



Federal Bureau of Investigation

Title of Instruction:	Regional Hotspots
Time of Instruction:	2 Hours
Target Group:	New Agent Trainees and Regional IT
Instructor:	CTC Staff
Methods of Instruction:	Lecture with Q & A throughout the course of discussion
Additional Information:	N/A
Date:	Habitual

Statement of Goals and Objectives

Instructional Goal:


This lesson addresses the complex landscape of global jihad. It distinguishes between central al-Qa'ida and its affiliated and associated organizations, specifically focusing on the regions in which they operate. The block of instruction discusses factors in South Asia, Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and North Africa that have contributed to environments conducive to jihadist activity. Further, it draws connections between activities and individuals within these countries and regions and the networked and autonomous adherents of global jihadist ideology.

Instructional Objectives:

After 2 hours of instruction, the learner will be able to:


- Describe the history and geography of Pakistan and Afghanistan
- Explain how the Soviet-Afghan war set the conditions for today's global jihad
- Describe the regional background of Yemen and the evolution of jihad within the country
- Explain conditions within the Horn of Africa and North Africa that influence jihadist activity

Criterion Test Questions



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Criterion Test Answers



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List of Items and Materials

Equipment / Aids Required for Instructor:

- Overhead Proxima projector
- Computer
- Pointer
- PowerPoint

Equipment / Aids Required for Students:

- CTC West Point handbook with note-taking space provided
- Pencil/pen

Power Point Slides or Outline:

Outline:

1. Title Slide
2. The Global Jihad
3. South Asia: Epicenter of Global Jihad
4. South Asia: Regional Background
5. South Asia: Evolution of Jihad
6. South Asia: Current Picture
7. Waziristan/FATA
8. South Asia: Key Take-Aways
9. Yemen
10. Yemen: Regional Background
11. Yemen: Evolution of Jihad
12. Yemen: Current Picture
13. Yemen: Key Take-Aways
14. Horn of Africa
15. Horn of Africa: Regional Background
16. Horn of Africa: Evolution of Jihad
17. Horn of Africa: Current Picture

18. Horn of Africa: Key Take-Aways
19. North Africa: Current Picture
20. North Africa: Key Take-Aways
21. Case Study: Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab
22. North Africa
23. North Africa: Regional Background
24. North Africa: Evolution of Jihad
25. Key Take-Aways

Handouts:

- Provided by CTC West Point

Outline of Activities

Content	Instructor Notes
Grabber: <i>Please see attached presentation</i> Introduction: Instructors introduce themselves and their credentials. Thesis Statement: The threat of global jihad currently facing the United States originated in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In order to truly understand the current landscape and challenges, one as to understand the history, geography, and culture of the region, and how these characteristics shaped the Afghan-Soviet war and the global terrorist movement that emerged. However, the jihadist threat has evolved since 2001 to include organizations and individuals affiliated with, associated with, or inspired by al-Qa'ida. A more comprehensive understanding of today's threats also requires familiarity with key nations and regions such as Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and North Africa. Needs Statement: Understanding the roots of global jihad as well as contemporary, regional hotspots is essential to the investigation of current threats. Objective #1: Describe the history and geography of Pakistan and Afghanistan Afghanistan and Pakistan have a shared history and culture. Ethnic lines, linguistic lines, religious lines, and tribal lines all cross the artificial borders separating the two countries. The interplay of geography with these cultural and familial considerations creates a region that is exceptionally complicated. Many of the same considerations are true in relation to the border between India and Pakistan, although the history differs. What is most similar is that both border regions are notoriously difficult to govern, as the British found out. In Kashmir, the British presence from the mid 17th to mid 19th century contributed to the radicalization of local populations.	

Objective #2: Explain how the Soviet-Afghan war set the conditions for today's global jihad

The decade-long war greatly affected the region. Afghan mujahideen were almost entirely responsible for the defeat of the Soviets, but they allied with various countries to do so, along with and an ineffective group of foreign fighters from Arab countries who came to be known as the Arab Afghans. Saudi Arabia was a large sponsor of the effort, and along with Saudi money came Wahabbi madrassas. Afghanistan's Sufi variant of Islam would grow much more conservative as a result of this influence.

The Arab-Afghans grew a reputation in the Arab world, despite their limited impact on the war. Usama bin Laden would wield this reputation, along with the international network of jihadis brought together to repel the foreign invader, to underpin a global terrorist organization and a potent ideology.

Objective #3: Describe the origins, ideology, and politics of the Taliban

Upon the Soviet withdrawal, Afghanistan descended into a civil war. The ex-mujahideen and a new generation of Wahabbi-madrassa-educated Afghans form a student movement know as the Taliban, whose intent was to stop the raping and pillaging by the various warlords of the country they had fought to defend.

The Taliban's creed is evidence of their early goals to restore peace, cleanse the war torn society, and enforce Islamic law as a way to distance themselves and the country from politics.

Objective #4: Describe various challenges faced by Yemen and how these factors relate to today's jihadist threat.

Yemen is a mountainous nation that is twice the size of Wyoming. It is the poorest and most populous country in the Gulf and risks running out of water. Natural resource present an additional challenge in that 70% of State revenue comes from oil production which has declined dramatically. Additionally, Yemen's many tribes have traditionally limited the efficacy of its central government, which is also

challenged by an insurgency in the North and a secessionist movement in the South. Faced with these issues and others, the ability of the Yemeni government to effectively combat global jihadists like al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula is limited.

Objective #5: Describe the evolution of jihad in Yemen and how it relates to current threats.

AQAP has experienced an evolution since the early 2000s, and various characteristics have defined each phase. Today, AQAP is focused on domestic targets within Yemen but also on the United States, as demonstrated by the attempted Christmas day attack in 2009 and Operation Hemorrhage in October 2010.

Objective #6: Describe regional factors in the Horn of Africa which challenge the region and facilitate an environment conducive to jihadist activity.

The Horn of Africa is an extremely underdeveloped region that is challenged by failed states, population issues, and its vulnerability to natural disasters. It is also a region that continues to experience arm conflict and criminal activity, problems exacerbated by porous national borders that enable the flow of arms and people. Further, sectarian and ethnic divisions are worsening in the region.

Objective #7: Discuss jihadist activity in the region.

Not only has al-Qa'ida been active in the Horn of Africa since (at least) the early 1990s, but catastrophes in Somalia facilitated the rise of an associated organization, al-Shabaab, that combines nationalist rhetoric with a radical Islamist narrative. Shabaab threatens the region and beyond and became of increasing concern to the United States after several waves of Somali-American youth left the U.S. to join the organization in 2007/2008.

Objective #8: Discuss regional issues and the evolution of jihad in North Africa.

In 2007, al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) emerged out of two Algerian precursor organizations, the Armed Islamic Group and the Salafist Group for preaching and combat. All three organizations have benefited from the

region's large swaths of uncontrolled territory, as well as from a general lack of state policing. Although there is concern that global jihadists will exploit North Africa's close proximity to Europe, AQIM in particular is challenged by several vulnerabilities. There are effectually three AQIM's within the region, each with different leadership and - in some cases - objectives. The larger organization suffers from this lack of cohesion, and its political pursuits are obscured by its criminal activities.

Summary/Conclusion:

The Soviet-Afghan War created a network of individuals brought together to wage jihad against a foreign invader, and who would be trained and indoctrinated during the ten year war. The Soviet withdrawal set the stage for the rise of the Taliban, an Islamist regime that would eventually provide safe-haven for the global jihadi movement that arose from the same network of foreign fighters. However, additional countries and regions have grown in importance when it comes to the threat of global jihad. Conditions and circumstances in the geographic hotspots of Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and North Africa have made the movement more diffuse, and the overlap of local, regional, and global organizations provides individuals with multiple avenues for participation.

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