

JOINT REGIONAL INTELLIGENCE CENTER

SPECIAL BULLETIN



25 July 2011

Oslo Suspect's "Compendium" Details How to Avoid Detection in the Planning Stages of an Operation

On 22 July 2011, coordinated attacks involving a car bombing and an active shooter took place in Oslo, Norway. While all the facts are not yet known, documents and videos posted by the alleged perpetrator provide a detailed view into the mindset and careful planning of a violent actor. Though there is no single model/path from ideology to action, the information in these documents provides an opportunity for public safety personnel to re-examine current training with regard to indicators and warnings, and may allow for the development of new countermeasures.

Incident Overview

On 22 July 2011 at approximately 1520 hours local time, a car bomb detonated in downtown Oslo, Norway damaging several buildings, including the offices of Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg. Later that day, a gunman, reportedly wearing a police uniform, opened fire at a Labour Party youth camp organized on the island of Utoya, approximately 19 miles northwest of Oslo. Police arrested Anders Behring Breivik, a 32-year-old Oslo resident, at the scene.

Over the next hours, a series of documents and video messages surfaced on the Internet that meticulously detailed Breivik'sⁱ philosophy and plans for events that corresponded with the crimes that took place that day.ⁱⁱ While the entries begin in 2002, Breivik writes with increasing detail post-2009 about what appeared to be preparations for an improvised explosive device and small arms attack. (Note: Breivik's writing might have intended to influence or to mislead.)

First Steps: "Armed struggle appears to be futile at this point but it is the only way forward."

April/May 2002 – Developing an Ideology

Breivik concludes there is nothing to gain by working within the existing political system to counteract what he perceives to be the negative effects of multi-culturalism and the "Islamization" of



Oslo after the car bomb (above); rescue workers on Utoya island, site of the second attack (below).

ⁱ Breivik authored the compendium using the Anglicized version of his name, "Andrew Berwick." For clarity, this bulletin refers to him by the Norwegian spelling, Breivik.

ⁱⁱ Included was a 1500+ page "compendium," titled, [2083: A European Declaration of Independence](#), that Breivik claimed he distributed to 7,000 "primary nationalists" and possible members of parliament in Western countries [NFI] earlier. The majority of the quotes in this bulletin are taken from this compendium.



Europe. He and eight associates allegedly form a group called the “Knights Templar Europe,”ⁱⁱⁱ and Breivik begins to write/compile a compendium of beliefs/strategies that will be used to grow the organization into the “foremost conservative revolutionary movement in Western Europe.” The compendium refers to the ideology as “Crusader Nationalism,” a balance to the prevailing “cultural Marxism.”

- At this time, it does not appear Breivik has the 22 July attacks in mind, “I don’t know if I will ever proceed with a martyrdom operation at this point as it simply seems too radical.” It would have been difficult for public safety personnel to identify him here because he has not yet moved from talk to action.

2002-2006 – Financing the Ideology

Breivik has €250,000 in assets (approximately \$360,000) with which to sustain himself while he writes the compendium and sets up the Templar organization. He will not hold a formal job from this point forward, and will be financially insolvent at the time of the July 2011 attacks.

- Breivik’s initial financial independence allowed him to work without the need to contact like-minded individuals for financing, or to engage in any activity that might have triggered suspicious financial activity indicators or warnings.

2006-2008 – Studying the Failures of Others, Moving toward Action

Breivik spends this time researching and writing the compendium, “2083: A European Declaration of Independence.” In addition to developing the group’s ideological underpinnings, he makes a study of the failures of other extremist movements. He believes members of an alleged Swedish neo-Nazi group might have been caught due to their “outdated, traditional and vulnerable hierarchical military cell-model.” He judges other European resistance groups “amateurish” and lacking in “subtlety and discretion.”

- It was unclear at what point Breivik made the decision to carry out the operation; however, in the course of writing, he memorialized the group’s tenets that a “Justiciar Knight” should embrace voluntary poverty and martyrdom. His activity so far may not have attracted any attention, and there would likely have been no legal basis for investigation.

Operations Begin

Autumn 2009-Winter 2009/10 – Cover Stories, Operational Security, Recruitment Efforts, and Virtual Shooter Training

Sometime in late 2008 or early 2009, Breivik appears to have made the decision to conduct some kind of attack, because he begins to create the infrastructure needed to obtain the necessary

ⁱⁱⁱ Quotes and excerpts from the compendium, explaining the Templars’ ideology, can be found in Appendix A.



supplies without arousing undue suspicion.^{iv} He starts the operation by developing a cover to purchase and transport explosives and explosives components. He believes that if authorities question or arrest him during this time, his cover story and clean criminal history will make it difficult to bring him up on terror charges. Regardless, he is cautious and acknowledges, “an arrest will land [me] on every imaginable watch list for the rest of my life.”

- Even at this stage, Breivik’s activities would likely not have aroused law enforcement suspicion. He creates two different, professional-looking business proposals for a mining company and a small farm operation (Geofarm), modeled on an existing prospectus, and makes plans to create two Web sites, obtain business cards, and contact suppliers related to these industries who can act as future witnesses.

While he is setting up a clean business history, Breivik works on an e-mail campaign, hoping to identify 10,000 like-minded “primary nationalists”—and, possibly a few members of parliament in Western countries (“It is important that our enemies know ‘how we see what they are doing’”)—who will receive his compendium. He ultimately identifies 5,700 contacts via two accounts on a social networking site, and obtains 800 “high quality” e-mail addresses in the United States, Australia, Canada, South Africa, “certain Eastern European countries,” Armenia, Israel, and India.

- Though he has taken care to maintain separation between his online and real-world activity to this point, Breivik is aware that his online activity may attract attention. He expresses concern that his work in compiling his e-mail list has landed him on various watch lists, and knows at least a few of the profiles he invited were fake.

During this time, Breivik also seeks out, assesses, and plays active-shooter online role-playing games, some of which he judges are excellent military simulators that closely mimic actual operations.

“Armour Acquisition Phase” – Personal Physical Security Preparations

Breivik’s study of failed resistance movements may have informed the order in which he carried out the next stages of his plan. He does not immediately attempt to acquire weapons or manufacture explosives; instead, he begins by acquiring and caching items less likely to trigger existing suspicious activity reporting programs.

Summer 2010 – Acquiring and Storing Materials, Actively Destroying Evidence of the Activity

Breivik begins to acquire and hide personal protection equipment that will likely enable him to extend the duration of his shooting spree. He takes care to keep most of these items far from

^{iv} The Mumbai terror attacks took place in November 2008; it is unknown what, if any, impact these events might have had on Breivik’s plans.



locations common to his daily routine. While he omits details of how he acquired the equipment, he describes his operational security considerations in minute detail. Using Internet imagery, he identified a remote forested area three to four hours by car from his home. There, he hid equipment, including “a complete set of Lokis armour—shield included, caltrops, police insignias...” inside of a Pelican™ case. However, due to size considerations, he hid large, bulky equipment, such as a Damascus FX-1 Flexforce™ riot suit and MOLLE pouch, in a box in his attic marked “air soft equipment.”

- Breivik’s activity at this stage reveals that he has given thought to both the method of his attack and the rising possibility that his preparations will raise suspicions. In addition to taking great care with the acquisition and storage of his equipment, Breivik continues to clean up his “digital trail.” After this step, as from the beginning, Breivik covers his tracks, including purging and destroying computer hard drives.

“Weapons Acquisition Phase”

Late Summer 2010-Winter 2011 – Taking Care to Stay Under the Radar as the Risk of Discovery Rises

At this stage, Breivik moves into a pre-operational phase he acknowledges is likely to garner unwanted law enforcement attention: attempting to acquire weapons, materials to manufacture explosives, and false law enforcement identification and insignias. His planning indicates an extraordinary sensitivity to operational security – seeking to keep his movements and activities as low profile and low risk as possible by using cash, limiting his use of electronic communications, traveling through less-trafficked routes, and acquiring materials in other countries. However, he ultimately fails to acquire the weapons outside of Norway, and resorts to buying them legally within the country.

- Breivik’s attention to operational security in this phase is noteworthy. He planned his travel in a manner designed to avoid contact with authorities and minimize legal/financial traces. Knowing he would have to use identification and electronic payments for flights, ferries, or trains that might enable his movements to be tracked, he planned to drive to Prague, Czech Republic. He chose to cross back into Norway through the northern border with the weapons he hoped to obtain because he believed it had the fewest customs agents. He planned to leave his mobile phone off, except for emergencies, and to hide the weapons in a hollowed-out section of his back seat. Though he worried about his old car breaking down en route, he felt it would provide good cover because it was less likely to draw attention. He also used his stay in Prague to manufacture the sensitive items—police badges and other insignia—he believed would be reported to law enforcement in Norway. He paid cash for these services.



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After failing in his plan to acquire weapons in the Czech Republic, Breivik fills out the necessary legal paperwork in Norway, and meets the training requirements to obtain guns. (See text box for a description of weapons.)

His compendium outlines Breivik's experiments to increase the lethality of his attacks. He orders 50 ml, 99 percent pure liquid nicotine from a Chinese online supplier, intending to inject three to four drops into hollow-point bullets in order to kill more effectively; however, when he tries to manufacture these "bio rounds," he finds the size of the ammunition would not accommodate a lethal dose. He weighs whether 9mm bullets might be more suitable for the task, but has to wait for a Glock license before he can access larger rounds. The text does not specify whether he tried again with new ammunition.

"Chemical Acquisition Stage"

November-December 2011 – Finalizing Cover for Explosives Acquisitions, Experiments

Breivik considered and/or purchased the following weapons (costs, which he provided in Euro, were converted to dollars):

- Ruger Mini-14® Semi-Automatic, \$2009
- Glock (unclear whether "17" or "34"), \$1006
- 10 x 30 Round Magazines, .223 Caliber, \$550
- GG&G Picatinny-Style Scope Base Ruger Mini-14, Ranch Only, \$136
- Aimshot Laser Sight and Flashlight Tri-Rail Barrel Mount, \$43
- Allen Buttstock Shotgun Ammunition Carrier, 5-Round Nylon, \$14
- Loctite Blue Aluminum Threadlocker, \$10
- LaserLyte Pistol Bayonet, Quick Detachable, \$62
- 4 x 30 Round Magazines for Glock 9mm, \$330
- Cammenga Easyloader for AR15/Mini 14, \$100
- Hollow Point Ammo for .223, \$717 (he researched and used the cover story that he was buying them for bird hunting)
- Slugs Ammo for Shotgun, \$144 (he used the cover "deer hunting")
- Benelli Nova Pump Action Shotgun (previously owned)

Breivik acknowledges this is probably his most vulnerable stage. He estimates there is a 30 percent chance of failure, a thought that fills him with such apprehension that he begins the second of three courses of steroids,^v which improves his mood. He methodically purchases other items he will need. (For a list of the items that Breivik purchased, along with their intended use; amount purchased; place purchased; cost; purchase/delivery details; cover story; and assessed risk, see Appendix B.)

Breivik uses one of his previously-prepared business plans (Geofarm) to rent a remote piece of farmland, ostensibly to test sugar beet production methods. He educates himself on farm practices and learns all of the appropriate terminology in order to better appear legitimate.^{vi}

^v In addition to steroids, Breivik used "ECA stack," an ephedrine-caffeine-aspirin combination, to stay alert.

^{vi} Toward the end of the compendium, Breivik presents a section on small-scale farming "to prepare the Justiciar Knight for the fertilizer acquisition phase of his operation." He advises the reader must "learn to think, dress and act like a farmer and become confident through study of agricultural practices" to establish an effective cover. Additionally, he presents an introduction to small-scale surface mining for those planning to initiate a high-grade



- Following media reports that Breivik was a suspect in the Oslo attacks, several agricultural supply companies notified authorities that he had purchased fertilizer and chemicals from them. They did not report him earlier because his orders fell within expected norms, and he appeared to be operating a legitimate business.

“Explosive Manufacturing Stage”

Breivik’s continued focus on operational security manifests in his choice of an improvised explosive, and his recommendation to others to work alone to avoid detection. He acknowledges the most common popular primary explosive is currently “AP” (acetone peroxide), but advises against using it because it is too dangerous. He suggests instead picric acid/DDNP (diazodinitrophenol). Although he calls himself a “chemistry amateur,” he successfully manufactures both picric acid and DDNP on his first try. In the compendium, he attempts to persuade readers to use these components unless the materials cannot be acquired.



Part of Breivik’s cover for obtaining fertilizer was that he planned to farm sugar beet; he rented this remote property as part of that cover, as well as to have a location to develop his explosives.

Breivik provides meticulous details on buying materials or substitutes; manufacturing times and costs; trial and error; improved techniques; testing; and storage. Reviewing his experience, Breivik realizes he could have accomplished in 30 days what took him 80, and offers a timeline for others (see Appendix C). He also calculates what he perceives as the risk of detection and interdiction based on the number of persons involved and the time to accomplish the tasks:

Risk vs. Labor	Time required to complete	Risk of apprehension
1 person	30 days	30%
2 people	20 days	60%
3 people	16 days	85%
4 people	13 days	90%
5 people	12 days	90-95%

explosive acquisition phase. “Buying some new or second hand equipment relating to prospecting will strengthen your cover story.”



The Compendium Ends; It Appears Online; the Attacks Take Place

The final entry in the compendium dates to 22 July 2011. On or around the 22nd, it was posted online, accompanied by a video version explaining some of the Knights Templars' fundamental tenets. That day, Oslo is attacked using weapons and tactics similar to those described in the compendium.

Learning from the Compendium

Breivik made a careful study of the failures of other violent actors and groups, and the factors that led to their interdiction, so that he could take steps to avoid the same pitfalls. Once identified, he took steps to craft plans he felt would minimize his risk of exposure, and carried them out in a methodical, patient manner. He identified the foundation of legitimate business enterprises as the most effective means to acquire materials legally, and purchased them in a manner that fell within normal patterns within the industry he used as a cover. For materials he could not obtain without arousing suspicion, he crafted a plan to gain them far from the watch programs he knew to be in effect in Norway. Ironically, when this plan failed, he resorted to legal means by which to obtain materials, leveraging his lack of criminal history to facilitate the acquisition process. Though he actively participated in online forums where he posted extremist views, he was careful to avoid mentioning operation details. He took steps to destroy physical evidence of his activities as he moved through the planning and operational stages. And at all times, he took care to maintain a low-key, "ordinary" appearance and behavior.

Re-assessment, Re-calibration of Suspicious Activity Reporting Procedures and Thresholds

While it may yet come to light that Breivik did arouse minor suspicion at various stages of activity, he appears to have successfully evaded detection programs designed to identify indicators of possible terrorist and criminal activity in relation to chemical purchases, weapons acquisition, fraudulent businesses, and so forth. This is cause to review current protocol and training with regard to similar programs in effect in the United States and the JRIC area of responsibility. Though Breivik managed to elude detection, we still believe in the need for continued awareness training and suspicious activity reporting at the local level, arising from the general public, state and local law public safety personnel, or private sector partners. Careful study of the measures Breivik took to avoid detection may help public safety personnel re-calibrate existing training and outreach efforts, and develop new countermeasures.

(U) Law enforcement can report tips and leads to the JRIC via the Web site at www.jric.org, by e-mail at leads@jric.org, or by telephone at (562) 345-1100 or (888) 705-JRIC (5742).



Appendix A – Tenets of the “Justiciar Knights”

The following excerpts are taken from the purported Breivik compendium, and explain the creation, grievances, and goals of the alleged group.

“The European Military Order and Criminal Tribunal (the PCCTS [Pauperes commilitones Christi Templique Solomonici]—Knights Templar) was created by and for the free indigenous peoples of Europe. One of the primary purposes of the tribunal and order is to attempt/contribute to seize political and military control of Western European multiculturalist regimes and to try, judge and punish Western European cultural Marxist/multiculturalist perpetrators (category A, B and C traitors) for crimes committed against the indigenous peoples of Europe from 1955 until this day.”

The group was reportedly founded, or, as they state “re-founded,” in London in 2002 by representatives from eight European countries. Its founding members—all anonymous—are described as “English Protestant (host); English Christian atheist; French Catholic; German Christian atheist; Dutch Christian agnostic; Greek Orthodox; Russian Christian atheist; Norwegian Protestant (member and proxy for Anonymous 9); Serbian Orthodox (by proxy, location: Monrovia, Liberia).” Three additional members are listed only as “Swedish,” “Belgian,” and “European American.”

The compendium outlines a 100-year plan to contribute to the destabilization of political power in Western European countries currently controlled by “cultural Marxist/multiculturalist nationalists” in order to seize power and “bring freedom and cultural and demographical sustainability to all Europeans.”

Tenets of “Justiciar Knights”

- Oppose all hate-ideologies; communism (anti-individualist), cultural Marxism/multiculturalism (anti-European), Islam (anti-kafr) and national socialism (anti-Jewish)
- Serve and protect the indigenous peoples of Europe and all other loyal and patriotic European individuals
- Preserve European culture, traditions and heritage
- Stop the ongoing European cultural and demographical genocide facilitated by the cultural Marxists/multiculturalists, suicidal humanists, and capitalist globalist elites
- Prevent the deconstruction of Christendom in Europe
- Prevent further Islamic demographic warfare—disallow the Muslim invasion/colonization of Europe
- Repulse Islam from Europe by the initiation of future deportation campaigns
- Effectuate punishment for Western European cultural Marxist/multiculturalist/globalist perpetrators for crimes committed against the indigenous peoples of Europe
- Oppose and defeat the Multiculturalist Alliance (MA 100) in Europe using any and all means necessary
- Support Israel’s fight against Jihad
- Liberation of the Middle East Christians from Islamic rule
- Virtues such as the willingness to martyr oneself for the cause, the exercise of discretion, voluntary poverty, and devoted obedience to the principles are mandatory for all Justiciar Knights
- Honour the wishes and memories of our forefathers, who secured European security and prosperity in the past
- Follow the PCCT’s mantra—“Martyrdom before Dhimmitude.”



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Appendix B

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Item	Intended use	Amt	Supplier	Cost	Purchase/delivery	Cover story
Sulphur powder	Component to primary charge	0.5 kg	Ebay; aquarium stores as backup supplier	20 Euro	Paypal; delivered without incident	None
Sodium nitrate	Primary charge	0.3 kg	a Polish chemical store	10 Euro	Paypal; delivered without incident	Used as a preservative to cure/process meat
Sodium nitrate	Secondary charge; Picric acid (1.5 kg)	3 kg	Apothecary/drug store	500 Euro	Visa (did not want to leave a traceable transaction, but thought cash result in questions; upon pick up, he checked the box to be sure authorities had not slipped in a GPS transmitter	Used as a preservative to cure/process meat; clerk did ask (deluxe business regalia used to send right signals; recommended use of rural drug store in expensive area with hunting in the vicinity and have hunting license available.
Sulphuric acid (car battery acid)	component to primary and secondary charge	12 litres of 80 to 90% pure	Got 7L from two auto parts stores; 6L from four large batteries from car recycling facility; and 25L at wholesale supplier for auto mechanic shops; all 30% purity	150, 20, and 130 Euro, respectively	Visa for latter to avoid suspicion of cash transaction; cash for others; purchased and transported	Told clerk he bought batteries from online store but they didn't have liquid (which clerk knows is illegal, so it's a good story. Only buy 3-5L per supplier this way.) Cover story needed at all stores.
Distilled water	Manufacturing process of primary and secondary charge (never use normal water)	25L	Same as previous			Strengthened story as batteries should contain 30% sulphuric acid and 70% distilled water
Acetylsalicylic acid (aspirin)	component to primary and secondary charge	190 packages (20 tabs x 440mg (for 1.5 kg of picric acid)	Drug stores	1140 Euro for all (started off buying name brand; ended with generic)	Cash; retail sale	Three packages for my company (December is the season for Christmas parties, so lots of residual hangovers); used cover story in every store
Aluminum powder, flaked 400 mesh (particle size)	component to tertiary charge (fertilizer sensitizer)	10-15% of total fertilizer weight (two tons of fertilizer means 200-300 kg of aluminum powder)	a Polish chemical store; alternative method is to buy large aluminum bars/ingots from forge/supplier, and file them to powder using cryo filing drill bit and renting a high powered drill; aluminum scrap is an option if intelligence agencies begin monitoring forge/suppliers (he provided great detail about the tools/method to accomplish this)	2000 Euro for 150 kg (can probably get 100 kg unprocessed from 1000 Euro	Bank wire; supposed to be able to pick up in neighboring Sweden where he planned to transport to Norway	Aluminum powder is a component of boat epoxy paints to give the paint UV protective properties; explained this in detail in first of five e-mail to company; claimed his company was producing coating solutions for the maritime sector
Microballoons/sil-cell (very small glass spheres filled with oxygen)	component to tertiary charge (fertilizer sensitizer)	2-3% of total fertilizer weight (two tons of fertilizer means 50-60 kg balloons)	A maritime shop in Norway	Not yet purchased	N/A	Going to research a story when needed; believe it was a component of boat plastics



Appendix C

30-Day Operation Schedule for Explosives Manufacture (1 person): ANFO-3 x 600kg; PA-3 x 0,5kg; DDNP-3 x 10g

1. Moving and getting your equipment and gear into place
2. Installing all equipment—fume hood, fan etc.
3. Finishing the metal skeletons/cylinders for the blast devices and completing other practical issues relating to gear and equipment
4. Creating an evacuation/emergency strategy, packing an evacuation kit (survival gear, etc.)
5. Grinding 2,5 kg of aspirin: 30 minutes with blender, manufacture of acetylsalicylic acid from aspirin (4 hours) + drying in oven (4 hours per batch x 3)
6. Manufacture of acetylsalicylic acid from aspirin (4 hours) + drying in oven (4 hours per batch x 3)
7. Boiling sulfuric acid using 4 cooking plates outside, from 23.00-07.00, 15-18L ->5L of 90% +
8. Boiling sulfuric acid using 4 cooking plates outside, from 23.00-07.00, 15-18L ->5L of 90% +
9. Creating Picric Acid (6 out of 12 batches using 3 x hot plate stirrers)
10. Creating Picric Acid (6 out of 12 batches using 3 x hot plate stirrers). Completed
11. Purification of Picric Acid
12. Purification of Picric Acid
13. Purification of Picric Acid. Completed
14. Creating DDNP
15. Creating DDNP. Completed
16. Relocation of 27-0-0 fertilizer. Break down a 600kg bag into 13-14 x 50kg bags, load in the truck, drive to the location where you are going to crush them if needed.
17. Relocation of fertilizer. Break down another 600kg bag into 13-14 x 50kg bags.
18. Relocation of fertilizer. Break down the last 600kg bag into 13-14 x 50kg bags.
19. Initiate fertilizer grinding phase using 4 stationary blenders simultaneously. It will take approx. 30-40 minutes to complete a full 50kg bag of ANFO, including the addition of diesel and sealing the inner and outer bag with pieces of duct tape. It should be done nighttime between 23.00-07.00 as it is quite noisy. The task also includes filling 20L plastic containers with diesel and then breaking each 20L container down to 4L containers (empty distilled water containers) Complete 9 x 50kg bas of ANFO
20. Complete 9 x 50kg bags of ANFO.
21. Complete 9 x 50kg bags of ANFO.
22. Complete 9 x 50kg bags of ANFO.
23. Complete 9 x 50kg bags of ANFO. Completed.
24. Mix in 2,5% (by weight) micro balloons and 10-15% (by weight) aluminum powder into the now hardened ANFO.
25. Mix in 2,5% micro balloons and 10-15% aluminum powder into the now hardened ANFO.
26. Mix in 2,5% micro balloons and 10-15% aluminum powder into the now hardened ANFO.
27. Prepare trucks for transportation.
28. Prepare trucks for transportation
29. Prepare trucks for transportation.
30. Completed.