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MAY 2014

Countering Violent Extremism:
A Guide for Practitioners and Analysts

A GUIDE

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Definitions of Key Terms

- **Extremist violence** refers to violence committed by nonstate actors in the name of a political, ethnic, or ideological cause and includes recruiting as well as facilitating violence.
- **Radicalization** is the process by which individuals come to believe that their engagement in or facilitation of nonstate violence to achieve social and political change is necessary and justified.
- **Mobilization** is the process by which radicalized individuals take action to prepare for or engage in violence or material support for violence to advance their cause.
- A **violent extremist** advocates, is engaged in, or is preparing to engage in ideologically motivated violence to further political or social objectives.
- **Countering violent extremism (CVE)** encompasses programs and policies intended both to prevent individuals and groups from radicalizing and mobilizing to commit violence and to disengage individuals and groups who are planning to commit, or who have already engaged in, extremist violence.
- **Disruption** refers to military or law enforcement actions intended to interrupt violent actions through arrest, deportation, or physical force.
- **Resilience** refers to the capacity of individuals and communities to manage and overcome adversity and risk. It is a dynamic concept assessed by considering the balance of risk and protective factors at a given moment.
- **Diversion** refers to programs and activities undertaken to change an individual's trajectory away from violent extremism and toward acceptable social behavior. Diversion usually starts once an individual has been identified as mobilized or preparing to mobilize.
- **Disengagement** separates an individual who has radicalized and mobilized to violence from engaging in or supporting violent behavior.
- **Deradicalization** encourages an individual to renounce extremist ideas. This term is sometimes used to describe the entire process of changing a violent extremist's attitudes and behaviors and reintegrating him or her into society.
- **Rehabilitation** repairs an individual's relationship with society by addressing material needs and imparting new coping and vocational skills to replace socially destructive behavior patterns.
- **Reintegration** brings an individual back into mainstream society by helping him or her function socially and emotionally. *Aftercare* and *monitoring* are key components of reintegration.
- **Aftercare** encompasses activities that support disengagement and new attitudes and behaviors learned in rehabilitation.
- **Monitoring** is a security component that is often folded into aftercare but that may be a separate activity in which family members, NGOs, or law enforcement officers track individuals who leave deradicalization programs to determine if they are reengaging in extremist activities.
- **Reengagement** occurs when an individual who has stopped terrorist activities—often due to incarceration or involvement in a program—returns to these activities. Such individuals, particularly when they have been through formal disengagement programs, are often referred to as *recidivists.*
- A **community** is a residential area—usually a neighborhood, town, or city—where individuals share a common environment. Communities can also include groups of people who share special interests or express a common religion or ethnicity. Communities can also exist in cyberspace and can be as meaningful to individuals as those in which they live physically.
- **Countermessaging** involves a concerted effort to dissuade or reduce an individual's or group's susceptibility to accepting a narrative or worldview.

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Understanding CVE as a Spectrum of Efforts

CVE efforts complement counterterrorism (CT) approaches aimed at disrupting individuals and groups already mobilized and committed to violent action. CVE efforts differ from other CT approaches, however, by aiming to have an effect on both the radicalization and mobilization-toward-violence processes at work before an individual engages in operational plotting (see graphic, "CVE as a Counter to Radicalization and Mobilization"). CVE also seeks to disengage individuals from violence and reintegrate them into society.

- CVE typically works long term; involves a diversity of departments and agencies working across local, state, and federal boundaries; and relies on engaging individual psychology, group dynamics, and public policy to achieve ends—the prevention of radicalization and mobilization—not easy to quantify.
- Because of this complexity, practitioners and analysts need to appreciate the breadth of the CVE spectrum to recognize the strengths, limitations, and challenges associated with any particular programmatic component. Such an appreciation will aid in better situating CVE within the overall context of CT policy, as well as provide precision in identifying exactly what issues need to be addressed. It could also help shape public expectations, foster transparency, and help governments demonstrate measureable success in preventing and countering terrorism.
- The complexity of the CVE process is somewhat mitigated by the fact that many of the programs that can be useful for CVE already exist for other purposes, such as reducing delinquency, countering gangs, and preventing violence. Understanding the CVE spectrum can help in incorporating CVE goals into such existing programs, rather than having to create new programs from scratch.

In broad terms, the CVE spectrum can be broken down into **prevention** and **disengagement** components. The first aims to prevent individuals from becoming radicalized or mobilized toward violence, while the latter seeks to disengage those who are already radicalized or mobilized and to reintegrate former violent extremists into society. Prevention approaches broadly address the individual, group, community, sociopolitical, and ideological factors associated with radicalization. Disengagement approaches tend to focus on individuals who have already mobilized to act by reducing the contributing factors, inhibiting behavior, and focusing on changing patterns of mobilized behavior. In the graphic, "CVE as a Counter to Radicalization and Mobilization," CVE efforts addressing the top circle, radicalization, fall primarily in the prevention range of the CVE spectrum, while efforts to address the *mobilization* and *action* circles would fall in the disengagement range of the CVE spectrum.

Spectrum of CT Strategies



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CVE as a Counter to Radicalization and Mobilization Toward Violence

Radicalization and mobilization toward violence are dynamic, not linear processes. CVE aims to:

- Mitigate factors that contribute to radicalization,
- Enhance factors that act as inhibitors to radicalization and mobilization toward violence, and
- Foster individual and community resilience to radical thought and action.



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Prevention Approaches

The most successful prevention program activities aim to increase individual and community resilience, based on conclusions emerging from a large body of social science research and programmatic experience in the US and abroad indicating that social networks—families, neighbors, local religious and community leaders—provide the greatest access to, and serve as the best inhibitors of, radicalizing individuals. Relevant program activities involve **raising community awareness** about the threat of radicalization or mobilization toward violence, **securing community buy-in** to combat this threat, and, as necessary, helping to **equip community leaders** with tools, resources, and aid to coordinate public and private services to reach at-risk individuals.

- Community outreach forums can help raise awareness of radicalization or mobilization-to-violence threats as well as provide soundingboards for community grievances that may contribute to the radicalization or mobilization of some individuals. Public messaging campaigns can support broader shared values and nonviolent behavior.
- Existing community programs—such as team sports, afterschool activities, and mentoring programs focused on community and individual resilience—can serve to rechannel grievances and address some individual, group, and community vulnerabilities that can contribute to extremist violence.
- Community-oriented policing and networks of religious, social welfare, health, and educational organizations in local communities can identify early on those individuals at risk of radicalizing and engage in preventive interventions to mitigate grievances, promote alternative opportunities, and highlight the costs of pursuing extremism.

Preventive approaches can involve addressing broader social, economic, educational, and political circumstances that provide fodder for perceived grievances and that individuals seek to rectify by resorting to violence. Such programs often seek to prevent mobilization to violent action by enhancing education, social welfare, and civic engagement.

- In the Netherlands, the national government runs community programs to help thwart discrimination and to assist citizens who have complaints about discrimination, according to an academic study. The government also seeks to increase community trust and engagement with law enforcement by promoting diversity in hiring and conducting programs aimed at reducing discrimination, according to the same study.
- In France, cities with high concentrations of immigrants have a range of programs that overlap with CVE goals. For example, in Marseilles, police units are assigned to develop relationships with those who live in underprivileged neighborhoods, and they hire local mediators, who are often immigrants, to assist law enforcement officers on an ad hoc basis. The Paris municipal government has many social service programs aimed at helping immigrants find jobs, access health care, and obtain legal advice, as well as an advisory council for the city government, according to an academic study.

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Community-Based Prevention: Lewiston Police Department Outreach to Somali Community

Lewiston, Maine—a small city of about 40,000 inhabitants—provides an example of community-based prevention that focuses on integration of at-risk communities. This is in contrast to cities that have treated at-risk communities with a security-based approach. Using established community-oriented policing (COP) practices of inclusion that build mutual trust and respect between law enforcement and members of the community, Lewiston has successfully prevented young immigrants from returning to their homelands to fight.

Immigrants from conflict zones make up 15 percent of Lewiston's population. The police department has 83 sworn officers and has committed five officers in its Community Resource Office to maintaining and improving quality of life through rapport building, code enforcement, community engagement, and work in the schools. This office carries out a variety of outreach and engagement activities, such as meeting with parents, helping children with homework, and conducting home visits.

The Community Resource Office is well integrated, formally and informally, into the community it serves and maintains close relationships with nonprofits and public agencies. Officers study immigrant cultures and work with community leaders to ensure that appropriate translators are available. A sergeant and two officers are colocated with other agencies—such as Housing, Health, and Head Start—in neighborhoods with large immigrant populations. Officers have regular, direct contact with community members, helping them solve day-to-day problems and linking them with appropriate services and programs.

Community resource officers (CROs) regularly attend community meetings and meet with local leaders, including imams and pastors. They engage in structured activities, such as leading parenting classes and sports leagues, and in extensive informal engagement by maintaining an active presence in the community. CROs noted that a key to effective trust building has been the freedom to spend time with community members, building rapport, linking them with resources, and solving problems. CROs are well known to community members through the following types of activities:

- An open-door policy, where community members can drop by the office whenever officers are present.
- Bicycle and walking patrols in the neighborhood, with frequent informal interaction with business owners and community members.
- Coordination with school resource officers, teachers, community nonprofits, religious institutions, and other city departments to help community members get answers and solve personal and family issues.
- Ongoing contact that maintains a sense of caring and continuity for community members. Individuals regularly stop CROs for informal chats, information, and requests for help.

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Disengagement Approaches

Disengagement is the process of moving an individual who has already committed violent action away from violence and toward more socially productive activities. Similar programs for addiction, gang prevention, and prison rehabilitation try to change ingrained behaviors rooted in a person's identity, lifestyle, and social networks.

- Many CVE programs worldwide also involve efforts to change participants' ideological worldviews.
- Activities generally referred to as *diversion, deradicalization,* or *rehabilitation* programs fall into the category of disengagement, although practitioners worldwide have tended to use such terms interchangeably and inaccurately.

Academic literature on gangs, violence prevention, and behavior change and an examination of multiple disengagement programs suggest that there are five key aspects of disengagement, as illustrated in the "Process of Disengagement" diagram. A comprehensive effort should include all of these components, but some efforts will focus only on a handful.

Process of Disengagement



The process of disengagement is not linear, and individuals can revert to old behaviors at any time. Experience and clinical research on behavior change demonstrate that individuals often relapse during the process of disengagement and that maintaining long-term behavior change requires a strong aftercare component.

- **Disengagement** programs often occur in prisons or controlled settings and are intended to *stop the violent behavior* of an individual who has been radicalized and mobilized to engage in violence and to end involvement with violent associates.
- **Deradicalization** programs help individuals *rethink their ideas and behaviors* and renounce their support for violence. For example, one type of deradicalization program that occurs in prison offers participants alternative ideological interpretations of their beliefs and attempts to convince them that their violent extremism results from flawed thinking.
- **Rehabilitation** programs are developed to *repair an individual's relationship with society* by teaching him or her new coping and vocational skills to replace less desirable behavior patterns. Rehabilitation programs are best initiated after an individual is no longer engaged in violent activities, has renounced radical ideas about violence, and is open to learning new ways of functioning in society. Educational and vocational training, as well as the provision of therapy and economic benefits, help an individual develop new behavior patterns that do not lead to violence.
- **Reintegration** programs focus on *bringing individuals back into the social milieu* and helping them function socially and emotionally, primarily to establish a sense of normalcy, predictability, and harmony with social norms. Reintegration programs support and maintain the new behaviors introduced during the rehabilitation process.
- **Aftercare and monitoring** constitute a subtheme in reintegration programs that includes activities supporting disengagement and rehabilitation. Aftercare assumes individuals have learned new skills and changed their behavior and is intended as a *means of maintaining new behaviors.* Monitoring is a separate activity in which family members, NGOs, or police *track individuals who leave disengagement programs* to determine if they are reengaging in violent extremist activities.

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The Saudi Violent Extremist Rehabilitation Program

The state-run Saudi program focuses on reeducating individuals and reducing the participant's desire to commit acts of terrorism. Riyadh's program is premised on the view that participants have an inaccurate understanding of Islam and focuses heavily on ideological and religious reeducation. The program goal is to reintegrate participants into the Saudi social structure, and Saudi officials see successful rehabilitation as reinforcing regime legitimacy and obedience to Saudi authority among participants, according to academic and press reports.

- A key operating assumption—which has not been rigorously tested—is that individuals gravitate to violent jihad because they are victims of violent extremist ideology. The untested corollary is that by correcting wrong thinking and providing social benefits, misguided—but otherwise good—individuals can be rehabilitated.

Saudi Arabia's program is designed to tackle psychological, religious, and socioeconomic factors contributing to radicalization or mobilization to extremist violence with a comprehensive service strategy. This strategy, called PRAC—prevention, rehabilitation, and aftercare—is carried out in five phases, according to open-source reporting:

- Counseling and initial assessment,
- A six-week rehabilitation course,
- Evaluation and release,
- Aftercare, and
- Monitoring.

In addition to religious reeducation, the program offers benefits such as jobs, financial support, and marriage to non-violent extremist partners.

Saudi Government officials claim their program is effective but acknowledge they have no systematic method for evaluating the internal elements of the program. Instead, they rely on recidivism rates—which are affected by factors external to the program—to estimate success.

Aftercare and monitoring involve informal social controls exerted by family and friends. Monitoring facilitates an estimation of the recidivism rate, but the estimate does not reflect what factors—internal and external to the program—led a program participant to return to extremism.

Effective Disengagment: Multidimensional Approach

Established violent extremist rehabilitation programs, such as those in Saudi Arabia and Singapore, appear to work toward several overarching goals, including maintaining social order, reeducating troubled individuals, and addressing some of the economic and integration issues that contributed to radicalization. To accomplish these goals, these programs employ public messages, offer families support, and provide direct psychological and social interventions to participants.

- However, because of the dynamics of radicalization and because laws, customs, and surrounding cultures differ from country to country, CVE programs cannot be copied directly from one country to another. Doing so would create inherent flaws in program design that could hinder effectiveness. A 2010 Rand study of deradicalization programs found that programs cannot simply be transplanted from one country to another, even within the same region, but have to develop organically in a specific country and culture.

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The Singaporean Violent Extremist Rehabilitation Program

Singapore's program addresses religious minorities, and it focuses on reducing social disorder from extremist behaviors while enhancing social integration with the wider society. The Singaporean program is a public-private partnership between the government and the religious community.

- According to Singaporean officials, extremists' "moral disengagement"—which they define as the moral and cognitive distortions that make it possible for individuals to commit violence—makes them potentially dangerous both in their behaviors and ability to influence other members of a minority community.
- Rehabilitation involves cognitive treatment, involvement of the community, and provision of financial benefits and social services for participants and their families, according to press reporting.
- Singapore's program serves only about 30 percent of all detainees because Singaporean officials believe not all individuals can be rehabilitated, according to press reporting. Those who cannot be rehabilitated are likely to remain incarcerated.

Singapore's program uses a multidisciplinary approach to provide a comprehensive program emphasizing psychological, religious, and social rehabilitation. Strong family and aftercare components focus on countering extremist ideology, trust building, and social integration.

- Rehabilitation includes cognitive therapy that helps participants think differently about themselves and others, along with counseling, social rehabilitation, and religious rehabilitation, according to reports by academics studying the program.
- Religious minority community organizations working with the program offer financial assistance and job placement to participants, as well as counseling to family members and religious education.

The Singaporean program tries to reduce the risks of reengagement through a comprehensive review process involving the Muslim community, security officials, and psychologists, along with intensive monitoring.

Similar to methods used in the Saudi program, law enforcement officers, psychologists, religious counselors, and an advisory board assess successful rehabilitation on a case-by-case basis. Their judgments rely on clinical impressions, but no systematic evaluation approach exists, according to program descriptions by Singaporean officials and program staff.

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Conceptualizing, Executing, and Monitoring CVE Programs

Social service programs are typically designed using a "logic model"—a blueprint that defines the problem the program attempts to address, lays out goals and desired outcomes, articulates the programmatic assumptions, and describes implementation and evaluation mechanisms.

Worksheet for Conceptualizing a CVE Program



Identifying the Problem and Articulating Goals and Desired Outcomes

This is the most important part of the program design process because it sets the foundation for everything else to follow. The program design, based on an understanding of the radicalization and mobilization-toward-violence processes, addresses three key questions:

- What is the target population whose violent behavior needs to be changed?
- What specific behaviors in the target population must change?
- Who are the stakeholders who need to be involved in addressing the situation?

Laying Out Programmatic and Design Assumptions

Answers to the questions above can determine whether a given program focuses on prevention, disengagement, or both. This, in turn, will shape which theories of change should be relied on in designing the programmatic elements. Theories of change form the basis of a CVE blueprint that identifies how program components are expected to lead to desired end states. Two basic sets of theories in the academic and social science literature regarding behavioral change—context and stage theories—have utility for different parts of the CVE spectrum.

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THEORY OF BEHAVIOR CHANGE	SAMPLE PROGRAM ACTIVITIES BASED ON THEORY
Context Theories look at the reciprocal interaction of social context and individual behavior.	
People learn by interacting with others, and roles and social expectations influence behavior. Every behavior has complex personal and social determinants. Therefore, changes in the social environment can influence behavior for good or ill. Moreover, changing behavior is predicated on redefining an individual's identity and sense of his or her social roles.	**Prevention efforts** often rely on context theory and are typically characterized by: • A focus on community engagement and outreach; • Intergroup dialogue and awareness; • Support for social development and civic engagement; • Social learning through sports, education, etc.; • Expanding access to education, jobs, and other services and resources.
Stage Theories focus on individual behavior and see change as a matter of working through various stages to break old patterns of behavior and adopt new ones.	
Change disrupts an individual's psychological balance, and programs need to work through these cycles for an individual to achieve a new sense of balance that breaks the old patterns of behavior. In this set of theories, recidivism is understood as a way for the individual to regain a familiar state of balance. The different stages are as follows: Stage 1: **Precontemplation**—the individual fails to acknowledge a problem or need to change; Stage 2: **Contemplation**—the individual is aware there is a problem but is not yet ready to change; Stage 3: **Preparation**—the individual is ready to change and begins to plan for change; support for the individual is critical at this stage; Stage 4: **Action**—the individual begins to change undesirable behavior(s); State 5: **Maintenance**—the individual establishes the new behavior in his or her lifestyle and needs counseling to avoid relapse.	**Disengagement efforts** are often based on stage theories and will do the following: • Engage and build trust with possible participants through social clubs, sports, health care, and social services; • Work with individuals and groups to identify and resolve obstacles to change through support groups, classes, and counseling; • Offer aftercare support to maintain changes; • Maintain an open door so that those who relapse have a way back.

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Creating an Implementation and Resource Plan

Implementation refers to the step-by-step process through which program design is carried out, with specific focus on achieving desired outcomes. Studies of behavioral change programs in fields such as substance abuse and domestic violence show that common sources of program failure include vague conceptualization of the problem, unclear goals, and challenges in implementing and providing resources for the program. Budgets, timelines, and program activity analysis—specific data on who receives services, how often, from whom, and where—are tools to help guide and improve implementation performance.

- An implementation plan details the specific resources—including facilities, staffing, training, funding, and partnerships—necessary to carry out the CVE program. Tab C summarizes good practices compiled by the Global Counter Terrorism Forum (GCTF) on implementation as they relate to rehabilitation and reintegration programs.
- A resource plan assesses the resources needed to initiate the CVE program and a plan for sustaining those resources.

CVE efforts typically will need to be integrated with existing social service programs, as outlined in the textbox, "Building on Existing Programs." Understanding how those programs are typically funded outside the CVE context can help practitioners select the appropriate funding mechanism keyed to the purpose of the program.

Applying and Learning From the Evaluation Plan

Research on the evaluation of programs that seek to change ingrained behaviors—such as gang prevention and drug rehabilitation programs—shows that it is important to test all aspects of a given program, including the following:

- ***Adequacy of design:*** This looks at whether the program follows current theory and research as well as whether the interventions being done are robust enough to accomplish the program's stated goals.
- ***Fidelity of program implementation:*** This looks at whether the program works as designed. Often practitioners need to make pragmatic decisions to solve day-to-day problems. However, without monitoring, these decisions can lead to inadvertent drift away from the program's original goals. It is important to determine whether the program as designed actually took place in order to assess results.
- ***Program impact:*** Program impact can be assessed by identifying milestones and measuring participant progress over time, enabling evaluators to see if the program is progressing toward desired outcomes.

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Building on Existing Programs

Many communities have established grassroots efforts to address individual and community problems that also could address factors that contribute to radicalization or mobilization toward extremist violence. Rather than designing wholly new programs and evaluation strategies solely focused on CVE, efforts to counter violent extremism could integrate with existing community programs—in areas such as family violence or gang prevention and early childhood education—that confront these factors.

- Programs intended to divert adolescents from gangs, substance abuse prevention programs, and rehabilitation programs tackle issues similar to those faced in CVE. Participants in these programs often exhibit similar needs for identity, meaning, belonging, and excitement that increase susceptibility to radicalization or mobilization toward violent action. Research and best practices from such programs could help managers identify programmatic approaches that address the personal and environmental risk factors for radicalization or mobilization.
- These programs have already established successful track records in the communities they serve, underscoring the promising potential of efforts to counter violent extremism that build on, rather than duplicate, their programmatic approaches to planning, organizing, and funding.
- Evaluations of CVE efforts and studies of violence prevention programs suggest that programs to counter violent extremism aimed at general community well-being rather than narrowly focused on identifying potential extremist threats are likely to increase community cohesion and trust.

Community-oriented policing—a model through which police officers collaborate with community members to build trust, solve community problems, and promote public safety—provides an existing framework for collaborative grassroots engagement that has the potential for success in counterradicalization outreach efforts.

- Community-oriented policing strategies provide a proactive approach to reducing individual and community risk by building a sense of trust, mutual respect, and shared ownership of public safety through partnerships with community stakeholders, such as business owners, religious groups, and social service programs. By closely aligning with established programs, these strategies have made progress in such areas as gang and delinquency prevention as well as domestic violence and child abuse reduction.
- Behavioral science studies of factors underlying violent behavior show that such strategies as community-oriented policing that are aimed at building trust and increasing individual, family, group, and community resilience are likely to reduce susceptibility to radicalization and violent action.

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TAB

Funding Strategies for CVE Programs

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Type of Funding	Advantages	Disadvantages
Categorical Funding Funding is earmarked for specific activities. Government entities set goals, manage applications, grant awards, and monitor funded projects. Organizations apply for funding in response to criteria set by the government entity requesting proposals. Recipients could be state and local governments, nonprofits, or for-profit entities.	• Only targeted populations are eligible for the services defined by the program. • Recipient has a direct line of accountability to the governmental funding component. • Program strategies and funding can be applied with consistency on a national basis.	• Eligibility for services and adaptations of the program criteria are restricted. • Programs may not be responsive to local needs. • Multiple similar programs in a community with different funding bases could lead to expensive duplication. • Organizations with multiple sources of categorical funding may experience administrative fragmentation. • Targeting specific groups may increase the risk of stigma or resentment from members of other groups who feel excluded from program benefits.
Block Funding A designated government entity allocates a sum of money to state and local governments to accomplish CVE goals in a way that those state and local governments see fit, usually through grants and contracts to local nonprofits. These local government bodies would probably allocate funds to local nonprofit entities to provide a variety of services and would be free to supplement federal funds with their own revenues. Each recipient would be responsible for providing a service, such as after-school mentoring or parent education. The state or local government would be responsible for identifying the types of services needed to meet the goal and ensuring that, in their allocations to nonprofit entities, those requirements are met.	• State and local governments can be more responsive to unique local circumstances and tailor funded services to community needs. • State and local autonomy and creativity in developing CVE is enhanced. • Local nonprofits are accountable directly to state and local funding authorities.	• Eligibility for services and adaptations of the program criteria are restricted. • Programs may not be responsive to local needs. • Multiple similar programs in a community with different funding bases could lead to expensive duplication. • Organizations with multiple sources of categorical funding may experience administrative fragmentation. • Targeting specific groups may increase the risk of stigma or resentment from members of other groups who feel excluded from program benefits.
Blended (Pooled) Funding Several federal agencies and private foundations could pool their funds to promote CVE programs. Funds from different entities would be comingled and a common agent would be named to manage disbursement and implementation. Recipients could be states, which would use the blended funding to disburse grants to local governments. Alternatively, these pooled funds could go directly to community-based nonprofits, which could pool their resources to form a program consortium so that individual agencies would provide parts of the overall program. A lead entity would be named as the intermediary between the community partners and the funding agent.	• Comprehensive services to individuals, families, and communities can be seamlessly provided, since eligibility and categorical service limits are eliminated. • Monitoring and administration are streamlined, since recipients only need to report to one entity. • Local flexibility is increased, since typical categorical funding restraints on populations and services are absent. • Blending funds reduces the likelihood of stigmatizing specific groups because a range of services are available to multiple at-risk populations in the community.	• Funding entities, such as the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, and Department of Health and Human Services, have reduced control over specific funding streams. • The managing entity—a nonprofit or local government—requires sophisticated accounting and tracking capabilities.
Braided Funding Braided funding maintains categorical funding streams but uses them collectively to support defined initiatives in a flexible and integrated manner. A community entity or intermediary, such as a state, could apply separately for funds from multiple public and private sources. Each source of funding would maintain its categorical fund accounting and reporting structure, but they would all be used for a common program to address individual, family, and community factors associated with radicalization.	• Braided funding ensures robust resources for an integrated CVE program and supports a wide range of interventions at the individual, family, and community levels. • Collaboration and partnership are encouraged to promote continuity of funding and synergy among funding streams. • This approach does not require regulatory waivers and encourages creativity and flexibility. • Local autonomy and responsiveness to community needs are likely to be maximized.	• This approach requires a fiscal and an administrative agent, possibly a local nonprofit with sufficient administrative and accounting infrastructure to manage multiple accounting and reporting demands. • Ongoing collaboration and planning are essential to maintaining a sufficient level of funding for the overall CVE strategy.

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B

TAB

Assessing Risk and Resilience for CVE Planning

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Assessing Risk and Resilience for CVE Planning

Introduction

Once a community has been identified as a venue for CVE efforts, the following analytic framework can help community-planning entities such as police officers, public health workers, educators, and social service departments determine where to deploy resources to help counter vulnerabilities to violent extremism. Key to this process is assessing the risk and protective factors and the resilience of the individual, family, or community under observation.

- Risk factors are characteristics or experiences that increase susceptibility to engage in violent extremism at the individual, family, or community level.
- Protective factors are characteristics or experiences that decrease susceptibility to engage in violent extremism at the individual, family, or community level.
- Resilience is the ability to manage stress and adversity and is a dynamic state that depends on the balance of risk and protective factors.

Analytic Process Overview

Rating Risk and Resilience Factors

The mission and goals of the planning component should determine whether the unit of analysis is at the individual, family, or community level. For example, a state agency or Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) may be interested in using the planning worksheets for the community level. Law enforcement officers or social service case workers may want to use the individual or family worksheets, given their case focus.

As illustrated by the chart above, the process involves three steps.

- Once the unit of analysis is determined, rate the individual, family, or community on the items below and record the numeric score in the box at the left margin. Total the scores for individuals, families, or communities.
- Then plot the scores for each of the items on the blank graph provided. The graph will present a picture of the balance between risk and protective factors.
- Finally, identify community resources that could be applied to mitigate risk and bolster resilience based on the ratings for the risk and protective factors, as well as gaps in community resources and possible options to address the gaps.

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Step 1: Rating Risk and Resilience Factors

SCORE	SHEET A: COMMUNITY RISK AND PROTECTIVE RATING						
	A	Trust in Institutions and Law Enforcement					
		Not Rated	Low Trust		Neutral	High Trust	
		0	1	2	3	4	5
	B	Isolation and Social Exclusion, Degree of Insularity					
		Not Rated	Insular, High Exclusion		Neutral	Not Insular, Inclusive	
		0	1	2	3	4	5
	C	Discrimination					
		Not Rated	High Rate of Discrimination		Neutral	Low Rate of Discrimination	
		0	1	2	3	4	5
	D	Neighborhood Safety					
		Not Rated	Not Safe		Neutral	Safe	
		0	1	2	3	4	5
	E	Access to Health Care					
		Not Rated	Little Access		Neutral	Accessible Health Care	
		0	1	2	3	4	5
	F	Access to Social Services					
		Not Rated	Little Access		Neutral	Accessible Social Services	
		0	1	2	3	4	5
	G	Access to Educational Resources					
		Not Rated	Little Access		Neutral	Accessible Educational Resources	
		0	1	2	3	4	5
	H	Access to Recreational Resources					
		Not Rated	Little Access		Neutral	Accessible Recreational Resources	
		0	1	2	3	4	5
	I	Degree of Violence in Community					
		Not Rated	High Level of Violence in Community		Neutral	Low Level of Violence in Community	
		0	1	2	3	4	5
	J	Presence of Ideologues or Recruiters					
		Not Rated	Present		Neutral	Not Present	
		0	1	2	3	4	5
	K	Availability of Self-Help Networks					
		Not Rated	Not Present or Inaccessible		Neutral	Present and Accessible	
		0	1	2	3	4	5
	L	Cohesiveness Among Community Members					
		Not Rated	Low Cohesiveness, Fragmentation and Discord		Neutral	Community Is Cohesive	
		0	1	2	3	4	5
	TOTAL						

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Step 1: Rating Risk and Resilience Factors, *Continued...*

SCORE	SHEET B: INDIVIDUAL RISK AND PROTECTIVE RATING						
	A	Experiences of Trauma					
		Not Rated	High Degree of Trauma		Neutral	No or Minimal Trauma	
		0	1	2	3	4	5
	B	Witnessing Violence					
		Not Rated	High Degree of Witnessed Violence		Neutral	No or Minimal Witnessed Violence	
		0	1	2	3	4	5
	C	Talk of Harming Self or Others					
		Not Rated	Talks in Earnest About Harming Self or Others		Neutral	Rarely or Never Talks About Harming Self or Others	
		0	1	2	3	4	5
	D	Has Committed Violent Acts Toward Self or Others					
		Not Rated	Has Significant History of Violent Behavior Toward Self or Others		Neutral	Has Committed Minor or No Acts of Violence Toward Self or Others	
		0	1	2	3	4	5
	E	Experiences of Loss (Loss of Home, Role, Status, Loved Ones, Beliefs)					
		Not Rated	High Degree of Loss		Neutral	No or Minimal Loss	
		0	1	2	3	4	5
	F	Expressions of Hopelessness, Futility					
		Not Rated	High Level of Hopelessness or Futility Expressed		Neutral	Few or No Expressions of Hopelessness or Futility	
		0	1	2	3	4	5
	G	Perceived Sense of Being Treated Unjustly					
		Not Rated	High Degree of Feeling Unjustly Treated		Neutral	No or Minimal Feeling of Being Treated Unjustly	
		0	1	2	3	4	5
	H	Withdrawal From Former Activities, Relationships					
		Not Rated	Very Withdrawn From Activities and Relationships		Neutral	Engaged, Not Withdrawn	
		0	1	2	3	4	5
	I	Connection to Group Identity (Race, Nationality, Religion, Ethnicity)					
		Not Rated	No Connection to Group Identity		Neutral	Very Connected to Group Identity	
		0	1	2	3	4	5

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Step 1: Rating Risk and Resilience Factors, *Continued...*

SCORE	SHEET B: INDIVIDUAL RISK AND PROTECTIVE RATING						
	J	Degree of Isolation or Connection to Others (Family, Friends, Community)					
		Not Rated	Isolated		Neutral	Engaged	
		0	1	2	3	4	5
	K	Vocational or School Integration					
		Not Rated	Poorly Connected to Work or School		Neutral	Well Connected to Work or School	
		0	1	2	3	4	5
	L	General Health					
		Not Rated	Poor Health		Neutral	Good Health	
		0	1	2	3	4	5
	M	Perceived Economic Stress					
		Not Rated	High Economic Stress		Neutral	Economically Stable	
		0	1	2	3	4	5
	TOTAL						

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Step 1: Rating Risk and Resilience Factors, *Continued...*

SCORE	SHEET C: FAMILY RISK AND PROTECTIVE RATING						
	A	Parent–Child Bonding, Empathic Connection					
		Not Rated	Low Bonding, Poor Connection		Neutral	Mutual Empathy and Connection	
		0	1	2	3	4	5
	B	Parental Involvement in Child's Education					
		Not Rated	No or Minimal Involvement		Neutral	Very Involved	
		0	1	2	3	4	5
	C	Family Members Know Each Other's Friends					
		Not Rated	Do Not Know at All		Neutral	Know Most Friends	
		0	1	2	3	4	5
	D	Family Members Aware of Each Other's Activities					
		Not Rated	Low or No Awareness		Neutral	Very Aware	
		0	1	2	3	4	5
	E	Presence of Emotional or Verbal Conflict in Family					
		Not Rated	High Degree of Conflict		Neutral	Minimal Family Conflict	
		0	1	2	3	4	5
	F	Family Members Violent or Physically Abusive Toward Each Other					
		Not Rated	High Degree of Violence		Neutral	Minimal or Low Violence	
		0	1	2	3	4	5
	G	Family Members Trust Each Other					
		Not Rated	No Trust		Neutral	Appropriate Trust	
		0	1	2	3	4	5
	H	Family Connection to Identity Group (Race, Nationality, Religion, Ethnicity)					
		Not Rated	No Connection to Identity Group		Neutral	Very Connected to Identity Group	
		0	1	2	3	4	5
	I	Perceived Economic Stress					
		Not Rated	High Economic Stress		Neutral	Economically Stable	
		0	1	2	3	4	5
	J	Family Involvement in Community Cultural and Religious Activities					
		Not Rated	Not Involved		Neutral	Very Involved	
		0	1	2	3	4	5
	TOTAL						

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Step 2: Assess Balance of Risk and Protective Factors



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Step 2: Assess Balance of Risk and Protective Factors, *Continued...*

INDIVIDUAL RISK



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Step 2: Assess Balance of Risk and Protective Factors, *Continued...*

FAMILY RISK



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Step 3: Develop Action Plan

High Risk	0–24
Moderate Risk	25–47
Low Risk	48–60

1. What was the individual's overall risk/ protective score?

A. *List the items that received a rating of 1 or 2:*

B. *Based on these ratings, what services or interventions do you assess this person needs to reduce his or her risk factors and increase his or her protective factors?*

C. *What resources are available to meet these needs? What resource gaps exist?*

2. What was the family's overall risk/protective score?

A. *List the items that received a rating of 1 or 2:*

B. *Based on these ratings, what services or interventions do you assess this family needs to reduce its risk factors and increase its protective factors?*

C. *What resources are available to meet these needs? What resource gaps exist?*

3. What was the community's overall risk/ protective score?

A. *List the items that received a rating of 1 or 2:*

B. *Based on these ratings, what programs and interventions could reduce risk factors and increase protective factors? Please note what organization or government entity could provide the intervention.*

C. *What resources are available to meet these needs? What resource gaps exist?*

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C

TAB

Summary of the Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders

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Summary of the Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders

The multistate Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) produced in 2013 a memorandum outlining 25 good practices in rehabilitation and reintegration programs worldwide. These recommendations are aimed at improving the quality of CVE rehabilitation and reintegration, rather than helping to shape the strategy behind any comprehensive CVE effort. The categories and numbered items come directly from the memorandum.

A. Defining Goals and Objectives

Number 1: When developing a rehabilitation program, it is important first to define clearly the program's goals and objectives and identify indicators of success and failure.

B. Prison Context

Number 2: Good prison standards and practices can offer an appropriate starting point for building an effective, safe, and smoothly operating rehabilitation program.

Number 3: An important first step can be to develop an effective intake, assessment, and classification system for new inmates.

Number 4: States could carefully consider how inmates going through the rehabilitation programs are housed and whether they should be segregated from or integrated into the general prison population.

Number 5: Ensure, as appropriate, that all relevant staff are professionally trained and educated to deal with the complexities of reintegration or rehabilitation efforts.

Number 6: States could consider, on a case-by-case basis and taking into account relevant domestic and international laws, the introduction of specific control mechanisms with regard to the inmates' communication, both within and outside the prison.

C. The Role of Different Actors in Prisons

Number 7: Rehabilitation programs could incorporate a broad range of cross-disciplinary experts, with close coordination among the relevant departments and personnel involved.

Number 8: Psychologists can play a key role in the rehabilitation process and could be fully integrated into these programs.

Number 9: As the personnel in most frequent contact with the inmates, prison officers must understand and be carefully attuned to the rehabilitation process, even if they are not directly responsible for its delivery.

Number 10: States could consider integrating appropriate scholars into the rehabilitation process.

Number 11: Law enforcement officers who are interviewing inmates during the rehabilitation process could receive specialized training and coordinate these activities closely with rehabilitation professionals.

Number 12: Victims and victims' advocates can be powerful voices, and states could consider including them in rehabilitation programs.

Number 13: Former violent extremists can be influential with those going through the rehabilitation process and could be included.

Number 14: Charismatic members of the community can also help inspire change and could be included in rehabilitation programs.

D. Reintegration Components

Number 15: Rehabilitation efforts could include cognitive skills programs.

Number 16: Rehabilitation programs could include basic education courses.

Number 17: Rehabilitation programs could include vocational skills training and employment assistance.

Number 18: States could encourage their prison authorities to consider finding ways to recognize the achievement of inmates in rehabilitation programs.

Number 19: States could consider the use of incentives for inmates participating in rehabilitation programs.

Number 20: States could consider developing aftercare programs, working in close partnerships with civil society organizations and communities, to enable treatment to continue after an inmate has left prison.

Number 21: Consideration for protective measures could be given when authorities receive credible information that a reformed violent extremist may face threats to his or her life, or the lives of family members, during or upon release from custody.

Number 22: Formal or informal, parole-like monitoring after release can be an effective method to deter or interrupt recidivism.

Number 23: Families could be integrated where possible and appropriate into rehabilitation programs.

Number 24: Fostering a welcoming and positive community environment for an inmate after release is critical to long-term success.

E. Looking to Other Relevant Fields

Number 25: As states design rehabilitation programs, they could look to other relevant fields beyond terrorism for lessons learned.

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D

TAB

Selected CVE Resources

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Countering Violent Extremism **A GUIDE**

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