



U.S. Customs and
Border Protection

1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20229

October 9, 2020

SENT BY ELECTRONIC MAIL TO: agorski@aclu.org

Ashley Gorski
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
New York, NY 10004

Re: **20-cv-02213-NRB**

**American Civil Liberties Union and American Civil Liberties Foundation (ACLU) v
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE)**

Reproduction of First and Second Interim Releases for FOIA request CBP-2020-024672

Dear Ms. Gorski:

This letter concerns the First and Second Interim Releases in response to the above referenced Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) submitted January 9, 2020, in which you requested the following:

1. *All memoranda of understanding, information-sharing agreements, business requirements, contracts, letters of commitment, and other agreements with airlines, airports, other countries, or other U.S. federal, state, or local authorities, concerning any aspect of TVS, including the processing or receipt of data collected or generated through TVS.*
2. *All policies, procedures, guidelines, formal or informal guidance, advisories, directives, and memoranda concerning:*
 - a. *The acquisition, processing, retention, or dissemination of data collected or generated through TVS, including biometric templates;*
 - b. *Access by airlines, airports, cruise lines, seaports, commercial vendors, other countries, or other U.S. federal, state, or local authorities to data collected or generated through TVS, including biometric templates;*
 - c. *Retention or dissemination by airlines, airports, cruise lines, seaports, commercial vendors, other countries, or other U.S. federal, state, or local authorities of data collected or generated through TVS, including biometric templates.*
3. *All memoranda, briefing materials, advisories, presentations, or formal or informal guidance related to the December 5, 2019 announcement that "There are no current plans to require U.S. Citizens to provide photographs upon entry and exit from the United States," and that "CBP intends to have the planned regulatory action regarding U.S. citizens removed from the unified agenda next time it is published."*

4. *All records, excluding informal email correspondence, concerning the efficacy or efficiency of facial recognition technology, as compared to other biometric and/or biographic methods, for identifying visa overstays, reporting visa overstays by country, or identifying individuals using fraudulent travel documents.*

5. *Statistics created on or after November 1, 2018, concerning “facial comparison matching performance,” including valid matches, invalid matches, valid non-matches, invalid non-matches, consequences for individuals identified as non-matches, and the aforementioned data broken own by demographics including race, ethnicity, skin pigmentation, gender, age, and/or country of origin.*

6. *“Summary reports” that “present the actual performance of TVS against its [Biometric Air Exit Key Performance Parameters] in production.”*

7. *All final evaluations, tests, audits, analyses, studies, or assessments by the DHS Science and Technology Directorate, DHS Office of Biometric Identity Management, or the National Institute of Standards and Technology, in connection with CBP, related to (i) the performance of algorithms in matching facial photographs, and/or (ii) the performance of facial recognition technologies developed by vendors. This request encompasses records concerning whether the algorithms or technologies perform differently based on flight route or an individual’s race, ethnicity, skin pigmentation, gender, age, and/or country of origin.*

8. *All records, excluding informal email correspondence, concerning CBP’s implementation of recommendations by the DHS Science and Technology Directorate to conduct an analysis of the risk of “false matches based on the demographics (age, country of origin, gender) of travelers on individual flights.”*

9. *All final reports, memoranda, or budgets concerning the cost of implementation of facial recognition technology or TVS as part of entry and exit procedures.*

10. *All records, excluding informal email correspondence, concerning future interoperability between the TSA’s biometric capabilities and “mission partner systems,” including CBP and DHS Office of Biometric Identity Management systems.*

11. *All policies, memoranda, formal or informal guidance, training materials, or briefing materials concerning the purported legal basis for CBP to possess data on the TSA’s behalf in the course of a traveler identity verification process.*

12. *All memoranda, briefing materials, advisories, presentations, formal or informal guidance, or analysis concerning whether airline or airport involvement in TVS complies with Illinois’s Biometric Information Privacy Act.*

For the first interim release, CBP processed 311 pages of documents in response to your request. CBP determined that 193 pages are released, in part or in full, pursuant to Title 5 U.S.C. § 552

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(b)(4), (b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)(A), (b)(7)(C) and (b)(7)(E). In addition, we determined that 118 pages were not responsive to the request.

Turning to the second interim release, for this production, CBP processed 250 pages of documents in response to your request. CBP has determined that 237 pages may be released, in full or in part with redactions pursuant to Title 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(4), (b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and (b)(7)(E). In addition, we determined that 13 pages were not responsive to the request.

Information regarding the applicable exemptions and response can be found at the following link: <https://www.cbp.gov/document/guidance/exemption-definitions>. Copies of the FOIA and DHS regulations are available at www.dhs.gov/foia.

CBP is re-releasing the First and Second Interim Productions to you with all of the (b)(4) redactions removed, and with certain (b)(6) redactions removed. The page counts noted above have remained the same.

CBP wishes to bring to your attention several technical issues with the first two releases that have been corrected, to the extent possible, in the instant re-releases. First, on page FOIA CBP000296, due to issues with the redaction process, the (b)(7)(E) redaction at the bottom of the page was not visible when this production was originally sent to you, but it was asserted by CBP. CBP is now producing this page to you with the (b)(7)(E) redaction evident. Unfortunately, after many efforts, CBP is unable to produce this page without the presence of several black boxes at the bottom of the page. These black boxes do not obscure any text or images. CBP apologizes for this inconvenience.

Secondly, an incorrect set of pages FOIA CBP000187-000193 was produced during the first interim release. CBP has provided the correct version of pages FOIA CBP000187-000193 in the instant re-release. CBP apologizes for this error.

If you have any questions regarding this re-release of the first and second interim productions, please contact Assistant United States Attorney Jennifer Jude by email at Jennifer.Jude@usdoj.gov or 212-637-2663.

Please notate file number CBP-2020-024672 on any future correspondence to CBP related to this request.

Sincerely,



Jennifer R Davis

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Subject Matter Expert
FOIA Division
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

Enclosed: 430 pages

BIOMETRIC AIR EXIT

Standard Operating Procedure



U.S. Customs and Border Protection

March 2019

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Appendix A: Adjudicating (b)(7)(E) on Travelers Suspected of Entering the United States Without Inspection

Appendix B: (b)(7)(E)

Appendix C: (b)(7)(E)

1 Purpose

The purpose of this policy is to provide operational guidance and establish field responsibilities for personnel assigned to (b)(7)(E) biometric exit operations. This policy outlines the exception procedures (b)(7)(E) will follow to support biometric exit.

2 Background

In 2004, Congress required the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to develop a biometric entry and exit system. In 2013, Congress transferred the entry/exit mission to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Once the mission was transferred, CBP began testing various solutions and deploying biometric pilots across land and air ports of entry. In 2016, facial recognition exit testing began, leading to a realistic, scalable and adaptable biometric solution.

In order to support the biometric mission, CBP developed the Traveler Verification Service (TVS). TVS is a cloud-based matching service provided by CBP to stakeholders. In the air environment, CBP uses traveler data provided by the carrier via the Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) to identify passengers on a flight manifest. Biographic data from the APIS manifest is used to create a photo gallery. The photos are sourced and compiled from various government holdings, (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E) Each gallery is built (b)(7)(E) prior to the corresponding flight's scheduled departure. Prior to departure, each gallery is staged and ready for processing. Once a gallery is staged, it is updated periodically to capture APIS updates (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E) TVS receives a live captured photo during the boarding process and compares it against the TVS gallery formed for a given flight or location to find a match. A match at boarding indicates a biometric confirmation, and is documented as a biometrically confirmed departure in CBP systems.

There may be instances when photos are not loaded into the gallery on legitimate travelers because of name variations, dual citizenship, new or different documents (e.g. I-551 or foreign passport), aliases or other reasons. Reasons photos may not be located include, but are not limited to:

- (b)(7)(E)
-
-
-
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-

-
-
-

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

TVS technology incorporates a (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E) Together the system is capable of the following:

-
-
-
-

(b)(7)(E)

3 Policy

- 3.1 CBP's priority mission is to safeguard America's borders, thereby protecting the public from dangerous people and materials while enhancing the Nation's global economic competitiveness by enabling legitimate trade and travel.
- 3.2 The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 and the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (Public Law No. 110-53) called for the creation of a nationwide, biometric entry/exit system. In 2013, Congress transferred the biometric mission from the DHS to CBP.

3.3

(b)(7)(E)

4 Definitions

4.1 Biometric Data

Distinctive measurable physical characteristics (such as face and fingerprints) that uniquely identify a person.

4.2 Biometric Matching

Comparing biometrics (normally a live image to an enrolled image or images) to determine if the biometrics are from the same person.

4.3 Matching Exceptions

When the result of the biometric matching service reveals there is no match to a photo gallery. The biometric matching exceptions include false non-match, true non-match, and false match responses.

(b)(7)(E)

4.5 Photo Gallery

The photo gallery, also referred to as TVS gallery, is a compilation of photos pulled from DHS holding based on biographic information used for identity verification and matching. The gallery data is flight/terminal data and a unique identifier (UID) associated to the photo templates along with some photo metadata such as the photo source.

5 Authorities and References

The 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA, Public Law No. 104-208) called for the creation of an automated system to record arrivals and departures of non-citizens at all air, land and sea ports of entry. The 2002 Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act (EBSVERA, Public Law No. 107-173), the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA, Public Law No. 108-458), and the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (Public Law No. 110-53) called for the creation of a nationwide, biometric entry/exit system.

6 Procedures Prior to Boarding

6.1 Port Responsibilities

(b)(7)(E)

The (b)(7)(E) biographically identifies (b)(7)(E)
(b)(7)(E)
(b)(7)(E) An (b)(7)(E)
(b)(7)(E)

Ports will use all available systems to conduct (b)(7)(E) on travelers departing on outbound international flights in accordance with the procedures outlined in the (b)(7)(E). This responsibility now includes vetting passengers (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

6.2 (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

If it is determined that an individual is (b)(7)(E) an (b)(7)(E) to meet the traveler, (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E)

- Ports should refer identified aliens to the (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E) referral steps and procedures are located in Appendix B, (b)(5), (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E)
- (b)(5), (b)(7)(E)
- The (b)(7)(E) tracks the inspection from initial receipt by (b)(7)(E) to completion. (b)(7)(E)
- (b)(7)(E) inspection results are (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E) information is located in Appendix C, (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

7

(b)(7)(E)

As the Port identifies travelers requiring additional action by (b)(7)(E) the traveler's information will be sent to the (b)(7)(E) or other enforcement (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E) will prioritize and coordinate gate responses in accordance with existing outbound policy and the (b)(7)(E) to address issues that cannot be resolved directly through targeting.

(b)(7)(E)

During a response, if it is suspected that the traveler entered without inspection, CBP officers will (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E) Once it is confirmed that the subject is an EWI, the alien will be processed in the mobile application in accordance with Appendix B. The processing includes:

- Biometric collection (photo and fingerprints) for submission to (b)(7)(E)
- Law enforcement database queries (b)(7)(E)
- (b)(7)(E) and
- Documentation of the encounter in CBP systems.

If, during gate processing, it is determined that the subject has wants or warrants, has a different identity than the document presented, is a prior removal or deportee and meets prosecutorial thresholds, or is of any other CBP or law enforcement interest, the individual will be escorted to the CBP area and processed in accordance with the non-arriving alien policy. CBP officers should inform the air carrier that the traveler will be offloaded as soon as possible.

8 Air Carrier Boarding Process

Biometric exit solutions are supported by the airline industry. Biometric matching and flight confirmation occurs at the gate during the boarding process. The air carriers should adhere to the following procedures:

- At the departure gate, a traveler's photo is captured as the traveler approaches the boarding area. Once a satisfactory image is captured, the camera will provide a biometric match indicator.
- If the camera is unable to capture a satisfactory image, a second attempt at photo capture should occur.

- If a satisfactory image is still not obtained or the camera displays a no match indicator, the air carrier will follow the procedures outlined in section 8.1, Air Carrier Exception Procedures, of this policy.

8.1 Air Carrier Exception Procedures

As it pertains to CBP's biometric exit requirement, U.S. citizens, Canadian citizens, and travelers under 14 or over 79 are currently out-of-scope. In the event that any of these categories of travelers decline to be photographed (i.e., opt out from using TVS) or do not match via TVS, the air carrier may execute alternative manual processing. All other foreign nationals are required to submit their biometrics to the U.S. Government.

In the event that a U.S. citizen does not match through TVS or opts out at the departure gate, air carrier personnel should verify the traveler's identity against his or her U.S. passport before permitting the travel to board the aircraft. Once identity is verified, the air carrier personnel can revert to a manual boarding process. If the air carrier has any concern about the authenticity of the U.S. passport, or any concerns that the traveler is not the true bearer of the document, CBP may be contacted to adjudicate the matter.

CBP does not mandate an air carrier collect biometrics if an in-scope traveler declines to participate in the biometric process, (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

In regards to non-U.S. travelers, the air carrier, operating under its own authorities and business processes, can choose not to board the traveler if the traveler's identity is not adjudicated by CBP in time to allow for a timely departure. Air carrier personnel are not expected to detain or restrain passengers at the gate.

8.2 CBP Response

In all instances when contacted by a carrier, CBP will respond as soon as operationally feasible. CBP will inform the carrier as to an estimated time of arrival. (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

9 Equipment Failure and Outages

9.1 Proprietary Equipment Failure

When proprietary equipment is in use and that equipment is not working, gate agents should revert to manual processing and follow guidance provided by the manufacturer or service provider.

9.2 Mobile Enforcement Device Outage

If the (b)(7)(E) or other mobile enforcement runs excessively slow or suffers an outage, officers are encouraged to immediately complete routine maintenance on the slow or inoperable device (per device policy) or replace the device with a substitute/backup device.

Absent an operable enforcement device, officers will manually verify authenticity of documents and identity. Once identity is determined, allow the traveler to proceed through security or to the boarding gate.

(b)(7)(E)

9.3 Scheduled TVS or Mainframe Outages

During scheduled maintenance outages, the (b)(7)(E) or other designated unit will follow outage established outage protocols. There are built in redundancies that should not affect equipment operations, but if there is an adverse effect, users should revert to manual processing.

9.4 Unscheduled TVS or System Outage

In the event of an unscheduled TVS or system outage or TVS is returning excessive response times, biometric exit operations may be temporarily suspended. Air carriers can resort to manual processes until the system is back online. CBP officers should respond to (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)



U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Biometric Facial Debarkation
Business Requirements

Version 1.0
February 2019

Approval

Approved by: Colleen Manaher Date
Executive Director
Planning, Program Analysis and Evaluation
Entry/Exit Transformation
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

Revision Summary

Version	Date	Remarks
1.0	02/14/19	Initial Document

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1. Introduction

1.1 Background

U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Traveler Verification Service (TVS) enables deployment of a biometrically facilitated passenger inspection process for cruise line passengers under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. TVS uses facial recognition software in a cloud environment to match traveler photographs captured at debarkation with facial photographs maintained in U.S. Government holdings. Business sponsor participation in TVS is voluntary and is not mandated by CBP. TVS is designed to facilitate business sponsor procured and maintained infrastructure to efficiently and effectively fulfill the biometric entry-exit requirement for in-scope passengers; however, TVS is not the sole method of complying with this requirement. Through partnerships with various business sponsors, CBP is facilitating a large-scale transformation that will make travel more secure, predictable, and able to build integrity into the immigration system.

1.2 Purpose

The purpose of this document is to identify, at a high level, the business requirements for cruise lines and port authorities to participate in Biometric Facial Debarkation. This document focuses on arrival and entry to the U.S. using biometric technology. The use of biometric technology related to the departure of travelers, especially crew members, will be addressed in either an update to this document or in a separate business requirements document.

In addition, this document is intended as a companion to the TVS Technical Reference Guide. The TVS Technical Reference Guide provides the interface specifications for integrating CBP’s TVS and external stakeholder technology supporting the Biometric Facial Debarkation operations. CBP’s Office of Information and Technology (OIT) will work closely with each stakeholder in developing, testing, and implementing software as part of deployment of biometric facial debarkation.

2. Definitions

Term	Definition
Match	Passenger photograph successfully matched to gallery
Gallery	A library of facial photograph templates of passengers based upon a given ship manifest.
Declared Outage	There is a known outage to biometric matching systems
Failure to Capture	Image capture was unsuccessful
Non-match	Passenger photograph did not successfully match to gallery
Alternative Processing Required	Passenger requires alternative or additional inspection

3. Business Requirements

This section describes the business requirements for Biometric Facial Debarcation. The term ‘system’ in this Section refers to any physical equipment and/or any interface associated with the Biometric Facial Debarcation process.

#	Requirement	Comments
1	The business sponsor and its systems integrator must adhere to the requirements outlined in this document and any on-boarding guidance provided subsequently.	A business sponsor is a port authority or cruise line that facilitates the integration with the Traveler Verification Service (TVS) for the purposes of biometric facial debarcation.
2	The business sponsor must return a signed copy of the acknowledgement found at the end of the document. The acknowledgement confirms receipt of the program’s business requirements and records the business sponsor’s agreement to comply with the requirements.	Any TVS-related contract between a business sponsor and another organization (e.g., a systems integrator, vendor, or other third party) must contain flow down language that ensures compliance with all relevant business requirements and technical reference guides.
3	The business sponsor and its systems integrator must submit and receive approval for a proposal that incorporates the use of TVS. For approval, the business sponsor is required to submit the following: schedules for development, network engineering, testing, and deployment plans. In addition, the business sponsor must provide CBP with the camera's manufacturer name, model and serial number, and firmware versioning.	Proposals should be submitted to the CBP Air and Sea Entry Transformation program manager. The TVS Technical Reference Guides (TRG) contains specific technical requirements. Any required infrastructure and equipment must be procured and maintained by the business sponsor and/or its vendor.
4	The business sponsor and its systems integrator may not use any equipment to collect and send data to TVS, that has been manufactured by, or has parts that have been manufactured by, any company that is banned by statute from being purchased by a Federal government agency for national security purposes, in particular section 889 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (P.L. 115-232).	This covers video surveillance and telecommunications equipment produced by Hytera Communications Corporation, Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Company, Dahua Technology Company, or any other entity owned or controlled by, or otherwise connected to, the government of a covered foreign country (or any subsidiary or affiliate of such entities), who the Federal government is banned from using for national security reasons.

#	Requirement	Comments
5	The business sponsor and/or port authority must provide the necessary electrical power and reliable and secure network access (e.g., high-speed internet and/or cellular) for technology using TVS.	The TVS Technical Reference Guide contains specific internet access requirements and states, “Reliable, high-speed internet access is required. A hard-wired connection is preferred, but high speed wireless will be adequate if the connection can be reliable.” Cellular networks are also required to support CBP Officer mobile devices that will receive alerts related to biometric processing of travelers.
6	The business sponsor and its systems integrator/vendor must submit and receive approval for the proposed operational plan for biometric facial debaration using TVS-enabled technology. The operational plan should include the following: the name of the vessel, port location, average number of passengers and crew on vessel, percentage of travelers with WHTI-compliant vs. non-WHTI-compliant documents, number gangways/exit points to be used, number of TVS-enabled cameras, location where TVS-enabled technology will be deployed, queue management and coordination with cruise line security checkpoint protocols, passenger management (segregation of passengers, e.g. by document type, status (downliner) etc.), schedule for deployment, terminal/facility layout diagram.	Operational plan proposals should be submitted to the CBP Air and Sea Entry Transformation program manager. For approval, the business sponsor is required to coordinate with CBP officials from the local Port of Entry in developing the operational plan. Biometric facial debaration using TVS-enabled equipment may only be used for closed-loop cruises, until further notice. Furthermore, it is highly recommended that TVS-enabled technology is placed prior to baggage; however, the location will be determined by conditions/ constraints at the terminal facility and in coordination with CBP officials from the local Port of Entry.
7	The business sponsor and all relevant third parties (e.g., cruise lines, port authorities, system integrators) must comply with applicable DHS/CBP and TVS privacy policies and compliance documentation. Business sponsors and participating organizations should ensure their own privacy policies and notices are updated with relation to the use of TVS for biometric facial debaration processing.	The TVS Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) contains a complete list of applicable privacy policies (e.g., posting DHS-branded signs and facilitation of exemption processing for opt-out and out-of-scope travelers). The PIA is available at: https://www.dhs.gov/publication/dhscbp pia-056-traveler-verification-service-0

#	Requirement	Comments
8	<p>CBP is providing business sponsors the ability to participate in a TVS-enabled facial debarcation process to facilitate passenger inspections. The business sponsor (and all relevant cruise lines or port authorities) must comply with all CBP requirements for inspection of passengers.</p> <p>Pursuant to their contractual or other business relationship with travelers, business sponsors (e.g. cruise lines, port authorities) may mandate that passengers provide a facial photograph as part of their international arrival process. Business sponsors that elect to use TVS-facilitated inspections must assist travelers in complying with the biometric facial debarcation requirements and facilitate the capture and transmittal of a photograph for all participating travelers. Any passenger attempts to deceive the system (e.g., spoofing and intentional failure) should immediately be reported to CBP.</p>	<p>As it pertains to passenger inspections using TVS-enabled facial debarcations, participation by travelers is currently voluntary; however, participation may become mandatory in the future. In the event that a traveler declines to be photographed (i.e., opts out from the facilitative process using TVS), the cruise line must direct the traveler to a CBP Officer immediately for alternative manual inspection. However, unless otherwise exempted, foreign nationals are required to submit their biometrics to the U.S. Government as part of their admittance to the U.S. CBP personnel will respond to any law enforcement concerns related to the inspection of passengers for admission to the U.S. regardless of biometric facial debarcation operations.</p>
9	<p>Any photographs taken to facilitate TVS matching at the facial debarcation technology must not be stored and/or retained by the business sponsor or its vendor. All photographs must be immediately purged following transmittal to CBP's TVS. The business sponsor's system (including its systems integrator) must provide a mutually agreeable method by which CBP is able to audit compliance with this requirement.</p> <p>Photographs captured by the business sponsor pursuant to their contractual or other business relationship with travelers for use with internal business processes not related to TVS matching, must be managed according to the cruise line's privacy policies.</p>	<p>CBP will consider requests to retain the Advanced Passenger Information System Unique Identification Number and matching result (assuming compliance with DHS/CBP privacy requirements).</p>
10	<p>In the event that a traveler does not match through TVS, the cruise line personnel (or their designee) facilitating the use of the TVS-enabled technology will direct the traveler to a CBP Officer to confirm identity (i.e. alternative manual processing). To minimize the number of non-matches, the cruise line will segregate travelers based upon the document used to travel.</p>	<p>The business sponsor and all relevant third parties must ensure all personnel operating TVS-enabled technology are trained on standard operating procedures for biometric facial debarcation operations. Cruise lines will determine how to segregate travelers using a WHTI-compliant document from travelers using a non-WHTI compliant document to improve the efficiency of the biometric facial debarcation process.</p>

#	Requirement	Comments										
11	<p>To provide a consistent passenger experience, TVS enabled equipment must apply a set of consistent traveler-facing indicators. The following indicators must be used and visible to passengers, personnel operating/facilitating the use of the equipment, and CBP staff:</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="245 541 787 737"> <thead> <tr> <th data-bbox="250 541 415 583">Color</th> <th data-bbox="415 541 782 583">Meaning</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td data-bbox="250 583 415 615">Blue</td> <td data-bbox="415 583 782 615">No Match</td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="250 615 415 657">Yellow</td> <td data-bbox="415 615 782 657">Unable to Capture/ Recapture</td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="250 657 415 699">Green</td> <td data-bbox="415 657 782 699">Match</td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="250 699 415 737">Other Colors</td> <td data-bbox="415 699 782 737">TBD</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Color	Meaning	Blue	No Match	Yellow	Unable to Capture/ Recapture	Green	Match	Other Colors	TBD	<p>CBP reserves the right to alter and update the indicators. CBP will consider requests by the business sponsors to alter the defined list of indicators. The message and any accompanying symbols associated with the color indicator displayed on the TVS-enabled technology interface will be coordinated with and approved by the CBP Air and Sea Entry Transformation program office. The color indicator must be visible to personnel (cruise line employed or CBP officers) from an angle beyond the traveler-facing interface.</p>
Color	Meaning											
Blue	No Match											
Yellow	Unable to Capture/ Recapture											
Green	Match											
Other Colors	TBD											
12	<p>Any system log files associated with a TVS-enabled biometric facial debarcation solution must be approved by CBP to ensure compliance with DHS and CBP privacy and security policy.</p>	<p>The log files may be subject to select privacy and security policies depending on the content, retention period, and purpose.</p>										
13	<p>CBP must be allowed to review and/or audit any code, encryptions, network connections and any other TVS related technical specifications.</p>											
14	<p>Cruise lines and/or port authorities must ensure all voyage schedules and arrival times are updated within the relevant systems as soon as possible.</p>	<p>TVS is designed to ensure galleries are staged and removed "just in time". If a voyage arrival is significantly changed without a corresponding update with a new arrival time, biometric facial debarcation processing may not be available.</p>										
15	<p>Business sponsors who incorporate TVS as part of a single stop configuration, (i.e. combined traveler check out and biometric identity verification) will ensure the sequence of the process does not negatively impact the CBP TVS process or unnecessarily inconvenience the traveler.</p>	<p>If a single stop solution is proposed, CBP recommends that all cruise processes are completed, (e.g. resolution of outstanding balances, final debarcation, etc.) prior to submitting traveler photograph to TVS for matching.</p>										
16	<p>TVS performance standards for system availability and maintainability are provided on the TVS Service Level Statement.</p>											

#	Requirement	Comments
17	<p>CBP must be notified of any cybersecurity related incidents that occur on networks and hardware maintained by business sponsors (or other third party, e.g system integrator, vendor) which are integrated with CBP's TVS system. All known or suspected incidents shall be promptly reported to the CBP Air and Sea Entry Transformation program office and CBP Security Operations Center within one hour of discovery.</p>	<p>This requirement commences immediately once TVS integration is operational. Contact information will be provided by the CBP Air and Sea Entry Transformation program manager.</p>
18	<p>The business sponsor must produce and post CBP approved signage at locations proximal to where photographs are captured for TVS-matching.</p>	<p>The CBP Air and Sea Entry Transformation program manager will provide an electronic version of the signage to the business sponsor. Sign locations must be posted in close proximity to the collection points in order to provide travelers notice their photographs are being taken and the primary purpose for which the biometric is being collected.</p>
19	<p>CBP will distribute TVS performance data to the business sponsor (and other relevant stakeholders) on an agreed upon frequency that is operationally sustainable.</p>	<p>However, it is recommended that the business sponsor request their system integrator develop a mechanism wherein certain data reports can be produced independently.</p>
20	<p>Business sponsors are responsible for ensuring their participation in biometric facial debarcation using TVS is in compliance with applicable laws and contracts.</p>	<p>The business sponsor must confirm that equipment and traveler management processes are compliant with applicable fire codes, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), etc. and meet the requirements of CBP officials from the Port of Entry where biometric facial debarcation operations occur. For ADA compliance, it is recommended that a camera is provided at a height that is able to capture a photograph for individuals in wheelchairs or other mobility devices or whose height is below 48 inches.</p>
21	<p>All maintenance of the equipment provided by the business sponsor or relevant stakeholder in support of the TVS-related program is the responsibility of the business sponsor and/or the relevant participating stakeholders (e.g., port authorities, cruise lines, system integrator, or vendor). All maintenance personnel are required to meet all port security screening requirements.</p>	<p>Port security screening requirements may include criminal history, background and fingerprint check. Additionally, personnel may be required to obtain, possess, and display appropriate identification credentials/badge.</p>

#	Requirement	Comments
22	Any public communications regarding TVS performance or CBP's biometric facial debarcation program must be coordinated with CBP prior to release to the public or media. Any marketing campaigns and multimedia content related to CBP, TVS, or the biometric facial debarcation program must be approved in advance and in writing by CBP.	Public releases that do not reference CBP (or any of its programs and systems such as TVS) do not require CBP coordination or approval.
23	All documentation provided by CBP related to development of biometric facial debarcation capabilities or data sharing is only intended for the business sponsor and relevant third parties (e.g., cruise lines, port authorities, system integrators, etc.) and may contain privileged, confidential, and proprietary data that should not be copied, forwarded or distributed beyond the intended parties without approval from the Air and Sea Entry Transformation program manager.	Documentation includes, but is not limited to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Biometric Facial Debarcation Business Requirements; • Traveler Verification Service Technical Reference Guide(s); • Service Level Statement; Letter of Commitment; • XML schema, Business Rules, etc.

Acknowledgment Declaration

I, _____, acknowledge that I have received the Biometric Facial Debarkation Business Requirements Document (BRD) and Traveler Verification Service Technical Reference Guide (TRG) on behalf of _____, and will comply with the contents of each document.

Signature: _____

Printed Name: _____

Title: _____

Date: _____

Please return a signed copy of this document to the Director or Program Manager of the Air and Sea Entry Transformation Office.



U. S. Customs and Border Protection

Biometric Air Exit

Business Requirements

Version 1.1

November 1, 2018

Approvals

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

11/18

Approved by:

Colleen Manaher
Executive Director

Date

Planning, Program Analysis and Evaluation
Entry/Exit Transformation
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

Revision Summary

Version	Date	Remarks
1.0	September 19, 2018	Initial draft developed
1.1	November 1, 2018	Updated

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1. Introduction

1.1 Background

U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) “Traveler Verification Service” (TVS) offers a process for compliance with the pre-departure clearance of passengers under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. The TVS uses facial recognition software in a cloud environment to match traveler photos taken at the airport with facial photos maintained in U.S. Government holdings. Business sponsor participation in TVS is voluntary and is not mandated by CBP. Furthermore, TVS is designed to facilitate business sponsor procured and maintained infrastructure to efficiently and effectively fulfill the biometric exit requirement for in-scope passengers. It shall not be the sole method of complying with this requirement. Through partnerships with various business sponsors, CBP is facilitating a large-scale transformation that will facilitate air travel, while making it more secure in fulfillment of DHS mission responsibilities.

1.2 Purpose

The purpose of this document is to identify the business requirements for airlines and airport authorities to participate in Biometric Air Exit.

2. Definitions

Term	Definition
Declared Outage	There is a known outage to biometric matching systems
Failure to Capture	Image capture was unsuccessful
Match	Passenger photo successfully matched to gallery
Non-match	Passenger photo did not successfully match to gallery
Exception Processing Required	Passenger requires additional verification

3. Business Requirements

This section describes the business requirements for Biometric Air Exit. The term ‘system’ in Section 3 refers to any physical equipment and/or any interface associated to the Biometric Air Exit process.

#	Requirement	Comments
1	The business sponsor and its systems integrator must adhere to the requirements and timelines outlined in this document and the on-boarding guide below.	A business sponsor is an airline and/or airport authority that facilitates the use of the Traveler Verification Service (TVS) to implement Biometric Exit.
2	The business sponsor must return a signed copy of this document's acknowledgement page. The acknowledgment confirms receipt of the program's business requirements and records the business sponsor's agreement to comply with the requirements.	Any TVS-related contract between a business sponsor and another organization (e.g., a systems integrator, vendor, or other third party) must contain flow down language that ensures compliance with all relevant business requirements and technical reference guides.
3	The business sponsor and its systems integrator must submit and receive approval for a proposal, which incorporates the use of TVS. For approval, the business sponsor is required to submit information including schedules for development, network engineering, testing, and deployment plans. In addition, the business sponsor must provide CBP with the camera's manufacturer information to include name, model, serial number, and firmware versioning.	The TVS Technical Reference Guide contains specific requirements. Any required infrastructure and equipment must be procured and maintained by the business sponsor and/or its vendor.
4	The business sponsor must provide the required power for use of TVS, as well as reliable and secure network access (e.g., high-speed internet and/or cellular).	The TVS Technical Reference Guide contains specific internet requirements. Cellular networks are also required to support CBP Officer mobile devices that will be used to perform exception processing of travelers.
5	The business sponsor and all relevant third parties (e.g., airlines and port authorities) must comply with applicable DHS/CBP privacy policies and compliance documentation. Business sponsors and participating organizations should ensure their own privacy policies and notices are updated.	The TVS Privacy Impact Assessment contains a complete list of applicable privacy policies (e.g., posting DHS-branded signs, distribution of tear sheets, and facilitation of exemption processing for opt-out and out-of-scope travelers). This information can be found at: https://www.dhs.gov/publication/departure-information-systems-test
6	Any photos taken to facilitate TVS matching in any environment must not be stored and/or retained by the business sponsor or its systems integrator/vendor. All photos must be immediately purged following transmission to CBP's TVS. The business sponsor's system (including its systems integrator) must provide a mutually agreeable method by which CBP is able to audit compliance with this requirement.	CBP will consider requests by the business sponsor to retain the Advanced Passenger Information System Unique Identification Number and matching result (assuming compliance with DHS/CBP privacy requirements).

#	Requirement	Comments															
7	Any public communications regarding TVS performance or CBP's Biometric Exit program must be coordinated with CBP prior to release to the public or media. Any marketing campaigns and multimedia content related to CBP, TVS, or the Biometric Exit Program must be approved in advance and in writing by CBP.	Public releases that do not reference CBP or any of its programs and systems (such as TVS) do not require CBP coordination or approval.															
8	To provide a consistent passenger experience, all TVS-enabled equipment throughout the traveler continuum must apply a set of consistent traveler-facing indicators. The following indicators must be used and visible to both travelers and airline/CBP staff:	CBP will consider requests by the business sponsor to alter the defined list of indicators.															
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9	Any system log files associated with a TVS-enabled biometric exit solution must be approved by CBP to ensure compliance with DHS and CBP privacy and security policy.	The log files may be subject to select privacy and security policies depending on their content, retention period, and purpose.															
10	In the event that a U.S. citizen does not match through TVS, the airline personnel (or its designee) at the boarding gate should verify the traveler's identity against his/her U.S. passport, before permitting the traveler to board the aircraft. If there is any concern about the authenticity of the U.S. passport, or any concerns that the traveler presenting the U.S. passport is not the true bearer of the document, CBP can be contacted to adjudicate the matter. For non-U.S. citizens who do not match through TVS, CBP should be contacted for adjudication. CBP will respond as soon as operationally possible. Operating under its own authorities and business processes, the airline can choose to not board the traveler if the traveler's identity is not adjudicated by CBP in time to allow for a timely departure.	The business sponsor and all relevant airlines must ensure all boarding gate personnel operating international departure boarding gates are trained on alternative manual processing for persons who do not match through TVS.															

#	Requirement	Comments
11	Pursuant to their contractual or other business relationship with travelers, airline business sponsors may mandate that in-scope travelers provide a photo for TVS matching as part of their international departure boarding process. The business sponsor must comply with the biometric exit requirement for in-scope travelers. Airline personnel boarding travelers should assist travelers in complying with the biometric exit requirements. Any attempts to deceive the system (e.g., spoofing and intentional failure) should immediately be reported to CBP.	As it pertains to the biometric exit requirement, U.S. citizens, Canadian citizens, children, and the elderly are currently out-of-scope. In the event that any of these categories of travelers decline to be photographed (i.e., opt out from using TVS), the airline may execute alternative manual processing. All other foreign nationals are required to submit their biometrics to the U.S. Government. Business sponsors are not mandated to collect biometrics if an in-scope traveler declines to participate in the biometric process. The airline should advise the traveler of repercussions of not complying with biometric requirements (i.e., visa/ESTA revocation, etc.). In the event that an in-scope traveler elects to not participate in a TVS enabled boarding process, the airline must notify CBP. CBP will respond as soon as operationally possible. The airline may choose to not board the traveler if CBP does not arrive in time to allow for a timely departure.
12	Airlines must ensure all flight schedules and departure times are updated within the relevant systems as soon as possible.	TVS is designed to ensure galleries are staged and removed "just in time." Therefore, if a flight is significantly delayed without a corresponding update with a new departure time, biometric exit processing/boarding may not be available.
13	For TVS performance standards, the TVS Technical Reference Guide contains requirements for system scalability, availability, and maintainability.	The TVS Technical Reference Guide states "Reliable, high-speed internet access is required. A hard-wired connection is preferred, but high speed wireless will be adequate if the connection can be made reliable."
14	CBP must be allowed to review and/or audit any code, encryptions, network connections and any other TVS related technical specifications.	
15	The business sponsor must post CBP approved signage at locations proximal to collection of biometrics in order to provide travelers notice that their photographs are being taken and for what purposes.	

#	Requirement	Comments
16	CBP will distribute TVS performance data to the business sponsor (and relevant Biometric Exit Program stakeholders) on an agreed upon frequency that is operationally sustainable.	
17	CBP must be notified of any cybersecurity related incidents that occur on networks and hardware maintained by airport authorities and airlines which are integrated with CBP's TVS. All known or suspected incidents shall be promptly reported to the CBP Biometric Exit Program Office and CBP Security Operations Center (b)(7)(E).	This requirement commences immediately once TVS integration is operational.
18	Business sponsors are responsible for ensuring their participation in any TVS-related program is done in compliance with applicable laws and its relevant contracts. This includes any decision to integrate an e-gate into the biometric exit solution (e.g., the business sponsor must confirm such equipment is compliant with applicable fire code, the Americans with Disabilities Act, etc.).	
19	All maintenance of the equipment provided by the Business Sponsor or relevant stakeholder in support of the TVS-related program is the responsibility of that business sponsor and/or the relevant participating stakeholders. All maintenance personnel are required to meet all airport security screening requirements which include criminal history, background, and fingerprint check. Personnel are required to obtain, possess, and display a Secure Identification Display Area (SIDA) badge.	

Acknowledgment Declaration

I, _____ acknowledge that I have received the Biometric Exit Business Requirements Document (BRD) and Technical Reference Guide (TRG) on behalf of _____ and will comply with the contents.

Signature: _____

Name: _____

Title: _____

Date: _____



U. S. Customs and Border Protection
Biometric Air Exit
Business Requirements

Version 2.0
January 2020

Approvals

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

2/4/2020
Date

Approved by:

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Acting Executive Director
Planning, Program Analysis and Evaluation
Entry/Exit Transformation
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

Revision Summary

Version	Date	Remarks
1.0	September 19, 2018	Initial draft developed
1.1	November 1, 2018	Updated
1.2	August 1, 2019	Updated
2.0	December 1, 2019	Updated to include additional security requirements.
2.0	January 6, 2020	Inclusion of Appendices
2.0	February 4, 2020	Final edits for approval

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1. Introduction

1.1 Background

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is congressionally mandated to implement a biometric entry-exit system.¹ In 2017, CBP developed an integrated approach to a comprehensive biometric entry-exit system that stakeholders, including other U.S. government agencies and travel industry partners such as airlines, airports, and cruise lines, can incorporate into their respective operations. CBP offered relevant stakeholders, also known as business sponsors, an “identity as a service” solution that uses facial comparison technology to automate manual identity verification, and complies with the Congressional mandate for biometric exit. This harmonizes the data collection and privacy standards each stakeholder must follow.

CBP’s Traveler Verification Service (TVS) offers a process for compliance with the pre-departure clearance of passengers under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. TVS uses facial comparison technology in a cloud environment to match live traveler photos with photos maintained in U.S. Government holdings. Stakeholder participation in biometric exit is voluntary and is not mandated by CBP. Furthermore, the biometric exit program is designed to facilitate a public – private partnership wherein business sponsors procure and maintain biometric equipment that uses TVS to efficiently and effectively fulfill the biometric exit requirement for in-scope passengers.² Through partnerships with various business sponsors, CBP is enabling a large-scale transformation that will facilitate air travel, while making it more secure, in fulfillment of DHS mission responsibilities.

1.2 Purpose

The purpose of this document is to identify the business requirements for airlines and airport authorities to participate in biometric exit. Additionally, this document provides a list of operational recommendations that should be accounted for when onboarding new sites.

¹ The following statutes require DHS to take action to create an integrated entry-exit system: Section 2(a) of the Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management Improvement Act of 2000 (DMIA), Public Law 106-215, 114 Stat. 337; Section 110 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546; Section 205 of the Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-396, 114 Stat. 1637, 1641; Section 414 of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 353; Section 302 of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (Border Security Act), Pub. L. No. 107-173, 116 Stat. 543, 552; Section 7208 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638, 3817; Section 711 of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-53, 121 Stat. 266, 338; and Section 802 of the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-125, 130 Stat. 122, 199.

² An “in-scope” traveler is any person who is required by law to provide biometrics upon exit from the United States pursuant to 8 CFR 235.1(f)(ii). In-scope travelers include any aliens other than those specifically exempt as outlined in the CFR.

2. Definitions

Term	Definition
Biometric Confirmation Rate	The percentage of all travelers on a given flight who were biometrically confirmed.
Technical Match Rate	The percentage of in-scope travelers with a valid encounter photo and a gallery photo available for matching, who were successfully matched by TVS. For exit, this is a sample estimate of travelers who were positively matched out of all travelers who should have matched.
Capture Rate	The percentage of in-scope travelers whose encounter photo taken at crossing was of sufficient quality to be submitted and accepted by TVS for matching purposes. For exit this is an estimate based on a sample.
Photo Gallery	A compilation of government holding photos, specific to a flight manifest, used for facial comparison. Photo galleries are templated and stored in a cloud environment for matching.
Gallery Completion Rate	The percentage of travelers who had a gallery photo available for matching.
Exception Processing Required	Passenger needs manual processing. Please see Operational Considerations in Section 4 for additional instructions.

3. Business Requirements

This section describes the business requirements for Biometric Air Exit. The term ‘system’ in Section 3 refers to any physical equipment, software and/or any resource involved in the Biometric Air Exit process.

#	Requirement	Comments
1	The business sponsor and its systems integrator must adhere to the requirements outlined in this document and the technical on-boarding guide attached as Appendix A.	A business sponsor must be an airline and/or airport authority that facilitates the use of TVS to implement biometric exit. In addition to Appendix A, the CBP TVS New User Access Request (UAR) Form and TVS-In-A-Box New UAR Form are available upon request.

#	Requirement	Comments
2	The business sponsor must return a signed copy of this document’s acknowledgement and compliance page, which confirms receipt of the program’s business requirements and records the business sponsor’s agreement to comply with the requirements.	Any TVS-related contract between a business sponsor and another organization (e.g., a systems integrator, vendor, or other third party) must detail the specified actions and measures that will be taken to ensure compliance with all relevant business requirements contained herein and Technical Reference Guides (TRG).
3	The business sponsor and its systems integrator must submit and receive approval for a proposal, which incorporates the use of TVS. For approval, the business sponsor is required to submit information including: network topology, high-level solution architecture, test schedule, and deployment plan. In addition, the business sponsor must provide CBP with the camera’s manufacturer information, including name, model, serial number, and firmware version.	<p>The TVS TRG contains specific requirements. Any required infrastructure and equipment must be procured and maintained by the business sponsor and/or its vendor. Upon the release of an updated version of the TRG, the business sponsor must provide a plan and a reasonable timetable to bring the solution back into compliance with any Government-mandated changes. Any changes that are identified as “mandatory” must to be implemented as soon as technically possible, but no later than 60 days. CBP may provide an extension upon request.</p> <p>Upon review of the aforementioned documents (e.g., solution architecture), CBP may request additional IT and security documents from the business sponsor. Examples may include but are not limited to: the DHS Security Requirements Traceability Matrix (RTM); and/or FEDRAMP certification. All CBP requests for security documentation must be fulfilled and approved prior to “Go-Live” and connectivity with CBP’s Production environment. Existing partnerships will be required to comply within an agreed upon timeframe.</p>

#	Requirement	Comments
4	The business sponsor and its systems integrator must adhere to the CBP prescribed naming convention for device unique identifiers (i.e., camera's "Device_ID"). The scheme should comply with the following: (1) Port; (2) Terminal; (3) Gate; (4) Camera Model; and (5) Camera number. An example Device_ID is ATL-E-014-Vendor-01.	The TVS TRG mandates compliance with the Device_ID scheme on message elements. If the vendor recommends a different approach, CBP will consider all requests.
5	The business sponsor must provide the required power for use of TVS, as well as reliable and secure network access (e.g., high-speed internet and/or cellular).	<p>The TVS TRG contains specific internet requirements. Cellular networks are also required to support CBP Officer mobile devices that will be used to perform exception processing of travelers.</p> <p>The business sponsor must provide CBP with the site's network/internet bandwidth no later than the activation of the solution.</p>
6	The business sponsor and all relevant third parties (e.g., airlines and port authorities) must comply with applicable DHS/CBP security and privacy policies and compliance documentation. Business sponsors and participating organizations should ensure their own privacy policies and notices are updated. CBP will conduct compliance reviews on a periodic basis.	<p>The TVS Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) contains a complete list of applicable privacy policies (e.g., posting DHS-branded signs in close proximity of and prior to the cameras, provide CBP-approved tear sheets, boarding gate announcements, and facilitation of exemption processing for travelers who elect to opt-out). If e-signage is used, the CBP-approved language must be visible for the entirety of the boarding process.</p> <p>The current TVS PIA, along with the applicable appendices and its predecessor PIAs, can be found at: www.dhs.gov/privacy</p>

#	Requirement	Comments												
7	<p>Any photos taken to facilitate TVS matching must not be stored and/or retained by the business sponsor or its systems integrator/vendor. All photos must be immediately purged from the business sponsor’s system upon the photo’s transmission to TVS. The business sponsor’s system (including its systems integrator) must provide a mutually agreeable method by which CBP is able to audit compliance with this requirement.</p>	<p>CBP will consider requests by the business sponsor to retain the Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) Unique Identification Number (UID) and matching result (assuming compliance with DHS/CBP privacy requirements).</p> <p>An approved partner may collect photos of travelers using its own equipment under its own separate business process for its own commercial purposes. In this scenario, the business sponsor must distinguish its process from CBP’s TVS enabled one through signage and other forms of public notice.</p>												
8	<p>Any public communications regarding TVS performance or CBP’s biometric exit program must be coordinated with CBP prior to release to the public or media. Any marketing campaigns and multimedia content related to CBP, TVS, or the biometric exit program must be approved in advance and in writing by CBP.</p>	<p>Public releases that do not reference CBP or any of its programs and systems (such as TVS) do not require CBP coordination or approval.</p> <p>Public releases that do reference CBP or any of its programs and systems should be coordinated as soon as possible. CBP recommends at least 7 days in advance to ensure prompt approval.</p>												
9	<p>To provide a consistent passenger experience, all TVS-enabled equipment throughout the traveler continuum must apply a set of consistent traveler-facing indicators. The following indicators must be used and visible to both travelers and airline/CBP staff:</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="256 1591 912 1780"> <thead> <tr> <th>Color</th> <th>Symbol</th> <th>Meaning</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Blue</td> <td>X</td> <td>No Match</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Yellow</td> <td>Refresh</td> <td>Recapture or Error/Issue</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Green</td> <td>Checkmark</td> <td>Match/Board</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Color	Symbol	Meaning	Blue	X	No Match	Yellow	Refresh	Recapture or Error/Issue	Green	Checkmark	Match/Board	<p>CBP will consider requests by the business sponsor to alter the defined list of indicators.</p> <p>The messaging for the blue light indicator can vary by vendor and/or stakeholder. An example of messaging: “Please see gate agent.”</p>
Color	Symbol	Meaning												
Blue	X	No Match												
Yellow	Refresh	Recapture or Error/Issue												
Green	Checkmark	Match/Board												

#	Requirement	Comments
10	Any system log files and data stored, associated with a TVS-enabled biometric exit solution transaction data, must be approved by CBP to ensure compliance with DHS and CBP privacy and security policy.	The log files and data may be subject to select privacy and security policies depending on their content, retention period, and purpose. All data must be encrypted at rest and in transit.
11	For TVS performance standards, the TVS TRG contains requirements for system scalability, availability, and maintainability.	The TVS TRG states “Reliable, high-speed internet access is required. A hard-wired connection is preferred, but high speed wireless will be adequate if the connection can be made reliable.”
12	CBP must be allowed to review and/or audit any code, encryptions, network connections and any other TVS related technical specifications.	
13	<p>The business sponsor must ensure that CBP-approved signage is posted at each gate location, while the biometric boarding processing is ongoing. This is described below. The signage must be clearly visible and placed at a sufficient distance in front of the camera in order to provide the traveler with a reasonable opportunity to read the content and opt-out before reaching the photo capture area.</p> <p>Where signage is at least 22 inches wide and 28 inches tall, only one sign needs to be present. If signage is smaller than 22 inches wide and 28 inches tall, a minimum of two signs need to be present unless accompanied by e-signage (described below). Posted signage should never be smaller than 7 inches wide and 11 inches tall.</p> <p>Business sponsors can elect to display e-signage in either a static or slide show format. Should e-signage be displayed as part of a slide show, it must be visible for at least 45 seconds once every 5 minutes and be accompanied by at least one posted sign of a size no smaller than 7 inches wide by 11 inches tall. If the signage is displayed in a static format, it must be maintained as such throughout the entirety of the boarding process.</p>	<p>Any updates to CBP mandated privacy signage must be posted as soon as possible (e.g., sufficient time for fabrication and posting). Business sponsors can find the most current version of communication materials on the CBP website.</p> <p>www.cbp.gov/biometrics</p>

#	Requirement	Comments
14	CBP will distribute TVS performance data to the business sponsor (and relevant biometric exit program stakeholders) on an agreed-upon frequency that is operationally sustainable.	
15	CBP may request ad hoc performance reporting on select systems integrated with TVS. Examples include, but are not limited to: (a) estimated number of opt-outs; (b) camera capture rates; (c) number of travelers processed; (d) average photo quality scores; and (e) percentage of photos taken that were below the prescribed quality threshold.	
16	Upon the identification of a system performance issue, the business sponsor and its systems integrator must provide a detailed remediation plan and schedule. The business sponsor will provide progress reports to the CBP Biometric Exit Program Office on a mutually agreed-upon interval.	All remediation schedules must be completed as quickly as possible.
17	CBP must be notified of any cybersecurity-related incidents or breaches that occur on networks and hardware maintained by airport authorities and airlines which are integrated with CBP's TVS. All known or suspected incidents or breaches shall be promptly reported to the CBP Biometric Exit Program Office, CBP Privacy Office, and CBP Security Operations Center within 24 hours after discovery of a suspected incident or within 1 hour after a suspected incident has been confirmed, whichever is earlier.	<p>This requirement begins immediately once TVS integration is operational.</p> <p>Points of Contact:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Biometric Exit Program Office: <div style="background-color: black; color: white; padding: 2px;">(b)(7)(E)</div> • CBP Privacy Office: <div style="background-color: black; color: white; padding: 2px;">(b)(7)(E)</div> • CBP Security Operations Center: <div style="background-color: black; color: white; padding: 2px;">(b)(7)(E)</div> <p>Source: DHS Privacy Incident Handling Guidance (https://www.dhs.gov/publication/privacy-incident-handling-guidance-0)</p>

#	Requirement	Comments
18	The sponsor and/or vendor must ensure that all access to the hardware is secured and restricted to authorized personnel only. CBP does not permit any unsecured methods of externally accessing the camera (e.g., interfaces or ports such as USB). Furthermore, access to the system and its endpoints must require no less than a username/log-in and password.	
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21	All maintenance of the equipment and software development provided by the business sponsor or relevant stakeholder in support of the TVS-related program is the responsibility of that business sponsor and/or the relevant participating stakeholders. Any personnel with access to equipment that is located airside must meet airport security requirements for access to secured areas. Airport security screening requirements may include criminal history, background, and fingerprint check and CBP vetting.	

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22	The business sponsor and its systems integrator may not use any equipment to collect and send data to TVS, which has been manufactured by, or has parts that have been manufactured by, any company that is banned by statute or regulation from being purchased by a Federal Government agency, or is suspended or debarred for federal contracts. This includes Section 889 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 and the System for Award Management (SAM).	This covers video surveillance and telecommunications equipment produced by ZTE, Hytera Communications Corporation, Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Company, or Dahua Technology Company (or any subsidiary or affiliate of such entities), whom the Federal Government is banned from using for national security reasons.
23	All relevant business sponsor and system integrator personnel are required to review CBP's Privacy and Security Principles.	Please see Appendix B for a list of CBP's Privacy and Security Principles.

4. Operational Considerations and Recommendations

This section describes the operational considerations for carriers conducting biometric exit.

#	Operational/Onboarding Considerations	Comments
1	The business sponsor and its systems integrator must submit and receive approval for its deployment schedule.	
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3.	It is highly recommended that all carriers provide boarding announcements prior to boarding and periodically throughout the boarding process. The boarding gate announcements should clearly convey the use of TVS for purposes of boarding	Please see www.cbp.gov/biometrics for the most current version of the Biometric Boarding Gate Announcement script and/or recording that gate agents should use.

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Acknowledgement and Compliance Declaration

I, _____, acknowledge that I have received and read the Biometric Exit Business Requirements Document (BRD) and Technical Reference Guide (TRG) on behalf of _____, and agree to comply with the contents as of the date of signature.

Signature: _____

Name: _____

Title: _____

Date: _____

Appendix A: TVS Onboarding Guide

Upon commitment to implementing a biometric verification process, CBP will provide the business sponsor the TVS Technical Reference Guide(s).

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Appendix B: CBP Privacy and Security Principles

FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICE PRINCIPLES (DHS FIPPs)

- **Transparency:** DHS should be transparent and provide notice to the individual regarding its collection, use, dissemination, and maintenance of personally identifiable information (PII).
- **Individual Participation:** DHS should involve the individual in the process of using PII and, to the extent practicable, seek individual consent for the collection, use, dissemination, and maintenance of PII. DHS should also provide mechanisms for appropriate access, correction, and redress regarding DHS's use of PII.
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- **Data Quality and Integrity:** DHS should, to the extent practicable, ensure that PII is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete.
- **Security:** DHS should protect PII (in all media) through appropriate security safeguards against risks such as loss, unauthorized access or use, destruction, modification, or unintended or inappropriate disclosure.
- **Accountability and Auditing:** DHS should be accountable for complying with these principles, providing training to all employees and contractors who use PII, and auditing the actual use of PII to demonstrate compliance with these principles and all applicable privacy protection requirements.³

³ *Privacy Policy Guidance Memorandum*, Hugo Teufel III, Chief Privacy Officer, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (Dec. 29, 2008), www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_policyguide_2008-01.pdf.



U. S. Customs and Border Protection
Biometric Air Exit
Business Requirements

Version 2.0
January 2020

Approvals

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

2/4/2020
Date

Approved by:

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Acting Executive Director
Planning, Program Analysis and Evaluation
Entry/Exit Transformation
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

Revision Summary

Version	Date	Remarks
1.0	September 19, 2018	Initial draft developed
1.1	November 1, 2018	Updated
1.2	August 1, 2019	Updated
2.0	December 1, 2019	Updated to include additional security requirements.
2.0	January 6, 2020	Inclusion of Appendices
2.0	February 4, 2020	Final edits for approval

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1. Introduction

1.1 Background

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is congressionally mandated to implement a biometric entry-exit system.¹ In 2017, CBP developed an integrated approach to a comprehensive biometric entry-exit system that stakeholders, including other U.S. government agencies and travel industry partners such as airlines, airports, and cruise lines, can incorporate into their respective operations. CBP offered relevant stakeholders, also known as business sponsors, an “identity as a service” solution that uses facial comparison technology to automate manual identity verification, and complies with the Congressional mandate for biometric exit. This harmonizes the data collection and privacy standards each stakeholder must follow.

CBP’s Traveler Verification Service (TVS) offers a process for compliance with the pre-departure clearance of passengers under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. TVS uses facial comparison technology in a cloud environment to match live traveler photos with photos maintained in U.S. Government holdings. Stakeholder participation in biometric exit is voluntary and is not mandated by CBP. Furthermore, the biometric exit program is designed to facilitate a public – private partnership wherein business sponsors procure and maintain biometric equipment that uses TVS to efficiently and effectively fulfill the biometric exit requirement for in-scope passengers.² Through partnerships with various business sponsors, CBP is enabling a large-scale transformation that will facilitate air travel, while making it more secure, in fulfillment of DHS mission responsibilities.

1.2 Purpose

The purpose of this document is to identify the business requirements for airlines and airport authorities to participate in biometric exit. Additionally, this document provides a list of operational recommendations that should be accounted for when onboarding new sites.

¹ The following statutes require DHS to take action to create an integrated entry-exit system: Section 2(a) of the Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management Improvement Act of 2000 (DMIA), Public Law 106-215, 114 Stat. 337; Section 110 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546; Section 205 of the Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-396, 114 Stat. 1637, 1641; Section 414 of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 353; Section 302 of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (Border Security Act), Pub. L. No. 107-173, 116 Stat. 543, 552; Section 7208 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638, 3817; Section 711 of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-53, 121 Stat. 266, 338; and Section 802 of the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-125, 130 Stat. 122, 199.

² An “in-scope” traveler is any person who is required by law to provide biometrics upon exit from the United States pursuant to 8 CFR 235.1(f)(ii). In-scope travelers include any aliens other than those specifically exempt as outlined in the CFR.

2. Definitions

Term	Definition
Biometric Confirmation Rate	The percentage of all travelers on a given flight who were biometrically confirmed.
Technical Match Rate	The percentage of in-scope travelers with a valid encounter photo and a gallery photo available for matching, who were successfully matched by TVS. For exit, this is a sample estimate of travelers who were positively matched out of all travelers who should have matched.
Capture Rate	The percentage of in-scope travelers whose encounter photo taken at crossing was of sufficient quality to be submitted and accepted by TVS for matching purposes. For exit this is an estimate based on a sample.
Photo Gallery	A compilation of government holding photos, specific to a flight manifest, used for facial comparison. Photo galleries are templated and stored in a cloud environment for matching.
Gallery Completion Rate	The percentage of travelers who had a gallery photo available for matching.
Exception Processing Required	Passenger needs manual processing. Please see Operational Considerations in Section 4 for additional instructions.

3. Business Requirements

This section describes the business requirements for Biometric Air Exit. The term ‘system’ in Section 3 refers to any physical equipment, software and/or any resource involved in the Biometric Air Exit process.

#	Requirement	Comments
1	The business sponsor and its systems integrator must adhere to the requirements outlined in this document and the technical on-boarding guide attached as Appendix A.	A business sponsor must be an airline and/or airport authority that facilitates the use of TVS to implement biometric exit. In addition to Appendix A, the CBP TVS New User Access Request (UAR) Form and TVS-In-A-Box New UAR Form are available upon request.

#	Requirement	Comments
2	The business sponsor must return a signed copy of this document’s acknowledgement and compliance page, which confirms receipt of the program’s business requirements and records the business sponsor’s agreement to comply with the requirements.	Any TVS-related contract between a business sponsor and another organization (e.g., a systems integrator, vendor, or other third party) must detail the specified actions and measures that will be taken to ensure compliance with all relevant business requirements contained herein and Technical Reference Guides (TRG).
3	The business sponsor and its systems integrator must submit and receive approval for a proposal, which incorporates the use of TVS. For approval, the business sponsor is required to submit information including: network topology, high-level solution architecture, test schedule, and deployment plan. In addition, the business sponsor must provide CBP with the camera’s manufacturer information, including name, model, serial number, and firmware version.	<p>The TVS TRG contains specific requirements. Any required infrastructure and equipment must be procured and maintained by the business sponsor and/or its vendor. Upon the release of an updated version of the TRG, the business sponsor must provide a plan and a reasonable timetable to bring the solution back into compliance with any Government-mandated changes. Any changes that are identified as “mandatory” must to be implemented as soon as technically possible, but no later than 60 days. CBP may provide an extension upon request.</p> <p>Upon review of the aforementioned documents (e.g., solution architecture), CBP may request additional IT and security documents from the business sponsor. Examples may include but are not limited to: the DHS Security Requirements Traceability Matrix (RTM); and/or FEDRAMP certification. All CBP requests for security documentation must be fulfilled and approved prior to “Go-Live” and connectivity with CBP’s Production environment. Existing partnerships will be required to comply within an agreed upon timeframe.</p>

#	Requirement	Comments
4	The business sponsor and its systems integrator must adhere to the CBP prescribed naming convention for device unique identifiers (i.e., camera's "Device_ID"). The scheme should comply with the following: (1) Port; (2) Terminal; (3) Gate; (4) Camera Model; and (5) Camera number. An example Device_ID is ATL-E-014-Vendor-01.	The TVS TRG mandates compliance with the Device_ID scheme on message elements. If the vendor recommends a different approach, CBP will consider all requests.
5	The business sponsor must provide the required power for use of TVS, as well as reliable and secure network access (e.g., high-speed internet and/or cellular).	<p>The TVS TRG contains specific internet requirements. Cellular networks are also required to support CBP Officer mobile devices that will be used to perform exception processing of travelers.</p> <p>The business sponsor must provide CBP with the site's network/internet bandwidth no later than the activation of the solution.</p>
6	The business sponsor and all relevant third parties (e.g., airlines and port authorities) must comply with applicable DHS/CBP security and privacy policies and compliance documentation. Business sponsors and participating organizations should ensure their own privacy policies and notices are updated. CBP will conduct compliance reviews on a periodic basis.	<p>The TVS Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) contains a complete list of applicable privacy policies (e.g., posting DHS-branded signs in close proximity of and prior to the cameras, provide CBP-approved tear sheets, boarding gate announcements, and facilitation of exemption processing for travelers who elect to opt-out). If e-signage is used, the CBP-approved language must be visible for the entirety of the boarding process.</p> <p>The current TVS PIA, along with the applicable appendices and its predecessor PIAs, can be found at: www.dhs.gov/privacy</p>

#	Requirement	Comments												
7	<p>Any photos taken to facilitate TVS matching must not be stored and/or retained by the business sponsor or its systems integrator/vendor. All photos must be immediately purged from the business sponsor’s system upon the photo’s transmission to TVS. The business sponsor’s system (including its systems integrator) must provide a mutually agreeable method by which CBP is able to audit compliance with this requirement.</p>	<p>CBP will consider requests by the business sponsor to retain the Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) Unique Identification Number (UID) and matching result (assuming compliance with DHS/CBP privacy requirements).</p> <p>An approved partner may collect photos of travelers using its own equipment under its own separate business process for its own commercial purposes. In this scenario, the business sponsor must distinguish its process from CBP’s TVS enabled one through signage and other forms of public notice.</p>												
8	<p>Any public communications regarding TVS performance or CBP’s biometric exit program must be coordinated with CBP prior to release to the public or media. Any marketing campaigns and multimedia content related to CBP, TVS, or the biometric exit program must be approved in advance and in writing by CBP.</p>	<p>Public releases that do not reference CBP or any of its programs and systems (such as TVS) do not require CBP coordination or approval.</p> <p>Public releases that do reference CBP or any of its programs and systems should be coordinated as soon as possible. CBP recommends at least 7 days in advance to ensure prompt approval.</p>												
9	<p>To provide a consistent passenger experience, all TVS-enabled equipment throughout the traveler continuum must apply a set of consistent traveler-facing indicators. The following indicators must be used and visible to both travelers and airline/CBP staff:</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="256 1591 912 1780"> <thead> <tr> <th>Color</th> <th>Symbol</th> <th>Meaning</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Blue</td> <td>X</td> <td>No Match</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Yellow</td> <td>Refresh</td> <td>Recapture or Error/Issue</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Green</td> <td>Checkmark</td> <td>Match/Board</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Color	Symbol	Meaning	Blue	X	No Match	Yellow	Refresh	Recapture or Error/Issue	Green	Checkmark	Match/Board	<p>CBP will consider requests by the business sponsor to alter the defined list of indicators.</p> <p>The messaging for the blue light indicator can vary by vendor and/or stakeholder. An example of messaging: “Please see gate agent.”</p>
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10	Any system log files and data stored, associated with a TVS-enabled biometric exit solution transaction data, must be approved by CBP to ensure compliance with DHS and CBP privacy and security policy.	The log files and data may be subject to select privacy and security policies depending on their content, retention period, and purpose. All data must be encrypted at rest and in transit.
11	For TVS performance standards, the TVS TRG contains requirements for system scalability, availability, and maintainability.	The TVS TRG states “Reliable, high-speed internet access is required. A hard-wired connection is preferred, but high speed wireless will be adequate if the connection can be made reliable.”
12	CBP must be allowed to review and/or audit any code, encryptions, network connections and any other TVS related technical specifications.	
13	<p>The business sponsor must ensure that CBP-approved signage is posted at each gate location, while the biometric boarding processing is ongoing. This is described below. The signage must be clearly visible and placed at a sufficient distance in front of the camera in order to provide the traveler with a reasonable opportunity to read the content and opt-out before reaching the photo capture area.</p> <p>Where signage is at least 22 inches wide and 28 inches tall, only one sign needs to be present. If signage is smaller than 22 inches wide and 28 inches tall, a minimum of two signs need to be present unless accompanied by e-signage (described below). Posted signage should never be smaller than 7 inches wide and 11 inches tall.</p> <p>Business sponsors can elect to display e-signage in either a static or slide show format. Should e-signage be displayed as part of a slide show, it must be visible for at least 45 seconds once every 5 minutes and be accompanied by at least one posted sign of a size no smaller than 7 inches wide by 11 inches tall. If the signage is displayed in a static format, it must be maintained as such throughout the entirety of the boarding process.</p>	<p>Any updates to CBP mandated privacy signage must be posted as soon as possible (e.g., sufficient time for fabrication and posting). Business sponsors can find the most current version of communication materials on the CBP website.</p> <p>www.cbp.gov/biometrics</p>

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14	CBP will distribute TVS performance data to the business sponsor (and relevant biometric exit program stakeholders) on an agreed-upon frequency that is operationally sustainable.	
15	CBP may request ad hoc performance reporting on select systems integrated with TVS. Examples include, but are not limited to: (a) estimated number of opt-outs; (b) camera capture rates; (c) number of travelers processed; (d) average photo quality scores; and (e) percentage of photos taken that were below the prescribed quality threshold.	
16	Upon the identification of a system performance issue, the business sponsor and its systems integrator must provide a detailed remediation plan and schedule. The business sponsor will provide progress reports to the CBP Biometric Exit Program Office on a mutually agreed-upon interval.	All remediation schedules must be completed as quickly as possible.
17	CBP must be notified of any cybersecurity-related incidents or breaches that occur on networks and hardware maintained by airport authorities and airlines which are integrated with CBP's TVS. All known or suspected incidents or breaches shall be promptly reported to the CBP Biometric Exit Program Office, CBP Privacy Office, and CBP Security Operations Center within 24 hours after discovery of a suspected incident or within 1 hour after a suspected incident has been confirmed, whichever is earlier.	<p>This requirement begins immediately once TVS integration is operational.</p> <p>Points of Contact:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Biometric Exit Program Office: <div style="background-color: black; color: white; padding: 2px;">(b)(7)(E)</div> • CBP Privacy Office: <div style="background-color: black; color: white; padding: 2px;">(b)(7)(E)</div> • CBP Security Operations Center: <div style="background-color: black; color: white; padding: 2px;">(b)(7)(E)</div> <p>Source: DHS Privacy Incident Handling Guidance (https://www.dhs.gov/publication/privacy-incident-handling-guidance-0)</p>

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Acknowledgement and Compliance Declaration

I, (b)(6), acknowledge that I have received and read the Biometric Exit Business Requirements Document (BRD) and Technical Reference Guide (TRG) on behalf of Delta Air Lines, and agree to comply with the contents as of the date of signature.

Signature: (b)(6)
Name: (b)(6)
Title: Managing Director - Passenger Facilitation
Date: 3/12/2020

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- **Data Quality and Integrity**: DHS should, to the extent practicable, ensure that PII is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete.
- **Security**: DHS should protect PII (in all media) through appropriate security safeguards against risks such as loss, unauthorized access or use, destruction, modification, or unintended or inappropriate disclosure.
- **Accountability and Auditing**: DHS should be accountable for complying with these principles, providing training to all employees and contractors who use PII, and auditing the actual use of PII to demonstrate compliance with these principles and all applicable privacy protection requirements.³

³ *Privacy Policy Guidance Memorandum*, Hugo Teufel III, Chief Privacy Officer, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (Dec. 29, 2008), www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_policyguide_2008-01.pdf.



December 10th, 2018

Colleen Manaher
Executive Director
Planning, Program Analysis and Evaluation
Entry/Exit Transformation
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
1300 Pennsylvania Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20229
United States of America

Commitment letter for Simplified Travel

Dear Colleen Manaher,

This letter is to commit that All Nippon Airways Co., Ltd. (ANA) will implement Biometric Exit which is taking place as a part of CBP's Simplified Travel initiative.

We believe that your strategy with the facial recognition functionality will contribute not only to our customers' convenience of seamless and hassle-free travel but also to our efficient boarding process, which would become a standard in the airline industry in very near future. Kindly allow us to advise you the relevant facts listed below.

1. The entity or organization making the commitment to implement Biometric Exit

ANA intends to implement Biometric Exit for (b)(5).
(b)(5) It is also applicable to flights operated by Air Japan Co., Ltd. (AJX), one of ANA group companies, which outsource their basic business to ANA.

2. The degree or extent of the commitment to which Biometric Exit will be implemented

As stated above, ANA and AJX will implement Biometric Exit for (b)(5).
(b)(5). In the meantime, ANA and AJX are (b)(5).
(b)(5)



(b)(5)

As of December, 2018, applicable airports and their current status are as below;

Airport	Current status (as of December, 2018)
John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Biometric Exit is (b)(5) operated by British airways, but (b)(5) (b)(5)
Washington Dulles International Airport (IAD)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Metropolitan Washington Airport Authority (MWAA) has begun to introduce CBP-approved Biometric Exit. So far, some airlines excluding ANA have entered the trial.
Chicago O'Hare International Airport (ORD)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">No progress to implement the program
Seattle-Tacoma International Airport (SEA)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Biometric Exit is (b)(5) (b)(5)
Los Angeles International Airport (LAX)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Some other airlines are piloting Biometric Exit with (b)(5) (b)(5)
San Francisco International Airport (SFO)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">A trial started with a United (UA) flight with (b)(5) (b)(5)
Norman Y. Mineta San José International Airport (SJC)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">A pilot implementation (b)(5) from (b)(5) for (b)(5) airlines including ANA.
Daniel K. Inouye International Airport (HNL)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">(b)(5)
George Bush International Airport (IAH)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">A trial is (b)(5) with UA flight to Tokyo.



3. The current state of implementation

(b)(5) ANA (b)(5)
(b)(5)
ANA (b)(5)
(b)(5)

4. The planned Exit implementation timelines

Biometric Exit would have dependencies on (b)(5) In case of HNL, where the airport operation is directly managed by the State of Hawaii Department of Transportation, (b)(5)
(b)(5)

In closing, it will be our pleasure to enhance the security level and to provide our customers with the better travel experience by fulfilling this strategy in partnership with your team. We always appreciate your continuous support and cooperation.

Respectfully yours,

(b)(6)

All Nippon Airways Co., Ltd.



City of Austin

Aviation Department

September 17, 2018

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

I just wanted to follow up on our previous conversations as related to the biometric exit technology project we are piloting at Austin. We are anticipating having the pilot gate

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

I am very happy to share with you that we

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

Basically that

means we will have biometrics

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

While adding all the technology was an unbudgeted expense for Austin, we believe it will be beneficial to both the airport and CBP going forward into the future. (b)(5)

(b)(5)

We look forward to our continued partnership working towards improving the customer experience and ensuring our airport is safe. Thank you again for the open communication and allowing AUS to participate in the biometric pilot program.

Regards,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

City of Austin – Aviation

Austin-Bergstrom International Airport

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

From: [REDACTED] (b)(6) **On Behalf Of** [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, June 7, 2018 7:55 AM
To: [REDACTED] (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)
Cc: [REDACTED] (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)
Subject: Memo of commitment to Biometric Exit implementation

Dear [REDACTED] (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

British Airways, as part of International Airlines Group [IAG], is confirming its commitment [REDACTED] (b)(5) in Biometric Exit [REDACTED] (b)(5) for Terminal 7 at JFK airport. It should be noted that British Airways is the terminal operator at JFK T7 as well as the dominant carrier operating out of the facility.

British Airways Terminal operations has a vision to ensure that this terminal will be the most equipped, forward looking terminal with the best use of new technology that enhances the customer experience.

[REDACTED] (b)(5)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Commitment to JFK Terminal 7

British Airways is committed to [REDACTED] (b)(5) with Biometric Exit technology, specifically:

- [REDACTED] (b)(5)
- [REDACTED] (b)(5)
- British Airways intends to [REDACTED] (b)(5) JFK Terminal 7 with Biometric Exit technology [REDACTED] (b)(5).
 - [REDACTED] (b)(5)
 - [REDACTED] (b)(5)
 - [REDACTED] (b)(5) British Airways [REDACTED] (b)(5)

To date British Airways has already delivered Biometric Exit integration at both LAX and MCO, and are proud to partner with CBP on these initiatives to add value to the customer experience. British Airways were the first airline to market with a full self service automated gate. [REDACTED] (b)(5)

[REDACTED] (b)(5)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (b)(5) . [REDACTED] (b)(5)
[REDACTED] (b)(5)

Timelines

British Airways [REDACTED] (b)(5)
[REDACTED] (b)(5)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (b)(5) British Airways [REDACTED] (b)(5)

(b)(5)

Regards

(b)(6)

(b)(6)



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November 9, 2018

(b)(6)

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

Area Port Director, Baltimore
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Baltimore/Washington International Thurgood Marshall Airport
7035 Elm Road
Baltimore MD 21240

Dear (b)(6);(b)(7)(C):

Re: BWI Marshall Airport Biometric Exit Implementation

This letter is to notify U.S. Customs and Border Protection of the commitment the Maryland Department of Transportation Maryland Aviation Administration (MDOT MAA) will make to address the U.S. Government mandate regarding biometric exit capability at U.S. airports. MDOT MAA's strategy for implementation of biometric exit at Baltimore/Washington International Thurgood Marshall (BWI Marshall) Airport

(b)(5)

Based on the (b)(5) it is the intent of the MDOT MAA to (b)(5)

(b)(5)
BWI Marshall Airport. (b)(5)

(b)(5)

We look forward to working with you and your team at U.S. Customs and Border Protection as, together, we strive to improve both security and the passenger experience here at BWI Marshall Airport.

(b)(6)

(b)(6) BWI (b)(6)

cc: (b)(6)

(b)(6) MDOT MAA (b)(6) MDOT MAA

(b)(6) (b)(6)

Easy come, easy go.

P.O. Box 8766
BWI Airport
Maryland 21240-0766

TOLL-FREE
1 800 I FLY BWI

FACSIMILE
410-850-4729

WEBSITE
www.bwiairport.com



(b)(6)

Delta Air Lines, Inc.
Department 177
P.O. Box 20706
Atlanta, GA 30320-6001

(b)(6)
(b)(6)

September 7, 2018

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Ronald Reagan Building
1300 14th St.
Washington, DC 20509

Dear (b)(6);(b)(7)(C),

This Letter of Intent outlines Delta Air Lines, Inc.'s ("Delta") plans (b)(5) biometric hardware in support of the **U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Biometric Exit Program**. Further, by this letter (b)(5)

(b)(5)

Delta was the first airline to partner with CBP to demonstrate the operational feasibility of deploying facial-recognition based biometrics to further the longstanding congressional mandate for the Department of Homeland Security to implement a biometric-exit program. Our experience working with CBP personnel to design, test, and experiment with a variety of biometric-capture configurations for biometric-exit gives us confidence that a nation-wide rollout will be possible without significant disruption to our operation, and with a high degree of confidence in the accuracy of the biometric match results.

Delta passengers arriving in the United States through Atlanta's Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport's Terminal F have also been among the first international travelers to experience CBP's Simplified Arrival process, which incorporates facial-based biometric recognition into the customs and immigration arrivals procedures.

As you know, Delta (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5) Delta (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

With that in mind, we would like to formalize our intention to (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5), at the following locations and according to the (b)(5)

schedule outlined below:

Deployment Locations:

- Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport (ATL), Maynard H. Jackson International Terminal F
- Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport (DTW), Edward. H. McNamara Terminal
- New York John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), Terminal 4
- Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), Terminal 2

Funding Source:

- ATL Terminal F (b)(5)
- DTW McNamara Terminal (b)(5)
- JFK Terminal 4 (b)(5)
- LAX Terminal 2 (b)(5)

Pace of Deployment:

- ATL Terminal F (b)(5)
- DTW McNamara Terminal (b)(5)
- JFK Terminal 4 (b)(5)
- LAX Terminal 2 (b)(5)

Technology to be Used:

- ATL Terminal F (b)(5)
- DTW McNamara Terminal (b)(5)
- JFK Terminal 4 (b)(5)
- LAX Terminal 2 (b)(5)

I anticipate that given the significance and complexity of this work, we will need to establish a regular cadence of planning meetings in the near future. Thank you for your partnership, and I look forward to talking with you soon to get this process under way.

Sincerely,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)
(b)(6)

June 4, 2018

The Honorable Kirstjen Nielsen, Secretary
United States Department of Homeland Security
3801 Nebraska Ave, NW
Washington, DC 20598

Dear Secretary Nielsen:

I write today to express my appreciation for the partnership and collaboration Delta enjoys with officials in your department. In particular, Commissioner McAleenan and Administrator Pekoske and their teams at U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the Transportation Security Administration. (b)(5)

(b)(5) Atlanta-Hartsfield
Jackson International Airport (ATL) (b)(5) (b)(6)
Atlanta's International Terminal F.
(b)(5)

As you are most likely aware, Delta was the first U.S. airline to test a facial-biometric immigration air-exit system with CBP at the Atlanta airport, beginning in the Spring of 2016. Since then, we have expanded our testing with CBP to include flights departing from New York's JFK International Airport and additional configurations and procedures at ATL. (b)(5)

Recognizing the significant enhancements biometric technologies can bring to identity validation and security process-flows, Delta (b)(5)

(b)(5) Harnessing the CBP Traveler Verification System (TVS) platform, Delta, (b)(5)
(b)(5) Atlanta's Terminal F, a dedicated international arrivals and departures facility. (b)(5)

(b)(5) (b)(5)
(b)(5) at ATL Terminal F, (b)(5)
(b)(5)

In phase one, Delta plans to (b)(5)

The Honorable Kirstjen Nielsen

June 4, 2018

Page 2

(b)(5) For
passengers entering the U.S., CBP plans to (b)(5)
(b)(5) l. (b)(5)
(b)(5)

Phase two will include (b)(5)

Phase three will include (b)(5)

Delta's experience working with both CBP and our partner, CLEAR, Inc., in (b)(5) both facial and fingerprint-based biometrics have demonstrated not only that biometrics significantly enhance the match-rate between participants and their identity documents, but they also hold great promise for improving security between the checkpoint and aircraft boarding by preventing boarding-pass "swapping."

(b)(5)

At your convenience, we would welcome the opportunity to brief you or your immediate staff in greater detail about this project. In addition, once the project is up and running, we, along with the Atlanta Airport Executive management team, would be delighted to welcome you to Atlanta to observe the efficiencies and security benefits of this project first-hand.

In the meantime, we will continue to keep your staff apprised of progress on this initiative, as we work closely with both CBP and TSA to bring it to fruition.

Sincerely,

Original signed by:

(b)(6) Delta Air Lines, Inc.

(b)(6)

cc: The Honorable Kevin McAleenan, Commissioner CBP
The Honorable David Pekoske, Administrator TSA

(b)(6)
(b)(6)

(b)(6)
(b)(6)

May 3, 2018

The Honorable Kevin K. McAleenan, Commissioner
United States Customs and Border Protection
1300 Pennsylvania Ave, NW Suite 4.4A
Washington, DC 20229

Dear Commissioner McAleenan:

Thank you again for the time you spent with us during our recent visit, and for the partnership and dedication you and your team demonstrate every day as we work to achieve our common goals of both securing and facilitating legitimate trade and travel. We are as committed to ensuring that our passengers, employees, aircraft, and cargo process securely through the various stages of air travel as we are that they have excellent experiences. We cannot emphasize enough how much we appreciate the work CBP officers and your headquarters teams do to make that job easier.

Before mentioning some of the other longer-term projects we discussed, I am pleased to report that

(b)(7)(E)

Under separate cover, I will write to Secretary Nielsen, Administrator Pecoske and you to provide an overview of the Atlanta Terminal F

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)
(b)(5)

However, I would be remiss in not mentioning now how excited we are about the project and how much, again, we appreciate your strong support and the great willingness to collaborate we have found in the Office of Field Operations, in particular, Mr. Wagner, Ms. Manaher, (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) and their teams. We agree that facial recognition technology is the most effective biometric means currently available to validate identity and improve security and throughput, and are consistently communicating this to TSA and Capitol Hill. We look forward to demonstrating the security and throughput benefits facial recognition technology can offer

(b)(5)

In light of continuing increases in international passenger traffic entering the United States and

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)
(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

Delta's (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)
(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

Delta (b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

(b)(5), (b)(7)(A)

The Honorable Kevin K. McAleenan, Commissioner

May 3, 2018

Page 2

(b)(7)(A)

Again, thank you for your time on April 20th and for all the work you and the people of Customs and Border Protection do every day to keep us secure and keep people and things moving. Please don't ever hesitate to reach out to me or any on my team at any point that we can be of assistance.

Sincerely,

(b)(6)

cc:

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

John P. Wagner
Deputy Executive Assistant Commissioner
Office of Field Operations
US Customs and Border Protection

Deputy Executive Assistant Commissioner Wagner,

This letter represents a confirmation of commitment by DFW International Airport to (b)(5) Biometric Exit for (b)(5) at Dallas Ft. Worth International airport as mandated by Congress.

DFW has identified the (b)(5) Facial Recognition technology at (b)(5) to meet this mandate. (b)(5)

DFW is (b)(5) a Facial Recognition Biometric Exit pilot (b)(5)
(b)(5)

DFW is currently in the process of working with British Airways, Lufthansa, JAL, and QANTAS on (b)(5) American Airlines (b)(5) JAL (b)(5)
(b)(5)

DFW looks forward to continuing the ongoing collaboration and partnership with US Customs and Border Protection to enhance our security protocols and improving customer facilitation and experience processes.

DFW would like to respectfully request the (b)(5) once this letter of intent is received and acknowledged.

(b)(6)

Dallas Fort Worth International Airport



CITY OF HOUSTON

Sylvester Turner

Mayor

(b)(6)



Houston Airports
16930 John F. Kennedy Boulevard
Houston, Texas 77032
fly2houston.com

June 7, 2018

Mr. John P. Wagner
Deputy Executive Assistant Commissioner
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Department of Homeland Security

Dear Mr. Wagner:

We are happy to inform you that Houston Airports (HAS) is committed to develop and implement a frictionless, one-step, biometric facial recognition (b)(5) (b)(5) (b)(5) George Bush Intercontinental Airport (IAH), Terminal D, (b)(5) and at Hobby International Airport (HOU) (b)(5).

As you know, together with CBP, we have been (b)(5) at both IAH and HOU.

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(6)

Houston Airports has secured strong support from BA and LH and (b)(5)

(b)(5)

At HOU, we are in active discussions with WN and (b)(5) for implementation, (b)(5)
(b)(5). A separate commitment letter shall follow.

Scheduled Milestones at IAH

(b)(5)

In addition to meeting the requirements of the Federal mandate, this project (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

We look forward to continuing our close collaboration with you

to bring this to fruition.

(b)(6)

cc: Colleen M. Manaher, CBP
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) CBP
(b)(6) IT-HAS
(b)(6) IAH-HAS

(b)(6)



CITY OF HOUSTON

Sylvester Turner

Mayor



(b)(6)

Houston Airports
16930 John F. Kennedy Boulevard
Houston, Texas 77032
fly2houston.com

Mr. John P. Wagner
Deputy Executive Assistant Commissioner
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Department of Homeland Security

June 26, 2018

Dear Mr. Wagner:

We are happy to inform you that the Houston Airports (HAS) is committed to develop and implement a frictionless, (b)(5) biometric facial recognition pilot that facilitates secured international-traveler enplanement. In close collaboration with Southwest Airlines (WN), (b)(6) Hobby International Airport (HOU) (b)(6)

As you know, together with CBP, (b)(5) (b)(5) HOU and IAH. (b)(5)

(b)(5) (b)(5)

(b)(5) (b)(5) (b)(6)

HAS secured strong support from WN and will now (b)(5)
(b)(5) HOU. Southwest (b)(5)
(b)(5)

Schedule Milestones:

(b)(5)

In addition to meeting the requirements of the Federal mandate, this project also supports our interest in advancing biometric technologies. We look forward to CBP (b)(5) that will have a meaningful impact on reducing wait times through the (b)(5) at HOU. We look forward to continuing our close collaboration with you to bring this to fruition.

(b)(6)

- Cc: Colleen M. Manaher, CBP
(b)(6);(b)(7)(C) CBP
(b)(6) WN
(b)(6) WN
(b)(6) WN
(b)(6) WN
(b)(6) WN
(b)(6) WN
(b)(6) WN
(b)(6) IT-HAS
(b)(6) HOU-HAS

(b)(6)

February 7, 2019

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

Deputy Executive Director
Planning, Program Analysis and Evaluation
Entry/Exit Transformation
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)

Dear **(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)**

This letter shall confirm the intent of JFK International Air Terminal LLC ("JFK IAT") to commit to a **(b)(5)** at JFK International Airport, Terminal 4
(b)(5) **(b)(5)** Terminal 4
(b)(5) **JFKIAT** **(b)(5)**

(b)(5)

Terminal 4.

We are working with airline partners Delta Airlines, Virgin Atlantic, Caribbean and Emirates to

(b)(5)

Please contact **(b)(6)** should you require any further details.

Thank you.

(b)(6)

LAS VEGAS



McCARRAN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

Department of Aviation

(b)(6)

POSTAL BOX 11005
LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89111-1005
(702) 261-5211
FAX (702) 597-9553

October 8, 2018

Ms. Colleen Manaher
Executive Director, Planning, Program Analysis, and Evaluation Office
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Room 5.3D
Washington DC 20229

Subject: McCarran International Airport - Commitment to Biometric Exit

Dear Ms. Manaher:

Thank you for your participation in the recent Future Travel Experience conference and for your demonstration of biometric entry during your visit to McCarran International Airport (McCarran).

Pursuant to our discussion with you and your staff during your visit, McCarran would like to make a commitment to work productively towards facilitating the biometric exit program. As you know, the airport deployed dual-lane automated boarding gates at every international departure gate. (b)(5)

(b)(5)

We hope to make installation of the (b)(5) during the (b)(5)
(b)(5)

Additionally, as you know, McCarran has been selected to be a part of the (b)(5)
(b)(5)

We do look forward to working with you and your team towards a biometric entry and exit program.

(b)(6)

cc: (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) CBP Port Director, (b)(4)
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(6)



(b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(6)



Los Angeles
World Airports

September 14, 2018

The Honorable Kevin K. McAleenan
Commissioner
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
1300 Pennsylvania Ave. NW
Washington, D.C. 20229

LAX

Van Nuys

City of Los Angeles

Eric Garcetti
Mayor

Dear Commissioner McAleenan:

The entire Los Angeles World Airports (LAWA) executive leadership team fully supports the U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) mission to leverage innovative technology to enhance safety and security, increase the efficiency of passenger processing and improve the overall passenger experience. We believe the success of this mission is extremely important and (b)(5) LAWA (b)(5) In close collaboration with the CBP team, (b)(5) in pursuit of CBP's mission by (b)(5)

(b)(6)

In December 2017, LAWA collaborated with CBP and launched a facial recognition biometric exit pilot in the Tom Bradley International Terminal (TBIT) at the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX). This was the first implementation of a completely paperless biometric exit solution where passengers used only their face to board the airplane, without requiring a passport or boarding pass. It also was the first pilot to implement the biometric exit solution with a common use platform. Currently we have six airlines using this paperless solution and others are preparing to use it. This pilot has been extremely successful and airlines have seen their boarding process times improve by as much as 40%.

(b)(5)
(b)(5) TBIT (b)(5)
(b)(5) TBIT. (b)(5)
(b)(5)
(b)(5) TBIT (b)(5)

We also have been supporting and collaborating closely with CBP to (b)(5)
(b)(5)
(b)(5)



Commissioner Kevin K. McAleenan

September 14, 2018

Page 2 of 2

(b)(5)

As such, LAWA
at LAX

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

The initial biometric entry pilot is going extremely well and

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5) Please let us know how we can work together with CBP to implement these solutions further.

Thank you very much for your continued collaboration and support.

(b)(6)

cc:

(b)(6)

Colleen Manaher, Executive Director, CBP
Donald Kusser, Port Director, CBP



AVIATION DEPARTMENT - Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport
2200 SW 45th Street, Suite 101 • Dania Beach, Florida 33312 • 954-359-6100

April 16, 2019.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Assistant Port Director
1850 Eller Dr.
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33316

Dear **(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)**,

The Broward County Aviation Department (BCAD) wishes to engage with United States Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Traveler Verification Services (TVS) biometric program at Fort Lauderdale - Hollywood International Airport (FLL)

BCAD proposes to establish a **(b)(5)** facial recognition technology for **(b)(5)** international flights from BCAD gates as follows:

1. BCAD **(b)(5)**
2. BCAD **(b)(5)**
(b)(5)
(b)(5)

(b)(5) County **(b)(5)**
(b)(5) The biometric technology will improve and expedite the traveler's experience to and from FLL.

Enclosed is a PDF showing **(b)(5)**
(b)(5)

Sincerely

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Enclosed

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(5)

(b) (5)



February 25, 2019

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Area Port Director
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Area Port of Boston
10 Causeway Street
Boston MA 02114

Subject: Biometric Exit Letter of Intent

Dear (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

This Letter of Intent (“LOI”), to the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) from the Massachusetts Port Authority (“Massport”), confirms Massport’s intent to (b)(5) Biometric Exit facial recognition technology at Boston-Logan International Airport (“BOS”).

(b)(5)

Massport and local aircraft operators support the implementation of biometric facial recognition technology at BOS in order to provide a seamless travel experience with enhanced safety and efficiency. JetBlue has collaborated with CBP on a biometric exit/boarding pilot project at BOS

(b)(5)

Like JetBlue, Delta is (b)(5)

Massport has an existing contractual relationship with SITA Corporation (“SITA”) to provide all information technology services in the Terminal E Common-Use Terminal Environment (“CUTE”). Massport plans to (b)(5)

(b)(5)
Massport (b)(5)

(b)(5) that (b)(5)

With delivery of this LOI, Massport understands that (b)(5)
(b)(5)

While this LOI sets forth the general plan for the future of biometric technology at BOS, this LOI shall not be binding upon either Party nor does it set forth all of the terms and conditions

necessary to (b)(5) We will certainly keep you informed as progress continues and we look forward to working with you on this program.

Sincerely,

(b)(6)

cc:

(b)(6)



GREATER ORLANDO AVIATION AUTHORITY

Orlando International Airport
One Jeff Fuqua Boulevard
Orlando, Florida 32827-4399

MEMORANDUM

TO: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Orlando Port Director
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Assistant Orlando Port Director

FROM: (b)(6)

DATE: March 19, 2018

SUBJECT: BIOMETRIC EXIT

The Greater Orlando Aviation Authority (Aviation Authority) intends to (b)(5)
(b)(5) Aviation Authority's (b)(5)
(b)(5) . The Aviation Authority (b)(5)
(b)(5) (b)(5) Aviation Authority (b)(5)
(b)(5) Orlando International Airport. (b)(5)
(b)(5)

The Aviation Authority also intends to (b)(5)

(b)(5)

In June, the Aviation Authority (b)(5)

(b)(5)

Please advise if you have any questions.

(b)(6)



Miami-Dade Aviation Department
P.O. Box 025504
Miami, Florida 33102
T 305-876-7000 F 305-876-0948
www.miami-airport.com

Commercial Airport:
Miami International Airport

miamidade.gov

General Aviation Airports:
Dade-Collier Training & Transition Airport
Homestead General Aviation Airport
Miami Executive Airport
Miami-Opa Locka Executive Airport

September 18, 2018

Mr. Christopher Maston
Port Director
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
PO Box 997930
Miami, FL 33299-7930
Via E-Mail: (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

Dear Director Maston:

Thank you for the continued strong partnership and your forward leaning vision to keep our borders secure while improving the experience for international arriving passengers at Miami International Airport.

In the spirit of meeting the congressional mandate for Biometric Exit, we are in the process of (b)(5)

(b)(5)

With that in mind, we request that you consider moving forward with the Biometric Entry solution that

(b)(5)

(b)(5) We believe this is an important enhancement in the processing of international arriving passengers that will maintain our leadership in the industry.

We look forward to working with your team to fully implement both solutions.

(b)(6)

cc: (b)(6)

July 27, 2018

Mr. Kevin K. McAleenan
Commissioner
United States Customs and Border Protection
1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20229

Re: Commitment to Participate in United States Customs and Border Protection's ("CBP")
Biometric Entry/Exit System Program

Dear Commissioner McAleenan:

This letter is to confirm the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority's ("Airports Authority") commitment to participate in CBP's Biometric Entry/Exit System Program using an Airports Authority (b)(5) (the "Airports Authority Biometric Exit Solution") (b)(5). As described below, (b)(5), the Airports Authority intends to (b)(5) Airports Authority (b)(5) (b)(5) Washington Dulles International Airport ("Dulles International").

In the following paragraphs, I provide the specific information that CBP has sought from the Airports Authority.

1. The entity or organization making the commitment to implement Biometric Entry/Exit technology at Washington Dulles International Airport. The Airports Authority is the entity (b)(5) (b)(5), at Dulles International.

2. The degree or extent to which the Airports Authority will implement the Airports Authority Biometric Exit Solution at Dulles International. The Airports Authority has recently conducted a pilot test of the Airports Authority Biometric Exit Solution at Dulles International. The test involved the actual boarding of 245 passengers on SAS flight 926 which departed from Dulles International at 5:15 p.m. on July 24. From the accounts I have received, CBP believes that the test demonstrated the ability of the Airports Authority Biometric Exit Solution, in actual passenger boarding conditions, to interact with the TVS matching service in a completely successful manner.



As a result of this (b)(5), the Airports Authority (b)(5) (b)(5) Airports Authority Biometric Exit Solution (b)(5) (b)(5) Dulles International (b)(5). The Airports Authority (b)(5) (b)(5) Dulles International (b)(5) (b)(5) (b)(5) Airports Authority Biometric Exit Solution at Dulles International (b)(5) (b)(5)

3. The current state of the implementation of the Airports Authority Biometric Exit Solution at Dulles International. As of the date of this letter, the Airports Authority Biometric Exit Solution has been designed and developed, has been confirmed by CBP as meeting the technical requirements of the TVS matching service, and has been successfully tested in CBP-observed field tests and in the pilot test described in paragraph 2.

4. The current state of commitments to use the Airports Authority Biometric Exit Solution by international airlines operating at Dulles International. (b)(5) (b)(5) Dulles International. The Airports Authority (b)(5) (b)(5)

I want to thank the many individuals within CBP who have assisted the Airports Authority's technology team over the past few weeks in demonstrating the capabilities of the Airports Authority Biometric Exit Solution. Their assistance has been of significant value.

If there are questions regarding this letter or requests for additional information from the Airports Authority, I ask that they be directed to (b)(6), our Chief Information Officer, at (b)(6).

Sincerely,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

cc: Mr. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), CBP Director of Passenger Systems and Biometrics

December 12, 2018

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Newark Liberty International Airport
Terminal C, 2nd floor
Newark, New Jersey 07114

Dear (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

The Port Authority of New York & New Jersey (PANYNJ) and Newark Liberty International Airport (EWR) are committed to enhancing security and improving the customer experience for passengers traveling through our facilities. With these two goals in mind, I would like to express my commitment to the (b)(5) that will achieve the Congressional mandate of capturing biometric information for international departing passengers.

Our plan for the (b)(5) to capture biometrics has been divided into two phases. Phase 1 includes:

- (b)(5)
- (b)(5)
- (b)(5)
- (b)(5)

The completion date for Phase 1 is scheduled for (b)(5)
(b)(5)

Phase 2 includes:

- (b)(5)
- (b)(5)
- (b)(5)

The completion date for Phase 2 (b)(5)

(b)(5)

Newark Liberty International Airport
1 Conrad Road, Building One
Newark, NJ 07114
T: 973 961 6000

This commitment, as described, is only for the (b)(5) PANYNJ
(b)(5)
PANYNJ (b)(5) EWR. (b)(5)
(b)(5)

With my commitment to the (b)(5) for departing passengers, I
am requesting that (b)(5)
(b)(5)

To reiterate, PANYNJ is proposing (b)(5)
(b)(5). This timing will ensure that EWR is better able to accommodate (b)(5)
(b)(5) with greater efficiency and improved security.

I look forward to discussing with you in greater detail both this project and future plans to
enhance international passenger processing at EWR.

(b)(6)

Ontario International Airport Administration Offices

1923 E. Avion Street, Ontario, CA 91761

(b)(6)

October 5, 2018

The Honorable Kevin K. McAleenan, Commissioner
U.S Customs and Border Protection
1300 Pennsylvania Ave. NW Washington, D.C. 20229

Dear Commissioner McAleenan:

On behalf the Ontario International Airport Authority (OIAA) with the corporate offices located at 1923 E Avion Avenue Ontario CA 91761, OIAA is committed to implement Biometric Exit here at the Ontario International Airport.

The following questions from U. S. Customs and Border Protection are indicated in quotations below along with the OIAA responses in italics.

- "The entity or organization making the commitment to implement Biometric Exit?" *The OIAA.*
- "Specify how may flights, terminals, or gates will be TVS enabled initially and what a potential time-line for expansion would look like?" *The OIAA* (b)(5)
for ONT's (b)(5).
- "Will the Airport be using an existing vendor, an in-house IT department or does a procurement process need to be completed?" *OIAA* (b)(5)
(b)(5)
- "Have any carriers at the airport committed to working with the airport on a either a "two-step" or "one-step" integrated process?" (b)(5) *China Airlines and JetBlue* (b)(5) *OIAA.*

If you require any additional information, I can be reached at (b)(6)

Sincerely

(b)(6)

Ontario International Airport Authority



CHICAGO DEPARTMENT OF AVIATION
CITY OF CHICAGO

TO: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
Acting Port Director
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

FROM: (b)(6)

DATE: JUN 13 2019

RE: The U.S. Customs and Border Protection ("CBP") Biometric Exit Program at O'Hare International Airport

I. Overview

As we have discussed with CBP, the Chicago Department of Aviation ("CDA") is voluntarily undertaking (b)(5) CBP's Biometric Exit Program ("Program"). CDA intends to equip (b)(5) at O'Hare International Airport's Terminal 5 during the period specified herein, as specified below.

II. Status of the Current Implementation of Biometric Exit

The CDA has been committed to this Program since its inception and has been actively engaged (b)(5) The CDA (b)(5)

(b)(5)

The CDA has also been in contact with the Metropolitan Washington Airport Authority (MWAA). (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5) the CDA

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

III. Funding and Process

The CDA intends to fund this initiative

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

IV. Connectivity

As indicated, the CDA will be using the

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

V. Two stage (standalone) or integrated

The CDA will provide

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

the CDA

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

VI. Estimated Project Timeline

Listed below are the (b)(5) milestones for implementation of the Program. A complete project schedule can be provided upon request.

Milestone	Estimated Completion Date
(b)(5)	

VII. CDA Biometrics Exit Committee

To ensure a successful implementation, the following key individuals will serve on the Committee:

- (b)(5), (b)(6) – CDA (b)(6)
- (b)(5), (b)(6) – CDA (b)(6)
- (b)(5), (b)(6) – CDA (b)(6)
- (b)(5), (b)(6) – CDA (b)(6)
- (b)(5), (b)(6) – CDA (b)(6)
- (b)(5), (b)(6) – American Airlines
- (b)(5), (b)(6) – United Airlines
- (b)(5), (b)(6) – KLM
- (b)(5), (b)(6)

VIII. Methodology for providing project status updates with CBP

The CDA Biometrics Exit Committee will be providing monthly updates consisting of:

- Milestones achieved
- Scheduled vs. actual (delays or advances)
- Costs (under/over budget YTD)

IV. Expectations

The CDA (b)(5)
(b)(5)

The CDA is excited about the Program and looks forward to working in partnership with CBP. Please contact (b)(6), if you have any questions regarding the contents of this correspondence.

Cc: (b)(6)

December 3, 2018

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Area Port Director
Area Port of Philadelphia
200 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19106

RE: Commitment of Philadelphia International Airport to the CBP Biometric Exit Program

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

This letter is intended to signify that Philadelphia International Airport, sponsored by the City of Philadelphia and managed by the Division of Aviation and the Department of Commerce in that City, commits to **(b)(5)** biometric technology to verify the identity of travelers, improve inspectional efficiency, and to expeditiously transform the travel process.

Philadelphia International Airport intends to install TVS-connected equipment on **(b)(5)**

(b)(5)

Philadelphia International Airport **(b)(5)**

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

December 3, 2018
Page 2

Philadelphia International Airport will begin testing of TVS equipment during the month of

(b)(5)

Through this commitment we are asking for (b)(5)
(b)(5) at Philadelphia International Airport.

Sincerely,

(b)(6)

CC: Casey Durst, Director-Field Operations, Baltimore Field Office, CBP
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Deputy Executive Director Planning, Program Analysis, Evaluation, CBP
(b)(6)

October 18, 2018



Salt Lake City
Department of Airports

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Port Director
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
3850 W. Terminal Drive
Salt Lake City, UT 84116

Re: Letter of Commitment - Biometric Exit System

Dear (b)(6), (b)(7)(C),

Salt Lake City Corporation, a municipal corporation under the laws of the state of Utah, by and through its Department of Airports (SLCDA), hereby agrees as follows:

- 1) The SLCDA shall provide and install a Traveler Verification System (TVS) at (b)(5) at the Salt Lake City International Airport (Airport). Additionally, with the (b)(5) (b)(5) the SLCDA is agreeable to accommodate the (b)(5) (b)(5)
- 2) The SLCDA commits to (b)(5) the TVS, (b)(5) (b)(5)
- 3) The SLCDA will work with Delta Air Lines, the (b)(5) (b)(5), to (b)(5)

Should have any questions or require any additional information, please don't hesitate to contact me at (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Salt Lake City Department of Airports



City of San Antonio Aviation

March 4, 2019

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Area Port Director
Area Port of Dallas
7501 Esters Blvd., Suite 160
Irving, TX 75063
Email: **(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)**

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Port Director
Customs and Border Protection
San Antonio International Airport
9800 Airport Blvd. Suite 1101
San Antonio, TX 78216
Email: **(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)**

Subject: Commitment letter to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), for the Biometric Air Exit Program

San Antonio International Airport (SAT), in partnership with CBP, is committed to working towards improving passenger processing with facial recognition technology that is currently available and in use at other ports of entry.

(b)(5)
(b)(5)

SAT is committed to **(b)(5)** the biometric exit equipment **(b)(5)** of **(b)(5)**

(b)(5)

International air service to/from SAT **(b)(5)**

(b)(5)

SAT commits to implementation of this Biometric Air Exit Program, in partnership with CBP, and look forward to

(b)(5) You may contact **(b)(6)** for further details.

Sincerely,

(b)(6)

SAN ANTONIO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

9800 AIRPORT BOULEVARD | SAN ANTONIO, TX 78216 | T: 210.207.SAIA (7242) | F: 210.207.3500

November 12, 2018

Mr. Kevin McAleenan
Commissioner
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20229

Dear Commissioner McAleenan,

We are writing to share our commitment to working with you toward implementation of a biometric exit program for international departing passengers traveling through Seattle-Tacoma International Airport (Sea-Tac).

Sea-Tac has grown exponentially in terms of the number of international passengers travelling through our airport.

(b)(5)
[Redacted]

(b)(5) Sea-Tac. (b)(5)
[Redacted]

(b)(5)
[Redacted]

Thank you for your ongoing partnership to provide a safe and expeditious travel experience through Sea-Tac for arriving international passenger. I look forward to our continued work together.

Sincerely,

(b)(6)

Port of Seattle

CC: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), Seattle Area Port Director, U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Colleen Manaher, Executive Director, Planning, Program Analysis and Evaluation, U.S. Customs and Border Protection



San Francisco International Airport

August 30, 2018

Port Director Richard DiNucci
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
555 Battery Street
San Francisco, CA 94111

BY EMAIL & US MAIL

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Subject: Commitment to Biometric Exit Passenger Processing at SFO

Dear Director DiNucci:

Thank you for your continued efforts in working with San Francisco International Airport (SFO) to

(b)(7)(E)

This letter confirms SFO's commitment to implement a biometric entry and exit program for international arriving and departing passengers with the equipment and infrastructure necessary for CBP to operate the program **(b)(5)**

(b)(5)

at SFO –

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

SFO

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

I look forward to working with you to find new and innovative ways to meet customer services challenges.

(b)(5)

Very truly yours,

(b)(6)

cc: John P. Wagner, Deputy Executive Assistant Commissioner – Field Operations, CBP
Brian Humphrey, Director – San Francisco and Portland Field Offices, CBP

(b)(6)

SFO

(b)(6)

SFO

AIRPORT COMMISSION CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

(b)(6)

Post Office Box 8097 San Francisco, California 94128 Tel 650.821.5000 Fax 650.821.5005 www.flysfo.com

FOIA CBP 000106

April 16, 2018

Port Director Richard DiNucci
Customs and Border Protection
555 Battery Street
San Francisco, CA 94111

RE: Commitment of Support for a Biometric Exit Passenger Processing Program at SJC

Dear Port Director DiNucci:

We greatly appreciate our partnership with Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in an effort to expeditiously process and provide a positive travel experience through the Norman Y. Mineta San Jose International Airport (SJC) international processing facilities. This letter is to confirm the commitment of the City of San José for the implementation of a biometric exit program for (b)(5) traveling through SJC.

To fulfill this commitment, (b)(5) (b)(5)
(b)(5)
(b)(5)
(b)(5), the City (b)(5)

(b)(5)
SJC.

We look forward to our continued partnership and the successful implementation of the (b)(5) (b)(5). The San José Airport stands ready to cooperate with CBP to expedite the implementation of these programs.

Thank you for your consideration of this matter, and we look forward to working with you.

Sincerely,

(b)(6) (6)

cc: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), Deputy Executive Director, CBP
Brian Humphrey, Director of San Francisco and Portland Field Operations, CBP



2800 Executive Way
Miramar, FL 33025

spirit.com

Less Money. MORE GO.

October 4, 2018

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

Assistant Port Director – FLL Airport
Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33315

Dear **(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)**

Spirit Airlines would like to request a partnership with CBP to participate in the Biometric Exit and Biometric Entry Programs at Ft. Lauderdale International Airport.

This letter summarizes our proposal.

1. **Spirit Airlines** **(b)(5)**
the program **Biometric Exit**.

2. **Spirit Airlines will partner with SITA for** **(b)(5)**

3. **Closing Date**
Both entities **(b)(5)**
(b)(5)

4. **Agreement**
This constitutes an indication that Spirit Airlines intends to **(b)(5)**

(b)(6)

(b)(6) Airport Services, Spirit Airlines

- Cc: **(b)(6)** Spirit Airlines
- Cc: **(b)(6)** Spirit Airlines
- Cc: **(b)(6)** Spirit Airlines
- Cc: **(b)(6)** Spirit Airlines

August 13, 2018

(b)(6)

TampaAirport.com

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Area Port Director
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Tampa, Florida

Dear (b)(6), (b)(7)(C),

The Hillsborough County Aviation Authority (Aviation Authority) intends to (b)(5)
Biometric Exit technology solution at (b)(5)

(b)(5)

The Aviation Authority also intends to (b)(5)

(b)(5)
(b)(5)
(b)(5)

The Aviation Authority has committed \$1M in (b)(5)
(b)(5).

We are (b)(5)
(b)(5)
(b)(5)

Please feel free to contact me with any questions you may have.

Sincerely,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

BETWEEN

U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION

AND

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.

REGARDING SINGLE-TOKEN BIOMETRIC PILOT PROJECTS FOR INTERNATIONAL FLIGHTS DEPARTING FROM DESIGNATED U.S. AIRPORTS

I. PARTIES

The Parties to this Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) are U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) and American Airlines, Inc. (“AA”) (“collectively, “the Parties”).

II. PURPOSE

The purpose of this MOU is for the Parties to collaborate on AA’s pilot program utilizing facial biometrics to verify the identity of participating travelers prior to their departure on AA international flights departing from selected airports in the United States. The purpose of the pilot is to allow the Parties to make a feasibility determination about a longer-term biometric verification solution.

III. AUTHORITIES

CBP is authorized to enter into this MOU pursuant to 6 U.S.C. § 301a, and, more generally, the Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. §§ 112 et seq., as amended. Other legal authorities relevant to CBP’s participation in the pilot described herein include 8 U.S.C. § 1365b, 8 U.S.C. § 1731, and Section 8 of the Executive Order 13780, *Protecting The Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into The United States* (Mar. 6, 2017).

AA represents and warrants that it has the full power and authority to enter into this MOU and to carry out the requirements necessary for its implementation.

IV. OVERVIEW

AA intends to capture each participating traveler’s photograph, in accordance with CBP’s specifications, during the boarding process for AA’s international flights departing from designated airport(s), in the United States serviced by AA. AA’s collection from the traveler of

this information, processing of data, and transmission of such data to CBP are based solely on AA's contractual relationship with the traveler and other independent authority of AA.

AA intends to capture each participating traveler's photograph using its or its third-party providers' own technology and equipment. Once captured, such technology will process and transmit the photograph to CBP's Traveler Verification Service ("TVS"). Upon the receipt of each participating traveler's photograph, the TVS attempts to biometrically match a photograph with other records available to CBP and return a response to AA. The response from TVS to AA indicates whether a traveler's identity has been validated or if a manual review of travel documents is necessary to confirm identity. AA is expected to perform alternative manual processing in the event: (i) CBP is unable to confirm identity through TVS; (ii) technical issues on behalf of CBP or AA preventing the transmission of necessary data, matching, or response; or (iii) as otherwise requested by CBP. To the extent travelers are permitted to opt out of AA's collection of travelers' photographs under this MOU, AA is expected to conduct alternative manual processing of the non-participating traveler in order to confirm identity, consistent with the AA's standard processes.

CBP's authority to inspect all outbound international travelers is not affected by this arrangement.

V. ROLES

CBP intends to:

- 1) Build a biometric gallery of facial images obtained through various DHS databases, of all travelers identified by the manifest(s) submitted by AA to CBP's Advance Passenger Information System ("APIS");
- 2) Provide AA with technical specifications relating to image quality and protocols for the transmission to CBP of participating travelers' photographs;
- 3) Receive photos transmitted by AA namely facial photographs captured during the boarding process, and perform the biometric matching of each photograph against the pre-established biometric gallery of manifested travelers;
- 4) For each match, transmit an electronic response, comprised only of the APIS numeric identifier, to AA's boarding system to indicate whether CBP was able to confirm the traveler's identity or whether manual review by AA to confirm the traveler's identity is necessary;
- 5) Use the captured photographs for diagnostic and analytical purposes to evaluate the success of the pilot, to evaluate the potential for expansion of the pilot, to consider how to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of CBP's biometric exit program, and for other lawful purposes ; and
- 6) Protect AA-captured photographs received under this MOU in accordance with applicable law and CBP's privacy and security policies (including the Privacy Impact Assessment Update available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-cbp030e-tvs-august2018_0.pdf) and delete such photos from the TVS in accordance with applicable laws and policies.
- 7) Provide available statistics on a basis determined by CBP and provide ad hoc data pulls to the extent possible.

AA is expected to (directly or through cooperation with its third-party technology providers):

- 1) Integrate traveler photograph capture into the boarding process for flights within the scope of this MOU, in accordance with CBP's facial matching specifications;
- 2) Provide equipment and technology to capture photographs of participating travelers and transmit them to CBP's TVS per CBP's technical specifications;
- 3) For each participating traveler, capture a traveler photograph at boarding that conforms to CBP's facial matching specifications;
- 4) Facilitate transmission of each conforming traveler photograph to CBP's TVS per CBP's technical specifications;
- 5) Permit boarding of the traveler based in part on a positive matching response of CBP's biometric facial matching service indicating that CBP was able to validate the traveler's identity;
- 6) Perform manual confirmation of a traveler's identity using that traveler's travel documents in the event: (i) that traveler does not participate in the TVS photo capture; (ii) CBP is unable to confirm identity through TVS; (iii) technical issues on behalf of CBP or AA prevent the transmission of necessary data, matching, or response; or (iv) as otherwise requested by CBP;
- 7) Consistent with normal operating procedures, promptly contact CBP following any manual review of a traveler's travel documents if required under applicable procedures to receive CBP recommendations regarding the boarding of such traveler;
- 8) Delete any photograph captured or any matching response from CBP after it is no longer needed for the intended purpose of processing travelers for boarding, as outlined in this MOU; and
- 9) Develop and implement defined processes and instructions to undertake this pilot, including the provision of manual identity validation when necessary, as outlined in this MOU.

VI. PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS

Through participation in this Pilot initiative, CBP is not officially endorsing or approving the equipment, technology, or process developed by AA. As such, AA may not use any statements or feedback provided by CBP regarding the implementation of the pilot for marketing purposes. All content for public communications regarding cooperation under this MOU, including but not limited to the issuance of press releases or promotional activities, is expected to be approved by CBP prior to such release to the public or media. CBP may undertake public communications without AA's approval, but may not use AA's name, brand or logo without AA's prior approval.

VII. POINTS OF CONTACT ("POC")

Each Party is expected to provide specific contact information for their respective POC, listed below, by separate written communication, within 24 hours of the signing of this MOU, and provide updates of such information as necessary to ensure the information remains current for the duration of the Pilot.

CBP Point of Contact

Director, Biometric Exit Strategic Transformation
CBP
Program Planning, Analysis and Evaluation
1300 Pennsylvania Ave NW
Washington, DC 20229

AA Point of Contact:

Program Manager, Security Projects and Innovation
American Airlines
Corporate Security
4333 Amon Carter Blvd. MD 5555
Fort Worth, TX 76155

VIII. IMPLEMENTATION

This MOU is to be implemented and effective on the date of the last signature hereon by the Parties.

IX. FUNDS

Each Party is responsible for its own costs incurred in the implementation of this MOU and is expected to use its own equipment and personnel resources in performing the activities for which it is responsible under this MOU, unless otherwise mutually determined. This MOU does not obligate DHS/CBP funds or other resources, nor does this MOU in any way expand CBP's liability for any damage or loss to the other Parties that might arise from implementation of the Pilot. CBP's stated intentions are subject to the availability of appropriated funds and changing operational needs.

X. MODIFICATION

The Parties may discuss possible expansion of the Pilot to additional flights or airports, or processes associated with flights utilizing the biometric technology, provided the staff and background infrastructure are available. This MOU may be modified upon the mutual written consent of the Parties.

XI. DISCONTINUATION

This MOU remains in effect until the completion of the Pilot. Any Party may discontinue, suspend or terminate the Pilot with 90 days written notification to all other Parties if performance of the Pilot is unreasonable or causes disruption to CBP's or AA's respective operations.

XII. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

1. This MOU does not confer a right or benefit, substantive or procedural, on behalf of any third party, and does not otherwise confer a right on any third party to enforce any provision of this MOU.

2. This MOU, including any addenda or attachment hereto, represents the entire understanding between and among the Parties with regards to the Pilot. No other understanding, oral or otherwise, regarding the subject matter of this MOU exists or binds any of the Parties thereto.
3. Each Party is expected to permit access to data received by it under this MOU to only those personnel of such Party (including a Party's contractors, or personnel of affiliated entities) with an official need to know or as otherwise required by applicable United States law.
4. No Party may disclose any confidential or proprietary information of another Party exchanged under this MOU for any purpose outside the scope of this MOU without prior written consent of the Party that provided the information, unless otherwise authorized under this MOU or required by applicable law.
5. AA agrees to indemnify CBP for any liability that might arise from CBP's participation in the Pilot, including, but not limited to, any liability that might be argued to arise from AA's use of third party equipment and software as part of the Pilot (but excluding in any case any liability arising from CBP's or its personnel's breach of this MOU or negligence, willful misconduct, or violation of law).
6. CBP understands that terms of use related to AA's technology solution may be implicated by CBP's participation in this Pilot. To the extent such end user license agreement(s) include(s) indemnity language and/or other language that would cause CBP personnel or contractor personnel to violate the Antideficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1341, or otherwise violate Federal law, if accepted by the personnel in the course of their participation in the Pilot, AA is to strike that language and deem it unenforceable.
7. The Parties acknowledge that AA does not have authority to establish the manner or timing of any steps or actions taken by CBP, as all steps or actions taken by CBP are done so at its sole discretion and pursuant to its authorities and appropriations. Any benefit provided by AA to CBP under this MOU is provided without condition.
8. AA hereby grants to CBP a non-exclusive license to use, copy, reproduce, and create derivative works based upon the captured photos received by CBP under this MOU for the limited purpose of using facial biometrics to verify the identity of travelers prior to their departure from the United States as described in this MOU. Without prejudice to the foregoing, nothing in this MOU conveys to a Party any right, title or interest in any intellectual property right of another Party.
9. Nothing in this MOU obligates a Party to enter into any further arrangements with respect to the purpose described above or to preclude any Party from entering into future business arrangements or commercial opportunities related thereto.
10. AA understands that CBP's involvement with AA's Pilot is intended only to facilitate AA's feasibility determination for a longer term solution. AA also understands that CBP intends to explore future biometric verification projects utilizing the TVS in other use cases in collaboration with other carriers and/or technology providers, and therefore, CBP is making no commitment to give AA any special consideration in any future undertaking or acquisition.
11. Nothing in this MOU is intended to conflict with applicable U.S. law or the policies of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and CBP. If a term or provision of this MOU is inconsistent with such authority, then that term or provision shall be invalid, but the remaining terms, provisions, and conditions of this MOU shall remain in full force and effect.

XIII. APPROVED BY

Signed for and on behalf of and by its duly authorized representative:

U.S. Customs and Border Protection

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

Todd Owen
Executive Assistant Commissioner
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Date: 12/27/18

American Airlines, Inc.

(b)(6)

T
Date: 1/28/19

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
BETWEEN AND AMONG
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION
AND
SITA INFORMATION NETWORKING COMPUTING USA INC.
AND
BRITISH AIRWAYS PLC
REGARDING SINGLE-TOKEN BIOMETRIC PILOT PROJECTS FOR
INTERNATIONAL FLIGHTS DEPARTING FROM DESIGNATED U.S.
AIRPORTS

I. PARTIES

The Parties to this Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) are U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), SITA Information Networking Computing USA Inc. (SITA), and British Airways as a part of International Airline Group (BA), (collectively, "the Parties").

II. PURPOSE

The purpose of this MOU is for the Parties to collaborate on BA's proposed pilot program to utilize facial biometrics to verify the identity of travelers prior to their departure on BA international flights from selected airports in the United States to London, United Kingdom.

III. AUTHORITIES

CBP is authorized to enter this MOU pursuant to 6 U.S.C. § 301a, and more generally, the Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. §§ 112 et seq., as amended. Other legal authorities relevant to CBP's participation in the below-referenced pilot program include 8 U.S.C. § 1365b, 8 U.S.C. § 1731, and Section 8 of the Executive Order 13780, *Protecting The Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into The United States* (Mar. 6, 2017).

SITA and BA represent and warrant that they each have the full power and authority to enter into this MOU and to carry out their respective requirements necessary for its implementation.

IV. RESPONSIBILITIES

BA, working with SITA, its technology partner, intends to capture each traveler's photo, in accordance with CBP's specifications, during the boarding process for BA international flights from designated Airport(s) in the United States to London, United Kingdom. BA's collection from the traveler of this information, use of SITA's technology to facilitate capture, processing, and transmission to CBP, is based solely on BA's contractual relationship with the traveler, which is in accordance with the performance of the contract BA has with the traveler. SITA is entitled to rely upon BA's authority, which includes BA's making of disclosures and obtaining consents as may be required by applicable law, in regard to SITA's provision of services, including data processing, to facilitate boarding.

BA intends to capture each consenting traveler's photo using SITA provided technology and send it to CBP's Traveler Verification Service (TVS) which is expected to match the records biometrically within an agreed degree of accuracy and return a response to BA via SITA provided technology to indicate whether a traveler is clear to board or otherwise requires a manual review of travel documents to confirm identity. BA will perform alternative ("as-is") processing in the event CBP's response requires it, as otherwise directed by CBP, or in response to a traveler's declination to be photographed. CBP's authority to inspect all outbound international travelers is not affected by this arrangement.

The Parties expect to begin the pilot on or after 22 Jan 2018, and continue for 45 calendar days. The pilot may be extended for an additional 45 calendar days upon written concurrence of the Parties. The Parties can mutually determine, in writing, to continue or discontinue the pilot per Section XI, below.

BA and SITA understand that CBP's involvement with BA's pilot is for market research and exploratory purposes only. CBP intends to explore future projects to test the TVS in other use cases in collaboration with BA; however, CBP is making no commitment to give BA and/or SITA any special consideration in any future acquisition. The Parties consent to discuss possible expansion of the pilot to additional flights and/or locations, provided the staff and background infrastructure are available. Further, the Parties acknowledge that BA is a company organized under the laws of the United Kingdom and as such, BA must comply with applicable data protection laws of the UK and Europe and other applicable jurisdictions which may have current or future bearing on the Parties ability to agree to any continuation or expansion of the pilot.

CBP intends to:

- 1) Build a biometric gallery of facial images, obtained through various DHS databases, of all travelers intending to depart on select mutually agreed upon London bound flights as identified through its Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) manifest collections and CBP's facial image database;
- 2) Use the manifest to determine if CBP officer presence is required at the departure gate and coordinate with BA in advance to support its airport operations, as appropriate;
- 3) Provide BA and/or SITA with specifications for the collection and transmission of facial images from travelers to CBP;

- 4) Receive data transmitted by BA through the SITA-provided technology, namely facial photographs captured during the boarding process, and perform the facial matching of each photograph against the pre-established biometric gallery of manifested travelers;
- 5) For each match, transmit an electronic response through the SITA-provided technology to BA's pilot boarding system, comprised only of the APIS numeric identifier, to indicate whether the traveler is cleared to continue with the boarding process or manual review by BA to confirm the traveler's identity as necessary. If any traveler (US citizen or otherwise), does not wish to have his/her photo taken, he/she can request alternative processing;
- 6) Record a biometrically confirmed departure record for each traveler matched against the biometric gallery of expected travelers;
- 7) Use the submitted photo for diagnostic and analytical purposes to evaluate the success of the pilot, to evaluate the potential for expansion of the pilot, and to consider how to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of CBP's biometric exit program; and
- 8) Protect BA captured photos received under this MOU in accordance with its applicable privacy and security policies and delete such photos from the TVS in accordance with applicable U.S. law and policy.

BA intends to:

- 1) Take responsibility for instructing on the parameters for SITA providing services to enable the capturing and processing of the traveler photo and submission to CBP's TVS on BA's behalf, including such as may be required pursuant to BA's obligations as a UK organized and operating company, as such are mutually agreed upon in the Scope of Work ("SOW") as further contemplated and defined below.
- 2) Integrate traveler photo capture into the boarding process for flights within the scope of this MOU, in accordance with CBP's facial matching specifications;
- 3) For each traveler on the flight manifest, capture the traveler photo at boarding that conforms to CBP's facial matching specifications;
- 4) Facilitate transmission of each conforming traveler photo to CBP's TVS per CBP's technical specifications;
- 5) Permit boarding of the traveler based in part on a positive matching response of CBP's biometric facial matching service;
- 6) Perform as-is manual confirmation of each traveler's identity using that traveler's travel documents in the event CBP's response indicates that such review is necessary or as otherwise directed by CBP;
- 7) Consistent with normal operating procedures, promptly contact CBP following any manual review of a traveler's travel documents for which BA is not able to confirm the traveler's identity, to receive CBP instructions regarding the boarding of such traveler;
- 8) Not store or process any photo captured or matching response from CBP beyond the intended purpose of processing travelers for boarding, as outlined in this MOU,; and
- 9) Develop and implement defined processes and instructions to undertake this pilot, including the provision of alternative processing (As-Is) for those travelers who do not wish to have their photo taken.

SITA intends to:

- 1) Provide technology to perform facial image capture and facilitate transmission to CBP's TVS per CBP's specifications on BA's behalf in accordance with BA's defined process and instructions, as mutually agreed upon in the SOW;
- 2) Provide technology to integrate with BA Departure Control System (DCS) to provide boarding details;
- 3) Provide a pass-through service to BA, retaining no data, including but not limited to facial images or CBP TVS response transmissions, and excluding log-files, unless explicitly agreed among the Parties;
- 4) Not store or process any photo captured or matching response from CBP beyond the intended purpose of processing travelers for boarding, as outlined in this MOU ;
- 5) Provide BA with a traveler-facing interface with indicators to guide the boarding process in accordance with BA's defined process and instructions; and
- 6) Provide BA with an agent application to allow BA to view traveler information where applicable, such as name and seat number, to support BA's customer experience and boarding requirements.

BA and SITA intend to develop a separate SOW document identifying the designated airport and describing the boarding process concepts being developed, implemented, and tested by BA and SITA in this pilot initiative, which will define detailed concepts, technical specifications, an implementation schedule, and operating procedures. BA will provide a final draft copy of the SOW to CBP for review, and CBP may provide input to BA regarding the SOW, solely on the provisions that pertain to CBP and its operations. CBP will also be provided with a finalized version of the SOW as a reference and with updated copies as changes may be made. Receipt and review of the SOW by CBP shall not be construed as an endorsement of any kind.

V. PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS

BA and SITA understand that CBP's involvement with BA's pilot is for market research and exploratory purposes only. CBP is making no commitment to give BA and/or SITA any special consideration in any future acquisition. Through participation in this pilot initiative, CBP is not officially endorsing or approving the equipment, technology, or process developed by SITA and/or BA. As such, BA and SITA agree not to use any statements or feedback provided by CBP regarding the implementation of the pilot for marketing purposes. All content for public communications regarding the pilot project that is the subject of this MOU, including the issuance of press releases or promotional activities, is to be approved by all Parties prior to such release to the public or media.

VI. POINTS OF CONTACT (POC)

Each Party is expected to provide specific contact information for their respective POC, listed below, by separate written communication, within 24 hours of the signing of this MOU, and provide updates of such information as necessary to ensure the information remains current for the duration of the pilot.

CBP Point of Contact

Director, Entry/Exit Policy and Planning
CBP
Entry/Exit Transformation Office
1300 Pennsylvania Ave NW
Washington, DC 20229

BA Point of Contact

Design Manager – Business Transformation
Waterside (HBB1)
PO Box 365
Harmondsworth, Middlesex. UB7 0GB.
United Kingdom

SITA Point of Contact

CTO
SITA Information Networking Computing USA, Inc.
3100 Cumberland Blvd Suite 900
Atlanta, GA 30318

VII. OTHER PROVISIONS

Nothing in this MOU is intended to conflict with applicable U.S. law or the policies of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and CBP. If a term or provision of this MOU is inconsistent with such authority, then that term or provision shall be invalid, but the remaining terms, provisions, and conditions of this MOU shall remain in full force and effect.

VIII. IMPLEMENTATION

This MOU is to be implemented on the date of the last signature hereon by the Parties.

IX. FUNDS

Each Party is expected to be responsible for its own costs incurred in the implementation of this MOU, and is expected to use its own equipment and personnel resources in performing the activities under this MOU. This MOU does not obligate DHS/CBP funds, nor does this MOU in any way expand CBP's liability for any damage or loss to the other Parties that might arise from implementation of the pilot. CBP's stated intentions are subject to the availability of appropriated funds and changing operational needs.

X. MODIFICATION

This MOU and any annexes or addenda thereto may be modified upon the mutual written consent of the Parties.

XI. DISCONTINUATION

This MOU remains in effect until the completion of the pilot project. The MOU may be extended by mutual written consent of the Parties. Any Party may discontinue, suspend or terminate the pilot project with 24 hours' written notification to all other Parties if performance of the pilot is unreasonable or causes disruption to CBP or BA operations.

XII. MISCELLANEOUS

1. This MOU does not confer a right or benefit, substantive or procedural, on behalf of any third party and does not otherwise confer a right on any third party to enforce any provision of this MOU.
2. This MOU represents the entire understanding between and among the Parties. No other understanding, oral or otherwise, regarding the subject matter of this MOU shall be deemed to exist or to bind any of the Parties thereto.
3. Each Party is expected to permit access to data received by it under this MOU to only those personnel of such Party (including a party's contractors, or personnel of affiliated entities) with an official need to know or as otherwise required by applicable United States law.
4. No Party may disclose any confidential or proprietary information of another Party exchanged under this MOU for any purpose outside the scope of this MOU without prior written consent of the Party that provided the information, unless otherwise required by applicable law.
5. CBP understands that SITA's terms of use may be implicated by CBP's participation in this pilot. To the extent such end user license agreement(s) include(s) indemnity language and/or other language that would cause CBP personnel or contractor personnel to violate the Antideficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1341, or otherwise violate Federal law, if accepted by the personnel in the course of their participation in the pilot, SITA agrees to strike that language and deems it unenforceable.
6. BA hereby grants to CBP a non-exclusive license to use, copy, reproduce, and create derivative works based upon the captured photos received by CBP under this MOU for the limited purpose of using facial biometrics to verify the identity of travelers prior to their departure from the United States as described in this MOU. Without prejudice to the foregoing, nothing in this MOU conveys to a party any right, title or interest in any intellectual property right of another party.
7. Nothing in this MOU obligates a Party to enter into any further agreements with respect to the purpose or preclude any Party from entering into future business agreements or commercial opportunities.
8. This MOU is governed by federal law; but, to the extent necessary, as between BA and SITA, a court of federal jurisdiction will look to the laws of the State of New York to resolve disputes.

XIII. APPROVED BY

Signed for and on behalf of and by its duly authorized representative:

U.S Customs and Border Protection

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Todd Owen
Executive Assistant Commissioner
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Date: Jan 31, 2018

British Airways Plc

(b)(6)

British Airways Plc
Title: **(b)(6)**
Date: February 23, 2018

**SITA INFORMATION NETWORKING
COMPUTING USA INC.**

**SITA INFORMATION NETWORKING
COMPUTING USA INC.**

Title: _____
Date: _____

XIII. APPROVED BY

Signed for and on behalf of and by its duly authorized representative:

U.S Customs and Border Protection

British Airways Plc

Todd Owen
Executive Assistant Commissioner
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Date: _____

British Airways Plc
Title: _____
Date: _____

**SITA INFORMATION NETWORKING
COMPUTING USA INC.**

(b)(6)

**SITA INFORMATION NETWORKING
COMPUTING USA INC.**

Title: **(b)(6)**
Date: _____

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

BETWEEN AND AMONG

U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION

AND

SITA INFORMATION NETWORKING COMPUTING USA, INC.

AND

JETBLUE AIRWAYS CORPORATION

**REGARDING SINGLE-TOKEN BIOMETRIC PILOT PROJECT AT
BOSTON LOGAN AIRPORT**

I. PARTIES

The Parties to this Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) are U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), SITA Information Networking Computing USA, Inc. (SITA), and JetBlue Airways Corporation (JetBlue) (collectively, "the Parties").

II. PURPOSE

The purpose of this MOU is for the Parties to collaborate on JetBlue's proposed pilot program to utilize facial biometrics to verify the identity of travelers prior to their departure on JetBlue international flights from Boston Logan Airport in the United States to Aruba.

III. AUTHORITIES

CBP is authorized to enter this MOU pursuant to 6 U.S.C. § 301a, and more generally, the Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. §§ 112 et seq., as amended. Other legal authorities relevant to CBP's participation in the below-referenced pilot program include 8 U.S.C. § 1365b, 8 U.S.C. § 1731, and Section 8 of the Executive Order 13780, *Protecting The Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into The United States* (Mar. 6, 2017).

SITA and JetBlue represent and warrant that they each have the full power and authority to enter into this MOU and to carry out their respective requirements necessary for its implementation.

IV. RESPONSIBILITIES

JetBlue, working with SITA, its technology partner, intends to capture each traveler's photo, in accordance with CBP's specifications, during the boarding process for all JetBlue international flights from Boston Logan Airport in the United States to Aruba. JetBlue's collection from the traveler of this information, use of SITA to facilitate processing, and transmission to CBP, is based solely on its contractual relationship with the traveler and other independent authority of JetBlue, which may be obtained through disclosure and consent. SITA is entitled to rely upon JetBlue's authority.

JetBlue intends to capture the traveler's photo using SITA provided technology and send it to CBP's Traveler Verification Service (TVS) which is expected to match the records biometrically within an agreed degree of accuracy and return a response to JetBlue via SITA provided technology to indicate whether a traveler is clear to board or otherwise requires a manual review of travel documents to confirm identity. CBP's authority to inspect all outbound international travelers is not affected by this arrangement.

The Parties expect to begin the pilot on or before June 12, 2017, and continue for 45 calendar days. The pilot may be extended for an additional 45 calendar days upon written concurrence of the Parties. The Parties can mutually determine, in writing, to continue or discontinue the pilot per Section XI, below.

JetBlue and SITA understand that CBP's involvement with JetBlue's pilot is for market research and exploratory purposes only. CBP intends to explore future projects to test the TVS in other use cases in collaboration with JetBlue; however, CBP is making no commitment to give JetBlue and/or SITA any special consideration in any future acquisition. The Parties consent to discuss possible expansion of the pilot to additional flights and/or locations, provided the staff and background infrastructure are available.

CBP intends to:

- 1) Build a biometric gallery of facial images, obtained through various DHS databases, of all travelers intending to depart on the Boston/Aruba flight as identified through its Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) manifest submissions and CBP's facial image database;
- 2) Use the manifest to determine if CBP agent presence is required at the departure gate and coordinate with JetBlue in advance to support its airport operations, as appropriate;
- 3) Provide JetBlue and/or SITA with specifications for the collection and transmission of facial images from travelers to CBP;
- 4) Receive data transmitted by JetBlue through the SITA-provided technology, namely facial photographs captured during the boarding process, and perform the facial matching of each photograph against the pre-established biometric gallery of manifested travelers;
- 5) For each match, transmit an electronic response through the SITA-provided technology to JetBlue's pilot boarding system, comprised only of the APIS numeric identifier, to indicate whether the traveler is cleared to continue with the boarding process or manual review by JetBlue to confirm the traveler's identity is necessary;
- 6) Record a biometrically confirmed departure record for each traveler matched against the biometric gallery of expected travelers;

- 7) Use the JetBlue captured photo for diagnostic and analytical purposes to evaluate the success of the pilot, to evaluate the potential for expansion of the pilot, and to consider how to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of CBP's biometric exit program; and
- 8) Protect JetBlue captured photos received under this MOU in accordance with its applicable privacy and security policies and delete such photos from the TVS in accordance with applicable law and policy.

JetBlue intends to:

- 1) Integrate traveler photo capture into the boarding process for flights within the scope of this MOU, in accordance with CBP's facial matching specifications;
- 2) For each traveler on the flight manifest, capture the traveler photo at boarding that conforms to CBP's facial matching specifications;
- 3) Transmit each conforming traveler photo to CBP's TVS per CBP's technical specifications;
- 4) Permit boarding of the traveler based in part on CBP's biometric facial matching response through the SITA-provided technology indicating that the traveler is cleared to continue;
- 5) Perform manual confirmation of each traveler's identity using that traveler's travel documents in the event CBP's response indicates that such review is necessary or as otherwise directed by CBP;
- 6) Consistent with normal operating procedures, promptly contact CBP following any manual review of a traveler's travel documents for which JetBlue is not able to confirm the traveler's identity, to receive CBP instructions regarding the boarding of such traveler;
- 7) Delete biometric facial matching response provided by CBP in connection with this MOU within 14 days of capture; and
- 8) Develop and implement defined processes and instructions to undertake this pilot.

SITA intends to:

- 1) Provide JetBlue with technology to perform facial image capture and facilitate transmission to CBP's TVS per CBP's specification and JetBlue defined process and instructions;
- 2) Provide technology to integrate with JetBlue Departure Control System (DCS) to provide boarding details;
- 3) Provide a pass-through service to JetBlue, retaining no data, including but not limited to facial images or CBP TVS response transmissions, and excluding log-files, unless explicitly agreed among the Parties;
- 4) Provide JetBlue with a passenger-facing screen with indicators to guide the boarding process in accordance with JetBlue's defined process and instructions; and
- 5) Provide JetBlue with an agent application to allow JetBlue to view traveler information, such as passenger name and seat number, to support JetBlue's customer experience requirements.

JetBlue and SITA intend to develop a separate Scope of Work (“SOW”) document describing the boarding process concepts being developed, implemented, and tested by JetBlue and SITA in this pilot initiative, which will define detailed concepts, technical specifications, an implementation schedule, and operating procedures. JetBlue will provide a copy of the SOW to CBP as a reference and provide updated copies to CBP as changes may be made. CBP may provide input to JetBlue regarding the SOW, solely on the provisions that pertain to CBP and its operations. Receipt of the SOW by CBP shall not be construed as an endorsement of any kind.

V. PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS

JetBlue and SITA understand that CBP’s involvement with JetBlue’s pilot is for market research and exploratory purposes only. CBP is making no commitment to give JetBlue and/or SITA any special consideration in any future acquisition. Through participation in this pilot initiative, CBP is not officially endorsing or approving the equipment, technology, or process developed by SITA and/or JetBlue. As such, JetBlue and SITA agree not to use any statements or feedback provided by CBP regarding the implementation of the pilot for marketing purposes. All content for public communications regarding the pilot project, including the issuance of press releases or promotional activities, is to be approved by all Parties prior to such release to the public or media.

VI. POINTS OF CONTACT (POC)

Each Party is expected to provide specific contact information for their respective POC, listed below, by separate written communication, within 24 hours of the signing of this MOU, and provide updates of such information as necessary to ensure the information remains current for the duration of the pilot.

CBP Point of Contact

Director, Entry/Exit Policy and Planning
CBP
Entry/Exit Transformation Office
1300 Pennsylvania Ave
Washington, DC 20004

JetBlue Point of Contact

Director Customer Experience Programs
JetBlue Airways Corp
27-01 Queens Plaza North, Long Island City, NY 11101

SITA Point of Contact

CTO
SITA Information Networking Computing USA, Inc.
3100 Cumberland Blvd Suite 900
Atlanta, GA 30318

VII. OTHER PROVISIONS

Nothing in this MOU is intended to conflict with applicable U.S. law or the policies of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and CBP. If a term or provision of this MOU is inconsistent with such authority, then that term or provision shall be invalid, but the remaining terms, provisions, and conditions of this MOU shall remain in full force and effect.

VIII. IMPLEMENTATION

This MOU is to be implemented on the date of the last signature hereon by the Parties.

IX. FUNDS

Each Party is expected to be responsible for its own costs incurred in the implementation of this MOU, and is expected to use its own equipment and personnel resources in performing the activities under this MOU. This MOU does not obligate DHS/CBP funds, nor does this MOU in any way expand CBP's liability for any damage or loss to the other Parties that might arise from implementation of the pilot. CBP's stated intentions are subject to the availability of appropriated funds and changing operational needs.

X. MODIFICATION

This MOU and any annexes or addenda thereto may be modified upon the mutual written consent of the Parties.

XI. DISCONTINUATION

This MOU remains in effect until the completion of the pilot project. The MOU may be extended by mutual written consent of the Parties. Any Parties can discontinue, suspend or terminate the pilot project with 24 hours notification if performance of the pilot is unreasonable or disruption to the CBP or JetBlue operations.

XII. MISCELLANEOUS

1. This MOU does not confer a right or benefit, substantive or procedural, on behalf of any third party and does not otherwise confer a right on any third party to enforce any provision of this MOU.
2. This MOU represents the entire understanding between and among the Parties. No other understanding, oral or otherwise, regarding the subject matter of this MOU shall be deemed to exist or to bind any of the Parties thereto.
3. Each Party agrees to permit access to data received by it under this MOU to only those personnel of such Party (including a party's contractors, or personnel of affiliated entities) with an official need to know.
4. CBP understands that SITA's terms of use may be implicated by CBP's participation in this pilot. To the extent such end user license agreement(s) include(s) indemnity language and/or other language that would cause CBP personnel or contractor personnel to violate the Antideficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1341, or otherwise violate Federal law, if accepted by

the personnel in the course of their participation in the pilot, SITA agrees to strike that language and deems it unenforceable.


5. Nothing in this MOU conveys to a party any right, title or interest in any intellectual property right of another party.
6. Nothing in this MOU obligates a Party to enter into any further agreements with respect to the purpose or preclude any Party from entering into future business agreements or commercial opportunities.
7. This MOU is governed by federal law, but to the extent necessary, a court of federal jurisdiction will look to the laws of the State of New York to resolve disputes between or among the Parties.

XIII. APPROVED BY

Signed for and on behalf of and by its duly authorized representative:

U.S. Customs and Border Protection

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

for Todd Owen 
Executive Assistant Commissioner
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Date: 5/22/17

JetBlue Airways Corporation

JetBlue Airways Corporation
Title: _____
Date: _____

SITA INFORMATION NETWORKING
COMPUTING USA, INC.

SITA INFORMATION NETWORKING
COMPUTING USA, INC.
Title: _____
Date: _____

accepted by the personnel in the course of their participation in the pilot, SITA agrees to strike that language and deems it unenforceable.

5. Nothing in this MOU conveys to a party any right, title or interest in any intellectual property right of another party.
6. Nothing in this MOU obligates a Party to enter into any further agreements with respect to the purpose or preclude any Party from entering into future business agreements or commercial opportunities.
7. This MOU is governed by federal law, but to the extent necessary, a court of federal jurisdiction will look to the laws of the State of New York to resolve disputes between or among the Parties.

XIII. APPROVED BY

Signed for and on behalf of and by its duly authorized representative:

U.S Customs and Border Protection

Todd Owen
Executive Assistant Commissioner
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Date: _____

JetBlue Airways Corporation

(b)(6)

JetBlue Airways Corporation

Title: (b)(6)

Date: May 22, 2017

SITA INFORMATION NETWORKING
COMPUTING USA, INC.

SITA INFORMATION NETWORKING
COMPUTING USA, INC.

Title: _____

Date: _____

the personnel in the course of their participation in the pilot, SITA agrees to strike that language and deems it unenforceable.

5. Nothing in this MOU conveys to a party any right, title or interest in any intellectual property right of another party.
6. Nothing in this MOU obligates a Party to enter into any further agreements with respect to the purpose or preclude any Party from entering into future business agreements or commercial opportunities.
7. This MOU is governed by federal law, but to the extent necessary, a court of federal jurisdiction will look to the laws of the State of New York to resolve disputes between or among the Parties.

XIII. APPROVED BY

Signed for and on behalf of and by its duly authorized representative:

U.S Customs and Border Protection

JetBlue Airways Corporation

Todd Owen
Executive Assistant Commissioner
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Date: _____

JetBlue Airways Corporation
Title: _____
Date: _____

**SITA INFORMATION NETWORKING
COMPUTING USA, INC.**

(b)(6)

**SITA Information Networking Computing
USA, Inc**

Title: **(b)(6)**

Date: *May 22, 2017*

**AMENDMENT TO THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
BETWEEN AND AMONG
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION
AND
SITA INFORMATION NETWORKING COMPUTING USA INC.
AND
JETBLUE AIRWAYS CORPORATION
REGARDING SINGLE-TOKEN BIOMETRIC PILOT
PROJECT AT BOSTON LOGAN AIRPORT**

This Amendment No. 1 (“Amendment”) is effective September 11, 2017 (the “Amendment Effective Date”) and amends the Memorandum of Understanding by and between U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”), SITA Information Networking Computing USA Inc. (“SITA”), and JetBlue Airways Corporation (“JetBlue”) dated May 22, 2017 (the “MOU”), which was extended on or about July 25, 2017. CBP, SITA, and JetBlue are each individually referred to hereinafter as a “Party” and collectively referred to as “Parties”.

WHEREAS, the Parties have entered into the MOU and extended its initial term whereby the term of such MOU ends on September 10, 2017; and

The Parties now desire to extend the term of the MOU, expand the airports and destinations at which the single-token biometric pilot project may occur, and otherwise amend certain terms of the MOU as set forth herein.

NOW THEREFORE, the Parties hereby agree to amend the MOU as follows:

1. Definitions. Any term not otherwise defined in this Amendment shall have the meaning ascribed to it in the MOU.
2. Applicable Airports. All references to “Boston Logan Airport” shall be amended to also include “John F. Kennedy Airport”, and all references to “Aruba” shall be deleted and replaced with “international destinations serviced by JetBlue”. Specifically:
 - a. The title of the MOU is hereby deleted and replaced in its entirety as follows:

**MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
BETWEEN AND AMONG
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION,
SITA INFORMATION NETWORKING COMPUTING USA INC. AND
JETBLUE AIRWAYS CORPORATION
REGARDING SINGLE-TOKEN BIOMETRIC PILOT PROJECT AT BOSTON
LOGAN AND JOHN F. KENNEDY AIRPORTS**

- b. **Section II. Purpose** is hereby deleted and replaced in its entirety as follows:

Section II. Purpose The purpose of this MOU is for the Parties to collaborate on JetBlue’s proposed pilot program to utilize facial biometrics to verify the identity of travelers prior to their departure on JetBlue international flights from Boston Logan Airport and John F. Kennedy Airport in the United States, to international destinations serviced by JetBlue, as mutually identified by the Parties.

- c. The first sentence of **Section IV. Responsibilities** is hereby deleted and replaced in its entirety as follows:

Section IV. Responsibilities JetBlue, working with SITA, its technology partner, intends to capture each traveler’s photo, in accordance with CBP’s specifications, during the boarding process for certain mutually identified JetBlue international flights from Boston Logan Airport and John F. Kennedy Airport in the United States, to international destinations serviced by JetBlue.

- d. Number 1) under the heading “CBP intends to” in **Section IV. Responsibilities** is hereby deleted and replaced in its entirety with the following:

- 1) Build a biometric gallery of facial images, obtained through various DHS databases, of all travelers intending to depart on mutually identified international JetBlue flights departing from Boston Logan Airport and John F. Kennedy Airport, as identified through its Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) manifest submissions and CBP’s facial image database;

- 3. Responsibilities. **Section IV. Responsibilities** is further amended as follows:

- a. Paragraph 3, beginning with “The Parties expect to begin the pilot on or before June 12, 2017,....” is hereby deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following:

The Parties expect to begin the pilot on or before June 12, 2017.

- b. The final paragraph of **Section IV. Responsibilities** following items 1 through 5 under the section titled “SITA intends to” is hereby deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following:

JetBlue in conjunction and SITA intend to develop a separate Scope of Work (“SOW”) document describing the boarding process concepts being developed, implemented, and tested by JetBlue and SITA in this pilot initiative, which will define detailed concepts, technical specifications, an implementation schedule, and operating procedures, consistent with this MOU.

JetBlue and CBP, in conjunction with SITA, intend to develop operational protocols in support of this initiative to define procedures for both operations and mitigations.

4. Discontinuation. **Section XI. Discontinuation** is hereby deleted and replaced in its entirety with the following:

Section XI. Discontinuation This MOU remains in effect for six months from the effective date, unless such is extended by mutual written consent of all Parties or terminated pursuant to this Section XI. Any Party may elect to terminate, discontinue, or suspend the pilot project with twenty-four (24) hours' written notification if performance of the pilot is unreasonable or disruptive to CBP or JetBlue operations. Additionally, this MOU may be terminated upon the mutual agreement of the Parties or by one Party providing at least three (3) weeks' written notice to the other Parties.

5. No Other Amendment. All other terms and conditions of the MOU not explicitly amended by this Amendment shall remain unchanged and in full force and effect.

6. Entire MOU. This Amendment constitutes a modification by written consent of the Parties. The MOU and this Amendment constitute the entire understanding between and among the Parties with respect to the matters contemplated therein, which supersedes all other representations of the Parties, whether written or oral.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have caused this Amendment to be executed by their duly authorized representatives.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

**Executive Assistant Commissioner
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Date: 10/12/17**

JetBlue Airways Corporation

Title: _____
Date: _____

**SITA INFORMATION NETWORKING
COMPUTING USA INC.**

Title: _____
Date: _____

4. Discontinuation. **Section XI. Discontinuation** is hereby deleted and replaced in its entirety with the following:

Section XI. Discontinuation This MOU remains in effect for six months from the effective date, unless such is extended by mutual written consent of all Parties or terminated pursuant to this Section XI. Any Party may elect to terminate, discontinue, or suspend the pilot project with twenty-four (24) hours' written notification if performance of the pilot is unreasonable or disruptive to CBP or JetBlue operations. Additionally, this MOU may be terminated upon the mutual agreement of the Parties or by one Party providing at least three (3) weeks' written notice to the other Parties.

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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have caused this Amendment to be executed by their duly authorized representatives.

U.S Customs and Border Protection

JetBlue Airways Corporation

Todd Owen
Executive Assistant Commissioner
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Date: _____

Title: _____
Date: _____

**SITA INFORMATION NETWORKING
COMPUTING USA INC.**

(b) (6)
Title: _____
Date: 12-Oct-2017

4. Discontinuation. **Section XI. Discontinuation** is hereby deleted and replaced in its entirety with the following:

Section XI. Discontinuation This MOU remains in effect for six months from the effective date, unless such is extended by mutual written consent of all Parties or terminated pursuant to this Section XI. Any Party may elect to terminate, discontinue, or suspend the pilot project with twenty-four (24) hours' written notification if performance of the pilot is unreasonable or disruptive to CBP or JetBlue operations. Additionally, this MOU may be terminated upon the mutual agreement of the Parties or by one Party providing at least three (3) weeks' written notice to the other Parties.

5. No Other Amendment. All other terms and conditions of the MOU not explicitly amended by this Amendment shall remain unchanged and in full force and effect.


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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have caused this Amendment to be executed by their duly authorized representatives.

U.S Customs and Border Protection

Todd Owen
Executive Assistant Commissioner
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

JetBlue Airways Corporation



JetBlue Airways Corp.
10/12/2017

Date: _____

SITA INFORMATION NETWORKING
COMPUTING USA INC.

Title: _____
Date: _____



Metropolitan Airports Commission

6040 28th Avenue South, Minneapolis, MN 55450-2799 • 612-726-8100 • metroairports.org
Office of Executive Director/CEO

November 18, 2019

Ms. Colleen Manaher
Executive Director of Planning, Program Analysis and Evaluation
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20229

Re: Commitment Letter – Biometric Exit

Dear Ms. Manaher:

In September, Metropolitan Airports Commission (MAC) staff met with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) staff to discuss opportunities for (b)(5) at MSP to (b)(5) MSP.

In June of this year, the MAC, owner and operator of the Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport (MSP), in partnership with Delta Air Lines (Delta) deployed biometric facial recognition technology on sixteen gates at MSP Terminal 1. This deployment provides biometric facial recognition (Exit) screening capacity for all Delta international departures based on current flight schedules, except Canada, representing approximately 80% of all international departing traffic out of MSP.

In September of this year, the MAC and CBP met with Sun Country Airlines to (b)(5) (b)(5) MSP Terminal 2, a (b)(5) The MAC (b)(5) (b)(5) (b)(5)

On October 29th, MAC staff accompanied CBP representatives at MSP to (b)(5)

(b)(5) (b)(5) (b)(5) With the recent deployment of

Ms. Colleen Manaher
November 18, 2019
Page 2

(b)(5) and (b)(5)
Terminal 2, the MAC respectfully requests that CBP proceed with installation and deployment of biometric Entry at both Terminal 1 and Terminal 2 at MSP at the earliest opportunity. Please advise if there is anything the MAC can do to help facilitate Entry deployment at MSP.

Sincerely,

(b)(6)

cc: (b)(6);(b)(7)(C) Area Port Director – U.S. Customs and Border Protection, MSP
(b)(6);(b)(7)(C) Program Manager – Biometric Exit Strategic Transformation, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection



August 19, 2019

(b)(6) (b)(7)(C), Port Director
Office of Field Operations – Orlando Sanford International Airport
US Customs and Border Protection

SANFORD AIRPORT
AUTHORITY
Board of Directors

Re: Implementation of Biometric Exit at SFB

Dear Port Director (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

On May 30, 2018, the Sanford Airport Authority (SAA) was made aware that the existing Federal Inspection Services (F.I.S.) facility at Orlando Sanford International Airport (SFB) was (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E). On that same day, the SAA met with the Florida Department of Transportation and requested a grant for the design of the anticipated changes. The Sanford Airport Authority ultimately received that funding and has been working diligently to move forward with the repair/replacement/renovation of the F.I.S. facility at SFB to (b)(7)(E) now that we are aware of these needs. We look forward to regrouping with your agency on August 20 to review the preliminary design and discuss steps forward.

As expressed previously, it is our desire to move forward expeditiously to effect all needed improvements, including entrance and exit technology to improve both the passenger experience and assist the CBP with processing times and maximize utilization of personnel. At present, the SAA is aware that Biometric Entry will not be implemented by CBP until Biometric Exit has been completed. Towards that end, the SAA is committed to the implementation of Biometric Exit and wishes to move forward now with implementation completed prior to years' end.

The selected solution is the Amadeus/Gemalto solution. Amadeus is also the current provider for SFB common use/FIDS/AODB and RMS solutions.

The initial deployment of the Amadeus Biometric Solution will be implemented at International Gates 1-5. We anticipate initiating the Pilot (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5) Based on current and projected traffic, this (b)(5)

(b)(5)

We are most hopeful that the CBP will permit us to move ahead with the biometric exit technology now. In the meantime, we will continue to work with CBP facilities personnel to finalize the plans for the FIS and move forward to the construction phase. Please advise of next steps forward to achieve our mutual goals.

Very truly yours,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

FOIA CBP 000139

(b)(6)

Weekly Muster

Week of Muster: Immediate

Topic: Primary Processing of Travelers (b)(7)(E)
(b)(7)(E)

HQ POC: (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

Office: Air and Sea Entry Transformation, Office of Field Operations

- This muster outlines the proper use of the facial recognition version of the (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E) to inspect travelers seeking entry into the United States.
- The CBP officer will initiate traveler processing using a facial photograph capture rather than a document scan.
- The CBP officer will review the live and system-matched (gallery) photograph as well as the passenger data and information from the document listed on the manifest and, if there are no anomalies, will click *Accept Match*.
 - When the officer selects *Accept Match*, (b)(7)(E) displayed, (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E).
 - (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E)
- When the system returns (b)(7)(E) CBP officers always have the discretion (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E).
- If the CBP officer finds an anomaly with the system-matched photograph, such as a husband photo retrieving wife information, or the biographic information does not match the traveler:
 - (b)(7)(E)
 - (b)(7)(E)
- All travelers, regardless of age, nationality, or visa class are eligible to have a photograph captured for facial recognition.
- All travelers, regardless of age, nationality, or visa class are required to have a recorded class of admission in CBP systems prior to departing Ports of Entry.
- If a U.S. citizen requests to not have a photograph captured:

continue to occur as normal for first time (b)(7)(E) prompted by the system.

- During the traveler inspection using (b)(7)(E), the CBP officer will continue to:

- (b)(7)(E)

- Outage Mitigation Protocol

- (b)(7)(E)

Overall Deployment Checklist

Site Name: <XXXX>			
	Activity	Completion Status	Notes/Comments
1	Deployment Date		(b)(7)(E)
2	Identify Site Personnel (b)(7)(E)		2 weeks before 3 & 4
3	Local Union Notification		(b)(7)(E)
4	Communicate Deployment Date with Site Personnel along with Site Visit Dates and other milestone with dates		(b)(7)(E)
5	Time and Motion Baseline Study		<2 weeks prior to deployment (b)(7)(E)
6	Identify Site Visit Team (b)(7)(E)		
7	Verify Site Visit Travel Plans		
8	Site Visit Execution		(b)(7)(E)
9	Complete Site Visit Technical Checklist		
10	Complete Site Visit Report		
11	Revise deployment technical and operational concept based on site visit (b)(7)(E)		(b)(7)(E)
12	Authority to Proceed with Deployment (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E)		(b)(7)(E)
13	Coordinate Deployment Team (b)(7)(E)		2 weeks before 15, 16, 17
14	Site specific Acquisition		Determined by site Visit and Acquire
15	Communications Planning Activities		(b)(7)(E)
16	Delivery of Technical Equipment (Friday before deployment)		(b)(7)(E)
17	Deployment Activities (Use Technical Deployment Checklist)		(b)(7)(E)
18	Time and Motion Baseline Study		(b)(7)(E)
19	Site Acceptance of Ownership (Signoff)		(b)(7)(E)
20	Signoff of Completion <Signoff of Technical Deployment Checklist and Overall Deployment Checklist>		

Site Visit Checklist

Site Name: <XXXX>			
	Activity	Completion Status	
1	CBP Site Point of Contact		<Name> <Office Location> <Email Address> <Work Phone Number> <Cell Phone Number>
2	Technical CBP Site Point of Contact		<Name> <Office Location> <Email Address> <Work Phone Number> <Cell Phone Number>
3	Airline or Airport Point of Contact		<Name> <Office Location> <Email Address> <Work Phone Number> <Cell Phone Number>
4	Technical Airline or Airport Point of Contact		<Name> <Office Location> <Email Address> <Work Phone Number> <Cell Phone Number>
5	Selected Locations for Pod storage (Including Battery concerns)	(Y / N)	Primary: Alternate:
6	Do storage locations have multiple available power outlets?	(Y / N)	Count: Notes:
7	How many Pods required?		
8	Selected locations for Pod usage (include alternatives, if applicable)		Count: Locations:
9	Will Airline provide WiFi?	(Y / N)	Is there option for Primary and Secondary?
10	Obtain Airline WiFi Configuration Parameters (Primary and Secondary)		(b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E): (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E):
11	MiFi required for redundancy?	(Y / N)	
12	MiFi required as primary wireless communications method?	(Y / N)	How many? <Include redundancy considers>
13	Identify MiFi carrier(s) with best signal <Ideally 2 carriers>	(Y / N)	<Verizon, Sprint, AT&T, etc>
14	Extension Cords Needed	(Y / N)	Count (Include location identifier):
15	Power Stripe Required	(Y / N)	Count (Include location identifier):
16	Spectrum Analysis Conducted	(Y / N)	
17	Obtain Network Diagram from Airline	(Y / N)	
18	Obtain CAD Diagrams from Airport/Airline	(Y / N)	
19	Complete Site Visit Report		Distribute to leadership (PPAE and OIT)

Technical Deployment Checklist

Site Name: <XXXX>			
	Activity	Completion Status	Notes/Comments
1	Update POC information, if necessary		
2	Confirm Shipment Delivery materials list		<Copy delivery list for records>
3	Urgent Shipment required for missing material?	(Y / N)	<Specify items>
4	Assemble Pod (if necessary)		
5	Confirm location of storage areas		
6	Charge Pod		
7	Confirm WiFi configuration		<Copy configuration>
8	Test WiFi connection		<Save or copy test results>
9	Conduct response time test		<Save or copy test results>
10	Confirm MiFi configuration		<Copy configuration>
11	Test MiFi connection		<Save or copy test results>
12	Conduct response time test		<Save or copy test results>
13	Conduct Cloud reachability Test		<Save or copy test results>
14	Conduct Unit Test (Camera, Cloud, TVS)		<Save or copy test results>
16	Conduct End-to-End Test (b)(7)(E)		<Save or copy test results>
17	Update CAD diagrams according camera placement		<Save or copy test results>
18	Conduct Training		<Record number of classes and attendees list>
19	Obtain Officer Training Signoff		
20	Transition Operations to local team		
21	Coordinate Meeting with Airline/Airport/Local CBP		
22	Obtain Operations Signoff		
23	Completion Deployment Report		
24			



Homeland
Security

Sprint



Traveler Verification Service &
Biometric Exit Mobile Air

| July 2017

Biometric Exit Introduction




- History Biometric Entry/Exit
- Transfer of Biometric Exit Mission
- Targeted Biometric Experiments
- Traveler Verification Service (TVS)
- Biometric Exit Mobile Air App (BEMA)



Comprehensive Biometric Exit Mission

Key Parameters and Considerations



For a solution to be both feasible and realistic:

1 *Do not add another process*

Avoid adding any new processes

2 *Existing Infrastructure*

Utilize existing airport and airline infrastructure

3 *Existing Business Models*

Leverage existing stakeholder systems, processes, and business models

4 *Current Passenger Behavior*

Leverage passenger behaviors and expectations that do not require new or unexpected steps for travelers

5 *Existing Data & IT Infrastructure*

Use existing traveler data and existing government IT infrastructure

TVS & BEMA: How do they fit together?

- Fulfill the mission requirement of Biometric Exit using two tools: **TVS** and **BEMA**.



- **TVS** automates facial recognition of travelers on exit.
 - Uses APIS manifest data and existing photos to match live photos of travelers boarding.
- **BEMA** for exception processing.
 - BEMA is a (b)(7)(E) program that receives (b)(7)(E). Officers can use BEMA to take fingerprints, swipe and query travel documents (b)(7)(E).
- Used together, TVS and BEMA provide the foundation for robust biometric exit capabilities.

TVS Overview

What is TVS?

TVS biometrically confirms traveler departure by using facial recognition.

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)	Last Name, First Name	00/00/1900	P 123456 (MEX)	Boarded	(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)
------------------	-----------------------	------------	----------------	---------	------------------

TVS uses traveler photos already available to CBP. APIS data is used to create a gallery of photos on travelers on a particular flight. The photos come from government holdings, such as U.S. passport and visa photos, photos in (b)(7)(E) etc. The live photo captured by TVS during the boarding process is then matched against the gallery to biometrically confirm identity/departure on exit.

TVS Overview

- (b)(7)(E) before scheduled departure
(b)(7)(E) pulls the APIS information and Creates Gallery of photos from DHS holdings
- The Gallery will refresh every minute up to departure time, when updates are made to APIS.

MATCH	PASSANGER NAME	DOB	DOCUMENT	STATUS
	Smith, James	01/08/1992	P TR3456201 JP	Boarded
	Sally, Jane	09/12/1980	P TR1010201 JP	Boarded
	Mark, Robert	04/05/1959	P 534564981 US	Boarded
	Tanaka, Yuri	03/27/1979	P 568049423 US	No Match
	Arntson, Keenan Lanae	09/02/1991	P TR2935948 JP	Boarded
	Matsuyama, Asuka	06/15/1983	P 759403592 US	Boarded

TVS Step 1: Setup Camera


(b)(7)(E)



TVS Step 2: Process Flight



- Instruct the traveler to stand 22-26 inches away from the screen.
- If the traveler does not initiate facial capture, advise the traveler to move closer to the camera.



TVS Responses



• (b)(7)(E)



• (b)(7)(E)



• (b)(7)(E)

BEMA Overview

(b)(7)(E)

- BEMA is an enhanced handheld mobile device that allows CBPOs to collect and query biographic and biometric traveler data.

- (b)(7)(E)

- (b)(7)(E)

- (b)(7)(E)

- (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

BEMA Referral (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)



BEMA Selecting Referral

(b)(7)(E)

- Once you select a mismatch, (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E) the BEMA user will begin the adjudication process for that specific referral.

(b)(7)(E)

BEMA – Swipe Travel Document

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

- After selecting the (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E) the BEMA user can begin processing the mismatch using normal BEMA techniques.
- At this point, you should only process the referred/mismatched traveler.

(b)(7)(E)

BEMA – Primary Screen


(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)




BEMA – Biometric Collection


Biometrics Capture Screen



Fingerprint Capture



Homepage



BEMA — (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E)

BEMA – (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

- (b)(7)(E)

- (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

- (b)(7)(E)

- (b)(7)(E)

- (b)(7)(E)

BEMA — (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)
(b)(7)(E)

- (b)(7)(E)

- (b)(7)(E)

Policy

TVS allows the CBPO operating the device to determine the appropriate response to those travelers that do not match.

- All In-Scope passengers identities, including those of USCs, must be verified.
 - In-Scope is the same as the In-Scope age range for (b)(7)(E) Age 14 – 79
 - If A traveler Refuses or is unable to participate
 - Confirm using the (b)(7)(E)
 - Confirm using BEMA (NON- USC)
 - Out of Scope Travelers may be excused from TVS
- If the identity of a traveler cannot be verified by TVS, the CBP Officer will use appropriate alternative methods, such as BEMA or a manual review of documents, to verify that traveler's identity
- Once the traveler's identity is verified and there are no enforcement concerns, the CBP Officer may allow the traveler to board the flight

Exception Processing

For U.S. Citizen Travelers

- Absent any **Law Enforcement** concerns (b)(7)(E) a (b)(7)(E) review of the U.S. Passport can suffice for verification.
- If a U.S. Citizen Refuses to participate, Allow the traveler to bypass the TVS camera and verify the travelers identity manually.
- Allow the traveler to board.

Diplomats

- If a traveler identifies themselves as a diplomat, review their travel documents to confirm identity and validity, then allow the traveler to board.

Exception Processing (Continued)

For Non- U.S. Citizen Travelers

- Review the traveler's passport for entry stamps
- Review the travelers US documents (VISA, I-551 Refugee Travel Document, etc.)
- Swipe passport using the BEMA device
- (b)(7)(E)
 - Ensure biographic information (Name, DOB, etc.) (b)(7)(E)
 - (b)(7)(E)
 - (b)(7)(E)
- Process the traveler through the BEMA device

If the traveler Entered Without Inspection (EWI)

- (b)(7)(E)
- (b)(7)(E)

| TVS Closeout

Closing out a TVS (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)



Points of Contact

Supervisory Program Manager

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

Biometric Air Exit Director

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

BE-Mobile Mailbox

(b)(7)(E)

TVS Support Email

(b)(7)(E)

Enterprise Operations Center (EOC):

(b)(7)(E)



Questions?

[REDACTED]

(b)(7)(E)

Biometric Exit Mobile Referrals

January 2018



The purpose of this presentation is to explain how CBP has integrated (b)(7)(E) and mobile technologies to support air outbound operations.


(b)(7)(E)



(b)(7)(E)



(b)(7)(E)



(b)(7)(E)



(b)(7)(E)



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(b)(7)(E)



(b)(7)(E)



(b)(7)(E)




(b)(7)(E)



BE-Mobile Overview

- An enhanced handheld mobile device to collect **biographic and biometric exit data** from foreign national travelers departing the United States.
- CBPO can **confirm the departure of travelers** by scanning their travel documents and fingerprints.

(b)(7)(E)



BE-Mobile Passenger Processing

(b)(7)(E)

Primary Screen

(b)(7)(E)


Primary Screen

(b)(7)(E)




BE-Mobile Biometrics Collection

Biometrics Capture
Screen



Homepage



(b)(7)(E)



Primary Screen

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)



Processing Referrals

(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)



(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

The officer who completed the inspection, or the (b)(7)(E) needs to (b)(7)(E).



Appendix B:

(b)(7)(E)

Biometric Exit Mobile

2018



Overview

- **(b)(7)(E)**
- **(b)(7)(E)** is a powerful law enforcement tool to assist CBP Officers with inspections in the air outbound domain.
- **(b)(7)(E)**
- **(b)(7)(E)**



(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

- From within a (b)(7)(E) click on (b)(7)(E) checkbox, enter clarifying remarks in the pop-up window, and click (b)(7)(E)
- The remarks will be provided to the (b)(7)(E) user and also displayed on the (b)(7)(E) in the (b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)



(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)



(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)



(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)



(b)(7)(E)

(b)(7)(E)

- Now, process that specific traveler using normal (b)(7)(E) procedures.
 - (b)(7)(E)
- The disposition and comments, as well as (b)(7)(E) will be provided within the (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E)
- On the (b)(7)(E) will turn into a checkmark, meaning mobile inspection completed.
- Click on the (b)(7)(E) review inspection details, and close-out.

(b)(7)(E)

