C06236482

## Approved for Release: 2015/04/29 C06236482

•	CONTROL AND	COVER	SHEET FOR T	OP SECRET D	OCUME	NT (COLLATER	AL)	••••;*
A TOP SECRET CO	ONTROL NUMBER	×		CIA COPY/SERIE	S NUMB	ER DOCUMENT	DATE (MM/D	D/YYYY)
то				<u>ح</u> 08/19/200			02	
OIG TS IG 2002-0596			· · ·			<u>.</u>	-	
Office	NUMBER		YEAR	Сору	Serie	85 d.	,	
NON-CIA DOCUMENT RECEIPT (MM/DD/YYYY)						NTROL NUMBERS LOGGED BY:		
JBJECT / TITLE:	······································	2000	-6207-IG				L	
J//FOUO) Intel	ligence Activity Asse	sment:	Compliance v	vith Executive	Order	12333: The Us	e of	Collection
Fron	n 1995-2000 (b)	(3) Nat	SecAct	· · · ·			(b)(3) N	atSecAct
A ORIGINATOR (D	Directorate, Office, Division,	Branch)		NON-CIA ORIG	INATOR	(Dept., Agency) Co	ntrol No., Cop	y No.
CI/OIG			*					
		· · · ·		1				
ATTE	NTION: Access to the attac For Accounta					ts or Top Secret co nd date this form.	ntrol personne	h e
REFERRED TO-	SEE	N BY	REFERRED TO		1	SEEN BY		
OFFICE	SIGNATURE		DATE	OFFICE		SIGNATURE		DATE
					-			
DGC								
								34
с. (4)							·	
			, .		-		(8.47.6	
		•			-		A 11000 0000	
							*	
· · ·								
						•		
				Ŧ			•	
	· · · ·	•					;	
					1.			
		e this sh	eet upon compl		tion not	1		
DOWNGRADED			DESTROYED			DISPATCHED TO (Non-CIA Agency)		
0 8'			BY (Signature)			то		
Y (Signature)			ED BY <i>(Signature)</i>	BY (Signature)				
ECTORATE & OFFIC	DIRECTORATE & OFFICE				DIRECTORATE & OFFICE			
ATE			DATE			DATE		
							-	

TOP\_SECRET//NOFORN /X1

(b)(3) NatSecAct

IG 2002-0596 19 August 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

John L. Helgerson Inspector General

SUBJECT:

(U//FOUO) Intelligence Activity Assessment: Compliance with Executive Order 12333: Th(b)(1)e of Collection (b)(1) From (b)(3) NatSecAct)00-6207-IG) (b)(3) NatSecAct

1. (U/LFOUG) Attached is the report of our assessment of the Agency's (b)(1) of coll(b)(1) on from 1995-2000 and Ac(b)(3) NatSecActornee wit(b)(3) NatSecActorney General implementing procedures under Executive Order (EO) 12333 that govern such techniques. The assessment is our first general review of CIA's use of a variety of collection techniques—primarily electronic surveillance and physical searches—that implicate individual privacy interests protected by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, applicable statutory law and EO 12333.

2. (U//FOOO) Although the issuance of the report has been delayed, I believe that it is an important historical survey and provides a baseline for future assessments in this area. Recognizing that some of the policies and practices may have changed since the survey period, I also believe that the suggestions, particularly the need to have increased communication with the Department of Justice (DoJ), have continuing value in the post 11 September environment.

3. (U//EOUO) We found that the Agency's use of , both within the United States colle(b)(1)1 (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecActbroad, wi(b)(3) NatSecActin compliance with EO 12333 and implementing procedures during the survey period. Agency officers are sensitive to the rules governing the targeting of U.S. persor(b)(1) th col1(b)(1).on and take EO 12333 restr(b)(3) NatSecActously. (b)(3) NatSecAct evidence that any CIA officer has intentionally disregarded requirements of EO 12333 or its implementing procedures. Agency officers generally understand they must seek legal advice and secure necessary policy approval(b)(1) use collection (b)(1) and they thin(b)(3) NatSecAct Deguidance and (b)(3) NatSecAct provided by the Office of General Counsel (OGC).

> DOWNGRADE TO UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO WHEN SEPARATED FROM ATTACHMENT

COPY

## Approved for Release: 2015/04/29 C06236482 TOP SECRET(b)(1))FORN / /X1 (b)(3) NatSecAct

SUBJECT:

(U//FOUO) Intelligence Activity Assessment: Compliance with Executive Order 12333: The (b)(1)of Coll(b)(1).on From (b)(3) NatSecAct<sup>000-62</sup>((b)(3) NatSecAct

(U//FOUO) A f(b)(1) cases were found 4. to raise compliance and (b)(3) NatSecActes. The Agency did not uniformly consult with DoJ early in the process of reviewing and in some whether to undertake (b)(1) cases CIA did not seek (b)(3) NatSecActeral (AG) approval or DoJ review when it would have been prudent to do so. These and other issues are discussed in detail in the report, which makes six suggestions encompassing process and procedural improvements, additional training for selected Agency officers, review by CIA, DoJ and National Security Council staff officers of standards (b)(1) and increased OGC consultation w(b)(3) NatSecAct fined cases involving special collection.

5. (U//EQUO) Of our six suggestions for specific remedial actions, the most important is the call for  $i(b)(1)^{ased}$  consultation with DoJ.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

6. (U//FOUO) The only downside I have heard suggested to consultation with DoJ (b)(1) is that such consultation is somet(b)(3) NatSecActed by unacceptable delay. If that were to be the case in the future, I believe intervention by you or the DDCI would resolve the matter. In the final analysis, DoJ has an interest in finding or developing a basis upon which to concur legally in what CIA proposes to do. If DoJ cannot find a way to concur in proposed Agenc<sub>3</sub>(b)(1) activities involving U.S. persons, CIA ol(b)(3) NatSecAct great risks in proceeding in such cases.

Approved for Release: 2015/04/29 C06236482

COPY

## Approved for Release: 2015/04/29 C06236482

(b)(3) CIAAct

SUBJECT:

(U//FOUO) Intelligence Activity Assessment: Compliance with Executive Order 12333: The (b)(1)of Coll(b)(1)on From (b)(3) NatSecAct<sup>000-620</sup>(b)(3) NatSecAct

7. (U) I would be happy to discuss the report or any questions you have at your convenience. The Deputy General Counsel has received a copy of this memorandum and, of course, should participate in any follow-on discussion.

Jøµn L. Helgerson

Attachment: As stated

cc: DDCI w/att Executive Director w/att Deputy General Counsel w/att