

- 1) Thank you and recognitions
- 2) Let me start by explaining what Global Engagement is to provide context for our approach to CVE. I'll then discuss how we think about the issue as one among a number of community safety challenges. Finally, I will outline our three main areas of CVE activity.
- 3) Global Engagement
 - a) Global Engagement Directorate established by the President and charged with "comprehensive engagement policies that leverage diplomacy, communications, international development and assistance, and domestic engagement and outreach in pursuit of a host of national security objectives, including those related to the homeland."
 - b) Global not just in terms of geography, but in the kinds of partnerships and comprehensive relationships we build, recognizing that the major challenges we face are too complex for any one actor
 - c) Objective—to build diverse coalitions to address challenges. A move away from unilateralism and expansion beyond state-to-state. New partners and new ways of doing things. Different disciplines, different skill sets, better solutions.
 - d) Importantly, it takes advantage of the unique value added of government as a facilitator, convener, and network broker.
 - i) We have vast networks, and can bring people from many different perspectives and backgrounds together
 - ii) Bollywood story
- 2) Two Examples—one global, and a second local
 - a) The Global Alliance of Clean Cookstoves
 - i) Exposure to smoke from traditional cookstoves and open fires (the primary means of cooking & heating for nearly 3 billion people in the developing world) causes 1.9 million premature deaths annually, impacting women and children in particular. Cookstoves also increase pressure on local natural resources.
 - ii) The U.S. Department of State led the formation of a public-private partnership—involving Shell Oil, Morgan Stanley, and numerous local NGOs—to generate a global campaign to raise awareness of the danger and facilitate transition to clean cookstove technology in countries like El Salvador, Peru, and most recently Tanzania

- b) Very local level example—Working with Somali youth in London to impact media portrayals, built a mentorship/training program on grassroots organizing with at least ten different partners (UK Government included)
- 3) This approach to problem solving is something we have been doing domestically for decades—community-based problem solving, comprehensive relationships, local level
 - a) Community-policing—focuses on the use of wide ranging partnerships and problem solving to proactively address conditions that give rise to crime, social disorder, and fear of crime.
 - i) Collaborative partnerships include other government agencies, community members and organizations, NGOs, business, media, and others
 - b) Weed and Seed—DOJ delinquency prevention strategy, which develops partnerships among law enforcement, social service providers, educators, and others to create comprehensive, multi service programs that address vulnerabilities to delinquency and gang participation
 - c) School shootings
 - i) Shooting at Columbine H.S. as a turning point—April 20, 1999. Thirteen people killed before the two perpetrators committed suicide
 - ii) Prior to this, we were less sensitive to the threat—often seen as “blowing off steam,” and concerns about getting people in trouble by reporting
 - iii) Now, very different reactions—built a new awareness, local networks of trust.
 - (1) Recognition that need integrated approach and cooperation and partnerships between schools and organizations outside schools, including law enforcement, social services and mental health providers, courts, community organizations, families, religious organizations and many others
- 4) Now we are working to apply the approach of global engagement, and our experience in building diverse local networks for problem solving, to address the challenge of ideologically inspired violence and radicalization
 - a) We thus are building from established practices. Rather than inventing new CVE architecture, we are working through preexisting networks and trusted relationships, while establishing and building new ones where necessary. We are trying to mainstream this work as part of our efforts to promote community safety, rather as a standalone enterprise.

- b) Many of our potential partners are not involved in national security issues and wouldn't see themselves as playing a role. They don't speak the same language or use CT frames of reference. More effective to view CVE as part of community safety in general.
 - i) As a parent, my reaction if someone asked me to support CVE.
 - ii) Teachers
 - iii) Other government departments
- 5) In addressing violent extremism in the U.S., it is important to understand that we face a variety of threats, not just al-Qaeda, and as a result our CVE activities must be flexible enough to address multiple forms of violent extremism as well as new threats as they emerge.
 - a) From 2001-2010, there were numerous disruptions for non-al Qaeda terrorism, including plots and material support.
 - b) Diverse array of groups.
 - (1) Violent militia extremism and sovereign citizen groups
 - (a) In March 2010, nine militia arrests in Michigan.
 - (b) March 2011, five militia and sovereign citizens arrested for weapons violations and threats against a judge and law enforcement
 - (2) Violent white supremacists—April 2011, four indicted and charged with different violations for firebombing the home of a mixed race couple in Arkansas
 - (3) Violent anti-abortion groups. November 2010, Army of God member pled guilty to one count of distributing information related to explosives, destructive devices and weapons of mass destruction.
 - c) Having said this, we must prioritize our efforts and resources, and al Qaeda and its adherents remain the most significant threat to the security of our country.
 - i) When we assess this prioritization, we look at three factors:
 - (1) Intent—stated or implied purpose of a group to engage in an act of terrorism
 - (2) Capability—ability to conduct an attack based on resources, skills, historical actions, or presence

- (3) Posture—preparation of a group to conduct an attack
- ii) Without belaboring the point, AQ clearly rates high on all of these measures
 - (1) They don't hide their intentions—videos, Inspire Magazine, etc.—Awlaki, Adam Ghadan, and others have called on American citizens and residents to attack. UBL was still plotting, mass transit attack on the 10th anniversary of 9/11
 - (2) And they have proven their capability and posture, including several aviation plots by AQAP that fortunately failed.
- iii) The past several years have seen increased numbers of American citizens and residents inspired by AQ's ideology and involved in terrorism. Some have traveled overseas to train or fight, while others have been involved in supporting, financing, or plotting attacks in the homeland
- d) But patterns are difficult to come by, and in some ways differ from the experiences in Europe
 - i) Geographically dispersed throughout the country—Texas; Portland, Oregon; the Washington, DC area; NYC; and others
 - ii) Dozens involved over the past decade, but we don't find large networks—very small groups, generally a few individuals
 - iii) And wide range of individuals, making it difficult to profile—
 - (1) from Jihad Jane, who pled guilty of conspiring to kill a Swedish cartoonist,
 - (2) to Omar Hammami, a convert to Islam from Alabama who went on to become a military commander in al-Shabab,
 - (3) to Zazi, a legal permanent resident of the U.S. from Afghanistan who pled guilty to an al-Qaeda linked plot to bomb the NYC subway system.
- e) The number of such individuals is thus far limited, but we remain concerned, much in the way we are concerned about other community safety issues where there are relatively few perpetrators but enormous consequences. Take school shootings as an example.
 - i) Since September 2001, we have had around 60 school shootings. In the vast majority of incidents, between 0 and 2 were killed; in only 7 incidents were three or more people killed. And exceptions, like Virginia Tech, where 32 were killed. For

comparison, during that same period, there were 41 terrorism disruptions linked to AQ and its adherents.

- ii) There is no geographic concentration; incidents are spread throughout the country
 - iii) It is difficult to profile. Many shooters told Secret Service investigators that they were driven by alienation or persecution, but many students experience these things, making it less useful.
 - iv) Many more individuals are killed in car accidents and gang violence, but we still take school shootings as a threat to community safety seriously
 - f) We have responded to school shootings and other threats to community safety by engaging communities and building local networks of trust for collaborative problem solving. And we are taking a similar approach in addressing domestic violent extremism, focused on raising the awareness of everyone.
- 6) There are three pillars of our activity—all part of building diverse networks
- a) Engagement with several different groups and communities
 - i) Communities targeted by violent extremists for radicalization
 - (1) Ensure that where there are already relationships with the federal government, we work through those, dealing with CVE as one among a variety of community safety issues.
 - (2) Where there are no or weak relationships, then we need to build these, not only because of CVE but because this is good governance. Trust is essential for solving an array of challenges, from gang violence, to drug addiction, to school safety, to civil rights. Good governance builds up trust that applies across issue areas. This means an expanded role in engagement across our entire government, involving Health and Human Services and others.
 - (3) In our effort to counter violent extremism we must remain engaged in the full range of community concerns and interests and do not narrowly build our relationships on national security issues alone.
 - (a) So, for example, although we have begun working with the Somali community in Minneapolis on countering violent extremism, we also engage on a host of other issues.
 - (b) Somali parents, like parents everywhere, are concerned about school bullying.

- (i) An investigation in a Minneapolis school district found that, after a fight between eleven white and Somali students at a school, the district meted out disproportionate punishment to the students and that the school did not have appropriate policies, procedures and training to address harassment against Somali students.
 - (ii) DOJ and Department of Education reached a settlement agreement in which the district agreed to improve its policies and procedures on harassment and discipline.
- (4) In addressing CVE specifically, we engage communities for a number of reasons
 - (a) Raise awareness—NCTC community awareness briefing—the threat and challenge and what they can do to protect their families and loved ones. Communities have leveraged it in their own grassroots efforts.
 - (b) Understand concerns from communities about CVE related activities, and work to address them together
 - (c) Get advice and ideas about how to address the challenge, and the ways in which we can work together
- ii) Local government and law enforcement
 - (1) Often have stronger relationships and better understanding of local communities
 - (a) More likely to have trust
 - (b) More likely to be approached if an issue emerges; and
 - (c) Present as part of the communities, there day in and day out
- iii) NGOs, universities, others in civil society, such as interfaith groups, and private sector who may be able to support the communities that are being targeted
 - (1) Example from Diaspora Forum—individual noted that she wanted to communicate to broader audiences, but has no background or expertise in getting ideas out.
 - (2) Private sector has shown increased interest in becoming involved—Google formers conference at the end of June in Ireland
 - (3) Interfaith community—creating understanding, mitigating extremist arguments
- iv) And our close partners here today and their communities and networks

- (1) Example, the development of the Global Somali Diaspora network against violent extremism—offer up as a potential model for cooperation

b) Training

- i) Critical that our officials and local government and law enforcement understand the issue so that they know what it is, and what it isn't
- ii) We know that there are many trainers out there claiming to be experts, when they are far from it, and they promote a message that misguides people and weakens our national security by distracting people (Washington Monthly story)
- iii) We have formed an interagency working group on training. Among other areas of activity:
 - (1) Identify all CVE training and ensure it meets certain standards
 - (2) Identify community safety related training, where a CVE module could be included
 - (3) Develop a fully certified CVE training program that includes cultural competency, radicalization that leads to violence, and how to partner with communities and others
- iv) We have been expanding this training and will continue to do so, particularly with local officials and stakeholders. From October 2010-early March this year, for example, DHS offered this sort of training to more than 1,000 law enforcement and other government personnel across the country.

c) Challenging the narrative

- i) The narrative of terrorists—West is at war with Islam and anti-Muslim, and we need to challenge this by words and deeds.
 - (1) This means promoting an alternative narrative of what it means to be an American, and the ideals that unify us as a country, irrespective of race, religion, or creed. One of the strengths of our country is its diversity.
 - (2) It means continuing to vigorously protect civil rights and prosecute anti-Muslim hate crimes and ensuring that any community targeted by violent extremists for radicalization feel they are an essential part of the national fabric. And our Department of Justice has gone to court to protect the rights of Muslims.

(3) And it means communicating to the general American public about what the threat is, and is not. It is not Islam and it is not Muslims. As the President stated, Bin Ladin was not a Muslim leader, he was a murderer.

(a) Actions and statements that cast suspicion towards entire communities because of the actions of a few or send messages to certain Americans that they are somehow less American because of their faith or how they look, reinforce violent extremist propaganda and feed the sense of disenchantment and disenfranchisement that may spur violent extremist radicalization.

(4) This also has international implications. We live in a communications environment where you cannot separate the domestic from the international, where news about anti-Muslim antics in the U.S. spread to other countries, sometimes with deadly consequences.

(a) Pastor Jones burned the Koran in Florida and violent protests erupted in Afghanistan. He later announced he was headed to Dearborn, MI to protest in front of the largest mosque in North America. Rumors about possible Koran burning or burning an effigy of the Prophet.

(b) The reaction of the entire Dearborn community serves as a model for building cross-cutting networks in addressing a challenge. Explain the reaction.

7) Conclusion

- a) The President has been concerned about this challenge since day one. In fact, my first briefing to him on this topic was one month after he took office when the administration was just settling in.
- b) The President is someone who recognizes the value of collaborative partnerships; that is the purpose of global engagement. It is about building coalitions to address challenging problems. We recognize that this is not something government can do alone; it takes a diverse network of individuals and organizations, each of which brings unique skills and value added.
- c) At home, we are building these networks and these relationships, though there remains much work to be done.
- d) Importantly, our understanding of how we approach the challenge has benefited enormously from our partnerships and exchanges with our British, Dutch and German colleagues, and many others. In fact, prior to my current role at the White House, I spent 18 months in the UK, where our British colleagues generously allowed us

opportunities to witness their counter-radicalization efforts first hand to assess whether lessons can be applied to our Homeland. This was invaluable and has allowed us to build on the experiences of our close friends.

- e) We will continue to do so at conferences like this, and we hope many more.
- f) Thank you