NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE MARYLAND 20755-6000

15 January 2013

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD

THRU: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)

SUBJECT: (U//~~FOUO~~) Report to the Intelligence Oversight Board on NSA Activities - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U//~~FOUO~~) Except as previously reported to you or the President, or otherwise stated in the enclosure, we have no reason to believe that intelligence activities of the National Security Agency during the quarter ending 30 September 2012 were unlawful or contrary to Executive Order or Presidential Directive and thus should have been reported pursuant to Section 1.6(c) of Executive Order 12333, as amended.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Inspector General and the General Counsel continue to exercise oversight of Agency activities by inspections, surveys, training, review of directives and guidelines, and advice and counsel.

GEORGE ELLARD
Inspector General

RAJESH DE
General Counsel

(U//~~FOUO~~) I concur in the report of the Inspector General and the General Counsel and hereby make it our combined report.

KEITH B. ALEXANDER
General, U. S. Army
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Encl:
 Quarterly Report

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I. (U) **Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Intelligence-Related Activities that Violated Law, Regulation, or Policy and Were Substantiated during the Quarter, as well as Actions Taken as a Result of the Violations**

I.A. (U) **Intelligence Activities Conducted under Executive Order (E.O.) 12333 Authority**

I.A.1 (U) **Unintentional Targeting or Database Queries against United States Persons (USPs) or Foreign Persons in the United States**

(b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) During the first quarter of calendar year 2012 (CY2012), the National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) continued [   ] As part of that process, duplicate selectors were removed and the number of active selectors was reduced. At the end of third quarter of CY2012, NSA/CSS's primary tasking tools for telephone and Internet selectors contained approximately [   ] active selectors.

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(U//FOUO) During the third quarter of CY2012, signals intelligence (SIGINT) analysts in [   ] instances inadvertently targeted communications to, from, or about USPs, while pursuing foreign intelligence tasking or performed a query using a USP selector. Unless otherwise specified, all intercepts, query results, and reports have been deleted or destroyed as required by United States SIGINT Directive SP0018.

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(b)(2)
(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

I.A.1.a. (U) **Tasking Errors**

(1) (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [   ] [   ] were erroneously targeted and collection occurred. The first collection error occurred [   ] because a collection operator [   ] [   ] a second error occurred because a collection operator [   ] All collected data has been purged.

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(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

(2) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [   ] NSA analysts discovered that a [   ] had inadvertently been targeted. The error occurred because the [   ] did not coordinate with SIGINT analysts [   ] [   ] All results were deleted [   ] and no reports were issued. [   ] the SIGINT analysts are now coordinating with [   ] [   ]

(3) (TS//SI//NF) [   ] an NSA analyst was discovered to have tasked a selector associated with a USP. The target, previously believed to be foreign, [   ] a USP who had been kidnapped in a foreign hostage case [   ] the selector was detasked and no reporting resulted.

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Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
Dated: 20070108
Declassify On: 20371219

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(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

(4) ~~(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [ ] it was discovered that a tasked selector for an e-mail account believed to be used by a foreign target [ ] The selector (b)(1)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

was detasked [ ] and no reports were issued.

(5) ~~(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [ ] an NSA analyst discovered [ ] Targeting of personnel [ ] was authorized as long as one end of the collection is outside the United States; however, upon further research, the analyst determined that both ends of the collection were in the United States. Non-compliant data was purged [ ]

(6) ~~(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [ ] an NSA analyst learned that unauthorized collection had occurred during a survey operation and training event because of a misunderstanding between NSA headquarters and an NSA field unit about activity approved. A request to disseminate collected data led to the discovery that unauthorized collection had occurred. All e-mails containing the unauthorized data were deleted [ ] To avoid future occurrences, an approved Concept of Operations for training and collection operations is required.

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(7) ~~(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [ ] during the test of a collection system, a developer inadvertently collected data that included U.S. telephone numbers. The error occurred because the developer [ ] The developer deleted the collected data and [ ]

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(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

I.A.1.b. (U) Database Queries

(1) ~~(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [ ]

(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) On [ ] occasions during the third quarter, analysts performed overly broad or poorly constructed database queries that potentially sought or returned information about USPs. These queries used [ ] that produced imprecise results. On [ ] of those occasions, the queries returned results, which were deleted or aged off, as required, and no reports were issued. Analysts who performed these queries were counseled by their management.

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(U) Procedural and other errors contributed to the following incidents:

- ~~(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ On [ ] occasions during the third quarter, NSA analysts performed queries in raw traffic databases without first conducting the necessary research

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on the selectors. When the queries returned results, they were deleted and no reports were issued.

- (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) During a routine database audit [_____] NSA database developers were discovered to have unknowingly run multiple queries in a database [_____] while performing software testing on a new database, the developers ran the queries multiple times because software flaws prevented the queries from executing properly. No results were returned. To prevent future errors, the developers will test queries using [_____] that have been verified beforehand.

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(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

- (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [_____] a SIGINT analyst mistakenly ran queries in raw traffic databases on selectors associated with a USP because the analyst believed that the target, a USP, [_____] [_____] The selectors were detasked [_____] [_____] reports were cancelled; [____] of them were reissued with the USP information masked.

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- (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [_____] a software developer was discovered to have performed a query in a raw traffic database using a query string that contained [__] [_____] No results were returned by the query. The developer was counseled to be more careful when selecting text for testing.

- (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [_____] an NSA database auditor learned that an analyst had run a query in the incorrect raw SIGINT database [_____] The query was stopped before returning results. The analyst was counseled.

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(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

- (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [_____] an NSA database auditor discovered that, as the result of a software failure, a query was run in a raw traffic database against [_____] the query results were deleted. No reports were issued.

- (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [_____] because of an error in the interface of a raw traffic database, an analyst performed a query that did not contain the e-mail address he had entered in the search field. As a result, the query returned a large number of results, which were deleted. The problem was reported to the database team to make changes to the interface to prevent future errors.

- (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) [_____] while conducting a test, an NSA database developer unknowingly executed [____] queries against SIGINT data. A software flaw altered the query [_____] Upon discovery of the software flaw, the query function was disabled until the software was updated to fix the problem.

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- (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [_____] during a test [_____] software, a software tester unknowingly performed [____] queries against raw SIGINT. [____] of the [____] queries contained [_____] A software flaw allowed the

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queries to be executed against raw SIGINT. The system automatically deleted the queries and results. The software has been updated, and the flaw has been fixed.

- ~~(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [   ] after returning from a month-long class, an NSA analyst learned that [   ] associated with a valid foreign target [   ] while the target was in the United States [   ]. The selectors had been detasked [   ] The analyst deleted the query results [   ] and no reports were issued. The analyst was counseled to [   ] before extended absences from the office.

- ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ [   ] an NSA database auditor discovered that an analyst had queried on a selector associated with a U.S. military [   ] in a raw traffic database on [   ] The query returned results, which were deleted [   ] The analyst's database access was temporarily suspended. In addition, the analyst was counseled on the proper querying techniques and instructed to retake intelligence oversight training.

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- ~~(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [   ] an NSA analyst queried without authorization on the selector associated with a [   ] The error occurred because the analyst believed that the selector was an alternate selector for a valid foreign target. The query returned results, which were deleted; no reports were issued. The analyst [   ] to prevent future targeting.

- ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ [   ] an NSA analyst improperly performed a query on a selector authorized under a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) Order in the incorrect raw traffic database. No results were returned by the query. The analyst was counseled to perform queries on FISC-authorized selectors [   ] approved databases.

- ~~(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [   ] an NSA analyst discovered that a [   ] query of a valid foreign target [   ] in a raw SIGINT database when the target was known to be in the United States. The analyst [   ] had detasked the target's e-mail selector [   ] The analyst [   ] and no results were returned; no reports were issued [   ] the analyst was counseled [   ]

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- ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ [   ] an NSA analyst performed [   ] queries on a U.S. organization in a raw traffic database without formal authorization because the analyst incorrectly believed that he was authorized to query due to a potential threat. No results were returned by the query. The analyst was counseled that targeting or querying USPs was not permitted without formal authorization.

- (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [   ] a SIGINT analyst inadvertently queried on a U.S. telephone selector in a raw traffic database. The analyst deleted the query [   ] [   ] No results were returned by the query.

- (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [   ] a SIGINT analyst performed a query in [   ] using a selector that was associated with a USP. The targeting error occurred because the analyst had failed [   ] before querying. The analyst halted the query before it returned any results.

- (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [   ] after copying several selectors into a query in a raw traffic database, a SIGINT analyst realized that one of the selectors was associated with a USP. Upon realizing the error, the analyst deleted the query. No results were returned by the query.

- (TS//SI//NF) [   ] an NSA analyst performed a query in a raw traffic database using a selector associated with a USP. The analyst deleted the query and results [   ] and no reports were issued. The analyst was reminded that querying on USP selectors without authorization is prohibited and that query results returned by the unauthorized query must be deleted.

- (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [   ] an NSA analyst discovered that a software flaw had allowed a query [   ] Upon discovering that the query returned a larger number of results than expected, the analyst canceled the query and deleted the results without viewing them. The analyst reported the software problem to the database developers to develop a patch.

- (TS//SI//NF) [   ] a SIGINT analyst performed without proper authorization a query in a raw SIGINT database on a selector associated with a USP. While trying to verify the status of the target, the analyst queried the raw traffic database [   ] [   ] To avoid future errors, [   ] No results were returned.

- (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [   ] NSA analysts performed [   ] queries in raw traffic databases on selectors associated with valid foreign targets that included the dates when the targets were known to be in the United States. [   ] queries returned results, which were deleted; no reports were issued.

- (TS//SI//NF) [   ] a SIGINT analyst ran a query on a previously detasked selector that had been determined to be a USP. [   ] [   ] The query returned results, which were deleted.

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- (TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED] an NSA analyst performed a query on a selector associated with a USP that contained a date range not covered by the approved consensual collection agreement. The analyst included the period of [REDACTED] instead of the intended period of [REDACTED] The error occurred because the analyst believed that the database [REDACTED] The query results were deleted [REDACTED], and no reports were issued.

- (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [REDACTED] an NSA database auditor discovered that an analyst had performed [REDACTED] queries in a raw traffic database without [REDACTED] to exclude USP data. The error occurred because the analyst incorrectly believed that [REDACTED] The analyst deleted the query results [REDACTED] The auditor advised the analyst to ensure that [REDACTED] had been implemented properly by the interface before querying.

- (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [REDACTED] an analyst conducted a query that contained selectors associated with [REDACTED] targets in the United States. Non-compliant data was deleted, and the analyst was counseled on proper query procedures.

- (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [REDACTED] an NSA analyst mistakenly performed a query in a raw SIGINT database [REDACTED] No results were returned.

- (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [REDACTED] an NSA database auditor discovered that [REDACTED] queries had been conducted in a raw SIGINT database [REDACTED] The analyst was counseled. No reporting or dissemination resulted.

- (TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED] an NSA analyst mistakenly queried in a raw traffic database on the selector associated with a USP. Upon realizing the error, the analyst deleted the query results. No dissemination occurred.

- (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [REDACTED] an NSA analyst queried on his own personal identifier in a raw traffic database because the analyst was unfamiliar with the database interface and was not aware that he was searching against raw traffic. The analyst was provided training on proper querying techniques.

- (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) [REDACTED] an NSA database auditor discovered that an analyst had queried in a raw traffic database on [REDACTED] were accidentally included among the search terms in the query. The analyst was counseled. No results were returned, and no reports were issued.

- (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [REDACTED] an analyst queried on [REDACTED] selectors associated with a foreign intelligence target known to be in the United States because the analyst entered an incorrect date range for the query. The analyst was counseled, and the results were deleted.

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- (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) _____ an NSA database auditor discovered that an analyst had queried in a raw traffic database on _____ The query returned no results.

- (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) _____, while responding to a request for information, an analyst queried ____ raw traffic databases on a selector associated with a foreign intelligence target while the target was in the United States. The requester did not include in the request information _____ the United States. ____ _____ the analyst deleted results returned by queries; and no reports were issued.

- (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) _____ an NSA analyst learned that a selector on which he had performed queries in ____ raw traffic databases _____ was associated with a USP. The queries and results were deleted. No reports were issued.

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- (TS//SI//NF) _____ an NSA analyst queried without appropriate FISA authorization on an untasked selector associated with _____ ____ Although an _____ FISC Order exists, neither the target nor the selector was included in the order. _____ the analyst was counseled on the restrictions for querying on selectors not authorized under FISA authority. No reports were issued.

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(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

- (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) _____ after discovering the foreign target's _____ the United States, an NSA analyst continued to perform a query in a raw traffic database to determine whether the target was in the United States. The analyst was counseled about reviewing selectors and promptly detasking them after _____

- (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) _____ a SIGINT analyst queried ____ selectors associated with a foreign intelligence target when the target was known to be in the United States. _____ the analyst requested detasking of all selectors. The analyst deleted the query and results _____

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- (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) _____ an NSA analyst mistakenly performed a query in the incorrect raw traffic database using selectors associated with a USP. _____ _____ Upon discovery of the error, the analyst stopped the query and deleted all query results. No dissemination occurred.

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(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

- (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) _____ NSA analysts discovered that _____ on selectors for foreign intelligence targets while the targets were in the United States because queries _____ _____ the analysts canceled the queries and deleted the results; no reports were issued. To prevent future

error, a new procedure was developed [   ]   (b)(1)
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- (TS//SI//NF) [   ] an NSA analyst discovered that [   ]
[   ] on a selector associated with a FISA-approved target had
continued to run beyond the period of the FISC Order. The error occurred because the
analyst, who was unfamiliar with the database, [   ]
[   ] and deleted the results [   ]
[   ] No reports were issued.

- (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [   ] while conducting a test, an
NSA database developer performed queries in a raw traffic database on selectors that
[   ] The query results were not stored.   (b)(1)
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I.A.1.c. (U) Detasking Delays   (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

(1) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [   ] an NSA analyst discovered that the
selectors associated with [ ] valid foreign targets had remained on task when the targets were in
the United States. The error occurred because the analyst had overlooked information [   ]
[   ] the analyst detasked the selectors. No reports were issued.

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(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36   (2) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [   ] an NSA analyst discovered that [ ]
[   ] associated with a valid foreign target had remained on task when the target was in the
United States [   ] because the analyst was away from
the office for long-term training. The analyst was advised to detask selectors before extended
absences from the office.

(3) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [   ] an NSA analyst discovered that a
selector associated with a valid foreign target had remained on task while the target was in the
United States because the [   ]
[   ] the selector was detasked and the results were
deleted. No reports were issued. The analyst was counseled on immediate detasking procedures.

(4) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [   ] an analyst discovered that selectors
associated with a valid foreign intelligence target had remained on task while the target was in
the United States. [   ]
[   ]
[   ] The selectors were detasked [   ]. Non-compliant data
has been purged, and no reports were issued.

(5) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [   ] the selectors associated with a
foreign target remained on task when the target entered the United States on [   ] The
delay occurred because an Intelligence Community agency analyst did not [   ]
[   ] The NSA analyst detasked the selectors [   ]
No reports were issued.

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(6) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [   ] an NSA analyst discovered that collection had occurred [   ] associated with a valid foreign target, even though the selectors had been detasked [   ] [   ] The collection was attributed to a processing error [   ] [   ] that resulted in the detask request not being processed [   ] [   ] the selector was detasked and non-compliant data was purged. No reports were issued.

(7) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [   ] an NSA analyst discovered that [   ] associated with a valid foreign target had remained on task after the target had entered the United States on [   ] The analyst [   ] after learning [   ] that the target was in the United States but [   ] selector was detasked. No data was collected.

(8) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [   ] selectors associated with a valid foreign target were discovered to have remained on task while the target was in the United States. [   ] the analyst [   ] another analyst discovered [   ] and detasked them. The results were deleted, and no reports were issued.

(9) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [   ] after discovering that a valid foreign target [   ] the United States, an NSA analyst detasked [   ] another analyst discovered [   ] No non-compliant data was collected, and no reports were issued. The analyst was counseled to check [   ] selectors associated with a target when detasking.

(10) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) An NSA analyst discovered that [   ] associated with a valid foreign target had remained on task when the target was in the United States from [   ] [   ] the analyst had failed to detask this selector. The analyst deleted the collection associated [   ] No reports were issued.

(11) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [(b)(1)   ]

[   ]

(12) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [   ] an NSA analyst discovered that [   ] selectors associated with a valid foreign target had remained on task while the target was in the United States [   ] after learning that the target had traveled to the United States on [   ] the analyst detasked selectors [   ] which remained on task until [   ] Confusion about whether the data required purging resulted in a delay in

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purging. The analyst submitted a purge request for non-compliant data [_____] No reports were issued.

(13) ~~(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [_____] an NSA analyst discovered that [____] selectors associated with a valid foreign target had remained on task while the target was in the United States. [_____] and detasking [____] associated selectors [_____] the analyst learned that [_____] [_____] selectors were detasked. No non-compliant data was collected, and no reports were issued.

(14) ~~(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [_____] an NSA analyst discovered that one selector associated with a valid foreign target had remained on task while the target was in the United States. The analyst first became aware the target [_____] the United States [_____] After conducting further research, the analyst found that the target's e-mail selector was still tasked. The analyst detasked the selector on [_____] and no reports were issued.

(15) ~~(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [_____] NSA analysts discovered that [____] selectors associated with [____] valid foreign targets had remained on task while the targets were in the United States. [_____] detask request of the selectors [_____] the United States, collection occurred on the selectors. Upon discovery of the collection, the analysts detasked the selectors and deleted [_____]

(16) ~~(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [_____] selectors associated with a valid foreign target were discovered to have remained on task while the target was in the United States. The delay occurred because the analyst mistakenly believed that [_____] [_____] the selector was detasked. No reports were issued. The analyst was counseled [_____] [_____]

(17) ~~(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [_____] an NSA analyst discovered that a selector associated with a valid foreign target had remained on task while the target was in the United States. Although [_____] [_____] the target's selectors remained on task [_____] The delay occurred because the analysts responsible for tasking were on leave or temporary duty [_____] No reports were issued.

(18) ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ [_____] NSA analysts discovered that collection [_____] occurred on selectors associated with valid foreign targets despite [_____] detask that had been requested [_____] [_____] in the United States. The error occurred because [_____] was not aware of the detask requests. All non-compliant data was deleted, and no reports were issued.

(19) ~~(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [_____] an NSA analyst discovered that [____] selectors had remained on task after the expiration of a consensual collection request on [_____] The delay in detasking occurred because the analyst was not aware that the

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[redacted] The selectors were detasked [redacted] No collection on these selectors occurred.

(20) (TS//SI//NF) [redacted] an NSA analyst discovered that [redacted] selectors associated with [redacted] valid foreign targets had remained on task while the targets were in the United States [redacted]

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[redacted] was notified about the selectors that were to be detasked, and all selectors were detasked [redacted] No collection resulted from the selectors, and no reports were issued.

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I.A.2 (U) [redacted]

(1) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [redacted]

[redacted]

(2) (TS//SI//NF) [redacted]

[redacted]

I.A.3 (U) Unauthorized Access

(1) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [redacted] two analysts accessed raw SIGINT from a location not approved for that access. The analysts were counseled to access raw SIGINT only from approved locations.

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(2) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [redacted] raw SIGINT data was stored in files accessible to NSA personnel who did not have the appropriate training and were not authorized to view the data. The data was moved to files for which all personnel with access had the required training.

I.A.4 (U) Data-Handling Error

(1) (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) On six occasions [redacted] NSA analysts disseminated raw SIGINT in e-mails to IC agency analysts and other external customers not authorized to receive the information. The e-mails were deleted, and all analysts were counseled.

(2) (TS//SI//NF) [redacted]

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(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

(3) (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) [   ] an NSA analyst passed raw SIGINT data to a database without minimizing the U.S. identities. The data was recalled [   ]

(4) (TS//SI//NF) [   ] NSA personnel revealed the names of USPs to individuals not authorized to receive the information. They were counseled on procedures for disseminating USP identities.

(5) (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) [   ] NSA analysts disseminated raw SIGINT in an e-mail to recipients not authorized to receive the information because analysts used an incorrect alias that included the names of analysts from external organizations. [   ] [   ] the analyst recalled the e-mails. [   ] the analyst sent a follow-up e-mail to inform recipients to delete the e-mail.

(6) (TS//SI//NF) [   ] in response to a request for information, an NSA analyst disseminated in an e-mail to an IC customer not authorized to see the information a selector associated with a USP. [   ] the analyst requested that the e-mail be deleted. The analyst was counseled on proper minimization procedures.

I.B. (U) Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)

I.B.1. (U) NSA/CSS Title I FISA

I.B.1.a. (U) Detasking Delays

(TS//SI//NF) [   ] an NSA analyst discovered that a telephone selector associated with a valid foreign target had not been detasked [   ] [   ] Although [   ] the analyst responsible for the telephone selector had failed to submit a request for detasking. The selector was detasked [   ] and data was purged [   ] [   ] No reports were issued. [   ]

I.B.1.b. (U) Unauthorized Targeting

(1) (TS//SI//NF) [   ]

[   ] all communications collected on these selectors were requested to be purged. No reports were issued.

(2) (TS//SI//NF) [   ]

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(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36   (3) (TS//SI//NF) [_____] an NSA analyst discovered that collection had occurred on a target authorized under a FISC Order before the approved date [_____]

[_____] Non-compliant data was deleted [_____] and no reports were issued. NSA has taken steps to ensure that operational plans are properly reviewed and approved.

(4) (TS//SI//NF) [_____] an NSA analyst discovered that a selector associated with a valid foreign target had remained tasked after the target had departed the United States [_____] the analyst detasked the selectors and submitted a purge request for the collected data. No reports were issued. To prevent future occurrences, [_____] to ensure that selectors of targets departing the United States are detasked timely.

I.B.1.c. (U) Unauthorized Retention

(TS//SI//NF) [_____] an NSA analyst discovered that data collected under [_____] FISA authorizations had been retained in a raw traffic database longer than the authorized retention period. The data was purged, and no reports were issued. The analyst was counseled on retention procedures.

I.B.1.d. (U) Unauthorized Access

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(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (TS//SI//NF) [_____] because of a raw traffic database error, [____] SIGINT analysts were allowed to retrieve data collected [_____] FISA authority that they were not authorized to access. [_____] The problem will be fixed in a future software update.

I.B.1.e. (U) Data-Handling Errors

(1) (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) [_____] a Branch Chief discovered that, because [_____] FISA data had been disseminated improperly in an e-mail to a distribution list that contained the names of two individuals not authorized to receive the information. The e-mails were recalled, and the analyst was counseled on proper classification markings.

(2) (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) [_____] an NSA contractor not authorized for access to FISA data recovered a FISA document from a printer in a contractor SCIF not authorized for FISA data. Another contractor, who was authorized for FISA data, had printed the document four times because he believed that the printing had been unsuccessful. The copies

remained on the printer until they were discovered by the contractor. A second contractor, who also believed that printing had been unsuccessful, forwarded the document in an e-mail to a third contractor. All copies of the document were retrieved and destroyed.

I.B.2. ~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [_____]

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(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

I.B.2.a. (U) **Data-Handling Error**

~~(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [_____] an NSA analyst forwarded [__] information in an e-mail to [____] analyst no longer authorized to receive the information. [_____] the NSA analyst confirmed that the e-mail had been deleted.

I.B.3. ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ **Business Records Order**

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(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

(U) Nothing to report.

I.B.4. (U) **FISA Amendments Act (FAA)**

I.B.4.a. (U) **FAA Section 702**

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(U//~~FOUO~~) NSA/CSS has implemented a new process to ensure that FAA §702 data required to be purged is purged from NSA/CSS databases. NSA created a [_____] [_____] to identify non-compliant data that should be purged.

I.B.4.a.i. (U) **Tasking Errors**

(1) ~~(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [_____] an NSA analyst discovered that a selector had been tasked in error. An IC analyst had made a typographical error in the selector and passed the incorrect selector for tasking to the NSA analyst. [_____] the analyst detasked the incorrect selector and submitted the correct selector for tasking. No collection occurred.

(2) ~~(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [_____] selector [_____] were incorrectly tasked because of typographical errors. The selectors were detasked, and the information has been purged. No reports were issued.

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(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(3) ~~(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [_____] an NSA analyst discovered that [__] selectors had been improperly tasked because there was insufficient information to verify that the targets were located outside the United States. Additional information was provided to correct the tasking of [_____] Non-compliant data collected on the [__] selectors has been purged.

(4) ~~(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [_____] an NSA analyst discovered that a selector had been tasked in error because the target did not meet the criteria of the FAA §702

certification. [_____] the selector was detasked. Non-compliant data has been purged, and no reports were issued.

(5) (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [_____] an NSA analyst discovered that an e-mail selector for a valid foreign target had been tasked incorrectly because the e-mail address [_____] The incorrect selector was associated with a USP. It was detasked, and non-compliant data was purged. No reports were issued.

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(6) (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [_____] an NSA analyst discovered that a selector for a valid foreign target had been tasked incorrectly. An IC agency analyst mistakenly believed that [_____] The incorrect selector was determined to be associated with a USP and was detasked. Non-compliant data has been purged, and no reports were issued.

(7) (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [_____] an NSA analyst discovered that a foreign target's selector had been improperly tasked under FAA §702 because targeting procedures were not followed. The selector was detasked [_____] because of the target's travel to the United States; [_____]

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[_____] The selector was detasked [_____] Non-compliant data has been purged, and no reports were issued.

(8) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [_____] an NSA analyst discovered that a selector associated with a valid foreign intelligence target had been improperly approved for tasking [_____]

[_____] The selector was detasked [_____] No collection occurred.

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(9) (TS//SI//NF) [_____] an NSA analyst learned that [____] selectors for a foreign target had been erroneously tasked because [_____] not authorized under the FAA §702 certification. Upon recognition of the error, the analyst detasked the selectors. No collection occurred.

(10) (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [_____] an NSA analyst learned that a selector had been improperly tasked under FAA §702 authority [_____] because targeting procedures had not been followed. [_____] the selector was detasked and two reports were canceled. [_____] it was learned that data collected on this selector remained on a dual-route to an IC customer. [_____] Non-compliant data collected [_____] has been purged.

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(11) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [_____] an NSA analyst discovered that a selector associated with a foreign target had been tasked incorrectly. The selector was detasked, and non-compliant data has been purged. No reports were issued.

I.B.4.a.ii. (U) **Database Queries**

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(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

~~TOP SECRET//SI//TALENT KEYHOLE//NOFORN~~

(1) (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) On ▮ occasions in the third quarter, analysts performed in FAA §702 data collection overly broad or poorly constructed database queries that potentially targeted and returned information about USPs. These queries used ▮▮▮▮▮

▮▮▮▮▮ produced imprecise results. On ▮ of those occasions, the queries returned results from the database. The results were deleted or aged off, as required, and no reports were issued. Analysts who performed these queries were counseled by their management.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(2) (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) ▮▮▮▮▮ an NSA analyst performed in a raw traffic database ▮ queries on a selector associated with a USP. ▮▮▮▮▮ the results were deleted. No reports were issued.

(3) (TS//SI//NF) On ▮ occasions ▮▮▮▮▮ NSA analysts improperly queried on the selectors associated with FAA §704/705(b) USP targets in FAA §702 ▮▮▮▮▮ raw traffic databases. ▮▮▮▮▮

▮▮▮▮▮ The analysts were counseled on the procedures for querying on FAA §704/705(b) targets in raw traffic databases. The queries and results were deleted.

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(4) (TS//SI//NF) ▮▮▮▮▮ an NSA database auditor discovered that an analyst had performed an improper query in a raw traffic database. While conducting research on the selector before querying, the analyst noted that the target's e-mail account ▮▮▮▮▮ ▮▮▮▮▮ Although aware that OGC approval was required for ▮▮▮▮▮ the analyst missed that information while conducting ▮▮▮▮▮

(5) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) ▮▮▮▮▮ an NSA analyst mistakenly performed a query in a raw traffic database on ▮ selectors that had been detasked because ▮ ▮▮▮▮▮ the United States. The analyst intended to check the tasking tool but queried the raw traffic database instead. The selectors were detasked ▮▮▮▮▮ and non-compliant data has been purged. No reports were issued.

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(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(6) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) ▮▮▮▮▮ an NSA analyst discovered that a selector associated with a valid foreign intelligence target remained on task after the target had arrived in the United States. While conducting research on the selector, the analyst performed a query in a raw traffic database when the target was known to be in the United States. ▮▮▮▮▮ the selector was detasked. Non-compliant data was purged, and no reports were issued.

I.B.4.a.iii. (U) **Detasking Delays**

(1) (TS//SI//NF) ▮▮▮▮▮ an NSA analyst detasked ▮▮▮▮▮ associated with a target who had entered the United States, but ▮▮▮▮▮

▮▮▮▮▮ The selectors were detasked, and non-compliant data has been purged.

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~~TOP SECRET//SI//TALENT KEYHOLE//NOFORN~~

(2) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [ ] a selector associated with a valid foreign intelligence target was discovered to have remained on task after the target had arrived in the United States. [ ] the analyst made a typographical error in the detask request and the selector remained on task [ ]. [ ] All non-compliant data has been purged, and no reports were issued.

(3) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [ ] an NSA analyst reported that a selector associated with a valid foreign intelligence target had remained on task after the target had arrived in the United States. [ ] [ ] the analyst had failed to detask the selector. The selector was detasked [ ] and non-compliant data has been purged. No reports were issued.

(4) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [ ] an NSA analyst discovered that [ ] [ ] selectors associated with a foreign target remained on task after the target had entered the United States. [ ] [ ] the selector was confirmed to have been detasked, and non-compliant data has been purged. No reports were issued.

(5) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [ ] an NSA analyst discovered that [ ] selectors associated with a valid foreign intelligence target remained on task after the target had arrived in the United States. [ ] [ ] the selectors were detasked, and non-compliant data has been purged. No reports were issued.

(6) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [ ] a selector for a valid foreign target was discovered to have been overlooked when [ ] [ ] because of the target's arrival in the United States. The selector was detasked [ ] [ ] Non-compliant data has been purged, and no reports were issued.

(7) (TS//SI//NF) [ ] an NSA analyst learned that a selector had remained on task even though it had been determined that the target was a USP. [ ] the analyst detasked [ ]. The selector was detasked [ ] No collection occurred, and no reports were issued.

(8) (TS//SI//NF) [ ] an NSA analyst discovered that [ ] selector [ ] associated with a valid foreign intelligence target remained on task after the target [ ]. The detask delay occurred because the analyst was out of the office and there was no back-up [ ] the analyst confirmed that the selectors were detasked, and non-compliant data has been purged.

(9) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [ ] an analyst failed to timely detask selectors associated with valid foreign targets, which were in the United States. [ ] the selectors were detasked. No collection occurred.

(10) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [ ] an NSA analyst discovered that a selector associated with a foreign target had remained on task when the target was in the United States. [ ] the analyst

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(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

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did not detask ▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮ the United States. ▮▮▮▮▮▮ the selector was detasked, and non-compliant data has been purged. No reports were issued.

(11) ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ ▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮ selectors associated with a valid foreign intelligence target were discovered to have remained on task ▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮ ▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮▮ Because of an oversight, the analyst did not see the request to detask all selectors associated with the target because the target was in the United States. The alternate selectors were detasked ▮▮▮▮▮▮ and non-compliant data has been purged. No reports were issued.

(12) ~~(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ An NSA analyst failed to detask selectors associated with two foreign targets known to be traveling in the United States from ▮▮▮▮▮▮ The selectors for both targets were detasked ▮▮▮▮▮▮ and non-compliant data has been purged.

(13) ~~(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ ▮▮▮▮▮▮ an NSA analyst discovered that a selector for a valid foreign target had been tasked incorrectly ▮▮▮▮▮▮ No collection occurred. The selector was detasked ▮▮▮▮▮▮

(14) ~~(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ ▮▮▮▮▮▮ an NSA analyst discovered that a selector associated with a foreign target had remained on task when the target entered the United States. Although detasking had been requested ▮▮▮▮▮▮ the analyst had overlooked detasking the selector. ▮▮▮▮▮▮ the selector was detasked, and non-compliant data has been purged. No reports were issued.

(15) ~~(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ ▮▮▮▮▮▮ an NSA analyst discovered that ▮▮▮ selector associated with a valid foreign target remained on task ▮▮▮▮▮▮ The analyst detasked the telephone selector after learning that the target ▮▮▮▮▮▮ While conducting further research on the selector, the analyst also discovered that the target was a USP. The delay in detasking occurred because ▮▮▮▮▮▮ The selector was detasked ▮▮▮ and all non-compliant data has been purged.

(16) ~~(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ ▮▮▮▮▮▮ because of a miscommunication between analysts, ▮▮▮ selectors associated with ▮▮▮ valid foreign targets remained on task even though ▮▮▮▮▮▮ the United States. The delay in detasking occurred because ▮▮▮▮▮▮ that the targets had entered the United States. The analysts were counseled to conduct thorough research to find ▮▮▮ ▮▮▮ selectors associated with the targets and detask accordingly. Non-compliant data has been purged.

(17) ~~(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ An NSA analyst failed to detask ▮▮▮ selector associated with a foreign target even though ▮▮▮▮▮▮ the United States ▮▮▮▮▮▮ The error occurred because ▮▮▮▮▮▮

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(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

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[REDACTED] The analyst detasked the selector [REDACTED] Non-compliant data has been purged, and no reports were issued. To prevent future errors, [REDACTED] and require that a second analyst review the selectors.

(18) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [REDACTED] an NSA analyst discovered that the [REDACTED] selector associated with a valid foreign-target remained on task even though [REDACTED] because the target had entered the United States. The error occurred because [REDACTED] was not shared with the analyst. Non-compliant data has been purged, and no reports were issued. To prevent future errors, [REDACTED] will be sent to multiple analysts.

I.B.4.a.iv. (U) Data-Handling Errors

(1) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [REDACTED] after completing an IO training course, an NSA analyst realized that he had disseminated FAA §702 data in an e-mail to three analysts not authorized to receive the data. All e-mails were deleted [REDACTED]

(2) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [REDACTED] it was discovered that an NSA analyst had disseminated FAA §702 raw data by posting the data on internal NSA web pages in [REDACTED] accessible to analysts not authorized to receive the data. The non-compliant data was removed [REDACTED] and a request was submitted to remove the web pages.

(3) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [REDACTED] an analyst forwarded FAA data to a group e-mail address containing personnel not authorized to receive the data. The error occurred because the e-mail classification tool changed the classification to remove the restriction for FAA data. [REDACTED] the e-mail was recalled.

(4) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [REDACTED] an NSA database developer forwarded a file containing FAA §702 data to another developer who was not authorized to receive it. Upon realizing that the file contained FAA §702 data, the developer deleted the data from his mailbox. All members of the development team have since received the briefings on handling FAA §702 data.

(5) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [REDACTED] an NSA analyst disseminated FAA §702 data in an e-mail to another analyst who was not authorized to receive the information. The second analyst saved the data in a file in the home directory, which is not approved to store this type of data. The e-mail and file were deleted.

(6) (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) [REDACTED] an NSA analyst reported that in [REDACTED] he had forwarded FAA §702 data to a forward-deployed coworker not authorized to receive the data. The analyst delayed reporting the incident for fear that the coworker would be removed from the deployment. The analyst was counseled on the methods to check clearances before sharing raw SIGINT data.

(7) (TS//SI//NF) [REDACTED] an NSA division manager discovered that notes based on [REDACTED] had been shared with [REDACTED] analyst not authorized to receive the data. The error was attributed to a lack

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(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

of a standardized process for sharing informal working notes and the provision of an NSA e-mail account to [   ] analyst who was not operating under SIGINT authorities. The manager informed [   ] analyst that the notes must be deleted and had the analyst removed from the e-mail alias for notes.

(8) ~~(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [   ] an analyst unknowingly forwarded FAA §702 data to a group e-mail address containing personnel not authorized to receive the data. [   ] data was removed from the servers and the analyst was counseled on the appropriate alias to use.

I.B.4.a.v. (U) Overcollection

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(1) ~~(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [   ] during a regular review of E.O. 12333 collection, NSA personnel discovered that [   ]

[   ] NSA has deployed a short-term solution to address the problem and is continuing work on a long-term solution. See the summary of the Congressional Notification on page 23.

(2) ~~(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [   ] NSA collection managers learned that [   ] Non-compliant data has been marked for purging. Work on a resolution to the problem is ongoing.

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(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

I.B.4.b. (U) FAA Section 704

I.B.4.b.i. (U) Data Handling Errors

~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ [   ] it was discovered that [   ]

[   ] A purge was requested [   ] [   ] The data flow error has been corrected to prevent future incidents.

I.B.4.b.ii. (U) Database Query Errors

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~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ [   ] an NSA analyst discovered that another analyst had performed a query in a raw traffic database [   ] The analyst discovered the error when the original query was amended [   ] and he noticed a significant decrease in the number of results. The analyst deleted the query and the results [   ]

I.B.4.c. (U) FAA Section 705(b)

I.B.4.c.i. (U) Data-Handling Errors

(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) On ☐ occasions [_____], a SIGINT operator posted ☐ on selectors authorized under FISA §705(b) into a chat room that was not approved for FISA data. Upon realizing the mistake, the analyst posted a message requesting that all notes and records ☐ be deleted.

I.B.4.c.ii. (U) Tasking Error

I.B.4.c.iii. (U) Detasking Delay

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(TS//SI//NF) [_____] an NSA auditor discovered that a query of a USP authorized under FAA §705(b) [_____] after the Court Order had expired ☐ [_____] the selectors were detasked, [_____]

[_____] the analyst was counseled and the query was deleted.

I.C. (U) Consensual Collection

(U) Nothing to report.

I.D. (U) Dissemination of U.S. Identities

(TS//SI//NF) The NSA/CSS enterprise issued ☐ SIGINT product reports during the third quarter of CY2012. In ☐ SIGINT products, disseminations were found to be improper, and the reports were canceled as NSA/CSS and [_____] analysts learned of USPs, U.S. organizations, or U.S. entities named without authorization. All data in the canceled reports was deleted as required, and the reports were not re-issued or were re-issued with proper minimization.

I.E. (U) Counterintelligence Activities

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(U) Nothing to report.

I.F. (U) Detection and Prevention of Violations

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(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

(1) (TS//SI//NF) To reduce the risk of unauthorized telephony collection and prevent violations, NSA/CSS has instituted a process that gives analysts greater and faster insight into a target's location. [_____]

[_____] Collected data was purged from NSA/CSS's principal raw traffic repositories when required.

(2) (TS//SI//NF) [_____]

[_____] NSA analysts found ☐ e-mail accounts [_____]

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[_____] in the third quarter. Collected data was purged
from NSA/CSS's principal raw traffic repositories when required.

I.G. (U) Other

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(U//FOUO) In two instances, database accesses were not terminated when analysts were
deployed or reassigned to another site. Although not considered violations of E.O. 12333 or
related directives, the accesses were terminated.

II. (U) NSA/CSS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) IO Inspections, Investigations, and Special Studies

(U//FOUO) During the third quarter of CY2012, the OIG reviewed various NSA/CSS
intelligence activities to determine whether they had been conducted in accordance with statutes,
E.O.s, AG procedures, and Department of Defense and internal directives. The problems
uncovered were routine and showed that operating elements understand the restrictions on
NSA/CSS activities.

II.A. (U) NSA/CSS Representative [_____]

(U//FOUO) As part of an NSA/CSS OIG field inspection of NCR[_____]
[_____] an IO inspector reviewed the implementation of the IO program, IO training, and
application of IO standards in the SIGINT mission activities performed at the site. The inspector
found that the site lacked an IO Officer (IOO) structure that ensured the proper handling,
minimization, and dissemination of raw SIGINT data. The inspector also found that not all
personnel were compliant with the training requirements. The OIG recommended that an IOO
structure be established that complies with current SIGINT policies and procedures and ensures
adherence to training requirements.

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II.B. (U) [_____]

(U//FOUO) As part of an NSA/CSS OIG field inspection of the [_____]
[_____] an IO inspector reviewed IO program management, IO training, IO knowledge,
and the application of IO standards in mission activities. The inspector found that the site did not
have procedures to ensure that database accesses were properly terminated after personnel left
the site, and it did not conduct periodic reviews. Not all personnel had completed the mandatory
IO training. The OIG recommended that the site develop and implement processes for timely
access termination, perform periodic reviews, register all IOOs as mission auditors, and ensure
that training is tracked and completed.

II.C. (TS//SI//NF) Report on NSA Controls to Comply with the FISC Order Regarding Business Records (BR) Collection

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(TS//SI//NF) [_____] the OIG published the results of a special study of NSA
controls to comply with the FISC Order regarding BR collection. [_____]
[_____] an OIG auditor performed testing and procedural reviews to assess the Agency's
compliance and found that, except for one incident reported during the review, no incidents of

non-compliance had occurred during CY2011. The auditor made recommendations for improvement to BR processes to strengthen controls and reduce the risk of non-compliance.

II.D. (U) [⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛] IO Program

~~(S//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ [⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛] the OIG conducted a review of the [⬛] IO Program at the [⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛] is under the operational and technical control of the Director of NSA. In a report published [⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛] the OIG evaluators cited several weaknesses in the IO program, including a lack of centralized management of IO activities and internal controls.

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II.E. (U) **Report on the** [⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛]
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~~(S//SI//TK//REL TO USA, FVEY)~~ A team, led by the NSA OIG with [⬛⬛⬛⬛] [⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛] OIG participation, conducted a study of [⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛] which is owned and maintained by [⬛⬛⬛⬛] The review focused on the processes associated with SIGINT data acquired from [⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛] [⬛⬛⬛⬛] and found weaknesses in controls for handling and protecting SIGINT data. The report, published [⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛] included recommendations to address the weaknesses.

II.F. (U) **Misuse of the U.S. SIGINT System**

(U) Nothing to report

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II.G. (U) **Congressional and IO Board Notifications**

(1) ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ [⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛] NSA/CSS notified the Congressional intelligence committees about an overcollection of FAA §702 upstream collection as well as collection under other authorities. [⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛]

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[⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛] NSA has deployed a short-term solution to address the problem and is continuing work on a long-term solution.

(2) ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ [⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛] NSA/CSS notified the Congressional intelligence committees about the unauthorized disclosure of classified national security information derived from SIGINT [⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛] as well as limit NSA's access to other sensitive communications in the long term. NSA's OGC has filed a Crimes Report with the Department of Justice.

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II.F. (U) **Other Notifications**

(b)(1)
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(TS//SI//NF) NSA/CSS notified the AG of ▢ intelligence-related collection activities associated with USP hostage and detainee cases.

III. (U) **Substantive Changes to the NSA/CSS IO Program**

(U//FOUO) To improve its management and understanding of the rules and interpretations of FISA-related authorities, NSA has established an effort known as "Rules Management" to manage, organize, and maintain the authorities, policies, and compliance requirements that govern NSA mission activities. One of the key components of this effort is focused on technological solutions to support and simplify rules management. Two systems have been created to provide searchable databases that NSA personnel can use to find authoritative documents for NSA's FISA activities, as well as implementing guidance. One database is operational, and the system containing the more advanced document management and search capabilities is in development.

IV. (U) **Changes to NSA/CSS Published Directives or Policies Concerning Intelligence, Counterintelligence, or Intelligence-Related Activities and the Reason for the Changes**

(U) Nothing to report.

V. (U) **Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect USP (DoD Directive 5240.1-R, Procedure 15) Inquiries or Matters Related to IO Programs**

(U) Nothing to report.

VI. (U) **Crimes Reporting**

(U) Nothing to Report

VII. (U) **Other Matters**

(S//NF) The NSA OIG is investigating an allegation that activity associated with a

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