

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

(S)

b1
b7E




May 2010

Counterintelligence Division



Intelligence Analyst



b6
b7C
b7E

Derived from: ~~FBI NSISCG 20090615~~
Declassify on: ~~20350501~~

DATE: 01-26-2012
CLASSIFIED BY 65179 DMH/SBS
REASON: 1.4 (c,d)
DECLASSIFY ON: 01-26-2037

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

ACLURM041667

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FBI040567

Table of Contents

Executive Summary 2

Definitions..... 3

(S) [Redacted] 3

(S) [Redacted] 4

Lessons Learned..... 5

(S) [Redacted] 6

(S) [Redacted] 8

(S) [Redacted] 9

(S) [Redacted] 9

(S) [Redacted] 9

Endnotes..... 11

(S) Appendix A: [Redacted]

(S) Appendix B: [Redacted]

(S) Appendix C: [Redacted]

Appendix D: Pony to Request Attorney General (AG) Authority and Intelligence Community
Directive (ICD) [Redacted]
Overseas Travel

Appendix E [Redacted]

(S) Appendix F [Redacted]

Appendix G: Pony to Request FBIHQ to Obtain AG Authority and Travel Authorization for
Overseas Travel

Appendix H: Training Classes

(S) Appendix I: [Redacted]

b1
b7E

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


(S)

b1
b7E

(U) Most of the guidance is derived from current and previous FBI manuals, U.S. intelligence community (USIC) products and FBI operations. This guide was produced with the assistance of the [redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S)




b1
b7E

LESSONS LEARNED

(S)

X




b1
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S)

~~SECRET~~//NOFORN



b1
b7E

(U) This product was prepared by the Counterintelligence Division of the FBI. Comments and queries about the product may be addressed to IA [redacted] Comments and queries regarding specific [redacted] should be addressed to the proper substantive unit.

b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~//NOFORN

ENDNOTES

¹ Source is a SECRET//NOFORN FBI Report [REDACTED] 01 December 1999.

² Source is a SECRET//NOFORN FBI Report [REDACTED] 01 December 1999.

(S) ³ Source is a SECRET//NOFORN [REDACTED]

(S) ⁴ Source is a SECRET//NOFORN [REDACTED]

⁵ Source is a SECRET//NOFORN FBI Report [REDACTED] 01 December 1999.

⁶ Source is a SECRET//NOFORN Report "U.S. [REDACTED] Guidance": 09 December 1994.

⁷ Source is a SECRET//NOFORN Report "U.S. [REDACTED] Guidance": 09 December 1994.

⁸ Source is a SECRET//NOFORN Report "U.S. [REDACTED] Guidance": 09 December 1994.

⁹ Source is a SECRET//NOFORN Report "U.S. [REDACTED] Guidance": 09 December 1994.

¹⁰ Source is a SECRET//NOFORN Report "U.S. [REDACTED] Guidance": 09 December 1994.

¹¹ Source is a SECRET//NOFORN Report "U.S. [REDACTED] Guidance": 09 December 1994.

(S) ¹² Source is a SECRET FBI Report [REDACTED] "Seven Problem Areas": August 1997.

(S) ¹³ Source is a SECRET FBI Report [REDACTED] "Seven Problem Areas": August 1997.

(S) ¹⁴ Source is a SECRET//NOFORN [REDACTED]

¹⁵ Source is a SECRET//NOFORN FBI Report [REDACTED] "Reference Guide": 01 December 1999.

¹⁶ Source is a SECRET//ORCON/NOFORN FBI [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Issues: December 1995.

¹⁷ Source is a SECRET//NOFORN FBI Manual [REDACTED] : 31 March 2008.

¹⁸ Source is a SECRET//NOFORN FBI Manual [REDACTED] September 2007.

(S) ¹⁹ Source is a SECRET//NOFORN [REDACTED]

²⁰ Source is a SECRET//NOFORN FBI Manual [REDACTED] : 31 March 2008.

²¹ Source is a SECRET//NOFORN FBI Manual [REDACTED] : 31 March 2008.

b1
b7E

b1
b7E

-
- ²² Source is a ~~SECRET~~//NOFORN FBI Manual [REDACTED] : 31 March 2008.
- ²³ Source is a ~~SECRET~~//NOFORN FBI Manual [REDACTED] : 31 March 2008.
- ²⁴ Source is a ~~SECRET~~//NOFORN FBI Manual [REDACTED] : 31 March 2008.

b7E

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-26-2012 BY 65179 DMH/SBS

~~SECRET~~//NOFORN

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

APPENDIX A

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: XX/XX/XXXX

To: Counterintelligence

Attn: XXXXX (Program Manager)

Room XXXX

From: XXXXX (Field Office)

Squad XXXXX

Contact: SA XXXXX

Approved By: XXXXX

Drafted By: XXXXX:xxx

(S) **Case ID #:** (U) [] X-XX-XXXXX (Pending)

Title: (S//NF) XXXXX []

b1
b7E

(U) **Synopsis:** (S//NF) Request FBIHQ approval for a proposed []

~~Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20090615~~

~~Declassify On: 20XXXXXX (25 years to the date)~~

Reference: (U) XXXXX (Any previous case summaries)

Full Investigation Initiated: XX/XX/XXXX (XXXXX)

Details:

(U) BACKGROUND OF INVESTIGATION

(U) (S//NF) XXXXX (Provide a description of the investigation)

(U) OBJECTIVE OF []

b1
b7E

(S) (S//NF) The primary objective of the proposed [] includes, but is not limited to, XXXXX (state the primary objective and any possible secondary objectives).

(S)

~~SECRET~~//NOFORN

DATE: 01-27-2012

CLASSIFIED BY 65179 DMH/SBS

REASON: 1.4 (c,d)

DECLASSIFY ON: 01-27-2037

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

ACLURM041675

FBI040575

~~SECRET~~ // NOFORN

To: Counterintelligence From: XXXXX

(S) Re: (X) [] K-XX-XXXXX, XX/XX/XXXX

b1
b7E

(S)

b1
b7E

(U) DESCRIPTION OF THE OPERATION

(S)

b1
b7E

(U)

(S//NF) The proposed operation would entail XXXXX (provide what type of [] estimated time frame, projected expenses, operational plan).

b7E

(S)

(S//NF) After risk analysis of the operation, XXXXX (field office) has determined the [] is feasible, administratively sound, and a reasonable use of resources. (Describe any liabilities or safety concerns and how the liabilities will be handled. []

b1
b7E

statement explaining why a [] is the most appropriate technique.

(S)

[] Describe the potential value of this []

(U) CONCLUSION

(U)

(S//NF) XXXXX (field office) requests that [] approval of the proposed [] The operation is a logical step in the investigation because XXXXX (summarize why the [] is a logical technique for the investigation). The source selected is best suited for the operation because XXXXX (summarize why the source best fits in the []).

b7E

~~SECRET~~ // NOFORN

~~SECRET~~//NOFORN

To: Counterintelligence From: XXXXX

(S) Re: (S) [redacted] K-XX-XXXXX, XX/XX/XXXX

b1
b7E

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) (S//NF) XXXXX (field office) requests [redacted] to review the proposed [redacted] approval.

b7E

~~SECRET~~//NOFORN

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-27-2012 BY 65179 DMH/SBS

~~SECRET~~ // NOFORN

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

APPENDIX B

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: XX/XX/XXXX

To: Counterintelligence

Attn: XXXXX (Program Manager)
[REDACTED] Room XXXX

From: XXXXX (Field Office)
Squad XXXXX
Contact: SA XXXXX

Approved By: XXXXX

b1
b7E

Drafted By: XXXXX:xxx

(S) **Case ID #:** (S) [REDACTED] X-XX-XXXXX (Pending)

(S) **Title:** (S) /NF) XXXXX [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) **Synopsis:** (S) /NF) Request for Assistant Director approval to manually restrict ACS access to captioned case.

Derived From: FBI NSISCG-20090615

Declassify On: 20XXXXXX (25 years to the date)

Reference: (U) 319W-HQ-A1487699-NSB Serial 4

Full Investigation Initiated: XX/XX/XXXX

(C) **Details:** (S) /NF) The captioned investigation refers to XXXXX (provide background information, objective of operation, [REDACTED] background, [REDACTED] background, and if it's a [REDACTED] operation).

b7E

(U) (S) /NF) XXXXX (field office) understands [REDACTED] are not automatically granted, but the nature of this operation is extremely sensitive. Per referenced EC, when the facts and circumstances of the specific case indicate an extraordinary risk that the existing [REDACTED]

b7E

[REDACTED] The criteria for [REDACTED] are generally based on either [REDACTED] of [REDACTED] or on [REDACTED] of the subject of the investigation or [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~ // NOFORN

DATE: 01-27-2012
CLASSIFIED BY 65179 DMH/SBS
REASON: 1.4 (c,d)
DECLASSIFY ON: 01-27-2037

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

ACLURM041679

FBI040579

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN

To: Counterintelligence From: XXXXX

(S) Re: ~~(U)~~ [redacted]-XX-XXXXX, XX/XX/XXXX

b1
b7E

unauthorized disclosure. This [redacted] meets this criteria because XXXXX. The field recognizes that if the operation does not meet the criteria, the [redacted] not be granted.

b7E

(U) ~~(S//NF)~~ XXXXX (field office) requests [redacted] obtain Assistant Director Authority for ACS to be [redacted] to those individuals [redacted] (must include a [redacted]):

b7E

XXXXXX (list the name, title, and location)

XXXXXX

XXXXXX

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

To: Counterintelligence From: XXXXX

b1
b7E

(S) Re: (U) [] K-XX-XXXXX, XX/XX/XXXX

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) (S//NF) [] is requested to obtain Assistant Director
authority to [] the captioned case in ACS.

b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-27-2012 BY 65179 DMH/SBS

~~SECRET~~ // NOFORN

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

APPENDIX C

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: XX/XX/XXXX

To: Counterintelligence

Attn: XXXXX (Program Manager)
[REDACTED] Room XXXX

From: XXXXX (Field Office)
Squad XXXXX
Contact: SA XXXXX

Approved By: XXXXX

b1
b7E

Drafted By: XXXXX:xxx

(S) **Case ID #:** (X) [REDACTED] X-XX-XXXXX (Pending)

(S) **Title:** (S//NF) XXXXX [REDACTED]

(U) **Synopsis:** (S//NF) Request FBIHQ approval for a proposed [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] conducted jointly with XXXXX (name of agency).

~~Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20090615~~
~~Declassify On: 20XXXXXX (25 years to the date)~~

Reference: (U) XXXXX (Any previous case summaries)

Full Investigation Initiated: XX/XX/XXXX (XXXXX)

Details:

b1
b7E

(U) BACKGROUND OF INVESTIGATION

(U) (S//NF) XXXXX (provide a description of the investigation).

(U) OBJECTIVE OF [REDACTED]

(U) (S//NF) The primary objective of the proposed [REDACTED]
includes, but is not limited to, XXXXX (state the primary objective
and possible secondary objectives).

(S) [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~ // NOFORN

DATE: 01-27-2012
CLASSIFIED BY 65179 DMH/SBS
REASON: 1.4 (c,d)
DECLASSIFY ON: 01-27-2037

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

ACLURM041683

FBI040583

~~SECRET~~//NOFORN

To: Counterintelligence From: XXXXX

Re: (U) ~~(S)~~ [redacted] X-XX-XXXXX, XX/XX/XXXX

b1
b7E

(S)

(U) DESCRIPTION OF THE OPERATION

(U)

~~(S)~~/NF) The operation will run [redacted] XXXXX (provide case officer's name, contact, and if [redacted] for the case).

b7E

(S)

~~(S)~~/NF) The operation will utilize source XXXXX (provide source number; citizenship and ethnic background; position and access; source's background; statement of any vetting process, [redacted])

b1
b7E

(U)

~~(S)~~/NF) The proposed operation would entail XXXXX (provide what type of [redacted] estimated time frame, projected expenses, operational plan).

b7E

(S)

~~(S)~~/NF) After analysis of the operation, XXXXX (field office) has determined the [redacted] is feasible, administratively sound, and a reasonable use of resources. (Describe any liabilities or safety concerns and how these will be handled. [redacted])

b1
b7E

(S)

[redacted] a statement that utilizing a [redacted] is the most appropriate technique. [redacted]

[redacted] Describe the potential value of this [redacted]

(U) CONCLUSION

(U)

~~(S)~~/NF) VVVVVV (field office) requests that [redacted] obtain [redacted] of the proposed DAOP. The operation is a logical step in the investigation because XXXXX (summarize why the [redacted] is a logical technique for the investigation). The source selected is best suited for the operation because XXXXX (summarize why the source best fits into the [redacted])

b7E

~~SECRET~~//NOFORN

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN

To: Counterintelligence From: XXXXX

(S) Re: (U) [] K-XX-XXXXX, XX/XX/XXXX

b1
b7E

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) [] (S/NF) XXXXX (field office) requests [] to review the proposed [] and obtain [] Section Chief approval.

b7E

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-27-2012 BY 65179 DMH/SBS

~~SECRET~~ // NOFORN

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

APPENDIX D

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: XX/XX/XXXX

To: Counterintelligence

Attn: XXXXX (Program Manager)

Room XXXX

Attn: Legal Attache

Assistant Legal Attache

Attn: [] Unit

b7E

From: XXXXX (Field Office)

Squad XXXXX

Contact: SA XXXXX

Approved By: XXXXX

Drafted By: XXXXX:xxx

(S) **Case ID #:** (X) [] X-XX-XXXXX (Pending)

(S) **Title:** (S//NF) XXXXX []

b1
b7E

Synopsis: (S//NF) []

(S)

Derived From : ~~FBI NSISCG-20090615~~

Declassify On: ~~20XXXXXX (25 years to the date)~~

Full Investigation Initiated: XX/XX/XXXX (XXXXX)

Details:

(U) BACKGROUND OF INVESTIGATION

(U) (S//NF) The captioned investigation refers to XXXXX
(provide background information, objective of operation, []
background, [] background, and if it's a []
operation).

b7E

(U) RECENT ACTIVITY

~~SECRET~~ // NOFORN

DATE: 01-27-2012
CLASSIFIED BY 65179 DMH/SBS
REASON: 1.4 (c,d)
DECLASSIFY ON: 01-27-2037

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

ACLURM041687

FBI040587

~~SECRET~~ // NOFORN

To: Counterintelligence From: XXXXX

(S) Re: ~~(U)~~ k-XX-XXXXX, XX/XX/XXXX

(S) ~~(S)~~ // (NF)

(U) OPERATIONAL PLAN

(S)

b1
b7E

(U) CONCLUSION

(S)

~~SECRET~~ // NOFORN

~~SECRET~~ // NOFORN

To: Counterintelligence From: XXXXX

(S) Re: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] X-XX-XXXXX, XX/XX/XXXX

b1
b7E

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

(S) AT WASHINGTON, DC

[REDACTED]

b1
b7E

Set Lead 2: (Action)

LEGAT [REDACTED]

b1
b7E

AT [REDACTED]

(S) ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

Set Lead 3: (Info)

[REDACTED]

AT [REDACTED]

INIT

b7E

(U) For information only.

~~SECRET~~ // NOFORN

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-27-2012 BY 65179 DMH/SBS

~~SECRET~~//NOFORN

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

APPENDIX E

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: XX/XX/XXXX

To: Counterintelligence

Attn: XXXXX (Program Manager)

b7E

XXXXX (Legat)

Room XXXX

Attn: LEGAT XXXXX

From: XXXXX (Field Office)

Squad XXXXX

Contact: SA XXXXX

Approved By: XXXXX

Drafted By: XXXXX:xxx

(S) **Case ID #:** (S) [] X-XX-XXXXX (Pending)

(S) **Title:** (S//NF) XXXXX []

b1
b7E

Synopsis: (S//NF) []

(S) **Derived From:** FBI NSISCG-20090615

Declassify On: 20XXXXXX (25 years to the date)

Full Investigation Initiated: XX/XX/XXXX (XXXXX)

(U) **Details:** (S//NF) The captioned investigation refers to XXXXX
(provide background information, objective of operation, []
background [] background, and if it's a []
operation).

b7E

(S)

b1
b7E

~~SECRET~~//NOFORN

DATE: 01-27-2012
CLASSIFIED BY 65179 DMH/SBS
REASON: 1.4 (c,d)
DECLASSIFY ON: 01-27-2037

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

ACLURM041691

FBI040591

~~SECRET~~ // NOFORN

To: Counterintelligence From: XXXXX

(S) Re: ~~(S)~~ ☐ K-XX-XXXXXX, XX/XX/XXXX

b1
b7E

~~SECRET~~ // NOFORN

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN

To: Counterintelligence From: XXXXX

(S) Re: ~~(U)~~ X-XX-XXXXX, XX/XX/XXXX

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

b1
b7E

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(S)

Set Lead 2: (Info)

XXXXXX (LEGAT)

AT XXXXX

(U) For information only.

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-27-2012 BY 65179 DMH/SBS

~~SECRET~~ // NOFORN

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

APPENDIX F

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: XX/XX/XXXX

To: Counterintelligence

Attn: XXXXX (Program Manager)

Room XXXX

From: XXXXX (Field Office)

Squad XXXXX

Contact: SA XXXXX

Approved By: XXXXX

Drafted By: XXXXX:xxx

b1
b7E

(S) Case ID #: (X) X-XX-XXXXX (Pending)

(S) Title: (S/NF) XXXXX

(S) Synopsis: (S/NF)

Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20090615

Declassify On: 20XXXXXX (25 years to the date)

Full Investigation Initiated: XX/XX/XXXX (XXXXX)

(U) Details: (S/NF) The captioned investigation refers to XXXXX
(provide background information, objective of operation, background, and if it's a operation).

b7E

~~SECRET~~ // NOFORN

DATE: 01-27-2012

CLASSIFIED BY 65179 DMH/SBS

REASON: 1.4 (c,d)

DECLASSIFY ON: 01-27-2037

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

ACLURM041695

FBI040595

~~SECRET~~//NOFORN

To: Counterintelligence From: XXXXX

Re: (S) ☐ X-XX-XXXXX, XX/XX/XXXX

b1
b7E

(S) ☐

~~SECRET~~//NOFORN

~~SECRET~~//NOFORN

To: Counterintelligence From: XXXXX

Re: (S) ~~(U)~~ ☐ K-XX-XXXXX, XX/XX/XXXX

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

AT WASHINGTON, DC

b1
b7E

~~SECRET~~//NOFORN

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-27-2012 BY 65179 DMH/SBS

~~SECRET~~ // NOFORN

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

APPENDIX G

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: XX/XX/XXXX

To: Counterintelligence

Attn: XXXXX (Program Manager)

Room XXXX

b7E

From: XXXXX (Field Office)

Squad XXXXX

Contact: SA XXXXX

Approved By: XXXXX

Drafted By: XXXXX:xxx

(S) **Case ID #:** (X) [] X-XX-XXXXX (Pending)

(S) **Title:** (S//NF) XXXXX []
[]

b1
b7E

Synopsis: (S//NF) Request FBIHQ obtain AG authority and travel authorization for XXXXX (name of employee) to travel to XXXXX (overseas country name) from XXXXX (dates of travel) []
(S) [] (and to request [] authority for briefings to be conducted by travelers).

Derived From : FBI NSISCG-20090615

Declassify On: 20XXXXXX (25 years to the date)

Reference: (U) XXXXX (Any previous case summaries)

Full Investigation Initiated: XX/XX/XXXX

(U) **Details:** (S//NF) The captioned investigation refers to XXXXX (provide background information, objective of operation, [] background, [] background, and if it's a [] operation).

b7E

(U) (S//NF) XXXXX (name of employee) intends to travel to XXXXX (country) from XXXXX (dates) in order to XXXXX (provide reason as to why overseas travel is necessary, whom the employee will meet with, and his/her itinerary-include justification as to why it cannot be accomplished by Legat).

(U) (S//NF) Traveler information is as follows:

~~SECRET~~ // NOFORN

DATE: 01-27-2012
CLASSIFIED BY 65179 DMH/SBS
REASON: 1.4 (c,d)
DECLASSIFY ON: 01-27-2037

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

ACLURM041699

FBI040599

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN

To: Counterintelligence From: XXXXX
(S) Re: (S) [] K-XX-XXXXX, XX/XX/XXXX

b1
b7E

Name: XXXXX
Division/Field Office: XXXXX
Title: XXXXX
DOB: XXXXX
POB: XXXXX
SSN: XXXXX
Official Passport: XXXXX
Issue date: XXXXX
Expiration date: XXXXX
Itinerary: XXXXX
Current security clearance: XXXXX
Phone: XXXXX
Email: XXXXX
Hotel: XXXXX

(U) ~~(S)~~/NF) To facilitate the meeting with XXXXX (name of a foreign service or person), [] is also requested to obtain [] authority to discuss the following information:

b7E

XXXXX (State the facts that will be shared with the foreign service or person and the classification of the material to include all handling caveats.)

XXXXXX
XXXXXX

(S) ~~(S)~~/NF) [] is requested to obtain the necessary approvals for XXXXX (employee) to travel to XXXXX (country) [] in order to XXXXX (purpose). To facilitate a meeting with XXXXX (foreign service) [] authority is requested to disclose the aforementioned information.

b1
b7E

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN

~~SECRET~~//NOFORN

To: Counterintelligence From: XXXXX

Re: (S) [] X-XX-XXXXX, XX/XX/XXXX

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

b1
b7E

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(S) (S//NF) [] is requested to obtain AG Authority and travel authorization for XXXXX (name of employee) to travel to XXXXX (overseas country name) from XXXXX (dates of travel) []

[] authority is requested for information to be shared by the travelers.

~~SECRET~~//NOFORN

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-27-2012 BY 65179 DMH/SBS

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 01-27-2012
 CLASSIFIED BY 65179 DMH/SBS
 REASON: 1.4 (c)
 DECLASSIFY ON: 01-27-2037

Appendix H: Training Classes

b1

Below are several courses for FY2010.

Name	Description	Location	POC
(S)			
(S)	(S)		
(S)	(S)		
Interview Simulation	Develop skills needed to interview individuals	Computer based	
CI	Discuss techniques, solutions, and	Quantico, VA	FBI, Virtual Academy
CI Espionage	Advance course on how to conduct an espionage case.	Quantico, VA	FBI, Virtual Academy
CI Operations	Course on how to conduct CHS	Quantico, VA (other locations available)	FBI, Virtual Academy
CI Interview & Interrogation	Advance course to increase agents' skills in interview and interrogation		FBI, Virtual Academy
(S)			
CI Investigations & Operations	Extensive course for agents to familiarize with CI objectives, techniques, and	Quantico, VA	FBI, Virtual Academy
(S)			
Counter-	Introduce the complexities		


b1
 b6
 b7C
 b7E

~~SECRET~~


ACLURM041703

FBI040603


~~SECRET~~



FBI CI: Lessons Learned	Focus on case studies to determine best practices.	Quantico, VA	FBI, Virtual Academy
-------------------------	--	--------------	----------------------



Managing CI Investigations & Operations	Provides field supervisors with an introduction on administering a successful CI program	Quantico, VA	FBI, Virtual Academy
---	--	--------------	----------------------



b1
b7E

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-27-2012 BY 65179 DMH/SBS

~~SECRET/NOFORN/ORCON~~

b7E

(U)

~~(S/NF/OC)~~



DECEMBER 1995

b6
b7C
b7E

National Security Division

Derived From: ~~Multiple Sources~~
Declassify On: ~~X1~~

DATE: 01-27-2012
CLASSIFIED BY 65179 DMH/SBS
REASON: 1.4 (c,d)
DECLASSIFY ON: 01-27-2037

~~SECRET/NOFORN/ORCON~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

ACLURM041706

FBI040606

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN/ORCON

This study analyzes



b1
b7E

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN/ORCON

CONTENTS

I. KEY DEFINITIONS	i
II. KEY JUDGMENTS	v
II. SCOPE NOTE	1
III. SOME POSITIVE LESSONS	4
LESSON 1: SEIZE THE [REDACTED] OPPORTUNITY	4
(S) LESSON 2: [REDACTED]	5
(S) LESSON 3: [REDACTED]	6
(S) LESSON 4: [REDACTED]	7
(S) LESSON 5: [REDACTED]	10
(S) LESSON 6: [REDACTED]	11
IV. PITFALLS TO AVOID	13
PITFALL 1: THE CHICKEN OR THE EGG -- THE ORDERING OF ASSET/ [REDACTED]	14
THE FIRST OPERATION	14
THE SECOND OPERATION	15
THE THIRD OPERATION	17
PITFALL 2: OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS	18
THE FOURTH OPERATION	18
THE FIFTH OPERATION	19
PITFALL 3: ANALYSIS ISN'T PARALYSIS	20
THE SIXTH OPERATION	20

b1
b7E

b7E

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN/ORCON

(S)	PITFALL 4:	[REDACTED]	20
	PITFALL 5: REMEMBER	[REDACTED]	21
(S)	A SPECIAL CASE	[REDACTED] THE SEVENTH OPERATION	21
	V. THE ROLE OF ANALYSIS		23
	VI. CONCLUSION		26

b1
b7E

APPENDICES

	APPENDIX I: THE SAMPLE	A-1
(S)	APPENDIX I	[REDACTED] A-7
	APPENDIX III: FBI ANALYTICAL STUDIES WHICH MAY ASSIST IN	[REDACTED] OPERATION INITIATION A-9
	APPENDIX IV: NSTL ANALYSTS	A-11

b1
b7E

TABLES AND GRAPHS

(S)	TABLE I	[REDACTED] 9
	TABLE II: STUDY SAMPLE	A-3
	TABLE III: SAMPLE	[REDACTED] ACTIVITY LEVELS A-6
	TABLE IV:	[REDACTED] A-8
	GRAPH I: OPERATION TYPE/ASSESSMENT CORRELATION	5
	GRAPH II:	[REDACTED] 13
	GRAPH III:	[REDACTED] A-4
	GRAPH IV:	[REDACTED] A-5

b7E

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN/ORCON

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN/ORCON

KEY DEFINITIONS

(S)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U)

[REDACTED] -- A person who the FB [REDACTED]

b1
b7E

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] -- A person who is [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

operations

(S)

[REDACTED]

Foreign Official -- foreign nationals in the United States who are acting in an official capacity for a foreign power, attached to a foreign diplomatic establishment or an establishment under the control of a foreign power, or employed by an international organization or other organization established under an agreement to which the United States is party.⁴ (S)

(U)

(S)

[REDACTED]

b1
b7E

(U) 2

[REDACTED]

(U) 3 Ibid. (S)

(U) 4 Attorney General Guidelines, Section II, I. (S)

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN/ORCON

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN/ORCON

(S)

CRITERIA BY WHICH THE SAMPLE WAS EVALUATED:

The success of an operation can be judged broadly by whether the FBI learned anything of value from it, or, more narrowly, by whether it achieved its explicitly stated objectives.

b1
b7E

(S)

The NSTL Issues (subject to annual review):⁶

1. *TERRORISM* -- activities that involve violent acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or any State. Terrorist activities are intended to: (1) intimidate or coerce a civilian population, (2) influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or (3) affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping. (U)
2. *ESPIONAGE* -- foreign power-sponsored or coordinated intelligence activity directed at the U.S. Government, or U.S. corporations, establishments or persons, which involves the identification, targeting and collection of U.S. national defense information. (U)
3. *PROLIFERATION* -- The spread of Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological weapons, advanced conventional weapons, and their missile delivery systems is a significant threat to U.S. national security; (U)
4. *ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE* -- foreign power-sponsored or coordinated intelligence activity directed at the U.S. Government, or U.S. corporations, establishments or persons, which involves:

⁶ On September 28, 1995, the AG approved this updated list of NSTL Issues.

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN/ORCON

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN/ORCON

(1) the unlawful or clandestine targeting or acquisition of sensitive financial, trade, or economic policy information, proprietary economic information, or critical technologies, or

(2) the unlawful or clandestine targeting or influencing of sensitive economic policy decisions. (U)

5. *TARGETING THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE* -- foreign power-sponsored or coordinated intelligence activity directed at the U.S. Government, or U.S. corporations, establishments or persons, which involves the targeting of facilities, personnel, information, or computer, cable, satellite, or telecommunications systems, which comprise or are associated with the National Information Infrastructure. The National Information Infrastructure is the electronic backbone for the storage, processing, and communication of information for nearly every sector of U.S. society. (U)

6. *TARGETING THE U.S. GOVERNMENT* -- foreign power-sponsored or coordinated intelligence activity directed at the U.S. Government, or U.S. corporations, establishments or persons, which involves the targeting of Government programs, information, or the facilities of personnel of: (1) the U.S. Intelligence Community; (2) the U.S. foreign affairs, economic, or financial community; and (3) the U.S. defense establishment and related activities of national preparedness. (U)

7. *PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT* -- foreign power-sponsored or coordinated intelligence activity directed at the U.S. Government, or U.S. corporations, establishments or persons, which involves manipulating information and communications (domestically or internationally) designed to distort the perception of the public (domestically or internationally) or of U.S. Government officials regarding U.S. policies, ranging from foreign policy to economic strategies. (U)

8. *FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES* -- foreign power-sponsored or coordinated intelligence activity conducted in the United States or directed against the U.S. Government, or U.S. corporations, establishments, or persons, that is not described by or included in the other issue threats. (U)

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN/ORCON

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN/ORCON

KEY JUDGMENTS

◆ In the bipolar Cold War era, the primary threat to the United States was military; no country threatened U.S. international economic hegemony. This is not to say that foes and allies alike did not collect economic intelligence during the Cold War. They did. Although a military threat remains, it is drastically attenuated. However, the competitive economic threat, among others, has increased [REDACTED]

(S)

(S)

(S)

(S)

(S)

b1
b7E

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN/ORCON

v

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN/ORCON

SCOPE NOTE

Since the end of the Cold War, the international security and intelligence environment has been altered. Economic and political conflicts between allied nations, once relegated to secondary status, have come to the fore.⁷ Although intelligence targets and collection priorities may have changed as a result of the new world, with the exception of improved technology, intelligence tradecraft has remained essentially unchanged.

(U)

X

(U)

X

(S)

b1
b7E

⁷ One such example is the current series of trade disputes between the United States and Japan. The demise of the Cold War has allowed these disputes to become a relatively more important component of the relationship between these two politically allied nations. (U)

(S)

X

(S)

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN/ORCON

~~SECRET/NOFORN/ORCON~~

b1
b7E

(S) [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

The criteria used to evaluate the operations in the sample was a hybrid of both broad and narrow definitions of success. The success of an operation can be judged broadly by whether the FBI learned anything of value from it, or, more narrowly, by whether the operation achieved its explicitly stated objectives. In short, the operations were evaluated primarily on whether they achieved their explicit objectives, but were given the benefit of the doubt if other implicit objectives [REDACTED]

b1
b7E

~~SECRET/NOFORN/ORCON~~

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN/ORCON

SOME POSITIVE LESSONS

There are positive lessons to be taken from this study's sample. Due to the relatively small size of the study's sample, lessons drawn from it, while instructive, should not be interpreted as fact

b7E

(U) be further tested. (S)

LESSON 1: SEIZE THE [REDACTED] OPPORTUNITY

(S)

b1
b7E

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN/ORCON

(S)

~~SECRET/NOFORN/ORCON~~

b1
b7E

(S)

12

A

is a person who the FBI

/An

is a person who is

b1
b7E

(S)

(S)

~~SECRET/NOFORN/ORCON~~

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN/ORCON

PITFALL 1: THE CHICKEN OR THE EGG -- THE ORDERING OF

b7E

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1
b7E

THE FIRST OPERATION


(S) [REDACTED]

b1
b7E

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN/ORCON

(S)


~~SECRET~~/NOFORN/ORCON



b1
b7E

THE SECOND OPERATION

(S)



b1
b7E

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN/ORCON

(S)


~~SECRET~~/NOFORN/ORCON



b1
b7E

THE THIRD OPERATION

(S)



b1
b7E

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN/ORCON

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN/ORCON

(S) [REDACTED]
b1
b7E

PITFALL 2: OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS

(S) [REDACTED]
b1
b7E

THE FOURTH OPERATION

(S) [REDACTED]
b1
b7E

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN/ORCON

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN/ORCON


(S)



b1
b7E

THE FIFTH OPERATION

(S)



b1
b7E

(S)



b1
b7E


~~SECRET~~/NOFORN/ORCON

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN/ORCON

PITFALL 3: ANALYSIS ISN'T PARALYSIS

THE SIXTH OPERATION


(S)



b1
b7E

(S) *PITFALL 4:* 

(S)



b1
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN/ORCON

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN/ORCON

PITFALL 5: REMEMBER OPERATIONAL SECURITY

b1
b7E

×

A SPECIAL CASE -- THE SEVENTH OPERATION

b1
b7E

b1
b7E

³⁴ On December 14, 1995, the warring factions in the former Yugoslavia signed a peace accord in Paris, France. In part, the agreement calls for an Implementation Force (IFOR) of about 60,000 NATO troops to be deployed to the former Yugoslavia for peacekeeping purposes. The United States will contribute approximately 20,000 troops which will remain in place for about one year. See "Balkan Foes Sign Peace Pact Dividing an Unpacified Bosnia: Way Clear for Troops of U.S. and NATO," *New York Times*, December 15, 1995, p. A1. (U)

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN/ORCON

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN/ORCON

THE ROLE OF ANALYSIS

b1
b7E


b1
b7E

b7E

³⁵ The role that analysis plays in contributing to an operation is not readily apparent through a reading of operational files. Often times, analysis in support of operations is informal. However, considering that the target is relatively new to the FBI, interview-based research suggests analysis can contribute to improving operations. (U)

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN/ORCON


~~SECRET/NOFORN/ORCON~~



X

b1
b7E

(U) Simply put, the downside of increased analytical input at the initiation/planning stage of an operation is negligible, while the upside is potentially significant. (S)



b1
b7E

~~SECRET/NOFORN/ORCON~~

~~SECRET/NOFORN/ORCON~~

CONCLUSION

(S)

b1
b7E

~~SECRET/NOFORN/ORCON~~

(S)

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN/ORCON

b1
b7E

X

³⁷ A factor which might influence this is the potential for future multinational military efforts led by the United States. As the U.S. military's advanced technology is displayed, it may create among friend and foe alike, a desire to acquire the same level of military capability. The Persian Gulf War established this precedent. (U)

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN/ORCON

(S)

~~SECRET/NOFORN/ORCON~~

[REDACTED]

In order to avoid pitfalls, operational proposals should be able to answer clearly at least the following three questions: [REDACTED]

(S)

[REDACTED]

b1
b7E

Although the size of the sample used for this study was relatively small, the conclusions reached herein are not intended to be incontrovertible. However, it is hoped the experiences and lessons relayed in this study will help in the [REDACTED] in the future. (S)

(U)

(S)

[REDACTED] (S)

~~SECRET/NOFORN/ORCON~~

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN/ORCON

APPENDIX I

THE SAMPLE

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The demise of the Cold War, however, has changed the "shades" of international relations: no longer simply black and white, there are now many shades of gray. [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1
b7E

(S) [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

³⁸ The NSTL Issues are not "new" threats to national security. For instance, proliferation has long been a threat to U.S. national security. For myriad reasons, it has become relatively more important recently. For further information on how national security is defined, see FBIHQ *Transformed Threats: National Security in the Wake of the Cold War*, February 1994 (U)

(S) ³ [REDACTED] (S)

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN/ORCON

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN/ORCON

(S) [redacted] Graph III (page A-4) illustrates the frequencies with which the operational objectives in this sample were cited. (S)

b1
b7E

Graph IV (page A-5) compares the breakdown by operations type of this study's sample and another sample used in [redacted]

(S) [redacted]
X

b1
b7E

(U) ⁴⁰ The statistics below were compiled by [redacted] (S)

b7E

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN/ORCON

A-2

~~SECRET/NOFORN/ORCON~~

(S)

TABLE II - STUDY SAMPLE



b1
b7E

~~(S/NF/OC)~~

(S)



b1
b7E

~~SECRET/NOFORN/ORCON~~

TABLE III

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted Table Content]

(S)

X

b1
b7E

*** Due to rounding, the total does not add up to 100 percent.

(S)

[Redacted Table Content]

b1
b7E

⁴² On September 28, 1995, the AG approved the following NSTL Issue Threats: terrorism; espionage; proliferation (weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems as well as advanced conventional weapons); economic espionage; targeting the national information infrastructure; targeting the U.S. Government; perception management; and foreign intelligence activities. These issues subject to annual review. (U)

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN/ORCON

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN/ORCON

APPENDIX II

(S)

[REDACTED]

ADMINISTRATIVE AND PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

(S)

[REDACTED]

b1
b7E

(U)

[REDACTED] has been superseded by the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] has been preserved in its entirety and resumes in [REDACTED] ~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN/ORCON

~~SECRET/NOFORN/ORCON~~

APPENDIX III

FBI TACTICAL STUDIES WHICH MAY

(S)


b1
b7E

~~SECRET/NOFORN/ORCON~~

A-9

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN//ORCON~~



b1
b7E

GENERAL NATIONAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE



b1
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN//ORCON~~

A-10

APPENDIX IV

NSTL ANALYSTS

ANALYST	NSTL ISSUE THREAT	NSTL COUNTRIES	FBIHQ PHONE
	(S)		
			"
			"
			"
	Proliferation (nuclear)		"
			"
			"
			"
	Proliferation (chemical/biological)		"
			"
			"
			"
			"
	Proliferation (nuclear)		"

b1
b6
b7C
b7E

~~(S//NOFORN)~~

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN/ORCON



~~SECRET~~/NOFORN/ORCON


~~SECRET~~ // ORCON, NOFORN // X1

THIS DOCUMENT IS AN FBI COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PRODUCT

U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

b1
b7E

(S)



DATE: 01-27-2012
CLASSIFIED BY 65179 DMH/SBS
REASON: 1.4 (c,d)
DECLASSIFY ON: 01-27-2037

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

**Investigative Services Division
National Security Intelligence Section
Washington, D.C.
March, 2001**

THIS DOCUMENT IS AN FBI COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PRODUCT

~~SECRET~~ // ORCON, NOFORN // X1

FBI040639

U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

(S)

b1
b7E



March 2001

Prepared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Investigative Services Division
National Security Intelligence Section [redacted]
Intelligence Research Specialist [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

~~SECRET~~//NOFORN, ORCON//X1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<u>TOPIC</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
KEY JUDGMENTS	2 - 5
(S) [REDACTED]	6
SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS.....	7 - 10
ADDITIONAL DEVELOPMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS.....	10 - 11
"TRIED AND TRUE".....	12 - 13
COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS.....	14
OUTLOOK.....	15
RECOMMENDATIONS.....	16

b1
b7E

~~SECRET~~//NOFORN, ORCON//X1

~~SECRET//NOFORN, ORCON//X1~~

(S) **SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS**

b1
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN, ORCON//X1~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN, ORCON//X1~~

b1
b7E

ADDITIONAL DEVELOPMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS


b1
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN, ORCON//X1~~

(S)

~~SECRET//NOFORN, ORCON//X1~~

"TRIED AND TRUE"




b1
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN, ORCON//X1~~

~~SECRET~~//NOFORN, ORCON//X1

(S)



COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS





b1
b7E

~~SECRET~~//NOFORN, ORCON//X1



~~SECRET~~



b7E



b1
b7E



b1
b7E

DATE: 01-28-2012
CLASSIFIED BY 65179 DMH/SBS
REASON: 1.4 (c)
DECLASSIFY ON: 01-28-2037
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S) The [redacted]

► More Sub-files:

(S) [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S) The [redacted]

► Personnel Support Considerations:

(S) [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

b1
b7E

~~SECRET~~

(U) (S) The [redacted]

► Personnel Support Considerations:

- Team Effort a Must:
 - May require more agents at times.
 - Will require support personnel.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(U) (S) The [redacted]

► Personnel Support Considerations:

[redacted]

- Generally the Case Agent, but does not have to be
- Consider same qualities as alternate, plus:
- Appears confident, caring, and professional

~~SECRET~~

b7E

~~SECRET~~

(S) The [redacted]

► Personnel Support Considerations:

- Research & Coordination (IA)

(S) [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(U) (S) The [redacted]

► RESTRICTED ACCESS:

- Need-to-Know Basis
- Classification markings?
- Non-Disclosure forms?

~~SECRET~~

b1
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S) The [redacted]

[redacted]

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(U) (S) The [redacted]

► Debrief Reports:

- Make Use of Analytical Support

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

b1
b7E

~~SECRET~~

(U) (S) The [redacted]

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S) The [redacted]

[redacted]

(S)

~~SECRET~~

b1
b7E

~~SECRET~~

(U) (S) The [redacted]

► Liaison:

- Must be at FBIHQ
- Case decisions & direction remain with the FBI

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S) The [redacted]

[redacted]

(S)



- (FBIHQ Coordination Required)

~~SECRET~~

b1
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~




b1
b7E




~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~




(S)




b1
b7E

(S)
(S)
(S)




(S)




b1
b6
b7C
b7E

(S)



(S)



b1
b6
b7C
b7E

DATE: 01-28-2012
CLASSIFIED BY 65179 DMH/SBS
REASON: 1.4 (b,c,d)
DECLASSIFY ON: 01-28-2037
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

ACLURM041750

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S)

~~SECRET~~

Source Issues

~~SECRET~~

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b1
b6
b7C
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET~~

Administrative Notes

- Restrict case access

~~SECRET~~

(S)

~~SECRET~~

b1
b6
b7C
b7E

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b1
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
Lessons Learned

(S)

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
Lessons Learned

- Be creative and persistent
- Have multiple options

(S)

~~SECRET~~

b1
b7E

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

THIS IS A COVER SHEET

FOR CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

ALL INDIVIDUALS HANDLING THIS INFORMATION ARE REQUIRED TO PROTECT IT FROM UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE IN THE INTEREST OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES.

HANDLING, STORAGE, REPRODUCTION AND DISPOSITION OF THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT MUST BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE EXECUTIVE ORDER(S), STATUTE(S) AND AGENCY IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS.

(This cover sheet is unclassified.)




SECRET

704-101
NSN 7540-01-213-7902

STANDARD FORM 704 (8-85)
Prescribed by GSA/ISOO
32 CFR 2003

The following book was provided to students:



b7E

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-28-2012 BY 65179 DMH/SBS



b7E



"The human sources collect the smallest volume of intelligence but generally it is the most difficult to obtain and the most useful when we do get it. It is in this area that the best information is acquired on the all-important subject of intentions. "

Vernon Walters, Silent Missions (1978)

Counterintelligence Division
Counterintelligence Training Center



b7E

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-28-2012 BY 65179 DMH/SBS



X

STRATEGIC GOALS

[illegible]

OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES TO IMPLEMENT THE FIVE STRATEGIC GOALS

This image shows a full page of dot grid paper. A solid black vertical line runs down the left side, creating a narrow margin. The rest of the page is filled with a light gray background and features horizontal dotted lines spaced evenly apart. There are no other markings or text on the page.

DATE: 01-28-2012
CLASSIFIED BY 65179 DMH/SBS
REASON: 1.4 (c)
DECLASSIFY ON: 01-28-2037

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FBI040657

~~SECRET~~
NOFORN

(U)

~~(S)~~ The following is the Appendix

[Redacted]

APPENDIX

DEFINITIONS

~~(S)~~

A [Redacted]

(S)


[Redacted]

b1
b7E

~~SECRET~~
NOFORN

~~SECRET~~
NOFORN

(S)



b1
b7E

(U) Note: The U.S. Intelligence Community may apply these same category definitions to any




~~SECRET~~
NOFORN


ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-28-2012 BY 65179 DMH/SBS

~~SECRET~~


DATE: 01-28-2012
CLASSIFIED BY 65179 DMH/SBS
REASON: 1.4 (c)
DECLASSIFY ON: 01-28-2037



b7E



b7E



b7E

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

ACLURM041761

FBI040661

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

[Redacted]

☛ Be creative!

☛ In initiating [Redacted] you are only limited by your own imagination (but be realistic).



~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

b7E

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

What is a [Redacted]

Definition:

[Redacted]

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

(S)

b1
b7E

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

Objectives of [Redacted]

[Redacted]

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

(S)

b1
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

Objectives of

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

(S)

b1
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S)

b1
b7E

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~


(S)

b1
b7E

~~SECRET~~


~~SECRET~~

(S)




b1
b7E

(S)



b1
b7E

(S)




b1
b7E

~~SECRET~~


~~SECRET~~

(S)




b1
b7E

(S)



b1
b7E

(S)




b1
b7E


~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S)




b1
b7E



b7E

(S)



b1
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) ~~(S/NF)~~ [Redacted]

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S) ~~(S/NF)~~ [Redacted]

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1
b7E

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

(S) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]


~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

b1
b7E

~~SECRET~~


~~SECRET~~

(S)




b1
b7E

(U)



b7E

(S)



b1
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S) ~~(S/NF)~~ [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Or

(S) [Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(U) ~~(S/NF)~~ [Redacted]

• Define [Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S) [Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S) ~~(S/NF)~~ [Redacted]

[Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

(S/NF) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

b1
b7E

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

(S/NF) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

(S)

b1
b7E

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

(S/NF) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]



~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

(U)

b7E


~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S) ~~(S/NF)~~ 



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1
b7E

(S) ~~(S/NF)~~ 

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1
b7E

(S) ~~(S/NF)~~ 

- Go over everything at length.

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1
b7E

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S/NF) [Redacted]

(S) [Redacted]

SECRET//NOFORN

b1
b7E

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(S/NF) [Redacted]

(S) [Redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

b1
b7E

UNCLASSIFIED
Questions?



UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~//NOFORN

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date:

To: Counterintelligence

Attn: SSA [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

From: FIELD OFFICE

Squad XXX

Contact: SA XXXXXXXX

Approved By: XXXXXXXX

Drafted By: XXXXXXXX

Case ID #: (S) [REDACTED] XX-XXXXXXXX (Pending)

Title: (S) XXXXXXXX
[REDACTED]

Synopsis: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED] This communication complies with reporting requirements regarding the referenced communication.

(U) ~~(S)~~

Derived From: ~~G-3~~

Declassify On: ~~01/29/2032~~

(U) Full Investigation Initiated: XX/XX/XXXX

(U) Reference: ~~(S)~~ XXX ANY PREVIOUS CASE SUMMARIES

(U) Enclosure(s): ~~(S)~~ Two copies of an LHM regarding captioned matter. (ONLY NEEDED IF OIPR LHM IS REQUIRED)

(S) Administrative: ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(S) Details: ~~(S)~~//NF [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~//NOFORN

b1
b6
b7C
b7E

b1
b7E

DATE: 01-28-2012
CLASSIFIED BY 65179 DMH/SBS
REASON: 1.4 (c,d)
DECLASSIFY ON: 01-28-2037

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

ACLURM041773

FBI040673

~~SECRET~~//NOFORN

To: Counterintelligence From: FIELD OFFICE
Re: (S) [REDACTED] XX-XXXXXXXX, ??

b1
b7E

(S)

[REDACTED]

NECESSARY FOR NEW CASES OR WHEN OIPR LHMs ARE REQUIRED)

(ONLY

~~SECRET~~//NOFORN

~~SECRET~~//NOFORN

To: Counterintelligence From: FIELD OFFICE
Re: (S) -XX-XXXXXXXX, ??

b1
b7E

LEAD(s) :

Set lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(U) ~~(S)~~ Review EC, grant authority to operate, coordinate,
and advise.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~//NOFORN

~~SECRET~~//NOFORN//MR

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 06/23/2008

To: Counterintelligence

Attn:

From: XXX

Squad 5

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By:

Case ID #: (S)

Title: (S)

b1
b6
b7C
b7E

(S) Synopsis: (S)

(U) ~~(S)~~

Derived From: FBI NSISCG 20080301

Declassify On: 25-X1 HUMAN

(S) ~~(S)~~

(S) Enclosure(s): ~~(S)~~//NF Enclosed for Counterintelligence is a Letterhead Memorandum for dissemination to

b1
b7E

Details: ~~(S)~~

A. Background ~~(S)~~

DATE: 01-28-2012
CLASSIFIED BY 65179 DMH/SBS
REASON: 1.4 (c,d)
DECLASSIFY ON: 01-28-2037

~~SECRET~~//NOFORN//MR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

ACLURM041776

FBI040676

~~SECRET~~//NOFORN//MR

To: Counterintelligence From: ??
Re: (S) [redacted] 06/23/2008

(S)

b1
b7E

¹Reference IIRs: [redacted]

²IIR [redacted]

³IIR [redacted]


b7E

~~SECRET~~//NOFORN//MR

~~SECRET~~//NOFORN//MR

To: Counterintelligence From: ??
Re: (S) [redacted] 06/23/2008

(S)



b1
b7E

⁴IIR:

⁵IIR:



b7E

~~SECRET~~//NOFORN//MR

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN//MR

To: Counterintelligence From: ??
Re: (S) [redacted] 06/23/2008

(S)



b1
b7E

6 IIR [redacted]

b7E

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN//MR

~~SECRET~~//NOFORN//MR

To: Counterintelligence From: ??
Re: (S) [REDACTED] 06/23/2008

(S)

b1
b7E

~~SECRET~~//NOFORN//MR

~~SECRET~~//NOFORN//MR

To: Counterintelligence From: ??
Re: (S) [REDACTED] 06/23/2008

(S) [REDACTED]

b1
b7E

(S) Letterhead Memorandum is enclosed for
dissemination, coordination, and approval [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~//NOFORN//MR

~~SECRET~~//NOFORN//MR

To: Counterintelligence From: ??
Re: (S) [REDACTED] 06/23/2008

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

AT WASHINGTON, DC

b1
b7E

(S) [REDACTED]

♦♦

~~SECRET~~//NOFORN//MR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-28-2012 BY 65179 DMH/SBS

NONVERBAL BEHAVIOR A BRIEF OVERVIEW

January 19, 2001

The following material was previously published in the FBI's Global Notes by Special Agent Joe Navarro and is provided as a brief overview of the importance of nonverbal communications for those conducting interviews or seeking to communicate more effectively. While this article was written specifically for investigators, the subject obviously has wide application beyond law enforcement which we hope you will find useful.

PROXEMICS

Investigators often underestimate the powerful messages that we transmit nonverbally. In 1969, Edward T. Hall coined the term proxemics to describe the dynamics and importance of distance and angles in everyday communication.

For the investigator, proxemics has a special significance because it can be used to dominate an interview or control the level of anxiety or comfort. As Hall well noted, when our space, especially our intimate zone (skin to about 18 inches in the United States) is violated, the fight or flight mechanism is activated. Our pulse increases, muscles become tense, we become hyper vigilant, and in some individuals, anxiety begins to set in. Conversely by extending distances we can often make an individual relax and less tense. Social norms, family background, ethnicity, and culture influence the relative distances considered intimate, personal, social, and public. Rather than focusing on specific measured distances, investigators are encouraged to determine through observation the social and personal distances of the interview subject prior to any interview. This information can then be used to the advantage of the investigator.

The proximal angles at which we either converse or interview can often have an impact on our success and how we are perceived. Interviews where both the subject and the investigator are facing each other directly are the most hostile. Even a ten degree displacement, to either side, between the subject and the interviewer, will produce a less stressful environment. Likewise, investigators also need to remember that angles work in the vertical plane. Whoever sits or stands higher will exercise greater dominance during an interview or interrogation. Just as a judge sits higher than anyone else in a display of authority, investigators should be cognizant of this nonverbal dynamic which often sends a powerful message of authority and dominance.

Prepared by SA Joe Navarro, M.A., Behavioral Analysis Program, FBI, January, 2001

OUR PRESENTATION

This is a quick reminder that first impressions, even before any words are uttered, can have lasting effects and may influence how we are perceived by the public and the subjects of our investigation. Consider the following everyday aspects of what we project non-verbally:

Our **stance**, which can be observed at quite a distance, can communicate meekness or authority, confrontation or cooperation, indifference or concern, as well as restlessness or contentment. Our stance can help us to dominate a situation or diffuse it, simply by how we stand and where we place our feet.

Our **countenance** often betrays concern, worry, happiness, even anxiety. During interviews, our countenance can betray what we know or hope to achieve. Facial betrayals can be lethal in undercover work and can derail an otherwise productive interview.

In our culture, how we **stare** at an individual and the length of time that we stare can demonstrate subordination, superiority or even intimidation. By social convention, a superior is allowed to fairly much look anywhere he would like to and can loiter in his stare longer than a subordinate. However, when looking at another person, if the staring departs the eye-nose or eye-mouth region towards the top of the chest or lower, this is demonstrative of personalization which can be offensive.

How we **groom** ourselves transmits whether or not we care about ourselves and whether we are organized or disorganized, all the while either satisfying or negating the public's expectation of how we should look. When we fail to project what is expected, this works against us, both consciously and subconsciously.

Our **posture** either can demonstrate vitality, eagerness, and capability, or it can show lack of enthusiasm, illness, incompetence, or worse, serve as a detractor.

Dressing correctly for the job is more important than people think. Our **clothing** allows us to either formalize or informalize a setting and it can also assist us in creating a superior versus inferior relationship with someone depending on our needs. Research demonstrates that the traditional dark blue suit, white shirt, and a conservative tie can project success, competency, and even veracity. Dressing down is useful when we need to mirror the subject we are dealing with, otherwise, business attire is indicated.

Lastly, we need to consider the **accouterments** that we bring with us or that we wear. Large multi-purpose watches can be distracting during interviews. Fidgeting with equipment in our possession is

distracting and for a paranoid personality unsettling. A "legal pad." is exactly that, and when we write on it the message becomes even more emphatic. Take notes on a 3" x 5" card, it's less threatening.

THE EYES

Eyes do not just see, they also **communicate**, often more accurately than we think. Every culture has some saying about the eye's ability to communicate from within (e.g., "windows to the soul"). From an early age we use our eyes to express emotions of sadness, happiness, pride, joy, worry, suspicion, nervousness, anxiety, incredulity, or submissiveness. In fact, our eyes communicate quite a bit: doctors have long recognized the eyes as windows to our physical and mental health. From jaundice to epilepsy, a physician will use the eyes to elicit conditions otherwise occluded. In the last 30 years, psychologists also have learned to view the eyes as psychological and neurological communicators. Research in this area has thus helped investigators to better understand individuals with whom they come in contact.

For the investigator, the eyes often communicate when the brain is **processing information**, conducting internal dialogs, recovering past events, crafting answers, or conducting concentrated thinking. For the cognoscenti, the eyes are very revealing. When we learn a person's base line of eye responses during non stressful conversation or through elicitation, this can later serve the investigator to detect mental activity or possibly even deception during an interview or interrogation.

Eyes also serve as a **blocking mechanism** much the same way as when we fold our hands across our chest or we turn away from those we disagree with. In a similar response, when we don't like something we hear we will usually close our eyes as if to block out what we just heard. This is done subconsciously and so often that we don't pay attention to it in our day to day affairs. Eye closure may be followed by finger stroking of the eye as if to further block or relieve us of what we just heard. Investigators can capitalize on this by noting when interviewees block with their eyes those things which trouble them. In some cases, eye blocking is extremely accurate in highlighting those things which are problematic to the interviewee. Additionally, when we are really frustrated or dislike something we just heard our eye lids will **flutter** rapidly, accurately reflecting our sentiment. Lastly, some people will roll their eyes as an expression of their incredulity or disrespect.

When we like something we see, our pupils will actually dilate as if to absorb more of what we like. The eyes will also dilate when we recognize something or are surprised. On the other hand, the eyes will constrict when we are scared, nervous, or we don't like what we see. When we are nervous or troubled our blink rate increases, revealing an internal struggle.

Obviously the eyes can tell us a lot about our emotional state, willingness to cooperate, overall

interest, or even veracity. The eyes betray us because their responses to stimuli, either visual or as noted above aurally, is autonomic.

ASSURANCE

We as humans do curious things when we are confident and self assured. Probably the most often seen is steeping, which is a form of self assurance. The hands are usually brought in front, the pads of the fingers touching each other as in the palm down, what's often described as a pyramid. This a prominent sign of self assuredness and sometimes of an arrogant attitude. Where two negotiators are steeping, both self assured and confident of their positions, one will try to raise the steeple above the other. This is an extension of what are known as "gravity defying gestures" which we do all the time including raising ourselves on the balls of our feet or our toes when we feel confident, self assured, or are emphasizing a point.

Another behavior often seen when we want to portray honesty and sincerity is chest touching. This is an extrinsic demonstration usually done to emphasize our sentiment of sincerity or projected assurance. Look for this display and differentiate between full palm touching of the chest versus mere touching of the chest with the tips of the fingers or near touching. It is very quick, but there is a big difference indicative of the amount of emphasis we are placing on what is felt or said and sometimes indicative of truth or deception.

EMPHASIS

From childhood, we tend to touch to re-enforce our sentiments. We see this every day between a parent and a child as a mother traces the outlines of a baby's features with her fingers. In time the child will respond in kind. How we touch, where, and how long can make a big difference in our everyday conversations. When we point or gesture with our hands we are **emphasizing** what we feel or are saying. For further emphasis we may plant our hand down on a desk, palm face down. The extreme of this is to pound our hand on the desk or to pound our fists (which of course is for profound emphasis). We should be cognizant, however, that not all such gestures mean or emphasize the same. The placement of fingertips on a table surface to emphasize a point during discussion is much different than placing the full palm down. The same thing is true when we touch ourselves such as hand to chest gestures, or when we place our hand on the shoulder of a colleague. A full hand on the shoulder will feel quite different than mere fingertips. The difference is the degree of commitment or **emphasis**, and that is the key. The theory here, as applied to veracity, is that an honest person will not hold back and so there will be full contact with whatever the surface. A dishonest person or one not committed fully

to what they are expressing will unconsciously fail to make that full tactile contact.

Sometimes we will see someone speaking and emphasizing by gesturing forward with their open hand towards their audience. While on the surface this looks like emphasis there is some research which shows that this is actually a pushing away gesture and the only emphasis is on distancing the speaker from his audience.

BODY INCLINATION

In very simple terms, we humans like to lean or get closer to the things that we like and lean away from those that we don't. Watch any talk show on television where couples are at odds with each other and you will notice that they lean away from each other. Even in business settings, people will lean away from each other when they dislike or are at odds with someone else's expressed opinion. **Inclination** can involve the full body or it can be just a head tilt which is even more indicative perhaps since we usually only tilt our heads sideways (literally exposing our vulnerable necks) when we like someone, are extremely comfortable, or we side with what that person is saying. Incidentally, neck exposure is also very prevalent during courtship rituals.

Head tilt in the forward plane can be an attempt to hear better or to emphasize, but it is also more confrontational and needs to be viewed in context. We do usually lean towards a person we enjoy, you can see this between couples at a café, however, in business settings, leaning forward may be more indicative of a combative attitude, especially if the arms are crossed in front of the chest and there is squinting of the eyes or other facial cues of discomfort.

OPENNESS

When we are relaxed and are being truthful, our bodies reflect openness for there is nothing to hide or turn from. The more ventral (frontal) our displays the greater comfort we are manifesting. Arms out in front, palms up, is an often used display of openness. When we see someone begin to block their ventral aspect (frontal view) with crossed arms, by turning, or by placing objects in front (purse, pitcher of water, additional clothing), it is reasonable to conclude that the person is putting up barriers due to discomfort with the situation or with what is being uttered. Barriers often serve as security for people who are afraid, insecure, threatened, or are in the process of lying.



Obviously this is a very short and cursory overview of the complex arena of nonverbal communications. There are inherent weaknesses in such a brief survey and this material should therefore serve only as a stimulus to do further reading and study in this fascinating area of human

behavior. According to some experts, nonverbal behavior constitutes more than 75% of all interpersonal communication, and so the development of skills in this area will enhance our ability to communicate and understand each other more effectively

◆ ◆ ◆

If you have any questions about nonverbal behavior or this article, contact me at
 or on the web at

b6
b7C

NONVERBAL COMMUNICATIONS BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adler, Ronald B. And George Rodman. 1988. *Understanding Human Communication*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Axtell, Roger E. 1991. *Gestures: the Do's and Taboos of Body Language Around the World*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
- Bandler, Richard and John Grinder. 1979. *Frogs into Princes*. Moab, Utah: Real People Press.
- Burgoon, Judee K., David B. Buller and W. Gill Woodall. 1994. *Nonverbal Communication: The Unspoken Dialogue*. Columbus, Ohio: Greyden Press.
- Canter, David and Laurence Alison. 1998. *Interviewing and Deception*. Dartmouth, England: Ashgate.
- Cialdini, Robert B. 1993. *Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion*. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc.
- Darwin, Charles. 1872. *The Expression of Emotion in Man and Animals*. New York: Appleton-Century Crofts.
- Delmar, Ken. 1984. *Winning Moves: the Body Language of Selling*. New York: Warner Books.
- Dimitrius, Jo-Ellan. 1998. *Reading People*. New York: Ballentine Books.
- Ekman, Paul. 1985. *Telling Lies: Clues to Deceit in the Marketplace, Politics, and Marriages*. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
- Ekman, Paul. 1975. *Unmasking the Face*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Etcoff, Nancy. 1999. *Survival of the Prettiest: The Science of Beauty*. New York: Anchor Books.
- Fast, Julius. 1970. *Body Language*. New York: MFJ Books
- Ford, Charles V. 1996. *Lies!, Lies!, Lies!: the Psychology of Deceit*. Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Press. Inc.
- Ferne, Elizabeth W. 1965. *Guests of the Sheik: an ethnography if an Iraqi Village*. New York: Anchor Books.

- Guerrero, Laura K. And Joseph A DeVito, Michael L. Hecht, eds. 1999. *The Nonverbal Communication Reader: Classic and Contemporary Readings, 2nd Ed.* Illinois: Waveland Press.
- Givens, David G. 1998-2000. *The Nonverbal Dictionary of Gestures, Signs & Body Language Cues.* Spokane: Center for Nonverbal Studies
(<http://members.aol.com/nonverbal2/diction1.htm>).
- Goffman, Erving. 1959. *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life.* New York: Double Day.
- Hall, Edward T. 1969. *The Hidden Dimension.* Garden City, NY: Anchor.
- Hall, Edward T. 1959. *The Silent Language.* New York: Doubleday.
- Harper, Robert G., Arthur N. Wiens & Joseph D. Matarazzo. 1978. *Non Verbal Communications: the State of the Art.* New York: Wiley & Sons, Pub.
- Henley, Nancy M. 1977. *Body Politics: Power, Sex, and Nonverbal Communication.* New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
- Hickson III, Mark L. and Don W. Stacks. 1993. *Nonverbal Communication: Studies and Application, 3rd ed.* Dubuque, Iowa: Wm. C. Brown Communications, Inc.
- Jackson, C and Lulow, K. 1984. *Colour for Men.* London: Piatkus.
- Karpinski, K. J. and Trupp, P. Z. 1987. *The Winner's Style.* Washington: Acropolis Books.
- Knapp, Mark L. and Judith A. Hall. 1992. *Nonverbal Communication in Human Interaction.* 3rd. Ed. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
- Lewis, David. 1989. *The Secret Language of Success: Using Body Language to Get What You Want.* New York: Galahad Books.
- Lieberman, David J. 1998. *Never Be Lied to Again.* New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Lloyd-elliott, Martin. 1994. *Secrets of Sexual Body Language.* London: Ulysses Press.
- Mehrabian, Albert. 1972. *Nonverbal Communication.* Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company.