



Federal Bureau of Investigation

Title of Instruction:	A Survey of Domestic Jihadist Plots
Time of Instruction:	Varied
Target Group:	Varied – content tailored to audience
Instructor:	CTC Staff
Methods of Instruction:	Lecture with Q & A throughout the course of discussion
Additional Information:	N/A
Date:	Habitual

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Statement of Goals and Objectives

Instructional Goal:

This block of instruction provides students with a conceptual understanding of the various sources of jihadist violence directed against the homeland, as not all plots emanate from either al-Qa'ida core or from self-radicalized individuals. A cross-section of attacks against the homeland will be contextualized and any potential trends will be discussed. The block will also examine key individuals who foster radicalization among English speaking jihadists. Finally, section will examine the Mumbai attack of November 2008 and apply the key characteristics of that attack to the American security environment.

Instructional Objectives:

After this block of instruction, the learner will be able to:

- Discuss how the threat to the homeland comes from all facets of the global jihad
- Discuss the most significant plots directed at the homeland and/or involving American citizens
- Identify potential trends from among the plots

List of Items and Materials

Equipment / Aids Required for Instructor:

- Overhead Proxima projector
- Computer
- Pointer
- PowerPoint

Equipment / Aids Required for Students:

- CTC West Point handbook with note-taking space provided
- Pencil/pen

Power Point Slides or Outline:

Outline: *Slides will include some combination of the following.*

1. Title Slide: A Survey of Domestic Jihadist Plots
2. Map of the World
3. Photographs of arrested and indicted individuals
4. Understanding al-Qa'ida
5. Affiliates: Al-Shabaab
6. Affiliates: AQAP
7. Networked Adherents
8. Autonomous Adherents
9. Associated Organizations
10. Plotting Domestic Cases
11. Key Takeaways

Handouts:

- Provided by CTC West Point

Outline of Activities

Content	Instructor Notes
Grabber: <i>Please see attached presentation – Is there an ethnic or racial profile which explains the proliferation of domestic jihadist cases represented by the individuals in this slide (slide 3)?</i> Introduction: Instructors introduce themselves and their credentials. Thesis Statement: Al-Qa’ida has evolved from the primary proponent of the global jihad to a central player in a fluid global jihadist movement. This movement is composed of affiliated organizations, associated organizations, autonomous adherents, and networked adherents. The threat to the United States emanates from all components of this global movement. Needs Statement: It is necessary to develop an analytical framework that helps to make sense of the proliferation of jihadist plots affecting the U.S. homeland and U.S. citizens. This framework will help practitioners identify trends with respect to targeting, tactics, and motivations. Objective #1: There is no operationally useful ethnic or racial profile that explains domestic jihadist plots, nor is there a geographic centrality to jihadism in the United States. Multiple studies, conducted by academic, law enforcement, and intelligence community entities have all determined that there is no operationally useful profile for who will become a terrorist. In the U.S. over the last decade, for example, a study of 188 cases by the New America Foundation determined that 25% of those involved in some instance of jihadist behavior in the United States were of Arab background, 9% were African-American, 12% were Caucasian, 18% Somali, 18% South Asian, and 18% mixed ethnicity or “Other.” In a study produced by David Schanzer, Charles Kurzman, and Ebrahim Moosa which evaluated 139 individuals, a similar distribution of ethnicities was noted. Additionally,	

approximately 40% of those engaged in some form of jihadist activity in the United States were converts.

Regarding where these incidents occurred: only 14% of the individuals lived in the four largest Muslim communities of Chicago, Detroit, L.A., and New York City. 43 cases occurred in the South, 38 in the Northeast, 30 in the Midwest, 23 in the West, and 3 in the Southwest.

Objective #2: AQ Affiliated organizations have both attempted to recruit Americans and to target the homeland.

Between 2006 and the end of 2008, upwards of 27 Somali-Americans were recruited or volunteered to fight with an Islamist militia in Somalia that was fighting against Ethiopian military units which had occupied portions of Somalia, including Mogadishu. This militia, known as al-Shabaab, was designated as a terrorist organization in December 2008 due to its links to al-Qa'ida. In 2009, al-Shabaab offered its oath of loyalty to AQ. While it does not appear that AQ formally accepted the affiliation, it is clear that a portion of the al-Shabaab organization sees itself as a part of AQ's global jihad, while others in al-Shabaab have more local or regional aspirations.

After 2008, Americans from other ethnic backgrounds (i.e., not Somali) also attempted, and in some cases succeeded, in joining al-Shabaab. To date, Americans have been used as suicide bombers in Somalia, as guerrilla fighters, and as propaganda tools in English-language propaganda.

In Yemen, a different AQ affiliate has not only recruited or worked with several Americans, but has also targeted the United States directly. AQAP, based out of Yemen, has utilized PETN explosives to target both commercial and cargo aircraft en route to the United States. Just as significantly, two U.S. Citizens are working with AQAP to publish English-language propaganda meant to inspire Muslims in the United States to take up arms within the homeland. Samir Khan is the individual most directly responsible with publishing Inspire magazine, which advocates for "do it yourself" violence in the United States. Anwar al-Awlaki, another American citizen, appears frequently in both written and multi-media propaganda. His speeches and sermons have been found in the possession of

many aspiring and successful terrorists, and he is reported to have met with many other individuals who have conducted attacks against the United States.

Objective #3: Networked Adherents are those individuals who have been inspired to violence and have spent time in a training camp environment associated with al-Qa'ida's global jihadist agenda.

Individuals like Bryan Neal Vinas and Najibullah Zazi desired to fight against American military forces in Afghanistan prior to being redirected by al-Qa'ida to attempt attacks against the subway in New York City and the Long Island Railroad. Two sister plots to that of Najibullah Zazi's, in the U.K. and Oslo, will be discussed to further illustrate the contemporary dynamics of the networked jihadist plots.

These trajectories illustrate the importance of classical jihad for recruitment and radicalization, the importance of geographic co-location among local, regional, and global militant groups for the purposes of mobilization and resiliency, and illustrates how where an individual plugs in to the global jihadist movement can influence the operational outcome of their violence. In many cases (but not all cases), individuals who network into the AQ training infrastructure attempt high explosive attacks on economic infrastructure, often where they can expect a high casualty count.

Daniel Patrick Boyd is another example of a networked adherent, but one who "plugged in" to the network during a previous jihadist campaign. It is important that students understand that familial or other close links to individuals who have participated in jihadist violence in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, or Iraq may have access to networks or experience that can yield mobilization pathways that others inspired to violence may not have.

Objective #4: Autonomous Adherents who are inspired to violence but do not "plug in" to an organization or formal training environment represent a different facet of the global jihadist threat.

Major Nidal Hasan conducted a firearms attack on Fort Hood after exchanging emails with Anwar al-Awlaki. Like others inspired to violence but who were not able to gain direct

access to training, and whom trainers/ideologues were not able to indoctrinate directly, these individuals have frequently plotted to attack DoD and Israeli/Jewish targets in the United States using readily available firearms. These targets reflect political grievances that are propagated on-line.

It is essential to note that a large minority of individuals have plotted to conduct high explosive attacks and to target civilian targets unrelated to DoD or Israeli/Jewish interests.

Objective #5 Associated organizations are both recruiting American citizens and deploying terrorists to attack the U.S. homeland directly.

AQ core has been geographically co-located with local and regional jihadist organizations, and has produced a plethora of propaganda espousing violence against the United States. For both of these reasons, associated organizations which may not be subordinate to AQ can still pose a direct threat to the United States. Two primary examples are those of Lashkar e-Toiba, responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attack which targeted Westerners and infrastructure that caters to Westerners, and the Tehriki-Taliban Pakistan which is responsible for the Times Square bomber and which took credit for the suicide attack at Forward Operating Base Chapman which killed seven CIA employees.

Summary/Conclusion:

The threat to the United States emanates from groups and individuals beyond al-Qa'ida Core. Associate and affiliated groups, as well as inspired and networked individuals have also demonstrated the desire to target U.S. interests and Americans. Those who are inspired but lack access to more capable organizations tend to fall back on targets and tactics that are most available to them and that they perceive to be directly responsible for occupation of Muslim land. Those who spend more time with militant organizations run a greater risk of being further indoctrinated, orienting them to conduct attacks against economic infrastructure and civilian targets in line with AQ's attrition strategy.

Bibliography

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