
LESSON PLAN	COUNTERING INMATE EXTREMISM
TIME FRAME	30 minutes (Recommended)
OBJECTIVES	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Discuss the meaning of inmate extremism• Discuss new threats• Discuss management strategies for inmates who have been identified as extremists• Define the process and progression of inmate radicalization with specific indicators• Discuss the importance of information sharing and collaboration in countering inmate extremism
STUDENT MATERIALS	None
INSTRUCTOR MATERIALS	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Instructor Lesson Plan• PowerPoint Presentation
REFERENCES	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• United States Code (USC), Title 18, Part I, Chapter 113B § 2331• National Security Cases, 28 CFR §501.2, 3• Radicalization Dynamics: A Primer; NCTC 2010• Training Guiding Principles, DAG; 03-20-2012• DOJ National Security Division Statistics on Unsealed International Terrorism and Terrorism Related Convictions 9/11/01 – 3/18/10• “By the Numbers: Isis Cases in the United States, March 1, 2014 – June 22, 2015.” Center on National Security at Fordham Law. June 25, 2015. centeronnationalsecurity.org• Final Report of the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel, Homeland Security Committee, September 2015.
RECOMMENDED INSTRUCTORS	Captain, or Lieutenant designated by Captain
CONTACT	Learning and Career Development Branch (LCDB) Curriculum Development at BOP-HRM/Curriculum~

SPECIAL NOTES

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I. INTRODUCTION

Slide 1 – Countering Inmate Extremism (Header Slide)

Extremism has become an issue with our nation it has become an even greater issue in our institutions. Now more than ever, it is crucial in the correctional setting to be able to recognize new threats and report them accordingly.

In recent years, both domestic and international extremist groups have viewed detention and corrections populations as a potential recruitment ground. These groups have also made concerted efforts to influence inmates to join or support their cause while under correctional supervision or once they are released from custody.

Violent extremists use a variety of resources to achieve their goals, including recruiting individuals while in custody. As a correctional worker first, you have professional responsibility

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In this training, violent extremist behavior may be motivated, though not exclusively by religion, racial, ethnic or other ideological extremism.

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II. OBJECTIVES

Slide 2 - Objectives

After the completion of today's lesson, the participants should be able to discuss the following:

- Discuss the meaning of inmate extremism
- Discuss new threats
- Discuss management strategies for inmates who have been identified as extremists
- Define the process and progression of inmate radicalization with specific indicators
- Discuss the importance of information sharing and collaboration in combating inmate extremism

III. INMATE EXTREMISM

Slide 3 – Inmate Extremism

Inmate extremism is not new. Jails and prisons can be used as recruiting grounds for extremism:

- Violent extremists
- Terrorists
- Sovereign citizens

Slide 4 – Violent Extremism

Violent extremism is defined as any ideology that encourages, endorses, condones, justifies, or supports the commission of a violent act or crime against the U.S., its government, citizens, or allies in order to achieve political, social, or economic changes, or against individuals or groups who hold contrary opinions.

IV. TERRORISM

A. Types of Terrorism

Slide 5 – Types of Terrorists

There is not just one definition of terrorism. For the purpose of this class we will use the definitions on the slide, which is utilized by the Department of Justice (DOJ).

1. Domestic Terrorism

Domestic terrorism involves a violent act or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State that appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; or influence the domestic policy.

Within custody of the Bureau of Prisons, an inmate example is David Lane. He was involved in the 1984 Assassination of Alan Berg, Colorado radio host and was seen as a Minister of Propaganda for "The Order." He was coined for the "14 Words" slogan: "We must secure the existence of our people and a future for white children."


2. International Terrorism

International terrorism involves a violent act or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State that appear to be intended to


intimidate or coerce a civilian population; influence the policy of a government in furtherance of political or social objectives promoted by a foreign terrorist organization.

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


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
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
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Slide 8 – Lone Wolf Offenders

The threat of lone wolf terrorism in America is based on a number of recent terrorist events that authorities believe were carried out by a single person. They are individuals who performed their acts of terror alone and were not involved with a larger terrorist organization.

Examples of inmate lone offenders include:

1. Timothy McVeigh

Timothy James "Tim" McVeigh was an American domestic terrorist who detonated a truck bomb in front of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995. Commonly referred to as the Oklahoma City bombing, the attack killed 168 people and injured over 600. It was the deadliest act of terrorism within the United States prior to the September 11 attacks, and remains the most serious act of domestic terrorism in United States history. McVeigh, a militia movement sympathizer and Gulf War veteran, sought revenge against the federal government for their handling of the Waco Siege, which ended in the deaths of 76 people exactly two years prior to the bombing, as well as for the Ruby Ridge incident in 1992.

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4. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

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5. Sovereign Citizens

Slide 9 – Sovereign Citizens

Sovereign citizen extremists are defined as US persons who reject the legitimacy of US citizenship and all forms of government authority, and, therefore, believe they are immune from federal, state, and local laws. Some sovereign citizen extremists advocate change through the use, support, or facilitation of violence or other illegal conduct.

Many sovereign citizen extremists also believe they are emancipated from responsibilities associated with being a US citizen, such as paying taxes, or possessing a driver's license or motor vehicle registration. Several sovereign citizen groups in the United States produce fraudulent documents for their members in lieu of legitimate government-issued forms of identification, utilize "paper terrorism", and have resorted to violence. In December 2011, the FBI reported that they expected to see a continued increase in Sovereign Citizens activity.

Robert David Neal is an inmate example of a sovereign Citizen but not the best example by any stretch. Daniel Petersen is an Original Montana Freeman leader and the first inmate convicted under the Court Security Improvement Act. James Timothy Turner was the reported President of the "Republic of the United States" and convicted on tax fraud charges.

6. Homegrown Violent Extremist (HVE)

Slide 10– Homegrown Violent Extremist (HVE)

A homegrown Violent Extremist (HVE) is a US person who was once assimilated into, but who has rejected the cultural values, beliefs and environment of the US in favor of a violent extremist ideology. He or she is "US Radicalized" and intends to commit terrorism inside the United States without direct support or direction from a foreign terrorist organization

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V. BOP TERRORIST POPULATION

Slide 12 – BOP Terrorist Population

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2. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

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Slide 13 – BOP Terrorist Population

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5. Omar Rahman

Known as the “Blind Shiek,” Omar Rahman was accused of being the leader of Al-Gama’ a al-Islamiyya (aka, the Islamic Group). Rahman and nine others were convicted of seditious conspiracy which grew out of the World Trade Center 1993 bombings. Rahman’s imprisonment has become a rallying point for Islamic militants around the world, including Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden.

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7. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

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
VI. TERRORISM IDENTIFICATION

Slide 14 – Terrorist Identification

A. Security Threat Group (STG) Assignments


Inmates who have been identified with a history of or nexus to International or Domestic terrorism are assigned a Security Threat Groups (STG)^[2] assignment. The inmate is evaluated based upon his/her offense conduct, past criminal history, and behavior/conduct while in custody. Often the BOP relies upon sensitive reporting from outside sources such as other governmental and law enforcement agencies.

The STG International/Domestic Terrorist assignments are:



VII. COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGY

Slide 15 – BOP Counter Terrorism Strategy



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Slide 16 – BOP Counter Terrorism Structure

The BOP's Counter Terrorism Branch is to enhance institution and public safety by providing timely and in-depth analyses of raw investigative and intelligence data. Based on its analysis, the Branch develops and distributes intelligence products to institution staff and the intelligence community. The Branch is responsible for managing inmate foreign language translation services and maintaining a high level of communication and coordination with all domestic security agencies. The Branch includes the Administrator and Assistant Administrator who provide oversight of the CTU and BOP liaisons at the National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF).

A. Monitoring and Managing

Slide 17 – Monitoring and Managing

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2. Counter-Terrorism Unit (CTU)

Slide 18 – Counter-Terrorism Unit (CTU)

The BOP Counter Terrorism Unit (CTU) is located in Martinsburg, West Virginia, and was activated on October 1, 2006. The CTU directly assists with the intelligence coverage of communications and other activities for terrorist offenders, as well as coordinating with the FBI and other agencies in this regard. CTU support services include translation, link analysis, telephone monitoring, intelligence products and advisories, and similar project support.

3. Administrative Maximum (ADX)

Slide 19 – ADX Florence

Opened in 1994, the United States Penitentiary, Administrative Maximum (ADX) is a 490-bed, maximum security facility in Florence, Colorado, which houses inmates in single occupancy cells. Inmates at the ADX are considered the most dangerous in the BOP. The role of the BOP maximum-security facility in the performance of this mission is to confine inmates with chronic behavioral patterns or management issues that cannot be addressed in any other Bureau facility and are utilized for inmates who have demonstrated that they are incapable of functioning in our open penitentiaries.

Slide 20 – Communication Management Units (CMUs)

The Communications Management Unit (CMU) was established to house "those inmates who, based upon their current offense, offense conduct, and/or institutional disciplinary history have and/or have attempted to circumvent established policies and procedures, or pose a serious risk to the safety and security of the institution and community through social communications."

Slide 21 – CMU Inmates

Although not an all-inclusive list, the following are characteristics of inmates who may be housed in the CMU. They include inmates:

- with a current offense(s) of conviction, or offense conduct, included association, communication, or involvement, related to international or domestic terrorism;
- whose current offense(s) of conviction, offense conduct, or activity while incarcerated, indicates a propensity to encourage, coordinate, facilitate, or otherwise act in furtherance of, illegal activity through communication with persons in the community;

- who have attempted, or indicates a propensity, to contact victims of the inmate's current offense(s) of conviction;
- who have committed prohibited activity related to misuse/abuse of approved communication methods while incarcerated; or
- who are associated with any other evidence of a potential threat to the safe, secure, and orderly operation of prison facilities, or protection of the public, as a result of the inmate's unmonitored communication with persons in the community.

Slide 22 – CMUs

- Are non-punitive
- Are general population housing units
- Enable staff to more effectively monitor communication between inmates in CMUs and persons in the community.

VIII. REPORTING INMATE RADICALIZATION AND RECRUITMENT METHODS**A. Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs)****Slide 23 – Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs)**

Inmate radicalization is a process and progression with specific indicators. With this in mind, the Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) come into play.

The Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative (NSI) is a collaborative effort led by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Bureau of Justice Assistance, in partnership with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement partners.

Slide 24 – Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs)

This initiative provides law enforcement with another tool to help prevent terrorism and other related criminal activity by establishing a national capacity for gathering, documenting, processing, analyzing, and sharing SAR information. The SARs will assist in documenting the information to share with all other DOJ entities.

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IX. NATIONAL THREAT ENVIRONMENT

Slide 29 – National Threat Environment

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X. LOCAL THREAT ENVIRONMENT

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XI. REVIEW OF OBJECTIVES

Slide 32 – Review of Objectives

In review of the Countering Inmate Extremism lesson, we have:

- Discussed the meaning of inmate extremism
- Discussed new threats
- Discussed management strategies for inmates who have been identified as extremists
- Defined the process and progression of inmate radicalization with specific indicators
- Discussed the importance of information sharing and collaboration in countering inmate extremism

XII. SUMMARY

Slide 33 – Summary

Inmate extremism can be an issue in a correctional environment.

We need to be proactive in dealing with these inmates and follow all the policy and procedures that are used to manage these inmates. We also must be vigilant in making sure that the BOP is not a breeding ground for ongoing extremist activity, recruitment and radicalization.

Slide 34 – Thank you

Note: Ask for any questions. Encourage discussion.