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DISCOVERY REQUEST MATERIAL

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS & OPERATIONS (CIOPs) COURSE

****2002 - 2003****

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DATE: 11-09-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 65179 DMH/ stp/ lsg
REASON: 1.4 (c)
DECLASSIFY ON: 11-09-2036

**BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS
PROGRAM**
(BAP)
POC: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

BAP: Background
Purpose – Provide behavioral
science support to ongoing FCI, IT,
and DT investigations
Formed in January 1994
Based on behavioral science support
for criminal cases

BAP: Cases Supported
Interviews/Interrogations
(S) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

BAP: Types of Support
Personality Assessments
Certain cases, [REDACTED]
Develop Scenarios
[REDACTED]

b6
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b7E

b7E

b1
b7E

BAP: Sources of Assessment
Files
Technical Coverage
Surveillance
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]


BAP: Types of Useful Data
Physical
Educational/Military/Professional
Social
Personal (i.e., habits, interests)

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



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

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b7E



BAP STRATEGY AS THEATER

- Actors [REDACTED]
- Costumes- What to Wear [REDACTED]
- Props- [REDACTED]
- Stage- Where [REDACTED]
- Scripting- Dialog [REDACTED]

ESSENTIAL SKILLS FOR ASSET [REDACTED]

- Ability to Observe [REDACTED]
- Ability to Listen [REDACTED]
- Ability to Engage and Empathize [REDACTED]
- Ability to Communicate [REDACTED]
- Ability to Work and Deal with People [REDACTED]



ASSETS

- What is the objective?
- Think!
- Where are the weaknesses?
- Who do we go after?
- Who should we go after?
- Where do we start?





TECHNIQUES / APPROACHES THAT DO WORK

EACH BAP APPROACH IS TAILORED

- Auditory
- Tactile
- Visual



b7E



b7E

- Document
- All
- Is the
- Pre operation and post operation debriefings are critical
- Who is looking at the
- How

b7E

ASSETS

Assets

Looking

Document your efforts thoroughly





b7E

Now what do we do?

ASSET

What is the problem?

b7E



b7E

b6
b7C

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**COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
AGENDA - WEEK 1**
(10/21/02 - 10/25/02)

Monday

8:15 - 9:00	The FBI's FCI Mission	[REDACTED]	b6 b7C	
9:00 - 10:00	The FBI's FCI History	[REDACTED]		
10:00 - 11:00	U.S. Intelligence Community	[REDACTED]		
11:00 - 12:00	The FBI's FCI Strategy	[REDACTED]		
12:00 - 1:00	Lunch			
1:00 - 2:00	Types/Purposes of	[REDACTED]		
2:00 - 3:00	[REDACTED]	Identifying	[REDACTED]	b7E
3:00 - 3:20	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		
3:20 - 4:30	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]		

Tuesday

8:00 - 9:00	Authorities and Guidelines	[REDACTED]
9:00 - 10:00	National Security List	[REDACTED]
10:00 - 11:30	Handling Classified Materials	[REDACTED]
11:30 - 1:00	Lunch	
1:00 - 2:00	Report Writing	[REDACTED]
2:00 - 4:00	Types of NFIP Communications	[REDACTED]
4:00 - 5:00	Useful Writing Techniques	[REDACTED]

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b6
b7C
b7E

Wednesday

8:00 - 10:00

Asset

10:00 - 12:00

Types of Assets

12:00 - 1:00

Lunch

1:00 - 2:00

Asset Reporting and

2:00 - 3:00

Asset

3:00 - 4:30

Asset

Thursday

8:00 - 10:00

Contact Cases

10:00 - 12:00

FCI Interviews

12:00 - 1:30

Lunch

1:30 - 4:30

Short Interview Practicals

Friday

8:00 - 9:00

Analysis an an Investigative Tool

9:00 - 10:00

Behavioral Analysis Program

10:00 - 11:00

Review

12:00 - 1:00

Lunch

1:00 - 4:30

Cultural Issues

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Secret Working Papers

**COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
AGENDA - WEEK 2**

(10/28/02 - 11/01/02)

Monday

8:00 - 9:00 Admin Issues

9:00 - 10:00

The

10:00 - 11:00

11:00 - 12:00

Intro to

12:00 - 1:00

Lunch

(S) 1:00 - 2:00

2:00 - 3:00

3:00 - 5:00

b1
b6
b7C
b7E

Tuesday

8:00 - 10:30

Preparation for

10:30 - 12:00

12:00 - 1:00

Lunch

1:00 - 5:00

Practicals

for 10/31 Interview

b6
b7C
b7E

Wednesday

8:00 - 5:00

Demonstrations

(MD/Staff)

DATE: 03-15-2012
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Thursday

8:00 - 5:00 **Interview Practical Problems (Long Versions)**

Friday

8:00 - 9:00 **ANSIR Program**

9:00 - 10:00 **Positive Intelligence Reporting**

10:00 - 11:00

11:00 - 12:00 **Language Services**

12:00 - 1:00 **Lunch**

1:00 - 5:00 **Writing Assignment for 10/31 Interviews**

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**COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
AGENDA - WEEK 3**

(11/04/02 - 11/08/02)

b6
b7C

Monday

8:00 - 9:00

Admin Issues

9:00 - 11:00

[REDACTED]

Admin

[REDACTED]

11:00 - 12:00

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

12:00 - 1:00

Lunch

1:00 - 2:00

[REDACTED]

Objectives

[REDACTED]

2:00 - 3:00

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

: Fundamentals

b7E

3:00 - 5:00

[REDACTED]

Practical

[REDACTED]

Tuesday

8:00 - 9:00

Admin Issues

9:00 - 11:00

Undercover Operations: Admin

[REDACTED]

11:00 - 12:00

Undercover Operations:

[REDACTED]

12:00 - 1:00

Lunch

1:00 - 3:00

Undercover Operations:

[REDACTED]

~~Secret Working Papers~~

~~Secret Working Papers~~

(S)

Wednesday

8:00 - 9:00

(S)

9:00 - 10:00

10:00 - 12:00

12:00 - 1:00

(S)

1:00 - 2:00

(S)

2:00 - 3:00

(S)

3:00 - 4:00

(S)

4:00 - 5:00

Lunch

b1
b7E

b6
b7C

b1
b7E

Thursday

8:00 - 9:00

Intro to Espionage

9:00 - 10:00

Espionage Statutes

10:00 - 12:00

Basic Issues: Espionage Investigations

12:00 - 1:00

Lunch

1:00 - 3:00

Economic Espionage Investigation

3:00 - 5:00

Case Presentation

b6
b7C

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Friday

8:00 - 9:00

Attorney General Guidelines

9:00 - 12:00

12:00 - 1:00

LUNCH

1:00 - 5:00

& Minimization

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b7C
b7E

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

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AGENDA - WEEK 4

(11/11/02 - 11/15/02)

Monday

b1
b7E

(S) 8:30 - 9:30 [redacted] Overview [redacted]

9:30 - 10:30 [redacted] Unit [redacted]

b6
b7C

10:30 - 11:30 [redacted] Unit [redacted]

11:30 - 1:00 Lunch

1:00 - 2:00 [redacted] Unit [redacted]

(S) 2:00 - 3:00 [redacted] Unit [redacted]

3:00 - 4:00 [redacted] [redacted]

b1
b7E

b7E

Tuesday

(S) 8:00 - 9:00 [redacted] Overview [redacted]

9:00 - 10:00 [redacted] Unit [redacted]

10:00 - 11:00 [redacted] Unit [redacted]

11:00 - 12:00 [redacted] Unit [redacted]

12:00 - 1:00 Lunch

1:00 - 3:00 [redacted] Overview [redacted]

b6
b7C

3:00 - 5:00 [redacted] [redacted]

Wednesday

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8:00 - 9:00

Overview

9:00 - 10:00

Unit

10:00 - 11:00

Unit

11:00 - 12:00

Unit

12:00 - 1:00

Lunch

(S) 1:00 - 5:00

b6
b7C

Thursday

8:00 - 9:00

Counterespionage

Overview

9:00 - 9:30

Unit

9:30 - 10:30

Unit

10:00 - 10:30

Unit

10:30 - 11:00

Unit

11:00 - 11:30

Unit

11:30 - 12:00

Section Wrap-Up

12:00 - 12:30

Overview

b1
b6
b7C
b7E

b6
b7C

(S) 12:30 - 1:30

Lunch

1:30 - 2:30

(S) 2:30 - 3:30

3:30 - 4:30

Counterespionage Group

b1
b6
b7C
b7E

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Friday

8:00 - 9:00

Counterintelligence Division

9:00 - 10:00

Course Review

10:00 - 11:00

Admin Issues

11:00

Dismissal

b6
b7C

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SUMMARY OF EVALUATIONS
Counterintelligence (CI) Operations (03-02)
Week 1: 01/27/2003 - 01/31/2003

(Note: Copies of individual course evaluations can be obtained by contacting CD/OTU
IOS [redacted])

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b7C

Overall Average of Scores (based on 1-5 scale, with 5 being the highest rating): 4.56

Overview:

The overall average score indicates that the first week of the CI Operations Course was well received by attendees. Attendees advised that they has received valuable and informative information during the initial week of the Course. However, suggestions were made to expand those blocks that attendees noted were of particular importance and seldom addressed in field division training. (i.e., the segment on "Handling Classified Materials").

Review of Attendee Feedback: (Instructional blocks that received similar and multiple comments, suggestions, etc., on course evaluations are addressed below. Each "Feedback" entry is followed by related student comments.)

"The [redacted]

"The [redacted] segment was well-received by attendees. However, several advised that the block could be enhanced with slides, videos, or by incorporating briefing material into a PowerPoint presentation.

*"(The Instructor) knows the topic of his presentation...
(he should) use a different style to present the information."*

b7E

"Excellent content...not very interactive."

"Content seemed good. More variety in presentation, i.e., film, PowerPoint, would be better."

"Slides would have been appreciated."

OTU Comments: OTU will work with the instructor to identify audio visual material that can be used in the block and to reformat the briefing as a PowerPoint presentation.

"Handling Classified Materials"

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Attendees found this instructional block to be very valuable. Many indicated that this was a very important topic seldom addressed in the field. Students added that the current block was too short and that 30 to 60 minutes be added to this segment at future courses.

"More time please. It is too important to cut short "

"More time necessary to provide info that is needed to prevent errors in the field."

"Most important topic cut short."

b6
b7C

"As evidenced by questions from class, this area is of great concern to students and is not well understood. More time needed in this area."

"The most important information we have received in this class...should be longer."

"It was excellent and [] needs two hours."

OTU Comments: Consideration will be given to expanding this block by 30 to 60 minutes.

"Useful Writing Techniques"

Students advised this segment was too long. Some noted that attempting to address such a broad topic in one instructional block was too ambitious an undertaking. Recommendations were made that the topic be addressed in a separate course or be broken-up and incorporated into other existing instructional blocks. Students did indicate that material presented on asset reporting was helpful.

"Far too long. The asset section was better. It was more concise and focused."

"Cut this by half. Teaching someone to write requires a separate course entirely."

"Shorten the lecture. Assets - good info."

"Could be consolidated into (another) presentation."

b7E

OTU Comments: Consideration will be given to assimilating material covered in this presentation into other instructional blocks (i.e., addressing asset reporting into appropriate block devoted to asset [] etc.).

"Short Interview Practical Exercises"

This segment was very well received by attendees. Some advised the individual interview scenarios were too short and should be lengthened from the current ten minutes to 20

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minutes.

"Could have been two 20 minute presentations..."

"Would be useful to spend a little more time in each interview."

"...have longer interviews..."

"This practical needs to be more realistic. Ten minutes is too short."

OTU Comments: Consideration will be given to increasing the time allocated to each interview scenario.

"Earl Pitts Espionage Case"

Students indicated this instructional block was well organized and effectively presented. Many noted that the information provided was valuable, particularly material concerning investigative techniques that were employed in the case.

*"Its always good to hear the behind the scenes events...
showed the problems which (arise) in a major case."*

"Good to hear the variety of techniques used..."

"Best presentation I've seen at Quantico."

"Attorney General Guidelines"

Many students indicated the material addressed in the segment was very important. However some advised the block was too short, and that the Instructor had difficulty answering questions. It was suggested that additional time be allocated to this topics at future course, and that the Instructor provide hand outs of the PowerPoint presentation to the class.

"It would be good to hand out...the PowerPoint (presentation)."

"(Instructor) seemed lacking in some key areas when questions were asked."

"...presentation slides were great, would have liked a hard copy."

"It was unfortunate that the instructor didn't know the answers to some questions..."

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"PowerPoint hand-outs would be helpful..."

"... more effective if the briefer were to pass out copies of the PowerPoint presentations."

"the presenter was experienced to be giving presentation. Too many unanswered questions..."

OTU Comments: Consideration will be given to expanding this segment. Prior to the next course, OTU will advise the Instructor to prepare hand-outs of the PowerPoint briefing, and also familiarize the Presenter with the types of questions that most likely surface during the block.

**STATISTICAL COURSE EVALUATION FOR NSP/OTU INSTRUCTION
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS COURSE (03-02)**

01/27/03 - 01/31/03

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Block of Instruction:		
Total:		
FBI's FCI Objectives		4.59
FBI's FCI History		4.48
FBI's FCI Strategy		4.35
Types/Purposes		4.65
Foreign Presence		4.70
		4.30
Authorities/Guidelines/NSL (		4.64
Handling Classified Info		4.63
Report Writing		4.32
AG Guidelines		4.08
Types NFIP Communications		4.48
Asset		4.48
Types of Assets		4.75
Asset Reporting/Admin/Validation		4.75
Asset Practicum		4.50
		4.77
FCI Interviews		4.68
Interviews-Exercises		4.78
Analysis as Investigative Tool		4.87
Cultural Issues		4.43
Cultural Issues:		4.45
Totals:		4.56
Overall Average: 4.56		

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b6
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**COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
AGENDA - WEEK 1**

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(01/27/2003 - 01/31/2003)

Monday

8:30 - 9:00

The FBI's FCI Objectives [REDACTED]

9:00 - 10:00

The FBI's FCI History [REDACTED]

10:00 - 11:45

The FBI's FCI Strategy [REDACTED]

11:45 - 1:00

Lunch

1:00 - 2:30

[REDACTED]

2:30 - 3:30

Foreign Presence/Identifying Intel [REDACTED]

3:30 - 5:00

The [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Tuesday

8:00 - 9:00

Handling Classified Material [REDACTED]

9:00 - 10:00

Authorities/Guidelines/NSL [REDACTED]

10:00 - 11:45

Attorney General Guidelines [REDACTED]

11:45 - 1:00

Lunch

1:00 - 2:00

Report Writing [REDACTED]

2:00 - 4:00

Types of NFIP Communications [REDACTED]

4:00 - 5:00

Useful Writing Technique [REDACTED]

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Wednesday

8:00 - 11:00 Asset Development [REDACTED]
11:00 - 11:45 Types of [REDACTED]
11:45 - 1:00 Lunch
1:00 - 3:30 Asset Reporting/Admin/Validation [REDACTED]
3:45 - 4:45 Asset Practicum [REDACTED]

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Thursday

8:00 - 10:00 [REDACTED]
10:00 - 12:00 FCI Interviews [REDACTED]
12:00 - 1:30 Lunch
1:30 - 4:30 Short Interview Prac. [REDACTED]

Friday

8:00 - 10:00 Analysis an an Investigative Tool [REDACTED]
10:00 - 12:00 Review
12:00 - 1:00 Lunch
1:00 - 2:00 Cultural Issues [REDACTED]
2:00 - 3:00 Cultural Issues: [REDACTED]
3:00 - 5:00 Earl Pitts Espionage Case [REDACTED]

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Class Roster:

<u>Last Name</u>	<u>First</u>	<u>Middle</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>FO</u>
			SA	NY
			SA	CG
			SA	HN
			SA	SF
			SA	HO
			SA	MM
			SA	SF
			SA	AL
			SA	AQ
			SA	SU
			SA	WF
			SA	SF
			SA	MM
			SA	HO
			SA	MO
			SA	PH
			SA	HO
			SA	MM
			SA	DE
			SA	NY
			SA	NY
			SA	SF
			SA	MO
			SA	HO

b6
b7C

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SUMMARY OF EVALUATIONS
Counterintelligence (CI) Operations (03-02)
Week 2
(02/03/2003- 02/07/2003)

(Note: Copies of individual course evaluations can be obtained by contacting CD/OTU
IOS [redacted] at [redacted]

Overall Average of Scores (based on 1-5 scale, with 5 being the highest rating): 4.75

Overview:

The overall average score indicates that Week 2 of the CI Operations Course was very well received by attendees. Students advised the week's instructional blocks addressed important topics, contained valuable information, and were effectively presented. Extremely high ratings were given to those blocks which included practical exercises and demonstrations outside the FBI Academy. Students advised that these blocks helped them to more fully understand (and apply) techniques taught during earlier classroom presentations, and presented them with a rare opportunity to receive direct and immediate feed-back from their peers and experienced foreign counterintelligence investigators..

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Review of Attendee Feedback: (Instructional blocks that received similar and multiple comments, suggestions, etc., on course evaluations are addressed below. Each "Feedback" entry is followed by related student comments.)

"Th [redacted] Who They Are and What They Do"

This block was informative and the Instructor well-versed in the topic. However, some students indicated that the briefing was disorganized and could be corrected if the Instructor developed a PowerPoint presentation for the block.

"The topic is very relevant but the speaker needs a PowerPoint or slide show to keep him on the subject."

"PowerPoint needed."

"PowerPoint may have helped with this (presentation)."

OTU Comments: OTU will work with the Instructor to reformat the briefing as a PowerPoint presentation.

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[redacted] **Surveillance Practical Exercises**

Students found this segment to be valuable. Many noted that the exercises reinforced previous classroom instruction and served as an effective means to display [redacted] and [redacted]

b7E

"Excellent -- definitely learned a lot."

"Very good to...get out of the classroom as well as to solidify principals (taught earlier in course.)"

"This tied in very, very nicely with the classroom material. This practical exercise placed a big spot light on how [redacted] works, and how easy it is to [redacted]"

b7E

[redacted] **Demonstration:** [redacted]

Attendees indicated the segment was instructive and beneficial. Students advised that the demonstrations were realistic and allowed them to experience, in a real-world setting, [redacted] [redacted] It should be added that this instructional block received a perfect 5.00 overall average score from the class.

*"This was a great exercise. I would like more practical training exercises like this.
We learn a lot by actually seeing/experiencing."*

"Excellent."

*"This is a very important aspect of training.
It allowed us to see how hard [redacted] can be."*

b7E

"Interview Practicals (long)"

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Students advised these practical exercises were very effective. Attendees noted that the practicals gave them the opportunity to practice interviews in a realistic setting, and to employ techniques taught in previous instructional blocks. Attendees added that the constructive feedback and suggestions they received from the instructional staff (and fellow classmates) following the interviews were particularly helpful.

"Good to learn how to talk and to be less direct at first."

"Always good to observe others...bad habits are observed..(identify methods) to avoid."

"Aldrich Ames Espionage Case"

The majority indicated this instructional block was well presented, interesting, and very informative.

"Very interesting and applicable."

"Excellent presentation."

"Great presentation."

"Awesome. Very, very good job."

STATISTICAL COURSE EVALUATION FOR CD/OTU INSTRUCTION

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COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS COURSE (03-02)

02/03/03 - 02/07/03

Block of Instruction:		
Total:		
The		4.57
Intro to		4.83
Surveillance Issues		4.74
Surveillance Exercises		4.87
Demonstrations (OTU Staff)		5.00
Interview Practical (OTU Staff)		4.86
Ames Espionage Case		4.90
		4.76
Behavioral Analysis Program		4.24
Totals:		4.75
Overall Average: 4.75		

b6
b7C
b7E

**COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS COURSE
AGENDA - WEEK 2**

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(02/03/2003 - 02/07/2003)

b6
b7C
b7E

Monday

8:00 - 9:00

Admin Issues

9:00 - 11:45

What They Do

(IO): Who They Are

b6
b7C
b7E

11:45 - 1:00

Lunch

1:00 - 5:00

Intro to

Tuesday

8:00 - 10:00

Surveillance Issues

10:00 - 11:00

11:00 - 12:00

Lunch

12:00 - 4:00

Surveillance Practical Exercises (Staff)

Wednesday

8:00 - 5:00

Demonstrations (Silver Spring, MD/Staff)

Thursday

8:00 - 3:00

Interview Practical Problems (Long Versions/Staff)

3:00 - 5:00

Aldrich Ames Espionage Case

Friday

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8:00 - 9:00

Admin Issues



9:00 - 10:00



10:00 - 11:00

Behavioral Analysis Program



11:00 - 12:00

Lunch

12:00 - 5:00

Writing Assignment for Interview Exercises

b6
b7C
b7E

Class Roster:

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<u>Last Name</u>	<u>First</u>	<u>Middle</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>FO</u>
			SA	NY
			SA	CG
			SA	HN
			SA	SF
			SA	HO
			SA	MM
			SA	SF
			SA	AL
			SA	AQ
			SA	SU
			SA	WF
			SA	SF
			SA	MM
			SA	HO
			SA	MO
			SA	PH
			SA	HO
			SA	MM
			SA	DE
			SA	NY
			SA	NY
			SA	SF
			SA	MO
			SA	HO

b6
b7C

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Block of Instruction:			Total:
	Overview		3.80
			3.70
			3.38
	Case Study		4.70
			4.83
	UC Op Considerations -		4.83
	Espionage Investigations		4.91
(S)	Area Studies		4.14
			4.78
(S)			4.74
	Espionage Case Studies		4.91
	Legalities		4.75
	Overview		4.06
	Counterproliferation		3.27
	spionage Case		4.95
	Totals:		4.38
Overall Average: 4.38			

b7E

b7E

b1
b7E

b6
b7C
b7E

**CI OPERATIONS COURSE
AGENDA - WEEK 3**
(02/10/03 - 02/14/03)

Monday

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~~SECRET WORKING PAPERS~~

8:00 - 9:00

Admin Issues

9:30 - 10:30

10:30 - 11:30

11:30 - 1:15

Lunch

1:15 - 2:15

Intro to

2:30 - 5:00

Case Study

b6
b6
b7C

b7E

Tuesday

8:00 - 12:00

12:00 - 1:00

Lunch

1:00 - 2:00

Undercover (UC) Operations

2:00 - 4:00

UC Op Considerations:

Wednesday

8:00 - 11:00

Espionage Investigations

11:00 - 12:00

Area Studies:

12:00 - 1:00

Lunch

1:00 - 3:00

(S)

3:00 - 5:00

(S)

b1
b7E

Thursday

8:00 - 12:00

Espionage Case Studies

b6
b7C

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12:00 - 1:00

Lunch

1:00 - 5:00

Friday

8:00 - 9:00

Admin

9:00 - 10:00

Overview

11:00 - 12:00

Counterproliferation

12:00 - 1:15

Lunch

1:15 - 3:30

Ana Montes Espionage Case

b7E

Class Roster:

Last Name

First


Middle

Title

FO

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SA	NY
SA	CG
SA	HN
SA	SF
SA	HO
SA	MM
SA	SF
SA	AL
SA	AQ
SA	SU
SA	WF
SA	SF
SA	MM
SA	HO
SA	MO
SA	PH
SA	HO
SA	MM
SA	DE
SA	NY
SA	NY
SA	SF
SA	MO
SA	HO

b6
b7C

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CI OPERATIONS COURSE AGENDA - WEEK 3

(02/10/03 - 02/14/03)

Monday

8:00 - 9:00

Admin Issues

9:30 - 10:30

10:30 - 11:30

11:30 - 1:15

Lunch

1:15 - 2:15

Intro to

2:30 - 5:00

Case Stud

b6
b7C

b7E

Tuesday

8:00 - 12:00

12:00 - 1:00

Lunch

1:00 - 2:00

Undercover (UC) Operations

2:00 - 4:00

UC Op Considerations

Wednesday

8:00 - 11:00

Espionage Investigations

11:00 - 12:00

Area Studies

12:00 - 1:00

Lunch

1:00 - 3:00

3:00 - 5:00

b6
b7C
b7E

b1
b7E

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Thursday

8:00 - 12:00

Espionage Case Studies [REDACTED]

12:00 - 1:00

Lunch

1:00 - 5:00

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

Friday

8:00 - 9:00

Admin

9:00 - 10:00

[REDACTED]

Overview

[REDACTED]

11:00 - 12:00

[REDACTED]

Counterproliferation

[REDACTED]

12:00 - 1:15

Lunch

1:15 - 3:30

[REDACTED]

Espionage Case

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

b6
b7C
b7E

b7E

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~~SECRET WORKING PAPERS~~

Class Roster:

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5

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SUMMARY OF EVALUATIONS
Counterintelligence (CI) Operations (03-02)
Week 4
(02/17/2003 - 02/21/2003)

(Note: Copies of individual course evaluations can be obtained by contacting Counterintelligence Division/Operational Training Unit (CD/OTU) IOS [redacted] at [703] 632-1724.)

b6
b7C

Overall Average of Scores (based on 1-5 scale, with 5 being the highest rating): 4.14

Overview:

The CI Operations Course, Week 4, received an overall average score of 4.14. Attendees found presentations given by other U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC) agencies to be informative. Students added that these blocks provided them with a clearer understanding of the structure of USIC agencies and the support they provide to FBI foreign counterintelligence investigations. Attendees found some briefings given by CD operational units to be too long and suggested these presentations be shortened at future CI Operations Courses.

Review of Attendee Feedback: (Instructional blocks that received similar and multiple comments, suggestions, etc., on course evaluations are addressed below. Each *Feedback* entry is followed by related student comments.)

(S)

[redacted]

(S)

[redacted]

b1
b7E

"Very good presentation."

"I am happy they are part of the instruction."

"Very helpful."

(S)

[redacted]

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Thirty six percent of the class advised that the segment was too long and should be shortened at future courses.

b1
b7E

(S)

“...best to tell us who [redacted] can do for us, how they are different than [redacted] and provide contacts...30 minutes maximum (for block).”

OTU Comments: Consideration will be given to reducing this segment by 30 to 45 minutes at future courses.

b7E



Overview

Attendees noted that this segment was well organized and informative. Many indicated the Instructor focused on issues of direct relevance (i.e., basic structure, mission, trends, etc.) to the field, and that the information was conveyed in a very concise manner.

b7E

“...good presentation. Identified the Section, the units, and their mission/role in a brief period of time.”


“...the most organized of all the Section presentations. Concise and covered the basics. Enough detail for us to know what this Section does.”

“Not too long, not too short, it was just right. A good model for the rest of HQ briefings.”

“Presentation was great. The format was very appropriate.”

b7E

“Best HQ presentation for the Course.”



Overview

Students indicated the segment was too long and focused primarily on [redacted]

[redacted] Some suggested that future [redacted] instructional blocks devote

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more
time discussing other countries investigated by the Section.

"Would have liked to hear (Instructor) speak more...about the other units in the Section."

*"...lecture for someone interested in [redacted] issues.
But for this class, we need an overall description of the Section/units."*

b7E

"Very good presentation. Could use more from the Section."

OTU Comments: OTU initially scheduled all the units of the [redacted] Section to give presentations at the recent CI Operations Course. However, various administrative and logistical issues prevented this from occurring. It is anticipated that all [redacted] units will provide briefings at future CI Operations Courses.

b7E

STATISTICAL COURSE EVALUATION FOR CD/OTU INSTRUCTION
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS COURSE (03-02) - Week 4
02/17/03 - 02/21/03

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Block of Instruction:			
Total:			
			4.33
			4.30
(S)			4.42
			4.52
(S)			3.64
	Overview		4.49
	Overview		3.41
Totals:			4.14
Overall Average: 4.14			

b1
b7E

b7E

b6
b7C
b7E

**CI OPERATIONS COURSE
AGENDA - WEEK 4**

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(02/17/03 - 02/21/03)

Monday

HOLIDAY

Tuesday

8:00 - 9:00

Admin

9:00 - 10:00

10:15 - 11:15

11:15 - 1:15

Lunch

1:15 - 3:45

3:45 - 5:00

Test

Wednesday

8:00 - 9:00

Admin Issues

(S) 9:00 - 12:00

12:00 - 1:15

Lunch

(S) 1:15 - 2:30

2:30 - 5:00

Exercise

b7E

b6
b7C
b7E

b1
b7E

Thursday

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~~SECRET WORKING PAPERS~~

8:00 - 10:00



Overview



b7E

10:00 - 11:45



Overview



11:45 - 1:00

Lunch

1:00 - 5:00

Review/Admin



b6
b7C

Friday

8:00 - 10:00

Counterintelligence Division



10:00 - 11:00

Admin Issues



11:00

Dismissal

Class Roster:

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~~SECRET~~ WORKING PAPERS

<u>Last Name</u>	<u>First</u>	<u>Middle</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>FO</u>
			SA	NY
			SA	CG
			SA	HN
			SA	SF
			SA	HO
			SA	MM
			SA	SF
			SA	AL
			SA	AQ
			SA	SU
			SA	WF
			SA	SF
			SA	MM
			SA	HO
			SA	MO
			SA	PH
			SA	HO
			SA	MM
			SA	DE
			SA	NY
SA	NY			
SA	SF			
SA	MO			
SA	HO			

b6
b7c

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SUMMARY OF EVALUATIONS
Counterintelligence (CI) Operations (03-03)
Week 1: 04/14/2003 - 04/18/2003

(Note: Copies of individual course evaluations can be obtained by contacting CD/OTU
IO [redacted] at [redacted]

b6
b7C

Overall Average of Scores (based on 1-5 scale, with 5 being the highest rating): 4.37

Overview:

The overall average score indicates that the first week of the CI Operations Course was well received by attendees.

Review of Attendee Feedback: (Instructional blocks that received similar and multiple comments, suggestions, etc., on course evaluations are addressed below. Each "Feedback" entry is followed by related student comments.)

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STATISTICAL COURSE EVALUATION FOR CD/OTU INSTRUCTION
CI OPERATIONS (03-03)
04/14/03 - 04/18/03

Block of Instruction:	Total:	
FBI's FCI Objectives	4.14	
FBI's FCI History	3.96	
FBI's FCI Strategy	4.57	
Types/Purposes	4.22	
	4.32	
(video)	4.22	
Handling Classified Material	4.55	b6
Authorities/Oversight: CI Cases	4.60	b7C
AG Guidelines	4.47	b7E
Report Writing	4.17	
Bureau Paperwork	4.10	
Writing Well: Part 1	4.24	
Writing Well: Part 2	4.27	
Asset	4.79	
Types of Assets	4.67	
Common Asset Problems	4.71	
Asset Reporting/Manual Issues	4.46	
Asset Validation	4.58	b6
Technique	4.22	b7C
FCI Interviews/interrogations	4.26	b7E
Interview Practical 1	4.52	
Case Analysis	4.42	
Reporting Positive Intel.	4.13	
Cultural Considerations	4.53	
Cultural Considerations	4.13	
Totals:	4.37	

Overall Average:

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CI OPERATIONS
AGENDA - WEEK 1
(01/27/2003 - 01/31/2003)

Monday

8:30 - 9:00

The FBI's FCI Objectives [REDACTED]

9:00 - 10:00

The FBI's FCI History [REDACTED]

10:00 - 11:45

The FBI's FCI Strategy [REDACTED]

11:45 - 1:00

Lunch

1:00 - 2:30

Structure/Purposes of [REDACTED]

2:30 - 3:30

[REDACTED]

3:30 - 5:00

The [REDACTED]

b6
b7C
b7E

Tuesday

8:00 - 9:00

Handling Classified Materials [REDACTED]

9:00 - 10:00

Authorities/Guidelines/NSL [REDACTED]

10:00 - 11:45

Attorney General Guidelines [REDACTED]

11:45 - 1:00

Lunch

1:00 - 2:00

Report Writing [REDACTED]

2:00 - 4:00

Types of NFIP Communications [REDACTED]

4:00 - 5:00

Useful Writing Techniques [REDACTED]

b6
b7C
b7E

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Wednesday

8:00 - 11:00

Asset

11:00 - 11:45

Types o

11:45 - 1:00

Lunch

1:00 - 3:30

Asset Reporting

3:45 - 4:45

Asset Practicum

b6
b7C
b7E

Thursday

8:00 - 10:00

10:00 - 12:00

FCI Interview

12:00 - 1:30

Lunch

1:30 - 4:30

Short Interview Prac

b6
b7C
b7E

Friday

8:00 - 10:00

Analysis an an Investigative Tool

10:00 - 12:00

Review

12:00 - 1:00

Lunch

1:00 - 2:00

Cultural Issues

2:00 - 3:00

Cultural Issues

3:00 - 5:00

Earl Pitts Espionage Case

Class Roster:

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SUMMARY OF EVALUATIONS

Counterintelligence (CI) Operations (03-03)

Week 2

04/21/2003- 04/25/2003

(Note: Copies of individual course evaluations can be obtained by contacting CD/OTU
IOS [redacted] at [redacted]

b6
b7C

Overall Average of Scores (based on 1-5 scale, with 5 being the highest rating): 4.42

b7E

Overview:

The overall average score indicates that Week 2 of the CI Operations course was well received by attendees. Students indicated the instructional blocks were well organized and effectively presented. Attendees found all the practical exercise conducted during the week to be particularly helpful. Many suggested these blocks be allocated additional time at future courses.

b7E

Review of Attendee Feedback: (Instructional blocks that received similar and multiple comments, suggestions, etc., on course evaluations are addressed below. Each "Feedback" entry is followed by related student comments.)

[redacted] Exercises, [redacted]

Many advised the [redacted] Exercises in [redacted] were very informative and well organized. Students noted it was valuable to see techniques, that had been discussed in the classroom, displayed in a real-world setting. Some suggested that the exercises be allocated two full days so that additional [redacted] could be demonstrated.

CD/OTU Comments: Unfortunately, logistical and scheduling issues preclude OTU from expanding the exercise to two full days.

Contact Cases

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Students indicated this block was beneficial, and provided them with an opportunity to practice (and obtain) interview techniques. Additionally, the block was organized in a manner that allowed them to receive immediate and valuable feedback from their peers and the instructional staff.



b7E

This instructional block was well received by the class. Some attendees indicated the block too was short and suggested that it be allocated additional time at future courses.

CD/OTU Comments: Consideration will be given to expanding this instructional block at future courses.

STATISTICAL COURSE EVALUATION FOR CD/OTU INSTRUCTION
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS (03-03)

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Week 2 04/21/03 - 04/25/03		
Block of Instruction:		
Total:		
How the [redacted] Works [redacted] (video)		4.31
Intro to [redacted]		4.63
[redacted]		4.60
Surveillance Pitfalls [redacted]		4.13
[redacted] Practical [redacted]		4.43
Bethesda Practical [redacted]		4.78
[redacted] Interview [redacted]		4.46
Language Services [redacted]		4.31
[redacted]		4.69
BAP [redacted]		3.88
Totals:		4.42
Overall Average: 4.42		

b6
b7C
b7E

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
AGENDA - WEEK 2
(04/21/2003 - 04/25/2003)

Monday

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~~SECRET WORKING PAPERS~~

8:00 - 9:00

Admin Issues

9:00 - 11:45

The Intelligence Officer (IO): Who They Are
What They Do []

11:45 - 1:00

Lunch

1:00 - 5:00

Intro to [] []

Tuesday

8:00 - 10:00

[] Surveillance Issues []

10:00 - 11:00

Recon for Surveillance Exercises

11:00 - 12:00

Lunch

12:00 - 4:00

[] Surveillance Practical Exercises []

Wednesday

8:00 - 5:00

[] Demonstrations (Silver Spring, MD/Staff)

Thursday

8:00 - 3:00

Interview Practical Problems (Long Versions/Staff)

3:00 - 5:00

Aldrich Ames Espionage Case []

Friday

8:00 - 9:00

Admin Issues (Staff)

9:00 - 10:00

[]

~~SECRET WORKING PAPERS~~

b6
b7C
b7E

b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET WORKING PAPERS~~

10:00 - 11:00

Behavioral Analysis Program

11:00 - 12:00

Lunch

12:00 - 5:00

Writing Assignment for Interview Exercises


b6
b7C

Class Roster:

<u>Last Name</u>	<u>First</u>	<u>Middle</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>FO</u>
			SA	WF
			SA	DE
			SA	CV
			SA	KX
			SSA	HQ

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SA	JK
SA	PD
SA	SA
SA	SF
SA	KC
SA	AT
SA	DE
SA	CG
SA	SF
SA	HN
SA	MM
SA	AQ
SA	NY
SA	KC
SA	BS
SA	JK
SA	MM
SA	MM
SA	CG

b6
b7c

~~SECRET~~ WORKING PAPERS

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SUMMARY OF EVALUATIONS

Counterintelligence (CI) Operations (03-03)

Week 3

04/28/2003- 05/02/2003

Note: Copies of individual course evaluations can be obtained by contacting Counterintelligence Division, Operational Training Unit (CD/OTU) IOS [redacted] at [redacted]

Overall Average of Scores (based on 1-5 scale, with 5 being the highest rating): 4.37

Overview:

The high overall average score (listed above) and a review of course critiques indicates that Week 3 of CI Operations was well received by attendees. Instructional blocks on operational matters (i.e., espionage, [redacted] and [redacted] received high ratings and very positive comments from the class. It should be noted that the CD operational section/unit briefings received above-average scores. The overall average score for these briefings was 4.27, a marked increase over the 3.73 score the CD presentations received at the previous CI Operations course.

b6
b7C
b7E

Review of Attendee Feedback: (Instructional blocks that received similar and multiple comments, suggestions, etc., on course evaluations are addressed below. Each "Feedback" entry is followed by related student comments.)

Introduction to [redacted] Administration

The instructional blocks concernin [redacted] were very organized, well presented, and effectively supported by good videotapes.

"Great presentation." (Introduction to [redacted])

"Good use of videos." (Introduction to [redacted])

"Very good presentation." (Introduction to [redacted])

"Training related videos are wonderful." [redacted]

"Movies helped drive the point." [redacted]

"Good class." [redacted]

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~~SECRET WORKING PAPERS~~

"Great job. [] Administration)

b7E

"Instructor is invaluable to the CI course [] Administration)

Statistical Accomplishments

Students advised the block was very instructive and provided valuable information that could be immediately applied when they returned to the field.

"Very important."

"This is the type of training (paperwork) that we need most in the field."

b6
b7C

"Needed presentation."

Proliferation

Although the block contained interesting material, several students advised that the speaker spoke too softly and was difficult to understand.

"I could not hear speaker..."

"Could barely hear him..."

"Presenter spoke very low..."

CD/OTU Comments: OTU will ensure that this speaker uses a microphone at future courses.

[] Espionage Case

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~~SECRET~~ WORKING PAPERS

Many attendees advised the block was beneficial and informative. Students noted it was particularly valuable to receive information concerning the various methods employed and problems encountered in an actual espionage case.

"Valuable briefing. Affidavit will help."

"Exactly the type of instruction that is most valuable -- cases studies with lessons learned and mo's delineated."

"Excellent presentation, very informative, very helpful... Presentation was very organized and very polished."

"Outstanding presentation, a must for every FCI class."

CD/OTU Comments: OTU will ensure that attendees are provided case affidavits at future courses.

**STATISTICAL COURSE EVALUATION FOR CD/OTU INSTRUCTION
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS (03-03)**

04/28/03 - 05/02/03

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~~SECRET WORKING PAPERS~~

Block of Instr		Total	b6 b7C b7E
	Overview	4.41	
		4.30	
		4.05	
		4.30	b6 b7C b7E
		4.14	
	Intro to	4.72	
		4.67	
	Administration	4.60	
	Statistical Accomplishments	4.70	b1 b7E
		4.17	
		3.83	
	UC Operational Aspects	3.83	b7E
(S)		4.52	
		4.20	
		4.10	
(S)		4.10	
	Intro to	4.57	
(S)		4.62	
		4.48	
(S)	Intro to Espionage Investigations	4.67	
	Espionage Investigative Considerations	4.67	
	Espionage Investigations Administration	4.67	
		4.55	
		4.25	
		4.52	
	Proliferation	3.71	
	Espionage Cas	4.67	
	Totals:	4.37	
Overall Average: 4.37			

b6
b7C

**COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
AGENDA - WEEK 3**
(04/28/2003 - 05/02/2003)

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~~SECRET WORKING PAPERS~~

Monday

9:00 - 9:15

[] Section Briefings: Overview []

9:15 - 9:55

[] Unit []

9:55 - 10:35

[] Unit []

10:45 - 11:25

11:25 - 12:00

[] Unit []

12:00 - 1:30

Lunch

1:30 - 2:20

Intro to [] []

2:30 - 3:20

FB [] []

3:30 - 4:20

[] Administration []

b7E

b6
b7C

b6
b7C
b7E

Tuesday

8:00 - 9:00

Statistical Accomplishments []

9:00 - 12:00

12:00 - 1:15

Lunch

1:15 - 2:30

Undercover (UC) Unit []

2:30 - 3:30

UC Operational Aspects [] []

Wednesday

~~SECRET WORKING PAPERS~~

~~SECRET WORKING PAPERS~~

(S)

8:00 - 9:00

9:00 - 10:00

10:00 - 11:00

11:00 - 12:00

12:00 - 1:30

Lunch

(S)

1:30 - 2:30

Introduction

(S)

2:30 - 3:30

(S)

3:30 - 4:30

b6
b7C
b7E

b1
b7E

Thursday

8:00 - 9:00

Introduction to Espionage Investigations

9:00 - 10:30

Espionage Investigative Considerations

10:30 - 11:30

Espionage Investigation Administration

11:30 - 1:00

Lunch

1:00 - 4:30

FISA/Legal Issues (NSLU)*

b6
b7C
b7E

(*Due to logistical and administrative problems, critiques were not completed on this block. OTU will institute new procedures to ensure this does not happen in the future.)

Friday

~~SECRET WORKING PAPERS~~

~~SECRET WORKING PAPERS~~

8:00 - 9:00

[Redacted]

9:00 - 10:00

[Redacted]

10:00 - 11:00

[Redacted]

11:00 - 11:45

Proliferation

[Redacted]

11:45 - 1:00

Lunch

1:00 - 4:00

[Redacted]

Espionage Case

[Redacted]

b7E

b6
b7C

Class Roster:

~~SECRET WORKING PAPERS~~

Last Name	First	Middle	Title	FO
			SA	WF
			SA	DE
			SA	CV
			SA	KX
			SSA	HQ
			SA	JK
			SA	PD
			SA	SA
			SA	SF
			SA	KC
			SA	AT
			SA	DE
			SA	CG
			SA	SF
			SA	HN
			SA	MM
			SA	AQ
			SA	NY
			SA	KC
			SA	BS
			SA	JK
			SA	MM
			SA	MM
			SA	CG

~~SECRET~~ WORKING PAPERS

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~~SECRET~~ WORKING PAPERS

SUMMARY OF EVALUATIONS

Counterintelligence (CI) Operations (03-03)

Week 3

(04/28/2003 - 05/02/2003)

(Note: Copies of individual course evaluations can be obtained by contacting
Counterintelligence Division/Operational Training Unit (CD/OTU) IOS [redacted] at
[redacted])

b6
b7c

Overall Average of Scores (based on 1-5 scale, with 5 being the highest rating): 4.37

Overview:

The overall average score of 4.38 reflects that Week 3 of the CI Operations Course was well received. Overall, presentations given by the CD's Operational Units received lower scores than other blocks of instruction. Several attendees indicated that some Operational Unit blocks were too long, disorganized, and did not provide useful investigative information (i.e. foreign intelligence service [FIS] targeting priorities, etc.).

A review of Week 3 evaluations reflected that segments structured principally around case presentations were deemed to be very effective by students. Particularly beneficial were those that addressed information in on a step-by-step account of a case. Attendees noted that this type of presentation allowed them to more easily understand how various administrative, legal, and investigative issues were applied in foreign counterintelligence (FCI) cases

OTU Comment: Consideration will be given to providing a written outline of talking points that CD Operational Units should be prepared to address at future CI Operations Courses.

Review of Attendee Feedback: (Instructional blocks that received similar and multiple comments, suggestions, etc., on course evaluations are addressed below. Each "Feedback" entry is followed by related student comments.)

~~SECRET~~ WORKING PAPERS

~~SECRET WORKING PAPERS~~

b6
b7C
b7D

**STATISTICAL COURSE EVALUATION FOR CD/OTU INSTRUCTION
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS (03-03)**

Week 3

04/28/03 - 05/02/03

Block of Instruction:			Total:
	Overview		4.41
			4.30
			4.05
			4.30
			4.14
	Intro to		4.72
			4.67
	Administration		4.60
	Statistical Accomplishments		4.70
			4.17
	Unit		3.83
	UC Operational Aspects/		3.83
(S)			4.52
			4.20
			4.10
(S)			4.10
(S)	Intro to		4.57
(S)			4.62
			4.48
(S)	Intro to Espionage Investigations		4.67
	Espionage Investigative Considerations		4.67
	Espionage Investigations Administration		4.67
			4.55
			4.25
			4.52
	Proliferation		3.71
	spionage Case		4.67
	Totals:		0
	4.37		
Overall Average: 4.37			

b6
b7C
b7E

b1
b7E

b1
b7E

~~SECRET WORKING PAPERS~~

~~SECRET~~ WORKING PAPERS

SUMMARY OF EVALUATIONS

Counterintelligence (CI) Operations (03-03)

Week 4

(05/05/2003 - 05/09/2003)

Note: Copies of individual course evaluations can be obtained by contacting Counterintelligence Division/Operational Training Unit (CD/OTU) IOS [redacted] at [redacted]

b6
b7C

Overall Average of Scores (based on 1-5 scale, with 5 being the highest rating): 4.37

Overview:

(S) A review of course critiques indicated that Week 4 of CI Operations (03/03) was well received by attendees. Students advised that the majority of the Week's instructional blocks were well structured and informative. Of particular value were briefings given by FBI (S) detailees/representatives from the [redacted] and U.S. Department (S) of Energy (DOE). Many students related that they received timely and valuable information regarding how these agencies could provide assistance to FBI foreign counterintelligence (FCI) investigations. It should be noted that the U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC) presentations (S) received an overall score of 4.30, an increase over the 4.22 score given to the USIC blocks at the last CI Operations course.

b1
b7E

Review of Attendee Feedback: (Instructional blocks that received similar and multiple comments, suggestions, etc., on course evaluations are addressed below. Each "Feedback" entry is followed by related student comments.)

(S)

b1
b7E

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~~SECRET WORKING PAPERS~~

"Lots of information that could be very useful."

Practical

The [] Lecture" was very informative and the related "Practical" beneficial. Students noted that the exercise provided them the opportunity to practice and improve their interview skills.

"...extremely informative. (Instructor's) blocks should be taught to New Agent (classes)."
[] Lecture")

"Many useful points." [] Lecture")

"Good format, good questions." [] Lecture")

"Very helpful, will use." ("Practical")

*"Even though almost everybody has dealt with []
this was a good practical to polish our skills in the CI area."* ("Practical")

"...useful in terms of fixing the [] Lecture) in my mind..." ("Practical")

b7E

Working with Other Agencies: []

Students indicated the [] presentation was too long and not helpful. Many advised the briefing focused primarily on basic CI issues covered in previous blocks of instruction. Attendees added that the instructor provided minimal information concerning how [] could assist FBI FCI investigations.

"Presentation...simply repeated much of the info covered in prior classes."

"Too much repetition of basic info we have been exposed to...not enough concentration on how we can work together and the mechanisms for doing so."

*"...the content of presentation was not designed for class.
Presentation needs to answer...how [] can help (the field)..."*

~~SECRET WORKING PAPERS~~

~~SECRET WORKING PAPERS~~

The presentation was too long and directed towards a new [redacted] class."

b7E

*"Presentation could be vastly improved if instructor would just
come in and tell us how we can work with [redacted]"*

CD/OTU Comments: OTU will contact the instructor to ensure that future presentations focus primarily on the role DOD plays in CI investigations and assistance it can provide to FBI FCI cases.

**STATISTICAL COURSE EVALUATION FOR CD/OTU INSTRUCTION
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS (03-03)**

Week 4

05/05/03 - 05/09/03

~~SECRET WORKING PAPERS~~

~~SECRET WORKING PAPERS~~

(S)	Block of Instruction:				
(S)	Working/w Other Agencies			4.48	b1
(S)	Working/w Other Agencies			4.65	b7E
(S)	Working/w Other Agencies			4.43	
(S)	Working w/Other Agenci			4.74	
(S)	Working/w Other Agencies			4.25	
(S)	Lecture			4.87	b6
(S)	Practic			4.36	b7C
(S)	Working w/Other Agencies			4.33	b7E
(S)	Working w/Other Agencies			3.21	
(S)	Practical			4.36	
	Totals:			4.37	
	Overall Average:				

b1
b7E

**CI OPERATIONS
AGENDA - WEEK 4**
(05/05/03 - 05/09/03)

Monday

~~SECRET WORKING PAPERS~~

(S)

~~SECRET WORKING PAPERS~~

9:00 - 10:00

Working with Other Agencies

b6
b7C
b7E

(S)

10:00 - 12:00

Working with other Agencies

12:00 - 1:30

Lunch

(S)

1:30 - 2:45

Working with Other Agencies

2:45 - 4:30

File Reviews

Tuesday

8:00 - 10:00

Working with Other Agencies:

(S)

10:00 - 12:00

Working with Other Agencies

b1
b7E

12:00 - 1:00

Lunch

1:00 - 3:00

Lecture

b7E

3:00 - 5:00

Practical

Wednesday

8:00 - 10:00

Working with Other Agencies:

10:00 - 11:30

Working with Other Agencies

11:30 - 1:00

Lunch

1:00 - 4:30

(S)

Practical

Thursday

8:00 - 10:00

Final Case Determinations/Justifications

~~SECRET WORKING PAPERS~~

~~SECRET~~ WORKING PAPERS

10:00 - 12:00

Final File Reviews

12:00 - 1:00

Lunch

1:00 - 5:00

Review/Admin

b6
b7C

Friday

8:00 - 10:00

Counterintelligence Division

10:00 - 11:00

Admin Issue

11:00

Dismissal


b6
b7C

Class Roster:

<u>Last Name</u>	<u>First</u>	<u>Middle</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>FO</u>
			SA SA	WF DE

~~SECRET~~ WORKING PAPERS

~~SECRET~~ WORKING PAPERS



SA	CV
SA	KX
SSA	HQ
SA	JK
SA	PD
SA	SA
SA	SF
SA	KC
SA	AT
SA	DE
SA	CG
SA	SF
SA	HN
SA	MM
SA	AQ
SA	NY
SA	KC
SA	BS
SA	JK
SA	MM
SA	MM
SA	CG

b6
b7c

~~SECRET~~ WORKING PAPERS

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COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

The FBI's Role in the Intelligence Community



What is Counterintelligence ?

Counterintelligence is

"Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, sabotage, and other intelligence activities, conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons, or international terrorist activities, but not including personal, physical, document or communications security."

* By presidential order, the FBI alone conducts Counterintelligence within the United States and coordinates CI activities with the other agencies in the Intelligence Community. -- Executive Order 12333

b7E



US Intelligence Community

- Other Members ofUSIC:
 - CIA
 - Departments of State, Energy & Treasury
 - Department of Defense
 - DIA; NSA;
 - Air Force, Army, Navy, Marine Corps intelligence components



The Role of Foreign Counterintelligence Squads

- Gather Intelligence [redacted]
- Conduct Criminal Investigations
 - Espionage and Economic Espionage
- [redacted] Interrelated Goals



How Do We Do It?

Identify [redacted]

What? [redacted]

How? [redacted]

- Find out for ourselves through Operational or Investigative activities



How Do We Do It?

(S)

b1
b7E

~~SECRET~~

7/14/2011

FBI

How Do We Do It?

Espionage Statute, Economic Espionage Act
Any other federal criminal statute including
Title 18, USC, Sec. 1001

FBI

The Old Threat...

"Criteria Countries" Soviet Bloc was the main enemy (the Cold War)


b7E

b7E

FBI

The New Threat...

- Which countries or groups?
- Which U.S. Gov't entities are targets?
- Who is targeting the U.S.?
- Which private industries are targets?
- What military/defense industries are targets?



FBI

Country Threat List

- This list is classified but includes countries designated a threat because of aggressive, intrusive behavior that is a pervasive threat to the United States' national security

FBI

Issue Threat List

Categories of activity that pose a significant threat, or are of such concern, to the national security of the United States when engaged in by any foreign power or entity that counterintelligence or monitoring actions directed against such activities are warranted.

7/14/2011

 **Issue Threats**

1. Terrorism - International Terrorism committed by Terrorist Groups and/or State Sponsors of Terrorism
2. Proliferation of Special Weapons – nuclear, chemical, biological



 **Issue Threats**

3. Targeting the National Information Infrastructure – computers, cable, satellite, telecommunications, banking and financing systems, transportation, water supplies, electrical power systems, gas and oil storage and transportation, emergency systems, continuity of government



 **Issue Threats**

4. Espionage - the identification, targeting and collection of U. S. national defense information.
5. Economic Espionage -the unlawful or clandestine targeting or acquisition of sensitive financial, trade or economic policy or proprietary information or critical technologies; or influencing of sensitive economic policy decisions.




 **Issue Threats**

6. Targeting The US Government – Foreign Affairs, Economic Policy, Financial Matters, Defense Establishments, National Preparedness, Intelligence Community (including FBI personnel)
7. Perception Management
Propaganda use by an intelligence agency to effect public perception of another country through deception
8. Foreign Intelligence Activities




b6
b7C
b7E

 A closer look at



Agent 007

 Spies and



7/14/2011

Tools of the Trade

Spies and Foreign Services

Robert Hanssen
A 57-year-old veteran FBI employee who received more than \$1.4 million in cash and jewels while spying for the KGB/SVR. He pled guilty on 15 counts and received life in prison.

"ELLIS" Drop Site under a footbridge near Vienna, Virginia

Package dropped by Hanssen at the Ellis drop site on 2/18/01.

Package recovered at the Lewis drop site containing \$50,000 cash left by Russians for Hanssen.

b7E

Spies and Foreign Services

Aldrich Ames
CIA Veteran
KGB Spy - 1985-1994
Paid up to \$2.5 million
Sentenced to Life In Prison

Rosario Ames

I AM READY TO MEET AT 8 ON 1 OCT.
I CANNOT READ NORTH 33-14 SEPT.
IF YOU WILL MEET AT 8 ON 1 OCT. PLS SIGNAL NORTH 4 OF 20 SEPT TO CONFIRM MESSAGE AT FIVE.
IF YOU CANNOT MEET, I OCT, SIGNAL NORTH 11/20 27 SEPT WITH PHONE AT 0100.

30927049 11 20 04

Ames signal to KGB that the drop was ready

A note from Ames' trash
The first evidence of espionage

Spies and their ideologies

Teresa Squillacote
Pentagon Attorney
Sentence: 22 years
Motivation: ideology

Kurt Stand
Husband to Squillacote
Convicted with wife on 4 counts of Espionage.
Both were recruited by the former East German Intelligence Service

Stasi

Counterintelligence Strategies

- So how can businesses, educational institutions, state and local law enforcement organizations, and others join in a partnership with the FBI to meet our Strategic Priority?

**CI PROGRAM
STRATEGIC
PRIORITY**

Protect the United States against foreign intelligence operations and espionage

Counterintelligence Strategies

- Provide assistance where you can as the FBI seeks to ...
- Know the domain
- Engage in strategic partnerships
- Conduct sophisticated CI Operations
- Understand the threat
- Inform and influence policy makers

**CI PROGRAM
STRATEGIC
PRIORITY**

Protect the United States against foreign intelligence operations and espionage

~~SECRET~~

7/14/2011

 **Counterintelligence Strategies**

In the FBI, agents, analysts, surveillance groups and other specially trained personnel seek to meet tomorrow's Counterintelligence challenges by focusing on the continued enhancement of three key areas ...

CI PROGRAM STRATEGIC PRIORITY

Protect the United States against foreign intelligence operations and espionage

1 - Resource Management
2 - Workforce Expertise
3 - Intelligence Support

 **Counterintelligence Strategies**

Resource Management

- Stand alone FCI squads in 55 of 56 Field Office (Alaska next year)
- Increased analyst hiring
- Insure FCI resources are not diverted to lower priority programs or higher priority when other resources are available
- Adequate staffing and support (i.e., equipment, training) is provided to FCI Program components

CI PROGRAM STRATEGIC PRIORITY

Protect the United States against foreign intelligence operations and espionage

 **Counterintelligence Strategies**

Workforce Expertise

Training & Experience

- Agent Proficiency
- 4-week additional Basic CI Course
- Continuing education with goal toward CI expert certification
- Counterintelligence training for all FBI personnel

Continuity --- Career paths for agents, analysts and managers

Training partnerships with other federal agencies

CI PROGRAM STRATEGIC PRIORITY

Protect the United States against foreign intelligence operations and espionage

 **Counterintelligence Strategies**

Intelligence Support

- Emphasize that collection of intelligence should be thorough and of the highest quality
- Ensure quality of Intelligence Reporting to FBI Headquarters and subsequently to the White House, Capital Hill and others in the Intelligence Community
- Continually review sources of information to determine the sources' access and validate the sources' information

CI PROGRAM STRATEGIC PRIORITY

Protect the United States against foreign intelligence operations and espionage

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~~SECRET~~

 **UNCLASSIFIED**

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Counterintelligence Division
Washington, DC



"There is one evil I dread, and that is,
their spies. I could wish, therefore, the
most attentive watch be kept..."

Economic Espionage Presentation



UNCLASSIFIED



Today's Topics

• ANSIR Program • FBI Priorities • FBI Threat List	• Foreign Threat • FBI Cases • Questions
--	--

2 Hour - Presentation


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b7E

**Awareness of National Security
Issues and Response**

- Public Voice for Counterintelligence Issues
- National Threat Warning System
- Point of Contact for U.S. Businesses
- Liaison  Etc.
- National/local E-mail addresses
- International Awareness





fbi.gov/hq/ci/ansir/

b7E

 **FBI Priorities**

Protect the United States...

- ... From terrorist attack.
- ... Against foreign intelligence operations/espionage.
- ... Against cyber-based attacks and high tech crimes.

  Director Robert Mueller
June 21, 2002
Congressional Testimony

National Security Issue Threats

- Espionage (National Defense Info.)
- Terrorism
- Foreign Intelligence Activities
- Perception Management
- Targeting the U. S. Government
- Economic Espionage
- Targeting National Info Infrastructure
- Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction



~~SECRET~~

Economic Espionage Act of 1996

18 USC 1831

Theft of Trade Secrets - 18 USC 1832



Who ???

Economic Espionage Act of 1996

18 USC 1831

- | | |
|---|---|
| ☐ Business Information | ☐ DNA Cell line |
| ☐ Computer Source Code | ☐ Engineering Plans |
| ☐ Access Card Control | ☐ Drug Delivery System |
| ☐ Project Information | ☐ Micro Process/Research |
| ☐ Proprietary Pricing | ☐ Customer Account Info |
| ☐ Test Material | ☐ Network Switch Plans |
| ☐ Genetic Screening | ☐ Ultrasound Blueprints |
| ☐ DNA Cell Line | ☐ Software Design |

b7E

Economic Espionage Act of 1996

18 USC 1831

Theft of Trade Secrets - 18 USC 1832



TRUSTED INSIDER

Question break ...



- ANSIR Program
- FBI Priorities
- FBI Threat List
- Trusted Insider

Any questions?
Let's talk about
"Why?"



Why?



"The strongest castle
walls are not proof
against a traitor within."


- Ancient Proverb





Five Reasons?

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TRUSTED INSIDER



Today's Agenda





b7E

b6
b7C



UNCLASSIFIED

Questions on the
Trusted Insider?

Today's Agenda

 Let's Take A Break ... 

Please return in 5 minutes.

b7E

 Let's Take A Break ... 

Please return in 4 minutes.

 Let's Take A Break ... 

Please return in 3 minutes.

 Let's Take A Break ... 

Please return in 2 minutes.

 Let's Take A Break ... 

Please return in 1 minutes.



 "There is one evil I dread,
 and that is, their spies.
 I could wish, therefore, the
 most attentive watch be
 kept..."

That answers:
Who and Why
 What about
 "How?"





 "There is one evil I dread,
 and that is, their spies.
 I could wish, therefore, the
 most attentive watch be
 kept..."




 "Operate In Plain View"



Techniques of Espionage

Past:
 - Classified Military Info
 - Classified US Govt.
 - Dual use technology


 Trusted Insider




Techniques of Espionage

Present:
 - Classified US Govt.
 - Unclassified Proprietary
 Corporate Information


 Trusted Insider



Techniques of Espionage

- Corporate mergers
 databases
 - Liaison on govt.-2-govt. projects
 - International Conferences


 Trusted Insider


1


Techniques of Espionage




 Trusted Insider


2

Techniques of Espionage

[Redacted]

Trusted Insider

3

Techniques of Espionage

[Redacted]

"Operate In Plain View"

Trusted Insider

4

b7E

Techniques of Espionage

National Technical Programs

[Redacted]

Trusted Insider

[Redacted]

Trusted Insider

86/50

b7E

FBI Cases

[FBI Seal] [FBI Seal]

[Illustrations: Suit, Hat, Gun, Briefcase, Footwear]

FBI Cases

[FBI Seal] [FBI Seal]

Avery Dennison

PPG Pittsburgh Plate Glass

-ANSIR Program
-FBI Threat List
-The Law
-Criminal Cases



FBI Cases



Researcher

- Pressure sensitive products
- \$50 to \$60M Loss
- Trade Secret Misappropriation



FBI Cases



- Supervisor of Maintenance Crew
- Access to every office
- Diskettes, blueprints, R&D
- Tried to sell to Owens-Corning
- Five years and fine

b6
b7C



FBI Cases



What other companies have stepped forward with cases?



FBI Cases



- Bristol Myers (Anti-cancer drug: Taxol)
- Gillette Company (Razors)
- Deloitte & Touche (Software)
- Gwinette Daily Post (Subscription list)
- Roche Diagnostics (Hepatitis Kit)
- Wilsonart Int'l (Laminates)
- Idexx Labs (R&D, customer lists)

IBM, Caterpillar, Motorola, Intel, Cisco Systems
Mastercard, Bell Imaging, Lucent Technology

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FBI - CD
FBIHQ



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Questions?

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 The Attorney General's Guidelines for
FBI National Security Investigations and
Foreign Intelligence Collection (NSIGs)

National Security Law Branch
Office of the General Counsel
2004

 Coming Attractions

- Importance of NSIGs
- General Authorities
- Principles
- Levels of Investigative Activities
- Extraterritorial Operations and Investigative Assistance
- Foreign Intelligence Collection
- Strategic Analysis
- Retention and Information Sharing

 Why should we care about the
NSIGs?

- FBI
 - They are the basic Departmental rules for conducting national security investigations
 - They mandate increased cooperation and coordination of counterintelligence activities
 - Failure to adhere to certain provisions can result in a possible IOB matter

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 Why should we care about the
NSIGs?

- Intelligence Community
 - Provides insight into the FBI's capabilities (and limitations) to produce and disseminate foreign intelligence and counterintelligence
 - Another source of authority for sharing information with the Intelligence Community

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 Why should we care about the
NSIGs?

- Change the reporting and oversight mechanisms
- Shape the interaction and coordination among investigative, intelligence, and prosecutorial resources

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 NSG Revision Philosophy

- Eliminate the bifurcation of "criminal" and "intelligence" cases
- Modernize guidelines by including the concept of foreign computer intrusions
- Encourage early intervention and disruption of national security threats
- Lower approval levels and allows more aggressive investigation and analysis

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General Authorities

- The FBI is authorized to conduct investigations to protect against **threats to the national security**, which are:
 - International Terrorism
 - Espionage and other intelligence activities
 - Foreign computer intrusions
 - Other matters determined by the Attorney General consistent with E.O. 12333

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General Authorities

- FBI is authorized to assist state, local, and foreign governments
- FBI is authorized to collect foreign intelligence and to assist federal intelligence agencies
- FBI is authorized to conduct strategic analysis
- FBI is authorized to retain and disseminate information collected pursuant to these Guidelines

Respect for Constitutional Rights

- The FBI cannot investigate or maintain information on U.S. persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment or the lawful exercise of other rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States

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Investigations Must be Conducted Within the Bounds of U.S. Law

- All investigative activities must have a valid purpose consistent with the NSIGs and be carried out in conformity with the Constitution, applicable statutes, Executive Orders, and Departmental regulations and guidelines

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Relationship to Other Investigative Guidelines

- The authority to conduct national security investigations and other activities does not limit the FBI's ability to carry out investigations and other activities under other AG guidelines
- The NSIGs do not limit other authorized law enforcement activities of the FBI such as those authorized in the Domestic Criminal Guidelines

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Basic NSIGs principles: "Least Intrusive Means"

- As provided in E.O. 12333, the FBI shall conduct its investigations and other activities under the NSIGs using "the least intrusive collection techniques feasible."
- But the FBI shall not hesitate to use any lawful technique when the degree of intrusiveness is warranted in light of the threat to national security

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Significant change:

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US Person Presumption

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US Person Presumption Examples

- Person located in the US, NFI=USP
- Person's location is unknown, NFI=USP
- Person located outside the US, NFI=nonUSP
- Person located in the US, here on a student visa=nonUSP
- Person outside the US, has a valid US passport=USP

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US Person Presumption

- FBI discovers a subject uses an

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Departures from the Guidelines

- Attorney General, DAG, or designated official may approve departures from the NSIGs
- In circumstances involving an immediate or grave threat to the national security, or to the safety of persons or property and there is a need to take immediate action to protect against such a threat, the FBI may depart from the NSIGs provided notice is given to the AG, DAG, or designated official ASAP. Notice must also be given to OIPR.

Interpretation of NSIGs

- All significant new legal questions as to the coverage and interpretation of the NSIGs will be resolved initially by OIPR and reviewed by the DAG or AG as appropriate

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What's next?

- Importance of NSIGs
- General Authorities
- Underlying Principles
- Levels of Investigative Activities
- Assistance
- Foreign Intelligence Collection
- Strategic Analysis
- Retention and Information Sharing
- Questions

National Security Investigations

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Levels of investigative activities

- 3 levels of investigative activities:
 - Threat Assessment
 - Preliminary Investigations
 - Full Investigations

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Threat Assessments

- Without opening a preliminary or full investigation, the FBI may engage in the certain limited activities to investigate or collect information relating to threats to the national security

Threat Assessment

- FBI can actively gather info relating to threats to national security
- TA techniques:
 - Obtain "publicly available" information
 - Access FBI/DOJ records
 - Request info from other gov entities
 - Access online services and resources

Crucial Definition: "Publicly Available"

- Information that has been published or broadcast for public consumption, is available on request to the public, **is accessible on-line** or otherwise is available to the public by subscription or purchase, could lawfully be seen or heard by the casual observer, is made available at a meeting open to the public, or is obtained by **visiting any place or attending any event that is open to the public.**

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Threat Assessment (cont.)

- TA techniques (cont.):
 - Interview previously established assets
 - Interview or request info from members of the public/private entities
 - Accept info voluntarily provided by govt or private entities

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Predicates for Initiating National Security Investigations

- An individual is or may be an international terrorist or an agent of a foreign power
- A group or organization is or may be a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power

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Predicates for Initiating National Security Investigations

- An individual, group, or organization is or may be engaging, or has or may have engaged, in activities constituting a **threat to national security** (or related preparatory or support activities) for or on behalf of a foreign power
- A **crime involved in or related to** a threat to the national security has or may have occurred, is or may be occurring, or will or may occur

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Predicates for Initiating National Security Investigations

- An individual, group, or organization is, or may be, the target of a recruitment or infiltration effort by an international terrorist, foreign power, or agent of a foreign power under circumstances related to a threat to the national security
- An individual, group, organization, entity, information, property, or activity is, or may be, a target of international terrorism, espionage, foreign computer intrusion, or other threat to the national security

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Preliminary Investigation

- Basis for a PI
 - Info or allegation indicating that a threat to national security may exist
 - In order to identify potential assets in connection with activities related to a threat to the national security
- Approval levels
 - SAC
 - Authorized ASAC or squad supervisor

Preliminary Investigation (cont.)

- Duration:
 - Initially - 6 months
 - Extension - 6 months by field office
 - Further extension - beyond a year - must be authorized by FBI HQ, in 6 month increments, and must be reported to OIPR

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Preliminary Investigation (cont.)

- PI techniques:
 - All techniques used in threat assessment
 - All lawful investigative techniques **except**:
 - Elsur
 - Search
- Examples of available PI techniques:
 - [redacted] undercover ops, NSLs, pen registers/trap & trace

Full Investigations

- Basis for Full
 - Specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that a threat to the national security may exist
- Approval levels
 - SAC
 - Authorized ASAC/squad supervisor

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Full Investigations (cont.)

- FI techniques:
 - All lawful investigative techniques may be used
- Reports:
 - At the end of each year that full investigation continues, FBI shall provide summary of investigation to OIPR and Crim Div, and USAO, subject to authorization from Crim Div in espionage cases

PI/Full Investigations Notifications

- Field office must notify FBI HQ within 10 working days of initiation of PI or Full
- FBI HQ provides notice of initiation of PI or Full to OIPR and to Crim Div (within 10 working days of receipt of notice from field)
- OIPR notifies AG and DAG
- FBI must provide notice of initiation to US Attorney's office, subject to authorization by the Crim Div in espionage cases
- If FBI HQ disapproves field's initiation of PI or Full, FBI shall notify the DAG

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Pending [redacted]

- The FBI and the Criminal Division may [redacted] by mutual agreement exceptions to the [redacted]

- The FBI and OIPR may [redacted]

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FBI Proposed [redacted]

- Operational support to the Intelligence Community (particularly sensitive stuff)

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What's next

- Importance of NSIG
- General Authorities
- Principles
- Levels of Investigative Activities
- **[REDACTED]** and Investigative Assistance
- Foreign Intelligence Collection
- Strategic Analysis
- Retention
- Information Sharing
- Questions

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Investigative Assistance— State and Locals

- FBI may assist state and local governments in investigations relating to threats to the national security
- Controlling reg: MOU w/DHS

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Investigative Assistance— Foreign Governments

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Investigative Assistance— Foreign Governments

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What's next

- Importance of NSIG
- General Authorities
- Principles
- Levels of Investigative Activities
- **[REDACTED]** and Investigative Assistance
- Foreign Intelligence Collection
- Strategic Analysis
- Retention
- Information Sharing
- Questions

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Foreign Intelligence Collection

- FBI may collect foreign intelligence in response to the requirements authorized by the DCI

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(cont.)

- The FBI may also collect foreign intelligence, if consistent with EO 12333 or a successor order, as directed by the AG, the DAG, or an official designated by the AG

Strategic Analysis

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Strategic Analysis

- FBI has the authority to examine and analyze information in its possession to produce and disseminate counterintelligence and foreign intelligence
- Permits the FBI to look at the "big picture" and analyze trends or developing threats

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Strategic Analysis

- Significant in that strategic analysis does not need to be tied to any particular investigation
- Also authorizes the FBI to use Threat Assessment activities to supplement information already in its possession
- Responsive to the criticism that the FBI is too tied to investigations and that country would be better served by an intelligence agency

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What's next

- Importance of NSIG
- General Authorities
- Principles
- Levels of Investigative Activities
- Investigative Assistance
- Foreign Intelligence Collection
- Strategic Analysis
- Retention and Information Sharing
- Questions

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Information Systems & Databases – In General

- FBI shall maintain records in accordance with a records retention plan approved by the National Archives and Records Administration
- Records shall be available for review upon request by OIPR, including all information in the database or records system

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~~SECRET~~ Information Systems & Databases – Required Data

- FBI will maintain database/records system that permits prompt retrieval of:
 - Identity and status of each PI or full investigation (open or closed)
 - Total number of PIs, number of PIs involving U.S. persons, number of PI extensions in U.S. person investigations, number of PIs converted to full investigations

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- FBI will maintain database/records system that permits prompt retrieval of (cont.):
 - The number of full investigations and the number of such investigations involving US persons
 - Identity of full investigations of a group in the U.S. composed substantially of U.S. persons
 - Number of requests for assistance received by foreign governments and whether request was furnished or declined

Information Sharing

- Within DOJ, info sharing provisions mirror the information sharing procedures in the AG's March 6, 2002, memorandum and subsequent guidance
- Within Intel Community, provisions track the MOU between the Intelligence Community, Federal Law Enforcement Agencies, and Department of Homeland Security

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Information Sharing (cont.)

- DOJ
 - Crim Div. and OIPR have access to all information, unless limited by:
 - FISC
 - Controls imposed by originators of sensitive material
 - Restrictions established by AG or DAG
 - FBI will keep Crim Div and OIPR apprised of info obtained under NSIG

Information Sharing (cont.)

- DOJ (cont.)
 - FBI will provide Crim Div and OIPR notices of initiations and annual notices and summaries
 - FBI, Crim Div and OIPR shall consult with each other
 - US Attorney's Offices shall receive info and engage in consultation to the same extent as Crim Div (subject to Crim Div authorization in espionage cases)

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Information Sharing (cont.)

- NSICs guidance on info sharing with:
 - Intelligence Community/Federal Law Enforcement Agencies/Department of Homeland Security
 - Federal Authorities
 - State and Local Authorities
 - Foreign Authorities
 - Congressional Committees
 - White House

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What we covered

- Importance of NSIG
- General Authorities
- Principles
- Levels of Investigative Activities
 - [redacted] investigative Assistance
- Foreign Intelligence Collection
- Strategic Analysis
- Retention and Information Sharing

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QUESTIONS?



- NSLU - [redacted]

- Visit NSL [redacted]



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



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


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
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


- Program designed to



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  **Counterproliferation Mission**


 has programmatic oversight for WMD counterproliferation investigations i.e. those with the 

- The  has direct responsibility for the management of the WMD counterproliferation investigations.
- The  works closely with the  to provide support as needed such as tactical and/or strategic analytical support

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
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 **Proliferating Countries**

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 **Scope and Breadth of Proliferation Activities in the U.S.**

- Attempts by Foreign powers or entities to obtain U.S. technology and/or equipment for a WMD program
- Most activities involve dual use technology and equipment
- Often, U.S. firms are 




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

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 **Scope and Breadth of Proliferation Activities in the U.S. (Cont'd)**

- Some of the targeted technology has direct WMD device application
- Some proliferant countries are 
- Cases indicate a growing need to more aggressively address the exploitation of U.S. technology

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 **Proliferation Case Elements**

- Information sharing in the U.S. Intelligence Community
- Name releases 
- Identification of 



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Intelligence Dissemination

[Redacted] along with other Analysts in the Counterintelligence Division and other Divisions, regularly disseminate Intelligence Information Reports to the U.S. Intelligence Community. Other types of Reports are regularly generated including strategic and tactical analysis to support FBI Field Office investigations and other customers.

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Reference Material

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WMD PROLIFERATION EXPECTED TRENDS

- US Dual Use Equipment Will Remain a Target
- Increased Demand for US Equipment as Programs Continue to Mature



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Foreign Visitors in the United States

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Background

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Assessment

- No evidence [redacted] being used in U.S.
- Possible targets if used:

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Background

- Priority CI target of FBI

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- Used primarily as [redacted]

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Assessment

- Actively targeting "hard sciences"
- Involved in collecting WMD information

[redacted] a possible target

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(S) [Redacted] ~~Secret/Orcon/Noform~~

Background

- Priority CI target of FBI

(S) [Redacted]

(S) [Redacted] es [Redacted] to collect information

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(S) [Redacted] ~~Secret/Orcon/Noform~~

Assessment

- Targeting "hard sciences"
- Collecting information for nuclear weapons programs, WMD
- Collecting dual-use technology

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(S) [Redacted]

(S) [Redacted]

- All Field EC dated 07/14/2004
- Summarizes threat
- Investigative priorities of FBI Sub-Program [Redacted]

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(S) [Redacted] ~~Secret/Orcon/Noform~~

Overview

- Centrally-managed

[Redacted]

- Narrow investigative focus
- Target most significant threats

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(S) [Redacted] ~~Secret/Orcon/Noform~~

Overview

- Traditional threat
- Non-traditional threat

[Redacted]

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(S) [Redacted] ~~Secret/Orcon/Noform~~

Targets



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

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

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

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



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

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
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



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"The Break"

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- During search of [redacted] work space in February 2001 the FBI located notation to [redacted]

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How did the FBI confirm Ana [redacted] was a recruited agent of a foreign power?

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Identifying [redacted] was significant in that [redacted]

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Additionally [redacted]

[redacted] suspicious and consistent with other FBI investigations.

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The Toshiba



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- After identifying [redacted] as a suspect, the FBI identified [redacted]

- Through subsequent [redacted] FBI identified [redacted]

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
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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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DATE: 11-10-2011
CLASSIFIED BY 65179 DMH/ stp/ lsg
REASON: 1.4 (c)
DECLASSIFY ON: 11-10-2036



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


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

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
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
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
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


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


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


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



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

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
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


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