



DATE: 12-21-2011
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REASON: 1.4 (c)
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Investigative Services Division

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Counterintelligence Report

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October 2001

CI-01-7

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(U) Information Cutoff Date: October 2001

(U) Produced By:

[redacted]
National Security Intelligence Section
Investigative Services Division
FBI Headquarters

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[redacted]
Intelligence Research Specialist
Americas FCI

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(S) (C) [redacted] is the Investigative Services Division's (ISD) unit responsible for producing analytical products regarding [redacted]

(S) [redacted] is staffed by [redacted] Intelligence Research Specialists (IRS) and [redacted] Research Assistant previously assigned to the FBI's National Security Division.

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(U) (C) Any questions or comments concerning the content of this report are encouraged and should be referred to [redacted] FBIHQ, Room 4859 [redacted]

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(U) This product contains information from FBI sources and investigations, as well as information from other U.S. Government agencies and friendly foreign governments. Only those individuals with a need to know should be given access to this information. It is requested that no further dissemination of this information be made to outside agencies without consulting FBIHQ.

~~DR V FROM: Multiple Sources~~

~~CL REASON: 1.5(c)~~

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Cover-B

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~~(S)~~ Counterintelligence Report: [REDACTED]

November 2001

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(U) Key Findings

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~~(S)~~ Counterintelligence Report: [redacted]

November 2001

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(U) Scope & Objectives

(S) ~~(S)~~ This paper discusses the use of certain clandestine communication techniques, hereinafter referred to as [redacted]
[redacted] this study also uses information obtained through field investigations and other US Government agency collection activity. The paper attempts to deduce from these examples the general principles that [redacted] Moreover, open source information on [redacted] used by other intelligence services makes possible comparisons [redacted] across nationalities and services. These examples, principles, and comparisons should help FBI personnel to more readily identify [redacted] use of these and similar techniques in the future.

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
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~~(S//OC)~~ Analyst Comment: FBI Norfolk investigative reporting has revealed [redacted]

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[End Comment]

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(S) ~~(S)~~ Counterintelligence Report: [redacted] November 2001

(S) [redacted] b1 b7E

General Principles

(S) [redacted]

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(S) [redacted] b1 b7E

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~~(S)~~ Counterintelligence Report: [redacted]

November 2001

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~~(S)~~ Analyst Comment: [redacted]

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[redacted] [End Comment]

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November 2001

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(U) Different Procedures

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General Principles

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November 2001

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Figure 1




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
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Figure 2



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November 2001

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November 2001

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General Principles

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November 2001

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November 2001

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November 2001

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November 2001

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November 2001

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[End Comments]

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The Internet

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~~(S)~~ **Analyst Comment:** Most Internet Service Providers (ISP) give their customers at least one e-mail account, access to the Internet, and the ability to create a web page of at least several megabytes (MB). If a subject has such an account, then investigators

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~~(S//OC)~~ Analyst Comments:

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[End Comments]

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~~(S)~~ Counterintelligence Report:

[Redacted]

November 2001

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
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November 2001


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~~(S)~~ Usama Bin Laden (UBL) [redacted]

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
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~~(S)~~ Counterintelligence Report:

November 2001

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(U) Conclusion

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November 2001

Appendix 1 - Defector Biographies

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
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
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


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
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






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


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
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


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

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


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
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
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


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
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
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
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OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES



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

"He couldn't have done anything. He was only out of sight of the 'eye' for less than 5 seconds."

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
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
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
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

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

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
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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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Introduction

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


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Definition

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What Would  Do?

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A Note

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
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Other



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
Examples

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If you take away nothing else...




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Good Report




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
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What not to do....

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


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Basic Elements



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
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Basic Elements



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Basic Elements



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
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Basic Elements



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
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(S) There is NO perfect




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What is a good idea today, might be terrible tomorrow

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


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A reminder...



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
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Objective



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*Not/not force residents to call the police


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Relationship




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REMEMBER....



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Bottom Line



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
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Typical uses...



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

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An Example



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
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Examples:

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


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
In Short...



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Questions??

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7/15/2011

DATE: 12-22-2011
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(S) Introduction

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Definition

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

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

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

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Aldrich Ames' Signal Site (37th & R St., NW, D.C.)




Aldrich Ames' Signal Site (37th & R St., NW, D.C.)

4" Horizontal Chalk Mark



Robert Hanssen's Signal Site, Fairfax, VA, 2001

White Tape on Park Sign



"Ellis" signal site

10/10/76

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Drops

• Dead Drop

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
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Aldrich Ames Dead Drop Site "Pipe", Wheaton, MD



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Ames Dead Drop Site "Bridge", WDC




Gap Under Bridge

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
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Hanssen Dead Drop Site, WDC area, 2001





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



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

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

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
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
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♦ Newspaper classified ads.



Tools [REDACTED] (and Other Dirty Tricks)

- ♦ Concealment Devices
- ♦ Secret Writing
- ♦ Disguises

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[Redacted]

- ♦ Internet
 - Voice over Internet Protocol
 - Draft folders for email accounts
- ♦ Electronic devices
 - WiFi
 - Encryption
 - Cellular phones/cameras
 - Blackberries/burst transmissions
 - Thumb drives

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- ♦ Pre-paid phone cards
- ♦ Pre-paid cell phones
- ♦ Integrated vehicular GPS systems

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Training

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] principles and techniques are UNIVERSAL

[Redacted]

- If you don't know what to look for, you won't see it!

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

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
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
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
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

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

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REASON: 1.4 (c)
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

7/15/2011

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

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

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From: [redacted] (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, March 28, 2007 11:56 AM
To: [redacted]

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Cc:

Subject: Classified Addendum of One Source Manual

Attachments: Classified Addendum 1-6.wpd

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RECORD 134-0

All,

(S) [redacted] asked, based on my four years as an Asset Coordinator to review the classified addendum to the One Source Manual [redacted]. While I found the addendum very well put together, there were some issues that I either had questions on, disagreed with or needed clarification as to why it was placed in here as a requirement. My thought are my thoughts only based on my experience and the policies from the past as well as new issues that have come to light in the source administration.

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Please let me make this clear. This addendum needs to be vetted through CD and CTD. I am assigned to CD but I was not assigned this task through the CD front office. My comments should in no way be considered approval of the CD to go forward with this addendum.

(S)

I have made my comments in red and are included in the attachment. Again, they are my comments and not to be considered official CD approvals.



Classified
Addendum 1-6.wpd (1)

I will be out of the office until April 11 and if you have any questions on issues I brought up, you can contact me then. Thanks for giving me the opportunity to review and comment on this important undertaking. I can see a lot of work went into this project.

CITC/ [redacted]
[redacted]

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DERIVED FROM: G-1 FBI Classification Guide G-1, dated 1/99, Foreign Government Information

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ACLURM031639

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~~DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1~~
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

FBI031160

DATE: 12-22-2011
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

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



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
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
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
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
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


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


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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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Basic Elements

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Basic Elements

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There is NO perfect

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A reminder...

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What is a good idea today, might be
terrible tomorrow

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Without them knowing it

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Objective

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

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

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

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

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

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

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Typical uses...

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
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
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


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
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

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**Instructional Objectives Based on Career Path Competencies
Level 2 (Performs well with occasional guidance.)**

COMPETENCY: Writing Effectively

1. Given a scenario, complete a [] to the State Department.
2. Given a scenario, complete the paperwork required to open an []
3. Given raw intelligence and other information (including source and method information), write an [] for dissemination.
4. Given a scenario, write an LHM to notify DOJ of a Preliminary Investigation. (10-day rule)
5. Given a scenario, write an LHM to the victim organization in a Full Investigation.
6. Given a scenario, write an EC to open a Preliminary Investigation.
7. Given a scenario, write an EC to convert a PI to a Full Investigation.
8. Given a scenario, write an EC to close a Full Investigation.
9. Given a scenario, write an EC to close a PI (without ever making it an FI).
10. Given information from a source, report the []
[]
11. Given a scenario, document a complaint.
12. Given an espionage scenario, write an EC to set leads appropriately.
13. Given a scenario, develop an investigative plan.
14. After interviewing a source in a role-play situation, document the interview in an EC.
15. Write a surveillance log, documenting all pertinent target behaviors and contacts, during a surveillance role play.
16. Perform and document a records/database check on the subject []
[]
17. As part of a group and given a scenario containing the necessary facts/information, write an initial FISA request.

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18. As part of a group and given a scenario containing the necessary information, write a FISA renewal request.
19. In all CI documents prepared, appropriately apply the CI lexicon.

COMPETENCY: Organizing, Planning, and Prioritizing

20. Given a case scenario, write a specific investigative plan that documents objectives and proposed investigative methods/techniques.
21. Given a set of cases, prioritize them according to the CI National Strategy's Strategic Goals.

COMPETENCY: Communicating Orally

22. During a role play (practical), conduct a [] scenario, documenting it appropriately.
23. During a role play (practical), conduct a [] interview and document appropriately.
24. Given a CI Awareness presentation, brief half the class for 15 minutes.
25. Create and write a plan to liaise with a local academic institution.
26. Put into a small group and presented with several obstacles to liaison/community outreach efforts in a scenario, discuss with the team the most appropriate methods for overcoming each obstacle.
27. Given three different scenarios, devise and document a plan for developing an asset and/or initiating a specific kind of CI case.
28. During a role play and given a case scenario, brief the "analyst" on your team regarding investigative findings, issues, and concerns, and appropriately task the analyst.

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COMPETENCY: Relating Effectively with Others

29. In a role play situation of a file review, and given two specific case scenarios, brief your "SSA" on investigative progress, proposed strategies, and investigative plans.

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30. Given a specific case scenario, complete a file review sheet, using the appropriate CI lexicon and accurately and concisely summarizing your investigative objectives and progress.

COMPETENCY: Attending to Detail

31. Given specific case facts and take from a FISA search or target surveillance, accurately complete an FD-192; Evidence Sheet, for submission of evidence.

COMPETENCY: Thinking Critically, Evaluating/Judging Information, and Making Decisions

32. Given a thorough description of a Field Office domain and its entities, identify the three most important entities and defend your choices. *(from PRP)*
33. Given a thorough description of a Field Office domain and its entities, as part of a small team
- a. prepare a vulnerability and CI threat assessment of the relevant domain entities.
 - b. brief a panel of executives on
 - i. the level of FIS activity in the Field Office domain *(from PRP)*
 - 1. identify and articulate the intelligence objectives [] and assets) of the top priority countries in the domain. *(from PRP)*
 - 2. identify and describe the intelligence operations of the top priority countries in the domain. *(from PRP)*
 - ii. FIS capacity to acquire/proliferate CBNRE WMD information and/or materials in your Field Office domain.
 - iii. FIS capacity to penetrate USIC/USG programs and/or contractors with your Field Office domain.
 - iv. FIS capacity to compromise Critical National Assets in your Field Office domain.
 - c. fully document all information suggesting the presence of []
[]
 - d. determine for whom the division should establish a strong asset base
 - i. top priority countries:
 - ii. émigré countries:

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34. Explain what "sufficient" coverage against an [] means. *(from PRP)*

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COMPETENCY: Showing Initiative and Motivation

36. Given a description of several immigrant communities in a specific city, prioritize their CI importance according to the CI Program's country priorities and threat list.
37. Describe the purpose of the Counterintelligence Working Group in each Field Office. *(from PRP)*
38. Identify who should participate in the CIWG and explain why. *(from PRP)*
39. Identify the things a Field Office should routinely review. (i.e., all travel advisories, VISA traffic, pertinent index information, etc.) *(from PRP)*
40. Given a calendar for the year and the first date of specific events (i.e., CIWG meetings, all-source threat assessments, file reviews, etc.), complete a calendar of events for entire year. *(from PRP and other sources)*

COMPETENCY: Adapting to Changing Situations

41. Given a scenario of a unique CI situation and as part of a small group, discuss and present to the class possible ways to successfully address the situation.

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Goals & Objectives of *CI Investigations and Operations Course*

At the end of the blocks of instruction given during the first week of the *CI Investigations and Operations Course*, students will

CI National Strategy

1. identify and/or apply to investigative situations the definition of Counterintelligence (CI). (IMIS)
2. identify and/or apply to investigative situations the FBI's Counterintelligence Goals. (IMIS)
3. **know** the FBI's National CI Strategy and the role of the individual FBI Case Agent in carrying out the CI mission. (BT) **Must change performance word—not measurable as is.**
4. discuss the Bureau's CI objectives. (AS)
5. identify the [] in FBI CI cases. (BT)
6. identify the number one goal in FBI CI cases. (BT)
7. list the [] of the FBI's CI Program. (BT)
8. list the [] for accomplishing the goals/objectives of the CI Program. (BT/GF)
9. restate the FBI Strategic Focus in the CI National Strategy. (GF)
10. articulate the role of the FIG in the CI Program. (BT)
11. describe the types of different operations the FBI uses to meet the FBI's CI objectives. (AS)

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CI vs. Criminal Cases

12. **understand** the investigative principles and practices that made particular cases a success or a failure. (BT) **Must change performance word—not measurable as is.**

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Significant CI Cases

13. **be knowledgeable of** the FBI's significant CI cases. (BT) **Must change performance word—not measurable as is.**

14. **recognize** the newly emphasized role of the FBI as a lead foreign intelligence collector. (BT) **Must change performance word—not measurable as is.**

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Classified Information/Issues

25. explain classification and security issues that impact classifying information. (AS)
26. articulate the difference between classification and access restrictions. (GF/TE)
27. articulate the level of damage to the nation that would result from disclosure of information classified at each level. (GF/TE)
28. provide derivative classification actions. (TE)
29. mark classified information appropriately. (GF/TE)
30. handle classified information appropriately. (GF/TE)
31. wrap classified information appropriately for transport or mailing. (GF)
32. store classified information appropriately. (GF/TE)
33. destroy classified information appropriately. (GF/TE)
34. state who can classify and declassify information. (GF/TE)
35. mark a classified document appropriately. (GF/TE)
36. name the three classification markings required on classified documents as overall, portion, and descriptive information. (TE)
37. describe the information comprising the descriptive information part of classified markings. (GF)
38. given a classified document with or without handling and/or access restrictions, determine if it is appropriately marked as required. (GF/TE)
39. given three examples of information, review excerpts from the classification guide to determine if the guide says that the information should be classified, and classify the information accordingly, with all appropriate markings. (TE/GF)
40. use the FCI Classification Guide to apply the appropriate derivative classification markings on several documents. (TE/GF)
41. articulate recent changes to classification policies as a result of EO 13292. (BT)
42. list the two methods of classifying documents. (BT)

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- 43. **know** the proper locations of classification markings on an FBI document. (BT)
Must change performance word—not measurable as is.
- 44. articulate (explain?) the difference between a classification level and a handling restriction. (BT)
- 45. **recognize** appropriate methods for protecting, storing, and destroying classified information. (BT) **Must change performance word—not measurable as is.**
- 46. explain document markings/standards. (AS)
- 47. discuss the appropriate methods to store and handle classified material in a secure and prescribed manner. (AS)

Proliferation of WMD Information/Technology and Trade Secrets

- 48. explain the Bureau's counter-proliferation responsibilities. (AS)
- 49. identify the various programs utilized by CD-6. (AS)
- 50. explain the various services that Languages Services has to offer in translation matters. (AS)

CI Investigative Authorities

- 51. restate the CI Authority given to the FBI to conduct CI/Terrorism investigations. (AS)
- 52. identify and apply to investigative operations the relevant statutory and Executive authorities relating to CI. (BT)
- 53. given a chart of investigative authorities, determine if each applies to CI or criminal cases and, if CI, what kind of case. (GF)
- 54. given three scenarios, determine which section of the AGG applies. (GF)
- 55. given three investigative scenarios, determine the techniques you could use under the AGG. (GF)
- 56. given three investigative scenarios, determine if the AGG have been applied correctly. (GF)—**use in SSA course**

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The USIC

- 57. identify and apply to investigative operations the key USIC agencies and their responsibilities. (BT)
- 58. given various scenarios involving intelligence or other information coming into an FBI CI squad, determine which other agencies in the USIC need to receive it, in what format, and when. (GF)
- 59. given various scenarios involving investigative leads to the FBI CI squad, determine in each case which other agencies in the USIC should be contacted, how, and in what ways they could/should help. (GF)

National Security List (NSL)

- 60. identify and apply to investigative operations the various categories contained within the National Security List. (BT)
- 61. given scenarios of several cases, determine investigative priorities of the cases based solely on the National Security List. (GF)
- 62. given scenarios of several cases, determine if each falls within the National Security List and name which category it falls under, if yes (e.g., country or issue threat). (GF)
- 63. list the issue threats noted in the National Security List as terrorism, espionage, proliferation of WMD, targeting USG, economic espionage, national information infrastructure, perception management, and foreign intelligence activities. (GF)

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- 65. identify and apply various and appropriate sections of the AGG to investigative and operational situations. (BT)

NFIP Written Communications

- 66. summarize the issues needed for reporting writing. (AS)
- 67. identify the three types of NFIP written communications as ECs, LHMs, and FD-302s. (BT)
- 68. explain how each type of NFIP written communication is used. (BT)

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69. given three scenarios, explain which type of written communication would be appropriate. (GF)
70. apply proper report writing procedures for NFIP communications within the FBI and to outside agencies. (BT)
71. apply effective writing techniques to improve clarity and persuasiveness. (BT) (need to specify the techniques to apply)

Information/Intelligence Sharing

72. **protect** sensitive sources and methods in written communications. (BT)
communication of sources and methods? use the proper source markings/codes in the communications? apply proper classification markings to the document containing source and method information?)

b7E

Assets and Asset Validation

73.

74.

75.

76.

(S)

b1
b7E

77. given three scenarios involving handling assets, state whether or not the operational requirements were met. (GF)
78. given three scenarios involving handling assets, state whether or not the administrative requirements were met. (GF)
79. explain asset validation and vetting procedures. (AS)
80. **be knowledgeable of** the FBI's Asset Validation Review Process. (BT) [use specific scenarios for application] **Must change performance word—not measurable as is.**
81. **be familiar with** and apply the principles of the psychology of asset handling. (BT) **Must change performance word—not measurable as is.**

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82. given four different situations with different assets, describe the best way to handle the asset in each (apply the principles of the psychology of asset handling). (GF)
83. given two scenarios of assets in an operational environment, formulate a plan for contact with their assets, commensurate with the risk that asset faces in the operational environment. (BT)

FISAs

84. explain the various aspects of FISA. (AS) (too vague—what does aspect mean? how many aspects must they explain?)
85. identify other potential CI resources that are available to them. (AS) (too vague—how many resources? what kind of resources?)

[redacted]

86. restate the [redacted] (AS)
87. cite the importance/significance of [redacted] (AS)

[redacted]

88. identify [redacted] (AS) b7E
89. know the [redacted] (BT) **Must change performance word—not measurable as is.**
90. know the [redacted] to address [redacted] (BT) **Must change performance word—not measurable as is.**
91. know the overall importance and value [redacted] to the CI mission. (BT) **Must change performance word—not measurable as is.**
92. tell why [redacted] are so important to resolve. (AS)

Interviews/Interrogations

b7E

93. describe the difference between CI interviews and interrogations. (AS)
94. demonstrate the [redacted] method of establishing rapport. (AS)

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- 95. **know** the significance and importance (redundant?) of the differences between CI and criminal interviews. (BT) **Must change performance word—not measurable as is.**
- 96. practice and refine their introductory interview skills with a new perspective regarding the shortfalls and benefits of various methods of initiating CI interviews. (BT)

Analysis

- 97. describe the importance and need for analysis in a CI case. (AS)
- 98. **be knowledgeable of** the FBI's analytical capabilities and products. (BT) **Must change performance word—not measurable as is.**
- 99. **be knowledgeable of** the value and importance of on-going analysis. (BT) **Must change performance word—not measurable as is.**

Report Writing/Dissemination

- 100. explain the importance of ☐ (AS) b7E
- 101. identify pertinent positive intelligence information from ____? (BT)
- 102. disseminate pertinent positive intelligence to the appropriate people/groups, through the appropriate channels, and in the proper format. (BT)
- 103. **be knowledgeable of** the document format and dissemination process. (BT) **Must change performance word—not measurable as is.**
- 104. **be familiar with** the role and responsibilities of the Reports Officer. (BT) **Must change performance word—not measurable as is.**

Cross Cultural Issues (Asian, Hispanic, Slavic, Middle Eastern)

- 105. explain why they should explore the various significant cultural aspects/influences that may impact an interview and in establishing rapport. (AS)

- (S) 106. **be knowledgeable of** the various cultural issues and difference that directly impact the Case Agent's b1
b7E

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(S)

[Redacted]

b1
b7E

Must change performance word—not measurable as is.

[Redacted]

107. articulate the definition of [Redacted] (BT/DE)

b7E

108. give at least [Redacted] (BT/DE)

(S)

[Redacted]

b1
b7E

109.

[Redacted]

(S)

110.

111.

(S)

Surveillance

[Redacted]

b1
b7E

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121.

122.

123.

124.

125.

126.

127.

b1
b7E

(S)

128.

129.

(S)

b7E

130. **relate to** capabilities and advantages of using SSG Team(s). (DE) **Must change performance word—not measurable as is.**

(S)

131.

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b7E

132. list [redacted] of the National Strategy that address Counter-proliferation issues.
(DE)

133.

134.

(S)

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~~SECRET~~

(S)

135.

[Redacted]

136. list at least [Redacted] helpful in initiating Counter-proliferation cases in the Field. (DE)

137. **better plan** for interviewing an actual [Redacted] subject. (DE) **Must change standard word—what constitutes “better?”**

b1
b7E

138. protect the source of information about the meeting. (DE)

(S)

139.

[Redacted]

140.

141. identify at least [Redacted] (DE)

142. observe role players conducting [Redacted] and then discuss the potential success and pitfalls of each. (DE)

b7E

143. contrast and compare the differences between [Redacted] dependent upon environment. (DE)

144. identify personality motivations and characteristics of Robert Hanssen that would be indicators of concern. (DE)

145. identify investigative procedures taken in the Hanssen case. (DE)

(S)

146.

[Redacted]

b1
b7E

147. **observe** the result of good surveillance techniques and use of SSG in the outcome of this case. (DE) **Must change performance word—not measurable as is.**

148. identify cases in which one could potentially use a UC Operation. (DE)

149. identify employees who would be candidates for UC roles. (DE)

150. identify the training required for candidates of UC roles in order to obtain UC approval. (DE)

151. identify administrative procedures for developing and maintaining a UC OP. (DE)

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152. assemble information on their CI case subject or asset that will be useful to the BAP. (DE)

153. identify proper procedures for requesting and obtaining BAP assistance. (DE)

154.

155.

156.

157.

158. articulate the historical perspective that led the FBI to the FISA. (DE)

159. articulate FISA's implications in today's world of CI and CT. (DE)

160. identify the appropriate FISA-related statutes. (DE)

161. identify the mechanics of the FISA Process. (DE)

162. list the components of a FISA Package. (DE)

163. explain the FISA Court. (DE)

164. explain Minimization Procedures. (DE)

165. explain the difference (in rights?) between a U.S. Person (USPER) and a non-USPER. (DE)

166.

167.

168.

169.

170.

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b7E

b7E

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(S)

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(S)

171. identify and describe focal points of at least three Program priorities (to include the (1) [] (2) Counter-proliferation, and (3) [] (DE)

172. be aware of the Section structure by Unit and point of contact. (DE) **Must change performance word—not measurable as is.**

b1
b7E

173.

[]

(S)

174. define the Goals, Objectives and Investigative Responsibilities of the Counterespionage Section (CD-4). (DE)

175. describe the CD-4 Section structure by unit. (DE)

176. identify legal authorization to conduct espionage and economic espionage investigations. (DE)

177. list the objectives of the [] (DE)

b7E

178. articulate how these objectives are employed to counter the Econ. Esp. threat. (DE)

179. list the field office reporting requirements regarding Counterespionage and Economic Espionage cases. (DE)

180. be aware of points of contact within the [?] Section. (DE) **Must change performance word—not measurable as is.**

181. list [] of an espionage case. (DE)

182. identify espionage statutes. (DE)

183. list at least [] espionage cases originate. (DE)

b1
b7E

(S)

184.

[]

185. describe [] cases. (DE)

186. be exposed to case examples of espionage. (DE) **Must change performance word—exposure to information is not a valid student performance (not measurable).**

187. identify the responsibilities of the [] Section. (DE)

b7E

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188. identify appropriate points of contact within [redacted] (DE)

(S)

189.

[redacted]

(S)

190.

[redacted]

All instructional objectives

should be able to stand alone.

b1
b7E

191.

[redacted]

(S)

192.

193.

194. articulate the need for thorough asset validation. (DE)

195. understand

[redacted]

[redacted] (DE) Must change performance word—not measurable as is.

b7E

196. **better** formulate successful approaches to individuals on the college campus through whom they could obtain investigative assistance. (DE) **Must change standard word—what constitutes “better?”**

197. **better** formulate successful approaches to individuals in the scientific community through whom they could obtain investigative assistance. **Must change standard word—what constitutes “better?”**

(S)

198.

[redacted]

199.

200.

201.

202.

203.

204.

[redacted]

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b7E

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(S)

205.

206. discuss the mutual goals, working relationships, and liaison efforts between the two agencies. (DE)

207. describe how an espionage case can be reactivated. (DE)

208. **better** plan investigative efforts in [?]. (DE) **Must change standard word—what constitutes “better?”**

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209. avoid potential pitfalls in [?]. (DE)

210.

(S)

211.

212. articulate the value of conducting a thorough research of all records/databases available for corroboration of evidence. (DE)

213. **relate to** (compare? explain?) the differences and similarities of FBI and DOD CI agencies in different branches of the military. (DE) **Must change performance word—not measurable as is.**

214. describe by chart the DOD CI organization. (DE)

215. articulate the Global Mission and Major CI Initiatives of DOD CI. (DE)

216. list the DOD CI objectives. (DE)

217. list at least [] in which FBI / DOD CI can work in unison. (DE)

b7E

218. articulate how technical attacks on a target can provide a wealth of investigative information. (DE)

219. identify how traditional data intercepts are used to collect internet communications. (DE)

220. describe required procedures to implement technical attacks, to include FISA authority. (DE)

(S)

221.

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222.

223.

224. identify the [redacted] (KD)

225. employ the CI strategy with reference to the CI strategic pyramid. (KD)

226. use the pyramid to show where to focus CI investigative priorities. (KD)

227. **know** what cases they have that are supervised by this Section as well as to have a point of reference for assistance in their cases. (KD) **Must change performance word—not measurable as is.**

228.

229.

230. develop a “walk-in” strategy for the field office from dealing with interviewing a walk-in to a re-contact plan. (KD)

231. **know** the importance of having a “walk-in” plan prepared and “on the shelf.” (KD) **Must change performance word—not measurable as is.**

232. apply lessons learned during the “walk-in” lecture to an interview. (KD)
(Students will be critiqued on strengths and weaknesses in order to identify methods that work for them in a walk-in interview situation.)

233. identify how [redacted] can be used and the resources in the Intelligence Community that can assist to counter those threats. (KD)

234. identify analysts at FBIHQ they can request information on their targets. (KD)

235. implement the [redacted] they learned in the [redacted] block of instruction. (KD)

236. **understand** the importance of continually vetting and validating their sources as well as the information the sources provide. (KD) **Must change performance word—not measurable as is.**

237. identify risk factors of sources. (KD)

238. identify the types of visas most frequently used to enter the US. (KD)

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- 239. **know** when and how to request an NFPO. (KD) **Must change performance word—not measurable as is.**
- 240. discuss the different techniques they learned over the course and apply them to this case study. (KD)
- 241. Write ___ clearly and concisely, using a style and level of writing appropriate for the intended audience. (CTM)
- 242. Extract pertinent details from various sources of information and summarize them logically and effectively in writing. (CTM)
- 243. Effectively communicate abstract concepts in writing. (CTM)
- 244. Set investigative priorities appropriately. (CTM) (define “appropriately”—according to CD National Strategy priorities?)
- 245. Systematically and methodically plan _____. (CTM) (Adopt a systematic and methodological approach to planning).
- 246. In a CI scenario, determine when and how you would marshal and use the available field office personnel, time, and other resources effectively. (CTM)
- 247. Anticipate problems in an investigation and develop contingencies to avoid them. (CTM)
- 248. Adapt speaking style and comments to the audience. (CTM) (focus on classified vs. unclassified?)
- 249. Speak clearly, audibly, and fluently, using Standard English and effective vocabulary. (CTM)
- 250. Use non-verbal communication skills appropriate to a situation. (CTM)
- 251. Listen and attend to others. (CTM)
- 252. Persuade others, as appropriate, to accept and work towards objectives. (CTM)
- 253. Assess individuals and/or situations and adjust own interpersonal style to deal effectively with others. (CTM)
- 254. Persuade others and gain cooperation from them. (CTM)
- 255. Treat others in a respectful and diplomatic fashion. (CTM)
- 256. Compromising when appropriate to resolve disagreements. (CTM)

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- 257. Maintaining professional role and demeanor in emotional situations. (CTM)
- 258. Quickly and accurately perceive patterns and specifics when attending to detail. (CTM)
- 259. Take thorough notes during _____. (CTM)
- 260. Gather, analyze information, and draw sound conclusions from information. (CTM)
- 261. Discern pertinence, merits, and deficiencies in logic and credibility of information. (CTM)
- 262. Integrate diverse _____ information to detect relationships and patterns (of what kind?). (CTM)
- 263. Understand own and others' capabilities, behaviors, and motives. (CTM)
- 264. Decide on and commit to a reasonable course of action (in _____, when _____?). (CTM)
- 265. Generate alternate solutions to a problem, consider risks, and choose best alternative. (CTM)
- 266. Put forth the effort and initiative necessary to accomplish a job (like what?). (CTM)
- 267. Work under difficult or trying circumstances, when necessary (such as?). (CTM)
- 268. Learn from constructive criticism. (CTM)
- 269. Demonstrate initiative in developing skills needed to do the job well. (CTM)
- 270. Adjust to unanticipated events and circumstances. (CTM)
- 271. Demonstrate resourcefulness, creativity, and overcoming obstacles. (CTM)
- 272. Remain level headed and effective under stress. (CTM)
- 273. List the (PRP)
- 274. Given a sample of entities within a Domain, choose the entities and explain why. (PRP)

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275. Identify and articulate [redacted] of the top priority countries in a territory specified in a scenario. (PRP)
276. Name what each Field Office should have. (PRP) (CIWG) Name how often it should meet. (PRP) (quarterly)
277. Explain how the Field Office can use the CIWG to help with its Domain. (PRP) (identify and understand it, conduct [redacted] of it, and develop operations)
278. Identify for what each Field Office should have and use a system to routinely review [redacted] as a basis for opening new cases and investigations. (PRP)
279. Identify and articulate the operations of those top priority countries. (PRP)
280. Determine how often each Field Office must complete an [redacted] [redacted] (PRP)
281. Determine with whom the Field Office should partner when conducting an [redacted] [redacted] (PRP)
- (S) 282. Explain what "sufficient" coverage [redacted] means. (PRP)
283. Determine for whom each field office needs to establish a strong asset base (the [redacted] (PRP)
- (S) 284. Given two scenarios, identify and describe issues and policies impeding the full implementation of the CI National Strategy. (PRP)

b1
b7E

b1
b7E

b7E

Must revise most of the following Instructional Objectives from the CI Investigations and Operations IMIS course. They are too broad as written; they should identify only one performance word and clarify most standards. Identify and apply as performances fall into two different levels of performance—which is required for the task? Also, standards given are more topics (i.e., Economic Espionage and [redacted] than standards and don't clarify what about the topic should be identified or applied. How does one apply economic espionage or an [redacted] in a case situation? Also, how many investigative situations must the student apply them to? Will they all be different or a continuing, building case? standard given (i.e., Economic Espionage.

285. identify and/or apply to investigative situations investigative Authority. (IMIS)
286. identify and/or apply to investigative situations Economic Espionage. (IMIS)
287. identify and/or apply to investigative situations the member agencies of the U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC). (IMIS)

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288. identify and/or apply to investigative situations the ☐ (IMIS)

(S)

289.

290.

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291. identify and/or apply to investigative situations how collected positive intelligence is disseminated to USIC agencies. (IMIS)

292. identify and/or apply to investigative situations how Intelligence Analysts can be used to support FCI operations. (IMIS)

293. identify and/or apply to investigative situations Threat Assessments. (IMIS)

294. identify and/or apply to investigative situations the predicate for preliminary investigations (PI). (IMIS)

295. identify and/or apply to investigative situations the predicate for full investigations (FI). (IMIS)

296. identify and/or apply to investigative situations objectives of an investigation. (IMIS)

297. identify and/or apply to investigative situations case resolution and administrative requirements. (IMIS)

298. identify and/or apply to investigative situations the difference between interviews and interrogations. (IMIS)

299. identify and/or apply to investigative situations case conclusion. (IMIS)

300. identify and/or apply to investigative situations how to mark, handle, and destroy classified material. (IMIS)

301.

302.

303.

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304.

(S)

305.

306.

307. identify and/or apply to investigative situations electronic and physical surveillance. (IMIS)

(S)

308. identify and/or apply to investigative situations (IMIS)

b1
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(S)

309.

310.

311.

312. apply to investigative situations and **become familiar with** [redacted] and their use in FCI investigations. (IMIS) **not a measurable performance**

b7E

313. apply to investigative situations and **become familiar with** the history and purpose of FISA. (IMIS) **not a measurable performance**

314. apply to investigative situations and **become familiar with** FISA Court order requirements. (IMIS) **not a measurable performance**

315. apply to investigative situations and **become familiar with** the FISA application process. (IMIS) **not a measurable performance**

316. apply to investigative situations and **become familiar with the** [redacted] (IMIS) **not a measurable performance**

b7E

317. apply to investigative situations and **become familiar with** the definition of espionage. (IMIS) **not a measurable performance**

318. apply to investigative situations and **become familiar with** Title 18 U.S.C. 794(a) and its application to espionage investigations. (IMIS) **not a measurable performance**

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- 319. apply to investigative situations and **become familiar with** Title 50 U.S.C. 783(b) and its application to espionage investigations. (IMIS) **not a measurable performance**
- 320. apply to investigative situations and **become familiar with** how espionage cases are prosecuted. (IMIS) **not a measurable performance**
- 321. apply to investigative situations and **become familiar with** what is. (IMIS) **not a measurable performance**
- 322. apply to investigative situations and **become familiar with** the FBI's objectives regarding (IMIS) **not a measurable performance**
- 323. apply to investigative situations and **become familiar with** interview concerns regarding (IMIS) **not a measurable performance**

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DATE: 12-22-2011
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REASON: 1.4 (c)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-22-2036

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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CIOPS/IMIS Course Comparison

Highlight Key:

~~Already in IMIS Introduction to CI~~

Add to IMIS Introduction to CI

~~Covered in IMIS but not in CIOPS~~

Covered in CIOPS but not in IMIS

Suggested Rewrite of CIOPS Objectives

Suggested Rewrite of CIOPS Objectives

Fundamentals of FBI-CI

~~Basic CI Objectives~~

Original CIOPS Objectives	Original IMIS Objectives	Suggested Objectives
describe the types of different operations the FBI uses to meet the FBI's CI objectives. (AS)	identify and/or apply to investigative situations the definition of Counterintelligence (CI)	
explain the investigative principles and practices that made particular cases a success or a failure. (BT)	identify and/or apply to investigative situations the FBI's Counterintelligence Goals	
list the [] of the FBI's CI Program. (BT)		
identify the number one goal in FBI CI cases. (BT)		
discuss the Bureau's CI objectives. (AS)		
identify the [] in FBI CI cases. (BT)		

b7E

➤ Key Historical Events

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
discuss the FBI's significant CI cases. (BT)		

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➤ Basic Concepts (Proactive) (Strategy)

Covered in CIOPS	Covered in IMIS	Suggested Objectives

(S)

➤ [Redacted]

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
[Redacted]		

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(S)

The Adversary

Covered in CIOPS	Covered in IMIS	Suggested Objectives

(S)

➤ [Redacted]

Covered in CIOPS	Covered in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
[Redacted]		

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(S)

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(S)

Covered in CIOPS		Covered in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
(S)			

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Classification and Security Issues (Also covered in *FISA and Information Sharing* IMIS on Virtual Academy)

Covered in CIOPS	Covered in IMIS	Covered in <i>FISA & Info Sharing</i>	Suggested Objectives
explain classification and security issues that impact classifying information. (AS)		wrap classified information appropriately for transport or mailing. (GF)	
articulate the difference between classification and access restrictions. (GF/TE)		describe the information comprising the descriptive information part of classified markings. (GF)	
articulate the level of damage to the nation that would result from disclosure of information classified at each level. (GF/TE)		articulate the difference between classification and access restrictions. (GF/TE)	
provide derivative classification actions. (TE)			
mark classified information appropriately. (GF/TE)		state who can classify and declassify information. (GF/TE)	
handle classified information appropriately. (GF/TE)			
store classified information appropriately. (GF/TE)			
destroy classified information appropriately. (GF/TE)			

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state who can classify and declassify information. (GF/TE)			
name the three classification markings required on classified documents as overall, portion, and descriptive information. (TE)		articulate the level of damage to the nation that would result from disclosure of information classified at each level. (GF/TE)	
given a classified document with or without handling and/or access restrictions, determine if it is appropriately marked as required. (GF/TE)		given a classified document with or without handling and/or access restrictions, determine if it is appropriately marked as required. (GF/TE)	
given three examples of information, review excerpts from the classification guide to determine if the guide says that the information should be classified, and classify the information accordingly, with all appropriate markings. (TE/GF)			
use the FCI Classification Guide to apply the appropriate derivative classification markings on several documents. (TE/GF)			
articulate recent changes to classification policies as a result of EO 13292. (BT)			
list the two methods of classifying documents. (BT)			
know the proper locations of classification markings on an FBI document. (BT)			
articulate the difference between a classification level and a handling restriction. (BT)			

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recognize appropriate methods for protecting, storing, and destroying classified information. (BT)			
explain document markings/standards. (AS)			
discuss the appropriate methods to store and handle classified material in a secure and prescribed manner. (AS)			

CD-6 Special Projects

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
explain the Bureau's counter-proliferation responsibilities. (AS)		
identify the various programs utilized by CD-6. (AS)		

➤ Threat briefings to include trends, intentions, & section policy

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives

➤ FI Service baseline [presence, MO, targets]

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives

➤ Operational Strategies

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives

➤ Targeting priorities

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives

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Language Services (Overview)

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
explain the various services that Languages Services has to offer in translation matters. (AS)		

FCI Authority (Covered in depth in *FISA and Information Sharing* IMIS)

➤ Non-statutory authority (EOs, etc.)

Covered in CIOPS	Covered in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
restate the CI Authority given to the FBI to conduct CI/Terrorism investigations. (AS)		

➤ Statutory authority

Covered in CIOPS	Covered in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
restate the CI Authority given to the FBI to conduct CI/Terrorism investigations. (AS)		
identify and apply to investigative operations the relevant statutory and Executive authorities relating to CI. (BT)		

➤ The USIC (review)

Covered in CIOPS	Covered in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
identify and apply to investigative operations the key USIC agencies and their responsibilities. (BT)		
given various scenarios involving intelligence or other information coming into an FBI CI squad, determine which other agencies in the USIC need to receive it, in what format, and when. (GF)		

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given various scenarios involving investigative leads to the FBI CI squad, determine in each case which other agencies in the USIC should be contacted, how, and in what ways they could/should help. (GF)		
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➤ The National Security List

Covered in CIOPS	Covered in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
identify and apply to investigative operations the various categories contained within the National Security List. (BT)		
given scenarios of several cases, determine investigative priorities of the cases based solely on the National Security List. (GF)		
given scenarios of several cases, determine if each falls within the oversight (?) of the National Security List and name which category it falls under, if yes (e.g., country or issue threat). (GF)		
list the issue threats noted in the National Security List as terrorism, espionage, proliferation of WMD, targeting USG, economic espionage, national information infrastructure, perception management, and foreign intelligence activities. (GF)		
(S)		

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Report Writing & Dissemination (*Basics covered in FISA and Information Sharing IMI*)

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
summarize the issues needed for reporting writing. (AS)		
identify the three types of NFIP written communications as ECs, LHMs, and FD-302s. (BT)		
explain how each type of NFIP written communication is used. (BT)		

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given three scenarios, explain which type of written communication would be appropriate. (GF)		
apply proper report writing procedures for NFIP communications within the FBI and to outside agencies. (BT)		
apply effective writing techniques to improve clarity and persuasiveness. (BT) (need to specify the techniques to apply)		
protect sensitive sources and methods in written communications. (BT) ☐ communication of sources and methods? use the proper source markings/codes in the communications? apply proper classification markings to the document containing source and method information?)		

b7E

FBI Asset Issues

Covered in CIOPS	Covered in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
given two scenarios of assets in an operational environment, formulate a plan for contact with their assets, commensurate with the risk that asset faces in the operational environment. (BT)		

➤ Reporting requirements

Covered in CIOPS	Covered in IMIS	Suggested Objectives

➤ Asset validation and vetting

Covered in CIOPS	Covered in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
explain asset validation and vetting procedures. (AS)		

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explain the FBI's Asset Validation Review Process. (BT) [use specific scenarios for application]		

➤ Asset handling

Covered in CIOPS	Covered in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
apply the principles of the psychology of asset handling. (BT)		
given four different situations with different assets, describe the best way to handle the asset in each (apply the principles of the psychology of asset handling). (GF)		

➤ Administrative issues

Covered in CIOPS	Covered in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
given three scenarios involving handling assets, state whether or not the operational requirements were met. (GF)		
given three scenarios involving handling assets, state whether or not the administrative requirements were met. (GF)		

FCI Authority (NSLB)

➤ AG Guidelines/NSIG

Covered in CIOPS	Covered in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
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identify and apply various and appropriate sections of the AGG to investigative and operational situations. (BT)		
given a chart of investigative authorities, determine if each applies to CI or criminal cases and, if CI, what kind of case. (GF)		
given three scenarios, determine which section of the AGG applies. (GF)		
given three investigative scenarios, determine the techniques you could use under the AGG. (GF)		
given three investigative scenarios, determine if the AGG have been applied correctly. (GF)—use in SSA course		

CI Resources

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
identify other potential CI resources that are available to them. (AS)		

Covered in CIOPS	Covered in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
restate the [redacted] (AS)		
cite the importance/significance of [redacted] (AS)		

b7E

➤ Reasons for knowing the [redacted] process

Covered in CIOPS	Covered in IMIS	Suggested Objectives

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➤ [redacted]

Covered in CIOPS	Covered in IMIS	Suggested Objectives

b7E

➤ [redacted]

Covered in CIOPS	Covered in IMIS	Suggested Objectives

➤ [redacted]

Covered in CIOPS	Covered in IMIS	Suggested Objectives

b7E

➤ [redacted]

Covered in CIOPS	Covered in IMIS	Suggested Objectives

The FCI [redacted] Technique

Covered in CIOPS	Covered in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
identify the types of [redacted] (AS)		
know the [redacted] (BT)		
know the [redacted] to address in [redacted] (BT)		
know the overall importance and value [redacted] to the CI mission. (BT)		
tell why [redacted] are so important to resolve. (AS)		

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FCI Interviews/Interrogations (Basic FCI Interview Overview)

Covered in CIOPS	Covered in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
describe the difference between CI interviews and interrogations. (AS)		

FCI Interviews

Covered in CIOPS	Covered in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
demonstrate the [] method of establishing rapport. (AS)		
know the significance and importance (redundant?) of the differences between CI and criminal interviews. (BT)		
practice and refine their introductory interview skills with a new perspective regarding the shortfalls and benefits of various methods of initiating CI interviews. (BT)		

b7E

FCI Interrogations

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives

[] Practical Exercise

[] common questions and problems encountered in [] interviews.

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Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives

Analysis

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Covered in CIOPS	Covered in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
describe the importance and need for analysis in a CI case. (AS)		
be knowledgeable of the FBI's analytical capabilities and products. (BT)		
be knowledgeable of the value and importance of on-going analysis. (BT)		

Positive Intelligence Reporting ☐ (Basic Overview)

Covered in CIOPS	Covered in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
explain the importance of ☐ (AS)		
identify pertinent positive intelligence information from ☐ ? (BT)		
disseminate pertinent positive intelligence to the appropriate people/groups, through the appropriate channels, and in the proper format. (BT)		
be knowledgeable of the document format and dissemination process. (BT)		
be familiar with the role and responsibilities of the Reports Officer. (BT)		

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Cultural Considerations

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
explain why they should explore the various significant cultural aspects/influences that may impact an interview and in establishing rapport. (AS)		
be knowledgeable of the various cultural issues and difference that directly impact the Case Agent's ☐		

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	Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives

	Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives

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	Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives

Fundamentals	Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
articulate the definition of (BT/DE)			
give at least (BT/DE)			

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	Covered in CIOPS	Covered in IMIS	Suggested Objectives

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➤ The vulnerability of "mere presence"	Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
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➤ Admin requirements

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives

➤ Environmental requirements

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives

➤ Human Factors

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives

➤ Technical issues

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Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives

➤ concepts

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Covered in CIOPS	Covered in IMIS	Suggested Objectives

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Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
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Covered in CIOPS	Covered in IMIS	Suggested Objectives

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 Case Presentation

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives

Surveillance Photography

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
recognize optimal environments, camera settings and positions and techniques for effective photography of surveillance subjects. (BT)		

Surveillance Planning and Execution/SSG Capabilities

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
request and employ an SSG squad in investigations. (BT)		
incorporate the surveillance capabilities of SSG in an investigation. (DE/BT)		

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articulate at least [] that must be conducted while free of surveillance. (BT)		
articulate at least [] that can be conducted while under surveillance. (BT)		
relate the difference between a criminal and a CI surveillance. (DE)		
[]		
relate to capabilities and advantages of using SSG Team(s). (DE)		

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Briefing for Surveillance Exercise

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives

Surveillance Practical

Follow [] to a meeting with an unknown subject and ID the unknown subject.

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
conduct a pre-surveillance survey of an area. (BT)		
spot potential problems in an area during a pre-surveillance survey. (BT)		
initiate a surveillance at the appropriate time during a role play, after being divided into surveillance teams, provided with surveillance scenario information, and briefed on the surveillance, and having already reported to the starting point of the surveillance exercise. (DE)		

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Gusev Case Presentation (SSG)

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives

Counterproliferation Case Presentation

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
list [redacted] of the National Strategy that address Counter-proliferation issues. (DE)		
[redacted]		
list at least [redacted] helpful in initiating Counter-proliferation cases in the Field. (DE)		

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Rotating Interview Practicals

➤ Subjects from Wednesday's surveillance problems; each problem 1hr long with critique provided; every student does an interview.

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
protect the source of information about the meeting. (DE)		

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	Fredericksburg		
Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives	
identify at least (DE)			
observe role players conducting and then discuss the potential success and pitfalls of each. (DE)			
contrast and compare the differences between dependent upon environment. (DE)			

b7E

Hanssen Case Presentation

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives	
identify personality motivations and characteristics of Robert Hanssen that would be indicators of concern. (DE)			
identify investigative procedures taken in the Hanssen case. (DE)			
observe the result of good surveillance techniques and use of SSG in the outcome of this case. (DE)			

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Undercover Operations

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives	
identify cases in which one could potentially use a UC Operation. (DE)			
identify employees who would be candidates for UC roles. (DE)			
identify the training required for candidates of UC roles in order to obtain UC approval. (DE)			

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identify administrative procedures for developing and maintaining a UC OP. (DE)		
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Behavioral Analysis Program

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
assemble information on their CI case subject or asset that will be useful to the BAP. (DE)		
identify proper procedures for requesting and obtaining BAP assistance. (DE)		

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Covered in CIOPS	Covered in IMIS	Suggested Objectives

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FISA (Also covered in *FISA and Information Sharing* IMIS on Virtual Academy)

Covered in CIOPS	Covered in IMIS	Covered in <i>FISA & Info Sharing</i>	Suggested Objectives
explain the various aspects of FISA. (AS)			
explain the FISA Court. (DE)			

➤ History (*Basic Short Overview*) (*Basic Overview*) (Covered in depth in *FISA and Information Sharing* IMIS)

Covered in CIOPS	Covered in IMIS	Covered in <i>FISA & Info Sharing</i>	Suggested Objectives
articulate the historical perspective that led the FBI to the FISA. (DE)			

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articulate FISA's implications in today's world of CI and CT. (DE)			

➤ Statute/Minimization (*Basic Overview*) (Covered in depth in *FISA and Information Sharing* IMIS)

Covered in CIOPS	Covered in IMIS	Covered in <i>FISA & Info Sharing</i>	Suggested Objectives
identify the appropriate FISA-related statutes. (DE)			
explain Minimization Procedures. (DE)			
explain the difference (in rights?) between a U.S. Person (USPER) and a non-USPER. (DE)			

➤ Drafting Application

Covered in CIOPS	Covered in <i>FISA & Info Sharing</i>	Suggested Objectives
identify the mechanics of the FISA Process. (DE)		
list the components of a FISA Package. (DE)		

➤ ☐ (*Basic Short Overview*)

Covered in CIOPS	Covered in IMIS	Covered in <i>FISA & Info Sharing</i>	Suggested Objectives

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Using GPS

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
describe GPS devices. (DE)		
describe what type of investigative information can be extracted from GPS devices. (DE)		
describe requirements of GPS installation Authority. (DE)		

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compare different types of GPS devices (including their installation and power source requirements and data analysis). (DE)		
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Section Briefing		
Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
define the [redacted] by overall Mission and Responsibilities. (DE)		
identify and describe focal points of [redacted] Program priorities (to include the (1) [redacted] (2) Counter-proliferation, and (3) [redacted] (DE)		
(S) [redacted] (DE)		
(S) [redacted] be aware of the Section structure by Unit and point of contact. (DE)		

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➤ Threat briefings to include trends, intentions, & section policy

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives

➤ FI Service baseline [presence, MO, targets]

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
(S) [redacted]		

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➤ Operational Strategies

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives

➤ Targeting priorities

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
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Defector Speaker

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives

Section Briefing		
Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
define the Goals, Objectives and Investigative Responsibilities of the Counterespionage Section (DE)		
describe the Section structure by unit. (DE)		
list the field office reporting requirements regarding Counterespionage and Economic Espionage cases. (DE)		
be aware of points of contact within the [?] Section. (DE)		

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➤ Threat briefings to include trends, intentions, & section policy

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives

➤ FI Service baseline [presence, MO, targets]

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives

➤ Operational Strategies

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives

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➤ Targeting priorities

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives

Economic Espionage - Working with the Business Community

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
identify legal authorization to conduct espionage and economic espionage investigations. (DE)		
list the objectives of the [REDACTED] (DE)		
articulate how these objectives are employed to counter the Econ. Esp. threat. (DE)		

b7E

Espionage Investigations (Overview)

Covered in CIOPS	Covered in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
list [REDACTED] an espionage case. (DE)		
identify espionage statutes. (DE)		
list at least [REDACTED] espionage cases originate. (DE)		

b7E

[REDACTED] Section Briefing

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives

➤ Threat briefings to include trends, intentions, & section policy

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives

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➤ FI Service baseline [presence, MO, targets]

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives

➤ Operational Strategies

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives

➤ Targeting priorities

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
identify the responsibilities of [redacted]		
[redacted] (DE)		
identify appropriate points of contact within [redacted]		
(DE)		
[redacted]		

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Working with the Scientific/University Community

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
understand [redacted]		
[redacted]		

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better formulate successful approaches to individuals on the college campus through whom they could obtain investigative assistance. (DE)		
better formulate successful approaches to individuals in the scientific community through whom they could obtain investigative assistance.		

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Working with

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives

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Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
discuss the mutual goals, working relationships, and liaison efforts between the two agencies. (DE)		
discuss the mutual goals, working relationships, and liaison efforts between the two agencies. (DE)		

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discuss the mutual goals, working relationships, and liaison efforts between the two agencies. (DE)		
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(S) Espionage [redacted] Case Presentation—George Trofimoff Case Presentation

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
[redacted]		
describe [redacted] cases. (DE)		
be exposed to case examples of espionage. (DE)		
[redacted]		

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Working With DOD

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
relate to the differences and similarities of FBI and DOD CI agencies in different branches of the military. (DE)		
describe by chart the DOD CI organization. (DE)		
articulate the Global Mission and Major CI Initiatives of DOD CI. (DE)		
list the DOD CI objectives. (DE)		
list at least [redacted] in which FBI / DOD CI can work in unison. (DE)		

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Engineering Research Facility

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
articulate how technical attacks on a target can provide a wealth of investigative information. (DE)		
identify how traditional data intercepts are used to collect internet communications. (DE)		
describe required procedures to implement technical attacks, to include FISA authority. (DE)		

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(Overview)		
Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
identify (KD)		

Implementing the National CI Strategy in the Field

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
use the pyramid to show where to focus CI investigative priorities. (KD)		
use the pyramid to show where to focus CI investigative priorities. (KD)		

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Section Briefing		
Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
know what cases they have that are supervised by this Section as well as to have a point of reference for assistance in their cases. (KD)		

➤ Threat briefings to include trends, intentions, & section policy

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives

➤ FI Service baseline [presence, MO, targets]

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Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives

➤ Operational Strategies

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives

➤ Targeting priorities

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives

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Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives

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Handling (Overview)

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives

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Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
develop a for the field office from dealing with (KD)		

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know the importance of having a [redacted] [redacted] (KD)		
apply lessons learned during the [redacted] [redacted] (KD) (Students will be critiqued on strengths and weaknesses in order to identify methods that work for them in a [redacted] situation.)		

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CYBER Presentation

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
identify how [redacted] can be used and the resources in the Intelligence Community that can assist to counter those threats. (KD)		

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Break outs with Analysts

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
identify analysts at FBIHQ they can request information on their targets. (KD)		

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[redacted] Pitch Practical Exercise

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
implement [redacted] they learned in the [redacted] block of instruction. (KD)		

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Asset Validation (Overview)

Covered in CIOPS	Covered in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
articulate the need for thorough asset validation. (DE)		

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understand the importance of continually vetting and validating their sources as well as the information the sources provide. (KD)		
identify risk factors of sources. (KD)		
identify the types of visas most frequently used to enter the US. (KD)		

Working with Dept of State

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
know when and how to request an NFPO. (KD)		

Espionage Case Presentation—John Walker

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives
discuss the different techniques they learned over the course and apply them to this case study. (KD)		

CD Executive Address

Covered in CIOPS	Can Cover in IMIS	Suggested Objectives

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Basic CIOPs Course Redesign A Working Draft

Course Goal:

Orientation To The Counterintelligence Environment: Understanding the Landscape and Players

(WEEK ONE)

The U.S. Intelligence Community and the FBI's place within it

Section One Goal:

Overall Section One Objective:

INSERT MOTIVATIONAL PIECE HERE—Cover the importance of FCI to the U.S. and the damage FIS and spies have caused the U.S.

9/11 Commission Report, NCIX and the U.S. National Strategy (from [REDACTED])

- ✓ Explain how the FBI has responded to the 9/11 Commission's recommendations for "fixing" the intelligence problems in the FBI. Describe CD's role in this strategy.
- ✓ Define the National Counterintelligence Strategy of the U.S. as the first formal mission statement for strategic CI as an instrument of national security.
- ✓ Articulate [REDACTED]

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✓ Articulate [REDACTED]

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✓ Articulate [REDACTED]

✓ Articulate [REDACTED]

FBI National Security Service (NSS)—Integrating Analysis and Action

- ✓ Describe the purpose behind the creation of the New FBI NSS and
 - Role of CD
 - ❖ Describe the impact of the new FBI NSS on the CI Program Strategic Plan.
 - Role of CTD
 - Role of DI

Counterintelligence Division Organization (and the Reasoning Behind It?)

- Counterintelligence Program Goals
 - ❖ Name [REDACTED]
 - Prevent proliferation of WMD information, technology, and materials.

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- Prevent penetration of the USIC.
- Prevent penetration of other government agencies and contractors.
- Prevent the compromise of Critical National Assets.
- Conduct sophisticated operations against priority countries.
- ❖ *Explain how knowing these priorities affects your job.*
- ❖ *Given a scenario including [redacted] prioritize the tasks according to the CI Goals.*
- ❖ *Given a scenario including [redacted] prioritize the tasks according to the CI Goals.*
- Counterintelligence Program Strategies
 - ❖ *State the CI Program's Strategic Focus.*
 - Protect the United States against foreign intelligence (FI) operations and espionage.
 - Interface with and know the domain.
 - *List [redacted] and explain why they are considered significant.*
 - *Given a detailed scenario, articulate the CI relevance (or irrelevance) of each domain entity.*
 - Engage in strategic partnerships.
 - *Explain the importance of developing partnerships with strategic entities in your domain.*
 - *Given a scenario explaining all entities in a domain, select the [redacted]*
 - Conduct sophisticated operations.
 - *State [redacted]*
 - Understand the threat.
 - *Given a detailed description of a specific domain, describe the CI threat.*
 - Inform and influence policy makers.
 - *Describe what kinds of policies and who you (the FBI?) can influence within your domain.*

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U.S. Intelligence Community

- ✓ *List [redacted]*
- ✓ *Name [redacted] (with whom the FBI deals).*
- ✓ *Summarize the collection capabilities of and what the USIC can do for the FBI.*
- ✓ *Define each of the following acronyms:*
 - ☐ *USIC (U.S. Intelligence Community)*
 - ☐ *FIG (Field Intelligence Group)*
 - ☐ *NIC (National Intelligence Council)*
 - ☐ *etc.*

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Members and Their Missions

- ✓ *Name [redacted] with whom you will have the most contact as a CI Agent.*

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- ✓ From a list, choose the USIC agencies primarily responsible for collecting and analyzing [redacted]
- ✓ From a list, choose the USIC agencies primarily responsible for collecting and analyzing [redacted]
- ✓ From a list, choose the USIC agencies primarily responsible for collecting and analyzing [redacted]
- ✓ From a list, choose the USIC agencies primarily responsible for collecting and analyzing [redacted]
- ✓ From a list, choose the USIC agencies primarily responsible for collecting and analyzing [redacted]
- FBI
 - ☐ Name [redacted] in which the FBI is involved.
 - ☐ Summarize the collection capabilities of and what the FBI can do for other members of the USIC.
 - ☐ Explain why the FBI must become an intelligence-driven organization.

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Working as a CI Community Member

- National CI Working Group
 - ☐ course objective
- Regional CI Working Group
 - ☐ USIC (U.S. Intelligence Community)
- Local CI Working Group
- Bi-lateral Agency Partnerships
- FBI-DOD Technology Task Forces

Non-USIC Domain Entities

U.S. Government

Business Alliances

- Sensitivities, Concerns and Strategies for Resolving Conflicting Interests
- FBI Outreach Programs

Academic Alliances

- Sensitivities, Concerns and Strategies for Resolving Conflicting Interests
- FBI Outreach Programs

Agents in Laboratories Initiatives

- Sensitivities, Concerns and Strategies for Resolving Conflicting Interests

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(WEEK TWO)

Global Players: Common and Conflicting Interests

The Americas

- Historical and Cultural Perspectives
- Political and Economic Issues
- Intelligence Objectives, Capabilities, and Past Practices

Europe and the European Union

- Historical and Cultural Perspectives
- Political and Economic Issues
- Intelligence Objectives, Capabilities, and Past Practices

Middle East

- Historical and Cultural Perspectives
- Political and Economic Issues
- Intelligence Objectives, Capabilities, and Past Practices

Africa

- Historical and Cultural Perspectives
- Political and Economic Issues
- Intelligence Objectives, Capabilities, and Past Practices

Asia

- Historical and Cultural Perspectives
- Political and Economic Issues
- Intelligence Objectives, Capabilities, and Past Practices

Transnational Groups or Movements

- Historical and Cultural Perspectives
- Political and Economic Issues
- Intelligence Objectives, Capabilities, and Past Practices

Operating in the Counterintelligence Environment

(WEEK THREE INTRO)

Acting as Responsible Consumers and Producers of Intelligence: "The Currency of Counterintelligence"

Defining Intelligence

Sources and Types of Intelligence

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Intelligence Collection Requirements

Ensuring the Validity of Intelligence at All Levels

(WEEK THREE)

Conducting Basic CI Investigations

Objectives of Basic CI Investigations/Operations

- To identify intelligence service objectives, officers, assets and operations
- To collect and disseminate valid intelligence regarding suspected and/or identified intelligence activities
- To neutralize and, wherever possible, exploit the adversary's intelligence activities
- To gain greater proficiency in the conduct of CI investigations and operations

Categories of Basic CI Investigations



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Foreign Visitors

- Authorities
- Basic Techniques
- CI Communications


Contacts

- Authorities
- Basic Techniques
- CI Communications

Applying Sophisticated Techniques

Recruitments

✓ Define



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Undercover Operations

FISA/Technical Operations

Physical Surveillance (FISUR) and Countersurveillance

(WEEK FOUR)

Introduction to Advanced CI Investigations and Operations: Recognizing Hostile Operations, Applying Countermeasures, Initiating Our Own Operations

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Denial and Deception

Espionage

Proven Strategies, Best Practices and Lessons Learned

Post Mortem of Selected CI Cases

- Successful Strategies
- Innovative Thinking in the CI Environment

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

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Introduction

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Definition




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
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


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
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
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


What Would Do?




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


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


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
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
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
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
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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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
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
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
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


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Basic Elements

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Basic Elements	
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Basic Elements

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Basic Elements	
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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~
There is NO perfect

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~	
There is NO perfect	
What is a good idea today, might be terrible tomorrow	
~~SECRET//NOFORN~~	
	

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A reminder...

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A reminder...	
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Objective

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

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Objective	
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



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

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

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

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

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

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



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



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
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
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
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An Example




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

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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Introduction To

[Redacted]

"What you're seeing
isn't necessarily what's
happening."

~~SECRET~~ Derived From G-3
Declassify On 25X1

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Why [Redacted]

- ♦ Executive Order (E.O.) 12333
 - Designates the FBI as the lead agency for CI matters in the U.S.
- ♦ Proven methods of exploiting adversary weaknesses
- ♦ Proven counter-measure tactics

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Signals

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Visual Recognition Signal (VRS)

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



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

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

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

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

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	Training
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

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

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


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

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

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
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



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
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


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


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


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

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

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

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

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

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

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE


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Introduction To

"What you're seeing isn't necessarily
what's happening."

Derived From G-3
Declassify On 25X1

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Why

- Executive Order (E.O.) 12333
- E.O. 12333 designates the FBI as the lead agency for counterintelligence matters in the U.S.
- Proven methods of exploiting weaknesses of the adversary.
- Proven methods of counter-measures

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Signals



Signal

Signal Site

Visual Recognition Signal (VRS)

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




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

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

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
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

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



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

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

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

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
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

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

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

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
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DATE: 12-23-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 65179/DMH/BAW/STP/bls
REASON: 1.4 (c)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-23-2036

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

7/13/2011

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BASIC

"You Can See A Lot When You Observe Things"
Yogi Berra
Because...

"Simplicity is the Ultimate Sophistication."
Leonardo Davinci

SSA [redacted] CTC

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Objective and Goal

Objectives:
To understand basic [redacted] to reach
the below goal.

Goal:

[redacted]

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[redacted] **Definition**

[redacted]

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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
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


Concealment Devices




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
Concealment Devices




Dead Drop

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
Dead Drop



Dead Drop

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Ames Dead Drop Site "Bridge", WDC



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
Hanssen's "Lewis" Dead Drop Site



DEAD DROPS
Robert Hanssen's "Ellis" drop site and
package from 2/18/01




"ELLIS" Drop Site under a footbridge
near Vienna, Virginia



Package dropped by Hanssen at Ellis site
FOUO 2/18/01



Material From John Walkers Last Dead Drop



Aldrich Ames Dead Drop Site "Pipe", Wheaton,
MD, Early 1990's





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

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

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

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
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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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DATE: 12-23-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 65179/DMH/BAW/STP/bls
REASON: 1.4 (c)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-23-2036

TYPES OF

"How they do their job with CI coverage."

~~Classified by : 3022; Reason : 1.4(c); Declassify on : 25-X1~~

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DATE: 12-23-2011

CLASSIFIED BY 65179/DMH/BAW/STP/bls

REASON: 1.4 (c)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-23-2036

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

7/18/2011

OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES

Part II -

"He couldn't have done anything.
He was only out of sight of the
'eye' for less than 5 seconds."

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
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7/18/2011

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DATE: 12-23-2012
CLASSIFIED BY 65179/DMH/BAW/STP/bls
REASON: 1.4 (c)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-23-2036

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

7/18/2011

COMMUNICATION PLANS

"What we have here is a
failure to communicate"

Strother Martin
Cool Hand Luke

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Definition

- A communications plan is

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What a Commo Plan does

- A communications plan is used to:

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Types of Commo

- Electronic
 - Phone

- Pager

- Internet
 - Email

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Types of Commo

- Electronic—continued

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Types of Commo

- Written

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7/18/2011

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Signal Issues

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
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CLASSIFIED BY 65179/DMH/BAW/STP/bls
REASON: 1.4 (c)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-23-2036


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7/18/2011

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

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



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(S) [Redacted]
[Redacted] - **Miscellaneous**
(S) [Redacted] ■ **Concealment Device** [Redacted]
[Redacted]
(S) [Redacted]
[Redacted]

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★ DATE: 12-23-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 65179/DMH/BAW/STP/bls
REASON: 1.4 (c)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-23-2036

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
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7/18/2011

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CONDUCTING	
OPERATIONS	
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

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DATE: 01-03-2012
CLASSIFIED BY 65179/DMH/BAW/STP/bls
REASON: 1.4 (c)
DECLASSIFY ON: 01-03-2037

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



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

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] - "Drops"

• Drop Site [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] - Miscellaneous

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] - Miscellaneous

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[Redacted] - *Miscellaneous*

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] - *Miscellaneous*

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted] - *Miscellaneous*

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(part II)

Application of [Redacted]

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Training

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] Trends

- General [Redacted] are UNIVERSAL

– If you don't look for it, you won't see it!

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

- Concealment Devices
- Disguises

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[Redacted]

- Pre-paid phone cards
- Pre-paid cell phones
- Integrated vehicular GPS systems

[Redacted]



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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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SUMMARY OF EVALUATIONS

[REDACTED] (04-1)

Week 2

(01/26/2004 - 02/06/2004)

b7E

(Note: Copies of individual course evaluations can be obtained by contacting CD/CITC

IOS [REDACTED]

Overall Average of Scores (based on 1-5 scale, with 5 being the highest rating): 4.58

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Overview:

(S) The [REDACTED] was very well received by the attendees and proved to be an excellent model for instruction within realistic time constraints and needs/objectives of the FBI. Most attendees indicated the course was very helpful and informative. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] As a guide for course relevance, CITC instructor staff recommend using the demonstrated proficiency exhibited by the attendees which should provide an accurate assessment of the understanding the attendees have obtained concerning [REDACTED] methodology and the mind-set behind it. Specifically, upon successful completion of the [REDACTED] attendees should be able to [REDACTED] covered by the [REDACTED] course of instruction.

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(S) The attendees from [REDACTED] 04-1 learned the theory and how said theory is put into practice concerning [REDACTED]. An advanced level of operational understanding was demonstrated, coupled with a high level of confidence by all of the [REDACTED] 04-1 attendees during the final phase (last two days) of the course. The attendees absolutely believed that they could [REDACTED]

b1
b7E

CITC Comment:

The attendees of [REDACTED] 04-1 (SAs from a variety of field offices) attended [REDACTED] of advanced instruction on [REDACTED] during which the attendees were provided a general [REDACTED] review and advanced training in both operational application of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. This was immediately followed by a [REDACTED] practical exercise, during which the attendees were placed into a mock operational setting working [REDACTED]. The [REDACTED] attendees enthusiastically worked long hours throughout the [REDACTED]

b7E

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practical exercise segment of the course (often exceeding [redacted])
[redacted] Even with the limited amount of training received by the attendees, during the final phase of the practical portion of the course, they were able to effectively [redacted]
[redacted] Morale throughout the course was extremely high, with the attendees voluntarily taking on additional operational acts. Each act required casing, a report, an operational plan, deconfliction, and implementation/execution. Further, attendees were asking to receive additional [redacted] stating that it was niether "fun" nor as good a learning experience without [redacted]
[redacted] In the opinion of the instructor staff, all of the attendees of [redacted] 04-1 completed the course with a greater understanding [redacted]
[redacted] based on the lessens learned [redacted] The attendees' views of the relevance of the [redacted] to their work in CI were overall very high, as evidenced through their reviews reported here.

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Review of Attendee Feedback: (Each *Feedback* entry is followed by related student comments.)

Review of [redacted]

- The segment entitled, *Review of* [redacted] was a good refresher and was very helpful. .

b7E

"Initially concepts, known to me, appeared "common-sense," and that finer techniques could not be taught in such a short period (if at all for some people). But the outstanding instructors presented the topics in such a manner that really drove-home [redacted]"

"Should have hands-on during 1st week where student does an operation."

"Good refresher."

"Review as brief and adequate."

"Great infor, very helpful"

CITC Comment: No comment, review.

(S) [redacted]

(S) - The segment entitled [redacted] was helpful. The attendees indicated how good the instructors were in suggesting very good ideas [redacted]

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"Instructor were extremely helpful and encouraging."

(S)

[REDACTED]

"Super valuable information."

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(S)

"Instructors suggested very good ideas and approaches"

[REDACTED]

CITC Comment: This block of instruction is an essential, although a tedious part of the training.

(S)

[REDACTED]

(S)

- The segment entitled [REDACTED] had very useful and informative information. The attendees indicated they was not comfortable in doing some of the [REDACTED] operations.

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b7E

"Good, useful information."

(S)

[REDACTED]

"Outstanding job."

"Presentation were very informative and helpful."

CITC Comment: This block of instruction is an essential, although a tedious part of the training.

Operational Site Tours:

The segment, *Operational Site Tours* as very informative.

"This part of the course is essential to understanding the concepts."

"The tour not only aided in conceptualizing and appreciating sites, but seeing previously used sites [REDACTED] brought home the reality of our work."

b7E

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"An actual demonstration of an [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]"

b7E

(S) "Felt like too much time spent following the instructor car around - the videos depicted good sites. Suggest students do more on their own or in pairs to pick out good channels. [REDACTED] then Instructors evaluate."

b1
b7E

(S) "Would have been helpful to see how instructor would run through the entire [REDACTED]
Students could observe how instructor would analyze [REDACTED]"

(S) and actually use it with the students at his side."

"Because of Integrated Operation Course, many was already familiar with some of the sites."

"A little too long and cold. However great visual learning tool."

CITC Comment: This block of instruction is an essential part of the training. Recommend that [REDACTED]

b7E

and that each group is assigned an instructor. Some of the instruction was lost to some of the attendees due to lack of proximity to an instructor during the tour.

(S)

[REDACTED]
The segment entitled [REDACTED] was a great review.

was

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b7E

(S) "Wonderful review, but could have been done the same day as the Operational Site Tours (i.e. demonstrate how you could do [REDACTED] to one of the Operational sites)."

(S) "Weather affected demo; also would like to be in the lead/demo car the whole time (riding in trail vehicles did not teach much.)"

"Good Class"

CITC Comment: Excellent training exercise which would be improved through better communication (radios) and/or greater numbers of instructors, one for each vehicle.

(S)

[REDACTED]
The segment, [REDACTED] was very informative.

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"Was very beneficial. I became more aware of what exactly could be used for [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Great Ideas!!."

"Weather affected presentation; [REDACTED] This class was the class I was looking for - the techniques were outstanding."

"Let the group observe an instructor commit the act [REDACTED]

b7E

"Needs more hand on."

"Good Review"

CITC Comment: This block of instruction is an essential part of the training. Recommend [REDACTED]

b7E

and that each group is assigned an instructor. Some of the instruction was lost to some of the attendees due to lack of proximity to an instructor during the tour.

Review of Past Week Lessons:

Although the segment entitled, *Review of Past Week Lessons* was very good .

"Terrific block of instruction. Very helpful."

CITC Comment: No comment.

Phase 2: Practical Application - [REDACTED]

The segment, *Phase 2: Practical Application* - [REDACTED] was very appropriate.

"Needed more time to prepare, long days. Felt like [REDACTED]
"Extremely Intense". Very beneficial! Unique opportunity. might consider holding [REDACTED] of the course in the same city/area. Bottom Line best training I've ever had in any profession thus far. Thanks for putting this together! Keep up the excellent work."

b1
b7E

"Too Long- the schedule for each day... Exhausting at times. Too Short time allowed for area familiarization and to plan out operations acts. I would suggest picking a different area for the operational activity a expanding the operational area to include more than just [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] is too small and is not the most cosmopolitan environment, whereas many [REDACTED] in

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the US are located in large metropolitan cities and give way to more possibilities for operational sites. [redacted] Instructors are all excellent presenters and really made attending the 04-01 [redacted] a positive privilege."

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b7E

"This was the culmination of everything we learned. I was able to effectively conduct any operation, survey, or evaluation required, to include (appropriately) [redacted]
[redacted] The instruction was that thorough, that good."

"By far best training I have received from the Bureau. The only recommendation I could make would be to hold the demonstrations for the first few days and then allow the class another day or so for area familiarization - possibly relocate the course to a larger area - we ended up running into each other too much.."

"Excellent training."

"I learned a tremendous amount during Phase 2. It was a bit confusing at first as to what the ground rules were, and what was expected of me. However, it became clear as [redacted]
The staff did an outstanding job with the resources available, but it is apparent that the Bureau need to devote more people and resources to providing this type of crucial, relevant training."

b7E

CITC Comment: The intense level of activity as well as a compressed environment are essential to the realistic nature of the course. The training schedule was extremely demanding but no more so than similar training provided by other members of the intelligence community. The practical portion of the exercise would be enhanced with the inclusion of an analyst (or two) who would receive concurrent training in [redacted] while also working with SSA instructors to learn how operational planning, de-confliction and mis-direction are employed by the opposition.

b7E

CITC instructor staff are exploring [redacted] as an operational area instead of [redacted] does have certain limitations and [redacted] while still a compressed area, offers greater flexibility for routes, etc. [redacted] can be predictable with five or six main choke points and little flexibility once those points are crossed. Any change in venue is not so pressing that it would occur prior to the initiation of FY-05.

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STATISTICAL COURSE EVALUATION FOR CD/OTU INSTRUCTION									
Week2		1/26/2004 - 2/5/2004							
Block of Instruction:		Instructor's Name:		5	4	3	2	1	0
Review of				Total:					
(S)									
(S)									
(S)	Operational Site Tours								
(S)									
(S)	Review of Past Week Lessons								
	Phase 2 Practical Application - Annapolis								
Totals/Overall Average:									

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b6
b7C
b7E

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Class Roster:

<u>Last Name</u>	<u>First Name</u>	<u>MI</u>	<u>FO</u>
			LA
			MM
			SF
			LA
			WF
			DE
			DE
			CE
			SF
			LA

b6
b7C

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
Intro
Obs. discuss
1 -> TELPROG
2 -> Flow to defeat it
3 -> Opp Site
4 -> How to defeat it
5 -> For what purpose
65!!!

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
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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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
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
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Passive



Signals



Show video

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New York Division - A-7

cell

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

CHARLOTTE DIVISION - FAYETTEVILLE

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



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
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
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♦ Newspaper Classifieds

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Tools

♦ Concealment Devices


♦ Disguises

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- ♦ Internet and Computers
 - ♦ Electronic Devices
 - ♦ Prepaid
 - Cell phones
 - Phone cards
-

♦ Integrated vehicular GPS



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

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

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Surveillance Manipulation:

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General

♦ Are UNIVERSAL

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Review Briefly


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

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
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Review this!

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important

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

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These methods are for Criminal not CI



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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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



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

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
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
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

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
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

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

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

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

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


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Concealment Device



An innocuous object designed or adapted as a container for hiding material or equipment (money, film, documents, cameras, radios, etc)



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
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
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



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



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
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
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

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
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
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



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Signals



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

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
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
Dead Drop

A place unattended by individuals at which communications, materials, equipment, or a package can be left or placed by one individual, to be picked up later by another individual, without the two meeting or seeing each other. The package is disguised to conceal its contents.

We also propose for your consideration a new DD site "Lewis". DD LOCATION: wooden podium in the amphitheatre of Long-Branch Nature Center (map of N. Virginia, page 16, grid G8). The package should be put under the FAR-LEFT corner of the podium (when facing the podium). Enter (sic) Longbranch Nature Center at the sign from Carlin Springs Road (near 6th Road south) and after parking your car in the lot follow the sign "To Amphitheatre." LOCATION OF THE DD SIGNAL: a wooden electricity utility pole at the northwest corner of the intersection of 3d(sic) Street and Carlin Springs Road near (sic) the Metrobus stop (the same map, Grid 7). The signals are the same as in the "Foxstone Park" DD. The white adhesive tape should be placed on the NORTHERN side of the pole.... (Letter from SVR to Robert Hanssen on or about October 6, 1999)




Dead Drop Site, Ft. Tryon Park, NYC, 1950's




Gap Under Lamp Post

Dead Drop Site, Riverside Park, NYC, 1950's







Iron fence is arm's length away from the bench. Magnetic capsule was attached to fence and hidden by grass.

John Walker's Last Dead Drop Site, WDC, 1985



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