


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# FBI DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

## Evolving Homeland Threat from Al-Qa'ida & Sunni Extremists


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21 July 2010


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
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# Overview


- I. Status of al-Qa'ida today**
- II. External plotting and overview of Homeland threat streams**
- III. Key investigations: al-Qa'ida threat over the past year**
- IV. Trends in homegrown extremism**

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

## Al-Qa'ida Today



- Al-Qa'ida (AQ) undeterred in its objectives
- Death & capture of key personnel has not resulted in a lack of operational attempts
- AQ continues to leverage safe-haven in the FATA to plan attacks against the West
- AQ's strength is its network, not its hierarchy

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# Key Elements for US attack


## Four Key Elements for US Threat

- Top Leadership Intact (UBL and Zawahiri)
- Safe-haven in the FATA
- Key operational lieutenants (retention and co-location)
- Capability to train and deploy operatives


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# Al-Qa'ida Poses Enduring Threat



1. Enduring intent and capability
2. AQ maintains safe haven in FATA, despite CT pressure

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3. Cadre of trained operatives


4. Deepening alliances with local affiliates serves as force multiplier

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
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
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
# Status of al-Qa'ida: Setbacks



1. Increased pressure from CT campaign affecting AQ's current status—training, finances, operations
2. Key leadership losses in past year depleting cadre of experienced lieutenants
  - More losses in past 24 months than any other period since 9/11
  - Usama al-Kini, Abu Khabab al-Masri, Khalid Habib, Saleh al-Somali
3. Rifts within AQ
4. Disruptions to external plotting efforts



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# Al-Qa'ida's External Plotting


- “Heightened threat environment” since mid-2007

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
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- Decentralization in external plotting
  - Multiple simultaneous threat streams
- Increasing role for Pakistanis (and Pakistani affiliate groups) in leadership, training and plotting
- Still focused on getting operatives into the US from the outside – Zazi case changes overall perspective
- Ongoing plotting against the West

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# Where is the FATA?

- **Federally**
  - Bajaur
  - Mohmand
- **Administered**
  - Khyber
  - Orakzai
- **Tribal**
  - Kurram
  - North Waziristan
  - South Waziristan
- **Areas**

The FATA, lying between Afghanistan and the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, is comprised of 7 tribal agencies and 6 smaller frontier regions in northwest Pakistan with considerable autonomy from the rest of Pakistan.




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
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
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
# North Americans in the FATA




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- Our concern (Zazi, JKM) that AQ could exploit North Americans—who possesses legitimate access to the US—for an attack
- Trends: No pipeline necessary, Individualized paths
- Vetting by extremists in the FATA
- Difficult to ID operatives, either before they travel or surface in the FATA

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
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
# Salient Points for Homeland

- AQ Threat to Homeland persists
- Homemade explosives prepared locally
  - 7/7, Overt, Zazi
- AQ continues to train Western recruits (European, Canadian, American)
  - AQ often uses nationals from a Western country to attack it – allows operatives to enter country legally, speak language, understand culture—operate without raising suspicion
- Seeks to infiltrate operatives through legal means
  - AQ sought to deploy covert operatives to the US
  - Amount of time necessary not a deterrent; AQ patient and willing to devote time to infiltrate targets for surveillance and access
  - AQ willing to move forward short and long term attack strategies simultaneously
- Operatives self-selecting to participate in jihad and travel to the FATA
- Reports of North Americans training in the FATA – could they be used for a Homeland attack?
  - With other Western plots, see travel to Pakistan shortly before plot execution (attempts)
  - Should we expect to see the same thing with Homeland plotting?

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
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# Najibullah Zazi


## Overview:

- Traveled to Peshawar, Pakistan from August 2008 to January 2009
- Acquired explosive precursor chemicals in July & August 2009 – hydrogen peroxide and acetone
- Hand-written notes containing formulas for the manufacture and handling of explosives found on his computer, which Zazi sent himself from Pakistan
- FBI testing discovers the presence of acetone in the vent above stove in hotel suite where Zazi stayed




*Najibullah Zazi*

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

## Zazi's Activities in Pakistan

- Zazi, [REDACTED] initially intended to join Taliban, but were recruited by AQ
- Received training on several different types of weapons
- Zazi received explosives training, during which he took notes with bomb-making instructions. In Pakistan he later has these notes scanned and emails them to his newly created email accounts.
- Zazi provided both money and computers to AQ
- Zazi discussed target locations with AQ—decided upon New York City subway system

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


# Implications


## Significance

- *First known active core al-Qa'ida operational presence in United States since 9/11*
  - Zazi is legal permanent resident with US documents traveling from United States to Pakistan and back
- First instance of US-based operative attempting to manufacture hydrogen peroxide explosives

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
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# LOCAL AFFILIATES


- Al-Qa'ida has spread an ideology that individuals fight under
  - Taliban and AQ are the “same group:” share resources to increase the threat
- Key AF/PK-based AQ Affiliates:
  - Elements of Tehrik e-Taliban (TTP), Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT), the Haqqani network, Tehrik Nefaz-i-Shariat Muhammad (TNSM), Harakat ul-Jihad ul-Islami (HUJI), Afghan Taliban
- AQ's deepening relationship with local extremists serves as a force multiplier
- Most attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan over past 3 years have not been conducted by a single group, but rather individuals who tap into various networks
  - AQ serves as a larger umbrella organization with a strong network of individuals—some from other groups or splinter groups

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# AQ and Pakistani Militant Terrorist Training




Individuals who travel to Pakistan, attend training camps run by militant groups, and return to the US with unknown intentions, remain to be one of the most significant threats to the US and law enforcement officials.

- Militant individuals who have legal means to access the US are a concern. (Zazi, Shahzad, Abdulmutallab, etc.)
- Militant individuals who train overseas with no intention of returning but fight Western interests overseas are also a concern.  etc.)


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# Implications for U.S. Security



Trained individuals with legal access to the US could be tasked by group leadership to conduct a homeland attack.



Trained individuals could voluntarily provide support to another organization—such as AQ or TTP—planning a homeland attack.

Trained individuals could independently conduct a homeland attack. “Lone Wolf”

Trained individuals could be recruited by another organization planning a homeland attack.

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- Five US citizens between the ages of 18-24 departed the US for Pakistan in late November 2009 in order to engage in jihad against US coalition forces in Afghanistan

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- [REDACTED]



- Also admitted to watching Aulaqi videos online
- Charged and convicted in Pakistan – sentenced to 10 years in jail

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
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
# AQ Global Affiliates

- Relationships are developing with regionally-focused groups
- Some groups have adopted AQ name and shifted operations beyond previous country-specific focus
- Others have struggled to fully adopt AQ's global vision, resulting in organizational friction
- Relationships seen in North Africa, Arabian Peninsula, and East Africa (ex: Al-Qa'ida in Yemen, Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula, Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb, Al-Qa'ida in East Africa, Al-Qa'ida in Iraq)

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
## Example: AQAP

- 
- AQAP leaders view simple but high-profile attacks as successes, and may use operatives possibly already in place
- Continue to look for methods to attack the West using means that can penetrate transportation security
- English speaking US citizens acting as radicalizers, including Anwar Aulaqi and Samir Khan


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
# Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab




## Overview:

- On 25 December, Mutallab initiated an incendiary device on board Northwest Flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit.
- The device consisted of TATP and PETN powder sewn to the inside of Mutallab's underwear and a syringe used to ignite the device.
- Mutallab traveled to Yemen after watching Aulaqi videos and attended various mosques where he met several AQ affiliates—including Abu Tarek—who discussed plans to attack the US.
- Mutallab was indicted on six counts.

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



# Faisal Shahzad: Times Square




## Overview:

- On 1 May 2010, Shahzad parked a vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) in New York City
- The device consisted of three devices in the back of the vehicle connected to two battery operated clocks and utilized over 100 fireworks, 250lbs of fertilizer, three propane tanks, a pressure cooker, two gas cans, and a variety of other materials.
- On 2 May 2010, one of three videos were posted to YouTube with Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) leader Qari Hussain Mehsud claiming responsibility
- Shahzad was arrested on 3 May 2010 after attempting to flee the country to Islamabad via Dubai.




# Indicators of Radicalization

- Domestic Training and outward bound excursions
  - Paintball
  - Weapons Training
  - Martial Arts
  - Target Shooting
  - Rafting
- Surveillance, reconnaissance, and information gathering offers opportunities to law enforcement




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
# Trends in Homegrown Extremism

- Since 9/11, we have seen as many as 12 homegrown extremist plots
- Homegrown extremists in general struggle to develop capability to match intent to carry out attacks. However, successful use of small-arms could indicate a shift to less sophisticated tactics.
- Presence of radical mentor, followed by creating or viewing jihadist media online, most common attribute to plots.
- Individuals seeking paramilitary training or fighting in conflicts overseas

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


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


# Michael Curtis Finton

- Arrested on 23 September 2009
- Attempted to use a remotely-controlled car bomb to attack the Paul Findley Federal Building and Courthouse in Springfield, IL
- Prison convert
- Sought to receive paramilitary training overseas and to wage jihad in Pakistan, Somali or other locations
- Travel to Saudi Arabia in 2008




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# Al-Qa'ida Homeland Plotting: Lessons in Operative Detection



- Information is compartmentalized: operatives are organized into cells with separate missions, and may only know the identities of a few individuals to prevent infiltration; so even if we detect one, difficult to detect others.
- Wide-range of operatives
- Demonstrated capability to infiltrate
- Communication key to operative detection
- Our priority – to identify US-based individuals & networks with links to Pakistan



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
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


# Key Intelligence Gaps




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
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
# Implications

- AQ remains intent on attacking the US – we must continue to remain vigilant
- No “one profile” of an AQ operative—Europeans, Pakistanis, Americans are all attractive to AQ
- Detection remains a challenge [redacted] b7E  
[redacted] and requires collaboration from all members ofUSIC
- Travel to Pakistan and communication trends are hallmark in AQ external plotting
- Most FBI subjects engaged in non-attack terrorist support activities, but we continue to be concerned by those individuals who reach out to extremists overseas

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# Thank You!

## Questions or Comments?

### Federal Bureau of Investigation

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