



ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01-24-2012 BY 65179 DMH/STW



DISCOVERY REQUEST MATERIAL

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS & OPERATIONS (CIOPs) COURSE




****UNCLASSIFIED & CLASSIFIED CIOPs
COURSE PRESENTATIONS****





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

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

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
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b6
b7C



b6
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b7E



b7E

Welcome To

CIOPs
07/11/2005 - 08/05/2005

6/11/2003

Welcome to the

FBI Academy

Counterintelligence Training
Center

6/11/2003

Class Roster

- Print Clearly
- Name
- Office
- Phone Number

6/11/2003

b6
b7C
b7E

Course Critique Forms

- Please fill them out after each class (not at the end of the week)
- Purpose

6/11/2003

Academy Rules

- ⊙ • No Alcohol
- ⊙ • No Smoking Inside Buildings
- Display Quantico Badge
— Do NOT put badges on belt

6/11/2003

Dress Code

- Casual business attire
Collared shirts, blouses, & slacks,
skirts or dresses
- ⊙ No sandals, shorts, halter, tube or
tank tops or similar attire

6/11/2003

b7E

Dress Code

- Athletic attire - Gym area only
- ⊙ • No blue jeans during the business day
- Business day ends at 6:00 PM

6/11/2003

Linen Exchange

Monday - Friday
6:30 AM - 3:30 PM

6/11/2003

Telephones

- No direct dial long distance from
dorm rooms

6/11/2003

b7E

Telephones

- Local...Dial 9 + number
- Credit Card...9 + 0 + number
- Toll Free...9 + 1 + 800 + number

PHONE SYSTEM -

DO NOT CONNECT LAPTOPS

6/1/2003

Amenities

- Library - Open 24/7
- Internet Computers
- Dining Hall
- Board Room
- Mainside PX - Student ID

6/1/2003

Traffic Enforcement

- FBI / USMC Relationship
- MPs enforce speed, seatbelt, DUI/DWI & base regulations WHICH APPLY TO YOU
- FBI Police - Special Deputy U.S. Marshals

6/1/2003

Espionage

- Last 10 years -
Documented recruitment attempts of students
- Documented cases of an employee providing classified information to



6/1/2003

Clearance + Need To Know =
ACCESS

6/1/2003

b7E

Door Combinations

- Classroom
 - Beverages are okay
 - No food, newspapers & magazines
- Dorm Rooms
 - No "guests", even other FBI employees
- Red Trash Cans
- Regular Trash

6/1/2003

Protocols

- NO cellular phones in classroom
 - You CAN make cell calls from the balcony
- Smoking - 2nd floor Balcony (lock door when unoccupied)
- Books
- Restrooms
- Course materials
- Telephones
- E-mail computer

6/1/2003

b7E

Class Attendance

- You must attend all class sessions
- Absent from class - ASAC & CIRC UC
- Withdrawal - ASAC & CIRC UC
- AWOL - NA student -
Vehicle Accident / no insurance

At the end of the last block of instruction scheduled for the day, do NOT leave the [] until one of the Course Directors has advised that you are "Done for the day." One of the Course Directors will provide final instructions, comments and/or assignments at the end of each class day.

Class Administrative "Stuff"

- Bus list for departure Friday
- Class contact roster
- Departure after hours
-Leave note on desk in room

6/1/2003

Departure Friday

- Out of rooms by 7:45 AM
- PLEASE do NOT return to your room
- Prop open the door to your room
- Place sheets & towels in bins at elevators

6/1/2003

b7E

Friday Departure

- Stage luggage in break area or your vehicle
- Class begins at 8:00 AM
- Use public restrooms in Atrium
- Return student badges TO THE FRONT DESK

6/1/2003

Transportation for Departure Friday

Reagan National Airport:




Bus departs - 10:00 a.m.
12:00 noon

6/1/2003





6/1/2003


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

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


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

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b6
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


b4



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Trash Cover Exercise



Trash Covers

b6
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Trash Covers

b6
b7C
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**20 Years Combatting
Betrayals and Lies
1985-2005**

Larry Wu Tai Chin



20th Anniversary of the Year of the Spy 1985

Jonathan Jay Pollard



20th Anniversary of the Year of the Spy 1985

Walker Spy Ring



20th Anniversary of the Year of the Spy 1985

William Pelton



20th Anniversary of the Year of the Spy 1985

Edward Lee Howard



20th Anniversary of the Year of the Spy 1985

Randy Miles Jeffries



20th Anniversary of the Year of the Spy 1985

Clayton John Lonetree
















20th Anniversary of the Year of the Spy 1986




Stephen J. Ratkai





20th Anniversary of the Year of the Spy 1988










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


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


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
WHAT is the [redacted] (cont.)
Structured Data Fields



HOW does the [redacted] work? (cont.)
Select Accomplishment List




HOW does the [redacted] work? (cont.)
Main Dialog Box




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
HOW does the [redacted] work? (cont.)
Category, Type, Subtype, and Glossary



HOW does the [redacted] work? (cont.)
Glossary Changes for [redacted] Example




HOW does the [redacted] work? (last)
Lead Information




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
WHERE does the [redacted] data go?
Work Flow





WHERE does the [redacted] data go? (cont.)



CIOPS [redacted] **Stats & Best Practices**



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~~SECRET~~

DATE: 02-05-2012
CLASSIFIED BY 65179 DMH/STW
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 02-05-2037


ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE



CD's Program Coordination Section
"Knowing Your Domain"

Unit Chief 


Major Strategy Elements Supported



Changing the CI Paradigm



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
Defining the  Threat (S)



(S)








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 CI Strategic Partnership Unit



 Technology Protection & Partnerships





 A Community Coordination Issues





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
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




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




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


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Origins of the program

The 9/11 Commission (7/22/2004)

"Adding a new domestic intelligence agency will not solve America's problems in collecting and analyzing intelligence within the United States. We do not recommend creating one. We propose ...a **specialized and integrated national security workforce at the FBI**, consisting of agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance specialists who are recruited, trained, rewarded, and retained to ensure the development of an institutional culture imbued with a deep expertise in intelligence and national security."

Origins of the program

Presidential Memo to the A.G. (11/23/2004)

"...Create within the FBI a specialized, integrated intelligence cadre (including special agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance specialists), and implement a separate career track program permitting employees within the intelligence cadre to pursue their entire career... This effort shall include the establishment of specific requirements for training, career development, certification, recruiting, hiring and selection, and integration of the cadre into the FBI's field intelligence groups."

Origins of the program

Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (12/17/2004)

"The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall develop and maintain a **specialized and integrated national intelligence workforce** consisting of agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance specialists who are recruited, trained and rewarded in a manner which ensures the existence ... [of] an institutional culture with substantial expertise in, and commitment to, the intelligence mission of the Bureau."

Origins of the program


The WMD Commission (03/31/2005)

"The FBI's hybrid nature is one of its strengths. In today's world of transnational threats, the line between 'criminal activity' and 'national security information' is increasingly blurred... We believe it is **critical that the National Security Service remain within the FBI**. Personnel in the service would take advantage of its specialized career options, but agents in the service would go through law enforcement training along with their counterparts in the FBI's criminal divisions. Agents could laterally transfer between the service and the FBI's other divisions mid-career."


HOW EGs AVOID REMOVAL



Bars to Relief from Removal



There are no bars to



b7E

CREATIVE TOOLS



INS charged him under INA § 237(a)(1)(A) - "relating to" espionage

50 U.S.C. § 851: Every person who "has knowledge of, or has received instruction or assignment in, the espionage, counter espionage or sabotage service or tactics of a foreign country or of a foreign political party, shall register with the Attorney General."

□ found deportable for violating a law relating to espionage (He failed to register)

Low threshold of proof required.

§ 851 requires only "knowledge of" tactics, not actual espionage

no criminal conviction required under § 851 to establish deportability

no need that them be acting against US interests

Ordered deported under INA § 237(a)(1)(A) for violating a law of the United States related to espionage

State and INS initially concluded he could not be deported to □ and his prolonged detention led to a hunger strike

We offered him a demand letter for removal-related contacts (a new tool)

He received a court order to force-feed him (another tool)

He prevailed upon State to send the □ (another note)

Replacing it take the new show

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Mostly CounterIntelligence
and a little CounterTerrorism.

Mostly CounterTerrorism
and a little CounterIntelligence.

A little of one or the other or both.

Which squad gets it?
Who works it?

Is any one thinking about enforcement alternatives
and Bid Game? (Ask the question)

(CI, but also a bit CT - a hybrid >> BIA gives FBI presumptions)

worked for □ - never charged criminally.

Obtained engineering degrees in the U.S., employed as an associate professor at Duke, and worked on a DARPA-funded project. Project lost funding in August 1999

Ordered deported as overstayer, but applied to adjust status, and IJ gave him a green card □ rejected FBI evidence - "triple hearsay"

reversed the IJ, based on:

His testimony regarding his AI and his role,

Presumption that FBI performs in accordance with law

Credibility inherent in FBI's multiple sources, specificity of their observations

□ not the government

While on appeal, □ and his deportation, we filed gov't brief, and he got up and left the U.S.

dismissed case.

Extradition



Making deals

b6
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b7E

WHAT ABOUT . . . ?

[Redacted]

Home Shopping Network
"Anybody? Anybody?"

Custody to the end?
"I have fought the good fight."

Basic Immigration Course 101

[Redacted]

Basic Immigration Course 101

[Redacted]

b7E

Three Procedures

[Redacted]

DEPORTATION (throw them out)

[Redacted]

Espionage and Related National Security
Immigration Charges

INADMISSIBLE ALIENS

Any alien who a consular officer or the Attorney General (or DHS Secretary) knows, or has reasonable ground to believe

- seeks to enter the United States
- to engage, solely, principally, or incidentally in any activity
- to violate any law of the United States relating to espionage or sabotage, or
- to violate or evade any law prohibiting the export from the United States of goods, technology, or sensitive information or
- any activity a purpose of which is the opposition to, or the control or overthrow of, the Government of the United States by force, violence, or other unlawful means,

is inadmissible. INA § 212(a)(3)(A)

b7E

[Redacted] means:

PROBABLE CAUSE = same factual burden as that required for obtaining a search warrant or a [Redacted] approval

OR LESS? [Redacted]

Espionage and Related National Security
Immigration Charges, cont'd

DEPORTABLE ALIENS

- Any alien who has engaged in espionage or at any time after admission engaged
- in any activity
- to violate any law of the United States relating to espionage or sabotage, or
- to violate or evade any law prohibiting the export from the United States of goods, technology, or sensitive information or
- any other criminal activity which endangers public safety or national security,
- any activity a purpose of which is the opposition to or the control or overthrow of the U.S. by force, violence, or other unlawful means

is deportable. INA § 237(a)(3)(A)(i)

Espionage and Related National Security
Immigration Charges, cont'd

DEPORTABLE ALIENS, cont'd

- Any alien who at any time has been convicted of
- any violation of, or an attempt, or a conspiracy to violate, any provision of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 611, et seq.)

is deportable. INA § 237(a)(3)(B)

b7E

AT SQUARE ONE

- Know the facts
- Know the gravity
- Consider and preserve all options
- Do End Game analysis

(failure to plan is ...)

SQUARE ONE PRESSURES

We're driven by RUT FS & COMPLICATIONS that effect THE USE of NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

2. COMPLICATIONS THAT AFFECT USE

b7E

SQUARE ONE OPTIONS

AT THE SQUARE ONE TABLE




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Do you have ...

Best laid plans go awry 2.0

END GAME

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Post Script

- In immigration litigation, evidentiary record is frozen in immigration court
- Over (under) -selling >> avoid this problem through solid "End Game" analysis as early in the process as possible
- The Bigger the Headline, The Longer He Stays

Post Post Script

Was this useful?



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

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Experiment

Describe what you
have been given



INTRODUCTION






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Experiment


Define conflict and
your reaction to it.



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


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




Experiment


What elements of a party
do you most enjoy?



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


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


Experiment

How do you make
a trip happen?





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
Temperament Exercise

Using as much or as little of
your environment as you wish,
create or make something.

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
☐ Exercise

Presentation and
Discussion



☐ Descriptive Words

b7E



How ☐ Lead

How to Lead ☐

b7E

Teaching and Learning

Exercise

Presentation and
Discussion

b7E

Descriptive Words

How Lead

b7E


How to Lead

Teaching and Learning

Exercise


Presentation and
Discussion

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☐ Descriptive Words

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How ☐ Lead

☐

How to Lead ☐

☐

Teaching and Learning


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☐ Exercise

Presentation and Discussion




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


☐ Descriptive Words

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

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

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
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


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



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

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
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
	

Questions	Supervisory 

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








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QUESTIONS???

SIA [redacted]
FBIHQ [redacted]
Room [redacted]
[redacted]



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Interviewing



FBIHQ Counterintelligence Division
IA 

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

Goals & Objectives




> Questions

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
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

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
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CI DOMAIN PROGRAM CFIUS/FCC



Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)

- CFIUS is chaired by the Department of Treasury.
- Members include:
 - DOJ, DHS, DoD, Department of State, Commerce Department and Office of the U.S. Trade Representative

Federal Communications Commission

- Telecommunications Act of 1996
 - Requires entities seeking to make connections to the domestic infrastructure for the purpose of providing international telecommunications to submit an application for a license.



CI DOMAIN PROGRAM Academic Alliance Initiative



Academic Alliance

- Foster spirit of cooperation
- Establish a dialogue
- Share information
- Increase awareness



Academic Alliance

- National Security Higher Education Advisory Board (NSHEAB)
- College and University Security Effort (CAUSE)



National Security Higher Education Advisory Board (NSHEAB)

- Members include 16 university presidents and chancellors
- Chaired by Graham Spanier, President of The Pennsylvania State University
- Three meetings a year
- Other participants include:
 - National Science Foundation
 - Department of Commerce



Mission of the NSHEAB

- Promote understanding
- Create a forum for mutual issues
- Provide advice on the culture of higher education
- Build on traditions of openness, academic freedom and international collaboration
- Discuss matters pertaining to national security.

NSHEAB Members

- | | |
|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| • The Johns Hopkins University | • MIT |
| • UCLA | • Purdue |
| • Carnegie Mellon | • West Virginia University |
| • University of Washington | • University of Florida |
| • Texas A&M | • UNC - Chapel Hill |
| • Iowa State University | • University of Maryland |
| • University of Pennsylvania | • The Pennsylvania State University |
| | • University of Wisconsin |

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College and University Security Effort (CAUSE)

- Foster spirit of cooperation
- Establish a dialogue
- Share information
- Increase awareness
- Conduct outreach
 - at the local level.



CI DOMAIN PROGRAM Business Alliance Initiative



Objectives

- Business Alliance
 - What it is
 - Who it is
 - How it works



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FBI Priorities

- To protect the United States from:
 - Terrorist attack
 - Foreign intelligence operations/espionage
 - Cyber-based attacks and high tech crimes

Counterintelligence Focus



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Globalization: Why we need the Business Alliance

- Globalization
 - Version 1.0 1492 to 1799: size large to size medium *Countries* globalized
 - Version 2.0 1800 to 2000: size medium to size small *Companies* globalized
 - Version 3.0 2000: size small to size tiny *Individuals* globalized



» *The World Is Flat,*
Tom Friedman



Business Alliance—What is it?

- Working relationship between FBI and industry
- Focused on protecting intellectual property, prioritized on relevance to national security
- Bilateral Information Sharing
 - FBI provides specific threat information.
 - Company advises when indication of threat surfaces

Business Alliance: Anticipated Results

- Both the FBI & industry will have better understanding of the foreign intelligence threat
- Improved ability to identify intelligence activity
- Harden the target

Business Alliance

- National Steering Committee Members



National Business Alliance Mission

- Protect U.S. interests being targeted by Foreign Intelligence Services by developing partnerships



Business Alliance Core Components

- Focused threat briefs
- Information Sharing
- Counterintelligence Vulnerability Assessment (CIVA)
- FBI Response

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FBI Threat Information


- Company specific
- Classified or sanitized
- Who's targeting you?
- What are they after?
- Which employees may be at risk?
- How they could get it



CI Tool for Corporate America



Counterintelligence



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National Security Concerns

- Intellectual property
- Classified research & technology
- Unclassified but sensitive information
- Loss through cyber intrusions
- Weapons of Mass Destruction R&D
- Dual use technology
- Deemed exports

FIS Exploitation Techniques

- Email, fax, telephone
- Unsolicited requests and visits
- International conventions, symposiums, and meetings
- Information available on the internet
- Foreign visitors
- Family, friends & work relationships
- Personal ideology



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What is the RTP SIG?

- RTP = Research and Technology Protection
- SIG = Special Interest Group
- The RTP SIG is a tool for Domain Coordinators to use to provide information to their Domain representatives




What is the RTP SIG?



What is the RTP Special Interest Group?


- The RTP SIG is a tool the FBI utilizes to provide information to cleared Defense Contractors, private industry and academia. Domain Coordinators are your local FBI contacts.
- Mission: to provide actionable and relevant information to cleared defense contractors, private industry and academia to better enable them to protect their research and technology.



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Why we need the RTP SIG

- To provide information to the targets of foreign intelligence services and economic espionage that will help them become a tougher target.
- To increase reporting of Counterintelligence events.


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Membership: the application process for the RTP SIG

website

- Must be a current ☐ member
- Must have a need for information on how to protect research and technology
- Should have the capability to take action on the information provided to them




How do I access the RTP SIG?



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 Effective Writing Techniques

Make All your CI Writing
Complete, Clear, and Concise



Who Cares about Writing Anyway?

- What can *effective* writing do for you?
 - Save time!
 - Reduce paperwork
 - Get you what you want
 - Make an impression
- It's a critical part of your job...



What We'll Cover

- Reasons we write
- Perspectives in writing
- Techniques for active, clear, and concise writing
- Homework assignment

Reasons We Write in CI

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.




Reasons We Write in CI

1. Communicate
2. Request action
3. Document
4. Learn (see connections)



Essentials for Communicating



Who are Your Readers?

-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-



Who are Your Readers?

- Supervisor
- HQ Substantive Units
- Field and HQ Executives
- DOJ—OIPR
- Director, AG, President
- You or new Case Agent
- Indexing/unloading person



Meeting Your Readers' Needs

In a Memorandum for Heads of Department Components dated June 16, 1993, from AG Janet Reno:

"We should put ourselves in the place of those to whom we write and ask ourselves if we would find our responses complete, candid, and comprehensible."



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What do Your Readers Need?

-
-
-
-
-



What do Your Readers Need?
Enough and the right info to...

- Do what you ask
- Make resource allocation decisions
- Write policy and/or procedures
- Remember a case for testifying
- Learn a case to work
- Make connections



Looking at Writing from a
Business Perspective

Message

Writer Reader

Whose job is it to bridge the gap?

Put Your Bottom Line Up Front



- What's your most important point?
- Put it first (or close to it)
- Follow with the explanation/details

What's Your Bottom Line?

- NOT always the purpose
This EC documents the activities of known [redacted]
- IS always the most important point
[redacted]

Content

- Make sure it is complete—answers ALL possible questions from *the reader(s)*.
- Give context—all LHMs and ECs should be able to stand on their own
- Organize logically AFTER you start with your bottom line

Writing Style—Make it

- Active (direct)
- Clear and interesting
- Concise (uncluttered)

Make it Active and Direct

- Avoid forms of the verb "to be"
Be, being, bee n, am, are, is, was, were
- Put who does the action BEFORE the action.
SA [redacted] interviewed the subject.
NOT
The s ubject was interviewed by SA [redacted]

Make it Clear: KISS It!
Keep It Simple and Specific

In the same Memorandum for Head of Department Components from AG Janet Reno:

"Let's, where possible, eliminate confusing jargon and respond in a non-bureaucratic fashion with what Winston Churchill called 'small, old words' that everyone can understand."

KISS IT!

Keep It Simple (and Clear)

- Avoid professional jargon & legalese
- Avoid colloquialisms
- Use the correct terms
- Where possible, prefer simple words over more stilted ones

KISS IT!

Keep It Specific

- Avoid words that leave a lot of room for interpretation
- Avoid labels (i.e., dishonest; political)
- Paint a picture in the reader's mind
 - Describe actions
 - Describe characteristics



Keep It Specific: Instead of...

- "Contacted"
 - Phoned
 - Visited
- "Got angry"
 - Raged
 - Yelled
 - Slammed his fist on the table



Make it Concise

The most valuable of all talents is that of never using two words when one will do.

--Thomas Jefferson

Make it Concise

- Rethink BLIMP
- Eliminate clutter
 - Words that add no meaning
- Make every word count
- Think of your reader!



Strategies for Reducing Clutter

- Un-smother verbs
- Eliminate doublets
- Eliminate deadwood
- Reduce redundancies
- Reduce wordy phrases
- Eliminate unnecessary repetition



In Summary

- Put yourself in your reader's place
- Put your "bottom line" up front
- Organize logically
- Use active voice
- Keep It Simple and Specific
- Make every word count

Homework Assignment

- Due: Wednesday
- Please double-space what you turn in!
- Edit 2-3 paragraphs of the interview ECs you submitted before class started



Questions?



Orientation to the U.S. Business Environment

What you need to know to carry out the FBI's Counterintelligence Mission in the U.S. Business Community

FBI Training Center

Where we're going

- Why U.S. Business is important to the FBI's Counterintelligence Program
- What you need to understand about it to be effective as a CI Case Agent
- The three most relevant business sectors
- The one business person you need to know

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Why U.S. Business is important to the FBI's CI Strategy

- FBI CI Program Strategies

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Why U.S. Business is important to the FBI's CI Strategy

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Why U.S. Business is important to the FBI's CI Strategy

- Understand the threat

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Why U.S. Business is important to the FBI's CI Strategy

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Why U.S. Business is important to the FBI's CI Strategy

- Conduct sophisticated operations

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Why U.S. Business is important to the FBI's CI Strategy

- Inform & influence policymakers

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Why U.S. Business is important to the FBI's CI Strategy

- CI Strategy Program Objectives

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Why U.S. Business is important to the FBI's CI Strategy

- CI Strategic goals

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Monitoring the Business World

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Globalization

- Globalization is the central issue driving all business
- Globalization is the conduct of economic activity with little or no independent national restraints from which emerges new social, political, and business models
- Affects all aspects of business
- Increases vulnerability for business
- Increases responsibility and opportunity for the FBI CI Program

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Globalization

Best description of globalization today is Tom Friedman's The World is Flat

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Globalization

- Historical periods
 - Globalization 1.0
 - 1492 - 1800
 - Globalization 2.0
 - 1800 - 2000
 - Globalization 3.0
 - 2000 - ?

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Ten Forces that Flattened the World

- 11/09/89
- 08/09/95
- Work flow software
- Steroids

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Flattener #1 - 11/09/89

- The Walls came down and Windows went up
 - Fall of the Berlin Wall & the end of the Cold War
 - Democratic, consensual, free-market govts began replacing those govts with authoritarian rule and central planning
 - Bill Gates, Windows & the PC
 - Horizontal connectivity

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Flattener #2 - 08/09/95

- Netscape goes public
- Commercially available browser
- Windows 95
- Internet becomes interoperable
- World wide standards & protocols not created by the government
- Dot-com bubble & fiber-optic cables

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Flattener #3 - Work-Flow Software

- Web-enabled work-flow
- XML & SOAP

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Flattener #4 - [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Flattener #5 - [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Flattener #6 - [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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UNCLASSIFIED

Flattener #7 - [Redacted]

[Redacted]

FBI Q Training Center UNCLASSIFIED 23

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Flattener #8 - [Redacted]

[Redacted]

FBI Q Training Center UNCLASSIFIED 24

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Flattener #9 - [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Flattener #10 - The Steroids

[Redacted]

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Will Globalization Last?

- You can't stop it but you can slow it down
- Anti-globalization forces
- "Sinking globalization" – Niall Ferguson
 - Imperial overstretch
 - Great-power rivalry
 - Unstable alliance system
 - Rogue regime sponsoring terror
 - Rise of revolutionary terrorist organization hostile to capitalism

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U.S. Business Sectors

- Defense Contractors
- Non-Defense Technology
- Wal-Mart and the rest

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The World of Corporate Security

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The World of Corporate Security

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Relating to Corporate Security

- Be patient – most don't understand CI (yet)
- Bring in high level liaison when appropriate
- Be knowledgeable, available, responsive, and respectful of the Security Officer's position

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Summary

- U.S. Business is key to the CI Strategy
- Globalization is central to business
- All business sectors are important
 - Defense contractors
 - Technology
 - Wal-Mart and the rest
- The Corporate Security Director is your primary point-of-contact

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Why U.S. Business is important

FBI CI Strategy

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Globalization

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- Effects all aspects of business
- Increases vulnerability for business
- Increases responsibility and opportunity for the FBI CI Program

Globalization

- Definition: The conduct of economic activity with little or no national restraints from which emerges new social, political, and business models
- Best description of globalization today is Tom Friedman's The World is Flat

Globalization

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11/09/89

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08/09/95

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The Steroids

FBI Q Training Center

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
The World of Corporate Security



FBI Training Center

Relating to Corporate Security

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- Bring in high level liaison when appropriate
- Be responsive




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


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


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Scientific Community

- Key issues



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Scientific Community

- Culture and mindset



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Scientific Community



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The Academic Community

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Academic Community

- Targets



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Academic Community

- Key issues



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Academic Community



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Summary –
Scientific & Academic Communities



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Statement Analysis Practical Problem



William Kampiles

Objective

To demonstrate the value
of Statement Analysis
when preparing for an interview

Origin of the Matter

A young female CIA employee
contacted [redacted]
She explained that Kampiles bragged
that he had traveled to Greece,
met some Russians assigned
to the Embassy in Athens,
and conned them out of \$3,000.

Origin of the Matter

[redacted] met with Kampiles and
suggested that Kampiles write a letter
about his contacts
that could be of interest to the CIA.



August 11, 1978

Letter from William Kampiles to [redacted]
Dated May 23, 1978

WILLIAM P. KAMPILES



DOB: [redacted]
- MARITAL: Single
- EDUCATION: Indiana University, BS
- FORWARDING ADDRESS: Chicago, IL

WILLIAM P. KAMPILES



- POS: GS-7:
Watch Officer/Night Duty Clerk
- CLEARANCE:
"Every clearance government gives."
- Not recommended for Case Officer status
- TERMINATION:
"Failed to perform duties,
follow orders and correct deficiencies"



Analysis of Letter

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Analysis

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Analysis

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UNCLASSIFIED

Suggestions for Assessing Statements

ASK YOURSELF

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Suggestions for Assessing Statements

ASK YOURSELF

UNCLASSIFIED

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Suggestions for Assessing Statements

Quiz

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Planning the Interview

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Conducting the Interview

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Unknown Subject
(UNSUB)
Case Investigation



ESPIONAGE

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April 1978
FBI Receives Sensitive Information

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Overriding Case Issues/Factors

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Initial Investigative Steps

Action to be taken:

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Initial Investigative Results

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Investigation – Next Step

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Investigation – Next Step Results

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William P. Kampiles Espionage Case Chronology




August 11, 1978 – CIA provides Kampiles letter to FBI
August 14, 1978 – Interviews of Kampiles by FBI/CIA
August 15, 1978 – Interview/polygraph of Kampiles by FBI
August 17, 1978 – Arrest of Kampiles
November 17, 1978 – Kampiles convicted of ESP-TGP
December 22, 1978 – Kampiles sentenced 40 years

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Statement Analysis Practical Problem


Take - aways:

The Kampiles espionage case set precedent


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Analysis of Letter Written by William Kample



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The Recruitment of SGT. Clayton J. Lonetree

Marine Security Guard Clayton Lonetree first saw Violetta in August 1985. He was immediately attracted to her and went out of his way to stop her for badge checks in order to have an opportunity to talk with her. He felt that she noticed him and was somewhat attracted to him.

In late August, Lonetree followed Violetta to the metro station, followed her into the car she had entered and initiated conversation that continued until she reached her destination. The conversation mostly involved her job responsibilities at the Embassy. The following month, Lonetree again followed Violetta to a metro station. Although Violetta said she was going home, she continued to ride the metro beyond her stop, talking with Lonetree the entire time. Numerous short contacts at the Embassy followed.

During early October, Lonetree saw Violetta at the metro station and she invited Lonetree to get off at her stop. After leaving the metro station, they went for a two-hour walk, talking mostly about Lonetree and his background. Ultimately arriving at Violetta's apartment building, Violetta invited Lonetree inside. Violetta briefly spoke with a woman she claimed to be [REDACTED]

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Upon leaving the apartment, Violetta and Lonetree discussed the difficulties of his childhood, his parent's separation and crime in the United States. They found they had strikingly similar tastes in movies and music. The following day at the Embassy, Violetta initiated contact with Lonetree. They planned to meet again, but agreed to use caution and to "keep it low key". Short contacts and conversations continued.

In November, Lonetree and Violetta met at the metro station at a pre-arranged time. Lonetree rode the train with Violetta for several stops, then told her he had received a transfer order to Vienna. Violetta became visibly irritated.

During the November 10th Marine Corps Ball, Lonetree and Violetta danced once and spent a brief time together. A week later, Violetta attended a Marine Guard farewell party at the invitation of another marine. She and Lonetree talked, danced together, caressed and held hands in a covert manner. Lonetree suggested they meet again and she agreed. Lonetree was due to be transferred but requested an extension because of his feelings toward Violetta.

Later in November, on his first solo trip to Violetta's apartment, Lonetree was introduced to [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] and joined Violetta in her bedroom for conversation. They exchanged photographs of each other. Violetta walked Lonetree to the metro station and kissed him publicly for the first time. Frequent public and private conversations followed at the Embassy, along with telephone contacts.

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In December, Violetta again invited Lonetree to her apartment. She told him that due to some type of conflict, she was quitting her job. Immediately upon leaving the American Embassy, she began working at the Irish Embassy. After she left, Lonetree would call her at her new job using a telephone located away from the Embassy.

Lonetree continued to meet Violetta at the metro station, logging out of the Embassy by indicating he was going for a walk. He instead traveled by metro, changing trains and hats and outer-garments to avoid being observed by KGB surveillance or other Americans.

Lonetree became depressed, as the Marine Guards who were friendly to him were nearing transfer out of Moscow. Lonetree and Violetta spent more time in her apartment, talking in her bedroom. She discussed her feelings for him and her desire to either marry him or move to the United States to be with him. Lonetree agreed to find out what information he could about the prospect of acquiring a visa for Violetta, so she could leave the Soviet Union.

Violetta instructed Lonetree to always telephone her before arriving at her apartment. On one occasion, Lonetree tried to telephone, but the connection was poor and Violetta didn't recognize him as the caller. Lonetree traveled to her apartment anyway but she refused to let him in, saying that she had a cold and was not presentable.

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On the following visit, Lonetree met a man Violetta introduced as [redacted] and she invited Lonetree for dinner. They continued to discuss their personal relationship and Lonetree's impending transfer to Vienna, as well as her desire to live in the United States. Lonetree told her he had made inquiries at the Embassy regarding U.S./Soviet marriages. Violetta warned him to be cautious.

Several days later, Violetta told Lonetree she had a [redacted] to whom she had confided their relationship. Violetta said this [redacted] was not a government employee, but was nevertheless influential and had powerful friends. [redacted] wanted to meet with them and might be able to help them acquire a visa for her. Lonetree, having met [redacted] without incident, felt that a meeting with [redacted] would be acceptable.

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In late December 1985, Violetta directed Lonetree to meet her at a specific metro stop and instructed him to ride in the first metro car. He arrived as directed and they boarded a bus that took a long circuitous route to an apartment building. They entered the building through a hidden front door. Violetta warned Lonetree not to speak until they entered the apartment, allegedly inhabited by [redacted] later identified as [redacted].

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Lonetree was impressed with the immaculate condition of [redacted] apartment but felt that it had "not been lived in." [redacted] spoke Russian when talking with Violetta. With Lonetree, he spoke in English but appeared to speak it poorly, asking Violetta to translate. Refreshments were served. [redacted] told Lonetree that Violetta had discussed him a great deal, and he had looked forward to meeting him. He added that he admired the manner in which Lonetree could visit Violetta without being detected. [redacted]

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b7C

indicated that upon hearing of their relationship he protested, but Violetta had won him over. Lonetree discussed his family background including his Native American heritage, deprived childhood in an orphanage and strained family relationships, including physical abuse. Lonetree expressed somewhat negative personal feelings about the United States and told [] he followed the politics of the "Kremlin". [] asked if he felt discriminated against because of his race.

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Additional conversation included their plans for marriage and Violetta's desire to obtain a visa and travel to the United States. [] agreed to assist the couple, if Lonetree would continue to treat his relationship with Violetta seriously. [] told him not to date anyone else. [] explained that he had influential friends in the Central Committee and assured Lonetree the KGB was unaware of their relationship. [] cautioned him not to discuss it with anyone.

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b7C

[] asked Lonetree if he was affiliated with the CIA, which Lonetree denied. At the end of the meeting, [] invited Lonetree to visit him again but no specific plans were made. After leaving [] Violetta told Lonetree that [] was "wonderful", and that he could be trusted and would do what he could to help them.

The second meeting with [] was held in early January, 1986. To travel to [] Violetta again directed Lonetree to ride in the first metro car and meet her at a specific spot. When Lonetree arrived late and in the third car, Violetta was infuriated. She refused to speak with him for the remainder of the trip.

b6
b7C

[] served cold cuts, juice and wine to Lonetree. He questioned Lonetree on his Native American heritage and his feelings about the Marine Security Guard program. Lonetree explained that he did not get along with his Detachment Commander and indicated he felt harassed. [] was aggressively critical of President Reagan and the CIA Director and cited numerous examples to prove his point that the U.S./CIA were destructive forces opposed to world peace.

Lonetree continued to provide extensive personal background information. [] discussed a newspaper article Lonetree had previously discussed with Violetta. The article focused on Lonetree's assignment as a MSG to the USEMB, Moscow and additional personal achievements. Lonetree advised [] that most of the article, for which [] was the source of information, was false or exaggerated.

b6
b7C

During the meeting [] spoke better English than before. He told Lonetree he considered Lonetree to be his friend and also a friend of the Soviet Union. He added that the discussions [] and Lonetree would have, would also help Violetta. He told Lonetree to be honest with him and that he would be honest in return. [] discussed the feasibility of obtaining a visa for Violetta and mentioned he expected to have some word on the visa issue at their next meeting, which was then scheduled for two weeks later.

After the second meeting Lonetree asked Violetta if [] was really [] since [] was questioning him too pointedly. When Violetta did not respond, Lonetree thought "so this is how they work". During this month, Lonetree and Violetta's relationship became sexual in nature.

b6
b7C

In late January 1986, at the third meeting, [] told Lonetree that he was in trouble because of his relationship with Violetta. Lonetree took this to mean the KGB had somehow discovered their relationship and that it would be difficult to get a visa for Violetta. He then stated that the CIA was only in Moscow to cause trouble and made reference to CIA recruitment attempts and the discovery of CIA listening devices. He questioned Lonetree regarding which Marine Guards worked for the CIA and which would be vulnerable. Lonetree told him the Marines did not work for the CIA, but did identify a Marine he felt was exploitable.

b6
b7C

[] used a prepared, written list to ask Lonetree questions about CIA personnel, descriptions of the secure floors of the Embassy, [] and the presence of any other intelligence personnel in the Embassy. Unexpectedly, [] produced a photograph album of Embassy personnel and began reviewing it with Lonetree page by page. Some of the photographs were family photographs. [] asked him to select those photographs of individuals that he suspected may have a CIA affiliation. As Lonetree identified possible personnel he also corrected erroneous information presented by [] concerning the professional and personal lives of Americans at the Embassy. Lonetree identified the individuals working on each floor but was unable to answer questions [] asked about activities in [].

b6
b7C

[] began discussing the layout of the Embassy, floor by floor and asked specifically the locations of the Political and Economic Sections and the Defense Attaché's Office. Lonetree answered [] questions concerning the Ambassador's office, what the desk and furniture were made of, whether the windows could be opened and means of access to that office. [] also asked if Lonetree would be willing to "leave something" in the Ambassador's office, though he did not identify what it would be. [] asked if Lonetree could extend his tour in Moscow or if he could transfer to Leningrad or Hungary. He asked Lonetree if he wanted to work for the KGB. When told "no", he told Lonetree to think about it. He also hinted that Lonetree should try to obtain a position involved with Intelligence.

b6
b7C

When asked by Lonetree if he was in the KGB, [] advised that he had a friend who was a General in the KGB and who was a member of the Central Committee, but denied that he himself was KGB. Although [] said he was asking these questions on behalf of his friend, the context of the questions confirmed Lonetree's suspicions that [] himself was KGB. They agreed to meet again in two weeks.

b6
b7C

During the third meeting, Violetta remained in the room but sat in the corner, doing her nails and saying little. She no longer translated, a [] English was very much improved. Following each meeting with [] Lonetree and Violetta returned to her apartment to continue their sexual liaison.

b6
b7C

At the fourth meeting held in early February 1986, [] read from a prepared list of several codenames, which he indicated were intelligence operations being run by the CIA against the Soviet Union. He requested information regarding Lonetree's knowledge of them or any other operations or operatives.

b6
b7C

Both [] and Violetta aggressively tried to convince Lonetree that he should remain in the Soviet Union permanently. [] cited the opportunity of being with Violetta, and that he would be provided with a good standard of living which would include a car, a flat and maybe a dacha. [] informed Lonetree that he could leave the American Embassy immediately if he desired and that his problems would be over. He then advised Lonetree that he should consider working for the CIA, in order to help the Soviet people. [] directed him to bring out something from the Embassy for their next meeting. Although [] didn't have a preference as to what Lonetree should bring, he made reference to the secure floor of the Embassy. He continually pressed Lonetree for any information about CIA personnel and operations against the Soviet Union. Although Lonetree's feelings for Violetta were in conflict, he returned to her apartment after this meeting and continued their sexual relationship.








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






In late February, at the fifth meeting, Lonetree brought classified floor plans for the secure floor of the Embassy. Lonetree had also discovered [] and identified it to [] told Lonetree he had done the right thing in providing the floor plans and advised him not to worry about anything. He told Lonetree that the KGB knew of his relationship with [] and Violetta and that he was safe. He added that his friend, the KGB General, was aware of Lonetree's assistance to the Soviet people and sent his personal regards. Lonetree asked if he could meet the General. [] assured Lonetree that the KGB would protect him. The secure space floor plan, office spaces and personnel assigned therein, were discussed in detail.




b6
b7C
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At this time, Lonetree felt that [] was the only person who cared about his feelings and welfare, and maintained that [] was "a comfort" to him. [] had told him that the KGB had someone in the Embassy who would know if he was in trouble and would warn him and get him out. While his feelings for Violetta were at times conflicting, [] made Lonetree feel good. Lonetree didn't feel he could deny any request that [] would make, as he now felt he had no will. He believed that as a member of the Marine Corps, he had "been on the wrong side" and viewed the United States and CIA in a negative light.




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








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


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


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








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



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b7E





UNCLASSIFIED



List of Lonetree's Meet Sites - Vienna
Initial Contact Points
June - December, 1986

Meeting	Location
#1	State Opera House
#2	Park
#3	Restaurant
#4	Saloon
#5	Church
#6	Church
#7	Church
#8	Church
#9	**Church (missed)
#10	**Park (missed)

**Lonetree had turned himself in.
Corroboration of each site location is essential.

UNCLASSIFIED

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b7C
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b6
b7C
b7D

Schmoozing



SSA [REDACTED]

Program Manager
Behavioral Analysis Program - CIRG


Schmoozing

- Yiddish
- To chat or converse idly
- A friendly, gossipy, prolonged, heart-to-heart talk, or friendly persuasive conversation
- They had a little schmooz and settled everything

b6
b7C



Theatre




Nine Principles

1. Law of Association
2. Repeat exposure



Nine Principles

3. Reciprocal affection
 - We don't like people who don't like us
4. Similarities - Common Ground



b6
b7C





Nine Principles

5. How you make the source feel
6. Mirror
7. Helping others
 - Favors
 - Gifts
8. Feet of clay
9. Upbeat

b6
b7C

Gifts



"Bob's brilliant, but he's also very persuasive, very arrogant, something of a bull."



© American Society for Adult Forensic Interviewing and Training

Big Three Mistakes

- Voice
- Smile
- Active Listening



b6
b7C



Active Listening

- Eye contact
- Nods
- Verbal affirmation
- Head tilt
- Lean in
- Eyebrow flash
- Posture

Building Blocks of Relationships

- Proximity
- Duration
- Intensity
- Frequency

Questions?



b6
b7C

BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS PROGRAM



COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
DIVISION

Why am I here?

- Define Behavioral Analysis
- Discuss uses in FCI cases
- Explain BAP assessments and how to initiate one

Analysis of Behavior

ANALYSIS

BEHAVIOR



What is BAP?

- History
 - BSU
 - BAU
 - BAP
- Focus

b7E

**"Are you the guys from
Quantico?"**



BAP and NCAVC

- Mission
- Personnel
- Procedure
- Location



BAP Team



b7E

How do we operate?




Common Uses Of BAP:




b7E

Producing The Theater



Tools of the Trade



b7E

BAP Guides/ Questionnaires



OBSERVE

"But what do I know about
analyzing behavior?"

b7E

What YOU bring to the Team

Unique Perspective

- Behavior within Context
- Cultural standards
- Subjects' norms
- Situational factors

Emotions, Inflections, Variations, etc.

"Over Time."

Requesting An Assessment


- Contact BAP – phone or e-mail, EC
- Meeting – local or at HQ
- Individual or Team Consultation
- Verbal Presentation
- Written Report
- Survey

What the BAP is NOT

- ✓ Not interested in investigative oversight
- ✓ Not a strain on your case/division's budget
- ✓ Not reserved for specific cases
- ✓ Not providing directives, just suggestions.
- ✓ Not a box to check in your investigation.

Analogy

Cooking



Questions?




Behavioral Analysis Program



Federal Bureau of Investigation


SSA



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Mandatory Disclaimer

BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS PROGRAM



COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
DIVISION

"Welcome to Brooklyn."


Why am I here?

- Define Behavioral Analysis
- Discuss uses in FCI cases
- Explain BAP assessments and how to initiate one
- Tell bad jokes


Analysis of Behavior

ANALYSIS

BEHAVIOR



Analyze, then think outside the box



b7E

What is BAP?

History

Focus

"Are you the guys from
Quântico?"



BAP and NCAVC



Mission

Personnel

Procedure


Location



BAP Team



How do we operate?




b7E

Common Uses Of BAP:




Producing The Theater



b7E

Tools of the Trade




BAP Guides/ Questionnaires



"If I knew all that stuff, I wouldn't need you guys!"

b7E



A little knowledge can be dangerous.

OBSERVE

"But what do I know about analyzing behavior?"

(pens on the table)

What YOU bring to the Team

Unique Perspective

Behavior within Context

- Cultural standards
- Subjects' norms
- Situational factors

Emotions, Inflections, Variations, etc.

"Nice Voice."

But don't try this at home: Requesting An Assessment

- Contact BAP – phone or e-mail, EC
- Meeting – local or at HQ
- Individual or Team Consultation
- Verbal Presentation
- Written Report
- Survey

What the BAP is NOT


- ✓ Not interested in investigative oversight
- ✓ Not a strain on your case/division's budget
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- ✓ Not providing directives, just suggestions.
- ✓ Not a box to check in your investigation.

Cheesy Analogies

Gambling



Cooking



Questions?



Behavioral Analysis Program




Federal Bureau of Investigation

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When years of work and protected secrets are obtained by a foreign country, the results can be devastating.



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**COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
PROGRAM
2008-2009**

Counterintelligence Division
FBIHQ

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**Counterintelligence Program
Mission**

• Protect the US against foreign intelligence operations
and espionage:

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**Counterintelligence Program
Goals/Impact**

• Goals/Impact

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**Counterintelligence Program
Defining the Threat**

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ON 01-25-2012

CI Program Strategic Plan
FBI Strategic Focus: Protect the United States against foreign intelligence operations and espionage

CI Program Logic Model
FBI Strategic Focus: Protect the United States against foreign intelligence operations and espionage

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CI Program Logic Model
FBI Strategic Focus: Protect the United States from foreign intelligence activities.

CI Program Logic Model
FBI Strategic Focus: Protect the United States from foreign intelligence activities.



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CI Program Logic Model
FBI Strategic Focus: Protect the United States from foreign intelligence activities.

CI Program Logic Model
FBI Strategic Focus: Protect the United States from foreign intelligence activities.

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Intelligence Oversight Board

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Office of the General Counsel
National Security Law Branch

Today's Presentation

1. Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB)
2. Responsibilities Regarding IOB Matters
3. Examples of Common Reportable Matters

The Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB)

- History
- Authorities
- Composition
- Responsibilities

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Brief History

- "Executive discretion" really meant little or no oversight
- Sweeping interpretations of "national security"
- Real potential for abuse
- Church and Pike Commissions
- Congressional Oversight & FISA

Authorities

- Executive Order 12334 (December 4, 1981)
- Executive Order 12863 (Sept. 13, 1993)
- Agency-Specific Guidelines

Executive Order 12863

- Superseded EO 12334 (December 4, 1981)
- Name changed from PIOB to IOB
- Established IOB as a standing committee of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB)
- Responsibilities remain largely unchanged

Composition of the IOB

- Composed of not more than four members of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB)
- Appointed by the Chairman of the PFIAB

IOB Responsibilities: Report

- Prepare reports for the President concerning intelligence activities that the IOB believes "may be unlawful or contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive"
- Forward to the Attorney General reports received about intelligence activities that the IOB believes "may be unlawful or contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive"

IOB Responsibilities: Review

- Review the internal guidelines of each agency within the Intelligence Community that concern lawfulness of intelligence activities.
- Review the practices and procedures of each agency within the Intelligence Community for discovering and reporting intelligence activities that may be IOB matters

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IOB Responsibilities: Investigate

- Conduct investigations as the IOB deems necessary to carry out its functions.

Agency Responsibilities

- Obligations Under EO 12863
- Reporting Requirements

Obligations Under EO 12863

- "Inspectors General and General Counsel of the Intelligence Community, to the extent permitted by law, shall report to the IOB, at least on a quarterly basis and from time to time as necessary or appropriate, concerning intelligence activities that they have reason to believe may be *unlawful or contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive.*" (Section 2.4)

"to the extent permitted by law"

"unlawful or contrary to Executive Order or Presidential Directive"

- Sets the standard for reporting IOB matters

Reporting Requirement One

- A provision AG approved guidelines or regulations *designed in full or in part to ensure the protection of individual rights* must be regarded as incorporated by reference within the Executive Order.
- Therefore, a violation of such provision would constitute a breach of the Executive Order and would be reportable to the IOB.

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Reporting Requirement Two

- Provisions which are essentially *administrative in nature* and are not covered by the description in Item 1 above need not be reported to the IOB.
- Uncertainty as to the reportability of an incident shall be resolved by reporting it.

Reporting Requirement Three

- Professional judgment should be exercised by the General Counsel in deciding whether a particular incident is reportable to the IOB.

Reporting Requirement Four

- A record of decisions not to report incidents according to this understanding shall be maintained by the FBI and the record shall be subject to review by the Counsel to the IOB on request

Don't Forget...

- "The words 'may be unlawful' in the EO should be interpreted to include violations of agency procedures issued under the EO"
- Counsel for Intelligence Policy, OIPR (1983)

Examples of IOB Violations



Summary

- EO 12863 is the controlling authority regarding IOB violations.
- The IOB is responsible for reviewing the practices and procedures for discovering and reporting on IOB matters.
- Each agency in the Intelligence Community must report on at least a quarterly basis concerning intelligence activities that may be contrary to law, Executive Orders, or Presidential Directives.

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


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





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What led to FISA in 1978?

- 1967: *Katz vs. United States* US Supreme Court concludes that the Fourth Amendment does apply to (domestic) electronic surveillance. (exception for national security cases?)
- 1968: Omnibus Crime Control & Safe Streets Act Title- III establishes procedure for court-ordered electronic surveillance except for national security cases.

What led to FISA in 1978?

- 1972: *United States v. United States District Court (Keith Case)* US Supreme Court concludes that the Fourth Amendment does apply to national security cases that are purely domestic in nature (no foreign power or agent).

What led to FISA in 1978?

- Keith* case recognized the potential for abuse in domestic security surveillance but also recognized that there are policy and practical considerations in effectively gathering intelligence that differ from the surveillance of "ordinary crime".

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What led to FISA in 1978?

- Competing Demands:
 - Presidential power and duty to "preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the U.S." (Article II, Sec. 10). Exercise of executive power to gather intelligence deemed necessary to the security of the nation.
 - Requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
 - First Amendment implications of excessive surveillance.

What led to FISA in 1978?

- 1975: The Senate, the House of Representatives and the President all convened investigatory bodies to review perceived abuses of Executive authority in the name of national security.
 - The Church Committee
 - The Pike Committee
 - The Rockefeller Commission

Church Committee

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Congress Enacts FISA in 1978

- Codified at 50 U.S.C. Section 1801 et seq
- Unique mechanism for covert intelligence collection
- Intended to preserve essential intelligence collection requirements while simultaneously protecting Constitutional rights
- Crafted specifically to require multiple, exacting checks on surveillance authority
- Warrants issued only by a single Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC)
- Ex Parte* Orders based solely on government pleadings

FISA Authorities

FISA Authorities (cont.)

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FISA Basics

- Start with the definitions:



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What is sufficient PC?



FBI investigative activities



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"A significant purpose . . .




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


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
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



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


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




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
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
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


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


National Security Powers or Criminal Law?	
Criminal Law	National Security Law
Constitution	Constitution
Congress	Presidential Authority
Statutes	National Security Decision Directives
U.S. Criminal Code	Presidential DDs
"Administrative Violations"	Executive Orders
Atty Gen Guidelines	Atty General Guidelines
	Statutes



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Evolution of Legal Controls

- What's the fun of having power unless you abuse it?
- 1975 Congress convenes the Church Committee to investigate perceived abuses of Presidential "intelligence powers"

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Result: Congress Enacts FISA

How can you legally obtain a FISA?

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Getting started

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


*A significant purpose . . .

- What is the purpose of your FISA?




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


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


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


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

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The Attorney General's Guidelines for
FBI National Security Investigations and
Foreign Intelligence Collection (NSIGs)

Legal Instruction Unit
2007
This presentation contains ~~SECRET~~ material

Hey, what's in this for me?
(aka Learning Objectives)

- Basic guidance for all intelligence operations.
- Will enable you to use the techniques described in the AG Guidelines to conduct analytical operations and to initiate intelligence and criminal investigations.
- Analytical/Investigative Activities include:
 - Three at Assessments
 - Preliminary & Full Investigations
 - Strategic Analysis & Information Sharing

Why Should We, Gifted Analysts, Trust
You, Non-Agent (ack)?

- Old Guy: Done Stuff - often incorrectly
- Navy:
 - Various Criminal Law Assignments - 10
 - Operational Commands - 8
 - Schools - both sides of podium - 5
- FBI:
 - National Security Law - 8 years
 - Legal Instruction

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What "National Security Law"
is and what it ain't...

- | | |
|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none">The "Dark Side"Intelligence LawPresident's Art. II powerImplemented via PDDs, EOs, the AGGs/NSIGsECs and NFIPM | <ul style="list-style-type: none">Not Criminal LawNot Criminal LawNot Criminal LawNot Criminal LawNot Criminal LawBut hold that thought . . . |
|--|--|

The Guidelines Are How We Relate
to the Intelligence Community

- NSIGs Provide Insight Into the FBI's Authorities (and limitations) re the Collection, Analysis, Retention and Dissemination of Foreign Intelligence, Counterintelligence, Terrorism Information
- Together w/ EO 12333, the Principal FBI Legal Authority for Information Sharing Among the Components of the Intelligence Community

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

AG Guidelines Revised in 2003

- Eliminated the prior separation between "Criminal" and "Intelligence" cases
- Provide clear authority for Early Intervention and Disruption of National Security threats
- Lowered Approval Levels wherever possible
- Adopted much more aggressive Analysis and Investigation Techniques

Provide Specific Legal Authority

- Implement Presidential authorities in the Constitution, PDDs & EOs:
- Authorize the FBI to conduct analyses, intelligence operations & criminal investigations to protect against Threats to the National Security:
 - International Terrorism
 - Espionage and other Intelligence Activities
 - Other matters as authorized by the Attorney General consistent with E.O. 12333

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Legal Authorities (cont.)

- The FBI is authorized to collect foreign intelligence information and assist other components of the Intelligence Community
- Authorized to conduct strategic analysis
- Authorized to collect, retain and disseminate intelligence & criminal information collected pursuant to these Guidelines
- Authorized to assist State, local, and Foreign Governments

Respect for Constitutional Rights

- But, the FBI cannot investigate or maintain information on U.S. persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment or the lawful exercise of other rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States

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"Least Intrusive Means"

- As provided in E.O. 12333, the FBI shall conduct its investigations and other activities under the NSIGs using "the least intrusive collection techniques feasible."

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


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


Further Examples

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


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

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Predicates for Initiating National Security Investigations

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
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
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
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



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
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Investigative Assistance to State and Local Governments



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- FBI may collect foreign intelligence, consistent with EO 12333 or a successor Order, as directed by the AG or his designee.

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Strategic Analysis

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Strategic Analysis

- National Security Guidelines give the FBI specific authority to determine potential National Security threats
- Collection requirements can be established based on potential National Security threats

[Redacted]

Strategic Analysis

[Redacted]

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Information Systems & Databases

- FBI shall establish/maintain a records retention plan approved by NARA, to include:
- Total number of PIs; PIs involving US persons, extensions, PIs to full investigations
- Total number of full investigations, number involving US persons, extensions
- Identity of full investigations of a group in the U.S. composed substantially of [Redacted]

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

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QUESTIONS?

- NSLB [Redacted]
- OGC NSLB [Redacted] website contains [Redacted] Downloadable.

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
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DATE: 02-04-2012
CLASSIFIED BY 65179 DMH/STW
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 02-04-2037

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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(U) Countries, Issues, and
CI Investigative Priorities

Derived from: FI Threat in the US,
12/30/05
Declassify on: 25 YR//NF,INT

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Definition of Threat

Threat = the harm to U.S. national security
a country *can* (capability) and *will*
(intent) cause, if given the
opportunity (*presence and targets*)

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Capability - Can they hurt us?



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
Intent - Do they *want* to hurt us?




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
Do they have the Opportunity to hurt us?

Opportunity = 



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(S) **(U) Focus of CI Program Objectives**



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(U) AG's Country Threats - The Broad View



• (U) 3 levels of *threat* to
U.S. national security

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High Threat Countries



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Medium Threat Countries

[Redacted]

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Low Threat Countries (S)

[Redacted]

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(U) Threats These Countries Pose to U.S. National Security

[Redacted]

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(U) Overall Country Threats vs. CI Investigative Priorities

[Redacted]

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(S) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Summary

- Threat = Capability, Intent, and Opportunity [Redacted]
- 3 Levels - High, Medium, Low [Redacted]
- High Threat countries [Redacted]

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DECLASSIFIED BY 65179 DMH/STW
ON 02-05-2012

Overview of Certain Laws

By: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

This document contains ~~SECRET~~ material.

OUTLINE

- Who/what is NSLB?
- FARA
- Export Control Laws (ECLs)
- Theft of Trade Secrets (TTS) and Economic Espionage Act (EEA)

NSLB's role

[REDACTED]

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NSLB's role

[REDACTED]

U//FOUO

FARA

- 3 statutes

EEA & TTS v. ECLs

- EEA & TTS: they protect the items the company has identified as needing protection
- ECLs: they protect the items the USG has identified as needing protection

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EEA & TTS

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EEA & TTS Elements

- EEA: theft by a foreign power
- TTS: theft by anyone
- Elements:
 1. The info was a trade secret (easy to show)
 2. Misappropriation (easy to show)
 3. Misappropriation for the benefit of
 - EEA: a foreign government (hard to show)
 - TTS: economic benefit of someone other than the owner
 4. Knowledge that it was a trade secret (hard to show)

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EEA & TTS Elements

- Exclusions:
 - employee's general knowledge, skill or abilities
 - anything that negates secrecy of the secret
 - patent
 - copyright
 - industry publication/conferences
 - disclosure to 3rd parties (licensees, vendors, etc.) without steps to maintain secrecy
 - Internet postings
- NOT excluded
 - Disclosure to law enforcement to assist in investigations or prosecutions
 - Disclosure by misappropriator

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EEA & ITL

Defense

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Export Control Laws

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Why does the USG have Export Control Laws?

- Three purposes:
 - Economic growth
 - Interdependency of nations helps prevent conflicts
- BUT we have not achieved these goals yet
- Historic reasons for restricting trade:
 - Gain the upper hand in war by using the "starve the enemy" approach.
 - ECLs work during both wartime and peacetime
- Current use of ECLs (Commerce only)
 - National security
 - WMD & missile technology
 - Information
 - Nuclear safety
 - Crime control
- Export Control Committee
 - State Dept.
 - Defense
 - Energy
 - Justice
 - Commerce
 - Treasury
 - Agriculture
 - Health
 - Education
 - Labor
 - Environment
 - Transportation
 - International Trade Administration

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Who decides what items to control, de-control, why, etc.

- The USG decides on a case-by-case basis
- The USG decides on a case-by-case basis
- The USG decides on a case-by-case basis

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Which agencies?

- Various agencies (licensing regulations related to exports)
 - Commerce Dept. (BIS) - dual-use items
 - EAR, 15 USC 2481-2485, ECPA, 10 USC 1701-1708
 - EAR, 15 CFR 730-774 - relates to ECL
- State Dept. (DDIC) - military use items
 - ACLA, 22 USC 2776-2864
 - EAR, 15 CFR 120-124 - relates to ECL
- Treasury Dept. (DOF) - embargoed countries
 - Various statutes (E.O., etc.)
- Nuclear Regulatory Commission - nuclear reactors
- DEA - drug precursors
- FDA - certain prescription medications
- Department of the Interior - endangered animals

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Which agencies?

- Various agencies (investigative agencies related to exports)
 - BIS ("dual use" goods)
 - ICE
 - DOD: NCIS, AFOSI, etc.
 - FBI

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How effective are these laws?

- In 1999, the Commerce Dept. said these laws "add costs and delays to those nations and terrorists groups pursuing such items."
- In 2002, the State Dept. said "we are increasingly in danger of being out of the loop by nations which, in effect, have helped make."
- In 2004, the State Dept. said that shopping for nuclear weapons in the international black market was as easy as going shopping in a mall.
- May 2005, the State Dept. said "the international black market was as easy as going shopping in a mall."
- July 2007, the State Dept. said "the international black market was as easy as going shopping in a mall."

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Where does the FBI fit in?

- General criminal jurisdiction
- AG Order No. 2738-2004; (effective 11/15/04)
 - Gave the FBI concurrent jurisdiction "in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities, and related matters including investigating any potential violations of the Arms Export Control Act, the Export Administration Act, relating to any foreign counterintelligence matters."

• The Order states the FBI should "take charge" in these investigations.

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
Commerce Overview

- Administered by Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)
- Concerned with:
 - "Dual use" items as listed in the Commerce Control List (ECL) by Export Control Classification Number (ECCN)
 - Commercial items to certain end-users / end-users
 - General catch-all category - EAR 99
- BIS' OEE enforces these laws, ICE has concurrent jurisdiction.
- Export Administration Regulations (EAR), under the authority of Export Administration Act (EAA) of 1969 and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).

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- Deciphering the ECCN: example



ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

- Administered by the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC).

- Concerned with "defense articles" or "defense services" covered by the U.S. Munitions List (USML).
 - Requires registration
 - Brokering
- International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) under the authority of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA).

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[illegible]

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Treasury Overview

- Administered by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
- Administers **embargoes and economic sanctions** against foreign countries to counter threats to the U.S. national security, foreign policy and economy.
 - if an entity is on their list, NO U.S. Person or Entity can be involved in the transaction.
 - Commerce licenses some OFAC sanctions.
- Under the IEPPA, Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA), and various F.O.A.s

1017-0251

Treasury Background

- OFAC Country Sanctions,
 - oBalk ans
 - oBel ans
 - oBy Coast
 - oCuba
 - oCong o
 - oIran
 - oIraq
 - oLib ans
 - oNorth Kor ea
 - oSudan
 - oSyl a
 - oZimbab we
- OFAC List-Based Sanctions
 - oAnti-Terrorism
 - oCount o Narcotics Trafficking
 - oNon-proliferation
 - oDiamond Trading

TRAFFIC ASPECTS

The RULE, generally speaking

- Violations occur only if:
 - 1 Item is covered by the regulation,
 - 2 item is exported out of the U.S. or attempt,
 - 3 license is required,AND
 - 4 no license was obtained.
- Criminal violation.

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Element

- 1. Is the item subject to any agency?
 - o "Dual Use" Commercial and Defense (C&D) cases
 - These technologies "transit subject to the EAR"
 - o Military Use (Defense article or defense service) State (DOTC) cases
- 2. Item can be:
 - o The actual product,
 - o Technology (of source code) the specific information necessary for the government, production, or "use" of a product
 - A blueprint or design
 - "General Import/Export" across the budget (Official Import of the unique but foreign technology)
- 3. As defined in EAR,
 - o Development/creation, full scale prior to completion, production, distribution, production stages.
 - o Distribution, secondary distribution, resale, repair, overhaul, and refurbishing

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Elements

2. Is the item being exported out of the US?
 - Physically transporting the widget beyond the US
3. Foreign application of knowledge acquired in the US
 - If the US person provides the know-how to a foreign entity OR all US person's knowledge acquired in the US is used by a foreign entity in a foreign country
4. Widget manufactured outside of the US but is "US origin"
 - EAR has de minimus content requirement: must be at least 25% US origin
 - ITAR no de minimus content requirement. Example Boeing
5. Deemed exports
 - Discussing the widget with a foreign national located in the US so that technology is released
 - Visual inspection of the widget by a foreign national located in the US so that technology is released

Acknowledgements

Elements

- 2. What is NOT an export?
 - Ultimate end-user is in the U.S.
 - Export originates OUTSIDE the United States, *unless*:
 - Re-export: actual shipment is from one foreign country to the U.S. and then to another country.
 - Item is being brought back to the U.S. – for example, for servicing

INDEX

Elements

3. Is a license required?

- For the item
 - The item is on the United States Munitions List (USML)
- The item is listed on the Commerce Control List (CCL) and the Country Chart states that a license is required for the country
- If the end-use of the item is nuclear, missile, chemical or biological weapons AND the U.S. exporter has knowledge of the end-use

- If the end-user is on the
 - Denied Persons or Entities List - maintained by BIS
 - AECA Denoncements List - maintained by DDTC
 - Foreign Persons Designated - maintained by OFAC (in other lists)
- Sanctioned countries - OFAC or BIS

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Elements

4. License was not obtained

- License was not requested;

OR

- License was denied.

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Consequences of violating export control laws

- Administrative - civil
 - Strict liability
 - The relevant agency/negotiator's settlement
- Penalties
 - Monetary fines
 - Temporary denial of export privileges - if permanent violation
 - Denial of export privileges - if finding of guilt by Administrative Law Judge
- Investigative agencies may use this as a lead in an investigation, especially since it can establish knowledge for the future
- Criminal
 - Sanctions - will be knowledge described later
 - DOJ prosecutes
 - Penalty can be monetary or jail time
- Additionally
 - Restrictions on future exports/sports
 - Secure and safekeeping of items
 - Cross-debarment with other agencies
 - Forfeiture of right to conduct with the U.S. Government

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FBI's goal in these investigations

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BIS & ICE's goals in these investigations

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Questions?

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


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


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


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




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




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


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You are Going on Vacation!

What About The Newspaper?



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Going on Vacation

What About The Newspaper?

1. What is your critical information? Nobody's Home
2. Who is your threat? Burglar
3. Why are you vulnerable? Papers are Left in a Visible Location
3. What is an indicator of the Critical Information? Newspapers Piling Up
4. What is the Risk if you do nothing? Burglar sees Papers and Robs You better
5. What is a countermeasure? Ask Someone You Trust to Collect It! Stop the Paper Being Vested
5. Is there Residual Risk? Yes If so, What is it? Insider Threat and/or Newspaper Vulnerability

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Lesson Summary

- OPSEC Protects Unclassified Information
- OPSEC Considers the adversary's Perspective
- OPSEC is Operations Security
- OPSEC Process ✓

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BREAK!

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OPSEC Scenario

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OPSEC Process

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
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OPSEC and Your Work with the Private Sector




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Technology Development Life Cycle






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
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


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


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


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
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HANDOUTS!!

For the OPSEC Qualified Person

Print 3 per page handouts b/w/h up to the last slide of the show

For the In-class CLE exercise:

$$\frac{1}{\text{mole}} \rightarrow \frac{1}{\text{mole}} \times \frac{1}{\text{mole}} \times \frac{1}{\text{mole}} = \frac{1}{\text{mole}^3} \quad \text{For } \rightarrow \text{Double Agent in M/M}$$

Industry Outreach Section:

*Make copies of the following slides for students (40 each) in BU/wh

_____ and have them insert them in the unclass DSS book (between pages 2 and 3) Make sure they have the unclass DSS books

if DSS is not coming before you, bring them with you

• Make sure you bring copies of [redacted] and other things if you can!)


42

Going on Vacation

What About The Newspaper?

1. What is your critical information? _____
2. Who is your threat? _____
3. Why are you vulnerable? _____
3. What is an indicator of the Critical Information? _____
4. What is the Risk if you do nothing? _____
5. What is a countermeasure? _____
5. Is there Residual Risk? _____. If so, What is it? _____

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


Private Sector Outreach

CI Basic Operations Course
25 August 2006

SSA [redacted]

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OPSEC:

Critical Information
Threat Analysis
Vulnerability Assessment
Risk Assessment
Countermeasures



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OPSEC

CI Basic Operations Course
25 August 2006

[redacted]
Industry Program Lead
OPSEC Support Staff

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Agenda

- OPSEC Overview
- Apply and Test Your Knowledge
- OPSEC and Your Work with the Private Sector

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


OPSEC Overview

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Value of Unclassified Information



[redacted]

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What OPSEC Is... And Isn't



[redacted]

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OPSEC is ...

- A Process
- A Practice
- A Program

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OPSEC Methodology



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Critical Information

Putting Pieces of the Puzzle Together




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Identifying Critical Information



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Adversaries




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Threat

Threat = Intent + Capability



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
Vulnerability



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Examples of Vulnerabilities



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Indicators



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Risk

Threat • Vulnerability • Impact



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Countermeasures



Anything that works!

20

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Examples of Countermeasures



21

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
Residual Risk



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OPSEC Scenario




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OPSEC and Your Work with the Private Sector




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When Can You Use OPSEC?



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When Can You Use OPSEC?






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


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

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


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


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


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ON 02-05-2012

*Foreign Intelligence
Threat
In The
United States*

Threat

- *Presence*
- *Opportunity*
- *Intent*
- *Capability*

(U) Criteria for Overall Threat

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High	Medium	Low


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
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


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**Benedict Arnold
Volunteer Spy**



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
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




"Prescience cannot be gained from
ghosts or pods. cannot be augured
through signs, and cannot be proved
through conjectures.




It must be gained from what is learned
by men."

Sun Tzu
The Art of War

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
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
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



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


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
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


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


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
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Methodologies




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


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


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
Technical Areas of Interest



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


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
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
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
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
Patriotism vs Profit

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
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


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


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
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


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
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International Conferences




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Invitations to Visit




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
Unsolicited Requests



A Different Sort of Insider




The Professional Insider





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A Family Affair



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
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Countersurveillance

Tasking Instructions

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Handling Information



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DECLASSIFY ON: 02-06-2037

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Overview

11 August 2009

SECRET/NOFORN/VS/NM

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Presence

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SECRET/NOFORN/VS/NM

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SECRET/NOFORN/VS/NM


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


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
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Contact Information

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
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
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

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"At the time, the standard format of any important IBM meeting was a presentation using overhead projectors and graphics that IBMers called "foils." Nick was on his second foil when I stepped to the table, and, as politely as I could in front of his team, switched off the projector. After a long moment of awkward silence, I simply said "Let's just talk about your business."
- Louis V. Gerstner, Jr.



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
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


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
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


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


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
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
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Current Trends	
• Increased CI awareness	
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


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7/15/2011

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
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

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
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

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
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


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



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


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


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
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
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
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
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


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


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
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


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


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
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

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




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




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


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



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


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


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
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
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


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


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
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


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



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


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
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
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


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


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
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



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



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DATE: 02-06-2012

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
REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 02-06-2037


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
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


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


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
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

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



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




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
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
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


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


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
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


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
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
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
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
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


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


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
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


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
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
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
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

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DATE: 02-06-2012
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REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 02-06-2037


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


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


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
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
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
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Political Climate




Wrap up and implications...



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Questions?



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

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
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

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

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

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


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


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


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



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
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
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
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
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


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
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


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


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
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


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


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
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


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
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


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


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


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


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
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
Current Developments



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Questions?



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
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
DATE: 02-05-2012
CLASSIFIED BY 65179 DMH/STW
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 02-05-2037

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
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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(S)	UNKNOWN THREAT		b1 b7E
(S)	Recent activity?		

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


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

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Questions?

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DATE: 02-05-2012


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
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
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
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

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

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


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


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
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


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


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
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DATE: 02-05-2012
CLASSIFIED BY 65179 DMH/STW
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 02-05-2037


ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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


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


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
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
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UNKNOWN THREAT

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Recent activity2

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

Questions?

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
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REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 02-06-2037


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



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
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

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DATE: 02-05-2012
CLASSIFIED BY 65179 DMH/STW
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 02-05-2037

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
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 Program Overview

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


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
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Presence




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
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Questions?



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
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
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THIS BRIEFING IS CLASSIFIED

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




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




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


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


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




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


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
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DATE: 02-06-2012
CLASSIFIED BY 65179 DMH/STW
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 02-06-2037

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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


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


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


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


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

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
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May 2006



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[] ORCON/NOFORN [] FBI
Counterintelligence Division

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
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
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Counterintelligence Division

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


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

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


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DATE: 02-06-2012
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
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



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

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

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QUESTIONS?

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DATE: 02-06-2012
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SWITCH AROUND ESP - ISRAEL

SA [redacted] FBI-New York
SA [redacted] FBI-New York

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
Personal Background

- Ben-Ami Kadish
- DOB: [redacted]
- POB: Norwich, CT
- Current resident of Monroe Township, NJ
- [redacted]
- At age 3, moved to Palestine where he stayed until adulthood



~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

Personal Background



- Drafted into British Army during World War II, served in Palestine
- Later volunteered to join the U.S. Army Air Force (Signal Corps) during latter half of World War II
- Employed at Magnavox Corporation in 1960s
- Graduate of Stevens Institute

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U.S. Government Service



- Hired as Mechanical Engineer, Picatinny Arsenal, October 1962
- Served within Picatinny Arsenal's Fuze Section (aka Fuze Division)
- Retired January 1990 as Supervisory Electronics Engineer



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
Access

- Holder of a U.S. security clearance (Level: SECRET)



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

Access



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Access



Dragon



Hydra-70

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

Access



Hawk



Patriot



TOW (from Humvee)

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

History Lesson: The Pollard Affair

- Jonathan Jay Pollard convicted of Espionage in 1986
- Operated Israel's Scientific Liaison Bureau, LAKAM, from 1984-1985
- Spotted by [redacted] (IAF Pilot and [redacted] operated by LAKAM-K, undeclared Israeli Consulate official)



~~SECRET~~

The Pollard Affair (continued)



- Pollard was Naval Intelligence Analyst based near Washington D.C.
- Yagur was assigned to the Israeli Consulate in New York
- Pollard directed by LAKAM to obtain documents beyond the scope of his duties and which related to the Soviet Union and Israel

Jonathan Pollard

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Intelligence Indicators


Yossi Yagur in 1985
obtained via EGIS for



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Intelligence Indicators


Recan
Yossi Yagur



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Intelligence Indicators



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Espionage Indicators



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Espionage Indicators




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
Espionage Indicators



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
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Espionage Indicators






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


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


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


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

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


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


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What to do next? Post-Confession

[Redacted]

- Three additional Kadish interviews conduct
- Passport surrendered
- [Redacted]

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN 37

Arrest: April 22, 2008

[Redacted]

- Called both Israeli Consulate and Yagur's residence; admitted crime again
- Waived venue
- Medicines a concern
- Immediate press release

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN 38

Post-Arrest

- Continued monitoring of telephones with valuable intelligence obtained
- Taint issues
- Commence interviews of co-workers, friends, etc.
- Proffering

OLD SPY COULD FRY

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The Bottom Line

- Virtually same [Redacted] as what was used by Jonathan Pollard

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN 40

(S)

The Bottom Line

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN 41

The Bottom Line

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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
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SWITCH AROUND ESPIONAGE - ISRAEL



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Origins/Context



Jonathan Pollard

2 In 2004/2005 ONI-4C begins an examination of historical Israeli espionage.

◊ In part looking at the time period during which Israel ran the Pollard operation.

◊ One aspect focused on known including Pollard's handler Yossi Yagur.

First Identification

◊ Recent [redacted]
Yossi Yagur



Yossi Yagur

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Personal Background


- ◊ Ben-Ami Kadish
- ◊ DOB: [redacted]
- ◊ POB: Norwich, CT
- ◊ Current resident of Monroe Township, NJ

◊ [redacted]

◊ At age 3, moved to Palestine where he stayed until adulthood



Personal Background



- ◊ Drafted into British Army during World War II; served in Palestine
- ◊ Later volunteered to join the U.S. Army Air Force (Signal Corps) during latter half of World War II
- ◊ Employed at Magnavox Corporation in 1960s
- ◊ Graduate of Stevens Institute

U.S. Government Service


- ◊ Hired as Mechanical Engineer, Picatinny Arsenal, October 1962
- ◊ Served within Picatinny Arsenal's Fuze Section (aka Fuze Division)
- ◊ Retired January 1990 as Supervisory Electronics Engineer




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Access

- ◊ Holder of a U.S. security clearance (Level: SECRET)




Access



Stinger Missile

Access



Dragon

Hydra-70




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


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




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Other Indicators

- Interview disclosed that Kadish had spoken Hebrew during telephone calls at work
- Kadish's office contained a large trash can with the Israeli flag wrapped around it, making a fellow employee uncomfortable

~~SECRET~~ 19

Other Indicators

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
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Subject Interview


March 20, 2008:



~~SECRET/NOFORN~~ 28

Subject Interview

March 20, 2008:



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Subject Interview

March 20, 2008:



Kadish is asked about anyone connected to a man named "Joseph," including himself.

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~ 30

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Subject Interview

March 20, 2008:



Kadish denies knowing anyone named Joseph "Yossi" Yagur. Kadish denies knowing Yossi Yagur.

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~ 31

Interrogation Commences

March 20, 2008:



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Interrogation Commences

March 20, 2008:



Kadish admits to having provided Israel with classified information. When asked to tell the story in his words, he replies: "You have it all there..." referring to the props (hand receipts, etc.)

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
Confession



- Spied from 1980-1985
- 50-100 documents (more?)
- RD document (atomic)
- F-15 document
- No payments received; all ideological
- Kadish's brother was cut-out
- Wife was fully aware
- Kadish given lists of documents to obtain
- Photographed in his basement

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~ 34

What to do next? Post-Confession



- Three additional Kadish interviews conduct
- Passport surrendered

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Arrest: April 22, 2008



- Kadish was compliant
- Called both Israeli Consulate and Yagur's residence; admitted crime again
- Waived venue
- Medicines a concern
- Immediate press release

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Post-Arrest

- Continued monitoring of telephones with valuable intelligence obtained
- Taint issues
- Commence interviews of co-workers, friends, etc.
- Proffering



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37

Plea Deal



December 30, 2008:

- One-count Information charging Kadish with conspiracy to act as an unregistered agent of the Govt of Israel
- Allocation of espionage activities (not read aloud by Kadish)

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

38

Sentencing



May 22, 2009:

- Judge confounded by lessening of charges by SDNY; calls origins of case "shrouded in mystery"
- No jail time or probation (due to age, maladies); \$50,000 fine levied (outside guideline fine)

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The Bottom Line



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Going Forward



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
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REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 02-07-2037

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
7/15/2011

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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


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


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


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


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
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
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


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


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
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
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
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


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

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

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Visas

:(The First Line of Defense.)

SSA [redacted]
Counterintelligence Training Center

The overall classification of this presentation is
~~SECRET~~

Learning Objectives

- [redacted]
- Recognize visa types
- [redacted]
- Establishment visitors

~~SECRET~~

Why are Visas Important?

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Ways to Find Visa Information

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Assessing (Investigation)

DIOG Classified Provisions

B. (U) CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANTING A
PRELIMINARY OR FULL INVESTIGATION

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Questions/Comments

?/!

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Serial Description ~ Unrecorded Serial

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