Classified Information—Everyone's Responsibility

(U) Safeguarding classified national security information is imperative to prevent unauthorized disclosure of information that will cause harm to the national defense or foreign relations of the United States. When safeguarding classified information it is your responsibility to:

- Protect national security and FBI information and assets
- Alert others to the classification of the information
- Ensure protection of information classified by others



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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Security Briefing

Security Overview**(U) Classification Guidance Executive Order 12958, Classified National Security Information**

(U) The Bush Administration Order set forth a uniform system for classifying, declassifying, and otherwise safeguarding National Security Information (NSI).

(U) By ensuring its classification, this Executive Order protects NSI, which, if disclosed, would cause harm to the nation's security or foreign relations of the United States.



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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Security Briefing

Security Overview**(U) Classification**

(U) Classification is the element of information security that provides the policy for properly identifying classified information. This policy defines:

- The criteria and limitations of classifying information
- Who has authority to classify documents
- The levels of classification
- The criteria for declassifying NSI

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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**


Security Briefing

Security Overview**(U) Classification Types**

(U) Information is classified by the degree of damage its unauthorized disclosure would cause to national security:

- Confidential—*Damage*
- Secret—*Serious damage*
- Top Secret—*Exceptionally grave damage*

(U) Terms such as "For Official Use Only" or "Law Enforcement Sensitive" do not refer to Levels of Classification.



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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Security Briefing

Security Overview

(U) Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)

(U) SCI is not a classification. It is a restricted access control system used to safeguard a special class of classified information, most commonly related to intelligence sources and methods.

(U) SCI involves sensitive sources and/or methods and can be classified Confidential, Secret, or Top Secret.

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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Security Briefing

Security Overview



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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Security Briefing

Handling Classified Material

(U) Public Release of Classified Information

(U) Classified information must not be publicly released.

(U) You must not release unclassified information publicly without specific approval from the Office of Public and Congressional Affairs (OPCA) or the Security Program Manager and Local Security Officer.

(U) All written, electronic, and oral material intended for public release must go through a pre-publication security review by OPCA and/or the Security Program Manager and Local Security Officer.

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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Security Briefing

Handling Classified Material**(U) Non-Authorized Disclosure**

(U) The consequences of ignoring clearance and access rules are dangerous. If classified information is disclosed, the results could lead to a potential compromise of FBI information and assets, as well as disrupt ongoing investigations, and damage national security.

(U) In addition to harming national security and the FBI, unauthorized disclosures can also result in administrative/disciplinary action against and/or prosecution of the individual making the unauthorized disclosure.

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Security Briefing

Handling Classified Material**(U) Mishandling Classified Material****(U) Inappropriate spills of classified information can:**

- Damage national security
- Disclose highly sensitive sources or methods
- Disrupt ongoing operations
- Lead to prolonged and expensive investigations and damage assessment

(U) Classified material violations must be reported within 24 hours to the designated Security Officer (SO). The SO, Security Compliance Unit, and Supervisory Security Officer (SSO) investigate such violations. Full cooperation is essential to these investigations.

(U) The FBI is required to report any damage assessment regarding SCI violations determined as "significant" to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).

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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Security Briefing

Sharing Information With Parent Agency

(U) Two questions to ask regarding sharing information with the parent agency:

1. Is the person cleared for that level of information?
2. Is there a need for that person to know the information?

(U) If either question is answered with a "no," then the information cannot be passed to the parent agency.

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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Security Briefing

Non-Disclosure Rules And Procedures

(U) Procedures to Protect against Unauthorized Disclosure

(U) Five procedures protect classified information from unauthorized disclosure:

1. Access
2. Marking
3. Transmission
4. Storage
5. Destruction

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Security Briefing

Non-Disclosure Rules And Procedures**(U) Access—Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret Material**

(U) Access may be granted to people requesting classified material **AS LONG AS** they legitimately hold the clearance level commensurate with or above the classification level of the information to be disseminated **AND** an authorized holder in possession of the classified information determines their "Need-to-Know" **BEFORE** granting them access.

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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Security Briefing

Non-Disclosure Rules And Procedures

(U) Access—Need-to-Know

(U) Need-to-Know is defined as "...a determination made by an authorized holder of classified information that a prospective recipient requires access to specific classified information in order to perform or assist in a lawful and authorized governmental function." Thus, access is based on need—not position. Coworkers may not possess a valid "need-to-know."

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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Security Briefing

Non-Disclosure Rules And Procedures**(U) Markings—Essential Markings for Classified Documents**

(U) It is essential that documents be marked with their classification and access, if applicable, so that people handling them can determine how to safeguard them. Classified documents and other media should have overall markings according to the following criteria:


- The overall classification must match the highest classification level of any information contained in the document and other classified communication media.
- A cover sheet indicating specific classification must accompany every classified document. The overall classification and access marking should appear:
 1. At the top and bottom of the front cover,
 2. On all document pages, and
 3. All TS and SCI documents must be marked and attached to an FD-501.
- At the top and bottom of the outside of the back over.

(U) (U) [Click here to see a page marking example.](#)

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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Security Briefing

Non-Disclosure Rules And Procedures**(U) Markings—Essential Markings for Classified Documents**

(U) Each portion or paragraph of the document should be marked to indicate its classification level. Thus, in the document where 99% of the information is unclassified and 1% is classified as Secret, anyone having access to it will know exactly which part of the document is classified.

(U) Classification levels of the text (including SCI accesses and handling caveats) are indicated in parentheses, i.e., (TS) or (U), immediately preceding or following the portion to which it applies.

(U) Click here to see a portion marking example.


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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Security Briefing

Non-Disclosure Rules And Procedures

(U) Restrictive Handling Caveats and Control Markings

(U) Other types of restrictive handling caveats and control markings that may be seen when working with classified information include:

ORCON—Originator Controlled (which means that dissemination and extraction of the information is controlled by the originator and dissemination outside the FBI is allowed ONLY with the originating agency's approval.)

PROPIN—Caution: Proprietary Information Involved

NOFORN—Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals


REL—Authorized for release to the country or international organization named (i.e., REL INTERPOL)

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION****Security Briefing****Non-Disclosure Rules And Procedures****(U) Transmission—Secret and Confidential Material**

(U) When sharing Confidential and Secret classified material, remember to always check the classification level of the recipient(s) to be sure they hold the same classification clearance or above and verify their need-to-know. Also, Confidential and Secret information should not be discussed over non-secure telephone lines.

(U) You may handle Secret and/or Confidential Material in open storage facilities—for example, a field office that has been officially declared as such, but it must be locked in an approved safe at the end of the workday. Make sure the materials are accompanied by the appropriate classification cover sheet or label.

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
~~SECRET//NOFORN~~**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Security Briefing

Non-Disclosure Rules And Procedures**(U) Transmission—Secret and Confidential Material (con't)**

(U) You may send Confidential and Secret material via the following means:

- Secure fax machine
- Approved teletype
- Approved FBI or DCS courier
- U.S. Postal Service (registered mail) or Federal Express (If a waiver is granted by the Office of Security at the FBI)—In both cases, the package must also be return-receipt required and addressed to a specific addressee who has been determined in advance to have the requisite security clearance to receive the information.



(U) You must transport all Confidential and Secret material in a double-wrapped wrapping, marking the inner wrapping with the classification and keeping the outer wrapping free of classification markings. You may also send Secret and Confidential material using an FBI internal mail-routing wrapping.

(U) Make sure all materials are accompanied by the appropriate classification cover sheet or label.

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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Security Briefing

Non-Disclosure Rules And Procedures**(U) Transmission—Top Secret Material (TS)**

(U) When sharing TS material, remember to always check the classification and access level of the recipient(s) to be sure they hold the clearance level commensurate with or above the classification level of the information to be disseminated and verify their need-to-know. Also, never discuss any classified or sensitive information over non-secure telephone lines.

(U) With a classification coversheet or label and an FD501, Top Secret material may be sent by approved DCS Courier or hand carried between Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs) in an opaque double-wrapped wrapping. Mark the inner wrapping with the classification; then insert this wrapping inside a wrapping that has no classification markings.


(U) If you need to discuss classified or sensitive information, you must do so on a secure line. Also, copy or fax classified or sensitive materials only on authorized, secure copiers and to authorized, secure fax machines.

(U) FBINet cannot store, process, or transmit TS information. TS information can be processed only on a TS/SCI Local Area Network (LAN) computer in a SCIF.

(U) Finally, you must store TS materials in approved safes whenever you are not using them, as well as, at the end of the workday.

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JIFF CBT

Page Safety Tools

FD-501(b)

TOP SECRET

FBI CONTROL FORM

TOP SECRET (TS)

SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION (SCI)

NO-4-CI CODE WORD MATERIAL

To verify security clearance, all Security Programs Unit, FBIHQ, Form 501(b)

Control Number

NO Type

Classification

Document Type

Originator Serial #

Document Date

Copy 1 of 1

TS/CO Employee

Signature

Date Marked

Copy Classification

Recalling Unit

Fill out the following section if declassified, restricted, or destroyed.

Declassified By:	By:	Date:
Declassified By:	By:	Date:
Declassified By:	By:	Date:

My Computer

100%

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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Security Briefing

Non-Disclosure Rules And Procedures**(U) Classified Material Storage**

(U) You are responsible for securing all classified material at the end of the workday in a GSA certified safe with a spin-dial, combination lock. SCI material must be secured in a GSA certified safe inside a SCIF when not in use.

(U) Combinations to safes should be memorized and restricted only to those with an authorized need-to-know of the information stored in the safe. Safe combinations should be protected at the level of the information stored in it.

(U) You may NOT take home classified material at any level without approval from the FBI Director, the relevant FBIHQ Security Programs Manager, or your SAC or Assistant Director.

(U) Floppy disks must be marked with appropriate classification media labels and handled according to the highest level of classification ever processed on the disk.

(U) Computers are classified at the highest level of information that has ever been entered into, stored on, or produced by the system.

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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Security Briefing


Non-Disclosure Rules And Procedures**(U) Destruction of Classified Material**

(U) All classified material should be destroyed whenever the operational or historical need for the information ceases to exist. Place Secret and/or Confidential documents in classified trash bags or in an approved crosscut shredder.

(U) Do not place TS or SCI material in classified trash bags. TS or SCI material must be destroyed either by shredding in an approved crosscut shredder or disintegrated in an incinerator to a white ash.

(U) When destroying TS or SCI material you must have:

- Two-person integrity—an official and a witness fully controlling the destruction for its duration and
- Both witnesses must have clearances commensurate with the material being destroyed.

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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Security Briefing

Non-Disclosure Rules And Procedures**(U) Record of Destruction—the FD-501**

(U) You must maintain an FD-501, Record of Destruction, for a minimum of two years. Headquarters personnel should return this record to the Special File Room 5334, FBIHQ, immediately after destroying a document. The destroying official and witness must sign and date the form after the document's destruction. Field offices maintain the FD-501 at the field office. Field offices should contact their local Security Officer.

(U) All classified information destruction records will contain the following information:

- Identification of document destroyed
- Destruction method used
- Time and place of destruction
- Reason for destruction
- Name of destroying official and witness

(U) Click here to see an FD-501

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SECRET supportdesk

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Favorites FBI Intranet

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FD-S01(b)

TOP SECRET//SI

FBI CONTROL FORM

TOP SECRET//SI

SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION (SCI)

NON-SCI CODE WORD MATERIAL

For every security clearance, all Security Programs (LAW, FBI-40, Exemption 3/5)

Control Markings

SCI Types

Classification

Document Type

Originator of Materials

Originator Serial #

Document Date

Copy 1 of 1

YACO Employee

Captain

Date Marked

Copy Classification

Resolving Unit

Fill out the following section if downgraded, declassified, or destroyed.

Downgraded To:	By:	Date:
Declassified By:		Date:
Destroyed By:		Date:

My Computer 100%


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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Security Briefing

Exit Interviews

(U) Each individual who leaves as a member of the JTTF is to be interviewed and debriefed by their respective Chief Security Officer. The exit interview should be conducted promptly after the individual advises of his/her intended resignation or separation.

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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Security Briefing

Module Review

- (U) Safeguarding classified national security information is everybody's responsibility.
- (U) Proper handling of classified documents and information is critical to protecting the nation.
- (U) There are specific non-disclosure procedures to ensure unauthorized release of classified information.
- (U) If there is uncertainty about handling or dealing with classified information contact your Division's Security Officer.

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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Security Briefing

Overview Of Instructional Goal And Objectives

(U) Goal: The goal of this orientation is to introduce the new task force member to security requirements, classification types, and levels of access and security interviews.

(U) Objectives:

1. Read and review the importance of protecting national security information.
2. Gain a basic understanding of the FBI's document classification types and other security concerns.
3. Read of the importance of a security exit interview.

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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION****FBI Computer
Investigative Resources
And Networks****Overview Of Instructional Goal And Objectives**

(U) Goal: The goal of this module is to introduce the new task force officer to the computer investigative resources and networks employed by the FBI in the fight against domestic and international terrorism.

(U) Objectives:

1. Gain a basic understanding of the FBI's unclassified network (UNet) and its databases, applications, and systems.
2. Gain a basic understanding of the FBI's classified network (FBINet) and its databases, applications, and systems.
3. Read and review the functions and features of the [REDACTED]

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EXIT MODULE :: NEXT

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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**FBI Computer
Investigative Resources
And Networks**UNET**

(U) The Unclassified Network (UNet) System is a Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) information system designed to provide the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) with mission essential, unattributable (does not identify system users as FBI), secure high-speed access to the public Internet and other unclassified open sources of information available from other agencies and organizations within the Executive Branch.


(U) These sources include among others:



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(U) [Click here to see a screen capture of UNET.](#)


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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

**FBI Computer
Investigative Resources
And Networks**

UNet



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
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
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
**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

**FBI Computer
Investigative Resources
And Networks**

UNet



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
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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

**FBI Computer
Investigative Resources
And Networks**

UNet



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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

**FBI Computer
Investigative Resources
And Networks**

UNet

Open Source Search Engines

(U) Open source search engines such as Google are available through UNet.

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JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE (JTTF) ORIENTATION

FBI Computer
Investigative Resources
And Networks

FBINet

(U) FBINet is the FBI's classified network. Google is FBINet's search engine. The following applications are available on FBINet:

- Automated Case Support (ACS)
- 
- HQ Division/Field Office Web Sites
- Sentinel
- Intranet Resources
- Outlook

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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

**FBI Computer
Investigative Resources
And Networks**

FBINet

Automated Case Support (ACS)

(U) ACS is available through FBINet. ACS consists of:

-
-
-
-




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
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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

**FBI Computer
Investigative Resources
And Networks**

FBINet

(U) Automated Case Support (ACS) (Con't)



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
- Reports
- Tables
- Employee Self Search

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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

**FBI Computer
Investigative Resources
And Networks**

FBINet



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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

**FBI Computer
Investigative Resources
And Networks**

FBINet



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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

**FBI Computer
Investigative Resources
And Networks**

FBINet



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


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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

**FBI Computer
Investigative Resources
And Networks**

FBINet



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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

**FBI Computer
Investigative Resources
And Networks**

FBINet



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
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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION****FBI Computer
Investigative Resources
And Networks****FBINet**

(U) FBINet is an Internal FBI web-based computer network that is capable of carrying information classified up to the SECRET level. It is one of the primary backbones for FBI communications and information. FBINet provides access to investigative and database applications including Automated Case Support (ACS), Sentinel, [REDACTED]

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(U) FBIHQ division and Field Office web sites can be accessed from the FBI Intranet homepage.


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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

**FBI Computer
Investigative Resources
And Networks**



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PAGE: 16 OF 21


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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

**FBI Computer
Investigative Resources
And Networks**



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
(U) [Click here to see a screen shot of](#) 

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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

**FBI Computer
Investigative Resources
And Networks**



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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

**FBI Computer
Investigative Resources
And Networks**



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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

**FBI Computer
Investigative Resources
And Networks**



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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION****FBI Computer
Investigative Resources
And Networks****Module Review**

- (U) The FBI's unclassified network is UNct. It's databases, applications, and systems include: [REDACTED] and Google.
- (U) The FBI's classified network is FBINet. It's databases, applications, and systems include: Google, ACS, [REDACTED]

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**Introduction To
Foreign Intelligence
And Terrorism**Overview Of Instructional Goals And Objectives**

(U) Goal: The goal of this module is to introduce the new task force member to the Intelligence Community, FBI intelligence policy, and FBI Intelligence Analysts.

(U) Objectives:

1. Gain a basic understanding of the Intelligence Community.
2. Read and review the FBI's Intelligence policies.
3. Gain a basic understanding of the Field Intelligence Group and the role of Intelligence Analysts within the FBI.

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JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE (JTTF) ORIENTATION

Introduction To
Foreign Intelligence
And Terrorism

Intelligence Community Overview

(U) The United States Intelligence Community (USIC) is a 17-member federation of Federal Government agencies, services, bureaus, and other organizations within the executive branch that play a role in the collection and dissemination of national intelligence.

(U) The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) leads the Intelligence Community. The DNI is the President of the United States' principal advisor for national security intelligence matters. The DNI is assisted by the Principal and Deputy Directors of National Intelligence and the National Intelligence Council (NIC). The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) manages the Intelligence Community.

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JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE (JTTF) ORIENTATION


Introduction To
Foreign Intelligence
And Terrorism

Intelligence Community Overview

(Con't)

(U) 17 Members of the Intelligence Community Includes:

- Intelligence and Counterintelligence elements of the Air Force
- Intelligence and Counterintelligence elements of the Army
- Central Intelligence Agency
- Intelligence and Counterintelligence elements of the Coast Guard
- Defense Intelligence Agency
- Department of Energy (Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence)
- Department of Homeland Security (Office of Intelligence and Analysis)
- Department of State (Bureau of Intelligence and Research)
- Department of Treasury (Office of Intelligence and Analysis)
- Drug Enforcement Administration (Office of National Security Intelligence)
- Federal Bureau of Investigation
- Intelligence and Counterintelligence elements of the Marine Corps
- National Geospatial Intelligence Agency
- National Reconnaissance Office
- National Security Agency
- Intelligence and Counterintelligence elements of the Navy
- Office of the Director of National Intelligence



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JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE (JTTF) ORIENTATION


Introduction To
Foreign Intelligence
And Terrorism

Intelligence Community Overview

The FBI's National Security Branch (NSB)

(U) The NSB combines the missions, capabilities, and resources of the counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and intelligence elements of the FBI under the leadership of a senior FBI official. The components of NSB include:

- Counterintelligence Division (CD)
- Counterterrorism Division (CTD)
- Directorate of Intelligence (DI)
- Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate (WMDD)



(U) In the graphic to the right, click on the boxes under NSB for a detailed description of each component.

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JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE (JTTF) ORIENTATION

Introduction To
Foreign Intelligence
And Terrorism

Intelligence Community Overview

Executive Order 12333

(U) Executive Order 12333 focuses activities of the Intelligence Community almost exclusively on the capabilities, intentions and activities of foreign powers, organizations, or persons and their agents.



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JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE (JTTF) ORIENTATION


Introduction To
Foreign Intelligence
And Terrorism

Attorney General Guidelines: First Amendment And Privacy Act Issues

The First Amendment

(U) The First Amendment of the United States Constitution protects Freedom of Religion, Freedom of Speech, Freedom of the Press, and Freedom of Assembly.

(U) No FBI investigations are to be conducted solely based upon activities protected by the First Amendment or other Constitutional rights. In order to conduct an investigation, a nexus to violence, criminal activity, or permissible foreign intelligence or law enforcement purpose must be present.



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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**Introduction To
Foreign Intelligence
And Terrorism**Attorney General Guidelines: First Amendment And Privacy Act Issues****Attorney General (AG) Guidelines**

(U) AG Guidelines regulating the conduct of FBI investigative activity in the domestic context have existed since the 1970s in order to protect First Amendment rights. Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the AG Guidelines were updated: AG Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise, and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations (General Crime Guidelines) were reissued in May 2002, and AG Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (National Security Guidelines) were reissued in October 2003.

(U) Both the General Crime Guidelines and the National Security Guidelines require that investigative techniques be used in a manner that protects the rights of Americans and complies with constitutional and statutory restrictions. In addition, each set of Guidelines prohibits the collection, maintenance, and dissemination of information without a sound law enforcement basis.

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JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE (JTTF) ORIENTATION

Introduction To
Foreign Intelligence
And Terrorism

Attorney General Guidelines: First Amendment And Privacy Act Issues


Attendance and Surveillance at Public Events

(U) Agents may not conduct surveillance of individuals or groups solely for the purpose of monitoring the exercise of rights protected by the First Amendment. Generally, FBI personnel may only attend public events and conduct surveillance of persons in attendance for an established investigative purpose as set forth in the AG Guidelines. An established investigative purpose exists only if the agent can articulate objective facts and inferences that satisfy the Guideline's criteria. As with any investigative measure, the justification for this activity should be supported by appropriate documentation. Agents must always be mindful of the provision of the Guidelines that requires consideration of whether a less intrusive technique is available that could achieve the desired investigative results.

(U) There are two broad categories of investigative purposes established under AG Guidelines, either of which could justify attendance and surveillance at public events:

1. Monitoring an individual or group currently under investigation
2. Conducting an Assessment

(U) The Guidelines do not limit an agent to the original purpose of his/her attendance at a public event if unfolding circumstances provide additional bases for other investigative activity.




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
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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**Introduction To
Foreign Intelligence
And Terrorism**Attorney General Guidelines: First Amendment And Privacy Act Issues**
Collecting, Maintaining, and Disseminating Information

(U) Specific legal requirements apply to collecting, maintaining, and disseminating information obtained from the following sources:

- Surveillance
-
- Law Enforcement Unit Records
- Disclosure to Immigration Authorities
- Volunteered Information

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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**Introduction To
Foreign Intelligence
And Terrorism**Attorney General Guidelines: First Amendment And Privacy Act Issues****Surveillance**

(U) Information derived from surveillance of subject individuals or groups at public events pursuant to an open investigation should be collected, maintained in FBI records, and disseminated in compliance with the Privacy Act and departmental policy. If an agent conducts surveillance of persons under [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] personal identifying information obtained about individuals or groups through that surveillance may not be maintained in FBI records - absent some established law enforcement basis.

(U) Attendance by an agent under [REDACTED] should be documented in some retrievable fashion. That documentation should be entered in the appropriate control file and should not include identifying information about individuals or groups in attendance, absent a valid investigative basis as discussed above.

(U) Identifying information (e.g., [REDACTED]) cannot be temporarily collected for the sole purpose of determining whether a person of investigative interest is in attendance. However, identifying information can be collected if the presence of the individual at the event in question has independent investigative significance.



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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
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ORIENTATION**

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Foreign Intelligence
And Terrorism

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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
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Attorney General Guidelines: First Amendment And Privacy Act Issues




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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**Introduction To
Foreign Intelligence
And Terrorism**Attorney General Guidelines: First Amendment And Privacy Act Issues****Law Enforcement Unit Records**

(U) In accordance with a 2002 Department of Education Memo, a Law Enforcement Unit is officially authorized or designated to enforce laws and maintain the security of the school. Law Enforcement Unit records may be released to anyone without consent or court order if they:

- Have been created for law enforcement purposes
- Are maintained by the Law Enforcement Unit
- Do not include records obtained by the Law Enforcement Unit from other educational institutions

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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

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Attorney General Guidelines: First Amendment And Privacy Act Issues

Disclosure to Immigration Authorities



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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**Introduction To
Foreign Intelligence
And Terrorism**Attorney General Guidelines: First Amendment And Privacy Act Issues****Volunteered Information (March 1996 FBI Airtel)**

(U) FBI policy is not to accept volunteered information that on face value would appear to violate the Buckley Amendment. However, it is permissible to accept information, other than protected educational records, from sources (i.e., personal observations, etc). The FBI must return protected information that is acquired mistakenly and cannot make use of that information.

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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**Introduction To
Foreign Intelligence
And Terrorism**Attorney General Guidelines: First Amendment And Privacy Act Issues****Privacy Act Limitations**

(U) The FBI is prohibited from collecting, maintaining, using or disseminating a "record describing how an individual exercises rights guaranteed by the First Amendment . . . unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." Where information describes only the exercise of First Amendment rights unconnected to an authorized law enforcement activity, no record may be made of this information.

(U) Do not index the names of individuals in FBI files who may be participating in any group activity where First Amendment concerns exist unless the individuals are also subjects of a criminal or intelligence investigation or you can delineate a specific criminal or intelligence purpose for putting that person's name in the file.

(U) It is not the mere passive receipt of information concerning the exercise of First Amendment rights that violates the Privacy Act; The Privacy Act applies when information is collected and recorded in an Agent's notes, report of investigation or other medium. When information is thus recorded, the FBI must be able to demonstrate it is "pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity." If public source printed material is retained and put into a file, the Agent must make a handwritten notation explaining why it was retained.

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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**Introduction To
Foreign Intelligence
And Terrorism**Attorney General Guidelines: First Amendment And Privacy Act Issues****Disclosure of Information**

(U) "No agency shall disclose any record contained in a system of records by any means of communication to any person, or to another agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with prior written consent of, the individual to who the record pertains, unless..."

(U) Common exceptions applicable to FBI investigations include:

- Written request, by a domestic government agency, for civil or criminal law enforcement purpose, specifying what and why, signed by the agency head or designee
- Compelling circumstances affecting the health and/or safety of a person (must notify the person)
- Order of court of competent jurisdiction
- Any published "routine use" or "blanket routine use" for the system of records in which the information is maintained.

(U) Records must be kept of all dissemination of information, including to whom, the date, nature of information disclosed, and purpose for which information was disseminated. Knowing/willful disclosure of information not covered by a Privacy Act exception is a criminal misdemeanor.

(U) Form FD-999, Liaison with External Organizations, may be used for this purpose.

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References

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(Rev. 01-31-2003)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 09/08/2005

To: All Divisions

Attn: ADIC
AD
SAC
CDC
FBIHQ, Manuals Desk

From: General Counsel

Approved By: Caproni Valerie E
Thomas Julie F

Drafted By:

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Case ID #: 62F-HQ-C1413697 (Pending)
66F-HQ-C1384970

Title: PROTECTION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES -- UPDATE

Synopsis: To update FBI policy guidance, provided on March 19, 2004, on the protection of civil liberties during criminal and national security investigations.

Reference: 62F-HQ-C1413697 Serial 30
66F-HQ-C1384970 Serial 8139

Details: On March 19, 2004, we provided policy guidance that emphasized established FBI policy on the protection of civil liberties during criminal and national security investigations. It addressed several important issues in an effort to assist FBI personnel in meeting the challenge of aggressively pursuing legitimate investigative goals without infringing on the exercise of constitutional freedoms.

One of the issues previously addressed was the FBI's retention of personally identifying information obtained by surveillance conducted during threat assessments under the Attorney General's National Security Guidelines (NSIG). The following updates that previous guidance with more detailed comments regarding this specific issue.

The previous guidance stated that, to be retained in FBI records, such personally identifying information obtained during threat assessments "must be relevant to an existing investigation

To: All Divisions From: General Counsel
Re: 62F-HQ-C1413697, 09/08/2005

[redacted] by itself or in combination with other known information, justify a new inquiry or investigation; or relate to another law enforcement activity the FBI is authorized by law or regulation to conduct." The underlying intent was to ensure that those who retain such information do so for valid purposes. The intent was certainly not to restrict those who employ threat assessments as a legitimate tool to prevent terrorist attacks by [redacted]

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The introductory language of the NSIG's Part II, "National Security Investigations," discusses "critical information needed for broader analytic and intelligence purposes authorized by Executive Order 12333 and these Guidelines to protect national security." It then expressly states that "[i]nformation obtained [redacted]

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[redacted]--is accordingly to be retained and disseminated for these purposes as provided in these Guidelines, or in FBI policy consistent with these Guidelines, regardless of whether it furthers investigative objectives in a narrower or more immediate sense."

Even if information obtained during a threat assessment [redacted]

[redacted] those who possess personally identifying information derived from the threat assessment may retain it for the national security purposes stated above. In that regard, the information [redacted]

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[redacted] In addition, the information may possibly assist FBI personnel in [redacted]

One cautionary point in this regard must be emphasized. This type of information--i.e., information obtained during a threat assessment that has insufficient value to justify further investigative activity (at least at the time it is obtained)--is often [redacted]

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[redacted] If it is retained for the purposes addressed above, measures should be taken to identify it accurately as threat assessment information, to protect it from inadvertent disclosure, and to preclude its use as a basis for any further investigative activity unless and until such action is authorized by the NSIG or other applicable regulations.


To: All Divisions From: General Counsel
Re: 62F-HQ-C1413697, 09/08/2005

Set Lead 1: (Discretionary)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

Read and disseminate as appropriate.

CC:
Director Mueller
Deputy Director Pistole
EAD Bald
EAD Ashley



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FBI > Directors Office > Office of the General Counsel

Main Law Library

- Training Guide to Materials on the OGC Law Library Website (pdf)
- Attorney General Guidelines
- Attorney General Orders
- Aviation-Related Matters
- Border Searches
- Buckley Amendment
- CDC Team Site
[restricted - contact [redacted] for access]
- CDC Conference Presentations
- Church Committee Reports
- Department of Defense Assistance to U.S. Law Enforcement
- Digital Evidence and Computer Related Investigations
- Director of Central Intelligence Directives
- DoD Operational Law Handbook
- DOJ IG Reports
- DOJ Memorandums
- DOJ Office of Investigative Agency Policies
- DOJ Orders
 - OBD Orders
- DOJ USABook
- Electronic Communications Privacy Act
- Enemy Combatants and Military Commissions
- Espionage Violations and Authorities
- Executive Orders
- Export Controls
- Extraterritorial Matters
- Fair Credit Reporting Act (pdf)
- FBI Chief Division Counsel Critical Incident Manual
- FBI Guidance/Policy ECs
- Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
[redacted]
- Foreign Terrorist Organizations
- Homeland Security Presidential Directives
- Immigration Issues
- Information Sharing Environment
- Inspector General Procedures
- International Issues
- Intelligence Community/National Security Related Directives
- Legal Handbook for Special Agents (pdf)
- Legislative History of U.S. Public Laws
[redacted]
- Maritime-Related Matters
- MOU List (pdf)
- Model Memorandums of Understanding (MMOU)
- Memorandums of Understanding (MOU)
[redacted]
- National Response Framework (pdf)
- National Security Act of 1947 (amended 12/2007) (pdf)
(Title 50. War and National Defense, Chapter 15-- National Security)
- National Security Directives
[redacted]
- Office of the Director of National Intelligence Documents
- PATRIOT Act
- PATRIOT Reauthorization Act
- Probable Cause (ppt)
(presentation by AUSA [redacted])
- Right to Financial Privacy Act (pdf)
(Title 12, United States Code, Sections 3401-3422)
- State Electronic Surveillance Procedures and Laws
- Terrorism Related
- Treaties
- United States Attorney's Manual
- United States Public Laws

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For questions or comments, contact [redacted] (OGC) (FBI) Last modified on 7/7/2011 9:10:12 AM

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
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8/8/2011

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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**Introduction To
Foreign Intelligence
And Terrorism**National Foreign Intelligence Policy****National Foreign Intelligence Policy Manual (NFIPM)**

(U) ~~(S)~~ The NFIPM details the FBI's National Foreign Intelligence Program. The NFIPM can be found on the FBI Intranet at:

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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**Introduction To
Foreign Intelligence
And Terrorism**Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)**

(U) The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978 prescribes procedures for requesting judicial authorization for electronic surveillance and physical search of persons engaged in espionage or international terrorism against the U.S. on behalf of a foreign power. A special eleven-member court, appointed by the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, called the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court adjudicates FISA requests.

(U) Section 6001(b) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, known as the "lone wolf" amendment, broadened FISA to allow surveillance of any person, other than a U.S. person, who "engages in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefore." The expanded definition allows the government to use FISA for surveillance of a non-U.S. person who has no known ties to a group or entity.

(U) Recent changes to FISA as a result of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization act of 2005 and the USA PATRIOT Act Additional Reauthorizing Amendments Act of 2006 can be found [REDACTED]

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(Rev. 01-31-2003)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: PRIORITY

Date: 04/07/2006

To: All Divisions

From: Office of the General Counsel

Contact: [REDACTED]

Approved By: Caproni Valerie E

Thomas Julie F
[REDACTED]

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Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: 319X-HQ-A1487720-OGC

Title: (U) USA PATRIOT ACT RENEWAL - NEW LEGISLATIVE CHANGES TO
FCI/IT LEGAL AUTHORITIES.

Synopsis: (U) Summarizes recent changes to national security legal authorities as a result of the "USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (Public Law 109-177) and the "USA PATRIOT Act Additional Reauthorizing Amendments Act of 2006" (Public Law 109-178), and describes the preliminary implementation procedures.

Details: The President signed the "USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005" (USA PATRIOT IRA) and the "USA PATRIOT Act Additional Reauthorizing Amendments Act of 2006" on March 9, 2006. The USAPA IRA makes permanent many of the sunset provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act.¹ Additionally, both laws make significant changes to many national security legal authorities, including National Security Letters (NSLs) and certain FISA-related provisions, and impose new reporting requirements. Moreover, the new laws make changes in several substantive criminal laws, some of which may have implications in national security investigations.

The National Security Law Branch of the Office of General Counsel is issuing preliminary guidance on those portions of the two laws relating to national security operations. The following summarizes authorities contained in sections of the bills, to include a summary of potential changes in FBI operational procedures. Recipients should note that this is only initial guidance; more detailed explanations and procedures may follow in subsequent communications.

¹ The USA PATRIOT Act refers to the "Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001," which was signed into law on October 26, 2001.

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The USA PATRIOT Act Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 is organized into the seven titles. Title I, which carries the same title as the overall bill, contains the significant changes to the FBI's national security tools.² Titles II through VII contain several other Acts and miscellaneous provisions:

- **Title I - USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act**

Title I makes most of the original sunset provisions of the original USA PATRIOT Act permanent, though it creates new sunsets for the authorities in section 206 (FISA roving authority) and section 215 (FISA access to business records) of the USA PATRIOT Act, and section 6001 (Lone Wolf provision) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. It also extends the duration of several FISA tools. Additionally, it makes significant changes to the National Security Letter statutes. Finally, the USAPA IRA requires new Congressional reporting of the use of national security tools.

- **Title II - Terrorist Death Penalty Enhancement**

This portion of the USAPA IRA entitled the "Terrorist Death Penalty Enhancement Act of 2005" makes adjustments to the death penalty procedures for federal cases, including certain air piracy cases.

- **Title III - Reducing Crime and Terrorism at America's Seaports Act of 2005**

This Title amends certain criminal statutes to strengthen maritime and seaport safety.

- **Title IV - Combating Terrorism Financing Act of 2005**

This Title increases the penalties for terrorism financing, and adds new terrorism-related provisions to the specified unlawful activities that serve as money laundering predicates (including operating an illegal money transmitting business, such as the common "hawala" network).

- **Title V - Miscellaneous Provisions**

As recommended by the WMD Commission, this Title creates a National Security Division within the U.S. Department of Justice, which is to be led by an Assistant Attorney General for National Security.

² Congress drafted the USA PATRIOT Act Additional Reauthorizing Amendments Act of 2006 after the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005. Congress used the USA PATRIOT Act Additional Reauthorizing Amendments Act of 2006 to make additional adjustments to the nondisclosure provisions of FISA Business Records and National Security Letters contained in the USA PATRIOT IRA, and to add the "Privacy Protections for Library Patrons."

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- **Title VI - Secret Service Authorization and Technical Modification Act of 2005**

As the Title suggests, it modifies certain authorities of the Secret Service.

- **Title VII - Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 2006**

This Title creates regulations for the control of precursor chemicals and enhances the criminal penalties for methamphetamine production.

TITLE I - USA PATRIOT IMPROVEMENT and REAUTHORIZATION ACT of 2005.

This EC will not address the new sections of the USAPA IRA in sequence; instead, the sections will be organized by national security tools.

SUNSET PROVISIONS

Sec. 102. USA PATRIOT Act Sunset Provisions.

Section 102 repeals section 224 of the USA PATRIOT Act, making most of the original sunset provisions permanent. This section adopts a new 4-year sunset (December 31, 2009) for sections 206 (roving authority) and 215 (business records) of the USA PATRIOT Act. The now permanent provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act are the following:

USA PATRIOT Act 2001 Provision	Description of Provision
Sections 201 & 202	Expanded Title III predicates.
Section 203(b) & (d)	Information sharing of foreign intelligence obtained in Title III and criminal investigations.
Section 204	Clarification of Intelligence Exceptions from Limitations on Interception and Disclosure of Wire, Oral and Electronic Communications.
Section 207	Extended duration of certain FISAs.
Section 209	Seizure of voice mail with a search warrant.
Section 212	Emergency disclosures of e-mail and records by ISPs.
Section 214	FISA pen/trap authority.
Section 217	Interception of computer trespasser communications.
Section 218	Change in the probable cause ("significant purpose") standard of FISA.
Section 220	Nationwide search warrants for electronic evidence.

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Section 223	Civil liability for certain unauthorized disclosures.
Section 225	Immunity for compliance with FISA wiretap.

Procedural Changes: None at this time. If necessary, additional guidance may be issued in the future.

Provision	New Sunset Date
FISA Roving Authority	December 31, 2009
FISA Business Records Authority	December 31, 2009

Sec. 103. Extension of Sunset Relating to Individual Terrorists as Agents of a Foreign Power.

Section 6001(b) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) addressed the "lone wolf" terrorist by broadening the definition of the "agent of a foreign power" for any person other than a United States person to include a person who "engages in international terrorism or activities in preparation thereof." The USAPA IRA extends the sunset of this provision 4 years (until December 31, 2009).

Procedural Changes: None at this time. If necessary, additional guidance may be issued in the future.

Provision	New Sunset Date
FISA "Lone Wolf"	December 31, 2009

FISA DURATION CHANGES

Sec. 105. Duration of FISA Surveillance on Non-United States Persons under Section 207 of the USA PATRIOT Act.

Section 105 extends the duration of both initiations and renewals of electronic surveillance (FISA § 105(e)), physical search (FISA § 304(d)), and pen register/trap and trace surveillance (FISA § 402(e)) for agents of a foreign power who are not U.S. persons.

Procedural Changes Related to the New FISA Durations: DOJ Office of Intelligence Policy and Review will implement these changes to the FISA process. The new durations for non-United States persons are reflected in the chart below. Overall, the new durations should translate into considerable savings in FBI and OIPR resources.

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FISA Technique	

The initiations and renewals for United States persons will remain the same.

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FISA Technique	

FISA BUSINESS RECORD CHANGES³

Sec. 106. Access to Certain Business Records Under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act.

Section 106 makes the following changes to Sections 501 and 502 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) regarding access to 215 Business Records.

Procedural Changes Related to FISA Business Records: FISA Business Records, which have been the subject of much debate, have been modified to contain more safeguards to protect civil liberties and privacy. These safeguards include special procedures and approvals for certain types of tangible things (i.e. [redacted]), a directive to develop "minimization procedures," the recipient's right to seek judicial review of an order, and a recipient's right to disclose an order for the purpose of obtaining legal advice or for assistance in complying with the order. The following charts summarize significant provisions in the new law.

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Scope of FISA Business Records authority.	

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³ The changes included in this section also include the changes made by section 3 and 4 of the "USA PATRIOT Act Additional Reauthorizing Amendments Act of 2006."

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Special Categories of Tangible Things	Congress designated particular categories of records for special procedures and approvals. The FBI will adjust procedures to account for the special designation.
• Special Categories.	
• Approval Level for special categories:	The Director of the FBI may delegate the authority to either – • the Deputy Director of the FBI; or • the Executive Assistant Director (EAD) for National Security (or any successor position). No further delegation is allowed.
• Congressional Oversight of special categories:	Attorney General must provide annual report (April) to the House Judiciary Committee (HJC), the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), the Senate Judiciary Committee (SJC), and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI). • Number of FISA business record orders granted, modified, or denied for the special categories of tangible things.
FISA Business Record Standard- Relevance:	The FBI's facts must show that there are "reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are relevant to an authorized investigation."
• Presumptive Relevance Test:	The tangible things are presumptively relevant if the facts show they pertain to – "(i) a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; (ii) the activities of a suspected agent of a foreign power who is the subject of such authorized investigation; or (iii) an individual in contact with, or known to, a suspected agent of a foreign power who is the subject of such authorized investigations..."
FISA Business Record Order:	• The order must describe the tangible things with sufficient particularity to permit them to be fairly identified. • Date for return - the order will contain a date on which the tangible things must be provided. • Recipient must have a reasonable period of time to produce. • The Order may only require production of tangible things that would be available with a grand jury subpoena or a District Court order (in other words, privileges under the law will apply to Business Record orders).

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FISA Business Record Non-Disclosure Provision:	No person shall disclose the fact that the FBI has sought tangible things.
• Exceptions to non-disclosure.	A recipient may disclose a FISA Business Record Order to – (1) persons to whom disclosure is necessary to comply; (2) an attorney to obtain legal advice or assistance with respect to the production; (3) a person as permitted by the FBI Director (or designee).
• Extension of nondisclosure to others:	• If the recipient discloses to another person (see exceptions above), the recipient shall notify the person of the nondisclosure requirement. • The person to whom disclosure is made shall be subject to the nondisclosure requirement. • The FBI director (or designee) may ask the recipient to identify the other persons to whom disclosure of the Business Record order will be made (except that the recipient does not have to identify the attorney).
Judicial Challenge of FISA Business Record authority:	The recipient of a FISA Business Record order may challenge the legality of the order in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.
• Challenging the order:	• Recipient may move to modify or set aside the order. • FISC may grant the motion only if the order does not meet the requirements of FISA or is otherwise unlawful.

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• Challenging the non-disclosure provision:	• Not less than 1 year after the order, the recipient may move to modify or set aside the nondisclosure order. • FISC may grant such a motion only if there is no reason to believe that disclosure may endanger the national security of the U.S., interfere with a criminal, counterterrorism, or counterintelligence investigation, interfere with diplomatic relations, or endanger the life or physical safety of any person. • The FISC will treat as conclusive a certification by the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, an Assistant Attorney General, or the Director of the FBI that a disclosure may endanger the national security of the U.S. or interfere with diplomatic relations.
• Security:	• Filings shall be under seal • Chief Justice of the U.S., in consultation with the AG and the DNI, will establish security measures.

Minimization Procedures for FISA Business Records:	Within 180 days of enactment, the Attorney General shall adopt specific minimization procedures governing the retention and dissemination of FISA Business Record information.
• U.S. Person information:	The minimization procedures should minimize the retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting U.S. persons consistent with the U.S. intelligence community need to obtain, produce and disseminate foreign intelligence information.
• Evidence of a crime:	The procedures should allow for the retention and dissemination of information that is evidence of a crime.

Procedural Changes Related to Congressional Oversight of FISA Business Records: The new law beefs up the Congressional reporting requirements for the FISA Business Record authority. OIPR will have the responsibility for reporting the FISA Business Record statistics to Congress.

Reporting Cycle:	Attorney General will report on an annual basis (April of each year).
Congressional Committees:	• House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence • House Judiciary Committee • Senate Select Committee on Intelligence • Senate Judiciary Committee

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Reporting Categories:	(1) Total number of applications for FISA Business Records. (2) Total number of orders granted, modified, or denied. (3) Total number of orders granted, modified, or denied for the special categories of tangible things.
Additional unclassified report:	Annually (April of each year), the Attorney General shall make an unclassified report on the total number of FISA Business Records applications, and the total number of orders granted, modified, or denied.

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Sec. 106A Audit on Access to Certain Business Records for Foreign Intelligence Purposes.

Section 106A directs the Inspector General of the Department of Justice to perform a comprehensive audit of the effectiveness and use, including improper or illegal use, of the FISA Business Records authority. The audit will take place in two phases, covering the years of 2002 to 2006.

Procedural Changes Related to the Audit of FISA Business Records: The Inspector General's Office of the Department of Justice (DOJ IG) started the audit process in January 2006, in anticipation of the new USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act. It will be incumbent upon the FBI to cooperate with the DOJ IG to complete the two-phased audit. Per established procedures, the FBI's Inspection Division will be the primary point of contact for the DOJ IG. Additional guidance may be published as the audit process continues.

Scope of Audit:	The IG will perform a comprehensive audit of the effectiveness and use, including any improper or illegal use, of the investigative authority.
Timing of Audit:	For 2002, 2003, and 2004, the audit should be completed within one year of enactment (March 9, 2007). For 2005 and 2006, the audit should be completed by December 31, 2007.
Report results to Congress:	The IG shall submit the audit reports to – • House Judiciary Committee. • House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. • Senate Judiciary Committee. • Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

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Examine effectiveness of the tool:	Audit will look at the following for effectiveness – • Categories of records obtained. • The importance to the FBI and the IC of the information obtained. • The manner in which the information is collected, retained, analyzed, and disseminated by the FBI (this will include an examination of the access to “raw data” provided by the FBI to other agencies of the Federal, State, local, or tribal governments, or private sector agencies). • The minimization procedures adopted by the AG. • Whether, and how often, the FBI used information to produce analytical intelligence products for the FBI, the IC, or other Federal, State, local, or tribal government agencies. • Whether, and how often, the FBI provided the information to law enforcement authorities for criminal proceedings.
Examine the process:	The audit process will look at the following: • How often the FBI requested DOJ to submit an application and the request was not submitted to the court (including the basis for the decision). • Whether the court granted, modified, or denied the application. • The justification for the failure of the AG to issue implementing procedures governing the requests in a timely fashion, including whether the delay harmed national security. • Whether bureaucratic or procedural impediments prevent the FBI from fully using the authority.

FISA ROVING SURVEILLANCE CHANGES

Sec. 108. Multipoint Electronic Surveillance Under Section 206 of the USA PATRIOT Act.

This section modifies FISA sections 104(a) and 105(c), to clarify the amount of detail the FBI must provide to obtain a FISA roving surveillance order.

Procedural Changes Related to FISA Roving Surveillance:

The application must now include a description of the “specific” target when the target is identified by description rather than by name. The section also adds a return requirement on the FBI in national security investigations. This is consistent with Congress’ intent to provide an extra layer of judicial review and to prevent the potential abuse of this investigative authority.

OIPR will implement the new requirements for the FISA roving surveillance. OIPR and FBI OGC may develop more specific guidance on the new process for obtaining this authority in the future.

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Standard for roving surveillance:	
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Return requirement:	
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Consistent with Congress' intent to provide more oversight, the reporting requirements for FISA roving surveillance have been changed.

Procedural Changes Related to FISA Roving Surveillance Congressional Oversight: OIPR will maintain responsibility for reporting on the FISA roving surveillance.

Reporting cycle:	The Attorney General will report on a semi-annual basis.
Congressional Committees:	• House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence • Senate Select Committee on Intelligence • Senate Judiciary Committee
Reporting categories:	• Total number of applications made for orders and extensions. • Each criminal case in which information has been authorized for use at trial, during the period covered by such report. • Total number of emergency employments and total number of subsequent orders approving or denying surveillance.

FISA OVERSIGHT CHANGES

In section 109 of the USA PATRIOT Act Improvement and Reauthorization Act, Congress has implemented additional reporting requirements for the use of FISA physical search authority and FISA pen registers and trap and trace authority. This section modifies the reporting requirements in FISA sections 306 and 406(b).

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Congressional Reporting on FISA Physical Search authority:

Reporting cycle:	Attorney General will report on a semiannual basis.
Congressional Committees:	• House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence • House Judiciary Committee • Senate Select Committee on Intelligence • Senate Judiciary Committee
Reporting categories:	Report the following regarding emergency physical searches – • Total number of applications. • Total number of orders granted, modified, or denied. • Number of physical searches involving the residences, offices, or personal property of U.S. persons, and the number of occasions the AG provided notice. • Total number of emergency authorizations, and total number of subsequent orders approving or denying the physical searches.

Congressional Reporting on FISA Pen Register and Trap and Trace authority:

Reporting cycle:	Attorney General will report on a semiannual basis.
Congressional Committees:	• House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence • House Judiciary Committee • Senate Select Committee on Intelligence • Senate Judiciary Committee
Reporting categories:	Report the following regarding pen registers/trap and trace – • Total number of applications. • Total number of orders granted, modified, or denied. • Total number of emergency authorizations, and total number subsequent orders approving or denying the pen registers/trap and trace.

Procedural Changes Related to Enhanced Congressional Oversight: If necessary, OIPR and FBI OGC will publish guidance in response to the new provisions. OIPR will retain responsibility for reporting to Congress on FISA related activities.

FISA PEN REGISTER/TRAP AND TRACE CHANGES

Sec. 128. PATRIOT Section 214; Authority for Disclosure of Additional Information in Connection with Orders for Pen Register and Trap and Trace Authority under FISA.

Congress modified the FISA pen register and trap and trace devices authority to give the FBI access to more information through this authority. The pertinent portion of the new statute describing the information available to the FBI is reproduced here (highlights added):

FISA § 402 [50 U.S.C. § 1842]. Pen registers and trap and trace devices for foreign intelligence and international terrorism investigations.

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(C) shall direct that, upon the request of the applicant, the provider of a wire or electronic service shall disclose to the Federal officer using the pen register or trap and trace device covered by the order –

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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
[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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The chart below summarizes the information available through the new adjustments to the FISA tool.



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The chart below summarizes the Congressional reporting requirements for the use of the FISA pen register and trap and trace authority.

Reporting cycle:	Attorney General shall report on a semiannual basis.
Congressional Committees:	• House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence • House Judiciary Committee • Senate Select Committee on Intelligence • Senate Judiciary Committee
Reporting categories:	Use of pen registers and trap and trace.

Procedural Changes Related to Pen Registers/Trap and Trace: OIPR will retain the reporting responsibilities for the FISA pen register/trap and trace authority.

The FBI will now be able to obtain [redacted] with a FISA pen register/trap and trace, without having to couple the request with a FISA Business Record request. This provision should make this investigative tool more useful to

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the FBI. OIPR has already made the changes to its pen register/trap and trace format to take advantage of the new provision.

EMERGENCY DISCLOSURES

Sec. 107 Enhanced Oversight of Good-Faith Emergency Disclosures Under Section 212 of the USA PATRIOT Act.

The emergency disclosure provision, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(8) & (c)(4), provides law enforcement with the ability to gain quick access to [redacted] under emergency conditions. The USA PATRIOT Act created the emergency disclosure provision which explicitly permits, but does not require, a service provider [redacted] to voluntarily disclose to law enforcement information, including [redacted] in emergencies involving a risk of death or serious physical injury. Such disclosures are outside of the compulsory process – subpoena, court order, and search warrant – that is generally required before law enforcement can obtain such information from a service provider. See, 18 U.S.C. § 2703.

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Section 107 makes changes to the emergency disclosure provision of 18 U.S.C. Section 2702, including the requirement for more Congressional reporting, to deal with the concern that this authority was not subject to sufficient Congressional, judicial or public oversight.

Procedural Changes Related to Good-Faith Emergency Disclosures: The Attorney General must now report annually to Congress on the number of accounts subject to disclosure, and the Attorney General must report the basis for the voluntary disclosures in investigations that are closed without filing criminal charges.

The FBI will need to track the use of this investigative authority for reporting purposes. The FBI will publish additional guidance on this issue as necessary.

Voluntary disclosure by provider:	If the provider, in good faith, believes that an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to any person requires disclosure without delay.
Reporting cycle:	Attorney General shall report on an annual basis.
Congressional Committees:	• House Judiciary Committee • Senate Judiciary Committee
Reporting categories:	• Number of accounts from which voluntary disclosures were received. • Summary of the basis for disclosure where the investigation was closed without criminal charges.

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NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS⁴

Sec. 115. Judicial Review of National Security Letters.

Title 18, Chapter 223 of the United States Code (Witnesses and Evidence) is amended to include a new section 3511 which provides for the judicial review of NSLs.

Procedural Changes Related to the Judicial Review of NSLs: This new section modifies the NSL authorities under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)(18 U.S.C. § 2709), the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)(15 U.S.C. § 1681u and 15 U.S.C. § 1681v), and the Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA)(12 U.S.C. § 3414), to make it clear that the recipient may seek the help of an attorney, and may challenge the legality of an NSL order and its non-disclosure provision in Federal District Court. A Federal District Court can modify or set aside an NSL if it is unreasonable, oppressive, or otherwise unlawful. It continues to be important for the FBI to serve NSLs only if the information sought falls within the statutory categories, and which are not overly broad or oppressive.

Future practice will give the FBI an idea of how many NSL challenges can be expected in a calendar year. If Federal grand jury practice is any indication, the number of NSLs challenged on a yearly basis should be small. Regardless, the FBI Field Office will need to work with local Assistant United States Attorneys when a recipient challenges the legality of an NSL or the non-disclosure provision. Additionally, FBI Field Offices should immediately notify FBI OGC if they receive notice of any challenge to an NSL or the NSL's nondisclosure provision. The following chart breaks down the new provisions (including jurisdictional issues).

The new law also gives the U.S. government a mechanism to address the situation where a recipient fails to comply with the NSL, which has been missing from the investigative tool in the past. Again, this procedure will require the assistance of a local United States Attorney's Office.

Judicial review of NSL (Recipient may challenge the request):	• Jurisdiction: In the U.S. District in which the recipient resides or does business.
	• Recipient may ask court to set aside or modify request.
	• Court will grant the recipient's motion if the NSL is unreasonable, oppressive, or otherwise unlawful.

⁴ The changes listed in this section also include the changes made by sections 4 and 5 of the "USA PATRIOT Act Additional Reauthorizing Amendments Act of 2006."

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Judicial review of NSL nondisclosure provision (Recipient may challenge the nondisclosure provision):	• Jurisdiction: In the U.S. District in which the recipient resides or does business.
	• Filed within one year of NSL request – • Court may modify/set aside the non-disclosure if... “no reason to believe that disclosure may endanger the national security of the U.S., interfere with criminal, counterterrorism, or counterintelligence investigation, interfere with diplomatic relations, or endanger the life or physical safety of any person.” • Certification/Authority level: Court will treat as conclusive the certification by the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, an Assistant Attorney General, or the Director of the FBI that disclosure may endanger the national security of the United States or interfere with diplomatic relations (unless made in bad faith).
	• Filed one year or more after the NSL – • Within 90 days of recipient’s petition, designated government officials must either terminate the nondisclosure requirement or recertify that the disclosure “may result in a danger to the national security of the U.S., interference with a criminal, counterterrorism, or counterintelligence investigation, interference with diplomatic relations, or danger to the life or physical safety of any person.” • Termination/Recertification Authority level: The Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, an Assistant Attorney General, or the Director of the FBI, or his designee in a position not lower than Deputy Assistant Director at FBI headquarters or a SAC in an FBI field office designated by the Director shall either terminate the nondisclosure requirement or recertify that disclosure “may result in a danger to the national security of the U.S., interference with a criminal, counterterrorism, or counterintelligence investigation, interference with diplomatic relations, or danger to the life or physical safety of any person.” • Conclusive: Certification by the AG, DAG, an Assistant Attorney General, or the Director of the FBI that disclosure may endanger the national security of the United States or interfere with diplomatic relations shall be treated as conclusive (unless made in bad faith).

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Failure to Comply:	• The Attorney General may invoke the aid of a Federal District Court. • Jurisdiction: U.S. District in which the investigation is carried on, or the person or entity resides or does business or may be found. • Court may compel by ordering person/entity to comply. • Failure to obey is punishable by contempt.
Court Proceedings & Security:	• Court must close hearings to the extent necessary to prevent an unauthorized disclosure of NSL. • Petitions, filings, records, orders, and subpoenas must be kept under seal to the extent and as long as necessary to prevent unauthorized disclosure. • At government's request, ex parte and in camera review of government's submissions which may contain classified material.

Sec. 116. Confidentiality of National Security Letters.

Section 116 makes changes to the National Security Letter authorities contained in the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) (18 U.S.C. § 2709), the Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA) (12 U.S.C. § 3414), and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) (15 U.S.C. §§ 1681u and 1681v).

For example, Congress used this section to clarify the application of NSLs [18 U.S.C. § 2709 - telephone toll and transactional records] to libraries. A library is subject to an NSL only if it falls within the definition of a wire or communications provider.

Libraries and 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (telephone toll and transactional records):	A library is not a wire or electronic communications service provider unless the library is providing the services defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (electronic communication service).
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Additionally, this section is used to statutorily establish the NSL nondisclosure requirements and the exceptions to the nondisclosure requirement available to a recipient.

Procedural Changes Related to National Security Letters Confidentiality: To avoid overstepping this authority, the FBI [redacted]

[redacted] If you have any questions regarding the application of this provision [redacted] please direct your questions to FBI OGC NSLB.

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The other significant changes to NSLs regarding confidentiality are common to all NSLs used by the FBI. In order to activate the nondisclosure requirement, the NSLs must contain a certification from the Director of the FBI, or a Special Agent in Charge in an FBI field office. This new legislation allows designation of this certification to the SACs in field offices "designated by the Director." This language reflects Congress' intention that the delegation not occur automatically, but that the Director must choose which offices needed, and were properly

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prepared to exercise, the delegated authority. The Director has made delegations to FBI Field Offices in a separate communication. Field Offices with delegated authority will receive instructions on the process of preparing and issuing NSLs (instructions and updated forms will be posted on the FBI OGC National Security Law Branch website). The remaining changes are summarized in the chart below. FBI OGC NSLB will publish additional guidance on this authority as necessary.

Nondisclosure activated by FBI Certification:	• FBI certification: There may result a danger to the national security of the United States, interference with a criminal, counterterrorism, or counterintelligence investigation, interference with diplomatic relations, or danger to the life or physical safety of any person, if a recipient discloses that the FBI has sought or obtained access to information or records under NSL statutes.
	• Authority level: Director of the FBI, or his designee in a position not lower than DAD at FBI headquarters, or a Special Agent in Charge in a Bureau field office designated by the Director.
Exceptions - Recipient may disclose NSL request:	• Recipient may disclose to persons necessary to comply with NSL request.
	• Attorney: Recipient may disclose to an attorney to obtain legal advice or legal assistance regarding any NSL request.
Notice:	• The NSL shall notify the recipient of the nondisclosure requirement.
	• Recipient disclosing NSL to an individual necessary to comply or, to an attorney, shall inform them of the applicable nondisclosure requirement.
FBI request for identity of persons to whom recipient plans to disclose NSL:	• Only activated at the request of the FBI Director or Director's designee.
	• Recipient of NSL shall identify the persons to whom disclosure will be made or was made.
	• EXCEPT: Nothing requires the person to identify an attorney to whom disclosure was made or will be made to obtain legal advice or legal assistance.

Sec. 117. Violations of Nondisclosure Provisions of National Security Letters.

This section makes it a federal crime for an individual to knowingly and with the intent to obstruct an investigation or judicial proceeding violate the nondisclosure provision of an NSL.

Procedural Changes Related to Violations of National Security Letter Non-disclosure:
None at this point.

To: All Divisions From: Office of the General Counsel
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Obstruction of an Investigation (18 U.S.C. § 1510):	• Individual must have been notified of the nondisclosure provision.
	• Individual must knowingly and with the intent to obstruct an investigation or judicial proceeding violate the nondisclosure provision.
	• Punishable by up to five years imprisonment, a fine, or both.

Sec. 118. Reports on National Security Letters.

Section 118 of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 outlines a new reporting scheme for National Security Letters.

Procedural Changes Related to National Security Letter Reporting: This section now requires that NSL statistics be reported to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, in addition to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Additionally, Congress has directed that the NSL requests made pursuant to the 15 U.S.C. § 1681v [Fair Credit Reporting Act] be reported semi-annually to the House Committee on Financial Services and the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, in addition to the House and Senate intelligence committees. These provisions are consistent with Congress' desire for more oversight of the national security investigative tools. Finally, Congress has directed that the Attorney General provide an unclassified report annually (April) which will report the aggregate numbers of NSL requests concerning different U.S. persons. With the unclassified report, Congress intends for the public to have a better view of the material Congress sees in conducting its oversight responsibilities.

The FBI OGC's National Security Law Branch and OIPR will provide future guidance on the FBI's role in the reporting of NSLs.

Current NSL Reports:	• AG reports on a semi-annual basis.
	• Reports will now also be made to the House Judiciary Committee, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Senate Judiciary Committee, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

Enhanced Oversight of 15 U.S.C. § 1681v NSLs (for credit agency consumer records):	• AG reports on a semi-annual basis.
	• Reports will now also be made to the House Judiciary Committee, the House Committee on Financial Services, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Senate Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

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Aggregate Report of NSL requests:	• AG reports annually (April).
	• Total number of NSL (excluding NSL's for subscriber information) requests for information concerning <u>different</u> U.S. persons.
	• Unclassified report.

Sec. 119. Enhanced Oversight of National Security Letters.

Consistent with Congress' theme of more oversight, Congress has directed that the Inspector General of the Department of Justice shall perform an audit of the effectiveness and use, including any improper or illegal use, of national security letters issued by the Department of Justice.

Procedural Changes Related to the Audit of National Security Letters: This DOJ IG audit of the use of NSLs, which began in January of 2006, will require the cooperation of the FBI. Congress' goal in this audit is to obtain detail on the specific functions and characteristics of NSLs and an analysis of the necessity of this national security investigative tool. As with DOJ IG's audit of the FISA Business Record authority, the FBI's Inspection Division will be the primary point of contact for the DOJ IG (per established procedures). The FBI OGC NSLB may issue additional guidance as the audit process continues.

Requirements of DOJ IG Audit:	Comprehensive audit of – • Use of NSLs for 2003 through 2006. • Description of noteworthy facts/circumstances, including any improper or illegal use of NSLs.
Timing of Audit:	• For 2003 and 2004, must be completed not later than one year after enactment (March 9, 2007).
	• For 2005 and 2006, must be completed not later than December 31, 2007.
Congressional Committees:	• House Judiciary Committee and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. • Senate Judiciary Committee and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

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Examine Effectiveness of NSLs:	The audit will examine: • Importance of the information acquired by DOJ to the intelligence activities of DOJ and other members of the IC. • How information is collected, retained, analyzed, and disseminated (including access to raw data) to members of the IC community, and other Federal, State, local or tribal governments, or private sector entities. • How often NSL information was used to produce an analytical intelligence product for distribution to the IC community, and to other Federal, State, local or tribal governments. • Whether, and how often, NSL information was provided to law enforcement authorities for use in criminal investigations. • Following enactment of the USA PATRIOT IRA, the number of NSLs issued without the certification necessary to create a nondisclosure obligation. • Types of electronic communications and transactional information obtained under § 2709, and the procedures DOJ used if content information is obtained.
Feasibility of Minimization Procedures:	• Not later than February 1, 2007, or upon completion of the 2003/2004 audit, the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence shall jointly submit a report on the feasibility of applying minimization procedures to protect the constitutional rights of U.S. persons. • Report goes to the House Judiciary Committee, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Senate Judiciary Committee, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

DELAYED NOTICE SEARCH WARRANTS

Sec. 114. Delayed Notice Search Warrants.

The section changes the procedural requirements for the warrants and increases the oversight of the delayed notice search warrants (18 U.S.C. § 3103a). A major change is the implementation of a 30 day notice requirement, as opposed to the former requirement of "within a reasonable period" of the warrant's execution.

Procedural Changes Related to Delayed Notice Search Warrants: In applicable cases, the FBI (through the U.S. Department of Justice trial attorney or Assistant United States Attorney) must provide the facts to a court to show there is "reasonable cause to believe that providing immediate notification of the execution of the warrant may have an adverse effect." The showing will have to be updated for each extension.

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Notification Delay	No more than 30 days (or a later date certain if facts justify). •undue delay of trial is not a basis for a delayed notice.
Extensions of Delays	90 days (unless the facts justify longer)-- •granted upon an updated showing of the need for further delay.
Reporting	Annual reporting to Congress by Court (starting with the fiscal year ending September 30, 2007).

OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT/CRIMINAL RELATED PROVISIONS

Sec. 104. Section 2332b and the Material Support Sections of Title 18, United States Code.

This section makes permanent the material support of terrorism provisions in section 6603 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevent Act of 2004 (18 U.S.C. §§ 2332b and 2339B).

Procedural Changes: None at this time. If necessary, additional guidance may be issued in the future.

Sec. 110. Attacks Against Railroad Carriers and Mass Transportation Systems.

This section merges wrecking trains (18 U.S.C. § 1992) and attacks on mass transit (18 U.S.C. § 1993) into one section - 18 U.S.C. § 1992. The new law expands the law to cover the planning for such attacks, so it is now a federal crime to surveil, photograph, videotape, diagram, or collect information as part of a plan for an attack.

Procedural Changes: None at this time. If necessary, additional guidance may be issued in the future.

Sec. 111. Forfeiture.

This section expands the authorization to confiscate property located within the United States when it constitutes proceeds used in or derived from trafficking in nuclear, chemical, biological, or radiological weapons technology or material.

Procedural Changes: None at this time. If necessary, additional guidance may be issued in the future.

Sec. 112. Section 2332b(g)(5)(B) Amendments Relating to the Definition of Federal Crime of Terrorism.

This section adds drug trafficking in support of terrorism (21 U.S.C. § 960A) and receiving foreign military-type training from a foreign terrorist organization (18 U.S.C. § 2339D) to the definition of federal crimes of terrorism (18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B)).

Procedural Changes: None at this time. If necessary, additional guidance may be issued in the future.

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Sec. 113. Amendments to Section 2516(1) of Title 18, United States Code (Title III).

This section adds 20 federal crimes related to terrorism to the list of predicate offenses that may be used as a basis to intercept wire, oral, or electronic communications (18 U.S.C. § 2516(1)). The new wiretap predicates include the following:

- 18 U.S.C. § 37 [violence at international airports]
- 18 U.S.C. § 43 [animal enterprise terrorism]
- 18 U.S.C. § 81 [arson within special maritime and territorial jurisdiction]
- 18 U.S.C. §§ 175, 175b, and 175c [biological agents]
- 18 U.S.C. § 832 [nuclear and weapons of mass destruction threats]
- 18 U.S.C. § 842 [explosive materials]
- 18 U.S.C. § 930 [possession of weapons in Federal facilities]
- 18 U.S.C. § 956 [conspiracy to harm persons or property overseas]
- 18 U.S.C. § 1028A [aggravated identity theft]
- 18 U.S.C. § 1114 [killing or attempted killing of Federal employees, including any member of the uniformed services]
- 18 U.S.C. § 1116 [killing or attempted killing of certain foreign officials, including internationally protected persons]
- 18 U.S.C. § 1992 [attacks on mass transit]
- 18 U.S.C. § 2340A [torture]
- 18 U.S.C. § 2339 [harboring terrorists]
- 18 U.S.C. § 2339D [receiving military-type training from a foreign terrorist organization]
- 18 U.S.C. § 5324 [structuring transactions to evade reporting requirements]
- 49 U.S.C. § 46504 [assault on a flight crew member with a dangerous weapon]
- 49 U.S.C. § 46505(b)(3) or (c) [weapons offenses on board an aircraft]

Procedural Changes: None at this time. If necessary, additional guidance may be issued in the future.

Sec. 122. Prohibition of Narco-Terrorism.

This section makes it a federal crime to engage in drug trafficking to benefit terrorism (amended the Controlled Substance Import and Export Act - 21 U.S.C. §§ 951 et seq.). To prove this crime, the evidence must show that a defendant had knowledge that the person or organization has engaged or is engaging in terrorism.

Procedural Changes: None at this time. If necessary, additional guidance may be issued in the future.

Sec. 123. Interfering with the Operation of an Aircraft.

This section makes it a federal crime to interfere with or disable a pilot or navigation facility operator with the intent to danger or with reckless disregard for human safety (e.g., aiming lasers at pilots) (18 U.S.C. § 32).

Procedural Changes: None at this time. If necessary, additional guidance may be issued in the future.

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Sec. 124. Sense of Congress Relating to Lawful Political Activity.

Congress uses this section to express the sense of Congress that federal investigations should not be based solely upon an American citizen's membership in a non-violent political organization or their otherwise lawful political activity.

Procedural Changes: None at this time. All employees are reminded, however, that neither criminal nor national security investigations of U.S. persons may be predicated solely on the exercise of First Amendment rights.

Sec. 127. Sense of Congress.

Congress uses this section to express its sense that the victims of terrorist attacks should have access to the forfeited assets of terrorists under 18 U.S.C. § 981.

Procedural Changes: None at this time. If necessary, additional guidance may be issued in the future.

DATA-MINING ACTIVITIES

Sec. 126. Report on Data-Mining Activities.

This section requires the Attorney General to report to Congress on any Department of Justice (including the FBI) initiative that uses pattern-based data-mining or is developing pattern-based data-mining. Among several topics, the report is to explain how any pattern-based data-mining initiatives collect, review, gather, and analyze information, and how the initiatives will ensure the accuracy of information and protect the privacy and due process rights of individuals.

The statute defines pattern-based data-mining as follows in section 126(b)(1):

(1) Data-Mining.—The term “data-mining” means a query or search or other analysis of one or more electronic databases, where—

(A) at least one of the databases was obtained from or remains under the control of a non-Federal entity, or the information was acquired initially by another department or agency of the Federal Government for purposes other than intelligence or law enforcement;

(B) the search does not use personal identifiers of a specific individual or does not utilize inputs that appear on their face to identify or be associated with a specified individual to acquire information; and

(C) a department or agency of the Federal Government is conducting the query or search or other analysis to find a pattern indicating terrorist or other criminal activity.

Procedural Changes:

FBI will participate in preparing the report.

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TITLE II - TERRORISM DEATH PENALTY ENHANCEMENT

Among several provisions, this Title adjusts the Sentencing Guidelines to create a term of post-incarceration supervision in connection with a conviction for a federal terrorism crime for any term of years or for life and makes legal counsel available for death-penalty defendants.

Procedural Changes Related to the Terrorism Death Penalty Enhancement: None at this time.

TITLE III - REDUCING CRIME AND TERRORISM AT AMERICA'S SEAPORTS ACT of 2005

This Title strengthens statutes related to seaport and maritime safety. For example, the Title prohibits the maritime transportation of weapons of mass destruction for use in a federal terrorism crime (18 U.S.C. § 2283). Additionally, it prohibits the maritime transportation of terrorists (18 U.S.C. § 2284). The following highlights some of the new provisions in Title III.

Sec. 305. Transportation of Dangerous Materials and Terrorists.

This section makes it a federal crime to transport aboard a vessel an explosive, biological agent, chemical weapon, or radioactive or nuclear material with the intent that the material will be used to commit a federal crime of terrorism (as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B)).

Procedural Changes: None at this time. If necessary, additional guidance may be issued in the future.

Sec. 309. Bribery Affecting Port Security.

This section makes it a federal crime to give or take a bribe with the intent to commit international or domestic terrorism affecting port security.

Procedural Changes: None at this time. If necessary, additional guidance may be issued in the future.

Sec. 311. Smuggling Goods from the United States.

This creates a new federal crime for illegally smuggling goods from the United States.

Procedural Changes: None at this time. If necessary, additional guidance may be issued in the future.

TITLE IV - COMBATING TERRORISM FINANCING ACT of 2005.

The U.S. Department of Justice indicated that this Title carries forward the overall strategy to stop terrorist-financing by making several adjustments to criminal statutes. It accomplishes this goal by enhancing penalties for terrorism financing and prohibiting terrorism financing through informal money networks, including hawalas. Illegal money laundering transmissions (18 U.S.C. § 1960) are now predicates for racketeering (RICO predicate list at 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). Terrorism financing (18 U.S.C. § 2339C) and the receipt of foreign military

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training (18 U.S.C. § 2339D) are now added to the money laundering predicate offense list (18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(D)). Finally, the Title authorizes the U.S. to confiscate the U.S. property related to certain acts of international terrorism against a foreign government or international organization (18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(G)).

TITLE V - MISCELLANEOUS.

The Title creates a U.S. Department of Justice National Security Division which will be headed by a statutory Assistant Attorney General.

Sec. 506. Department of Justice Intelligence Matters.

This new section establishes a National Security Division (NSD) within the DOJ, headed by an Assistant Attorney General for National Security (AAGNS). This reorganization of DOJ is consistent with a recommendation by the WMD Commission that the "Department of Justice's primary national security elements - the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, and the Counterterrorism and Counterespionage sections - should be placed under a new Assistant Attorney General for National Security."

On March 2, 2006, the U.S. Department of Justice stated the following: This reorganization would bring together under one umbrella the attorneys from the Criminal Division's Counterterrorism and Counterespionage Sections and the attorneys from the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR), with their specialized expertise in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and other intelligence matters. The new Assistant Attorney General will thus have all three core national security components under his or her control. He or she will lead a dedicated team acting in concert to accomplish their shared mission of protecting the national security while simultaneously safeguarding Americans' civil liberties. The Assistant Attorney General will also serve as the Department's primary liaison to the new Director of National Intelligence, and the new Division will gather expertise from across the Department to create a focal point for providing advice on the numerous legal and policy issues raised by the Department's national security missions.

Procedural Changes: The new Division will contain the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, the Counterterrorism Section and the Counterespionage sections. The FBI's working relationships with these components will continue as normal. If the U.S. Department of Justice issues specific guidance at a future date, the guidance will be communicated to the FBI.

TITLE VI - SECRET SERVICE AUTHORIZATION AND TECHNICAL MODIFICATION ACT OF 2005.

The Title confirms that the Secret Service is a distinct entity within the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Among several provisions, the Title establishes a "rolling" no trespass zone for individuals under Secret Service protection. It also prohibits fraud in connections with U.S. identification documents issued for a presidentially designated nationally significant event.

Procedural Changes Related to the Secret Service Act: None at this time. If necessary, additional guidance may be issued in the future.

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TITLE VII - COMBAT METHAMPHETAMINE EPIDEMIC ACT OF 2005.

Congress meant to provide a comprehensive approach toward controlling the methamphetamine problem. This Title increases the regulation of domestic and international commercial transactions in methamphetamine precursor chemical and enhances the criminal sanctions for methamphetamine related crimes, including the smuggling and selling of methamphetamine. For example, the Title requires sale of products containing ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, and phenylpropanolamine be limited to a 3.6 grams per customer per day, and the products be available only "behind the counter" at sales locations.

Procedural Changes Related to the Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 2005:
None at this time. If necessary, additional guidance may be issued in the future.

Questions and Additional Information:

The National Security Law Branch [] is available to answer questions about this legislation. In addition, materials relating to the new legislation will be posted on the NSLB FBI Intranet website, which can be found through the FBI Office of General Counsel website.

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
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Read and Clear

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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**Introduction To
Foreign Intelligence
And Terrorism**415 Policy**

(U) International Terrorism investigations are classified as 415 investigations. 415 investigations are national security investigations that support the FBI's priority to protect the United States from terrorist attack. This goal drives the Counterterrorism Division's (CTD's) mission to prevent, disrupt, and defeat terrorist operations. The nature of International Terrorism investigations must focus on:



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(U) Additional information about 415 policy can be found on the FBI
Intranet at: (S)

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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**Introduction To
Foreign Intelligence
And Terrorism**266 Policy**

(U) Criminal Domestic Terrorism investigations are classified as 266 investigations. The 266 classification includes any investigation of a criminal act which involves an individual(s) who seeks to further political and/or social goals through activities that involve the use of force or violence and violate federal law. The 266 classification was developed to focus on the specific criminal activity of domestic terrorists. If a criminal violation on the part of a person(s) affiliated with a domestic terrorist group is determined to have occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur, then a criminal investigation should be opened under this classification.

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Additional DT guidance can be found on the FBI Intranet at:

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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**Introduction To
Foreign Intelligence
And Terrorism**Field Intelligence Group**

(U) The Field Intelligence Group (FIG) oversees a field office's analytical program. The FIG constitutes a mechanism for providing oversight of intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination. The FIG provides direction as to collection requirements, analysis that crosses multiple operational squads, and dissemination of information and analysis.

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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**Introduction To
Foreign Intelligence
And Terrorism**FBI Intelligence Analysts**

(U) Intelligence analysts provide both strategic and tactical support to investigations. Analysts are charged with identifying intelligence gaps and developing strategies for filling those gaps. Analysts can help agents make connections between their cases and developments within the intelligence community


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
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
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
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
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JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE (JTTF) ORIENTATION

Introduction To
Foreign Intelligence
And Terrorism

Module Review

(U) The Intelligence Community is a federation of Federal Government agencies, services, bureaus, and other organizations within the executive branch that play a role in the collection and dissemination of national intelligence.

FBI intelligence policy includes:

- AG Guidelines
- National Foreign Intelligence Policy
-
- DIOG
- 315 Policy
- 266 Policy

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(U) Intelligence Analysts provide both strategic and tactical support to investigations.

PREVIOUS :: FINISH MODULE

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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**Physical
Surveillance**Overview Of Instructional Goals And Objectives**

(U) Goal: The goal of this module is to introduce the new task force member to the physical surveillance techniques utilized by the FBI in the fight against domestic and international terrorism.

(U) Objectives:

1. Read and review an overview of physical surveillance.
2. Read and review an overview of [REDACTED]
3. Gain a basic understanding of enemy surveillance techniques.


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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**Physical
Surveillance**Bureau Surveillance Overview**Physical Surveillance

(U) Physical surveillance is a proactive investigative technique utilized to develop intelligence vital to the detection and prevention of acts of terrorism and espionage, as well as provide evidence needed in the prosecution of parties responsible for criminal activity. Surveillance coverage can be used for the following purposes:



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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Physical
Surveillance

Bureau Surveillance Overview

Physical Surveillance (Con't)



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
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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**Physical
Surveillance**Bureau Surveillance Overview****Surveillance Restrictions**

(U) There are to be no surveillances conducted in [REDACTED] unless specific authority is obtained from the Assistant Director of the FBIHQ Division responsible for the investigation. Assistant Director in Charge, SACs, or ASACs. WFO, may approve on an emergency basis a surveillance to be conducted in [REDACTED] with written notification within 24 hours to the Assistant Director of the appropriate FBIHQ Division. If a surveillance is authorized, there are not to be contacts with the individual(s) being surveilled, other law enforcement personnel or other individuals in the area. [REDACTED]

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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Physical
Surveillance

Bureau Surveillance Overview



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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
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Physical
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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Physical
Surveillance

Bureau Surveillance Overview



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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Physical
Surveillance

Bureau Surveillance Overview



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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
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
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
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
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
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
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
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ORIENTATION**Physical
Surveillance**Bureau Surveillance Overview**Surveillance Logs

(U) A surveillance log should be maintained for the purpose of documenting observations made during surveillance. The log is a chronological narrative detailing the observations noted during the surveillance. Prior to initiating the surveillance, a team member should be assigned to writing the log. At the end of the shift each individual should initial on the log the notations of the activities he/she observed. Completed logs should be incorporated into the case file and indexed. Original notes should be permanently retained in a 1A envelope (FD-340a). Logs should be concise and factual. When reporting locations, be as specific as possible. Avoid over-reporting or including unnecessary information since logs are subject to scrutiny in legal proceedings. All surveillance logs should be reviewed for accuracy since inaccuracies could be used by the defense to potentially discredit testimony.

(U) See this note regarding the alternative use of the FD-302.

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
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DATE _____
DAY _____
WEATHER _____
CASE # _____

by the following agents:

[illegible]**FBI020817**

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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
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
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


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
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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
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
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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
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
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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

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Module Review

- Physical surveillance is a proactive investigative technique utilized to develop intelligence vital to the detection and prevention of acts of terrorism and espionage, as well as provide evidence needed in the prosecution of parties responsible for criminal activity.



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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**Investigative
Techniques**Overview Of Instructional Goals And Objectives**

(U) Goal: The goal of this module is to introduce the new task force member to the investigative techniques that may be used when developing and/or collecting information/intelligence and evidence [REDACTED]

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Objectives:

1. Read and review the investigative techniques: [REDACTED]
2. Read and review the policies and procedures of [REDACTED], a Grand Jury Subpoena, and an Administrative Subpoena.
3. Read and review [REDACTED]
4. Read and review the policies and procedures of [REDACTED]
5. Gain a basic understanding of [REDACTED]
6. Read and review the FBI's policies and procedures regarding [REDACTED]
7. Gain a basic understanding of who can assist in [REDACTED]
8. Read and review the units that comprise [REDACTED]
9. Gain a basic understanding of how to [REDACTED]
10. Read and review [REDACTED]

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
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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
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
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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**Investigative
Techniques**(U) Grand Jury Subpoena**

(U) Grand Jury Subpoenas are issued in criminal matters and obtained from the USA's Office. Service of the Grand Jury Subpoena is done either by the Case Agent, another law enforcement officer or an Investigative Analyst. Document the serving of the Grand Jury Subpoena and the results of serving the subpoena on the same communication - for example, a FD 302 and/or an EC, [REDACTED]

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(U) If utilizing Grand Jury Subpoenas, do not [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The Case Agent may share the results of a Grand Jury Subpoena only with individuals who are on the 6(e) list with the case. To get on the 6(e) list, the Case Agent contacts the AUSA assigned to the case.

(U) While conducting an investigation, once an indictment has been returned, Grand Jury Subpoenas can no longer be used.

(U) **Reminder:** The use of certain investigative techniques may require disclosure to the subject, such as Federal Grand Jury Subpoenas. **Investigators should consider and consult with the** USA's Office, National Security Law Branch [REDACTED] and/or Chief Division Counsel, and the substantive unit in the Counterterrorism Division regarding these potential disclosure requirements when selecting an investigative technique.

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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**Investigative
Techniques**(U) Administrative Subpoena**

(U) Administrative Subpoenas (FD-617) are used only in criminal investigations involving violations of the Controlled Substances Act (Title 21), Health Care Fraud, and Child Pornography.

(U) Restraint should be exercised in the use of the Administrative Subpoena, as it is not a [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Primary use of the Administrative Subpoena will be [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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(U) The Administrative Subpoena is printed in two copies, original and attested copy. The original with executed return of service will be kept in the case file. The attested copy should be served to the person named on the subpoena. A copy of the Administrative Subpoena is "electronically" placed in the respective division subfiles. The Program Supervisory Special Agent or the ASAC signs Administrative Subpoenas.

(U) A FD-302 should be prepared on the service and results of the Administrative Subpoena. An Investigative Analyst (IA) can prepare and serve the Administrative Subpoena when provided with the appropriate information from the Case Agent. Further, the IA will prepare a FD-302 on the results on the Administrative Subpoena.

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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**Investigative
Techniques**(U) Administrative Subpoena
(Con't)**

(U) Information acquired as a result of an Administrative Subpoena is not 6(e) material. Like Grand Jury subpoenas, once an indictment is returned, Administrative Subpoenas can no longer be used to acquire records. Trial subpoenas or court orders remain the only options post indictment. Authority to compel attendance and testimony of witnesses, and require records production relevant to controlled substance investigations may be granted by the SSRA, OC/DP SSA, or ASAC.

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
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
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
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
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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Investigative
Techniques




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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Investigative
Techniques




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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Investigative
Techniques



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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Investigative
Techniques



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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Investigative
Techniques

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(See Note)

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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Investigative
Techniques



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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Investigative
Techniques




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
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


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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Investigative
Techniques




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


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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Investigative
Techniques



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PAGE: 30 OF 37


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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Investigative
Techniques



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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Investigative
Techniques



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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Investigative
Techniques

(U) Analysis 

(U) Intelligence Analysts and Financial Analysts are available to review and analyze:



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(U) An EC must be prepared setting a lead for their assistance.

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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Investigative
Techniques

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
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
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


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
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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Investigative
Techniques



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
**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Investigative
Techniques

(U)

~~(S)~~ **Undercover Activities And Operations**

(U) An undercover activity is any investigative activity involving the use of an assumed name or cover identity.



(U)

~~(S)~~ **(See Note)**


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


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
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ON 10-21-2011



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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**Investigative
Techniques**(U) Module Review**

- [redacted] are investigative techniques used by the FBI to develop and/or collect information/intelligence and evidence [redacted]
- Specific policies and procedures must be used when obtaining and using [redacted] Grand Jury Subpoenas, and Administrative Subpoenas.
- [redacted] are investigative techniques used to [redacted]
- Specific policies and procedures must be adhered to when using [redacted]
- [redacted]
- Specific policies and procedures must be adhered to when [redacted]
- [redacted] (U) Intelligence Analysts and Financial Analysts are available [redacted]
- [redacted]
- Specific policies and procedures must be used when obtaining [redacted]
- [redacted]

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REASON: 1.4 (c)
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Asset/Source
Recruitment And
Management

(U) Overview Of Instructional Goals And Objectives

(U) Goal: The goal of this module is to introduce the new task force member to the asset/source recruitment and management policies and procedures employed by the FBI in the fight against domestic and international terrorism.

Objectives:

1. Read and review an overview of International Terrorism Interviewing.
2. Read and review the type of information that should be obtained during a 415 interview.
3. Gain a basic understanding of the policies and procedures of source development and tasking.
4. Gain a basic understanding of asset administration.
5. Gain a basic understanding of

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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**Asset/Source
Recruitment And
Management

(U) ~~(S)~~ **Overview Of International Terrorism (IT) Interviewing**
(NFIPM Section 19-03, Part N)

(U) ~~(S)~~ There are many instances when the Bureau receives information about an individual that neither relates to a threat to national security nor alleges clear criminal conduct.

(U) ~~(S)~~

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(U) ~~(S)~~

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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Asset/Source
Recruitment And
Management

(U) Overview Of International Terrorism (IT) Interviewing



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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**Asset/Source
Recruitment And
Management

(U) ~~(S)~~ Overview Of International Terrorism (IT) Interviewing
CTD Approval Authority

(U)	~~(S)~~		b7E
(S)	~~(U)~~		b1 b7E
(U)	~~(U)~~		
(U)	~~(U)~~		
(U)	~~(U)~~		
(U)	~~(U)~~		
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Asset/Source
Recruitment And
Management

(U) ~~(S)~~ Overview Of International Terrorism (IT) Interviewing
CTD Approval Authority (Con't)

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
**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Asset/Source
Recruitment And
Management

(U)

~~(S)~~ Overview Of International Terrorism (IT) Interviewing

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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Asset/Source
Recruitment And
Management

(U) Interview Guide For 415 Cases



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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**Asset/Source
Recruitment And
Management**(U) Interview Guide For 415 Cases
(Con't)**

- Obtain knowledge of any suspicious individuals, to include those who are:

A large rectangular black box used to redact information.

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- Obtain knowledge of 
- Obtain knowledge of anyone involved in the planning of attacks against the U.S.

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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Asset/Source
Recruitment And
Management

(U)

~~(S)~~ Source Development And Tasking

(U)

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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Asset/Source
Recruitment And
Management

(S)

~~(S)~~ **Source Development And Tasking**

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
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
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


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
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


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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Asset/Source
Recruitment And
Management

(U) ~~(S)~~ Source Developing And Tasking



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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Asset/Source
Recruitment And
Management

(U) ~~(S)~~ Source Development And Tasking
Obtaining Information

(S)

~~X~~
X
~~X~~
~~X~~

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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

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Asset/Source
Recruitment And
Management

(U) ~~(S)~~ Administration
Approval to Operate

(U)

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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Asset/Source
Recruitment And
Management

(U) ~~(S)~~ Administration
Notification of Approval

(U) ~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

(U) ~~(S)~~ After approval of an asset:

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(U) ~~(S)~~ [Redacted]
(U) ~~(S)~~ [Redacted]
(U) ~~(S)~~ [Redacted]

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
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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**Asset/Source
Recruitment And
Management

(U) ~~(S)~~ Administration
Opening Assets

(U) ~~(S)~~ [redacted] must be completed prior to opening the source. [redacted] b7E
[redacted] requires the following:

(U) [redacted]
(U) [redacted]
(U) [redacted]
(U) [redacted]
(S) [redacted]
(U) [redacted]

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(U) ~~(S)~~/(NF) Visit the [redacted] for more details: b7E
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Asset/Source
Recruitment And
Management

(U) ~~(S)~~ Administration

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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Asset/Source
Recruitment And
Management

(U) ~~(S)~~ Administration

Special Approval Requirements are needed to open and operate the following types of sources:

(U) ~~(S)~~

(U) ~~(S)~~

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Refer to the  for more details:

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JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE (JTTF) ORIENTATION

**Asset/Source
Recruitment And
Management**

~~(S)~~ **Administration**

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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Asset/Source
Recruitment And
Management

(U) ~~(S)~~ Administration

(U)



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
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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

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Asset/Source
Recruitment And
Management

(U) ~~(S)~~ Administration



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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Asset/Source
Recruitment And
Management

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
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
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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Asset/Source
Recruitment And
Management

(U) ~~(S)~~ Administration

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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Asset/Source
Recruitment And
Management

(U) ~~(S)~~ Administration

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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Asset/Source
Recruitment And
Management

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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Asset/Source
Recruitment And
Management

(U) ~~(S)~~ Administration



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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

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Asset/Source
Recruitment And
Management

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Evaluation EC

(U) ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S)~~ For the latest information on human source validation, check with the [REDACTED]

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Asset/Source
Recruitment And
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(U) ~~(S)~~ Administration

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
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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Asset/Source
Recruitment And
Management

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
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ORIENTATION**

Asset/Source
Recruitment And
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
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ORIENTATION**

Asset/Source
Recruitment And
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JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE (JTTF) ORIENTATION

**Asset/Source
Recruitment And
Management**

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
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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Asset/Source
Recruitment And
Management

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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Asset/Source
Recruitment And
Management

(U) ~~(S)~~ Administration

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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Asset/Source
Recruitment And
Management

(U) ~~(S)~~ Administration

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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**Asset/Source
Recruitment And
Management

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Assets and [REDACTED]

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~~(S)~~ If you suspect that a subject may have connections or associates with [REDACTED]

trained [REDACTED]

or otherwise [REDACTED]

consider [REDACTED]

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(U) An EC will be prepared with a summary of your case and [REDACTED]

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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Asset/Source
Recruitment And
Management



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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Asset/Source
Recruitment And
Management

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[Redacted Content]

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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**Asset/Source
Recruitment And
Management

(U) ~~(S)~~ **Module Review**

- When conducting International Terrorism interviewing follow proper approval authority.
- 415 interviews are thorough in order to [REDACTED]
- The FBI's policies and procedures for source development and tasking must be followed.
- The FBI's policies and procedures for asset administration must be followed.

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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

International
Operations.

(U) Overview Of Instructional Goals And Objectives

(U) Goal: The goal of this module is to introduce the new task force officer to FBI international operations that support the FBI's fight against domestic and international terrorism.

Objectives:

1. Gain a basic understanding of the FBI's overseas theater operations.
2. Gain a basic understanding of role of the Legal Attache.
3. Read and review the FBI's policies and procedures regarding foreign travel.
4. Read and review information regarding pre-deployment planning.

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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

International
Operations

(U) Overseas Theatre Operations



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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

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International
Operations

(U) ~~(S)~~ Overseas Theatre Operations

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
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
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


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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

International
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(U) ~~(S)~~ Overseas Theatre Operations

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
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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
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International
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(U) ~~(S)~~ Overseas Theatre Operations

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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
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Operations

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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
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International
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
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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
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ORIENTATION**

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Operations

(U) Overseas Theatre Operations



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
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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
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(U) ~~(S)~~ Overseas Theatre Operations
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
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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

International
Operations

(U) Overseas Theatre Operations



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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

International
Operations

(U) Overseas Theatre Operations



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
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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

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Operations

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
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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**International
Operations**(U) Legat Operations****Legats**

(U) A Legat is the FBI's representative stationed in an American Embassy abroad who is responsible for liaison with [redacted] intelligence agencies in matters of interest between those agencies and the FBI. Legat personnel respond to the FBI's domestic and extraterritorial investigative needs. They can accomplish this because [redacted]

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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**International
Operations**(U) Legat Operations****Legat Services**

(U) The services of the Legat should be utilized by domestic field offices and FBIHQ personnel requiring investigative assistance abroad as the Legat is qualified to handle the full range of FBI matters overseas. Legats' territories cover all nations in which the U. S. Government (USG) maintains diplomatic relations. Legats are expected to [REDACTED]

(U) Each agent must utilize the Legats in all of his/her overseas contacts. In instances where ongoing or continuous contacts for extended periods of time become necessary, direct contact between the FBI domestic employees and [REDACTED] must be approved by and coordinated through the appropriate Legat.

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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
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International
Operations

(U) Legat Operations

Leads to Foreign Countries

(U) Leads for all foreign countries should be submitted to the Legat covering the region, with informational copies to the Office of International Operations (OIO) and substantive desk(s) at FBIHQ. Leads submitted through must include an information copy for the respective Legat.

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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**International
Operations**(U) Legat Operations****Legat Responsibilities**

(U) In addition to the Legat's responsibility to the host country, Legats are also responsible to the U.S. Ambassadors overseas. The FBI is obligated by a MOU between the Departments of Justice, State, and Treasury to keep the Chief of Mission "fully and currently informed" with respect to all activities and operations of FBI employees in that country. The Legats must be completely aware of all FBI activities in their territories so that they can meet their obligations to both the host country and the U.S. Ambassador.

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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**International
Operations**(U) Bureau Policy And Procedures****Foreign Travel and Country Clearance**

(U) In accordance with the requirements of the above MOU, all official foreign travel must be coordinated with the Legat Office covering the country concerned and the Office of International Operations (OIO). The Legat should be kept informed as to contemplated activity to ensure [REDACTED]. The Legat will also be able to comment as to any other current activity or political circumstances in the foreign country, which may have some effect on the travel activity.

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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
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Operations

(U) Bureau Policy And Procedures

Foreign Travel EC



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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
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
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International
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(U) Bureau Policy And Procedures



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
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
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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

International
Operations

(U) Bureau Policy And Procedures



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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

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International
Operations

(U) ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Bureau Policy And Procedures
Additional Travel Instructions

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE: 10-25-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 65179 DMH/ spt/ lsg
REASON: 1.4 (c, d)
DECLASSIFY ON: 10-25-2036

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Attorney General Guidelines for FBI
Foreign Intelligence Collection and
Foreign Counterintelligence
Investigations (FCIG)

Presented by:



Office of the General Counsel
National Security Law Unit

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Presentation Overview

- Lesson Objectives
- Introduction to the Guidelines
- Definitions
- Counterintelligence & Counterterrorism Investigations
- Dissemination
- Reporting Requirements

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Lesson Objectives --

By the end of the session you should:

- understand the basic purpose, scope, and organization of the FCIG
- be able to apply the "least intrusive means" principle
- know how to apply the U.S. Person presumption
- be familiar with the key definitions

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Lesson Objectives --

By the end of the session you should:

- know what investigative steps can be taken

[REDACTED]

- know

[REDACTED]

- understand which investigative techniques are available


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- know the rules for disseminating and reporting information

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Introduction

- E.O. 12333 requires the FBI to:
 - conduct and coordinate counterintelligence activities within the United States
 - Coordinate counterintelligence activities outside the United States with the CIA
 - Collect foreign intelligence
 - Produce and disseminate foreign intelligence and counterintelligence

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Introduction

- E.O 12333 provides that the FBI's responsibilities will be conducted in accordance with "such regulations as the Attorney General may establish"
- The FCIG are these regulations
- Most recent version is March 8, 1999

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Introduction

- The FCIG are the basic rules of the road that give the FBI its direction for conducting counterintelligence and counterterrorism investigations
- They also provide guidance on foreign intelligence collection and [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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Least Intrusive Means

- Required by Section 2.4 of E.O. 12333 and Section III.A.1 of the FCIG.
- The FBI should collect information under the FCIG using the *least intrusive means* that will provide the quality, scope and timeliness required in a manner consistent with the laws and policies of the United States

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U.S. Person Presumption

- in which the status of a subject is not known, the subject shall be treated as a U.S. person

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
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FCIG Structure

- Scope
- Definitions
- Collection of FCI information
- Special Techniques
- Dissemination
- Reporting

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Subjects

- Subjects of counterintelligence investigations are divided into:
 - foreign powers
 -
 - foreign visitors
 - U.S. persons

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Foreign Power


- A foreign government or any component regardless of whether recognized by U.S.
- A faction of a foreign nation, not substantially composed of U.S. persons
- Entity openly acknowledged by a foreign government
- Group engaged in international terrorism
- Foreign-based political organization, not substantially composed of U.S. persons
- Entity directed and controlled by a foreign government

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Pre-investigative Activities

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Pre-investigative Activities (Cont.)

- Examine FBI records, review publicly available reference material [redacted]

[redacted] in
order to obtain *identifying data*
concerning an *unknown person* for
indexing purposes

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Pre-Investigative Activities (Cont.)

- Examine FBI records *and* review publicly available reference material in order to obtain *identifying data* concerning a *known person* for *indexing purposes*

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
Pre-investigative Activities (Cont.)

- Conduct background inquiries concerning consenting individuals [REDACTED]

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
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Special Techniques




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Operations Outside the U.S.


- DCI (or designee) and Attorney General (delegated to section chief) approval is necessary for investigative activity conducted outside the United States



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Dissemination

- In General
- To Federal Authorities
- To State and Local Government Authorities

- [REDACTED]

- To Congressional Committees

- [REDACTED]

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Dissemination in General

- Transmission of information within DOJ is not dissemination
- Can disseminate publicly available information that doesn't identify U.S. persons for any lawful purpose

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Dissemination in General (cont.)

- Non-publicly available information can be disseminated within the intelligence community
- Non-publicly available information identifying U.S. persons may be disseminated outside the intelligence community if the identities may reasonably become necessary to understand or assess the importance of the information

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Dissemination to Federal Authorities

- FBI may disseminate information to other federal authorities when it:
 - relates to a crime or violation of regulation within that agency's jurisdiction
 - relates to the other agency's authorized responsibilities
 - is required to be disseminated by statute or other directive

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Dissemination to State and Local Authorities

- The FBI may disseminate facts or information relating to crimes to state and local governments if the dissemination is consistent with the interests of U.S. national security

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
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Dissemination to Congressional Committees

- The FBI can provide briefings and testimony on matters of general intelligence interests to the appropriate Congressional committees
- Any further dissemination requires Attorney General approval
- The FBI must consult with any other agency with a stake in the information prior to dissemination

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
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Reporting Requirements

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Questions?



Call NSLU

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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**International
Operations**(U) Bureau Policy And Procedures****Passports**

(U) Diplomatic passports do not automatically confer any diplomatic privileges or Immunities (P&Is) from search, seizure or arrest in a foreign nation. In order for the bearer of a diplomatic passport to have diplomatic P&Is in the host nation, the bearer must be a USG employee permanently assigned to the US Embassy and be named on the diplomatic list of the nation. Diplomatic passports are issued through liaison between the OIO and State. The issuance of diplomatic passports is within the sole purview of the Department of State and their issuance is strictly controlled. An official passport is the standard requirement for FBI employees travelling abroad on official business.

(U) The OIO recommends that the official traveler also carry a valid U.S. tourist passport as a back up for a diplomatic or official passport to be used under certain limited situations. The use of a tourist passport must not be presented to enter or depart from the foreign nation or in connection with other USG official duties or business.



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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**International
Operations**(U) Bureau Policy And Procedures****Passports (Con't)**

An official passport is not to be used for personal or pleasure travel, and any loss should be reported at once to the division head and the OIO. Since official passports and visas provide no immunity for the bearer, he/she (the bearer) can be held fully liable for all actions while abroad. This liability is both civil and criminal under the laws of the host country, which are often different from those in the United States.

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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**International
Operations**(U) Bureau Policy And Procedures**Visas

(U) Most foreign nations will not issue a visa if the diplomatic or official passport will expire in six months or less of the travel date.

(U) A visa is a permit, entered on the passport of a national of one country, by the consulate of another. This permit allows the bearer entry to or transit through, the country issuing the permit. On request, and with proper notice, the OIO will obtain visas necessary for official travel. A valid diplomatic or official passport with an expiration date greater than six months after the requested travel dates is required to be sent to the OIO when applying for a visa.

(U) The time for which visas are issued usually depends on the length of the trip. Applications, pictures, International Health Cards, and other certified documents may be required before visas are issued. Official travel to most countries requires a visa. The visa is stamped in the U.S. passport used for travel. Visas are obtained from that country's Embassy or Consulate in the U.S. Foreign diplomatic establishments require a DOS, Washington, D.C., Passport Office letter before they will issue a visa for official travel. Note that most foreign Embassies in the US have specified time frames required for the issuance of a visa. Three to five workdays are commonly required; however, select nations may require weeks to issue a visa. The OIO should be consulted at the earliest time when international travel is planned.

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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**International
Operations**(U) Bureau Policy And Procedures****Investigations**

(U) FBI Agents have no jurisdiction in foreign countries. Agents do not have arrest powers, subpoena powers, or the authority to conduct investigations, including foreign national interviews, in other countries without the approval of the COM and the host government. [REDACTED]

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FBI credentials must be carried while on official travel abroad; however, use and/or display of credentials in a foreign country except for identification in an official capacity is inappropriate.

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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**International
Operations**(U) Bureau Policy And Procedures****National Sovereignty**

(U) National sovereignty of the foreign nation prohibits FBI Agents from exercising law enforcement or peace officer status. Notwithstanding the extraterritorial reach of some US statutes, no U.S. law can override a foreign country's right to protect the integrity of its sovereignty. A foreign nation may, however, agree to permit the FBI to perform limited law enforcement functions when in the company of a counterpart host nation law enforcement or intelligence official when the FBI has joint investigative jurisdiction. Though not limited to terrorist activity, such investigations generally have been conducted in the aftermath of terrorist attacks. The FBI's role in these shared investigations requires COM/Legat, OIO and FBIHQ approvals, in addition to host nation approval and are usually limited to victim/witness interviews and routine forensic examinations.

(U) Unless the above approvals have been granted, FBI Agents from domestic offices may not independently conduct investigations in foreign countries, including foreign national interviews without concurrence of the host government. Exceptions to this prohibition are authorized when a foreign national appears at an embassy or consulate voluntarily (walk-ins) or when an American citizen voluntarily appears for interview on these diplomatic premises. However, the interview of an American citizen or foreign national in-country, not on U.S. diplomatically protected premises, requires the above approvals and host nation authority. Such off-premises interviews would normally be conducted by the host government authorities.

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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**International
Operations

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(U) Bureau Policy And Procedures**Interviewing Persons in Police Custody in a Foreign Country**

(U) Persons interviewed by FBI Agents while in police custody in a foreign country must be given the usual warning of rights under American Federal law provided there is no objection from the foreign police officer. If he/she objects, feeling the warning is not consistent with the law of his/her country and might work unfavorably on prosecution of the subject there, the officer should be requested to give the warning as required by the law of his/her country. Record the wording of this warning and the time and circumstances of its issuance.

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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

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International
Operations

(U) Bureau Policy And Procedures
Counterintelligence Activities



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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

International
Operations

(U) Bureau Policy And Procedures

Routine Leads in Foreign Countries




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
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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**International
Operations**(U) Bureau Policy And Procedures****Extradition**

(U) International extradition is the formal process by which a person found in one country is surrendered to another country for trial or punishment. The process is regulated by treaty and conducted between the U.S. government and the government of a foreign country. It differs considerably from interstate extradition or interstate rendition. Extradition, in most instances, may be granted only pursuant to a treaty. Responsibility for extradition matters lies with the DOJ and the DOS. A simple telephone call to a foreign police agency will not result in having a subject arrested and returned to the U.S. by host nation law enforcement officials.

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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**International
Operations**(U) Bureau Policy And Procedures****Subpoenas**

(U) It is possible, pursuant to U.S. law, to have a subpoena issued for a national or resident of the U.S. in a foreign country, directing the witness to appear before a U.S. court. However, Legats cannot automatically serve subpoenas in other countries. It may be a violation of sovereignty. Foreign laws may restrict the serving of such subpoenas. U.S. Attorney's Offices work closely with the Department of Justice's Office of International Affairs to select a method of obtaining the witness's presence in the U.S. In some cases this may be done in concert with an American consular official acting on a request by the DOS. [REDACTED]

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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

International
Operations

(U) Bureau Policy And Procedures



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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

International
Operations

(U) Bureau Policy And Procedures

Other Investigative Techniques: Consult Legat in Host Nation



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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

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International
Operations

(U) Bureau Policy And Procedures

Legat Responsibilities

(U) Legats are responsible for conducting and coordinating all investigative matters overseas, including cases where domestic FBI Agents are deployed from the extraterritorial squads. The Legat is there to ensure that the anticipated investigation proposed by the office of origin does not raise sovereignty issues with the host government and that all matters have been coordinated with the embassy in accordance with the COM MOU. The Legats must be part of the investigative planning and decision making in order to fulfill the Director's expectations with respect to their role in overseas investigations.


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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**International
Operations**(U) U.S. Department Of State Information And Updates****Travel Advisories**

(U) Travel advisories are issued by the DOS for countries where potential terrorist threats and potential unrest exist. Visit http://www.travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/tw/tw_1764.html for a current list of travel advisories. (Note: The DOS refers to travel advisories as "Travel Warnings" on their website. The terms are interchangeable.)



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JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE (JTTF) ORIENTATION


International
Operations

(U) U.S. Department Of State Information And Updates

Post Reports

(U) Post Reports provide information regarding countries in which U.S. Embassies are located. The information provided includes a brief history and description of the country's area, geography, climate, population, public institutions, arts, science, education, commerce and industry, transportation, communication, health and medicine, housing, food, clothing, supplies and services, education, recreation and social life, official functions, pets, etc. (Note: The DOS refers to post reports as "Background Notes" on their website. The terms are interchangeable.)

Visit www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/ for a full list of countries.



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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

International
Operations

(U) Temporary Duty Pre-Deployment Planning

Personal Property

(U) Household maintenance issues, household security issues, and automotive needs should be reviewed and addressed prior to deployment.

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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**International
Operations**(U) Temporary Duty Pre-Deployment Planning****Personal and Family Matters**

(U) The pre-separation period is stressful for all family members, especially for parents and children. Communication between yourself and loved ones is of vital importance, and can help alleviate the stress and tension often associated with deployment. The key to successful and authentic communication with family members is to be honest. Prior to deployment, is the time to open up lines of communication between you and family members. Honestly discuss with family members feelings about the assignment or deployment, and identify fears and expectations. Discuss any contingencies or unforeseen changes you might imagine. Personalities might change, especially those of the children. By the time you return home, goals may have changed for either you or your spouse or partner.

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
**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

International
Operations

(U) Temporary Duty Pre-Deployment Planning

Medical

(U) An important pre-deployment responsibility is to visit the Health Care Programs Unit (HCPU).



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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**International
Operations**(U) Temporary Duty Pre-Deployment Planning****Legal**

(U) During deployment there may be times when legal matters must be taken care of in your absence. Consult an attorney for any legal questions concerning your particular situation. Wills and Powers of Attorney are just as critical for a single FBI employee as it is for his/her married employee.

POWER OF ATTORNEY
U.S. Citizen

I, the undersigned, being of sound mind and legal age, do hereby authorize _____ to act as my agent and attorney-in-fact in all matters relating to my person and property, and to execute and deliver any instrument which may be necessary or proper for the purpose of carrying out the foregoing, and to do all such other acts and things as may be required or necessary for the purpose of the foregoing.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal this ____ day of _____, 20__.

Principal's Name: _____
Principal's Address: _____
Principal's Date of Birth: _____

Agent's Name: _____
Agent's Address: _____

TERMINATION DATE: _____
NOTARIZATION DATE: _____

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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

International
Operations

(U) Temporary Duty Pre-Deployment Planning

Financial and Insurance

(U) Your insurance carrier may provide worldwide assistance with traveler's medical insurance and terrorism coverage for FBI employees. Be sure to review how your Federal and Bureau benefits and insurance coverage work while you are overseas serving the FBI.

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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**International
Operations**(U) Temporary Duty Pre-Deployment Planning**Deployment Briefing

(U) After an employee has been identified as a candidate for deployment, management may hold a briefing. The Deployment Briefing will accomplish several objectives by communicating the following:

- The nature and objective of the deployment.
- All relevant, available intelligence.
- Potential dangers involved, and discussion regarding physical security during the deployment.
- Necessary precautions.
- Anticipated time frame and schedules.
- Chain-of-command.
- Emergency contacts and plans for deployment termination/emergency evacuation.
- EAP facilitated education relating to separations, stress and coping skills.
- Support services available via EAP, Health Services, Office of General Counsel, Office of International Operations, etc.
- Dissemination of pre-deployment checklists, tips, and family support information.
- Establish a time-period for candidates to prepare and set tentative dates for the next briefing.

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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**~~SECRET~~//NOFORNInternational
Operations**(U) Module Review**

-
- A Legat, an FBI representative stationed in an American Embassy abroad, is responsible for liaison and intelligence agencies in matters of interest between these agencies and FBIHQ. FBIHQ personnel and domestic field offices requiring investigative assistance abroad should utilize the services of the Legat.
 - Specific policies and procedures should be followed when planning to travel outside the United States.

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**Middle East/Arab
Culture And
Familiarization**Overview Of Instructional Goals And Objectives**

(U) Goal: The goal of this module is to introduce the new task force officer to Middle East/Arab culture.

(U) Objectives:

1. Read and review a history of the Middle East.
2. Gain a basic understanding of Islamic religion and society.
3. Read and review an overview of radical fundamentalist terrorist groups.

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JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE (JTTF) ORIENTATION

Middle East/Arab
Culture And
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History Of The Middle East

(U) The Beginning of the Middle East

(U) The earliest civilizations in the region now known as the Middle East were founded in Mesopotamia and Ancient Egypt. The Sumerians, Babylonians, Assyrians and others built important states. From about 500 B.C. onward, several empires dominated the region.

(U) In the 1st Century B.C., the Roman Republic absorbed the entire eastern Mediterranean area, and under the Roman Empire, the region was united with most of Europe and North Africa in a single political and economic unit; this unity facilitated the spread of Christianity. The rule of Rome was succeeded in the 4th Century A.D. by the rule of the Byzantine Empire centered in Constantinople, which ruled from the Balkans to the Euphrates River. The Persian Empire controlled much of the Middle East beyond the Byzantine Empire. Until the 7th Century, Anatolia (Turkey), Syria, Palestine, and Egypt were all Christian and Greek speaking, united culturally and politically under the rule of the Byzantine Empire, while Mesopotamia (modern Iraq) formed a buffer zone between the Byzantine and Persian Empires.



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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**Middle East/Arab
Culture And
Familiarization**History Of The Middle East****(U) The Rise of Islam**

(U) The rise of Islam in the Arabian Peninsula was a decisive event in the creation of the Middle East as a distinct cultural region. The followers of Muhammad occupied Palestine, Mesopotamia (Iraq), Syria, and Egypt. The Byzantines succeeded in preventing the Arabs from seizing Anatolia, which remained Christian until the arrival of the Turks 400 years later. The majority of the population in the areas conquered by the Arabs converted to Islam within two generations, creating a permanent cultural frontier between Europe and the Muslim world.



(U) During the 9th and 10th Centuries, the Arabs remained unchallenged in the zone between the Nile and the Tigris Rivers as well as in North Africa and most of Spain. The Arab cities of Cairo, Alexandria, Basra, Damascus and Baghdad, supported a large population, a prosperous trading economy, and a rich cultural life.

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JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE (JTTF) ORIENTATION

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History Of The Middle East

(I) The Rise of Empires

(U) By the mid-11th Century, the Seljuk Turks had migrated south from central Asia, and conquered Persia, Iraq, Syria, Palestine and the Hejaz, defeating the Byzantines and conquering Anatolia and later Egypt. The Seljuk Turks ruled most of the region for several hundred years, until the empire began breaking up. The fragmentation of the region allowed the Christian west to re-enter the region during the European-led Crusades. The Crusaders, however, were unable to establish a permanent presence in the area.

(U) By the 15th Century, a new empire had arisen in western Anatolia, ruled by the Ottomans who united the entire Middle Eastern region under one rule. The Ottomans continued by conquering Greece, the Balkans, and most of Hungary; however by 1700, the Ottomans had been driven out of Hungary and began a cultural and technological decline. The Middle East began looking to the west for money in order to build up the region.



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Culture And
Familiarization**History Of The Middle East****(U) British and French Involvement**

(U) When the Ottoman Empire collapsed in the 1900s, the British and the French enacted a secret treaty (Sykes-Picot Agreement) to partition the Middle East between them. Thus, the British and French established a permanent presence in the area. Great Britain, fearful of potential threats to their economically critical trade with India, began occupying the Middle Eastern counties of Egypt, Sudan, and Somalia. During World War I, the British took over Palestine and Mesopotamia, and freed Arabia from the Turks, ensuring their independence under pro-British rulers. Post-war settlements between the Allies left Britain in control of the Middle East in the 1920s. It was during this time of British control that territories on the Arabian Peninsula came together as Saudi Arabia and gave rise to Arab nationalism as a strong influence. In addition, the British implemented the Balfour Declaration.

(U) The Balfour Declaration put in writing Britain's Foreign Secretary, Arthur Balfour's, promise to "view with favor" the creation of a Jewish homeland, should the Jews support Britain in the war effort. Soon after World War I, Jews known as Zionists began their campaign to return Israel to "Ancient Israel." Jews by the thousands began immigrating to Palestine, buying land from absentee Arab owners, and settling in virtually independent, self-contained settlements. Balfour's Declaration created an ethnic and religious divide that is still a major cause of conflict in the area today.

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Culture And
Familiarization**History Of The Middle East****(U) Independence in the Middle East**

(U) During the 1920s and 1930s, Iraq, Syria and Egypt moved toward independence. In Palestine, the conflict between the forces of Arab nationalism and Zionist colonization was exacerbated by the 1947 United Nations plan to partition Palestine to create both a Jewish state and a Palestinian state. The Palestinians rejected the plan, and the Zionist settlers declared Israel a state in 1948, sparking a war in which the Palestinians, supported by neighboring Arabs, were defeated.

(U) The departure of European powers from direct control of the region, the increasing importance of the oil industry, and the establishment of Israel marked the creation of the modern Middle East.



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Culture And
Familiarization**Islamic Religion And Society****(U) The Founding of Islam**

Muhammad is the founder of the religion of Islam, and considered by Muslims to be the final prophet from God. Muhammad, at the age of 40 in 610 A.D. went on a retreat to Mecca and purportedly began hearing the voice of God telling him new, pure scripture. Muhammad recited the scripture to family, friends, and, later, growing numbers of believers. The scriptures were later put into a holy book called the Quran. Muhammad followed the scriptures absolutely, without deviation, and expected those who believed in Islam to do the same. To help him interpret the meaning of the scriptures, Muhammad gathered a group of close relatives, friends, and confidants, who become his Al Shura Council.

(U) When Muhammad started preaching in 612 A.D., he brought to the Arabian Peninsula a unifying influence. Islam, in effect, unified the Arabian Peninsula as a nation, by giving the inhabitants a:

- Common name – Muslim
- One leader to follow – Muhammad
- A common goal in life – to worship God and spread his word (Islam) to others
- A single language for all to use – classic Arabic

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Culture And
Familiarization**Islamic Religion And Society****(U) The Founding of Islam (Con't)**

(U) Not all people in Mecca, especially the rich merchants, welcomed Muhammad's revelations regarding Allah's desire for social justice among humans and prostration before him (Allah). When Muhammad's clan leader died, Muhammad lost his protection in Mecca. In 622 A.D., Muhammad fled to Medina, a city north of Mecca, where he and his followers found protection from the two Arab tribes living there. Muhammad's departure from Mecca is called Hijrah, and the Hijrah is considered the official beginning of Islam and the start of the Muslim calendar.

(U) Muhammad and his followers settled in Medina, where Muhammad continued his preaching. At first, Muhammad preached unity under one God with the Medini Jews, but the Jews wanted nothing to do with Muhammad or Islam. As time passed, the Jews became intolerant of Muhammad's message and the spread of Islam. The Medini Jews joined with the Meccan Arabs, who pursued Muhammad to Medina to stop Muhammad's spread of Islam. In 630 A.D., Muhammad marched an army to Mecca and retook the city.

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Culture And
Familiarization**Islamic Religion And Society****(U) Islam after Muhammad's Death**

(U) After Muhammad died in 632 A.D., the senior leaders of Muhammad's Al Shura Council fearing that the community could easily fall apart without strong leadership, moved quickly to decide the following:

- The Islamic government would consist of a khalifa (caretaker) or caliph, and
- A representative council could override the caliph if he overstepped his bounds.

(U) The Council elected the oldest member, Abu Bakr el-Saddeq, as the leader; however, many followers were unhappy with the Al Shura Council's decision and believed that Ali Ibn Abi Talib, Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law, as the blood relative, should be the first caliph. Ali eventually became the fourth and final caliph.

Two years into Ali's rule, a rival tricked Ali and seized power. This event set off vendettas and counter-vendettas that triggered three events:

- Ali's assassination
- The challenge against Ali's son Hassan as leader
- The murder of Ali's second son Hussain in a battle at Karbala (Iraq)

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(U) Islam after Muhammad's Death (Con't)

(U) Ali's followers calling themselves Shias, considered these three acts treasonous, and they permanently split from the main group, which was later called Sunni.

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Culture And
Familiarization**Islamic Religion And Society****(U) Shia Muslims**

(U) Shia Muslims' follow Ali's secular interpretation of Islam. Ali and his followers, as seculars, believed that if God wanted people to enter Islam by force or sword, he would have used the word youdkhloun (meaning "being pushed or forced") in the Quran. Instead, he used yadkhloun (meaning "by their own free will"). Thus, Ali believed that Abu Bakr was too militant, and his actions would prevent Jews, Christians, and pagans from freely flocking into Islam. Shia Muslims:

- Strongly believe in the tenets of Islam; however, they follow a less stringent (literal) interpretation of the Quran.
- Label as sinners all who do not believe that only blood descendants of Muhammad (and Ali) should be caliph.
- Follow a complete legal code called the Jafari School of Thought.
- Believe in the sinlessness and infallibility of their Imams (religious leaders).
- Dominate only in Iran, though they also have a significant presence in Iraq, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia.
- Tactically, the Shia are more apt to cooperate with any other entity, including the West, if doing so will give them an advantage against the Sunnis.
- Comprise approximately 10-15% of the Muslim community.

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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
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Culture And
Familiarization**Islamic Religion And Society****(U) Sunni Muslims**

(U) Sunni Muslims' follow Abu Bakr's fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. Abu Bakr believed that no one could repent without being pushed. Thus, people must "be repented" by force. Abu Bakr did not think Ali and his Shia followers were capable of effectively leading the Muslim armies against the idol worshippers, Jews, and Christians. Sunni Muslims:

- Believe that elections should determine caliphs.
- Have a conservative, traditionalist view of Islam.
- Believe in a literal interpretation of the Quran, and believe that anything outside of what the Quran teaches is unacceptable.
- Follow the Sharia law.
- Control how the Quran is printed and distributed.
- When Sunni's hear Muhammad's name they must speak the following phrase: Sallallahu alayhi wa sallam, meaning "the peace and blessings of God be upon him."
- Consider the Sunnah of Muhammad the second most important source of Islamic doctrine. The Sunnah is written using the filter of Muhammad's words, actions, and experiences.
- Comprise 85-90% of the Muslim community.
- Have been prolific in spawning numerous and varied fundamentalist extremist terrorist organizations. Sunni core doctrine and end state have remained the same and they continue to strive for Sunni Islamic domination of the world to prove a key Quranic assertion that no system of government or religion on earth can match the Quran's purity and effectiveness for paving the road to God.

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
Islamic Religion And Society

(U) Quran – The Holy Book of Islam

(U) The Quran is the principal source of every Muslim's faith and practice, and it consists of 114 surah (recitations) with a total of 6236 ayat (verses).

(U) The surah are arranged by length, which is believed by Muslims to be divinely inspired. The major themes of the Quran include:

- The absolute authority of God.
- The accountability of humans for their deeds.
- The impermanence of this life.
- The importance of following the examples and teachings of Muhammad.



(U) The Quran is viewed as a legal document containing the doctrines that must be followed to behave acceptably, in order to find salvation on the Day of Judgment. It governs every aspect of life—politics, government, economics, education, child-rearing practices, male/female relationships, family structure, values, jobs, friendships, hobbies, and interests. The Quran requires those who practice Islam to embrace and follow the Arkan al Islami, or Five Pillars of Islam. The actions required by the Five Pillars of Islam are integrated into every Muslim's daily and yearly routines.

(U) The Five Pillars are Shahadah, Salat, Zakat, Saum/Sivan, and Hajj.

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Culture And
Familiarization**Islamic Religion And Society****(U) Shahadah - Declaration of Faith**

(U) Also known as the Muslim Creed, the Shahadah (witnessing) is a declaration of the two founding principles of Islam spoken in a specific formula. Translated, the Shahadah means, "I declare there is no god except God," and "Muhammad is the Messenger of God."

(U) Muslims recite the Shahada a minimum of 17 times every day in their daily prayers. The first pillar reminds Muslims about the reality of dedicating their lives to God who is the only one worthy of devotion, praise, and worship. The first Islamic pillar also helps Muslims remember their pledge to practice what Muhammad, as God's last Prophet, preached.

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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
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Culture And
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(U) In addition to personal supplications to God spoken or thought throughout the day, Muslims must pray (perform a specific religious ritual) five times each day at specific prayer times.

- Fajr—before sunrise
- Zuhr—just after noontime
- 'Asr—in late afternoon
- Maghrib—just after sunset
- 'Isha—at night

(U) Muslims must ensure that they meet the following seven requirements:

- Pray only at prayer time
- Perform the ritual of wudu— the washing of hands, face, and feet with water to become ritually pure
- Wear clean clothes
- Be in a clean place
- Wear pants, a shirt, scarf or veil over hair (women only) and/or robe to cover the body
- Face the direction of Mecca
- Have the proper focus for prayer

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Culture And
Familiarization**Islamic Religion And Society****(U) Zakat – Almsgiving**

(U) Islam fights the temptation of avarice by requiring its practitioners to give up a fixed portion of their annual savings to be distributed to the poor. The third pillar is a 2.5% religious tax. Muslims must pay the tax to help them overcome the human natural tendency toward greed.

(U) According to Surah 59:9 of the Quran, "Those who are saved from the greed of their own selves, they are the ones who will prosper." Fulfilling a desire for material possessions can distract Muslims from their real purpose in life, which is surrendering themselves to God.

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Culture And
Familiarization**Islamic Religion And Society****(U) Saum/Sivan - Fasting**

(U) Because God despises gluttony as a terrible sin, the fourth pillar helps Muslims overcome gluttonous desires. Islam requires Muslims to fast as a means of self-purification and self-restraint. Such fasting allows them to focus on the purpose of life by bringing constant awareness of God's presence.

(U) Physically able Muslims must fast from sunrise to sunset (during the daylight hours) every day during the month of Ramadan. Fasting means abstaining from:

- All food and liquids
- Inhaled substances
- Sexual activity
- Nutritional or non-essential oral medicines

(U) In addition to abstaining from ingesting or inhaling anything during the daylight hours, fasting also requires Muslims to refrain from all normally undesirable behaviors. Thus, they cannot fight, curse, argue, lie, gossip, or commit other such sins.

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
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Culture And
Familiarization**Islamic Religion And Society****(U) Hajj - Pilgrimage**

(U) Even before Islam, hajj was an Arab custom. Arabs from all over the Arabian Peninsula would travel to the heart of Mecca to perform customary rituals at the Kabah, an ancient cube-shaped shrine. The fifth pillar continues a customary practice.

(U) All Muslims must make a pilgrimage to Mecca during the pilgrimage month, the twelfth month of the Islamic lunar calendar, at least once or twice in their life. However, they must do this only if they can afford the trip without depriving their families.




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ORIENTATION**Middle East/Arab
Culture And
Familiarization**Islamic Religion And Society****(U) Islamic Place of Worship: Masjid or Mosque**

(U) The focal point of the Islamic community, the *masjid* is far more than simply the Muslim place of worship. Muslims routinely congregate at their *masjid* for prayer (especially the five daily prayers), teaching, meditation, reading, study, and reflection. Many mosques also go by the title *Markaz al Islami* (Islamic Center).



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(U) Islam and Arab/Middle Eastern Culture

(U) Culture and the Islamic religion are closely linked because Muslims believe that God controls all things in life; Islam affects a Muslims whole way of living.

(U) Arabs and Middle Easterners believe a religious affiliation is essential for every person in their society. Mainstream Arabs place a great value on piety.

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Culture And
Familiarization**Islamic Religion And Society****(U) Arab Men and Women**

(U) Arab men and women are careful about appearances when they meet, and Arab and Middle Eastern women go out of their way to avoid situations in which they would be alone with a man who is not a close relative. When men and women, other than close family relatives, do interact together for personal reasons, they do so with others present and generally at some kind of shared activity or social event. Women always attend mixed social events with their husband or other male relative.

(U) Arab and Middle Easterners consider it improper for a man and woman who are not closely related to be alone in a room together with the door shut or to travel with one another.

(U) Societal norms for interactions between men and women vary among Arab countries, with the more fundamentalist Islamic countries being stricter in enforcing "proper behavior."

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Culture And
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(U) Foreigners must be aware of the restrictions that pertain to contact between Arab men and women and consider their own appearance in front of others.

- Arabs gain a negative impression when too much familiarity is shown toward a person of the opposite sex, and in turn, they may interpret that you are a person of low moral standards.
- Western men may greet Arab women at a social gathering, but they should include other people in the greeting.
- In many Arab countries men and women separate into their own conversation groups at social gatherings.
- Married Western women may greet and visit with Arab men if accompanied by their husbands.
- Westerners can expect to spend much of their social time in all-male or all-female groups.

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JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE (JTTF) ORIENTATION

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(U) Societal Structure

(U) Most Arab and Middle Eastern countries have three social classes assigned varying degrees of privilege:

- (U) Upper class
- (U) Middle class
- (U) Lower class


Nomadic Bedouin, who remain independent from the general society, don't fit into any of the social class structures.




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


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
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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**Middle East/Arab
Culture And
Familiarization**Islamic Religion And Society****(U) Family Structure**

(U) Arab society is built around the extended family system with strong relationships evident with both the immediate and extended family. Extended families who live together have a definitive structure according to status and control with the adult male head of the household having the highest status and daughters of the head of the household having the lowest status.

(U) The *Quran* dictates that men should be the head of the family. Many Arab men often remain in their father's household, while Arab women always move to live and raise their children within their husband's household.

(U) Men are the public face of a family, making all decisions that affect the family's welfare. Women have a clearly defined place in the family that exists "behind the scenes" or out of the public eye, and publicly women are always expected to defer to the wishes of the males in their family.

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(U) Family Obligations

(U) To Arab and Middle Easterners, family loyalty is second only to Islam, and adult men are responsible for caring for all family members, including the extended family.

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TASK FORCE (JTTF)
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Culture And
Familiarization**Radical Fundamentalist Terrorist Groups****(U) Al-Qa'ida**

(U) Formed in 1988, by Usama bin Laden to unite the Arabs in Afghanistan, Al-Qa'ida is the first multi-national terrorist group of the 21st century. Al-Qa'ida, comprising all extremist fundamentalist Sunni Muslims, has the following goals:

1. Establish Islamic states throughout the world
2. Overthrow non-Islamic states throughout the world
3. Expel U.S. and western influences from the Persian Gulf region

(U) Al-Qa'ida allies itself with other Islamic extremist groups, including the National Islamic Front and the Iranian Shiite organization, Hizballah, to achieve its goals. Bin Laden, as Al-Qa'ida's leader, follows the original concepts of Muhammad as written in the *Quran*, *Sharia*, and *Hadith*.



(U) Bin Laden does not make excuses for using terrorism because he believes he has Allah's blessings to commit violent acts and engage in mass casualty and catastrophic terrorism. Bin Laden promotes the belief that those who martyr themselves for Islam will go straight to heaven, with all sin forgotten. Because not all Muslims are assured a place in heaven, this belief accounts for the number of suicide operations Al-Qa'ida and other terrorists are willing to take. The broad-based ideology followed by Al-Qa'ida appeals to the young and continues to draw supporters, even in its currently weakened state.

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Culture And
Familiarization**Radical Fundamentalist Terrorist Groups****(U) Al-Qa'ida (Con't)**

(U) In 1998, bin Laderi announced the formation of a new organization called "Islamic World Front" for the Struggle Against the Jews and the Crusaders, making all non-Islamic nations and peoples a potential target for Al-Qa'ida. Under this banner, he issued a fatwa (contract) stating that "it is the duty of all" Muslims to kill U. S. citizens, both civilian and military, and their allies everywhere, and they can do so without fear of reprisal from Allah. In fact, some Muslims believe that they will face Allah's wrath on the Day of Judgment if they do not carry out fatwas issued by the religious leaders.

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
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Radical Fundamentalist Terrorist Groups



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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
TASK FORCE (JTTF)
ORIENTATION**

Middle East/Arab
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Familiarization

Radical Fundamentalist Terrorist Groups



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
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
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
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Familiarization**Radical Fundamentalist Terrorist Groups****(U) Al-Qa'ida Command and Control**

(U) Usama bin Laden is widely recognized as Al-Qa'ida's founder and leader. His consultative council, the Majlis al-Shura, has a rotating membership. Bin Laden appoints individuals he trusts to key positions (basing such decisions on family ties, friendship, and nationality).

(U) Al-Qa'ida's organizational headquarters has operated out of Afghanistan, Sudan and Egypt. After the Taliban was removed from power in Afghanistan, members of Al-Qa'ida dispersed into small groups. Al-Qa'ida is now spread across South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. It may also have a presence in Mexico and the tri-border area of South America.

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Familiarization**Radical Fundamentalist Terrorist Groups****(U) Al-Qa'ida Activities****(U) Major terrorist attacks include:**

- Bombing U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Sallam, Tanzania (August 1998). At least 301 people were killed and more than 5,000 were wounded.
- Directing the attack on the USS Cole in the port of Aden, Yemen (October 2000). Seventeen U.S. Navy personnel were killed and 39 were wounded.
- Hijacking and flying four airplanes. Two of the airplanes crashed into the World Trade Center's twin towers. One airplane crashed into the Pentagon in Arlington, VA, and one airplane that was targeting either the capital or the White House in Washington, D.C., crashed into a field in Shanksville, PA (September 11, 2001). Over 3,000 individuals were killed/missing and thousands were wounded.
- Firebombing a synagogue in Tunisia (April 11, 2002). Nineteen people were killed and 22 were wounded.
- Bombing a hotel in Mombasa, Kenya where at least 15 individuals were killed and 40 were wounded (November 28, 2002).



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
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
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
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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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**JOINT TERRORISM
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
Module Review

(U) The Middle East has a complex history that impacts national and international relationships today.

(U) The religion of Islam plays a significant role in Middle Eastern/Arab society.

(U) The following radical fundamentalist terrorist groups operate in the Middle East and worldwide:

- Al-Qa'ida



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Congratulations, you have completed the "Joint Terrorism Task Force Orientation" course." After completing the attached survey please select "Finish Module" at the bottom of the page to return to the course menu.

The purpose of this survey is to gain a better understanding of your views concerning the overall effectiveness of the online course you have just completed. Please take the time to write comments, particularly if you disagree or strongly disagree with an item, since this type of feedback is especially useful in improving future training.

All responses are anonymous and the results will be compiled, analyzed, and reported as group data.

Thank you for your participation.

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