

Countering Violent Extremism

OUTREACH STRATEGY WORKBOOK

For State, Local, and Tribal
Law Enforcement


C

V

E

Outreach Strategy

C
V
E



In the final analysis, our most effective defense against terrorism will come not from surveillance, concrete barriers, metal detectors, or new laws.

It will come from our own virtue, our courage, our continued dedication to the ideals of a free society. It will come from our realism in the acceptance of risk, our stoicism in the face of threats, our self-reliance, our humanity, our sense of community, too fleetingly expressed in times of disaster. It will come from our fierce determination, despite the risks, to defend our liberties and protect our values, for which we have fought many wars.

These are the kinds of defenses - the ones that come from deep within - that will make our nation unconquerable.

~ Brian Michael Jenkins, *Unconquerable Nation* (Rand Corporation, 2006), 177.

AGENDA

DAY ONE

0800 – 0930	Countering Violent Extremism – Mission and Vision Overview
0930 – 1100	Model Overview and Application
1100 – 1200	Context: Civil Rights / Civil Liberties
1200 – 1300	LUNCH
1300 – 1400	Community: Identifying Your Network
1400 – 1500	Group: Identifying Groups for Outreach
1500 – 1600	Outreach Panel
1600 – 1700	Assessment and Mission Statement

DAY TWO

0800 – 0810	Briefing
0810 – 0905	Hate Groups, Crimes and Social Media
0915 – 1000	Case Study Analysis
1000 – 1100	Context Factors
1100 – 1200	Increase Drivers / Decrease Drivers
1200 – 1300	LUNCH
1300 – 1400	Person Factors
1400 – 1500	Group Factors
1500 – 1600	Community Factors
1600 – 1700	Research Assessment and Strategy Adjustment

DAY THREE

0800 – 1130	Community Outreach Preparation
1100 – 1215	LUNCH
1230 – 1515	Community Outreach Presentations
1515 – 1600	Outreach Team and Executive Collaboration
1600	Closing



WORKBOOK TABLE OF CONTENTS

TOPIC	PAGE
DAY ONE	
Introduction	9
National Strategy for Counterterrorism Core Principles and Goals	10
Model Overview and Application - Case Study	13
United States Core Values	16
Context – Civil Rights / Civil Liberties	17
Presentation Overview	23
Community – Identifying Your Network	25
Group – Identify Groups for Outreach	26
Assessment and Mission Statements	30



WORKBOOK TABLE OF CONTENTS

TOPIC	PAGE
DAY TWO	
Hate Groups, Crimes and Social Media	33
Case Study Analysis	38
Context Factors	40
Increase Drivers / Decrease Drivers	42
Person Factors	44
Group Factors	46
Community Factors	48
Research Assessment and Strategy Adjustment	50



WORKBOOK TABLE OF CONTENTS

TOPIC	PAGE
CASE STUDIES (Listed Alphabetically)	
Shirwa Ahmed	54
Daniel Patrick Boyd	67
Anders Behring Breivik	85
Terry Jones	109
Samir Khan	130
Hutaree Militia	149
Faisal Shahzad	183

INTRODUCTION CVE OUTREACH STRATEGY

Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) is a strategic priority for the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and American law enforcement agencies. Over the course of the last year, DHS has sponsored a series of efforts intended to comprise a national CVE strategy and law enforcement training has emerged as a key component of the planned approach.

The goal of the CVE training project is to provide state and local law enforcement personnel the skills and knowledge to create, effectively execute and manage community engagement initiatives that have the potential to counter violent extremism in the United States at the strategic and operational levels.

Using the examination of case studies and lessons learned, an interactive model will be used and reinforced to cultivate better assessment and strategies for working with diverse communities.

This training involves facilitated discussion of actual CVE case studies and what the actions/strategies of community policing could accomplish in each of these cases. Traditional community policing will not adequately address the dynamics of violent extremism and the associated convergent threats. In this increasingly complex and ambiguous law enforcement environment, community policing requires new models that combine community and police resources to create environments where violent extremism cannot flourish. This outreach strategy will equip families, communities, and local institutions to be well-informed and therefore, our best defense against terrorist ideologies.

NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COUNTERTERRORISM CORE PRINCIPLES AND GOALS

The Core Principles guiding the National Strategy for Counterterrorism include:


- **Adhering to the United States Core Values**
- **Building Security Partnerships**
- **Applying Counterterrorism Tools and Capabilities
Appropriately**
- **Building a Culture of Resilience**

Goals

1. **Protect the American People, Homeland, and American
Interests**
2. **Disrupt, Degrade, Dismantle and Defeat al-Qa'ida and Its
Affiliates and Adherents**
3. **Prevent Terrorist Development, Acquisition, and Use of
Weapons of Mass Destruction**
4. **Eliminate Safe Havens**
5. **Build Enduring Counterterrorism Partnerships and
Capabilities**
6. **Degrade Links between al-Qa'ida and Its Affiliates and
Adherents**
7. **Counter al-Qa'ida Ideology and Its Resonance and
Diminish the Specific Drivers of Violence that al-Qa'ida
Exploits**
8. **Deprive Terrorists of their Enabling Means**

NOTES

MODEL OVERVIEW



MODEL OVERVIEW AND APPLICATION

Person:



Group:



Communities:



Context:



MODEL OVERVIEW AND APPLICATION

Refugee Case Study

What Do You Know?

What Do You Need To Know?

Context:

Communities:

Group:

Person:

Outreach Strategy for this community:

NOTES

UNITED STATES CORE VALUES

The United States was founded upon a belief in a core set of values that are written into our founding documents and woven into the very fabric of our society. Where terrorists offer injustice, disorder, and destruction the United States must stand for freedom, fairness, equality, dignity, hope, and opportunity. The power and appeal of our values enables the United States to build a broad coalition to act collectively against the common threat posed by terrorists, further delegitimizing, isolating, and weakening our adversaries.¹

- **Respect for Human Rights.** Our respect for universal rights stands in stark contrast with the actions of al-Qa'ida, its affiliates and adherents, and other terrorist organizations. Contrasting a positive U.S. agenda that supports the rights of free speech, assembly, and democracy with the death and destruction offered by our terrorist adversaries helps undermine and undercut their appeal, isolating them from the very population they rely on for support. Our respect for universal rights must include living them through our own actions.
- **Encouraging Responsive Governance.** Promoting representative, responsive governance is a core tenet of U.S. foreign policy and directly contributes to our CT goals. Governments that place the will of their people first and encourage peaceful change directly contradict the al-Qa'ida ideology. Governments that are responsive to the needs of their citizens diminish the discontent of their people and the associated drivers and grievances that al-Qa'ida actively attempt to exploit. Effective governance reduces the traction and space for al-Qa'ida, reducing its resonance and contributing to what it fears most—irrelevance.
- **Respect for Privacy Rights, Civil Liberties, and Civil Rights.** Respect for privacy rights, civil liberties, and civil rights are a critical component of our Strategy. Indeed, preservation of those rights and liberties is essential to maintain the support of the American people for our CT efforts. By ensuring that CT policies and tools are narrowly tailored and applied to achieve specific, concrete security gains, the United States will optimize its security and protect the liberties of its citizens.
- **Balancing Security and Transparency.** Democratic institutions function best in an environment of transparency and open discussion of national issues. Wherever and whenever possible, the United States will make information available to the American people about the threats we face and the steps being taken to mitigate those threats. A well-informed American public is a source of our strength. Information enables the public to make informed judgments about its own security, act responsibly and with resilience in the face of adversity or attack, and contribute its vigilance to the country's collective security. Yet at times, some information must be protected from disclosure—to protect personnel and our sources and methods of gathering information and to preserve our ability to counter the attack plans of terrorists.
- **Upholding the Rule of Law.** Our commitment to the rule of law is fundamental to supporting the development of an international, regional, and local order that is capable of identifying and disrupting terrorist attacks, bringing terrorists to justice for their acts, and creating an environment in every country around the world that is inhospitable to terrorists and terrorist organizations.
 - **Maintaining an Effective, Durable Legal Framework for CT Operations.** In the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States Government was confronted with countering the terrorist threat in an environment of legal uncertainty in which long-established legal rules were applied to circumstances not seen before in this country. Since then we have refined and applied a legal framework that ensures all CT activities and operations are placed on a solid legal footing. Moving forward, we must ensure that this legal framework remains both effective and durable.
 - **Bringing Terrorists to Justice.** The successful prosecution of terrorists will continue to play a critical role in U.S. CT efforts, enabling the United States to disrupt and deter terrorist activity; gather intelligence from those lawfully held in U.S. custody; dismantle organizations by incarcerating key members and operatives; and gain a measure of justice by prosecuting those who have plotted or participated in attacks.

CONTEXT: CIVIL RIGHTS / CIVIL LIBERTIES

LEGAL CONTACTS WITH THE PUBLIC¹

The Fourth Amendment

The first part of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution deals with the right of people to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. A Fourth Amendment "seizure" i.e., detention, does not occur merely because an officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions, or asks for identification, as in a consensual encounter. However, a detention may result from physical restraint, unequivocal verbal commands, or words or conduct by the officer, which clearly relate to the investigation of specific criminal acts.

Consensual Encounter

A consensual encounter is an encounter between a police officer and an individual in which the individual **voluntarily agrees** to stop and speak with the officer. These encounters can take place on streets and sidewalks, in cars, on buses, in airports, homes, or businesses. A consensual encounter allows an officer who has a hunch or minimal information that a person may be violating the law, to engage the person in a brief conversation for the purpose of confirming or dispelling the officer's suspicions. What makes these encounters unique is that officers, because they have neither reasonable suspicion to detain nor probable cause to arrest, **cannot legally prevent the individual from just walking away**. The individual has a right to refuse to cooperate, in which case officers must leave the individual alone. Refusal to cooperate, by itself, is not reason enough to detain. Nor would a refusal to cooperate constitute a violation of Penal Code §148, which makes it unlawful for a person to willfully resist, delay, or obstruct an officer in the performance of his or her duties. So, officers must seek the individual's cooperation, which means force, threats, and intimidation are out of the question. To be successful in a consensual encounter, officers must rely on a combination of their persuasive ability, personal restraint, common sense, and a good working knowledge of the law.

During a consensual encounter officers can gather information, interview witnesses at the scene of a crime or accident, have a casual conversation, and disseminate information. Officers may also approach an individual and **request** the individual to show identification, remove hands from pockets, or step to the side and answer questions.

Elevating Consensual Encounters

The exact words officer's use, and even their tone of voice, are extremely important to a court that is trying to decide if the contact was voluntary or not. If an officer starts to **give orders, demand answers, display a weapon, use a harsh tone, tell the person**

¹ Los Angeles Police Department Training Bulletin – Volume XXXVIII, Issue 1, April 2006
DHS-001-425-000149

to stop what he or she is doing, or to move to some other location, the encounter will be viewed as a detention, and it will be illegal unless supported by “reasonable suspicion.” The courts have ruled the following commands to a suspect rendered the encounter a detention:

- Come over here. I want to talk to you.
- Stop.
- Stay there.
- Hold it.
- Police.
- Step away from your car.
- Sit on the curb.
- Put your hands on the dashboard.
- Get off your bicycle, lay it down, and step away from it.
- Put your hands up and get out of the car.

Reasonable Suspicion

An officer may need to detain a person in order to investigate that person’s involvement in possible criminal activity. To be lawful, a detention must be based on reasonable suspicion that criminal activity has taken place or is about to take place, and that the person detained is connected to that activity. This “suspicion” must be supported by **articulable facts** rather than hunch or instinct. These facts can be drawn from the officer’s observations, personal training and experience, or information from eyewitnesses, victims, or other officers.

In some cases, the decision to detain is based on a single circumstance; e.g., the individual matched the description of a wanted person or a person who had just committed a crime in the area. But often the decision to detain is based on a variety of circumstances which, when considered as a whole, are sufficiently suspicious to justify a detention.

Contributing Factors

The following are some of the factors that contribute to establishing reasonable suspicion. **Although none of these circumstances standing alone will usually justify a detention, various combinations of them will.**

- Appearance of suspect (intoxicated, resemblance to wanted person),
- Actions (hiding objects, looking furtively, flight from officers or crime scene)
- Driving behaviors,
- Prior knowledge of the person (criminal record or conduct),
- Demeanor (nonresponsive, nervous, lying),
- Time of day (unusualness),
- Area of the detention (near crime scene, known criminal activity in area), and
- Officer training and experience (modus operandi, expertise in certain area such as narcotics or gang activity).

Probable Cause

The Fourth Amendment requires probable cause to make an arrest. Probable cause to arrest is a set of facts that would cause a person of ordinary care and prudence to entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person to be arrested is guilty of a crime. Definite information, or enough to convict the individual is not needed, only the fair probability that the individual committed the crime.

No matter what the context is, "probable cause" always boils down to the same question: Does an officer possess enough factual knowledge or other reliable information so that it is reasonable for him/her, in light of his/her training and experience, to believe "X."

In addition to the facts, knowledge, training, expertise, experience, observations, etc., that the officer personally has, probable cause can consist of information conveyed to the officer by others (such as victims, citizens, other officers, and "official channels," informants, tipsters, etc.), as long as it is reasonable to rely on this information under the totality of the circumstances.

Conclusion

It will be to the officer's advantage to have a thorough understanding of consensual encounters, reasonable suspicion and probable cause. Proper application directly impacts the officer's ability to enforce the law in a fair and impartial manner. Becoming confident in expressing the corresponding facts in reports and testimony will ensure that prosecutors file charges and cases are not dismissed in court.

The Photographer's Right

Your Rights and Remedies When Stopped or Confronted for Photography (Updated Nov. 2006).

About this Guide

Confrontations that impair the constitutional right to make images are becoming more common. To fight the abuse of your right to free expression, you need to know your rights to take photographs and the remedies available if your rights are infringed.

The General Rule

The general rule in the United States is that anyone may take photographs of whatever they want when they are in a public place or places where they have permission to take photographs.

Absent a specific legal prohibition such as a statute or ordinance, you are legally entitled to take photographs. Examples of places that are traditionally considered public are streets, sidewalks, and public parks.

Property owners may legally prohibit photography on their premises but have no right to prohibit others from photographing their property from other locations. Whether you need permission from property owners to take photographs while on their premises depends on the circumstances. In most places, you may reasonably assume that taking photographs is allowed and that you do not need explicit permission. However, this is a judgment call and you should request permission when the circumstances suggest that the owner is likely to object. In any case, when a property owner tells you not take photographs while on the premises, you are legally obligated to honor the request.

Some Exceptions to the Rule

There are some exceptions to the general rule. A significant one is that commanders of military installations can prohibit photographs of specific areas when they deem it necessary to protect national security. The U.S. Department of Energy can also prohibit photography of designated nuclear facilities although the publicly visible areas of nuclear facilities are usually not designated as such.

Members of the public have a very limited scope of privacy rights when they are in public places. Basically, anyone can be photographed without their consent except when they have secluded themselves in places where they have a reasonable expectation of privacy such as dressing rooms, restrooms, medical facilities, and inside their homes.

Permissible Subjects

Despite misconceptions to the contrary, the following subjects can almost always be photographed lawfully from public places:

- Accident and fire scenes
- Children
- Celebrities
- Bridges and other infrastructure
- Residential and commercial buildings
- Industrial facilities and public utilities
- Transportation facilities (e.g. airports)
- Superfund sites
- Criminal activities
- Law enforcement officers

Who Is Likely to Violate Your Rights

Most confrontations are started by security guards and employees of organizations who fear photography. The most common reason given is security but often such persons have no articulated reason. Security is rarely a legitimate reason for restricting photography. Taking a photograph is not a terrorist act nor can a business legitimately assert that taking a photograph of a subject in public view infringes on its trade secrets.

On occasion, law enforcement officers may object to photography but most understand that people have the right to take photographs and do not interfere with photographers. They do have the right to keep you away from areas where you may impede their activities or endanger safety. However, they do not have the legal right to prohibit you from taking photographs from other locations.

They Have Limited Rights to Bother, Question, or Detain You

Although anyone has the right to approach a person in a public place and ask questions, persistent and unwanted conduct done without a legitimate purpose is a crime in many states if it causes serious annoyance. You are under no obligation to explain the purpose of your photography nor do you have to disclose your identity except in states that require it upon request by a law enforcement officer.

If the conduct goes beyond mere questioning, all states have laws that make coercion and harassment criminal offenses. The specific elements vary among the states but in general it is unlawful for anyone to instill a fear that they may injure you, damage or take your property, or falsely accuse you of a crime just because you are taking photographs.

Private parties have very limited rights to detain you against your will and may be subject to criminal and civil charges should they attempt to do so. Although the laws in most states authorize citizen's arrests, such authority is very narrow. In general, citizen's arrests can be made only for felonies or crimes committed in the person's presence. Failure to abide by these requirements usually means that the person is liable for a tort such as false imprisonment.

They Have No Right to Confiscate Your Film

Sometimes agents acting for entities such as owners of industrial plants and shopping malls may ask you to hand over your film. Absent a court order, private parties have no right to confiscate your film. Taking your film directly or indirectly by threatening to use force or call a law enforcement agency can constitute criminal offenses such as theft and coercion. It can likewise constitute a civil tort such as conversion. Law enforcement officers may have the authority to seize film when making an arrest but otherwise must obtain a court order.

Your Legal Remedies If Harassed

If someone has threatened, intimidated, or detained you because you were taking photographs, they may be liable for crimes such as kidnapping, coercion, and theft. In such cases, you should report them to the police.

You may also have civil remedies against such persons and their employers. The torts for which you may be entitled to compensation include assault, conversion, false imprisonment, and violation of your constitutional rights.

Other Remedies If Harassed

If you are disinclined to take legal action, there are still things you can do that contribute to protecting the right to take photographs.

- (1) Call the local newspaper and see if they are interested in running a story. Many newspapers feel that civil liberties are worthy of serious coverage.
- (2) Write to or call the supervisor of the person involved, or the legal or public relations department of the entity, and complain about the event.
- (3) Make the event publicly known on an Internet forum that deals with photography or civil rights issues.

How to Handle Confrontations

Most confrontations can be defused by being courteous and respectful. If the party becomes pushy, combative, or unreasonably hostile, consider calling the police. Above all, use good judgment and don't allow an event to escalate into violence.

In the event you are threatened with detention or asked to surrender your film, asking the following questions can help ensure that you will have the evidence to enforce your legal rights:

- (1) What is the person's name?
- (2) Who is their employer?
- (3) Are you free to leave? If not, how do they intend to stop you if you decide to leave? What legal basis do they assert for the detention?
- (4) Likewise, if they demand your film, what legal basis do they assert for the confiscation?

Disclaimer

This is a general education guide about the right to take photographs and is necessarily limited in scope. For more information about the laws that affect photography, I refer you to the second edition of my book, *Legal Handbook for Photographers* (Amherst Media, 2006).

This guide is not intended to be legal advice nor does it create an attorney client relationship. Readers should seek the advice of a competent attorney when they need legal advice regarding a specific situation.

Published by: Bert. P. Krages II, Attorney at Law
6665 S. W. Hampton Street, Suite 200, Portland, Oregon 97223
WWW.KRAGES.COM
© 2003 Bert P. Krages II

PRESENTATION OVERVIEW

Formal Group Presentations:

Each officer, along with his/her group/table will complete a Formal Presentation on a Group identified in Day One of training. Your Community Outreach Project shall include researching cultures, sub-cultures, groups, organizations or historical locations that are related to that specific group.

Mandatory research for this project includes:

1. Identification of the cultures, groups, and organizations that co-exist around this specific group.
2. How the cultures, groups or organizations perceive law enforcement and identify what their expectations and needs are from law enforcement;
3. Examples of any previous conflicts with law enforcement and resolution;
4. Examples of positive police-community relations;
5. Law enforcement milestones within the community;
6. Identify the community leadership (both formal and informal) and how this does or does not impact a law enforcement response;
7. Current issues facing the culture, group, organization or location;
8. Recommendations on forming partnerships between law enforcement and community groups;
9. Identify any officers killed in the line of duty connected to this group and how this may impact law enforcement's relationship with this group/community.
10. Identify the person or key people, primary domain / perspectives
11. What was learned from your experience?
12. How the assignment changed their prior perception of the culture, group, organization or historical location
13. How the assignment will affect their performance in the field
14. List possible outreach strategies or milestones to be accomplished over the next year
15. Identify measures of success and progress should also be considered

Timeframe: Fifteen minutes and ten minutes for discussion with the audience

- Visual aids are recommended
- Must include a summary of the research

Sample Questions To Consider When Completing Your Project

What recent policy decisions have affected the area? Examples: airport expansion, gentrification, secession, gang injunctions, etc.


What demographic shifts or trends have affected the area? Examples: more renters than homeowners, influx of new residents who speak a language other than English

Results of the 2010 Census: <http://2010.census.gov/2010census/>

OUTREACH RESOURCES

Suggested Resources*	Contact Information
Adult Protective Services (APS) Advocacy Organizations: ACLU, MADD, SADD African American Organizations: NAACP Asian/ Pacific Islander Organizations: APADRC, APALC, Center for the Pacific Asian Family, KYCC, Blind & Visually Impaired Organizations: Chamber of Commerce Children's Advocacy Groups: City Departments: Commission on the Status of Women, Department on Aging, Department on Disability, Ethics Commission, Human Relations Commission	
Colleges: Community, 4-Year CPAB Deaf and Hard of Hearing Organizations: GLAD, Ethnic/Cultural Areas: Chinatown, Filipinotown, Little Tokyo, Thai Town Ethnic/Cultural Museums: Afro-American Museum, Chinese American Museum, El Pueblo, Japanese-American National Museum, Korean Cultural Center, Simon Wiesenthal Center Family Violence Centers/Shelters: About Face, Family Violence Project, Jenesse Center, Sojourn, 1736 Family Crisis Center Goodwill Organizations: <i>Goodwill, Red Cross, Salvation Army</i>	
Homeless Advocacy Groups Houses of Worship	
Housing Developments Landmarks Latino/Hispanic Organizations LGBT organizations: GLAAD Neighborhood Councils Persons with Disabilities Organizations Rape Treatment Centers Recovery Programs: Alcoholics Anonymous, Cocaine Anonymous, Gamblers Anonymous, Gangsters Anonymous, Narcotics Anonymous Religious Organizations: ADL, NOI, SCLC Senior Centers Service Dogs Organizations Schools: Elementary, Middle, High, Continuation Social Justice Organizations: Amnesty International, CHIRLA, El Rescate, Janitors for Justice, NCCJ, United Farmworkers Tenant/Housing Organizations: Housing Rights Center, Inquilinos Unidos, Veterans Organizations: American Legion, VFW, Veterans Hospital, Youth Centers: Boys & Girls Clubs, Bresee, YMCA, YWCA	

COMMUNITY: IDENTIFYING YOUR NETWORK



GROUP: OUTREACH FOCUS

Instructions:

1. Using the network analysis on the previous page, identify three groups where outreach is needed.
2. Include justification why each of these groups would be a priority for your Department.

Group:	Justification:
Group:	Justification:
Group:	Justification:

OUTREACH FOCUS WORKSHEET

The following questions are to prevent you from jumping immediately to a resolution without considering the needs and expectations of the outreach group.

1. **WHO** - Identify the group:

Preferred Term(s):

- Current Demographics (age, gender, ethnicity)
- History of Immigration/Migration
- History of Relationship with Police
 - Recent PD events
 - Significant PD events
- Diversity
- Political Views
- Spiritual / Religious Orientation
- Economic
- Literacy Assessment
- Language(s)
- Words for*:
 - Hello
 - Thank you
 - Good bye
 - Help

*Translation Sites:

www.babelfish.yahoo.com

www.translate.google.com

www.webtranslation.paralink.com

www.translation.babylon.com

2010 Census:

<http://2010.census.gov/2010census/>

2. **WHAT** – Do they value?

Family Roles / Relationships

- Birth Rituals
- Expectations of Children
- Gender Roles
- Elders
- Death Ritual
- Privacy

Communication

- Modesty
- Personal Space
- Eye Contact
- Tone of Voice
- Touch

Time Orientation

Special Clothing / Amulets

Health Views on:

- Getting Medical Help
- Birth Control
- Getting Psychological Help
- Domestic Violence
- Pain Management
- Words for Pain

Expectations on Education

Significant Holidays

- Duration
- Meaning

3. Connections – What are current issues / problems / concerns for this group?

-
-
-
-

4. Perspective – Using the issues / problem / concerns identified above, what is the perspective of this group on the problem / issues / concerns? Is this perception shared or divided in the group? Also, are these key people?

-
-
-
-

5. What additional information is required?

6. What / Who is the source for that information?

7. Do you know any key leaders / people?

4 Major Response Types

Service:

Assisting the public and referring them to appropriate partners

Protection:

Public and Police Safety, protecting the public, victims and those affected by their victimization, in partnership with community agencies and experts

Enforcement and Alternative:

Enforcement will always be an important part of policing, some situations are in the public's best interest, in the pursuit of justice, to enforce the law by arresting and prosecuting the offender to hold them accountable

Prevention:

Situation / Community; preventing incidents (crimes, accidents or problems) from occurring or escalating through intervention, proactive problem solving and education

8. Using the 4 Major Response Types, what would be your primary response and out of the 4, what type does your response represent?
9. Who are your potential partners in defining the problem and acquiring the information?
10. Referring to the problems / issues / concerns identified above, what alternative strategies are available to address the problem?
11. Identify two additional responses from the 4 Major Types (Be sure that one of your responses include prevention)
12. What criteria would you use to determine whether your response was successful?
 -
 -
 -
13. Where will you need assistance from partners to achieve these goals?
14. To improve outcomes, are there any political or organizational obstacles that need to be addressed? Who can help address those obstacles? Do you need to redefine the problems / issues / concerns to address these obstacles?

OUTREACH PANEL – LESSONS LEARNED

PRESENTATION WORKSHEET

Outreach Group: _____

Person:

Person:

- Cognitive
- Affective
- Psychomotor
- Civil Rights / Civil Liberties

Increase / Decrease Drivers

Group:

Group:

- What do they Value?
- Understanding Cultures
- Identifying Sources of Community Knowledge
- Critical Leaders:
 - Clergy
 - Ambassadors
 - Community Leaders
- Critical Vested Interest
- Blending Socio-Cultural Awareness with Community Policing
- Civil Rights / Civil Liberties

Communities:

Communities:

- Community Policing Models
- Local Businesses
- Leveraging Partnerships
- Community Network:
 - Schools
 - Hospitals
 - Libraries
- Who else is part of the honeycomb?
- Creating Open Dialogue with Communities
- Civil Rights / Civil Liberties

Context:

Context:

- Sociopolitical Factors
- Media and Current Events
- Prior Law Enforcement Contact
- Economic Background
- Civil Rights / Civil Liberties

MISSION STATEMENT

HATE GROUPS, CRIMES AND SOCIAL MEDIA

Hate Groups and Hate Crimes:

List how victims, families, and communities are affected by Hate Groups and Hate Crimes:

How could a victim of today's hate crime become tomorrow's violent perpetrator?

Notes:

Social Media¹:

Social media has become the tool du jour for thieves, frauds, combatants, terrorists, looters, and rioters. These groups are highly motivated, very skilled, flexible and resourceful in the application of a simple web-based service or software. Moreover, they are unhampered by governmental rules of engagement.

"Forms of electronic communication (as Websites for social networking and micro-blogging) through which users create online communities to share information, ideas, personal messages, and other content (as videos)²."

What is the current social media message about community and police interaction / relations in your community?

What is a possible counter-narrative message that peace officers may need to communicate?

Why should law enforcement participate in the creation of that counter-narrative message?

¹FYSA – For Your Situational Awareness: An Essay on Social Media's Impact on Law Enforcement Operations by LAPD Detective I. Jeffery Duggan and Detective III Mark Tharp

²Merriam-Webster, Definition of Social Media, 2011, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/social%20media> (September 2011)

Do you know if your agency uses any of the social media forms below? If so, which ones? (Check all that apply)

- ☐ Twitter
- ☐ YouTube
- ☐ Bebo
- ☐ Diaspora
- ☐ hi5
- ☐ MocoSpace
- ☐ Orkut
- ☐ Tagged
- ☐ XING
- ☐ NowPublic
- ☐ Vimeo
- ☐ AsianAvenue
- ☐ BlogPulse
- ☐ Lefora
- ☐ Zoho
- ☐ Constant Contact
- ☐ BIGADDA
- ☐ BlackPlanet
- ☐ Blogster

- ☐ Facebook
- ☐ Blog
- ☐ Cyworld
- ☐ Google+
- ☐ LinkedIn
- ☐ MySpace
- ☐ Ning
- ☐ Reddit
- ☐ Plaxo
- ☐ Metacafe
- ☐ Friendster
- ☐ Disqus
- ☐ vBulletin
- ☐ ExactTarget
- ☐ Care2
- ☐ Blauk
- ☐ Cloob
- ☐ Other: _____
- ☐ Other: _____

Identify pros and cons to maximizing social media in your Department:

PROS	CONS

What are some ideas for a counter narrative?

HATE GROUPS, CRIMES AND SOCIAL MEDIA

DIGITAL TERRORISM AND HATE 2011 – THE POWER OF SOCIAL NETWORKING IN THE DIGITAL AGE¹

SITEMAP

2.0 STRATEGIES

Internet 2.0

Blogs – North America
Blogs – International
Networking
Video on Demand
Virtual / Games / Mobile
Miscellaneous
Targeting the Enemy
Social Networking
Religion
Re-Writing History
Conspiracy
Images
Miscellaneous
Recruitment
Blogs / Publications
U.S./Foreign
Gender / Education
Networking
Discussion Forums

Marketing

Music / For Sale

Boycott
Topsites

Games

U.S.
Foreign

TERRORISM

Strategies

Recruiting
Propaganda / Threats
Broadcast / Video
Networking
Images
Instructional
Explosives
Guerilla Tactics
Manuals / Other
Cyberwars

Support

Social Networking
Fatwas
Blogs
Recruiting
Women / Children
Media / Publications
Video
Fundraising

Who's Who

United States

International
Icons – Global
Icons – Iraq
Forums

GEOGRAPHIC

U.S. / Canada

Social Networking
Internet 2.0
Nazi / Supremacy
Klan / Skinhead
Other U.S. Groups
Miscellaneous
Canada
Europe
Social Networking
Western Europe
Northern Europe
Central Europe
Eastern Europe
Latin / S. America
Youth / Music
Aryan
Other
Social Networking

Asia / Africa /

Australia

Asia
Australia / New
Zealand
Africa / Middle East
Social Networking

Transnational

¹ Simon Wiesenthal Center Snider Social Action Institute

NOTES

CASE STUDY ANALYSIS WORKSHEET - 1

CASE STUDY: _____

	What Do You Know?	What Do You Need To Know?
Person:		
Group:		
Communities:		
Context:		

CASE STUDY ANALYSIS WORKSHEET - 2

CASE STUDY: _____

Recommendations for Outreach and Mobilization

Person:

Group:

Communities:

Context:

CONTEXT FACTORS

CASE STUDY: _____

Person:

Person:

- Cognitive
- Affective
- Psychomotor
- Civil Rights / Civil Liberties

Increase / Decrease Drivers

Group:

Group:

- What do they Value?
- Understanding Cultures
- Identifying Sources of Community Knowledge
- Critical Leaders:
 - Clergy
 - Ambassadors
 - Community Leaders
- Critical Vested Interest
- Blending Socio-Cultural Awareness with Community Policing
- Civil Rights / Civil Liberties

Communities:

Communities:

- Community Policing Models
- Local Businesses
- Leveraging Partnerships
- Community Network:
 - Schools
 - Hospitals
 - Libraries
- Who else is part of the honeycomb?
- Creating Open Dialogue with Communities
- Civil Rights / Civil Liberties

Context:

Context:

- Sociopolitical Factors
- Media and Current Events
- Prior Law Enforcement Contact
- Economic Background
- Civil Rights / Civil Liberties

NOTES

INCREASE / DECREASE DRIVERS

CASE STUDY: _____

Person:

Person:

- Cognitive
- Affective
- Psychomotor
- Civil Rights / Civil Liberties

Increase / Decrease Drivers

Group:

Group:

- What do they Value?
- Understanding Cultures
- Identifying Sources of Community Knowledge
- Critical Leaders:
 - Clergy
 - Ambassadors
 - Community Leaders
- Critical Vested Interest
- Blending Socio-Cultural Awareness with Community Policing
- Civil Rights / Civil Liberties

Communities:

Communities:

- Community Policing Models
- Local Businesses
- Leveraging Partnerships
- Community Network:
 - Schools
 - Hospitals
 - Libraries
- Who else is part of the honeycomb?
- Creating Open Dialogue with Communities
- Civil Rights / Civil Liberties

Context:

Context:

- Sociopolitical Factors
- Media and Current Events
- Prior Law Enforcement Contact
- Economic Background
- Civil Rights / Civil Liberties

INCREASE / DECREASE DRIVERS WORKSHEET

Homegrown Violent Extremist (HVE) Definition:

A person of any citizenship who has lived and/or operated primarily in the United States or its territories who advocates, is engaged in, or is preparing to engage in ideologically-motivated terrorist activities (including providing support to terrorism) in furtherance of political or social objectives promoted by a foreign terrorist organization, but is acting independently or direction by a foreign terrorist organization.¹

It has been identified that most HVEs tend to “cluster” into five groups, whose members share some motivating factors and characteristics, as well as, display similar life experiences during their radicalization to violence.

	Increase Drivers	Decrease Drivers
Lost and Damaged:		
History of Violence:		
Foreign Policy Driven:		
Terrorist Wannabe:		
Violent Nationalist:		

¹ A Model for Understanding the Motivations of Homegrown Violent Extremists, Nov. 2011 - DHS

PERSON FACTORS

CASE STUDY: _____

Person:

Person:

- Cognitive
- Affective
- Psychomotor
- Civil Rights / Civil Liberties

Increase / Decrease Drivers

Group:

Group:

- What do they Value?
- Understanding Cultures
- Identifying Sources of Community Knowledge
- Critical Leaders:
 - Clergy
 - Ambassadors
 - Community Leaders
- Critical Vested Interest
- Blending Socio-Cultural Awareness with Community Policing
- Civil Rights / Civil Liberties

Communities:

Communities:

- Community Policing Models
- Local Businesses
- Leveraging Partnerships
- Community Network:
 - Schools
 - Hospitals
 - Libraries
- Who else is part of the honeycomb?
- Creating Open Dialogue with Communities
- Civil Rights / Civil Liberties

Context:

Context:

- Sociopolitical Factors
- Media and Current Events
- Prior Law Enforcement Contact
- Economic Background
- Civil Rights / Civil Liberties

NOTES

GROUP FACTORS

CASE STUDY: _____

Person:

Person:

- Cognitive
- Affective
- Psychomotor
- Civil Rights / Civil Liberties

Increase / Decrease Drivers

Group:

Group:

- What do they Value?
- Understanding Cultures
- Identifying Sources of Community Knowledge
- Critical Leaders:
 - Clergy
 - Ambassadors
 - Community Leaders
- Critical Vested Interest
- Blending Socio-Cultural Awareness with Community Policing
- Civil Rights / Civil Liberties

Communities:

Communities:

- Community Policing Models
- Local Businesses
- Leveraging Partnerships
- Community Network:
 - Schools
 - Hospitals
 - Libraries
- Who else is part of the honeycomb?
- Creating Open Dialogue with Communities
- Civil Rights / Civil Liberties

Context:

Context:

- Sociopolitical Factors
- Media and Current Events
- Prior Law Enforcement Contact
- Economic Background
- Civil Rights / Civil Liberties

NOTES

COMMUNITY FACTORS

CASE STUDY: _____

Person:

Person:

- Cognitive
- Affective
- Psychomotor
- Civil Rights / Civil Liberties

Increase / Decrease Drivers

Group:

Group:

- What do they Value?
- Understanding Cultures
- Identifying Sources of Community Knowledge
- Critical Leaders:
 - Clergy
 - Ambassadors
 - Community Leaders
- Critical Vested Interest
- Blending Socio-Cultural Awareness with Community Policing
- Civil Rights / Civil Liberties

Communities:

Communities:

- Community Policing Models
- Local Businesses
- Leveraging Partnerships
- Community Network:
 - Schools
 - Hospitals
 - Libraries
- Who else is part of the honeycomb?
- Creating Open Dialogue with Communities
- Civil Rights / Civil Liberties

Context:

Context:

- Sociopolitical Factors
- Media and Current Events
- Prior Law Enforcement Contact
- Economic Background
- Civil Rights / Civil Liberties

COMMUNITY FACTORS RESILIENCE

Resilience is just starting to be examined for understanding how individual's, families, and communities can become resilient to the influence and recruitment of violent extremists. These capacities might include:¹

- Economic development;
- Social capital;
- Information and communication; and
- Community competence

Resilience has also become a key term in the disaster preparedness field, where it has been described in terms of multiple subsystems (ecological, economic, physical infrastructure, civil society, and governance) and encompasses such elements as infrastructure and communication systems.

Resilience is just starting to be explored in regards to the potential recruitment of terrorists in the U.S. or violent extremists. Over the past ten years there has been a significant increase of interest in resilience in the clinical, community, and family sciences concerning a broad range of adversities. What does this new knowledge of resilience tell us about deterring terrorism or violent extremism?

- It tells us that you can be resilient to some risks but not to others;
- It tells us that resilience is neither entirely individual nor entirely social but an interactive combination;
- It tells us that when youth face risks from socio-economic and sociocultural adversities, their family is often the strongest buffer against the associated risks. How can we better help families to do so when they are already struggling to meet many basic challenges of daily life?
- It tells us that in diaspora communities, resilience is shaped as much by their home country and refugee camp internment as by American values and institutions;
- It tells us that preventive interventions have been able to lessen youth's negative actions through effectively enhancing protective resources at multiple levels. This shift requires moving away from a heavy focus on risk factors to an equal focus on protective factors; integrating knowledge and practice concerning psychosocial factors with that of security; working collaboratively with families and communities to design programs and policies that work in real-world settings.
- It tells us that preventative interventions' true aim is to reduce the vulnerability of a population. These interventions should not only aim to increase family and community cooperation with law enforcement, but also try to change basic family and community processes that will reduce young men's entry into violent extremism.
- It tells us that effective preventive strategies are locally tailored, multi-pronged, sustainable, and involve far more than information sharing. Thus enhancing resilience to violent extremism recruitment will take more than a town hall meeting or an informative briefing, as important as those are.

¹ Research on Violent Radicalization and Terrorist Recruitment in Somali Americans, September 2011 - DHS
DHS-001-425-000181

LESSONS LEARNED

The Executive Summary on Risk Reduction for Countering Violent Extremism study is an explorative review on the CVE programs being conducted by 5 countries. The diversity among the objectives and approaches in these countries was striking. Reducing the risk of engagement (and/or re-engagement) in terrorism was the key and the singularly common feature across the array of programs. None of the programs visited had systematic “outcome” data that could be used to evaluate them, but each had some useful elements.¹

1. **Singapore** - has a fully developed, multi faceted, resource-intensive risk reduction program for militant detainees. The Government uses its Internal Security Act (ISA) primarily to neutralize terrorist plots rather than charge suspects in court. ISA detainees may be placed in physical detention or restrictive release. The program has three core components: Psychological, Social and Religious. As of 2010, 60 participants were in the program with individualized programs extended to the detainee's and their families in perpetuity.
2. **Indonesia** - *Detachment 88* (Indonesia's police counterterrorism unit) operates a highly focused intelligence source development program that matches unit members with known violent extremists to develop individual, personal relationships. A local NGO operated by a former radical uses a similar approach but only for rehabilitation, not to elicit security-related information.
3. **Northern Ireland** - CVE efforts are embedded in a multi-layered national peace process based on a philosophy of “engaged grievance management.” The Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) leads an engaged, community policing initiative that aims to challenge the ideology of violent extremists, empower individuals who are vulnerable to terrorist recruitment, and enhance community resilience.
4. **Great Britain** – There is an elaborate, multi-pronged national CVE effort that is focused on persons “at-risk” rather than those who are convicted or detained. The strategic cornerstone, known as PREVENT, involves countering ideological support for violent extremism, disrupting those who promote the ideology, supporting persons vulnerable to recruitment, enhancing community resilience, and addressing extremist-related grievances.
5. **France** – France believes rehabilitation or de-radicalization programs for violent extremists generally have no value. They view terrorism principally as a strategic threat, and have crafted an intelligence-driven approach to prevention. They seek only to counter violence and terrorism, not the underlying ideologies. Using the leverage of their laws and justice system, they assertively collect intelligence against, and disrupt the operations of, individuals and groups engaged in violent extremist activity.

¹ Qatar International Academy for Security Studies (QIASS) - 001425-000182 Violent Extremism (CVE) Risk Reduction Project - 2010

Research Results - The nature of this sample and the methodology employed do not permit a distillation of "best practices" as that term is commonly used. "Best practice" typically refers to an approach or technique that is far superior to any other approach. It is one that has been successfully implemented and is transferable elsewhere. Those conditions do not exist here. There are, however, some practical and overarching observations that emerged from the project, including:

- a. In countering violent extremism, one size does not fit all (or even most). There may be no single "right" answer in trying to explain violent extremism.

Two suggestions seem evident:

1. Local knowledge is often a good place to start and;
 2. People's motivational pathways in and through terrorism are often complicated. Extremism is not always driven by the explicit ideology or the "cause."
- b. Among the countries studied, most have a goal in mind, but few have a clearly defined strategy for *how* to get there.
 - c. Different programs have very different objectives and expectations for both community-- and individual-- level outcomes. It helps to be explicit and clear up front about those objectives, how they will be measured, and which ones to pursue.
 - d. Nearly everyone thinks systematic program evaluations are important, but no one does them. This is a critical deficiency in this global effort. Knowledge of whether a program is "working" cannot be established without objective and systematic evaluation. Unknowingly sustaining and growing a program that is not working is costly, inefficient, and, at times, even counterproductive.
 - e. Systems and interagency relationships are critical. Partnerships among agencies and systems are a centerpiece of the approaches in every country where there is any degree of satisfaction or success.
 - f. Violent extremism is not evenly distributed throughout the world, and typically not even within a given country. Countries seeking to address the problem of violent extremism at a strategic level should carefully examine "hot spot" areas and conditions that might exist locally. They should also examine how the [state's] own actions, inactions, or reactions might be fueling rather than mitigating militant sentiments.

NOTES

CASE STUDIES

SHIRWA AHMED

DANIEL PATRICK BOYD

ANDERS BEHRING BREIVIK

TERRY JONES

SAMIR KHAN

HUTAREE MILITIA

FAISAL SHAHZAD

CASE STUDIES

SHIRWA AHMED

Outreach Strategy



Case Study: Shirwa Ahmed

Shirwa Ahmed was born in Somalia in 1981 and immigrated to the United States in 1994. His single mother raised him, along with his three brothers and a sister. Ahmed went on to graduate from a Minneapolis high school and become a naturalized US citizen.

The FBI also believes Shirwa Ahmed to be the first known American suicide bomber.

Many of the Somali teenagers who immigrated at the same time as Ahmed were unaccustomed to Western conveniences and luxuries, and some suffered emotional trauma from years spent amidst a bloody civil war. As a first-generation immigrant, he attempted to assimilate with the local Minneapolis culture but still retain his Somali family identity.

Ahmed learned to play pickup basketball, memorized rap lyrics, and emulated the clothing style and vocabulary of his American-born neighbors. When they rejected him, he was genuinely surprised, as he believed African-Americans and Somali-Americans shared a common ancestry. To compound the matter, his relatives disapproved of his associations with "ghetto people," preferring that he honor the relationships of his family's clan.

After graduating from high school in 2000, Ahmed took community college classes and worked odd jobs. He avoided the criminal activity that appealed to some of his peers. By 2004, Ahmed began associating with a group of fundamentalist Muslims and changed his dress and mannerisms, actively preaching his mosque's form of Islam to people on the street.

In 2006, Ethiopian troops, with American intelligence support, invaded war-torn Somalia and overthrew the fundamentalist Islamist government that at the time was believed to be sheltering al-Qa'ida elements and threatening its neighbors. The invasion of Muslim-majority Somalia by a Christian-majority Ethiopia united Somalis around the world, who ordinarily display loyalties to their respective clans, instead of towards Somali nationalism.

In this environment, the al-Shabaab ("the youth" in Arabic) terrorist organization flourished, presenting itself as a group fighting to restore Islamic sovereignty in Somalia and exaggerating the degree of US involvement in the country. Al-Shabaab recruiters with combat experience in Somalia persuaded the first group of Minneapolis Somali-Americans—which included Ahmed—to travel to become "freedom fighters" in Somalia in 2007.

On October 29, 2008, Shirwa Ahmed drove a car bomb into a government compound in northern Somalia, killing more than 20 people, one of five coordinated al-Shabaab operations that day.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/12/us/12somalis.html?pagewanted=all>

<http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=6331697&page=1#.TsavUHMbUpw>

<http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony%20Folk.pdf>

The New York Times

Search All NYTimes.com



U.S.

 WORLD U.S. N.Y./REGION BUSINESS TECHNOLOGY SCIENCE HEALTH SPORTS OPINION ARTS STYLE TRAVEL JOBS REAL ESTATE AUTOS
 POLITICS EDUCATION

A Call to Jihad, Answered in America



Nicole Bengiveno/The New York Times

More than 20 young Somali-Americans, many of them raised in Minneapolis, left the United States to join a militant Islamist group in Somalia.

By ANDREA ELIOTT

Published: July 11, 2009

MINNEAPOLIS — The Carlson School of Management rises from the asphalt like a monument to capitalist ambition. Stock prices race across an electronic ticker near a sleek entrance and the atrium soars skyward, as if lifting the aspirations of its students. The school's plucky motto is "Nowhere but here."

TWITTER

LINKEDIN

SIGN IN TO E-MAIL

PRINT

REPRINTS

SHARE

Multimedia



Joining the Fight in Somalia

For a group of students who often met at the school, on the [University of Minnesota](#) campus, those words seemed especially fitting. They had fled Somalia as small boys, escaping a catastrophic civil war. They came of age as refugees in Minneapolis, embracing basketball and the prom, hip-hop and the Mall of America. By the time they reached college, their dreams seemed within grasp: one planned to become a



SHIRWA AHMED ARTICLES



Shabab's Latest Pr paganda Video

Related

Essay by Mohamoud Hassan (July 12, 2009)


Radio Interview with Zakaria Maruf (July 12, 2009)

Times Topics: [Al-Shabab](#)

From the Midwest to Mogadishu

While “homegrown” jihadism has caused alarm in Britain and other European countries, does the United States face challenges of its own?

[Join a Discussion »](#)



[Enlarge This Image](#)



The New York Times

A screenshot of the Facebook profile of Mohamoud Hassan, one of a group of Minneapolis men who left for Somalia to join in a militant Islamic movement last November. Mr. Hassan went by a nother name. Bashir Maxamed Caydid, on his Facebook account.

doctor; another, an entrepreneur.

But last year, in a study room on the first floor of Carlson, the men turned their energies to a different enterprise.

“Why are we sitting around in America, doing nothing for our people?” one of the men, Mohamoud Hassan, a skinny 23-year-old engineering major, pressed his friends.

In November, Mr. Hassan and two other students dropped out of college and left for Somalia, the homeland they barely knew. Word soon spread that they had joined the [Shabab](#), a militant Islamist group aligned with [Al Qaeda](#) that is fighting to overthrow the fragile Somali government.

The students are among more than 20 young Americans who are the focus of what may be the most significant domestic terrorism investigation since Sept. 11. One of the men, Shirwa Ahmed, blew himself up in Somalia in October, becoming the first known American suicide bomber. The director of the [Federal Bureau of Investigation](#), Robert M. Mueller, has said Mr. Ahmed was “radicalized in his hometown in Minnesota.”

An examination by The New York Times, based on interviews with close friends and relatives of the men, law enforcement officials and lawyers, as well as access to live phone calls and [Facebook](#) messages between the men and their friends in the United States, reveals how a far-flung jihadist movement found a foothold in America’s heartland.

The men appear to have been motivated by a complex mix of politics and faith, and their communications show how some are trying to recruit other young Americans to their cause.

The case represents the largest group of American citizens suspected of joining an extremist movement affiliated with Al Qaeda. Although friends say the men have never thought of carrying out attacks in the United States, F.B.I. officials worry that with their training, ideology and American passports, there is a real danger that they

SHIRWA AHMED ARTICLES

abc NEWS App for iPad™



your world.
in your hands.

Available on the
App Store

CLICK HERE
TO DOWNLOAD

abc NEWS

CUOMO
ON THE CASE

HOT TOPICS:

God Particle • Karen Swir • Jerry Sandusky

SEARCH

Facebook • ESPN • ABC

Home Video Blogs **News** Politics Investigative Health Entertainment Money Tech

Nightline This Week 20/20 Good Morning America

MORE NEWS: Penn State | Newt Gingrich | Michelle Parker | Business Traveler | Cuomo on the Case | Weather | Sports from ESPN.com | U.S. | International

World News

Feds Probing Possible Minn. Terror Group



By PIERRE THOMAS (@PierreTABC) and JASON RYAN (@JasonRyanABC)

Nov. 25, 2008

Recommend 3

0

Share

Email

Comment

Print

Text Size - / +

A naturalized U.S. citizen who reportedly blew himself up in a suicide bomb attempt in Somalia last month might have recruited others to join a terror network, U.S. law enforcement officials tell ABC News.

The officials believe Shirwa Ahmed, a naturalized U.S. citizen from Somalia, blew himself up in a suicide bombing in northern Somalia Oct. 28.

ABC News has learned that agents from the FBI and Department of Homeland Security are investigating whether Ahmed had developed a recruiting network in the Minneapolis area where he had been residing before departing for Somalia.

More than a dozen young men of Somali descent, mostly in their 20s, from the Minneapolis area have recently disappeared, U.S. law enforcement officials tell ABC News. All are thought to be associates of Ahmed.

U.S. officials suspect that most of the young men have departed for Somalia to fight in ongoing violence there or to train in terrorist camps. Family members of the young men are said to be distraught, trying to figure out what happened to them, sources tell ABC News.

The Justice Department declined to comment on the matter.



U.S. law enforcement officials are investigating a suicide attack allegedly carried out by a naturalized U.S. citizen in Somalia.

The investigation has not uncovered credible evidence of a plot targeting the U.S. homeland, but U.S. officials want to track down all these young men before they can say for certain what this is or is not. Sources say the situation is being closely monitored by senior law enforcement and intelligence officials in Washington.

CIA director Michael Hayden recently voiced his concern about increased fighting in Somalia and the Horn of Africa and the desire of al Qaeda to strengthen its ties in Somalia.

"In East Africa, al Qaeda's engaging Somali extremists to revitalize operations," said Hayden. "And while there clearly has not yet been an official merger, the leader of the al-Shabaab terrorist group is closely tied to al Qaeda. And the recent bombings in Somalia may have meant, at least in part, may have been meant to strengthen the bona fides of this group with al Qaeda's senior leaders."

"A merger between al-Shabaab and al Qaeda could give Somali extremists much-needed funding while al Qaeda could then claim to be re-establishing its operations based in East Africa," Hayden said. "That's a base that was severely disrupted about two years ago when Ethiopia moved into Somalia."

Arrests of Extremists

Two weeks ago, officials in Boston arrested a U.S. citizen traveling to Somalia who was reportedly in communication with Daniel Maldonado, a Muslim convert who moved from the Houston area in 2005 and eventually ended up in an al Qaeda training camp near Mogadishu.

Maldonado was initially detained by Kenyan security forces in 2007. He pleaded guilty to federal charges of training at an al Qaeda camp in Somalia.

In the recent Boston case, Tarek Mehanna was charged with making false statements for allegedly lying to the FBI about his communications with Maldonado while he was in Egypt and Somalia.

According to the charges against Mehanna, Maldonado told him in 2006 he was in Somalia, "I'm here fighting," according to the court papers. The FBI arrested Mehanna as he was leaving the United States to take employment in Saudi Arabia.

Gold Stock to watch
The best gold stock to watch this week!
chicagofinancialtimes.com/S&P

Testimony of W. Anders Folk
U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Homeland Security
Al Shabaab: Recruitment and Radicalization within the Muslim American Community and the
Threat to the Homeland
July 27, 2011

I served as an Assistant U.S. Attorney ("AUSA") for the District of Minnesota from October 2005 through December 2011. Prior to my work as an AUSA, I was a judge advocate in the Marine Corps, prosecuting and defending Marines and Sailors charged with criminal offenses under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. I am also a Minnesota native, who attended the University of Minnesota as an undergraduate and law student. Among other duties as an AUSA, I served as the Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council prosecutor for the District of Minnesota ("ATAC"). In that capacity, I was responsible for working with the Federal Bureau of Investigation's ("FBI") Joint Terrorism Task Force ("JTTF") in Minnesota to investigate individuals who were involved with terrorist groups or terrorist-related activity. In some circumstances, this led to criminal charges directly related to terrorism (e.g., providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization), and other times, charges with no direct relation to terrorism (e.g., immigration-related marriage fraud).

During the course of my duties as ATAC, I worked collaboratively with the FBI and numerous other federal agencies involved in national security to investigate *al-Shabaab's* activities in the District of Minnesota. This assignment ultimately led to work across the United States and the world. To date, the U.S. Attorney's Office in Minnesota and the FBI's JTTF in Minnesota have unsealed indictments against twenty (20) individuals – nineteen of whom were Minnesota residents – involved either directly with *al-Shabaab* or who supported others connected to *al-Shabaab*.

In addition to my work targeting individuals in Minnesota who were supporting *al-Shabaab*, I was also involved in and aware of, though less so, investigations into individuals providing material support to *al-Shabaab* in other federal districts within the United States.

By way of background to the investigation of *al-Shabaab*, between September 2007 and October 2009, over twenty mostly ethnic Somali men left the Minneapolis, Minnesota area and traveled to Somalia, where they trained with *al-Shabaab*. Many of them ultimately fought with *al-Shabaab* against Ethiopian forces, African Union troops, and the internationally-supported Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Since their departure from Minnesota, these men have been involved in all aspects of *al-Shabaab's* terrorist activities, including military training, combat, suicide bombings, and recruitment.

The unique and extraordinary threats to national security that foreign terrorist organizations present to the United States are abundantly clear. *Al-Shabaab's* successful recruitment of U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents and the existence of a base of ideological and actual support for *al-Shabaab* in the United States raise a number of issues that require study in order to ensure that the United States maintains its safety in the face of the threat posed by the group. The lessons learned in Minnesota and across the United States from investigating and prosecuting members of *al-Shabaab* provide an opportunity for such study.

General Concerns Raised by Al-Shabaab's Recruitment, Training and Operational Deployment of U.S. Citizens and Residents in Combat

The departure of men from Minnesota to fight in Somalia on behalf of a designated foreign terrorist group raises numerous concerns for federal and state law enforcement, the national security agencies and U.S. military, and for any community which experiences recruiting, fundraising or advocacy on behalf of designated foreign terrorist groups. First, the idea that it is possible that men (or women) may leave the United States, receive military training, combat experience and religious indoctrination justifying violence against innocent people, and then return to the United States to either put those experiences to use or to recruit others to do the same, poses a significant threat. Second, the strong social and family networks that individuals leaving the United States maintain when they travel to foreign countries to join foreign terrorist organizations enhances the reach-back capability of those organizations to conduct recruiting and fund-raising in the U.S., thus enhancing the organization's ability to continue to function. Third, the recruiting of U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents allows foreign terrorist organizations access to identification and travel documents that permit travel and access to and within the United States. Fourth, recruiting U.S. persons provides international terrorist organizations with inside knowledge about the United States that makes it easier to operate within the United States and to teach others to do the same.

There are a number of distinct challenges to protecting U.S. communities from foreign terrorist activities. First, the organizations are international, thus, often their members and resources are located outside the reach of a domestic law enforcement agency. Second, the organizations are often motivated by ideology - political, religious, or otherwise. As a result, the forces driving the groups' desire for violence or other operational activities often cannot be controlled by law enforcement in a meaningful way. Third, because the groups are international, their *modus operandi* may not be easily discernable to domestic law enforcement agencies. Fourth, their members often will not be known to law enforcement agents.

Background on Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda Recruitment Efforts

Al-Shabaab's efforts to recruit foreign fighters are no secret. Its former leader, Aden Hashi Ayrow, called for foreign fighters to join *al-Shabaab* in a "holy war" against the Ethiopian and African Union forces in Somalia. This call was echoed by *al-Qaeda* leadership, including Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. Since Minnesotans began leaving the U.S. for Somalia, *al-Shabaab* has made significant and repeated efforts to advertise its cause, to recruit individuals from outside Somalia to join its organization, and to raise money in support of its operations in Somalia. Such efforts are disclosed in press releases, videos released on the Internet, and documents contained in publicly available court proceedings. Additionally, these efforts include the glorification of *jihad*, espousal of rhetoric critical of the United States, and justifying violence. Illustrative of such conduct by *al-Shabaab's* are the widely distributed and viewed videos on the internet, one of which features an individual who left Minnesota and traveled to Somalia to fight for *al-Shabaab* and to recruit other men to travel to Somalia.

The Minnesotans ultimately charged as part of the investigation into *al-Shabaab* generally fell into two groups: individuals who have traveled to Somalia to fight, and individuals who have provided support from the United States to *al-Shabaab* members in Somalia or to

individuals in the United States preparing to travel to Somalia to join *al-Shabaab*. Among the men who traveled to fight in Somalia, the individuals can be further categorized based upon the year of their departure for Somalia: the classes of 2007, 2008, and 2009.

Separate from these travelers is the additional category of individuals who were investigated and charged for supporting the travelers who joined *al-Shabaab* or who independently supported *al-Shabaab* financially. This category includes an individual charged and convicted of committing perjury before a grand jury as a result of false statements related to his knowledge of individuals planning to leave the United States for Somalia; an individual charged and convicted of obstruction of justice regarding his knowledge of individuals traveling from Minnesota to California, ultimately to leave the United States and join *al-Shabaab*; and individuals raising money from supporters in the United States and sending that money to *al-Shabaab* in Somalia via the *hawala* money transfer system.

2007

The class of 2007 fighters left Minnesota in December 2007, traveling from Minneapolis, Minnesota to Somalia via the Netherlands and Dubai, United Arab Emirates. At the time these men left Minnesota, *al-Shabaab* was not yet designated a foreign terrorist organization by the U.S. Department of State. Upon their departure from Minnesota, members of the class of 2007 stayed at an *al-Shabaab* operated safe house outside of Mogadishu, Somalia, attended an *al-Shabaab* training camp, and in some cases, participated in combat actions on behalf of *al-Shabaab*. Of the men who left Minnesota in 2007, three ultimately returned to Minnesota. These three men were Salah Osman Ahmed, Kamal Said Hassan and Abdifatah Yusuf Isse. Isse and Ahmed both pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, for providing material support to terrorists. Hassan pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B and 1001, for providing material support to terrorists, providing material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization, and making false statements in an offense involving international terrorism.

Other individuals who traveled to Somalia as part of the class of 2007, but who have not returned to the United States, include Khalid Abshir and Ahmed Ali Omar. These men have been charged with a number of federal criminal offenses related to providing material support to *al-Shabaab* but remain at large.

In addition to the individuals who returned to the United States and were charged with criminal offenses, the class of 2007 included Shirwa Ahmed. On October 29, 2008, Ahmed took part in one of five simultaneous suicide attacks on targets in northern Somalia that appeared to have been coordinated. These attacks resulted in a significant number of deaths, including his own, and represented *al-Shabaab's* ability and willingness to use suicide bombers to carry out attacks.

Finally, the class of 2007 included two individuals who remained in Minnesota but were involved in criminal activity supporting the travel of men to fight in Somalia. Adarus Ali was charged with and pled guilty to committing perjury in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623, based on false statements he made to a grand jury that was investigating the travel of Minnesotans to Somalia to fight. Omer Abdi Mohamed was charged with and pled guilty to providing material

support to terrorists in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, based on his role in the conspiracy to assist the class of 2007 to travel to Somalia.

2008

In January 2008, Mahamud Said Omar was the first of the class of 2008 to travel to Somalia from Minnesota. While in Somalia he stayed at an *al-Shabaab* safe house with other Minnesotans. While at the safe house, he provided money to purchase AK-47 assault rifles and to operate the safe house. Mahamud Said Omar returned to Minnesota in April 2008, during which time he remained in contact with members of the conspiracy and members of *al-Shabaab*. Upon his return, he assisted other Minnesotans in their departure from Minnesota to Somalia. Mahamud Said Omar left the United States for a second time later in 2008, and was ultimately arrested in the Netherlands pursuant to charges filed in the District of Minnesota, alleging Mahamud Said Omar's activities in support of *al-Shabaab*.

In February 2008, Zakaria Maruf traveled from Minnesota to Somalia to join *al-Shabaab*. Maruf was charged with a variety of terrorism-related offenses following his departure to Somalia. Maruf's later death in Somalia was widely-reported. The reports surrounding Maruf's death included descriptions of Maruf's efforts to recruit additional fighters from Minnesota, in a manner consistent with the recruiting language and themes found in *al-Shabaab's* videos available on the internet.

In August 2008, Mohammed Abdullahi Hassan and Mustafa Ali Salat left Minnesota for Somalia to join *al-Shabaab*. Each has been charged with a variety of criminal offenses related to providing material support to *al-Shabaab*.

In November 2008, Abdisalan Hussein Ali, Abdikadir Ali Abdi and others, left Minnesota for Somalia to join *al-Shabaab*. This departure took place less than one week after Shirwa Ahmed conducted his suicide bombing attack on behalf of *al-Shabaab* in Somalia. Abdisalan Hussein Ali and Abdikadir Ali Abdi have been charged with a number of criminal offenses related to providing material support to *al-Shabaab*. They remain at large.

Among the men in the class of 2008, the following have been reported killed in Somalia: Zakaria Maruf, Troy Kastigar, and Burhan Hassan.

2009

In October 2009, three additional Somali men left Minnesota and traveled to Somalia to fight. Amongst them was Farah Mohamed Beledi, recently identified publicly by the FBI and his family as being killed in Somalia in an attempt to detonate a suicide bomb. Another man who traveled to Somalia to fight on behalf of *al-Shabaab* was Cabdullahi Faraax. Faraax was charged not only with terrorism-related offenses, but also with lying to the FBI on multiple occasions about his knowledge of terrorist-related activities in and around Minneapolis, Minnesota.

As part of the class of October 2009 travelers, Abdow M. Abdow was also charged with and pleaded guilty to lying to the FBI regarding his knowledge of others who traveled with him from Minnesota to California.

Financing

The criminal cases against Minnesotans and others throughout the United States financially supporting *al-Shabaab* highlight the central role that money plays in sustaining terrorist organizations. As illustrated by the cases of Amina Ali and Hawo Hassan in Minnesota, Nima Ali Yusuf, Basaaly Saeed Moalin, Mohamed Mohamed Mohamud and Issa Doreh in San Diego, California, and Mohamud Abdi Yusuf in St. Louis, Missouri, fundraising has occurred across the United States to support *al-Shabaab*. As set forth in the charging documents in these cases, *al-Shabaab* supporters sought financial support from others that they would then pool and send to members of *al-Shabaab* located abroad. Cutting off the ability for those in the United States to provide financial support to *al-Shabaab* is crucial to diminish *al-Shabaab's* ability to carry out terrorist operations.

Recruiting

Al-Shabaab has made no secret of its desire to recruit individuals from abroad to join its cause. *Al-Shabaab's* efforts to recruit include edited videos posted on the internet. These videos depict *al-Shabaab* training camps, combat footage involving *al-Shabaab*, and religious messages in an effort to glamorize and justify their actions. The videos include statements by individuals such as Omar Hammami, a U.S. citizen, encouraging others to join *al-Shabaab* and justifying the terrorist activities of *al-Shabaab*. At least one video put out by *al-Shabaab* includes rap or hip-hop style music and a message that appears clearly to focus on recruits in Western Europe or the United States. Additionally, videos celebrating the death of *al-Shabaab* fighters and extolling their virtues as "martyrs," to include individuals from Minnesota, have also circulated on the internet.

In addition to the formal attempts to recruit through the internet and media, *al-Shabaab* has used its recruits to conduct further recruiting. As set forth in charging documents and a variety of interviews of individuals in Minnesota by the media, those men who left Minnesota to fight in Somalia have maintained contact and communication through phone calls, the internet and email with friends and family in Minnesota. In part, such contact has included the recruiting of others to join *al-Shabaab*. One of the more disturbing elements of *al-Shabaab's* recruiting efforts in the United States has been the number of recruits leaving the United States who are teenagers. The fact that *al-Shabaab* has managed to convince very young men that a better life exists for them in Somalia, despite its abject poverty, lack of a functioning government and violence, is a testament to the persuasiveness and allure of its message.

In addition to recruiting by *al-Shabaab* as an organization and by individuals on behalf of *al-Shabaab*, religious figures such as Anwar al-Awlaki have provided potential recruits with ideological underpinnings for individuals to fight in Somalia on behalf of *al-Shabaab*. As has been publicly reported, *al-Awlaki's* "Constants on the Path to *jihad*" has provided recruits and potential recruits with an ideological framework, however distorted and incorrect it may be, to fight on behalf of *al-Shabaab* in Somalia.

Threat Posed by Al-Shabaab

It is impossible to predict with certainty what, if anything, and who, if anyone, will come to the United States after training and indoctrination by *al-Shabaab*. It is obvious, however, that individuals who are trained, indoctrinated and deployed in combat by *al-Shabaab* have learned how to carry-out acts of lethal violence. Additionally, it is clear that the ideology espoused by *al-Shabaab* echoes that of *al-Qaeda*. This combination of ability and ideology illustrates the threat that is posed by even one *al-Shabaab* veteran residing in the United States. The ability to prevent or detect such a person from entering the United States or carrying-out any terrorist acts in the United States requires continued vigilance of the group's activities in Somalia, but also to ensure that supporters or sympathizers within the United States are targeted for investigation.

Deterrence of Al-Shabaab Recruitment, Fundraising and Violence in the United States

To fight *al-Shabaab* and its supporters, the United States must engage in a multi-faceted approach that utilizes all of the United States' abilities, including military, intelligence, law enforcement and diplomatic options. Further, this effort must be carried out in Somalia, the Horn of Africa, and the United States.

Consistent with U.S. legal authorities, a focus must remain on Somalia and the Horn of Africa, and importantly include Yemen, to ensure that the U.S. targets *al-Shabaab* in the same manner as it does other foreign terrorist organizations, such as *al-Qaeda*, and *al-Qaeda* in the Arabian Peninsula. This targeting should focus on the application of military power and intelligence-gathering techniques to make certain that if there are threats or potential threats to the United States in foreign countries, those threats are extinguished in that foreign country and the information regarding those threats is provided as quickly as possible to the FBI and other relevant agencies. This will increase the likelihood that any connections to the threat that come from or link to the United States are identified and either eliminated or mitigated.

Second, the FBI must continue to investigate and prosecute those within the homeland who provide, attempt, or conspire to provide, support to *al-Shabaab*. This investigation and prosecution requires the continued use of all techniques within the FBI's lawful authorities under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"), Title-III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, and the Attorney General's guidelines, to target groups and individuals supporting *al-Shabaab* within the United States. Additionally, as is illustrated by the Minnesotans who have left to fight in Somalia, the FBI's relationships with foreign law enforcement and intelligence agencies are imperative to allow the United States to track suspects and if possible, affect their arrests in foreign countries where appropriate.

Third, military, intelligence and law enforcement techniques must be complimented through local outreach within the United States to the communities with members who have supported *al-Shabaab*. For example, the Somali community in Minnesota has experienced firsthand the negative effects that *al-Shabaab* recruiters have had in their communities. One way to work to gain cooperation and assistance from the Somali community is to provide education regarding how the Department of Justice's investigative processes, the legal system generally, and civil rights operate, as well as ways they can help to strengthen their communities against the

message of *al-Shabaab* recruiters. Younger Somalis have in many cases invested in the United States through their education and employment, as well as through their athletic and social networks. It is important to ensure that they understand the government's interest in them is not limited to putting their name on an indictment. Additionally, law enforcement will be more effective in its ability to detect and prevent extremist behavior if the Somali community trusts the FBI enough to make contact with the FBI or other law enforcement if the community has concerns.

CASE STUDY

DANIEL PATRICK BOYD



Case Study: Daniel Patrick Boyd

Daniel Patrick Boyd is the senior member of a group of seven North Carolina men charged in July 2009 with supporting violent jihad movements overseas. The defendants included two of his sons. All but one of the group were US citizens, and one was a legal permanent resident. A superseding indictment followed soon afterwards, accusing Boyd of plotting to attack the US Marine Corps base in Quantico, Virginia.

Daniel Boyd was born in the United States to an Episcopalian family. His father was a Marine. He converted to Islam shortly after high school. In 1989, he reportedly traveled abroad to train with mujahedin rebels fighting against the Soviet presence in Afghanistan.

In 2006, Boyd went to Israel for what prosecutors believe was an attempt to contact radical jihadists in the Palestinian territories.

Following a 2007 trip to Israel, Boyd allegedly lied to US Customs officials and FBI agents about his intentions to meet with two co-defendants in Israel.

In 2009, Boyd stopped attending mosques in his home town due to ideological differences and began hosting Friday prayer services at his own home. Authorities believe he attempted to radicalize and recruit young men in the Raleigh-Durham area to engage in violence against perceived enemies of Islam. His activities included demonstrations of the use of AK-47-style weapons in his living room, to develop familiarity and skills with the weapons used by mujahedin in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

In an audio recording, Boyd described how he had once robbed a bank in Pakistan and intended to fund upcoming jihad by robbing Wells Fargo banks and trucks.


Daniel Boyd was a valuable asset to terrorist organizations. As a US-born white male, he was fluent in Western culture and language. His appearance could potentially draw less suspicion from other Americans than a foreign-born terrorist operative. He trained in paramilitary combat tactics, networked with international extremists, and deeply believed that killing Americans was a religious duty. Perhaps most unusual is the fact that Boyd offered a unique street credibility among local extremists due to his Soviet Afghan war experience.

Authorities believed Boyd had participated in paramilitary exercises with other Islamic radicals in the North Carolina countryside.

When investigators searched the Boyd home, they discovered a cache of firearms; 27,000 rounds of ammunition; \$13,000 in cash; gas masks; a book titled *Emergency Response*

Outreach Strategy

C
V
E



Case Study: Daniel Patrick Boyd

to *Terrorism*, described by a federal agent as the FBI's "playbook"; and a *fatwa* declaring war against America, and the killing of Americans a duty for all Muslims.

Boyd's rural neighbors knew that family members were devout Muslims, but they were unaware of his alleged terrorist activities or of Boyd's Afghan fighting experience.

In February 2011, Boyd pleaded guilty to conspiring to assist violent jihadists and participate in attacks in foreign countries. When sentenced, he could face life in prison.

http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/b/daniel_patrick_boyd/index.html?scp=1-spot&sq=daniel%20patrick%20boyd&st=cse
<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/29/us/29terror.html?ref=danielpatrickboyd>
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/10/us/10boyd.html?ref=danielpatrickboyd>
http://articles.cnn.com/2009-08-04/justice/carolina.terror.suspects_1_gas-masks-fbi-terrorism?s=PM:CRIME

[HOME PAGE](#) |
 [TODAY'S PAPER](#) |
 [VIDEO](#) |
 [MOST POPULAR](#) |
 [TIMESTOPICS](#)

The New York Times

U.S.

[WORLD](#) |
 [U.S.](#) |
 [N.Y. / REGION](#) |
 [BUSINESS](#) |
 [TECHNOLOGY](#) |
 [SCIENCE](#) |
 [HEALTH](#) |
 [SPORTS](#) |
 [OPINION](#)
[POLITICS](#) |
[EDUCATION](#) |
[BAY AREA](#) |
[CHICAGO](#) |
[TEXAS](#)

North Carolina Man Admits to Aiding a Jihadist Plot

By CAMPBELL ROBERTSON
 Published: February 9, 2011

[Daniel Patrick Boyd](#), a North Carolina man whose arrest on terrorism-related charges surprised the residents of his bucolic town, pleaded guilty in Federal District Court in New Bern, N.C., on Wednesday to conspiring to assist violent jihadists and to participate in attacks in foreign countries, Justice Department officials said.

[Enlarge This Image](#)



Department of Justice, via Associated Press
Daniel Boyd

Mr. Boyd, 40, an American citizen who worked for a company that installed drywall, and six other men, including two of his sons, [were first charged in July 2009](#) with participating and supporting violent jihad overseas.

A superseding indictment two months later contained more charges, including one accusing Mr. Boyd and another man of plotting an attack on the Marine Corps base in Quantico, Va. He did not enter a plea on that charge on Wednesday.

Mr. Boyd is scheduled to be sentenced in May. He faces up to 15 years in prison on one count of conspiring to provide material support to terrorists and a life sentence for conspiring to "murder, kidnap, maim and injure persons in a foreign country."

[RECOMMEND](#)
[TWITTER](#)
[LINKEDIN](#)
[SIGN IN TO E-MAIL](#)
[PRINT](#)
[REPRINTS](#)
[SHARE](#)

Descendants
 Now Playing

DANIEL PATRICK BOYD ARTICLES

The cases involving the other defendants, including Mr. Boyd's sons, are working their way to trial, said Robin G. Zier, a spokeswoman for the United States attorney's office for the Eastern District of North Carolina.

At the time of his arrest, Mr. Boyd's neighbors in [Willow Spring, N.C.](#), about 15 miles south of Raleigh, were in disbelief.

Although they knew he was a devout Muslim, many were hearing for the first time that Mr. Boyd was known by an alias, Saifullah, and that he had been in Afghanistan and Pakistan from 1989 to 1992, training with and supporting fighters who were trying to overthrow the government in Kabul, Afghanistan.

The charges also said that he had taken his sons to Gaza to introduce them to jihadists and that Mr. Boyd had been stockpiling assault weapons and had participated in paramilitary exercises with other Islamic radicals in the North Carolina countryside.

The indictments described a period from 2006 to 2009 during which Mr. Boyd plotted with other radical Muslims to recruit jihadists and send material support to fighters overseas.

"This case proves how our world is changing," the United States attorney, George E. B. Holding, said in a statement on Wednesday. "Terrorists are no longer only from foreign countries, but also citizens who live within our own borders."

A version of this article appeared in print on February 10, 2011, on page A14 of the New York edition.

DANIEL PATRICK BOYD ARTICLES

HOME PAGE TODAY'S PAPER VIDEO MOST POPULAR TIMES TOPICS

Subscribe: Home Delivery / Digital Log In Register Now

The New York Times

U.S.

Search At NYTimes.com



WORLD U.S. N.Y./REGION BUSINESS TECHNOLOGY SCIENCE HEALTH SPORTS OPINION ARTS STYLE TRAVEL JOBS REAL ESTATE AUTOS

Arrests in Terror Case Bewilder Associates



Wake County City/County Bureau of Investigation, via Reuters

Left to right, Daniel Patrick Boyd, Hyson Sherifi, Mohammed Omar Aly Hassan and Ziyad Yaghi have been charged with supporting violent jihad.

By CAMPBELL ROBERTSON

Published: July 28, 2009

WILLOW SPRING, N.C. — Daniel Boyd was a man of rare conviction for these parts.

Related

The Lede: 7 Charged With Plotting 'Violent Jihad' Abroad (July 28, 2009)

► The Takeaway With Campbell Robertson

Indictment (U.S. v. Boyd, et al.) (findlaw.com)

Criminal Histories of Four Suspects (findlaw.com)

Rare because he and his family were Muslims in this quiet rural subdivision where the denominations generally run from Baptist to Presbyterian. But also rare for his intensity.

"How many Christians you see standing in the yard praying five times a day?" asked Jeremy Kuhn, 20, who lives across the street. "They just believed more than anyone else."

TWITTER

LINKEDIN

SIGN INTO E-MAIL

PRINT

REPRINTS

SHARE



DANIEL PATRICK BOYD ARTICLES

Criminal Histories of Four Suspects
(findlaw.com)

[Enlarge This Image](#)



Jeremy M. Lange for The New York Times
Daniel Patrick Boyd is said to have
worshiped at the Ibad Ar-Rahman
mosque in Durham, N.C.

[Enlarge This Image](#)



Chris Seward/News & Observer, via
Associated Press
The small town of Willow Spring, N.C.,
was the scene of an F.B.I. investigation
Tuesday at the home of Daniel Patrick
Boyd.

But to the disbelief of Mr. Kuhn, the federal authorities say Mr. Boyd and two of his sons took their convictions beyond religious faith and into terrorism. They were among seven men charged on Monday with supporting violent jihad movements in countries including Israel, Jordan, Kosovo and Pakistan. An eighth man was still being sought, said a spokeswoman for federal prosecutors in Raleigh, about 20 miles north of here.

The men are charged with stockpiling automatic weapons and traveling abroad numerous times to participate in jihadist movements. There is no indication in the [indictment](#) that they were planning attacks in the United States, though prosecutors said they had practiced military tactics this summer in a rural county close to Virginia.

Their plans apparently involved a suicide attack, according to an e-mail message Mr. Boyd sent in 2008 to another defendant, Hysen Sherifi, about dying as a martyr.

Besides Mr. Boyd, who is 39, the indictment names his sons Zakariya, 20, and Dylan, 22; Anes Subasic, 33; Mohammad Omar Aly Hassan, 22; Ziyad Yaghi, 21; and Mr. Sherifi, 24. All are American citizens except Mr. Sherifi, who is from Kosovo and has legal residence in the

United States. Detention hearings for the men are set for Thursday.

Mr. Boyd, the son of a Marine, is a convert to Islam, and received training from Islamic radicals in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the indictment said.

Prosecutors said much of the activity took place over the last three years, citing coded conversations, exchanges of cash, numerous gun purchases and a Kalashnikov demonstration in Mr. Boyd's living room.

Mr. Boyd, the central figure in the indictment, is also charged with lying to federal agents in 2007 about his reasons for a trip to Israel. According to the indictment, he and several other defendants had intended to join violent jihadists in the [Palestinian](#)

DANIEL PATRICK BOYD ARTICLES

territories, though the trip was ultimately unsuccessful.

It was the second trip to Israel mentioned in the indictment. Mr. Boyd is said to have taken his son Dylan to Gaza meet jihadists in March 2006, though that, too, was apparently unsuccessful.

Highlighted in the indictment, but not part of the charges, was a period the authorities say Mr. Boyd spent with his brother in Afghanistan and Pakistan from 1989 to 1992, training with and supporting fighters who were trying to overthrow the Soviet-backed government in Kabul. They were in the news at the time, when the Pakistani government charged them with bank robbery and sentenced them to lose their right hands and left feet. (The convictions were overturned by the Pakistani Supreme Court at the urging of the State Department.)

Federal officials in Washington said that the men charged on Monday were not seen as serious terrorist threats to the United States or American interests abroad, and that there were no indications of ties to [Al Qaeda](#) or other militant groups. But the officials said there was concern that they were amassing a sizable number of automatic weapons, given Mr. Boyd's record as a foreign fighter.

"What essentially this is about is a guy with foreign fighter experience," said one law enforcement official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the pending prosecution, "who comes back to the U.S. from the conflict zone with street cred and a network of contacts overseas, intending to recruit others who were on the fence."

Mr. Boyd's wife, Sabrina, cited that same period in defense of her husband. "He was

there fighting against the Soviets in a war that had the full backing of the U.S. government," Ms. Boyd said through a spokeswoman, Khalilah Sabra of the American Muslim Society Freedom Foundation, an advocacy group.

Ms. Boyd is also an American, and, according to a [1991 Washington Post report](#), the couple were high school sweethearts in Northern Virginia. A neighbor said the Boyds looked for other churches before settling on Islam. The Post profile said Mr. Boyd's stepfather was a Muslim.

"The charges have not been substantiated," Ms. Boyd said. "We are an ordinary family,

and we have the right to justice, and we believe justice will prevail. We are decent people who care about other human beings.”

Neighbors were startled, even angered by the arrests, which they learned about when federal agents, some carrying assault weapons, swarmed over the lawn of the Boyds’ house.

The house, with a Ford Bronco in the driveway and a swimming pool in the back, looks like any other in the quiet subdivision, and neighbors said the Boyds were generally no different than anyone else, other than being nicer than average. Mr. Boyd ran a company installing drywall, for which his two older sons often worked. The Boyds had two younger sons, one of whom was killed in a car accident two years ago, and a daughter.

Prosecutors said Mr. Boyd had stopped attending mosques this year because of “ideological differences” and had begun having Friday prayer services at home.

The Boyds had the usual interactions with the neighbors — tool swapping, rides to school — and other than a day when the house was egged, which neighbors attributed to their religion, their faith did not seem to be an issue.

“We never really had a problem with it,” said Anthony Perfetto, 15, who used to have after-school snacks at the Boyd home. “All they’d say about it was like they had to go pray, and that’s about it.”

All of which has left neighbors shaking their heads and repeating that there must have been some kind of mistake.

“I don’t believe any of this,” Mr. Kuhn said. “And it’s going to take a whole lot of evidence to convince me otherwise.”

Liz Robbins contributed reporting from New York, and Eric Schmitt from Washington.

The New York Times

Tuesday, December 13, 2011

Times

[WORLD](#)
[U.S.](#)
[N.Y. / REGION](#)
[BUSINESS](#)
[TECHNOLOGY](#)
[SCIENCE](#)

Daniel Patrick Boyd



Reuters

Updated: July 29, 2009

Daniel Patrick Boyd is among seven men charged by a federal grand jury with supporting violent jihad movements in countries including Israel, Jordan, Kosovo and Pakistan.

The men are charged with stockpiling automatic weapons and traveling abroad numerous times to participate in jihadist movements. There is no indication in the [indictment](#) that they were planning attacks in the United States, though prosecutors said they had practiced military tactics this summer in a rural county close to Virginia.

Their plans apparently involved a suicide attack, according to an e-mail message Mr. Boyd sent in 2008 to another defendant, Hysen Sherifi, about dying as a martyr.

Besides Mr. Boyd, who is 39, the indictment names his sons Zakariya, 20, and Dylan, 22; Anes Subasic, 33; [Mohammad Omar Aly Hassan](#), 22; Ziyad Yaghi, 21; and Mr. Sherifi, 24. All are American citizens except Mr. Sherifi, who is from Kosovo and has legal residence in the United States.

Mr. Boyd, the son of a Marine, is a convert to Islam, and received training from Islamic radicals in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the indictment said.

Prosecutors said much of the activity took place over the last three years, citing coded conversations, exchanges of cash, numerous gun purchases and a Kalashnikov demonstration in Mr. Boyd's living room.

Mr. Boyd, the central figure in the indictment, is also charged with lying to federal agents in 2007 about his reasons for a trip to Israel. According to the indictment, he and several other defendants had intended to join violent jihadists in the [Palestinian](#) territories, though the trip was ultimately unsuccessful.

It was the second trip to Israel mentioned in the indictment. Mr. Boyd is said to have taken his son Dylan to Gaza meet jihadists in March 2006, though that, too, was apparently unsuccessful.

[>> Read the Indictment](#)

Highlights From the Archives

7 Charged With Plotting ‘Violent Jihad’ Abroad

By ROBERT MACKEY

Federal agents arrested seven men in North Carolina and charged them with plotting attacks outside the U.S.

July 28, 2009 | [BLOGS](#) | [WEB LOG](#)

North Carolina: Second Guilty Plea in Terror Case

By CAMPBELL ROBERTSON

The 22-year-old son of a North Carolina man who pleaded guilty in February to supporting Islamist terrorism pleaded guilty himself on Tuesday, Justice Department officials said.

June 8, 2011

MORE ON DANIEL PATRICK BOYD AND: NORTH CAROLINA, BOYD, ZAKARIYA

Daniel Boyd Pleads Guilty to Terrorism Charges in N. Carolina

By CAMPBELL ROBERTSON

Daniel Patrick Boyd, who worked for a drywall installation company, was charged with conspiring to assist Islamic militants and to participate in attacks overseas.

February 10, 2011

MORE ON DANIEL PATRICK BOYD AND: MILITARY BASES AND INSTALLATIONS, ISLAM, TERRORISM, DECISIONS AND VERDICTS, NEW BERN (NC), NORTH CAROLINA, QUANTICO (VA)

The Allure of Terrorism

By OLIVER ROY

Radicalization takes place in the virtual ummah, not in Yemen, or Afghanistan.

January 11, 2010

MORE ON DANIEL PATRICK BOYD AND: MOSQUES, TERRORISM, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, AL QAEDA

Court in North Carolina Hears Tapes in Terror Case

By VICTORIA CHERRIE

Federal prosecutors played recordings in which the man accused of being the ringleader of a group of radical Muslims advocated violent jihad against the West.

August 5, 2009

MORE ON DANIEL PATRICK BOYD AND: ISLAM, RECORDINGS AND DOWNLOADS (AUDIO), TERRORISM, NORTH CAROLINA

Arrests in Terror Case Bewilder Associates

By CAMPBELL ROBERTSON; LIZ ROBBINS CONTRIBUTED REPORTING FROM NEW YORK, and ERIC SCHMITT FROM



JOINT REGIONAL INTELLIGENCE CENTER

SPECIAL BULLETIN



25 July 2011

Oslo Suspect's "Compendium" Details How to Avoid Detection in the Planning Stages of an Operation

On 22 July 2011, coordinated attacks involving a car bombing and an active shooter took place in Oslo, Norway. While all the facts are not yet known, documents and videos posted by the alleged perpetrator provide a detailed view into the mindset and careful planning of a violent actor. Though there is no single model/path from ideology to action, the information in these documents provides an opportunity for public safety personnel to re-examine current training with regard to indicators and warnings, and may allow for the development of new countermeasures.

Incident Overview

On 22 July 2011 at approximately 1520 hours local time, a car bomb detonated in downtown Oslo, Norway damaging several buildings, including the offices of Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg. Later that day, a gunman, reportedly wearing a police uniform, opened fire at a Labour Party youth camp organized on the island of Utoya, approximately 19 miles northwest of Oslo. Police arrested Anders Behring Breivik, a 32-year-old Oslo resident, at the scene.

Over the next hours, a series of documents and video messages surfaced on the Internet that meticulously detailed Breivik'sⁱ philosophy and plans for events that corresponded with the crimes that took place that day.ⁱⁱ While the entries begin in 2002, Breivik writes with increasing detail post-2009 about what appeared to be preparations for an improvised explosive device and small arms attack. (Note: Breivik's writing might have intended to influence or to mislead.)

First Steps: "Armed struggle appears to be futile at this point but it is the only way forward."

April/May 2002 – Developing an Ideology

Breivik concludes there is nothing to gain by working within the existing political system to counteract what he perceives to be the negative effects of multi-culturalism and the "Islamization" of



Oslo after the car bomb (above); rescue workers on Utoya island, site of the second attack (below).

ⁱ Breivik authored the compendium using the Anglicized version of his name, "Andrew Berwick." For clarity, this bulletin refers to him by the Norwegian spelling, Breivik.

ⁱⁱ Included was a 1500+ page "compendium," titled, [2083: A European Declaration of Independence](#), that Breivik claimed he distributed to 7,000 "primary nationalists" and possible members of parliament in Western countries [NFI] earlier. The majority of the quotes in this bulletin are taken from this compendium.



Europe. He and eight associates allegedly form a group called the “Knights Templar Europe,”ⁱⁱⁱ and Breivik begins to write/compile a compendium of beliefs/strategies that will be used to grow the organization into the “foremost conservative revolutionary movement in Western Europe.” The compendium refers to the ideology as “Crusader Nationalism,” a balance to the prevailing “cultural Marxism.”

- At this time, it does not appear Breivik has the 22 July attacks in mind, “I don’t know if I will ever proceed with a martyrdom operation at this point as it simply seems too radical.” It would have been difficult for public safety personnel to identify him here because he has not yet moved from talk to action.

2002-2006 – Financing the Ideology

Breivik has €250,000 in assets (approximately \$360,000) with which to sustain himself while he writes the compendium and sets up the Templar organization. He will not hold a formal job from this point forward, and will be financially insolvent at the time of the July 2011 attacks.

- Breivik’s initial financial independence allowed him to work without the need to contact like-minded individuals for financing, or to engage in any activity that might have triggered suspicious financial activity indicators or warnings.

2006-2008 – Studying the Failures of Others, Moving toward Action

Breivik spends this time researching and writing the compendium, “2083: A European Declaration of Independence.” In addition to developing the group’s ideological underpinnings, he makes a study of the failures of other extremist movements. He believes members of an alleged Swedish neo-Nazi group might have been caught due to their “outdated, traditional and vulnerable hierarchical military cell-model.” He judges other European resistance groups “amateurish” and lacking in “subtlety and discretion.”

- It was unclear at what point Breivik made the decision to carry out the operation; however, in the course of writing, he memorialized the group’s tenets that a “Justiciar Knight” should embrace voluntary poverty and martyrdom. His activity so far may not have attracted any attention, and there would likely have been no legal basis for investigation.

Operations Begin

Autumn 2009-Winter 2009/10 – Cover Stories, Operational Security, Recruitment Efforts, and Virtual Shooter Training

Sometime in late 2008 or early 2009, Breivik appears to have made the decision to conduct some kind of attack, because he begins to create the infrastructure needed to obtain the necessary

ⁱⁱⁱ Quotes and excerpts from the compendium, explaining the Templars’ ideology, can be found in Appendix A.



SPECIAL BULLETIN

25 July 2011

supplies without arousing undue suspicion.^{iv} He starts the operation by developing a cover to purchase and transport explosives and explosives components. He believes that if authorities question or arrest him during this time, his cover story and clean criminal history will make it difficult to bring him up on terror charges. Regardless, he is cautious and acknowledges, “an arrest will land [me] on every imaginable watch list for the rest of my life.”

- Even at this stage, Breivik’s activities would likely not have aroused law enforcement suspicion. He creates two different, professional-looking business proposals for a mining company and a small farm operation (Geofarm), modeled on an existing prospectus, and makes plans to create two Web sites, obtain business cards, and contact suppliers related to these industries who can act as future witnesses.

While he is setting up a clean business history, Breivik works on an e-mail campaign, hoping to identify 10,000 like-minded “primary nationalists”—and, possibly a few members of parliament in Western countries (“It is important that our enemies know ‘how we see what they are doing’”)—who will receive his compendium. He ultimately identifies 5,700 contacts via two accounts on a social networking site, and obtains 800 “high quality” e-mail addresses in the United States, Australia, Canada, South Africa, “certain Eastern European countries,” Armenia, Israel, and India.

- Though he has taken care to maintain separation between his online and real-world activity to this point, Breivik is aware that his online activity may attract attention. He expresses concern that his work in compiling his e-mail list has landed him on various watch lists, and knows at least a few of the profiles he invited were fake.

During this time, Breivik also seeks out, assesses, and plays active-shooter online role-playing games, some of which he judges are excellent military simulators that closely mimic actual operations.

“Armour Acquisition Phase” – Personal Physical Security Preparations

Breivik’s study of failed resistance movements may have informed the order in which he carried out the next stages of his plan. He does not immediately attempt to acquire weapons or manufacture explosives; instead, he begins by acquiring and caching items less likely to trigger existing suspicious activity reporting programs.

Summer 2010 – Acquiring and Storing Materials, Actively Destroying Evidence of the Activity

Breivik begins to acquire and hide personal protection equipment that will likely enable him to extend the duration of his shooting spree. He takes care to keep most of these items far from

^{iv} The Mumbai terror attacks took place in November 2008; it is unknown what, if any, impact these events might have had on Breivik’s plans.



locations common to his daily routine. While he omits details of how he acquired the equipment, he describes his operational security considerations in minute detail. Using Internet imagery, he identified a remote forested area three to four hours by car from his home. There, he hid equipment, including “a complete set of Lokis armour—shield included, caltrops, police insignias...” inside of a Pelican™ case. However, due to size considerations, he hid large, bulky equipment, such as a Damascus FX-1 Flexforce™ riot suit and MOLLE pouch, in a box in his attic marked “air soft equipment.”

- Breivik’s activity at this stage reveals that he has given thought to both the method of his attack and the rising possibility that his preparations will raise suspicions. In addition to taking great care with the acquisition and storage of his equipment, Breivik continues to clean up his “digital trail.” After this step, as from the beginning, Breivik covers his tracks, including purging and destroying computer hard drives.

“Weapons Acquisition Phase”

Late Summer 2010-Winter 2011 – Taking Care to Stay Under the Radar as the Risk of Discovery Rises

At this stage, Breivik moves into a pre-operational phase he acknowledges is likely to garner unwanted law enforcement attention: attempting to acquire weapons, materials to manufacture explosives, and false law enforcement identification and insignias. His planning indicates an extraordinary sensitivity to operational security – seeking to keep his movements and activities as low profile and low risk as possible by using cash, limiting his use of electronic communications, traveling through less-trafficked routes, and acquiring materials in other countries. However, he ultimately fails to acquire the weapons outside of Norway, and resorts to buying them legally within the country.

- Breivik’s attention to operational security in this phase is noteworthy. He planned his travel in a manner designed to avoid contact with authorities and minimize legal/financial traces. Knowing he would have to use identification and electronic payments for flights, ferries, or trains that might enable his movements to be tracked, he planned to drive to Prague, Czech Republic. He chose to cross back into Norway through the northern border with the weapons he hoped to obtain because he believed it had the fewest customs agents. He planned to leave his mobile phone off, except for emergencies, and to hide the weapons in a hollowed-out section of his back seat. Though he worried about his old car breaking down en route, he felt it would provide good cover because it was less likely to draw attention. He also used his stay in Prague to manufacture the sensitive items—police badges and other insignia—he believed would be reported to law enforcement in Norway. He paid cash for these services.



SPECIAL BULLETIN

25 July 2011

After failing in his plan to acquire weapons in the Czech Republic, Breivik fills out the necessary legal paperwork in Norway, and meets the training requirements to obtain guns. (See text box for a description of weapons.)

His compendium outlines Breivik's experiments to increase the lethality of his attacks. He orders 50 ml, 99 percent pure liquid nicotine from a Chinese online supplier, intending to inject three to four drops into hollow-point bullets in order to kill more effectively; however, when he tries to manufacture these "bio rounds," he finds the size of the ammunition would not accommodate a lethal dose. He weighs whether 9mm bullets might be more suitable for the task, but has to wait for a Glock license before he can access larger rounds. The text does not specify whether he tried again with new ammunition.

"Chemical Acquisition Stage"

November-December 2011 – Finalizing Cover for Explosives Acquisitions, Experiments

Breivik considered and/or purchased the following weapons (costs, which he provided in Euro, were converted to dollars):

- Ruger Mini-14⁹ Semi-Automatic, \$2009
- Glock (unclear whether "17" or "34"), \$1006
- 10 x 30 Round Magazines, .223 Caliber, \$550
- GG&G Picatinny-Style Scope Base Ruger Mini-14, Ranch Only, \$136
- Aimshot Laser Sight and Flashlight Tri-Rail Barrel Mount, \$43
- Allen Buttstock Shotgun Ammunition Carrier, 5-Round Nylon, \$14
- Loctite Blue Aluminum Threadlocker, \$10
- LaserLyte Pistol Bayonet, Quick Detachable, \$62
- 4 x 30 Round Magazines for Glock 9mm, \$330
- Cammenga Easyloader for AR15/Mini 14, \$100
- Hollow Point Ammo for .223, \$717 (he researched and used the cover story that he was buying them for bird hunting)
- Slugs Ammo for Shotgun, \$144 (he used the cover "deer hunting")
- Benelli Nova Pump Action Shotgun (previously owned)

Breivik acknowledges this is probably his most vulnerable stage. He estimates there is a 30 percent chance of failure, a thought that fills him with such apprehension that he begins the second of three courses of steroids,^v which improves his mood. He methodically purchases other items he will need. (For a list of the items that Breivik purchased, along with their intended use; amount purchased; place purchased; cost; purchase/delivery details; cover story; and assessed risk, see Appendix B.)

Breivik uses one of his previously-prepared business plans (Geofarm) to rent a remote piece of farmland, ostensibly to test sugar beet production methods. He educates himself on farm practices and learns all of the appropriate terminology in order to better appear legitimate.^{vi}

^v In addition to steroids, Breivik used "ECA stack," an ephedrine-caffeine-aspirin combination, to stay alert.

^{vi} Toward the end of the compendium, Breivik presents a section on small-scale farming "to prepare the Justiciar Knight for the fertilizer acquisition phase of his operation." He advises the reader must "learn to think, dress and act like a farmer and become confident through study of agricultural practices" to establish an effective cover. Additionally, he presents an introduction to small-scale surface mining for those planning to initiate a high-grade



- Following media reports that Breivik was a suspect in the Oslo attacks, several agricultural supply companies notified authorities that he had purchased fertilizer and chemicals from them. They did not report him earlier because his orders fell within expected norms, and he appeared to be operating a legitimate business.

“Explosive Manufacturing Stage”

Breivik’s continued focus on operational security manifests in his choice of an improvised explosive, and his recommendation to others to work alone to avoid detection. He acknowledges the most common popular primary explosive is currently “AP” (acetone peroxide), but advises against using it because it is too dangerous. He suggests instead picric acid/DDNP (diazodinitrophenol). Although he calls himself a “chemistry amateur,” he successfully manufactures both picric acid and DDNP on his first try. In the compendium, he attempts to persuade readers to use these components unless the materials cannot be acquired.



Part of Breivik’s cover for obtaining fertilizer was that he planned to farm sugar beet; he rented this remote property as part of that cover, as well as to have a location to develop his explosives.

Breivik provides meticulous details on buying materials or substitutes; manufacturing times and costs; trial and error; improved techniques; testing; and storage. Reviewing his experience, Breivik realizes he could have accomplished in 30 days what took him 80, and offers a timeline for others (see Appendix C). He also calculates what he perceives as the risk of detection and interdiction based on the number of persons involved and the time to accomplish the tasks:

Risk vs. Labor	Time required to complete	Risk of apprehension
1 person	30 days	30%
2 people	20 days	60%
3 people	16 days	85%
4 people	13 days	90%
5 people	12 days	90-95%

explosive acquisition phase. “Buying some new or second hand equipment relating to prospecting will strengthen your cover story.”



The Compendium Ends; It Appears Online; the Attacks Take Place

The final entry in the compendium dates to 22 July 2011. On or around the 22nd, it was posted online, accompanied by a video version explaining some of the Knights Templars' fundamental tenets. That day, Oslo is attacked using weapons and tactics similar to those described in the compendium.

Learning from the Compendium

Breivik made a careful study of the failures of other violent actors and groups, and the factors that led to their interdiction, so that he could take steps to avoid the same pitfalls. Once identified, he took steps to craft plans he felt would minimize his risk of exposure, and carried them out in a methodical, patient manner. He identified the foundation of legitimate business enterprises as the most effective means to acquire materials legally, and purchased them in a manner that fell within normal patterns within the industry he used as a cover. For materials he could not obtain without arousing suspicion, he crafted a plan to gain them far from the watch programs he knew to be in effect in Norway. Ironically, when this plan failed, he resorted to legal means by which to obtain materials, leveraging his lack of criminal history to facilitate the acquisition process. Though he actively participated in online forums where he posted extremist views, he was careful to avoid mentioning operation details. He took steps to destroy physical evidence of his activities as he moved through the planning and operational stages. And at all times, he took care to maintain a low-key, "ordinary" appearance and behavior.

Re-assessment, Re-calibration of Suspicious Activity Reporting Procedures and Thresholds

While it may yet come to light that Breivik did arouse minor suspicion at various stages of activity, he appears to have successfully evaded detection programs designed to identify indicators of possible terrorist and criminal activity in relation to chemical purchases, weapons acquisition, fraudulent businesses, and so forth. This is cause to review current protocol and training with regard to similar programs in effect in the United States and the JRIC area of responsibility. Though Breivik managed to elude detection, we still believe in the need for continued awareness training and suspicious activity reporting at the local level, arising from the general public, state and local law public safety personnel, or private sector partners. Careful study of the measures Breivik took to avoid detection may help public safety personnel re-calibrate existing training and outreach efforts, and develop new countermeasures.

(U) Law enforcement can report tips and leads to the JRIC via the Web site at www.jric.org, by e-mail at leads@jric.org, or by telephone at (562) 345-1100 or (888) 705-JRIC (5742).



Appendix A – Tenets of the “Justiciar Knights”

The following excerpts are taken from the purported Breivik compendium, and explain the creation, grievances, and goals of the alleged group.

“The European Military Order and Criminal Tribunal (the PCCTS [Pauperes commilitones Christi Templique Solomonici]—Knights Templar) was created by and for the free indigenous peoples of Europe. One of the primary purposes of the tribunal and order is to attempt/contribute to seize political and military control of Western European multiculturalist regimes and to try, judge and punish Western European cultural Marxist/multiculturalist perpetrators (category A, B and C traitors) for crimes committed against the indigenous peoples of Europe from 1955 until this day.”

The group was reportedly founded, or, as they state “re-founded,” in London in 2002 by representatives from eight European countries. Its founding members—all anonymous—are described as “English Protestant (host); English Christian atheist; French Catholic; German Christian atheist; Dutch Christian agnostic; Greek Orthodox; Russian Christian atheist; Norwegian Protestant (member and proxy for Anonymous 9); Serbian Orthodox (by proxy, location: Monrovia, Liberia).” Three additional members are listed only as “Swedish,” “Belgian,” and “European American.”

The compendium outlines a 100-year plan to contribute to the destabilization of political power in Western European countries currently controlled by “cultural Marxist/multiculturalist nationalists” in order to seize power and “bring freedom and cultural and demographical sustainability to all Europeans.”

Tenets of “Justiciar Knights”

- Oppose all hate-ideologies; communism (anti-individualist), cultural Marxism/multiculturalism (anti-European), Islam (anti-kafir) and national socialism (anti-Jewish)
- Serve and protect the indigenous peoples of Europe and all other loyal and patriotic European individuals
- Preserve European culture, traditions and heritage
- Stop the ongoing European cultural and demographical genocide facilitated by the cultural Marxists/multiculturalists, suicidal humanists, and capitalist globalist elites
- Prevent the deconstruction of Christendom in Europe
- Prevent further Islamic demographic warfare—disallow the Muslim invasion/colonization of Europe
- Repulse Islam from Europe by the initiation of future deportation campaigns
- Effectuate punishment for Western European cultural Marxist/multiculturalist/globalist perpetrators for crimes committed against the indigenous peoples of Europe
- Oppose and defeat the Multiculturalist Alliance (MA 100) in Europe using any and all means necessary
- Support Israel’s fight against Jihad
- Liberation of the Middle East Christians from Islamic rule
- Virtues such as the willingness to martyr oneself for the cause, the exercise of discretion, voluntary poverty, and devoted obedience to the principles are mandatory for all Justiciar Knights
- Honour the wishes and memories of our forefathers, who secured European security and prosperity in the past
- Follow the PCCT’s mantra—“Martyrdom before Dhimmitude.”



SPECIAL BULLETIN

Appendix B

25 July 2011

Item	Intended use	Amt	Supplier	Cost	Purchase/delivery	Coverstory
Sulphur powder	Component to primary charge	0.5kg	Ebay; aquarium stores as backup supplier	20 Euro	Paypal; delivered without incident	None
Sodium nitrate	Primary charge	0.3 kg	a Polish chemical store	10 Euro	Paypal; delivered without incident	Used as a preservative to cure/process meat
Sodium nitrate	Secondary charge; Picric acid (1.5kg)	3 kg	Apothecary/drug store	500 Euro	Visa (did not want to leave a traceable transaction, but thought cash result in questions; upon pick up, he checked the box to be sure authorities had not slipped in a GPS transmitter)	Used as a preservative to cure/process meat; clerk did ask (deluxe business registered to send right signals; recommended use of rural drug store in expensive area with hunting in the vicinity and have hunting license available.
Sulphuric acid (car battery acid)	Component to primary and secondary charge	12 litres of 80 to 90% pure	Got 7L from two auto parts stores; 6L from four large batteries from car recycling facility; and 25L at wholesale supplier for auto mechanic shops; all 30% purity	150, 20, and 130 Euro, respectively	Visa for latter to avoid suspicion of cash transaction; cash for others; purchased and transported	Told clerk he bought batteries from online store but they didn't have liquid (which clerk knew is illegal, so it's a good story. Only buy 3-5L per supplier this way.) Cover story needed at all stores.
Distilled water	Manufacturing process of primary and secondary charge (never use normal water)	25L	Same as previous			Strengthened story as batteries should contain 30% sulphuric acid and 70% distilled water
Acetylsalicylic acid (aspirin)	Component to primary and secondary charge	190 packages (20 tabs x 440mg (for 1.5 kg of picric acid)	Drug stores	1140 Euro for all (started off buying name brand; ended with generic)	Cash; retail sale	Three packages for my company (December is the season for Christmas parties, so lots of residual hangovers); used cover story in every store
Aluminum powder, flaked 400 mesh (particle size)	Component to tertiary charge (fertilizer sensitizer)	10-15% of total fertilizer weight (two tons of fertilizer means 200-300 kg of aluminum powder)	a Polish chemical store; alternative method is to buy large aluminum bars/ingots from forge/supplier, and file them to powder using cryo filing drill bur and renting a high powered drill; aluminum scrap is an option if Intelligence agencies begin monitoring forge/suppliers (he provided great detail about the tools/method to accomplish this)	2000 Euro for 150 kg (can probably get 100kg unprocessed from 1000 Euro)	Bank wire; supposed to be able to pick up in neighboring Sweden where he planned to transport to Norway	Aluminum powder is a component of boat epoxy paints to give the paint UV protective properties; explained this in detail in first office e-mail to company; claimed his company was producing coating solutions for the maritime sector
Microballoons/sil-cell (very small glass spheres filled with oxygen)	Component to tertiary charge (fertilizer sensitizer)	2-3% of total fertilizer weight (two tons of fertilizer means 50-60 kg balloons)	A maritime shop in Norway	Not yet purchased	N/A	Going to research a story when needed; believe it was a component of boat plastics

JOINT REGIONAL INTELLIGENCE CENTER

SPECIAL BULLETIN



25 July 201

Appendix C

30-Day Operation Schedule for Explosives Manufacture (1 person): ANFO-3 x 600kg; PA-3 x 0,5kg; DDNP-3 x 10g

1. Moving and getting your equipment and gear into place
2. Installing all equipment—fume hood, fan etc.
3. Finishing the metal skeletons/cylinders for the blast devices and completing other practical issues relating to gear and equipment
4. Creating an evacuation/emergency strategy, packing an evacuation kit (survival gear, etc.)
5. Grinding 2,5 kg of aspirin: 30 minutes with blender, manufacture of acetylsalicylic acid from aspirin (4 hours) + drying in oven (4 hours per batch x 3)
6. Manufacture of acetylsalicylic acid from aspirin (4 hours) + drying in oven (4 hours per batch x 3)
7. Boiling sulfuric acid using 4 cooking plates outside, from 23.00-07.00, 15-18 L -> 5L of 90% +
8. Boiling sulfuric acid using 4 cooking plates outside, from 23.00-07.00, 15-18 L -> 5L of 90% +
9. Creating Picric Acid (6 out of 12 batches using 3 x hot plate stirrers)
10. Creating Picric Acid (6 out of 12 batches using 3 x hot plate stirrers). Completed
11. Purification of Picric Acid
12. Purification of Picric Acid
13. Purification of Picric Acid. Completed
14. Creating DDNP
15. Creating DDNP. Completed
16. Relocation of 27-0-0 fertilizer. Break down a 600kg bag into 13-14 x 50kg bags, load in the truck, drive to the location where you are going to crush them if needed.
17. Relocation of fertilizer. Break down another 600kg bag into 13-14 x 50kg bags.
18. Relocation of fertilizer. Break down the last 600kg bag into 13-14 x 50kg bags.
19. Initiate fertilizer grinding phase using 4 stationary blenders simultaneously. It will take approx. 30-40 minutes to complete a full 50kg bag of ANFO, including the addition of diesel and sealing the inner and outer bag with pieces of duct tape. It should be done nighttime between 23.00-07.00 as it is quite noisy. The task also includes filling 20L plastic containers with diesel and then breaking each 20L container down to 4L containers (empty distilled water containers) Complete 9 x 50kg bags of ANFO
20. Complete 9 x 50kg bags of ANFO.
21. Complete 9 x 50kg bags of ANFO.
22. Complete 9 x 50kg bags of ANFO.
23. Complete 9 x 50kg bags of ANFO. Completed.
24. Mix in 2.5% (by weight) micro balloons and 10-15% (by weight) aluminum powder into the now hardened ANFO.
25. Mix in 2,5% micro balloons and 10-15% aluminum powder into the now hardened ANFO.
26. Mix in 2,5% micro balloons and 10-15% aluminum powder into the now hardened ANFO.
27. Prepare trucks for transportation.
28. Prepare trucks for transportation.
29. Prepare trucks for transportation.
30. Completed.

CASE STUDY

TERRY JONES

Outreach Strategy



Case Study: Terry Jones

Terry Jones is the pastor of the Florida-based Dove World Outreach Center, a small evangelical Christian congregation. Jones and his followers espouse strong anti-Muslim and anti-gay beliefs. Several human rights organizations consider Jones' group an extremist hate organization.

Jones may have gained most of his media coverage and notoriety through his proposed "International Burn a Koran Day" on the 2009 ninth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, in which he threatened to destroy several hundred copies of the Muslim holy text. Although the Koran-burning protest was ultimately canceled, Jones would not rule out revisiting the issue in the future.

Jones held an "International Judge the Koran Day" in March 2011. At his Gainesville church, Jones hosted a mock trial of the Koran, allowed Facebook followers to vote on the method of "execution" of the book, then convicted and burned a Koran. This received significantly less press coverage than his earlier event, but videos and images appeared online. The action resulted in actual loss of life several weeks later when a mob of protesters in Afghanistan, citing Jones' desecration of the Koran, attacked a UN compound and killed at least 12, including seven foreign employees. Violent rioting continued for days.

The saying "Islam is of the devil" is often associated with Jones and his church. Jones has authored a book with that title, and followers have worn T-shirts and carried signs with that slogan to Dove protests.

A group called the "Order of the Dragon" planned to protest in front of the Islamic Center of America (ICA) in Dearborn, Michigan, on April 22, 2011. At the time, the ICA was the largest mosque in North America. The Order invited Jones to join their protest. Following a meeting with community and interfaith leaders, the Order cancelled their protest, retracted the invitation to Jones, and called him insensitive and dangerous. Jones vowed to continue his own protest at the ICA regardless.

For the week leading up to the protest, the community planned a response. Dearborn's mayor and police chief met with religious and community leaders. The city refused to grant Jones a permit to protest in front of the mosque. The county prosecutor employed an uncommon strategy: issuing a peace bond of \$100,000 payable by Jones. (This type of bond required Jones to post the amount in advance to ensure funding for the additional cost to public safety services, since there was a reasonable likelihood of a threat to public safety.) The pastor refused to pay.

Outreach Strategy

C
V
E



Case Study: Terry Jones

The Dearborn community—of all faiths—stood together to show support for the Islamic center, demonstrate unity as Americans, and reject the hate speech of Terry Jones and his followers. Over 700 attended the mosque service on the day of the protest, and hundreds more rallied near the civic center despite cold rain. Jones first protested at city hall but was unable to walk the two miles to a nearby Arab-American festival because counter-protestors—mostly non-Muslims—blocked his path.

(U//DRAFT) DHS Summary: Dearborn, Michigan events as related to Pastor Jones Visit, 23 April 2011

http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/j/terry_jones_pastor/index.html?scp=1-spot&sq=terry%20jones&st=cse

http://www.myfoxdetroit.com/dpp/news/huel_perkins/controversial-florida-pastor-terry-jones-to-protest-in-dearborn-20110323-wpms

<http://www.freep.com/article/20110618/NEWS05/106180355/Pastor-Terry-Jones-thwarted-Deaorborn>

Controversial Florida Pastor Terry Jones to Protest in Dearborn

Planned for April 22 outside Islamic Center

Updated: Tuesday, 19 Apr 2011, 6:08 AM EDT
Published : Wednesday, 23 Mar 2011, 10:56 PM EDT

By AMY LANGE
WJBK | myFOXDetroit.com

SOUTHFIELD, Mich. (WJBK) - The Florida pastor who made headlines for threatening to burn a Koran on the anniversary of 9-11 is headed to metro Detroit. He says he won't burn the Muslim holy book here, but he is planning to protest outside the **Islamic Center of America** in Dearborn on Good Friday.

"I think you would define our message as one of welcome and warning. We welcome Muslims into the country," Pastor **Terry Jones** told FOX 2's **Huel Perkins** on Wednesday. "The only thing that we are demanding of them is that they honor and obey and submit to the Constitution of the United States."

Click on the first video to hear Jones' complete interview with FOX 2.

During the interview, Jones confirmed he actually burned a Koran last weekend, but said he will not do that when he comes to metro Detroit. The spiritual leader of the Islamic Center of America has the following advice for the pastor.

"I would invite him instead of burning the Koran to read the Koran," said Imam **Sayed Hassan Al-Qazwini**.

More Terry Jones Stories



Terry Jones to Return to Dearborn 
Controversial Florida Pastor Terry Jones plans to return to



Pastor Jones Holds Protest in Dearborn 
A chaotic scene unfolded in Dearborn as demonstrators broke



Pastor Terry Jones Back on 'Let It Rip' 
He was jailed last week and not allowed to hold his con

TERRY JONES ARTICLES



Jones' Peace Bond violates Free Speech

Koran burning Reverend Terry Jones' First Amendment right to



Terry Jones Returns to Metro Detroit

The Koran-burning, gun-toting pastor from Florida is back in



Terry Jones Returning, Talking to FOX 2

Pastor Terry Jones is coming back to Michigan to finish the



Florida Pastor Plans to Return Friday

Pastor Terry Jones says he'll be back this Friday, and he's not



Let It Rip: Was Free Speech Squashed?

A jury decided Pastor Terry Jones' planned protest would breach



Jones Chose Jail over Paying a \$1 Bond

A judge sent two controversial Florida pastors to the slammer



Pastor's Gun Goes Off Outside FOX 2

Moments after he appeared live on FOX 2's "Let it Rip," Pastor

"There is no need for him to question our loyalty to this country. We belong to this country as much as he belongs to this country," the imam added. "If he is a true man of religion, he must respect other religions, including Islam."

The imam met Thursday with the mayor of Dearborn and the police chief to start preparing for the pastor's visit. Jones and his supporters won't be allowed on private property, but will be allowed in free speech zones.

"We're defining what the public space is at this site. We're offering them other sites," said Dearborn Mayor **John O'Reilly**.

It's not clear how many supporters will be with Jones on April 22, but the police chief is strongly urging people not to counter protest.

"I would hope that there is no counter protest. I'm going to go on the record as saying that," said Dearborn Police Chief **Ronald Haddad**.

"The best way sometimes to deal with a fool is to ignore a fool, so we don't plan on doing any counter protest against him," said **Dawud Walid** with the **Council on American-Islamic Relations**.

Click on the second video in the player to hear more from Walid.

Detroit's religious leaders call Jones an agent of disruption, a spiritual terrorist dropping hate bombs, and they're urging him to stay away.

"This is totally against the message that we're trying to promote," said Pastor **John Tolbert** with the People's Missionary Baptist Church.

"Thank you, but no thank you. Nobody's bringing you here for a revival. Nobody's bringing you here to preach, so there's no reason for you to come here," said Pastor **Charles Williams II** with the King Solomon Baptist Church.

"It's not just we don't need you, the message is don't come," said **Rev. David Bullock** with the Greater St. Matthew Baptist Church.

TERRY JONES ARTICLES

Pastor Terry Jones thwarted in Dearborn

7:26 AM, Jun. 18, 2011 |

Comments

Recommend

1
r

Recommend 188

Tweet 4

0

A A



Show Caption

View Thumbs

PURCHASE IMAGE

1 of 25

JARRAD HENDERSON/DFP

BY [Niraj Warikoo](#)

DETROIT FREE PRESS
STAFF WRITER

FILED UNDER

[Local News](#)
[Metro Detroit](#)
[Dearborn](#)

After railing at Dearborn City Hall against Muslims and African Americans, Quran-burning Pastor Terry Jones and his supporters were thwarted Friday in their plans to speak out at a nearby Arab-American festival after a group of angry protesters confronted him. But a group of Christians sympathetic to Jones did rally at the festival later, hurling insults through a megaphone at people attending the festival.

"Dearborn has made it clear: Racist bigots aren't welcome here," shouted a small group of protesters who surrounded Jones as he tried to walk up Schaefer Avenue near City Hall. Earlier, Jones had led a rally against Islam, where several pastors and a rabbi -- all from out of state -- spoke about what they saw as the threat of Islam in the U.S.

Jones sported sunglasses, a bulletproof vest and a T-shirt that read: "Everything I ever needed to know about Islam I learned on

DHS-001-425-000246

Page 112 of 208

TERRY JONES ARTICLES

Related Links

[Terry Jones back in Dearborn](#)



Pastor Terry Jones attempts to walk through a crowd of protestors Friday on his way to the Dearborn Islamic Festival after his anti-Muslim rally at City Hall. He had to keep changing directions as protestors blocked his path. He did not speak at the Arab festival as planned. / Photos by JARRAD HENDERSON/Detroit Free Press



"Dearborn has made it clear: Racist bigots aren't welcome here," shouted a small group of protestors who surrounded Jones as he tried to walk up Schaefer Avenue near Dearborn City Hall on Friday.

9-11."

"We stand up for the Constitution," he said during his rally at City Hall.

Afterward, he tried to walk the 2 miles to the Arab festival, but had to keep changing directions as protestors -- mostly non-Muslims with the group By Any Means Necessary -- blocked his path.

After a few minutes of shouting and minor scuffling, Jones decided to not continue and canceled his plans to walk and speak at the festival. Dearborn police swarmed in to whisk Jones and his assistant pastor, Wayne Sapp, into a police car.

Police arrested six counter-protesters, ages 18-22. Three of them were men, three were women, Dearborn Police Chief Ron Haddad said. Five of the six arrested were not from Dearborn, indicating that Dearborn residents largely stayed away, Haddad said.

Mayor John O'Reilly criticized both Jones and BAMN protesters for being outsiders who were disturbing the peace in his city.

Compared with a similar rally Jones held in April at City Hall, this one attracted markedly fewer supporters and counter-demonstrators. There were about 15 Jones supporters.

Matthew Keller, 78, a Dearborn resident who supports Jones, said he has Muslim neighbors, but is concerned about Islam.

"I'm a patriot. I'm a Christian. I believe in Jesus Christ above everything," he said.

Jones announced a plan to target Muslim-heavy communities across the U.S., including neighborhoods in Chicago, where the Nation of Islam has a presence. He said he would return to Dearborn.

DHS-001-425-000247

TERRY JONES ARTICLES

Jones said Friday, as he has said repeatedly before, that Muslims have to prove their loyalty to the U.S. because their religion makes them suspect.

That outraged Dearborn resident Mohamed Al-Hachami, 14, who said Jones has no right to question them.

"I love America," Al-Hachami said. "I've never even been to the Arab world my entire life."

Late Friday, a group of Christians yelled at people attending the Arab festival.

Shouting through a bullhorn, they repeatedly insulted Muslims.

One sign read: "Muhammad is a ... liar ... pervert."

Wayne County sheriff's deputies later escorted them away as Arab Americans yelled back.

Contact *Niraj Warikoo*: 313-223-4792 or nwarikoo@freepress.com

TERRY JONES ARTICLES

Terry Jones (Pastor)



Chip Litherland for The New York Times

Updated: April 1, 2011

Terry Jones is an evangelical pastor who threatened to mark the ninth anniversary of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks by burning more than 200 copies of Koran, the sacred text of Islam, at his small church in Gainesville, Fla. Mr. Jones later canceled his demonstration, saying he had won a promise to move the proposed Islamic center near ground zero to a new location. After learning that the project's leaders in New York had said that no such deal existed, Mr. Jones backed away from his promise, saying the bonfire of sacred texts was simply "suspended."

The overall commander of forces in Afghanistan, Gen. David H. Petraeus, among others, had warned at that time that such an action could provoke violence in Afghanistan, putting American lives in danger. Mr. Jones subsequently publicly promised not to burn a Koran, but in March 2011 he nonetheless presided over a mock trial and then the burning of the Koran at his church, the Dove World Outreach Center, with only 30 worshippers attending.

The provocation drew little response worldwide, but drew angry condemnation in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where anti-American sentiment runs high. Stirred up by a trio of angry mullahs who urged them to avenge the burning of a Koran, thousands of protesters on April 1 overran the compound of the United Nations in the northern Afghan city of Mazar-i-Sharif, killing at least 12 people, Afghan and United Nations officials said. The dead included at least seven United Nations workers — five Nepalese guards and two Europeans, one of them a woman. None were Americans.

Plans That Garnered Worldwide Attention

In 2010, Mr. Jones's plans garnered him worldwide news media attention and set off protests in Afghanistan and other Muslim countries. His intention to burn the Koran brought condemnation from national religious leaders and from General Petraeus. President Obama also weighed in, saying that he hoped the pastor behind the event "understands that this is a destructive act that he's engaging in," and will call it off after listening to his "better angels."

Mr. Jones's scheduled event coincided with the uproar surrounding the building of an Islamic center near ground zero. With the debate in New York putting religious tensions front and center, the Florida pastor suddenly attracted thousands of fans and critics on Facebook, while around the world he was presented as a symbol of American anti-Islamic sentiment. Muslim leaders in several countries, including Egypt and Indonesia, formally condemned him and his church.

Mr. Jones, a former hotel manager, has argued that as an American Christian he has a right to burn the Koran because "it's full of lies." In 2009, he posted a sign at his church declaring "Islam is of the devil," but it caused no outcry.

TERRY JONES ARTICLES

He said he sincerely hoped that his planned Koran-burning would not lead to violence. He dismissed the idea that it could put American troops at greater risk, and – echoing his sermons – he said that his church was being persecuted. His bank recently demanded immediate repayment of the \$140,000 balance on the church mortgage, Mr. Jones said. His property insurance had also been canceled since he announced in late July 2010 that he intended to burn copies of [the Koran](#); and that death threats now come in regularly, he said.

Angry Clerics' Call to Action

In 2010, even though Mr. Jones called off his burning of the Koran, a subsequent wave of protests at [NATO facilities](#) in Afghanistan led to at least five deaths. In several of those incidents, Taliban agitators played a role, allegedly spreading rumors that the Koran burning had taken place. However, the Taliban have had little or no presence in Mazar-i-Sharif.

On March 20, 2011, Mr. Jones burned the sacred text with little apparent reaction. President [Asif Ali Zardari](#) of Pakistan, however, condemned the burning in an address before Parliament, and President [Hamid Karzai](#) of Afghanistan called on the United States to bring those responsible for the Koran burning to justice. A prominent Afghan cleric, Mullah Qyamudin Kashaf, acting head of the Ulema Council of Afghanistan (and a Karzai appointee), also called for American authorities to arrest and try Mr. Jones for the Koran burning.

[Go to next page](#) The incident that resulted in the deaths of United Nations workers began in April when three mullahs, addressing [Friday prayers](#) inside the Blue Mosque in Mazar-i-Sharif, one of Afghanistan's holiest places, urged people to take to the streets to agitate for Mr. Jones's arrest.

The crowd – some carrying signs reading “Down With America” and “Death to Obama” – poured into the streets and swelled – the governor of Balkh Province, Atta Mohammad Noor, later put the number at 20,000. According to Lal Mohammad Ahmadzai, spokesman for General Daoud Daoud, the Afghan National Police commander for northern Afghanistan, the crowd soon overwhelmed the United Nations guards, disarming some and beating and shooting others.

Mr. Jones was unrepentant. “We must hold these countries and people accountable for what they have done as well as for any excuses they may use to promote their terrorist activities,” he said in a statement.

TERRY JONES ARTICLES

Police Chief Magazine - View Article

<http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/>



Building Trust, Driving Relationships with the Dearborn, Michigan, Arab American Community

By Ronald Haddad, Chief of Police, Dearborn, Michigan, Police Department



[Click to view the digital edition.](#)



Images courtesy of Dearborn, Michigan, Police Department

We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty . . ."

These words, taken from the preamble to the U.S. Constitution, have rightfully served as the uncontested, timeless cornerstones of many police department mission statements for more than 200 years. The police mission has faced many challenges in meeting the demands of the evolving global perspective, changing the role of law enforcement in modern society. Police departments continually **redefine** their missions as dictated by the needs of the community they are empowered to serve. The changing faces and cultures that make up the United States of America are vital in defining the police mission.

The city of Dearborn, Michigan, hometown of Ford Motor Company, is a city built on industry and shaped by diversity. Dearborn has a population of approximately 100,000 residents and a 200-officer police force. Like many communities in Michigan, Dearborn is battling through difficult economic times as a result of the serious challenges faced by the American auto industry. During this period defined

TERRY JONES ARTICLES

by unemployment and increasing incidents of foreclosure, crime and the fear of crime have become more disconcerting to Dearborn residents and its diverse community.



The surrounding areas of southeastern Michigan and the city of Dearborn are home to the largest concentrated Arab population (estimated at 380,000) outside of the Middle bEast. Many in this community prefer to be referred to as American Arab, as they believe it is important to represent that they are Americans first and of Arab heritage. The city of Dearborn has been home to Arab American populations for many years. In the early 1900s, people from all over the country and world migrated to Dearborn as a result of the opening of the Ford Rouge Assembly plant, which marked the birth of the American auto industry. Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria were the main countries of origin during that time period. Throughout the 1950s, another large wave of Palestinian and Lebanese immigrants came from the Middle East to the Dearborn area. This population has grown and thrived. Arab American families are now multigenerational; have established deep cultural, political, and religious roots in the Dearborn community; and play a significant role in the Dearborn economy.

TERRY JONES ARTICLES

The Immigrant Communities

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Dearborn became home to a growing Yemen American population that immigrated to the area largely because of jobs in the auto industry and the established Arab American and Muslim community. The Yemen American community is primarily first- and second-generation immigrants from the country of Yemen. This community started primarily with working-class men settling in to set up a financial base before establishing roots and bringing family members to the area.

While a number of these community members have jobs as professionals, there are also currently members of the Yemen American community who do not speak or write the English language and often rely on school-aged children to translate and communicate with public safety personnel. Communication barriers can create challenges with developing trust, and, as a result, many in the Yemen American community are still relatively reluctant to make contact with police. Being members of their community's first and second generation to live in the United States, the Yemen American community also is experiencing many of the growing pains that occur when parents are from a traditionally non-Westernized culture and the children tend to be inundated with Western culture. In addition, the country of Yemen is challenged economically and is often associated with militant Muslim ideologies, which have resulted in Yemen being of grave concern to U.S. national security. This broad-based stigma has added stress to the Yemen American community as it struggles to assimilate, grow, and contribute in the American way of life.

Adding to the Arab American mix in Dearborn and metropolitan Detroit is a well-established Chaldean (Iraqi Christian) population. Individuals in the Chaldean community have been joined over the past 18 years by many Iraqi citizens fleeing their homes during the Gulf and Iraq wars. During the past decade, many of the displaced Iraqi refugees landed in Dearborn as they chose to settle in communities with high Arab populations.

In Michigan, the Arab American population is predominately of the Christian faith. In contrast, it is estimated that approximately 80 percent of Dearborn's Arabic population is Muslim. The Arab American community accounts for more than 30 percent of Dearborn's residents, or 30,000 residents.

TERRY JONES ARTICLES

Barriers to Trust

Dearborn strives to provide upscale housing and vibrant business venues in addition to serving as a destination for dining and entertainment. Dearborn is home to several universities, colleges, and institutions for professional career development. The city is known as a regional employment center, center of commerce, and a regional health care destination. The city works hard to offer a welcoming environment that accommodates residents and visitors alike and offers a high quality of life, with well-cared for homes in attractive neighborhoods. Its residents have a sense of purpose and belonging and above all else value the atmosphere of safety and security provided in the community.

The city of Dearborn has a rich history of providing quality public services to its citizens. The Dearborn Police Department continues to follow a philosophy of service that requires it to work in partnership with members of the community to identify common issues and develop common solutions. This has not been without challenges, as the Arab American population in Dearborn is often impacted by global events that create barriers to effective communication and trust. Wars in the Middle East, the ongoing Palestinian conflict, terrorist video threats, acts of violence by terrorist organizations, and global heightened security have all had an impact on the Arab American population in Dearborn, often subjecting its members to stereotypical cultural bias created by these global events. Arab American populations, like most Americans, have resigned themselves to certain infringements on freedoms, such as added airport security screening procedures. However, the perception of cultural bias in issues such as unfair national immigration policies, reported recruitment of informants within local mosques, and racial profiling can all elicit a passionate community response. These issues add a continuous burden on the local police department in building trust with the community in areas that were not created by—or in the control of—any police department. These factors cannot be allowed to impede progress. Adhering to a community-oriented policing philosophy continues to be significant in overcoming these obstacles.



TERRY JONES ARTICLES

Encouraging Community Involvement

The cornerstone of the Dearborn Police Department's philosophy is communication, education, and mutual respect. Dearborn believes that through effective communication, all segments of a population have a chance to contribute and educate each other in the hopes that they all realize they are of equal importance and with that have equal responsibility in contributing to a successful and safe community.

A defining example of community identity is a section of the city of Dearborn referred to as Altar Road. Located along Altar Road is the Islamic Center of America, the largest mosque in the United States. The Islamic Center of America hosts 350,000 visitors each year and is very involved with the community. It is led by Imam Hassan Qazwini, who has been a communicator, facilitator of education, and a true community partner. Important to note is that also located on Altar Road are Saint Sarkis Armenian Apostolic Church, Saint Clement Orthodox Church, Warrendale Community Church, and Abundant Life Arabic Lutheran Ministry. Adjoining Altar Road is Saint Thomas Aquinas Catholic Church as well. Churches of various religious beliefs seamlessly coexist as peaceful neighbors, working together and all contributing to one community. This is representative of the spirit of Dearborn and why effective communication and education promotes mutual respect.

Cooperative community-based efforts are often the result of elaborate community policing initiatives. The ideals are quite simple: Individuals should become educated about their community and show through action their legitimate concern, ensuring all members of the community have an equal voice and are respected for who they are and what they represent. These actions will result in trust. Trust results in communication. Communication allows police to better deter and solve crime and enlist community support and assistance in providing a safe and secure environment for the entire community.

Before facilitating community outreach initiatives, the Dearborn Police had to clearly define the meaning of community policing. Community policing initiatives can be costly, so they must be results oriented and have a meaningful and measurable outcome. Only through education and positive experience comes the recognition of community policing as a serious facilitator of innovative problem solving and intelligence gathering. Community policing approached this way can positively affect defined crime issues with the byproduct of building relationships and trust in the community.

TERRY JONES ARTICLES

Mindfulness of Cultural Differences

In Dearborn, the learning process has been extensive. Beyond acknowledgement of the stereotypical cultural bias associated with the Arab American community, it is imperative that police officers recognize that the Arab culture has many nuances. Not understanding some of these nuances can lead certain police officer actions or honest efforts to be misconstrued as being offensive or disrespectful. That can inadvertently result in conflicts and communication breakdowns.

The majority of Arab Americans residing in Dearborn practice Islam, which celebrates religious beliefs and customs that are not well understood by non-Muslim peoples and are often incorrectly correlated and linked to radical portrayals of the religion. The Muslim religion has a great influence in the local Arab American culture, and, therefore, it is very important for police officers to understand many of the core ideologies. It is also important to note that Arab American communities can vary greatly within themselves in cultural traditions, ideologies, and religious beliefs based on their country of origin or religious sect. Established long-term residency that includes jobs, voting, education, civic involvement, and inclusion in a community lends itself to greater community assimilation and assists in developing relationships and trust in any ethnic community. It is imperative to recognize that although communities share a common culture, religion, and language, they do not necessarily have the same needs and concerns, nor will they automatically and harmoniously live together. Each distinct community must have equal voice and input and be an equal contributor to solutions.



TERRY JONES ARTICLES

A valuable lesson learned in Dearborn is the importance of locating, recognizing, and supporting programs and initiatives already existing within the community. William K. Brehm and the Brehm Scholarship Program is one such program. Brehm, a successful businessman and previous public servant as the assistant secretary of the U.S. Army in both the Nixon and Ford administrations, was a Fordson High School (Dearborn) and University of Michigan graduate. Brehm has established scholarships to encourage accomplished Fordson students to attend the University of Michigan and recently created full-tuition scholarships at the University of Michigan Medical School. The Arab American student population at Fordson is predominant and this generous educational opportunity is highly revered in the Arab American community.

Recognizing initiatives like the Brehm Scholarships is important, but, as Chief Haddad also points out, it is equally important to recognize the efforts of individuals like William Ali, a Yemen American citizen who works as a community liaison/youth intervention counselor at Edsel Ford High School (Dearborn). It is the unofficial daily efforts of William Ali that serve as a community example. Ali resides in the community and has, for more than two decades, worked with the youth in the Yemen American community, keeping them away from gangs and crime by organizing athletic programs, promoting education and language skills, and identifying at-risk youth for mentoring. The police department has been greatly assisted by the efforts initiated by Ali in reaching out to the community, building relationships, identifying at-risk youth, and bringing resources to the area. These are only two examples at each end of the spectrum of community leaders stepping forward to benefit the greater good. There are many more individuals who are also deserving of recognition.

Police Commitment and Interest

The Dearborn Police Department believes partnerships are made one at a time and are often facilitated by the interactions and professional services provided by the patrol officer. The patrol officer sets the tone, which can be positive or negative. This

TERRY JONES ARTICLES

is why patrol officers are essential in the success or failure of any community-oriented police initiative and should be well educated and knowledgeable about the communities in their patrol areas. Members of the Dearborn Police Department benefit from education and training that portrays community policing as a philosophy, not a program. Officers continuously study the effective use of positive communication skills to create relationships, trust, and opportunities to facilitate change. These skills can also be vital in gaining useful information on a daily basis. Community policing philosophies adopted by the Dearborn Police Department are being incorporated in the policies and procedures manuals. These skills are also being incorporated in the field training officers mentoring program and in new-officer, supervisor, and in-service training, as well as in the officer's goals and objectives. Dearborn police officers are expected to have a commitment and interest in the citizens they are serving. All officers are expected to show empathy and professionalism in all citizen contacts. Most officers continually cultivate relationships with citizens and gain information every day about crime, criminals, and issues that affect the community. It has proven to be beneficial to police and to the community to utilize teaching sources provided by the communities themselves. This allows a better understanding of key components. It is a continuing goal of the Dearborn Police Department to expand its efforts in facilitating relationships in all segments of the community.



Just as it is important to recognize the vital role of the patrol officer in community policing initiatives, law enforcement supervisors and administrators play an equally important role in developing relationships with the Arab American community. The police chief and command staff facilitate and have ongoing dialogue with the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the American Civil Liberties Union, the Anti-Defamation League, the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, the Council on American-Islamic Relations, the Advocate and Leaders for Police and Community Trust, the Yemeni American Benevolent Association, and other civil rights-related groups. They actively participate on committees that stem from these interactions. It is important to communicate directly with these leaders to address common issues and develop equal participatory strategies for solving problems.

TERRY JONES ARTICLES

It is important and beneficial to be involved in these committees, but it is also important that the committees do not over evolve, transforming themselves into police oversight committees where outside committee members feel they are entitled to a policy-making role. The value in committee involvement is in equal sharing, not one-sided complaint receiving. Involvement is crucial so members of the community have the opportunity to become familiar with police and government functions. Trust and respect need to be mutual.



Programs to Instill Community Confidence

The Dearborn Police Department has made a commitment to the School Resource Officer program, assigning a police officer to each public high school and providing services at all the elementary and middle schools. This commitment proves itself valuable especially in the Arab American community, as it allows first- and second-generational youths to see police officers as educators and mentors rather than solely law enforcers, which serves as a foundation for the future.

The police department promotes and supports a solid Reserve Officer program, which has 33 officers, 21 percent of whom are volunteers from the Arab American community. This program allows volunteers from the community to assist and participate in certain police functions, which not only adds great value to the police department, but helps facilitate the police mission through civilian volunteers.

TERRY JONES ARTICLES

The Dearborn Police Department has a police Explorer program, which has 25 Explorers, 33 percent of whom are youths from the Arab American Community. The purpose of this program is to attract youths to the police department, expose them to the police profession, and facilitate relationships with them with the intent of building inroads and relationships with members of the community in the future.

Another program calls for police **interns**. Dearborn Mayor John B. O'Reilly Jr. strongly believes in the value of having a paid police intern program. This program currently comprises five interns, 60 percent of whom come from the Arab American community. The **intern program** offers these youths the opportunity to work side by side with police officers in a supporting role. The program offers college tuition reimbursement as the interns work toward a degree related to law enforcement. Gail Mee, president of Henry Ford Community College in Dearborn, has added her support by allowing the interns to earn six credit hours. The interns serve as ambassadors both in the community and within the police department.

Multidimensional and Information Sharing Policing

Community policing traditionally is thought of as **facilitating** relationships in one direction: between the police and community. The Dearborn Police Department looks at community policing as a **multidimensional** philosophy. If communication and trust work well in one direction, then, if properly implemented, they should work in all directions. The police department is perfectly positioned to serve the community, and it is also perfectly positioned to be the facilitator between the community and the government agencies **more** removed from daily contact.

The Dearborn Police **Department** believes it is extremely important to also build relationships upward with federal law enforcement partners by facilitating the sharing of information. Violent extremism that **emanates** out of radical groups concealed or blended into various religions, ethnic groups, special interest groups, bullied teens, and hatred from otherwise disturbed individuals is a concern of every citizen and government agency. It would be naive to believe information that the patrol beat officers recognize through training indicators, traits, and early warning signs could not be of value to the interests of federal law enforcement. It would also be naive to believe that services offered by federal law enforcement could not be of value to the community. Local police officers receive information daily from many **street-level** sources, but many times are **unfamiliar** or reluctant to share that **information** with a federal law enforcement agency because they lack knowledge or trust that the information they have obtained is valuable.

TERRY JONES ARTICLES

In 2010, both the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice publicly commended, endorsed, and pledged support for community-oriented policing initiatives. The Dearborn Police Department is taking initiatives to facilitate relationships between the local police officers and the federal agents at the investigative level. The police department is making efforts to invite federal law enforcement entities to meet and train local officers in areas of interest and invite federal agents to learn and participate locally, developing relationships between agents and officers. The goal of these initiatives is for the police department to build relationships of trust and common interests with federal law enforcement partners. The goal is also to be a link in the chain that facilitates relationships between federal law enforcement entities and the members of the community.

Communication, education, and mutual respect likely already play an important part in the majority of law enforcement mission statements and philosophies across the United States. Local police departments have the opportunity to be the lead facilitators of change and can be vital in providing the necessary ingredients for safe and secure communities. Legislation will not create public order. Rather, the goodwill of individuals must be relied upon to ensure that the common good of any community will be served. Citizens' voices must be heard and their treatment must be viewed as equitable. Dialogue on the critical issues of this time can be perplexing. It can also be painful. However, mutual recognition of each other's perspectives, not intimidation, will go a long way in building respect and trust. There are times when the right decision is clear and it cannot be impacted by political correctness, budgetary constraints, or popular demand. It relies upon the individual courage of the police executive to do what is right to ensure all people enjoy the safeguards and freedoms that are designed and guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. ■

Please cite as:

Ronald Haddad, "Building Trust, Driving Relationships with the Dearborn, Michigan, Arab American Community," *The Police Chief* 78 (March 2011): 42–47.

From *The Police Chief*, vol. LXXVII, no. 3, March 2011.
Copyright held by the International Association of Chiefs of Police, 515 North Washington Street, Alexandria, VA 22314 USA.

The online version of the *Police Chief* Magazine is possible through a grant from the IACP Foundation. To learn more about the IACP Foundation, click [here](#).

All contents Copyright © 2003 - 2011 International Association of Chiefs of Police. All Rights Reserved.
Copyright and Trademark Notice | Member and Non-Member Supplied Information | Links Policy

515 North Washington St., Alexandria, VA USA 22314 phone: 703.836.6767 or 1.800.THE IACP fax: 703.836.4543
Created by Matrix Group International, Inc.®

CASE STUDY

SAMIR KHAN

Outreach Strategy



Case Study: Samir Khan

Samir Khan was perhaps most notoriously known as the editor and primary contributor of the al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) online jihad magazine, *Inspire*. Written in colloquial English, with a keen understanding of American youth culture, and illustrated with sophisticated graphics and photos uncommon in the jihadi world, *Inspire* aimed directly at a Western audience and sought to recruit terrorist operatives to strike their own homelands or abroad. Khan was 25 years old when he was killed by a September 2011 US drone strike targeting AQAP's operational leader, Anwar al-Aulaqi.

Born in Saudi Arabia of Pakistani ancestry, Khan moved to the New York area with his middle-class family at the age of 7. Neighbors knew him as a teenager who played basketball in the street with his brother, adopting the clothing and slang of his peers until shortly before the 9/11 attacks, when he attended a mosque summer camp.

Following the 9/11 attacks, Khan's attraction to militant websites and a radical shift in his social and religious views alarmed his parents. Khan's family moved to North Carolina in 2004. Acquaintances in Charlotte described him as introverted, awkward, and already radicalized upon his arrival. He expressed outrage that local mosque leaders were not preaching about the injustice of the US-led war against Muslim countries.

Khan became a prolific blogger supporting the cause of violent jihadis. He took the precaution of consulting an attorney regarding the limits of his free speech and was advised to avoid directly advocating violence. There was no evidence at the time that Khan was violating the law by providing material support to terrorists. However, he leveraged his fluency in the English language and American culture to make relevant the messages broadcast by al-Qa'ida and its affiliates.

Many online jihadi forums perpetuate the myth that American forces routinely and deliberately commit atrocities against Muslim civilians. Many view the United States and its allies as waging a war not against terrorist groups, but against Islam and all Muslims. Khan believed in the value of winning what he called the "media jihad," producing propaganda that would convert terrorist sympathizers into actual operatives willing to take violent action.

Several times, vigilante groups notified Khan's Internet service provider about his extremist bloggings, causing his access to be suspended. Khan himself was surprised that the government did not directly contact him.

Khan's father tried to bring him to religious scholars in an effort to reverse his radicalization. According to one imam, Samir "would give you the impression that he would

Outreach Strategy



Case Study: Samir Khan

change,” before he disconnected from the mosque. Khan’s father also cut off Samir’s Internet access several times.

In 2009, Khan is believed to have moved to Yemen, the stronghold of AQAP. The inaugural issue of *Inspire* magazine appeared in summer 2010, and by the time of his death, Khan was able to publish six more issues.

<http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/01/world/la-fg-khan-profile-20111001>

<http://www.longislandpress.com/2011/10/06/slain-al-qaeda-mouthpiece-samir-kahns-westbury-long-island-roots/>

<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/world/middleeast/samir-khan-killed-by-drone-spun-out-of-the-american-middle-class.html>

http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/k/samir_khan/index.html?scp=6&sq=internet%20jihad%20aims%20at%20american&st=cse

<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/15/us/15net.html?ref=samirkhan>

Slain al Qaeda Mouthpiece Samir Khan's



The Westbury home where al Qaeda propagandist Samir Khan once lived. (Photo credit: Long Island Press) Foreground: Samir Khan

Samir Khan, the al Qaeda propagandist killed in U.S. airstrikes alongside militant cleric Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen last week, spent some of his teenage years living in Westbury, Long Island, just down the road from two prime targets: Roosevelt Field Mall and the Long Island Rail Road, officials and neighbors say.

Khan, 25, was the editor of *Inspire*, an English-language al Qaeda magazine that publishes interviews with leading terrorists as well as how-to articles on topics such as bomb building and firing assault rifles. Khan and al-Awlaki were seen as key players in sowing anti-Western sentiment that helped in recruiting new fighters. They became the first American citizens targeted and killed in a drone strike [Sept. 30](#).

"He's a person who was basically raised on Long Island, became radicalized and became a terrorist while he was on Long Island," Rep. Peter King (R-Seafood), the chair of the House Homeland Security Committee, tells the Press. "It really makes you wonder."

A law enforcement source confirmed that the Khan family moved from Queens to Nassau County, where they lived several years before moving to North Carolina eight years ago. It was unclear when he moved to the tidy L-shaped Plymouth Drive in Westbury, but the [New York Times](#) reported Khan began became radicalized after the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks—despite his family's interventions.

"I am proud to be a traitor to America," is the title of one article reportedly penned by Khan after he moved to Yemen in 2008 to head up *Inspire* magazine. [East Meadow Patch](#) reported Khan graduated in 2003 from W.T. Clarke High School, where he wrote for the student newspaper. Neighbors who remembered the family were stunned at the news, but the new owners of the Khan residence saw it coming.

"I wasn't shocked when we heard about this," says the new owner of the ranch-style home, Rocco Abbatiello. The 44-year-old independent contractor tells the Press he got the first of several visits from federal investigators asking about the house where Khan had lived with his parents and older sister six months after his family moved in to the home in the fall of 2003.

SAMIR KHAN ARTICLES

"Even when we purchased the house we never actually met them," he says. "We gutted the whole house, it's not like we found anything."

Neighbors did not take the news as lightly.

"It takes away the whole sense of suburbia," says one neighbor who asked not to be named. "They tell you if you see something, say something. Are we supposed to be suspicious of every new neighbor?"

The neighbor found it odd that the family suddenly moved to North Carolina on a week's notice, but had never suspected anything out of the ordinary. The family reportedly wore traditional garb and mostly kept to themselves.

The Khan family released a statement Wednesday defending Samir and condemning his death, according to [The Charlotte Observer](#).

"We feel appalled by the indifference shown to us by our government," it reads. "No U.S. official has contacted us with any news about the recovery of our son's remains, nor offered us any condolences."

The statement charges Samir was deprived of his Fifth Amendment rights to due process.

"Was this style of execution the only solution?" it asks. "Why couldn't there have been a capture and trial? Where is the justice?"

King has said the killing of al-Awlaki was justifiable despite his U.S. citizenship because he was at war. He tells the Press that al-Awlaki and Khan were more dangerous in recent years than the late al Qaeda chief, Osama bin Laden, "because they knew how to talk to Americans."

"I read his magazine every month," King says. "It's scary stuff. I know the impact it has."

Khan is not the first al Qaeda member from Long Island. [Bryant Neal Vinas](#), Patchogue native and Muslim convert, pleaded guilty to conspiring to kill U.S. nationals in 2009. That was a year after he was captured in Pakistan, where he admitted giving al Qaeda information about the LIRR for a bomb plot.

In a related case, 45-year-old [Mohammad Younis](#) of Centereach pleaded guilty in August to operating an unlicensed money transmitting business after admitting in federal court that he unwittingly provided \$7,000 to Faisal Shahzad, the would-be Times Square Bomber. Younis will be sentenced Nov. 30.

"No one was as effective as al-Awlaki and Samir Khan," King says. "They knew American culture. They knew American hopes and fears."

More articles filed under [Long Island News, News](#)

Tags: [Al Qaeda](#), [al-Qaida](#), [Anwar al-Awlaki](#), [bomb](#), [bomb making](#), [Bryant Neil Vinas](#), [Centereach](#), [cleric](#), [drone](#), [drone strikes](#), [editor](#), [featured](#), [Homeland Security](#), [Homeland Security Committee](#), [Inspire](#), [LIRR](#), [Long Island](#), [Long Island Rail Road](#), [Mohammad Younis](#), [North Carolina](#), [Osama Bin Laden](#), [Patchogue](#), [Pete King](#), [Peter King](#), [roosevelt field mall](#), [Samir Khan](#), [target](#), [terrorist](#), [terrorists](#), [westbury](#), [Yemen](#)

HOME PAGE TODAY'S PAPER VIDEO MOST POPULAR TIMES TOPICS

The New York Times

Tuesday, December 13, 2011

Times Topics

WORLD U.S. N.Y. / REGION BUSINESS TECHNOLOGY SCIENCE HEALTH SPORTS

Samir Khan

News about Samir Khan, including commentary and archival articles published in The New York Times.

Updated: Sept. 30, 2011

Samir Khan, a young Web-savvy American of Pakistani origin thought to be behind the Al Qaeda magazine *Inspire*, was killed in the same September 2011 strike that killed the radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki.

Mr. Awlaki, whom the United States had been hunting in Yemen for more than two years, had been identified as the target in advance and was killed with a Hellfire missile fired from a drone operated by the Central Intelligence Agency. Mr. Khan was traveling with Mr. Awlaki, but it was not clear whether he was also a deliberate target of the strike.

Mr. Khan, who was born in 1986, was an enthusiast of jihad who lived with his parents in North Carolina as recently as 2007, before leaving the United States for Yemen in 2009, where he is thought to have started *Inspire* magazine.


Mr. Khan was born in Saudi Arabia and grew up in Queens. He was an unlikely foot soldier in what Al Qaeda calls the "Islamic jibadi media." He had grown up in middle-class America and wrestled with his worried parents about his religious fervor.

Before leaving the United States, Mr. Khan had served as a Western conduit for the multimedia productions of violent Islamic groups, a role he appeared to have continued to pursue from Yemen. At the time, he was not thought to have had terrorist ties.

In recent years, Mr. Khan had become a strong part of the information arm of Al Qaeda's Yemen affiliate, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. He proclaimed, in an early edition of the Qaeda magazine, that "I am proud to be a traitor," according to an ABC News report from 2010.

Inspire magazine attracted attention in September 2011 for its issue commemorating and celebrating the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. In the issue, the group criticized President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran for repeating conspiracy theories that diminished Al Qaeda's role in the attacks.

Multimedia



Killing of Awlaki Is Latest in Campaign Against Qaeda Leaders

Anwar al-Awlaki's lectures were linked to several investigations in the United States, Britain and Canada.

[More Multimedia »](#)

MC

E

ARTICLES ABOUT SAMIR KHAN

Newest First | Oldest First

Page: 1 | 2 | Next >>

Al Qaeda Group Confirms Deaths of Two American Citizens

By CHARLIE SAVAGE

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula confirmed the deaths of the American citizens Anwar Al-Awlaki and Samir Khan, but said their killings went against the principles the United States says it was founded upon.

October 11, 2011

MORE ON SAMIR KHAN AND: AL QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA, AWLAKI, ANWAR AL-, KHAN, SAMIR

Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a Citizen

By CHARLIE SAVAGE

A memo offers a glimpse at the legal debate that led to the Obama administration's decision to kill Anwar al-Awlaki, an American citizen, in Yemen.

October 9, 2011

MORE ON SAMIR KHAN AND: UNITED STATES DEFENSE AND MILITARY FORCES, CLASSIFIED INFORMATION AND STATE SECRETS, TERRORISM, YEMEN, AL QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA, OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, OBAMA, BARACK, AWLAKI, ANWAR AL-



HOME PAGE T DAYS PAPER VIDEO MOST POPULAR TIMES TOPICS

The New York Times

Middle East

WORLD U.S. N.Y. / REGION BUSINESS TECHNOLOGY SCIENCE HEALTH SPORTS OPINION

AFRICA AMERICAS ASIA PACIFIC EUROPE MIDDLE EAST

2nd American in Strike Waged Qaeda Media War

By ROBBIE BROWN and KIM SEVERSON
Published: September 30, 2011

CHARLOTTE, N.C. — From his parents' basement in a part of town where homes have lots of bedrooms and most children go to college, [Samir Khan](#) blogged his way into the highest circles of [Al Qaeda](#), waging a media war he believed was as important as the battles with guns on the ground.

[Enlarge This Image](#)



Fox News, via Associated Press

Samir Khan, 25, pictured in 2008, was killed on Friday in Yemen. In 2009, he began a magazine for jihadists called [Inspire](#).

His parents — by all accounts a low-key, respected couple who had moved south from Queens in 2004 — were worried about the increasingly radical nature of their son's philosophy and the increasing [media reports](#) that exposed it.

They turned more than once to members of their religious communities to impress upon their college-aged son the perils of such thinking and behavior.

RECOMMEND

TWITTER

LINKEDIN

SIGN IN TO E-MAIL

PRINT

REPRINTS


SHARE



Multimedia



TimesCast | September 30, 2011



Killing of Awlaki Is Latest in Campaign Against Qaeda Leaders



Map of Countries Where Al Qaeda and Its Affiliates Operate

It did not work. In 2009, he left his comfortable life in Charlotte for [Yemen](#), started a slick magazine for jihadists called Inspire that featured political and how-to articles written in a comfortable American vernacular, and continued to digitally dodge government and civilian efforts to stop his self-described “media jihad.”

His life ended in Yemen on Friday, when Mr. Khan, 25, was killed in a drone strike that also took the life of the radical cleric [Anwar al-Awlaki](#) and two other men, according to both American and Yemeni officials.

At a mosque run by the Islamic Society of Greater Charlotte, few of the several hundred Muslims gathered for Friday Prayer wanted to talk about Mr. Khan.

“This is a very dangerous road when you go and kill someone like this,” said Ayeb Suleiman, 25, a medical resident. “He was just an editor. He was just writing.”

Others felt grief for a family who had lost a son, no matter the nature of the son’s activities.

Mr. Khan’s father, Zafar Khan, is an information technology executive and a respected, regular worshiper who bought his family a two-story brick house near a mosque. He often talked cricket with Yasin Raja, a fellow

Related

Two-Year Manhunt Led to Killing of Awlaki in Yemen (October 1, 2011)

News Analysis: Judging a Long, Deadly Reach (October 1, 2011)

Yemenis Say They Have Bigger Problems Than Al Qaeda (October 1, 2011)

Times Topic: Anwar al-Awlaki

Connect With Us on Twitter

Follow
@nytimesworld for
international
breaking news and
headlines.



Pakistani-American.

"If Samir got caught up with something, that was on his own," Mr. Raja said.

Steve Glocke, who lives across the street from the family, watched Mr. Khan grow from a cordial teenager who played basketball with his brother in the street into a quiet, but radical, young man. When Mr. Khan moved to Yemen, he said, "I would ask if he was O.K., and they would say they didn't know."

His parents were worried even before the family moved from Queens. Mustapha Elturk, the imam and president of the Islamic Organization of North America, met the family in the mid-1990s during an educational program at a mosque in Flushing, Queens. Mr. Khan was interested in Islam as a way to "stay away from the peer pressure of his teenage days," he said.

But after the Sept. 11 attacks, Mr. Khan's attraction to militant sites on the Internet and his radical views grew to the point where his father intervened.

"He tried his best to make his son meet all sorts of imams and scholars to dissuade him from those views," said Mr. Elturk, who spoke with Mr. Khan's father on Friday to offer condolences. "He would give you the impression that he would change."

Early intervention by members of the local community is key to preventing the radicalization of Islamic youth, said Sue Myrick, the member of Congress who represents the part of Charlotte where Mr. Khan lived.

Mr. Khan's last issue of Inspire came out this week. It was 20 pages, smaller than the rest, and dedicated largely to the Sept. 11 attacks. It has lost some of the cheekiness of early editions, which outlined what to expect on a jihad and had headlines like "Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom."

In this edition, he made clear the role he believed he played in the war. "While America was focused on battling mujahedeen in the mountains of Afghanistan and the streets of Iraq," he wrote, "the jihadi media and its supporters were in fifth gear."

Robbie Brown reported from Charlotte, and Kim Severson from Atlanta. Matt Flegenheimer contributed reporting from New York.

A version of this article appeared in print on October 1, 2011, on page A8 of the New York edition with the headline: Drone Victim Went From American Middle Class to Waging a Media War for Al Qaeda.