

FBI [REDACTED] State of Play

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Intelligence is a critical part of every law enforcement officer's duties. At its most basic level, intelligence is produced using information and analysis. The focus of intelligence, both [REDACTED] within the FBI is [REDACTED] in other words, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The following paper will look at the FBI's use of intelligence in activities such as [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] It hopes to help identify those elements that are working well towards mission accomplishment and those that could use improvement. The information used came from discussions with analysts and agents and a review of FBI literature and database holdings.

1. Intelligence use in [REDACTED]

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FBI's goal is to use both [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] to best use Bureau [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Among the roadblocks the Bureau has overcome to this goal are the fundamental differences between investigations [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The Bureau is proceeding at pace to create a standard of training, product development, and operational purpose to build a culture of intelligence and operations working together to close the gaps in our national security.

[REDACTED] is the process of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] although within the Bureau most of this work is in [REDACTED] It responds to emerging threats identified through [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] This process has recently been improved with new guidelines that [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] can identify [REDACTED] as well as gaps in reporting that the field office is currently [REDACTED] and has little capability to report on and the [REDACTED] identification can then be performed by the [REDACTED] or special agent.

Most recently, the Bureau has further enhanced its intelligence function by creating three distinct career paths for Intelligence Analysts (IA) which allows for a more tailored training and developmental opportunities for IAs. It also allows the FBI to develop more IA subject-matter expertise. The three career paths, Tactical, Collection/Reporting, and Strategic should also allow the Bureau to identify trends in the IA workforce and standardize the IA work roles.

Organizational and technical challenges remain however in achieving an efficient and manageable system of [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] different complicated organizations/teams/initiatives are identified below which the Bureau has stood up to help the Bureau achieve its goal. These organizations/initiatives are also subject to frequent name changes and reorganization which further complicates understanding. While all were developed with some unique qualities, they are unnecessarily numerous, often confusing, overlapping, and time consuming. Less may be better. What is needed is one corporate solution/protocol for the field and headquarters.

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D. Regional Intelligence Group (RIG)
Developed to support Field Offices in their efforts to identify risks and threats, and to develop an understanding of how these risks and threats impact the region. As

emerging threats and trends that transcend Field Office boundaries emerge, the RIGs will facilitate awareness of regional Field Office collection postures to identify opportunities for shared source exploitation.

E. [REDACTED]
Developed to [REDACTED] as a single, integrated process, to ensure sharing across program lines, and to enhance the collection, evaluation, production, and dissemination of intelligence information. Each field office maintains its [REDACTED] Each [REDACTED]

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In addition, the Bureau's IT system is not up to the task. The analyst and agent are burdened with having to access numerous [REDACTED] The Bureau case file system is not well suited for topical study or the discovery of knowledge. Better data retention and sharing methods are needed. In many situations a Bureau analyst or agent needs training on searching techniques, not to find the next terrorist, but simply to help him/her locate common case information that isn't at his/her ready disposal. There is no ready repository of institutional knowledge from which to draw. This challenge is recognized and is being worked on, but again, one corporate IT solution is needed to avoid the proliferation of even more data bases that do not communicate with each other.

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2. Training:

A variety of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] exist within the FBI and the Intelligence Community. These

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courses provide the Bureau with an excellent resource to help overcome some of the challenges outlined above. The

[REDACTED] staffed and rolled out targeting training to the [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] which will be embedded in FBI Headquarters operational divisions, will help ensure [REDACTED] strategies by collaborating with Intelligence Analysts (IAs) in both the operational divisions and the Directorate of Intelligence's (DI's) Analysis Branch. The more than two weeks of rigorous classroom training included instruction on [REDACTED] and key analytical and technical tools.

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Based upon a review of a search of available courses for FBI IAs, the following training options may be considered of interest:

A. [REDACTED] Trains personnel immediately on existing tools and databases to ensure [REDACTED] or leads are missed. Instructors use a Case-based approach, and an overview of tools, databases, [REDACTED] capability & methodology for data aggregation & exploitation.

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B. Threat Identification and [REDACTED] Trains personnel in advanced analytics and critical thinking to enable analytical and operational elements of the FBI to synthesize the sources of information taught in Data Utilization towards operational outcomes and to educate these elements in their defined work roles and to the value-added of working jointly towards mission completion. Training will include: FBI and [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Briefing Results, [REDACTED]

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C. Advanced Approaches to Critical Thinking: Focuses on the mechanics of intelligence analysis and provides hands-on practice at using the elements of critical thinking and fourteen specific techniques for analysis. Students learn how their biases prevent thorough analysis and the means for compensating against those biases through structured analytic techniques. Classroom problems as well as operation examples reinforce and help transfer what is learned into the operational environment. A final project

developed by student teams completes the formal requirements.

D. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Includes, but is not limited to: submitting and [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] for analysis; submitting and tracking the [REDACTED]
use of raw intelligence for [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] accessing intelligence on a priority threat [REDACTED]
topic; and [REDACTED] as a management tool to identify [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] file review, etc.,
at the squad and program levels.

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E. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Covers the basics of writing [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] to include the identification [REDACTED]
of [REDACTED] from investigative and [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] and coordination of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] with FBIHQ counterparts.

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F. Reports Officer Training: Intended for Intelligence Analysts (IA) who will perform duties as a Reports Officer (RO). Participants will learn about RO roles and responsibilities; the national requirements structure and collection requirements process; what intelligence is and how to discern intelligence information from operational information; receive training in Intelligence Information Report [REDACTED] the importance of [REDACTED] legal authorities that govern collection and reporting. The course teaches students how to refine techniques for writing various intelligence products including Division specific Intelligence Information Reports, Teletype Memos, Requests for Information, and [REDACTED]

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G. [REDACTED] Provides guidance in [REDACTED] of differing nationalities.

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H. Fundamentals of [REDACTED] Teaches fundamentals of [REDACTED] to include doctrine, tolls, processes and practical exercises.

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I. Session [REDACTED] Aimed at Collection Management Team, [REDACTED] Embedded IA's, [REDACTED] IA's. Includes; understand [REDACTED] leading to the development of Target Collection Plans, and basic source targeting.

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J. [REDACTED] FBI sponsored six (6) week training course designed to provide advanced knowledge of [REDACTED]

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K. [REDACTED] was developed to enhance collaboration within the IC. Through role-play scenarios, this six-week course teaches participants about the capabilities and legal authorities of IC agencies [REDACTED] and the skills needed to work together while collecting this intelligence in a domestic environment.

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L. [REDACTED] Teaches identification of [REDACTED] with the placement and access to fill intelligence gaps when existing sources are inadequate, inappropriate, or non-existent.

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M. [REDACTED] Discusses the process of source identification. Reviews what [REDACTED] is, methodology, process, and [REDACTED]

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N. [REDACTED] This course introduces a different perspective and guidance in [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] It places emphasis on the [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] of reference. The ultimate goal of this course is to illustrate how to [REDACTED] and use it to prevent a terrorist attack.

3. Communication

Good analysts can adjust their methodology and research approach to address the needs of their customer; however, the analyst must be able to communicate with the operator to understand the operator's end-goals and vice-versa. Analysts and Agents should brief each other on their capabilities; lay out their intended analytical or operational course of action. That brief should be used as a platform for fostering communication on how the analysis can drive the operation/investigation and what the ops officer expects from the analytical plan (operational objectives). The interaction can be conducted in a formal or informal manner.

It is important that the agent understand what targeting can and cannot do. Targeting cannot identify sources with

certainty. Much of the analysis on a [REDACTED] access and vulnerability is based on individual pieces of information identified by an analyst. While an analyst may learn that [REDACTED] holds a particular position and has contact with case subjects and therefore concludes that the potential source has direct access, this does not mean that they definitively have that access. That likely can only be proven once an agent uses the tools available to them. Targeting instead narrows the field and makes analytical judgments based on information available to an analyst.

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In addition to analyst/agent communication, both the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] which both house important elements necessary to the [REDACTED] should be involved in [REDACTED] should be collaborated and coordinated with to ensure that threats are properly understood and covered. Anyone else with relevant information should also be involved. Furthermore, coordination with the relevant squad should also take place. Working together, they can best develop a plan that will outline where and how [REDACTED] can be developed or where and what the emerging threat is. This plan provides a baseline for [REDACTED] which can then be performed by [REDACTED] or special agent.

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4. Products/Results:

The problems posed by the limited menu of products available for conveying FBI analysis has been evident for some time. Intelligence Assessment and Bulletin formats have not lent themselves to specific requirements and have been improperly adapted to a host of newer products such as Domain Assessments.

[REDACTED] that formed early in 2009 looked at finished intelligence production among its other tasks. The recommendation of [REDACTED] was that the various formal and informal FBI finished products should be encompassed in "Five Families" of products. Each family covers a broad functional purpose while sub-products detail specific mission requirements with specific audiences.

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The new families of products are designed to provide FBI analysts with a greater range of analytic products.

Analysts will be able to select the product type that best suits a particular requirement and a particular audience. The family concept also lends itself to the adoption of future product types to address requirements unrecognized at present.

Former Products:

[REDACTED]

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Convey analytic conclusions based on comprehensive analysis; answers one main intelligence question
Intelligence Bulletins

Highlight new developments, trends

[REDACTED]

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Assess known or potential terrorist threats to an event

Situational Information Reports

Disseminate relevant localized information to state, local law enforcement (produced [REDACTED])

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Letterhead Memoranda

Respond to official requests, other case specific uses

A. [REDACTED]
B. [REDACTED]

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C. *Intelligence Assessment (IA)*

D. *Intelligence Study*

E. *Weekly Intelligence Reports (WIR)*

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F. [REDACTED]

G. [REDACTED]

A tool at the Collection Managers disposal when confronted with a new or emerging threat identified by the Domain Manager or a threat that had not previously been understood. It provides the [REDACTED] with the ability to develop a [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] to report immediately on

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[REDACTED]

The Five Families of Products

- A. Intelligence Studies
- B. Intelligence Assessments
- C. Intelligence Bulletins
- D. Intelligence Memos
- E. Intelligence Notes

- A. Intelligence Studies

comprehensive analytical works on an intelligence topic or threat of some significance. These products are mainly intended to convey as thoroughly as possible the FBI's understanding of this topic/threat to date.

Sub-products:

1. Intelligence Threat Study: a comprehensive analysis of a major topic/threat with an accompanying outlook for future trends and actions. Intended for dissemination to external [REDACTED]

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2. [REDACTED] similar to the Intelligence Threat Study but restricted to FBI internal dissemination. Contains operational data to include case numbers and more detailed [REDACTED] as well as operational measures taken.

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3. Case Study: an in-depth historical analysis of select cases whose unique features would benefit and add to the knowledge of FBI agents and analysts for current and future investigations. Such studies would generally be initiated upon case closure and would [REDACTED] at an FBI audience.

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4. [REDACTED] Takes the place of the [REDACTED] due to its more comprehensive nature. The Domain Section at FBIHQ retains responsibility for the content, approval and dissemination of the [REDACTED]

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B. [REDACTED] analytic products seeking to answer one primary intelligence question about a [REDACTED] Much less thorough than a study, assessments will have a singular focus and concentrate analysis on one main line.

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Sub-products:

1. [REDACTED] serves our external customers primarily by providing an analytic picture of some [REDACTED] [REDACTED] or intention for which the FBI and/or other agencies have collected related intelligence on. The analysis in the assessment focuses on addressing what the related reporting likely means, why it is important to our customers and what [REDACTED]

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2. [REDACTED] This nuanced version of the [REDACTED] looks at situations [REDACTED] [REDACTED] through the lens of an adversary. Very often hypothetical in nature, the [REDACTED] seeks to provide our customers with likely threat intentions, motivations and potential targets or opportunities.

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3. [REDACTED] examines specific adversary (usually state actors) efforts to obtain sensitive or protected US technology in order to [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] other advanced US technology.

While highlighting the technology involved and its

importance or application, the focus of the assessment is on the threat and their efforts to obtain the technology.

4. [REDACTED] To be produced at a later date when better technology is available to the FBI, the [REDACTED] will emphasize graphic tools, imagery, diagrams and data-links to convey its analytic message to the reader. This assessment will exist principally in a virtual format rather than a hard-copy paper format.

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5. [REDACTED] generally produced in the field to assess the risks posed by terrorists to high-profile, popularly-attended events. Such events include college or professional sports championship games, large political rallies and major community celebrations or festivals. They are produced for event organizers, local LE and appropriate USG agencies.

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C. Intelligence Bulletins:

convey briefer and generally more timely analysis to our customers. Reliant on far less source reporting than an assessment, the bulletin will seek to point more to a newly emerging trend or condition rather than analyze a threat operation in detail.

Sub-products

1. Intelligence Bulletin: provides customers with a brief analysis of recent reporting on an FBI-relevant threat or topic. Relies on little but very current reporting which suggests a new trend or change in threat behavior whose potential importance requires more immediate dissemination than a lengthier assessment would permit. Generally directed at external customers.

2. DHS-FBI Joint Bulletin: already existing, primarily to alert LE and first responders to potential terrorist threats. Almost always unclassified due to its audience, this bulletin possesses little analysis and serves more as a warning or alert document than as an analytic intelligence product.

3. Technical Analysis Bulletin: designed to afford the FBI to provide relevant subject matter experts with a technical analysis of some weapon, equipment, device or information application. The emphasis in the Technical Analysis Bulletin is on the technology and its importance and characteristics, not on the threat who may be employing it.

4. Notes and Perspectives: an amalgam of short, topically related items produced for the broad awareness of the targeted audience. Each item should include a brief analysis of its meaning, but fall short of that which might

be found in an assessment or bulletin. Each of the several items relies on very little underlying reporting. May be produced by a Field Office for its local partners.

D. Intelligence Memos

used as text-based briefing or information-sharing products, generally for more senior management officials. Due to the brevity of the memo, much of the underlying reporting and analysis will have been condensed in order to provide the audience with an essential understanding of the threat and actions taken by or proposed by the FBI to counter the threat.

Sub-products

1. Presidential Decision Briefs/National Threat Briefs/Spear: Existing high-level briefing tools, these products fall under the memo family as they are briefings. The Executive Intelligence Support Unit in the Directorate of Intelligence has proponentcy for the format, approval and dissemination of all three of these product types.

2. [REDACTED] produced from a variety of different distilled FBI reporting. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] in the Directorate of intelligence has proponentcy for the format, approval and dissemination of [REDACTED]

3. Letterhead Memorandum: used to send information to law enforcement and intelligence community partners. Unlike assessments and bulletins, LHMs do not contain recommendations or conclusions.

E. Intelligence Notes

[REDACTED] used to [REDACTED] of a [REDACTED] nature between investigative and case support/case management entities. Notes are disseminated only within the FBI and are not shared with external agencies. [REDACTED] notes offer detailed information regarding specific [REDACTED]

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Sub-products

1. [REDACTED] managed under the guidance of the [REDACTED] in the Directorate of Intelligence who is the proponent for format, guidance and approval.

2. [REDACTED] To be used as a specific vehicle for recording personal data on subjects of FBI investigations only. This is an internally used and handled product and subject to all of the limitations in [REDACTED] on collecting information on US persons.

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5. Needed Improvements:

In addition to the recommendations made above, discussions with Subject Matter Experts from FBIHQs and the Field has produced the below list of suggested changes/improvements that have the potential to help the Bureau towards its goal of [REDACTED]

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- A. A process to collect and analyze information to search for future threats. Currently need to tie it to a specific or rumored threat to legally collect/analyze the information.
- B. More people of all disciplines in every Field Office.
- C. Protocols to prevent or limit leadership from pulling officers from their "assigned" duties. In the field, IAs especially suffer from a lack of focus because they are pulled from their operational analysis duties. Operational analysts need to be dedicated to the same subject for 4-5 years.
- D. Improved "business process" so that analysts routinely get feedback from the consumer of their work as to its usefulness.
- E. Enhanced ability to find and exploit intelligence within the FBI's own databases to ensure that we know what we know.
- F. An ability to retain pertinent case and analytic information, including finished intelligence, in a collaborative environment which will allow finding and using what information has already been collected, analyzed, and produced or is in the process. The ability to tag and pair up related pieces of raw data so that work doesn't have to be done again. A sharing environment that contains the narrative of the operational environment and encourages the constant maintenance of understanding of that picture.