




Homeland
Security

INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT



(U//FOUO) Domestic Terrorists: Common Characteristics of Paths to Violence

16 May 2014

Office of Intelligence and Analysis

IA-0151-14

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2015-IAFO-00150 - 1672



(U//FOUO) **Domestic Terrorists: Common Characteristics of Paths to Violence**

(U//FOUO) Prepared by the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A).

(U//FOUO) This Assessment details the findings of an I&A study of the process of radicalization leading to violence of domestic terrorists.* Through research and study of 88 domestic terrorists inspired by purely domestic causes, I&A identified common characteristics that could play a role in the process of radicalization to violence. Our ability to analyze relevant personal details of individuals and observable behaviors preceding their violent crimes depended heavily on the nature of the sources and availability of specific information; we note when pertinent information was available for a given analyzed characteristic. The study—conducted in accordance with DHS's efforts to fulfill the White House Strategic Implementation Plan for Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)—is a companion to the Homegrown Violent Extremism Initiative Optional Task Report entitled, "Homegrown Violent Extremism Initiative: Characteristics and Clusters of Radicalization" (March 2011).†

(U//FOUO) This Assessment was produced to assist federal, state, local, and tribal government agencies and authorities in the deterrence, prevention, preemption of, or response to terrorist attacks against the United States relating to an existing or emerging threat of terrorism by advancing stakeholders' understanding of the pathways of radicalization to violence and how they might impact individuals or groups vulnerable to recruitment. The model presented in this Assessment illustrates characteristics identified by studying known domestic terrorists; individuals may exhibit similar characteristics without ever having any connection to violence or terrorism, however. Some of these activities or characteristics are constitutionally protected, and none should be viewed as definitive indicators of domestic terrorist activity without corroborative information revealing a link to violence or terrorism. Members of law enforcement should apply the study's findings within the existing framework of the law, regulations, and operating procedures.

(U) **Key Judgments**

(U//FOUO) **Our examination of observable characteristics of the paths to radicalization**

* (U) See Appendix A for the DHS-established definitions for each of the groups used throughout this Assessment.

† (U) See Appendix B for a description of the methodology and analytical process used for this Assessment.

leading to violence among a selected group of domestic terrorist subjects revealed several prominent features which may inform strategies to counter domestic terrorism.

- » (U//FOUO) (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) played the most important role in radicalizing domestic terrorist subjects.
- » (U//FOUO) **The average length of time for domestic terrorist subjects to radicalize to violence—the period between initial exposure to violent extremist ideology and the first domestic terrorist-related offense—was 7.5 years, although the timeline ranged between 3.7 and 9.1 years.**
- » (U//FOUO) **Regardless of the three categories ascertained for the purposes of this study—"Hate," "Anti-Government," and "Single Issue"—most subjects exhibited (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) during their radicalization to violence.**
- » (U//FOUO) **Most subjects justified violence out of a perception that their identity group was being harmed by certain elements of society or the government.**

» (U//FOUO) (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

(U//FOUO) (b) (3) (A), (b) (7)(E)

(b) (3) (A), (b) (7)(E)

(U//FOUO) (b) (3) (A), (b) (7)(E)

(U//FOUO) (b) (3) (A), (b) (7)(E)

(U) Study Categories

(U//FOUO) Study subjects were evenly selected among three broad categories of domestic extremism that encompass the range of DHS-defined domestic terrorist groups.

- » (U) *Hate* violent extremist groups included white supremacist extremists and black supremacist extremists.
- » (U) *Anti-Government* violent extremist groups included sovereign citizen extremists and militia extremists.
- » (U) *Single Issue* violent extremist groups included animal rights extremists, environmental rights extremists, and anti-abortion extremists.

(U//FOUO) Domestic Terrorists Share Broad Factors in Paths to Violence

(U//FOUO) Our analysis of the characteristics of domestic terrorist subjects revealed most individuals—across the *Hate*, *Anti-Government*, and *Single Issue* violent extremist categories—shared (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

[Redacted]

(b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

(U//FOUO) First Exposure to Violent Ideology Usually (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)


(U//FOUO) (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) played the most common role in domestic terrorist subjects' initial exposure to violent extremist ideology. Among the study subjects for whom information was available, a majority were first exposed to violent extremist ideology through (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) (see Figure 1). Contact frequently occurred because the individual (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

[Redacted]


(U//FOUO) (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

(b) (3), (b) (7)(E) appeared to become an important source of radicalization only after (b) (3), (b) (7)(E), particularly for domestic terrorist subjects belonging to the *Hate* and *Single Issue* violent extremist category (see Figure 2). (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) played a lesser role.

(U) Figure 1: Domestic Terrorists' Initial Exposure to Violent Extremist Ideology



(U) Figure 2: Distribution of Initial Exposure by Group



(U//FOUO) Timeline of Radicalization to Violence Varies by Affiliation, Role

(U//FOUO) The average length of time of domestic terrorist subjects' radicalization to violence—the period between initial exposure to violent extremist ideology and the first


domestic terrorist-related offense—was 7.5 years; the average timeline within each category ranged between roughly 4 and 9 years (see Figure 3). The age at initial exposure to ideology and the duration of the process differed depending on domestic terrorist category and the subject's role in the plotting of a violent incident.

- » (U//FOUO) Domestic terrorist subjects in the *Single Issue* and *Hate* categories tended to radicalize at a younger age than *Anti-Government* domestic terrorists; on average, individuals in these categories radicalized in their mid-twenties, while *Anti-Government* domestic terrorists radicalized in their forties.
- » (U//FOUO) *Single Issue* domestic terrorists radicalized to violence twice as fast as *Hate* or *Anti-Government* domestic terrorists; subjects within this category were first arrested for violence less than four years after their first exposure; *Hate* category subjects, eight years; and *Anti-Government*, nine years.
- » (U//FOUO) On average, those characterized as leaders and lone actors took at least twice as long to radicalize as those classified as co-conspirators. Similarly, co-conspirators committed their first domestic terrorist-related offense around 30

years old, lone actors in their mid-thirties, and leaders around 40 years old.

- » (U//FOUO) The female *Anti-Government* subject took just two years to radicalize, compared to an average 9.4 years for male subjects in that category. The remaining three females—all in the *Single Issue* category—radicalized in three years or less, compared to an average 3.8 years for their male counterparts. Overall, female domestic terrorist subjects of the study appeared to have radicalized much faster than their male counterparts. Because there were only four female subjects, this finding is not reliable, however.

(U) Figure 3: Domestic Terrorist Radicalization Timeline



(U//FOUO) (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

(U//FOUO) Most domestic terrorist subjects, regardless of category, exhibited (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) during their radicalization to violence (see Figure 4). Results, however, should be interpreted with caution given the small number of subjects for whom information was available.

(U//FOUO) (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) changed as they radicalized toward violence. This most often manifested as [redacted]. The likelihood of all three types of change occurring in a Hate group subject was 70 percent; Anti-Government and Single Issue, 55 percent.

» (U//FOUO) (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [redacted]

» (U//FOUO) (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [redacted]


(U//FOUO) We did not examine control groups to determine if (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) were also widely found in individuals who adhered to a non-violent extremist version of the ideology. In addition (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) are generally constitutionally protected and do not indicate impending violence. When they are observed with behavior reasonably indicative of criminal activity associated with terrorism, it may be useful to identify and document suspicious activity in suspicious activity reports (SARs), provided such documentation is in accordance with existing information sharing environment SAR criteria.

(b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [redacted]

» (U//FOUO) (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [redacted]

(U) Figure 4: Overall Domestic Terrorist (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

(b) (3), (b) (7)(E)



(U//FOUO) Violence Justified By Self-Perceived Harm Inflicted Upon Group

(U//FOUO) **Most domestic terrorist subjects justified violence out of a perception that their identity group was being harmed by certain elements of society or the government.** Although there are likely many more individuals who publicly espouse these beliefs who never engage in violence, knowledge of how violent extremists justify violence might help provide warning of possible escalation towards the commission of a violent act.


- » (U//FOUO) **Targeting the Government.** Among the study subjects for whom information was available, 88 percent justified violence against the government or law enforcement believing they, their group, or the ideals associated with their ideology were under attack by the government (see Figure 5). Other justifications for anti-government violence included the beliefs that the government was not legitimate and that the perpetrators were outside its authority.
- » (U//FOUO) High percentages of the *Hate* and *Anti-Government* study subjects considered violence against law enforcement or the government justified (80 and 84 percent, respectively) compared to 23 percent of *Single Issue* domestic terrorists (see Figure 6). As would be expected, more *Anti-Government* subjects exhibited anti-government-related beliefs than *Hate* and *Single Issue* subjects.
- » (U//FOUO) **Non-Government Targets.** Fifty-seven percent of the total number of domestic terrorist study subjects justified violence against non-government civilians based on the perceived harm specific individuals or groups caused their group or society (see Figure 6).^{*} This was particularly true for the *Hate* category, with 79 percent expressing justifications for violence against

^{*} (U) A non-government civilian is any individual not working directly for the government, law enforcement, or military.

non-government civilians (see Figure 7). By contrast, 42 percent of *Single Issue* domestic terrorists argued *against* harming non-government civilians.[†]


[†] (U) The case of (b) (6) ^{USPER}, who in 2003 allegedly placed two pipe bombs that exploded at the headquarters of Chiron Corporation^{USPER} in California, is a noteworthy exception among animal and environmental rights domestic terrorists. The second blast was time-delayed, a tactic which law enforcement suspected was intended to harm emergency teams responding to the blast. A month later, he allegedly wrapped a bomb in nails that targeted the Shaklee Corporation^{USPER} in California in a likely attempt to injure people.

(U) **Figure 5: Percentage of Subjects by Violent Justification**




(U) **Figure 6: Justification of Violence by Ideological Category**

- Group he/she identified was under attack by the US Government
- Violence against law enforcement or other government officials was justifiable
- US Government was illegitimate



(U) Figure 7: Justification of Violence Against Non-Government Targets by Ideological Category



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(U//FOUO) (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) Usually Observable

(U//FOUO) Most subjects (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

» (U//FOUO) (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

* (U) Weapons acquisition, as well as participation in weapons training and paramilitary exercises can constitute constitutionally protected activities and do not necessarily indicate terrorist activity; however, when observed with behavior reasonably indicative of criminal activity associated with terrorism, these activities may be useful in identifying and documenting suspicious activity in SARs when done in accordance with existing information sharing environment SAR criteria.

(b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

» (U//FOUO) (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)


† (U) The Functional Standard v 1.5 defines SAR as "official documentation of observed behavior reasonably indicative of pre-operational planning related to terrorism or other criminal activity."

‡ (U//FOUO) The lack of a suitable control group, as with other characteristics analyzed in in the study, makes it impossible to determine whether crimes were indicative of a radicalization pathway; some of the non-violent criminal activity was expressive of the political ideals of a larger—and not necessarily violently expressed—ideology.

(b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

[Redacted]

(U) Figure 8: Type of (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)
 (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)



(U//FOUO) Socio-Demographic Features Generally Similar to Larger Population

(U//FOUO) While unemployment figured prominently among a number of domestic terrorist study subjects, their socio-demographic characteristics were similar to the general population in education, economic status, family status, and rates of mental illness. Some differences did appear within various domestic terrorist categories, but they were not sufficiently common to serve as notable features in the study of the subjects' radicalization to violence.*

* (U//FOUO) The study also examined some additional demographic and life experience factors besides age and role in the plotting of a violent incident—such as employment status and religious affiliation—as prior homegrown violent extremism studies indicated that factors personal to the individual's life experience may play a role in radicalization. In this study, however, these additional factors did not appear to have an effect on age at onset of radicalization or length of time for radicalization to violence. Further research is needed on additional demographic factors not listed in the study to determine if they contribute to the onset of radicalization.

» (U//FOUO) Little difference in education levels existed between domestic terrorist subjects and the general populace or between the domestic terrorist categories. Almost 90 percent of all domestic terrorist subjects for whom there was information achieved at least a high school education or equivalency, compared to 88 percent of 25 to 29 year olds among the general population as of 2011, according to Department of Education statistics. Seventy-six percent of the domestic terrorist subjects in the *Hate* violent extremist category, 100 percent of those in the *Anti-Government* category, and 91 percent of those in the *Single Issue* category had achieved at least a high school or equivalency degree (see Figure 9 below).


» (U//FOUO) Fifty-seven percent of domestic terrorist study subjects were identified as middle class during their childhoods, while 61 percent were judged to be in a low-income bracket at the time of their violent extremist act. No universal definition of middle class exists, but these percentages fit within the range of national averages reported in (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

- » (U//FOUO) Only about 60 percent of the domestic terrorist subjects for whom pertinent information was available were employed full-time—well below national averages—and many had faced financial or social challenges, but these factors are not useful indicators of radicalization to violence given their prevalence in the general population. Data indicated that some domestic terrorist subjects also earned unreported income from activities that were not categorized as employment—such as selling pamphlets—or through various criminal activities conducted in support of their cause.
- » (U//FOUO) Familial relationships had little overall relationship to individuals’ radicalization process. Seventy percent of domestic terrorist subjects for whom pertinent information was available, or 30 of 43 subjects, came from intact families, which is consistent with the national average. According to the US Census Bureau, in both 1990 and 2000 about three-fourths of all households with children contained a partner of the householder (see Figure 9). Although abuse and neglect can have a

considerable impact on a child’s development and well-being, too little information was found on the domestic terrorist subjects’ internal family dynamics to gain insight on the relationship between these factors and the radicalization process.

- » (U//FOUO) The number of domestic terrorist subjects with a reported history of possible mental illness also appeared to be consistent with the incidence of mental illness in the national population as reported by the National Institute of Mental Health statistics, and appears to have little significance to a subject’s radicalization process. The study identified 19 domestic terrorist subjects with a reported history of possible mental illness, accounting for 22 percent of all individuals in the study, as compared to approximately 25 percent of the general population (Figure 9). These mental illnesses included mild to severe cases of paranoia, phobias, clinical depression and schizophrenia, and anxiety disorders.

(U) Figure 9: Socio-Demographic Factors of Domestic Terrorists



*Percentage of subjects for whom information was available. Total number of subjects in parenthesis.
 **Percentage of total subjects in study.

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(U//FOUO) Domestic Terrorists within Categories Share Characteristics

(U//FOUO) Domestic terrorist subjects in the *Hate violent extremist category* were more likely than individuals in other categories to have a history of violence (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

[REDACTED]. *Hate* domestic terrorist study subjects stood out from those in the other categories for their history of escalating violent criminality before and during their radicalization, greater participation in training and preparations for domestic terrorist acts, and likelihood of exhibiting observable signs of their ideological commitment.

- » (U//FOUO) Domestic terrorist subjects in the *Hate violent extremist category* accounted for half of those identified with escalating criminal behavior, including lethal violence. They also were most likely to justify violence against civilians and, in accordance with their racist ideology, they were more likely to use targeted violence against individuals based on their race and ethnicity than subjects in any other category.
- » (U//FOUO) Compared to *Anti-Government* or *Single Issue* domestic terrorist subjects, individuals within the *Hate violent extremist category* were nearly twice as likely to engage in violent crime before their radicalization, with 45 percent doing so. Assaults accounted for 54 percent of violent crimes conducted by *Hate violent extremist category* subjects, followed by shootings and homicides. *Hate violent extremist category* subjects typically conducted more crimes of opportunity than domestic terrorist subjects in other categories—for example targeting an interracial couple walking down the street—a practice that may explain the frequent lack of group involvement in their violent extremist plots.
- » (U//FOUO) Most *Hate violent extremist category* domestic terrorist subjects also participated in non-violent criminal activity such as counterfeiting, fraud, theft, and robbery prior to their violent extremist act. (b) (3) (A), (b) (7) (E)

- » (U//FOUO) The radicalization process for domestic terrorist subjects in the *Hate violent extremist category* took 8.9 years on average, generally beginning in their mid-20s and culminating with the commission of their first act in their mid-30s.
- » (U//FOUO) Almost all domestic terrorist subjects in the *Hate* category participated in some form of training for their violent extremist act, including paramilitary training, bomb-making training, or weapons training. Individuals in the *Hate violent extremist category* used firearms more than any other weapon and, compared to other categories, used significantly more weapons designed for hand-to-hand combat, such as knives and blunt objects.
- » (U//FOUO) *Hate violent extremist category* domestic terrorist subjects overwhelmingly exhibited some type of observable change following exposure to the violent extremist interpretation of their *Hate* ideology, most often in appearance and dress, followed by use of racist speech and paraphernalia associated with the ideology. Changes in appearance and dress often included getting tattoos symbolizing white supremacist ideals and wearing clothing similar to Nazi German uniforms. Due to the lack of control groups in the study, however, it is not possible to determine whether these changes were indicative of radicalization or could be commonly found in those who did not adopt a violent extremist interpretation of the ideology.*

(U//FOUO) ***Anti-Government* domestic terrorist subjects generally were older than subjects in other categories and their activities displayed fewer observable changes in behavior until well into their radicalization to violence.** Of the three categories, (b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

* (U//FOUO) Additionally, the changes were generally constitutionally protected behaviors, and thus not reportable by themselves, however, when observed with behavior reasonably indicative of criminal activity associated with terrorism, may be useful in identifying and documenting suspicious activity in SARs when done in accordance with existing information sharing environment SAR criteria.

(b) (3), (b) (7)(E)

Most in the *Anti-Government* violent extremist category also were more likely to be part of a close-knit group at the time of their violent extremist act.

- » (U//FOUO) Most individuals in the *Anti-Government* violent extremist category radicalized at a later age than other domestic terrorist subjects, 68 percent after 30 and 37 percent after 40. By comparison, domestic terrorist subjects in the *Hate* and *Single Issue* violent extremist categories typically radicalized to violence before age 30. Domestic terrorists in the *Anti-Government* category were also the oldest, at an average age of 49, at the time the of arrest for first violent extremist offense. Domestic terrorist subjects in the *Anti-Government* violent extremist category justified their violent extremist act based on perceived illegal action committed by the government, a perceived loss in personal freedom, or an objection to paying taxes. Due to the lack of a control group, however, it is not possible to say whether or how these grievances differed from those held by those who adhere to one of the anti-government ideologies but did not radicalize to violence.
- » (U//FOUO) Over 80 percent of domestic terrorist subjects in the *Anti-Government* category for whom pertinent information was available were married at the time of their offense. They also had the highest—albeit still low—rate of employment at 65 percent and were more likely to have stable homes than subjects in other categories. However, unless observed with behavior reasonably indicative of criminal activity associated with terrorism, age, marital or employment statuses are not an appropriate basis for law enforcement action.
- » (U//FOUO) Domestic terrorist subjects in the *Anti-Government* category often sought out the support of group associates and friends during the planning and execution phases of their violent extremist acts, and only 11 percent (or three) acted as lone actors, fewer cases than for any other category.

- » (U//FOUO) Twenty-five percent of *Anti-Government* category domestic terrorist subjects were involved in spontaneous violence during routine encounters with law enforcement—such as traffic stops—that primarily involved firearms.

(U//FOUO) ***Single Issue* domestic terrorist subjects were less likely to justify violence that caused collateral harm and considered a narrower range of targets acceptable than was the case for the other two categories.** *Single Issue* domestic terrorist subjects also appeared to radicalize twice as fast as those in other categories, probably because they were younger when they started the radicalization process.

- » (U//FOUO) Reflecting reluctance to employ violence against people, 94 percent of violent animal and environmental rights extremists in the study, or 17 out of 18 subjects, targeted facilities for attacks—as opposed to conducting attacks against persons—typically using, or attempting to use, incendiary devices. Only two persons advocated violence against people. By contrast, 77 percent of anti-abortion extremists in the study targeted people, all of whom were abortion service providers.
- » (U//FOUO) Almost all anti-abortion extremists advocated violence against people, although they were more likely to identify specific individuals or businesses for violence and avoid collateral harm to those not involved with their targets.
- » (U//FOUO) The process of radicalization for domestic terrorist subjects in the *Single Issue* category took 3.7 years on average, generally beginning in their mid-20s and culminating with the commission of their first act in their late-20s. Such a radicalization timeline translates into shorter potential intervention periods for CVE professionals.

(U) Appendix A: DHS Definitions Used in this Assessment

(U) Domestic Terrorism and Radicalization

(U//FOUO) **Domestic Terrorism:** any act of violence that is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources committed by a group or individual based and operating entirely within the United States or its territories without direction or inspiration from a foreign terrorist group. The act is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any state or other subdivision of the United States and appears to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping. A domestic terrorist differs from a homegrown violent extremist in that the former is not inspired by and does not take direction from a foreign terrorist group or other foreign power.

(U//FOUO) **Radicalization:** the process through which an individual changes from a non-violent belief system to a belief system that includes the willingness to actively advocate, facilitate, or use violence as a method to effect societal or political change.

(U) Extremist Categories

(U//FOUO) **White Supremacist Extremists:** groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of violence directed at the federal government, ethnic minorities, or Jewish persons in support of their belief that Caucasians are intellectually and morally superior to other races and their perception that the government is controlled by Jewish persons.

(U//FOUO) **Black Supremacist Extremists:** groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of violence as a means to oppose racial integration or to eliminate non-black people and Jewish people.

(U//FOUO) **Sovereign Citizen Extremists:** groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of violence directed at public officials, financial institutions, and government facilities in support of their belief that the legitimacy of US citizenship should be rejected; almost all forms of established government, authority, and institutions are illegitimate; and that they are immune from federal, state, and local laws.

(U//FOUO) **Animal Rights Extremists:** groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of violence directed against people, businesses, or government entities perceived to be exploiting or abusing animals.

(U//FOUO) **Environmental Rights Extremists:** groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of violence against people, businesses, or government entities perceived to be destroying, degrading, or exploiting the natural environment.

(U//FOUO) **Anti-Abortion Extremists:** groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of violence directed against the providers of abortion-related services, their employees, and their facilities in support of the belief that the practice of abortion should end.

(U//FOUO) **Militia Extremists:** groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in acts of violence directed at federal, state, or local government officials or infrastructure in response to their belief that the government deliberately is stripping Americans of their freedoms and is attempting to establish a totalitarian regime. These individuals consequently oppose many federal and state authorities' laws and regulations (particularly those related to firearms ownership), and often belong to armed paramilitary groups. They often conduct paramilitary training designed to violently resist perceived government oppression or to violently overthrow the US Government.

(U) Appendix B: Methodology and Analytic Process

(U) Core Methodology

(U//FOUO) Domestic terrorism subject matter experts (SMEs) assessed 156 characteristics and behaviors of 88 subjects who conducted acts of domestic terrorism or violent extremism since 1975. These subjects were chosen because they fit the DHS Lexicon definitions of violent extremists (see Appendix A), were convicted of domestic terrorism charges, were killed while conducting domestic terrorist activities, and about whom a sufficient base of (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) exists to serve as a basis of an assessment.* Subjects were chosen to fit evenly among three broad study categories—*Hate* (29 subjects), *Anti-Government* (28 subjects), and *Single Issue* (31 subjects)—to facilitate comparisons, but this does not imply that *Hate*, *Anti-Government*, and *Single Issue* domestic terrorists are equally represented in the domestic terrorism landscape.

(U//FOUO) The results of the study should be caveated (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) so that the findings could be broadly disseminated to law enforcement. Details on individual cases varied greatly, moreover, and information on subjects' lives before they turned to violent extremism—that might have shed more light on radicalization processes—often was not available. In addition, we did not examine control groups—such as individuals who adhered to a non-violent extremist version of the ideology, or were radicalized to believe violence in furtherance of the ideology was justified but had not themselves mobilized to violence—to determine whether the characteristics of the subjects of the study necessarily indicated radicalization to violence. Further research involving more subjects and using data from investigative files, or interviews of subjects or law enforcement, would be required to develop a more comprehensive study of domestic terrorist activity and pathways from radicalization to violence in the United States.

(U) Analytic Process

(U//FOUO) We surveyed common characteristics as gleaned from academic literature and the work of outside SMEs on radicalization and mobilization to violence. Analysts coded (b) (3) on the individual domestic terrorist subjects according to consistent standards and then evaluated the data across and within domestic terrorist categories to identify common behaviors and activities. Analysts qualitatively and quantitatively coded and analyzed data collected from (b) (3), (b) (7)(E). Outside SMEs assessed and validated both the methodology used and the findings of this Assessment.

(U) Data Collection

(U//FOUO) Based on (b) (3), (b) (7)(E) analysts used a data collection questionnaire that contained questions pertaining to subjects' socio-demographic characteristics and the behaviors that preceded their terrorist activities. Definitions were developed for each question to ensure consistent and reliable analyst coding. Internal reviews were conducted on each questionnaire for quality assurance.

* (U//FOUO) Domestic terrorism SMEs initially identified 101 subjects to be included in the study, 13 of which were either discarded for lack of information (6), the ideology the subject espoused was removed because of small sample size (5), or subjects were disqualified as domestic terrorists upon further review (2).

(U//FOUO) Analysts conducted (b) (3) (A) [redacted] populate the questionnaire for each subject. Analysts relied on (b) (3) (A) [redacted]

[redacted] Analyst judgments were clearly labeled as such. Ninety-two percent of the data came from (b) (3) (A) [redacted].

- » (U//FOUO) High (3): (b) (3) (A) [redacted]
- » (U//FOUO) Medium (2): (b) (3) (A) [redacted]
- » (U//FOUO) Low (1): (b) (3) (A) [redacted]

(U) Data Coding

(U//FOUO) Analysts isolated specific variables in the original questionnaire for coding and quantitative analysis. SMEs assisted with this process, suggesting several existing codebooks as references for the development of a coding system for the study. Based on these existing codebooks and consultation with outside SMEs, analysts developed a “Domestic Terrorism Coding Standard Operating Procedure” to help ensure data consistency and integrity.

(U) Subject Matter Experts
(b) (3), (b) (7)(E) [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

(U) Source Summary Statement

(U//FOUO) The source for all factual and analytic assertions made in this Assessment is the DHS I&A study entitled "Assessing Characteristics and Behaviors of Domestic Violent Extremists." Details and facts about the subjects of the study were derived solely from (b) (3), (b) (5), (b) (7)(E)

Analysts assigned source credibility rankings to individual sources based on (b) (3), (b) (7)(E), (b) (5)

Most sources were assigned (b) (3), (b) (7)(E), (b) (5)

(U) Report Suspicious Activity

(U) To report suspicious activity, law enforcement, Fire-EMS, private security personnel, and emergency managers should follow established protocols; all other personnel should call 911 or contact local law enforcement. Suspicious activity reports (SARs) will be forwarded to the appropriate fusion center and FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force for further action. For more information on the Nationwide SAR Initiative, visit <http://nsi.ncirc.gov/resources.aspx>.

(U) Tracked by: (b) (3)

CLASSIFICATION:



Homeland Security

Office of Intelligence and Analysis

Customer Feedback Form

Product Title:

1. (U//FOUO) Please select partner type: and function:

2. (U//FOUO) Please rate your satisfaction with each of the following:

	Very Satisfied	Somewhat Satisfied	Neither Satisfied nor Dissatisfied	Somewhat Dissatisfied	Very Dissatisfied	N/A
Product's overall usefulness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Product's relevance to your mission	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Product's timeliness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Product's responsiveness to your intelligence needs	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

3. (U//FOUO) How do you plan to use this product in support of your mission? (Check all that apply.)

Integrate into one of my own organization's finished information or intelligence products

Share contents with partners outside my organization

Share within my organization

Improve situational awareness

Incorporate into training

Incorporate into planning and preparedness efforts

Do not plan to use

Other:

4. (U//FOUO) How does this product add value to your mission? (Please portion mark comments.)

5. (U//FOUO) How could this product be improved? (Please portion mark comments.)

6. (U//FOUO) How strongly do you agree with the following statements?

(U//FOUO) I rely on intelligence products like this one to perform my homeland security function.

Strongly Agree

Agree

Neither Agree nor Disagree

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

N/A

(U//FOUO) I would like to continue receiving products on topics like this from I&A.

Strongly Agree

Agree

Neither Agree nor Disagree

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

N/A

To help us understand more about your organization so we can better tailor future products, please provide:

Name:

Organization:

Contact Number:

Position:

State:

E-mail:



[Privacy Act Statement](#)

CLASSIFICATION:

Product Serial Number:

2013-IAFO-00150 - 1690

REV: 12 July 2013