

RELEASE IN PART
B7(F),B6

**TRANS-SAHARA COUNTER-TERRORISM PARTNERSHIP
(TSCTP)**

FY 2014

FULL PERFORMANCE PLAN REPORT (PPR)

Date Submitted: 4/23/2015

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I - ACTIVE MISSION OBJECTIVE REPORTING

Mission Objective:	The United States and its partners build stronger security partnerships and regional security frameworks to prevent, mitigate, and respond to conflicts, crises, and mass atrocities, increase the level and quality of cooperation on regional security issues, and enhance regional stability
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Performance Narrative:

Authorized by a Deputies Committee in March 2005, TSCTP was created to bring the State Department, DOD, and USAID together to focus on improving individual country and regional capabilities to defeat terrorist organizations, counter efforts to recruit and train new terrorist fighters, particularly from among the young and rural poor, and counter efforts to establish safe havens for domestic and outside violent extremist groups. The initiative reflected interagency recognition that the countries in the region did not have the capacity to prevent Al-Qaeda or other violent extremist organizations from building and sustaining safe havens and recruiting and facilitating networks in the Sahel and the Maghreb. TSCTP mobilizes resources from multiple agencies to assist Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Morocco, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia to disrupt terrorist activities, address key systemic vulnerabilities, and facilitate increased regional cooperation and interoperability. Instability in Libya and the temporary relocation of Embassy Tripoli precluded Libya's ability to join TSCTP in 2014.

The U.S. government's overall counterterrorism objective in the Maghreb is to create an environment that will disrupt the ability of terrorists, violent extremist organizations (VEOs), and traffickers to operate by promoting regional partnerships. U.S. assistance aims to develop criminal justice institutions that have the capabilities to detect, deter, investigate, prosecute, and incarcerate transnational criminal organizations and networks, while protecting and upholding human rights, rule of law, and due process; to address drivers of terrorist and violent extremist recruitment and radicalization in at-risk communities; and to amplify moderate voices that counter violent extremist messaging. TSCTP programs are designed to be proactive and preventive in nature, to combat terrorism and violent extremism through both civilian and military efforts that respect national sovereignty and cultural sensitivities of countries in the region, while empowering local law enforcement authorities to effectively address the threat of terrorist organizations. In the NEA region in FY 2014, TSCTP programmed International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE) resources to continue to build the capacity of forensic police, Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) funds to continue the development of cross-border regional security strategies, and Economic Support Fund (ESF) to address vulnerable youth populations.

TSCTP strives to address the factors that drive terrorist activity in the region, including the permissive environment in post-Qadhafi Libya, instability in Northern Mali, the rise of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)-affiliated groups in North Africa, and border security challenges across North Africa. The Government of Algeria (GOA) has been steadfast in battling Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Mali-based Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, and al-Murabitoun (led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar), achieving a level of success that has

severely curtailed the ability of AQIM to operate within the country's borders compared to previous years. However, Algeria still faces residual and persistent terrorist threats. AQIM's emir, Abdelmalik Droukdel and Belmokhtar - both Algerian nationals - remained a threat and were at-large in the region at year's end. The terrorist group Jund al-Khilafa fi Ard al-Jazayer (JAK, Soldiers of the Caliphate in Algeria), emerged in 2014 following a split from AQIM, and swore allegiance to ISIL. These groups continue to target Algerian security services, local government, and Western nationals and continue attacks using improvised explosive devices (IEDs), bombings, false roadblocks, kidnappings, and ambushes, particularly in the mountainous areas to the east of Algiers (Kabylie region and eastern wilayas) and in the expansive Saharan desert regions of the south and southeast. The Algerian and Tunisian security forces are cooperating along the Algeria/Tunisia border in the Chaambi mountains area, south of Souk Ahras, given the increased threat and attacks against security forces from terrorist brigades such as Okba Ben Nafaâ.

Morocco has a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy that includes vigilant security measures, regional and international cooperation, and counter-radicalization policies. The Government of Morocco (GOM) has treated counterterrorism as a top policy priority since the country experienced suicide bombing attacks in Casablanca in 2003, and that focus has been reinforced by further attacks in 2007 and 2011. In 2014, Morocco's counterterrorism efforts effectively mitigated the risk of attack, although the country continued to face threats, largely from numerous small, independent violent extremist cells. Those groups and individuals, referred to collectively as adherents of the so-called Salafiyya Jihadiyya ideology, remained isolated from one another, small in size, and limited in capabilities; however, with the growth of the ISIL phenomenon, their international connections may have grown in 2014.

While the Tunisian government has made progress in its capacity to disrupt VEOs, terrorism remained a serious challenge for Tunisia's nascent democracy. The rise of violent extremist organizations in Tunisia since the January 2011 revolution - including Ansar al-Shari'a in Tunisia (AAS-T) and AQIM - posed serious security challenges to a post-revolutionary government previously inexperienced in counterterrorism operations. The government continued its efforts to reorient the focus of the security forces toward a counterterrorism mission, but these reforms need time and international support to succeed. The Tunisian government also continues to face challenges with political and economic instability, the influx of arms and extremists from across the Algerian and Libyan borders, the new and expanded use of IEDs, and disenfranchisement of unemployed youth. As the terrorist attack at the Bardo Museum in the center of Tunis on March 18, 2015 demonstrated, the threat of attack continues and the Tunisian Ministry of Interior has warned of threats to industrial and tourist sites. The disproportionate numbers of Tunisians traveling to fight in Iraq and Syria - and the potential for the return of these fighters - was another cause for concern.

TSCTP programs continue to seek to reduce sympathy and support for AQIM and other VEOs by strengthening resilience in communities at risk of recruitment and radicalization through improving livelihoods and social services for vulnerable, impoverished, and marginalized communities, in coordination with U.S. humanitarian and development efforts; encouraging and assisting governments and communities to develop positive alternatives to violent extremism; and improving relationships between those communities and government entities, especially security and justice sector institutions.

Standard and Custom Indicator Reporting

SPS Objective:	Peace and Security
SPS Area:	1.1 Counter-Terrorism
SPS Element:	1.1.2 De-Legitimize Terrorist Ideology

Indicator	Req?	Baseline	FY 2014 Target	FY 2014 Result	
		FY 2015 Target	FY 2016 Target	FY 2017 Target	

1.1.2-3 Number of projects directly related to US Government countering violent extremism (CVE) objectives implemented in country by civil society and partner governments			1	2	2	2
		2	1			

Status:	Dropping in FY 2017	DQA Date:	Dec 13, 2013	Agency
	Designation:		USAID	

Dropping Year Explanation:

We anticipate the Maghreb-Sahel CVE program to continue through FY 2016 and the Favorable Opportunities to Reinforce Self-Advancement for Today's Youth program to end in FY 2017, which is why the target is reduced to 1 in FY 2017 and the indicator is set to drop after FY 2017 results are reported.

Out Year Targets Rationale and Other Explanation:

In FY 2014, USAID began implementing a three-year CVE project that seeks to prevent youth delinquency and reduce recidivism among at-risk youth in Morocco in selected neighborhoods of Tangiers and Tetouan. The project addresses the challenges of marginalized youth by building on the capacity of relevant local and national partners and enhancing their ability to identify and work with at-risk youth and young offenders. The program recognizes that young people without connections to the community and without job skills, who cannot find work, constitute a particularly vulnerable group at risk of getting into conflict with the law and possibly being recruited by extremist circles. The partnering local associations are located in neighborhoods that lack adequate public services. The project therefore aims at strengthening the capacity of government and non-government institutions to improve the quality and delivery of services provided to the targeted youth; this approach will ensure the sustainability and long-term value of the program.

USAID will support initiatives that increase safety in marginalized neighborhoods in close collaboration with civil society organizations and GOM institutions.

SPS Objective:	Peace and Security
SPS Area:	1.1 Counter-Terrorism
SPS Element:	1.1.3 Governments Capabilities

Indicator	Req?	Baseline	FY 2014 Target			FY 2014 Result		
			FY 2015 Target	FY 2016 Target	FY 2017 Target			
1.1.3-2 Number of individuals in the security sector trained in counterterrorism knowledge and skills			300	16	38	27	27	75
1.1.3-2a Number of men								
1.1.3-2b Number of women								
Status:	Active	DQA Date:	Dec 14, 2012	Agency Designation:		State		

Deviation Narrative:

The FY 2014 target was set based on expected results from ATA funding in NEA's TSCTP Operating Unit (OU) as well as bilateral ATA funds for Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. This has been corrected so that the result only takes the funding under NEA's TSCTP OU into account. It is expected that any results from bilateral ATA funds for Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia be reflected in the relevant bilateral OU PPRs, as appropriate.

Out Year Targets Rationale and Other Explanation:

Having conducted the assessments, and having identified appropriate programming, approaches, and participants, it is expected that 2015 will yield a higher number of results than the previous year. With the ramp-up phase completed it is expected that this next phase will see a high level of activity and training.

Indicator	Req?	Baseline	FY 2014 Target			FY 2014 Result	
			FY 2015 Target	FY 2016 Target	FY 2017 Target		
Cust Number of USG-assisted assessments on terrorism			0	1	1		
Status:	Dropping in FY 2014	DQA Date:	Dec 14, 2012	Agency Designation:		State	

Dropping Year Explanation:

CT does not have any further assessments planned at this time, so this indicator is no longer needed.

Out Year Targets Rationale and Other Explanation:

CT commissioned the United States Institute of Peace to assess the regional challenges of border security in North Africa and produce a report identifying key gaps in capacity and coordination that a regional approach to border security would need to include to address such challenges.

Indicator	Req?	Baseline	FY 2014 Target		FY 2014 Result		FY 2015 Target	FY 2016 Target	FY 2017 Target
Cust Number of mentorship visits by U.S. Senior Law Enforcement Advisor				2	1	4	1	0	0
Status:	Active	DQA Date:	Dec 13, 2013	Agency Designation:		State			

Deviation Narrative:

In FY 2014 INL decided to carry out a number of evaluations and gap analyses to inform future programming, which required more field visits than had been initially planned.

Out Year Targets Rationale and Other Explanation:

In FY 2014, INL continued to work with the Moroccan police, helping to improve its capability to collect and analyze forensic evidence in accordance with international standards. As the program related to this indicator will continue until September 2015, INL will continue to provide mentoring visits by Senior Law Enforcement Advisors. INL identifies an indicator target of one visit for FY 2015. INL may potentially extend the program into FY 2016, but does not currently know whether an extension will take place. FY 2016 and FY 2017 TSCTP INCLE resources will support training and technical assistance to TSCTP-member governments in the areas of law enforcement, border security, rule of law, and corrections. As appropriate, INL will fund programs that bolster cooperation and coordination among Maghreb countries and with counterparts in Sahel countries.

Indicator	Req?	Baseline	FY 2014 Target		FY 2014 Result		FY 2015 Target	FY 2016 Target	FY 2017 Target
Cust Number of law enforcement bodies assisted by U.S. Government for international standards compliance purposes.			1	1	1	2	1	1	
Status:	Active	DQA Date:	Dec 13, 2013	Agency Designation:		State			

Out Year Targets Rationale and Other Explanation:

During FY 2014, INL continued to assist Morocco's Scientific Police with TSCTP INCLE resources. In FY 2015, INL will continue to assist Morocco's Scientific Police with international standards compliance related to forensics and will also expand to assist the Inspectorate General of the Moroccan National Police on accountability standards in line with international norms and

best practices. Therefore, INL's FY 2015 target for this indicator is two law enforcement bodies. INL anticipates maintaining its assistance on international standards to at least one law enforcement body in FY 2016 and FY 2017, as reflected in the out-year targets. FY 2016 and FY 2017 TSCTP INCLE resources will support training and technical assistance to TSCTP-member governments in the areas of law enforcement, border security, rule of law, and corrections. As appropriate, INL will fund programs that bolster cooperation and coordination among Maghreb countries and with counterparts in Sahel countries.

Indicator	Req?	Baseline	FY 2014 Target	FY 2014 Result	
			FY 2015 Target	FY 2016 Target	FY 2017 Target
Cust Number of vehicles provided to law enforcement agencies to combat terrorism			0	28	
Status:	Dropping in FY 2014		DQA Date:	Dec 13, 2013	Agency
	Designation:		State		

Dropping Year Explanation:

The dropping year guidance was misunderstood last year when this indicator was mistakenly set to drop in FY 2014, rather than FY 2013. This vehicle procurement was planned as a one-time occurrence, and therefore, did not have results planned beyond FY 2013, which is why there are no targets set for FY 2014.

Out Year Targets Rationale and Other Explanation:

To enhance the reach of Tunisian law enforcement agencies to counter terrorism, in March 2013, INL donated 13 Hi-aces and 15 Land Cruisers to various units of the National Police (Public Security-Jardin de Carthage, Special Services-CT Directorate, Special Services-Border Security Directorate, PHP, and Antiterrorism Brigade) and National Guard (CT Subdirectorate). There are no results to report for FY 2014.

SPS Objective:	Peace and Security
SPS Area:	1.3 Stabilization Operations and Security Sector Reform
SPS Element:	1.3.1 Operations Support

Indicator	Req?	Baseline	FY 2014 Target	FY 2014 Result	
			FY 2015 Target	FY 2016 Target	FY 2017 Target

1.3.1-16 Number of commitments or initiatives undertaken by police in response to community feedback based on US-supported community-policing programs and initiatives	1	0	1
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Status:	New OU Indicator	DQA Date:	Mar 04, 2015	Agency Designation:	State
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Out Year Targets Rationale and Other Explanation:

In FY 2015, INL is launching a regional community-driven policing program in the Maghreb and Sahel. For the Maghreb, the program will specifically benefit Morocco and Tunisia. In FY 2015, INL anticipates that at least one commitment or initiative will be undertaken by either the Moroccan or Tunisian police in response to community feedback based on its community-driven policing program. As the program’s period of performance is until September 2016, INL anticipates an indicator target of one for FY 2016 and zero for FY 2017. This program will bolster cooperation and coordination among Maghreb countries and with counterparts in Sahel countries.

III. Key Issue Narratives

Trans-Sahara Counter-terrorism Partnership (TSCTP)	Youth Development (YDV)
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Trans-Sahara Counter-terrorism Partnership (TSCTP)

The United States has an overriding national interest in maintaining the stability of North Africa - a region with close ties to some of our most important European allies and with substantial influence over the course of events in the Middle East and Africa. TSCTP seeks to counter the sources of radicalization and violent extremism in the Maghreb through a wide array of civilian and military programs carried out on bilaterally and multilaterally. Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia are members of TSCTP. Including Libya in TSCTP is contemplated when conditions allow, but has been delayed due to political instability and the security situation, leading to the temporary relocation of U.S. Embassy Tripoli. NEA's FY 2014 TSCTP programs have focused on engaging sectors of society or segments of the population that are particularly exposed to violent extremist and terrorist rhetoric and recruitment in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, with a specific focus on regional programs.

In Algeria, a series of mass-casualty attacks dating back to 2007 - including a failed assassination attempt against Algerian President Bouteflika, the 2013 complex attack against the In Amenas gas facility, and the September 2014 the ISIL-affiliated Jund al-Khalifa (Soldiers of the Caliphate) abduction and beheading of a French citizen - underline the potential for instability. In Morocco, an analysis of membership statistics in indigenous terrorist organizations, including the cell convicted with committing the notorious Casablanca bombings of 2003, indicated a majority of recently-released prison inmates - who had been incarcerated for minor poverty-related crimes - were drawn to terrorist organizations during or after their time in prison. Tunisians constitute one of the largest groups of foreign fighters in Syria. Tunisia's frontier regions in the west and south have been used as transit points for extremist groups and traffickers.

Violent extremism in Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco has the potential to be fueled by a large, vulnerable, unemployed youth population that overwhelmingly lacks the technical and language skills necessary to compete, domestically and in the region. U.S. efforts are aimed at building the preventive and investigative capacities of these governments, while curtailing extremists' recruitment of youth in these countries.

Youth Development (YDV)

Appropriately addressing youth vulnerability to violent extremism and recruitment by terrorist networks is a continuing challenge for the governments of the Maghreb and the Sahel. Regional youth populations approaching 60 percent, coupled with youth unemployment rates approximately twice the world average, provide violent extremist recruiters in the Maghreb with a vulnerable and receptive audience.

Youth, comprising more than half of Morocco's population, are disproportionately affected by socioeconomic challenges facing the country. Lack of access to quality education, high rates of unemployment, and political disenfranchisement contribute to high rates of youth marginalization. This phenomenon contributes to an increase in crime, and vulnerability to violent extremism, all of which imperil Morocco's peaceful reform agenda.

USAID CVE programs in FY 2014 addressed the main challenge in countering the continued disaffection of youth, namely the enabling environment in Morocco for extremism, with particular focus on the socioeconomic and political drivers. These drivers include: high rates of social exclusion and marginality; limited economic opportunities; disillusionment with politics; and the perceptions of pervasive corruption and impunity for well-connected elites. USAID's programming targets Morocco's disaffected youth aged 15 to 30 that are vulnerable to unproductive and anti-social behavior by encouraging youth integration and participation in community life through capacity building of government and non-government youth-serving institutions located in the most marginalized urban neighborhoods that lack adequate public services. In addition, the program initiated the development of youth councils in marginalized neighborhoods to advocate for at-risk youth needs and help elected officials prioritize youth issues.

IV - SUCCESS STORIES

Headline	SPS Linkage	Key Issue Linkage
INL Works with Moroccan Scientific Police	Trans-Sahara Counter-terrorism Partnership (TSCTP)	1.1.3 Governments Capabilities
United States and Morocco Sign Framework for Trilateral Cooperation initiative	Trans-Sahara Counter-terrorism Partnership (TSCTP)	1.1.3 Governments Capabilities

Annex I - Performance Indicators - Summary Table by Mission Objective

Note: Some performance indicators track progress for more than one MO; however, the targets and results displayed always represent the total for that indicator, not a sub-total for the particular MO under which it appears. Additional details about each indicator appearing in this report, including explanations of targets and results, can be found in the section above entitled "Standard and Custom Indicator Detailed Reporting" within each MO section.

Mission Objective: **The United States and its partners build stronger security partnerships and regional security frameworks to prevent, mitigate, and respond to conflicts, crises, and mass atrocities, increase the level and quality of cooperation on regional security issues, and enhance regional stability**

Indicator	Req?	Baseline	FY 2014 Target	FY 2014 Result	FY 2015 Target	FY 2016 Target	FY 2017 Target
1.1 Counter-Terrorism							
1.1.2 De-Legitimize Terrorist Ideology							
1.1.2-3 Number of projects directly related to US Government countering violent extremism (CVE) objectives implemented in country by civil society and partner governments			1	2	2	2	2
			2	1			
1.1 Counter-Terrorism							
1.1.3 Governments Capabilities							
1.1.3-2 Number of individuals in the security sector trained in counterterrorism knowledge and skills			300	16	38	27	27
Cust Number of USG-assisted assessments on terrorism			0	1	1		
Cust Number of mentorship visits by U.S. Senior Law Enforcement Advisor			1	0	0	2	1
						4	
Cust Number of law enforcement bodies assisted by U.S. Government for international standards compliance purposes.			1	1	1	2	1
						1	1
Cust Number of vehicles provided to law enforcement agencies to combat terrorism						28	

0

1.3 Stabilization Operations and Security Sector Reform

1.3.1 Operations Support

1.3.1-16 Number of commitments or initiatives undertaken by police in response to community feedback based on US-supported community-policing programs and initiatives	1	0	1
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Annex III - Dropped Mission Objectives

Mission Objective:	A final status agreement between the Government of Israel and the Palestinians is implemented as stipulated in the agreement itself
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Dropping Explanation

These are JRS Objectives and are not relevant to TSCTP.

Mission Objective:	A reliable supply of energy products from countries in the MENA region contributes to global economic stability
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Dropping Explanation

These are JRS Objectives and are not relevant to TSCTP.

Mission Objective:	Civil society is able and empowered to represent societal interests, constructively engage in policymaking, and hold governments accountable
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Dropping Explanation

These are JRS Objectives and are not relevant to TSCTP.

Mission Objective:	Countries in the region develop effective, responsible, and accountable security and justice sector institutions that provide a safe and secure domestic environment protecting all citizens
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Dropping Explanation

These are JRS Objectives and are not relevant to TSCTP.

Mission Objective:	Engagement with U.S. business increases and trade is enhanced throughout the region
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Dropping Explanation

These are JRS Objectives and are not relevant to TSCTP.

Mission Objective:	Government institutions and political processes are more transparent, accountable, and responsive to all citizens
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Dropping Explanation

These are JRS Objectives and are not relevant to TSCTP.

Mission Objective: Growth in the private sector leads to expanded and equitable employment

Dropping Explanation

These are JRS Objectives and are not relevant to TSCTP.

Mission Objective: Improved rule of law and greater respect for human rights foster political stability

Dropping Explanation

These are JRS Objectives and are not relevant to TSCTP.

Mission Objective: Improvements in the enabling environment promote increased investment

Dropping Explanation

These are JRS Objectives and are not relevant to TSCTP.

Mission Objective: The Arab Peace Initiative is implemented by a majority of Arab League states and the Israeli government

Dropping Explanation

These are JRS Objectives and are not relevant to TSCTP.

Mission Objective: The Palestinian economy is less dependent upon external aid and is increasingly private-sector led, sustainable, and integrated into the region, and government institutions more effectively respond to citizen needs

Dropping Explanation

These are JRS Objectives and are not relevant to TSCTP.

Mission Objective: The United States enhances regional partners' commitment and capability to prevent the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery

Dropping Explanation

These are JRS Objectives and are not relevant to TSCTP.

Mission Objective: U.S. bilateral and multilateral partnerships in the region disrupt terrorist networks and reduce terrorist attacks

Dropping Explanation

These are JRS Objectives and are not relevant to TSCTP.

Mission Objective: Highlights by Program Objectives
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Dropping Explanation

This is no longer an active MO.

Mission Objective: Counter-Terrorism: Government Capabilities
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Dropping Explanation

This is no longer an active MO.

Mission Objective: Counter-Terrorism: De-Legitimize Terrorist Ideology

Dropping Explanation

This is no longer an active MO.

Annex V - Success Stories - Detailed Reporting

Headline:	INL Works with Moroccan Scientific Police	
Pullout Quote:	"The DNA section of the Scientific Police's forensic laboratory made significant progress in FY 2014, establishing new policies and procedures in line with international norms."	
Contact Information:		B6 B7(F)
Key Issue:	Trans-Sahara Counter-terrorism Partnership (TSCTP)	
Success Story SPS Item:	1.1.3 Governments Capabilities	

Background Information

Success Story Body Text

INL's TSCTP forensic development program with the Moroccan Scientific Police continued to make steady progress through FY 2014, especially in the DNA sphere. During FY 2014, the DNA section of the Scientific Police's forensic laboratory made significant progress on establishing policies and procedures in line with international norms, including the development of various training manuals, in-service training schedules, and equipment maintenance plans. INL will continue to work the police in FY 2015 to build upon these accomplishments.

Headline:	United States and Morocco Sign Framework for Trilateral Cooperation initiative	
Pullout Quote:	"This ceremony highlights our long standing relationship with the Kingdom of Morocco and what we hope will be an equally successful future partnership. We have had an exceptionally positive experience working with the Kingdom through the ATA program since 1986, and we are enthusiastic about moving into a new phase of this partnership." -Ambassador Kaidanow	
Contact Information:		B6 B7(F)
Key Issue:	Trans-Sahara Counter-terrorism Partnership (TSCTP)	
Success Story SPS Item:	1.1.3 Governments Capabilities	

Background Information

Success Story Body Text

The United States hosted a delegation of GOM officials in Washington, D.C. for the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit. On August 7, 2014, the United States and Morocco signed a Framework for Cooperation on Training for Civilian Security Services. The goal of the framework is to develop mutual expertise in the areas of crisis management, border security, and terrorism investigations to strengthen regional counterterrorism capabilities and to deny space to terrorists and terrorist

networks. The framework outlines steps to identify and further develop a cadre of Moroccan training experts, jointly train civilian security and counterterrorism forces in partner countries in the greater Maghreb and Sahel regions, and measure the effectiveness of these trainings.

In October 2014, the ATA program hosted two separate groups of senior Moroccan policymakers and academy officials to focus on the issues of border security and critical incident management. The border security group engaged in classroom exercises and also traveled to the U.S.-Mexico border. The critical incident management group stayed in Washington and included representatives from the Ministry of Interior, the National Police, and the Royal Gendarmerie, all of whom will ultimately be among those engaging directly with trainees in third countries. The seminars allowed the participants to not only enhance their own knowledge of border security and crisis management issues, but also to learn how to structure similar seminars themselves and instruct others in these concepts. ATA instructors and mentors are now meeting with individuals from both groups in Morocco to help with the development of Moroccan curricula on critical incident management and border security in preparation for the commencement of training in third countries.

Here is the link to Ambassador Kaidanow's remarks:
<http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/rm/2014/230388.htm>

Here is a link to the press release:
<http://www.state.gov/t/pa/prs/ps/2014/230386.htm>