DHS CVE Definition

Violent Extremist: *An individual who supports or commits ideologically-motivated violence to further political goals.*

Countering Violent Extremism (CVE): Actions to counter efforts by extremists to radicalize, recruit or mobilize followers to violence and to address the conditions that allow violent extremist recruitment and radicalization.

https://www.dhs.gov/countering-violent-extremism

Violent extremist threats come from a range of groups and individuals, including domestic terrorists and homegrown violent extremists in the United States, as well as international terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and ISIL. Lone offenders or small groups may be radicalized to commit violence at home or attempt to travel overseas to become foreign fighters. The use of the Internet and social media to recruit and radicalize individuals to violence means that conventional approaches are unlikely to identify and disrupt all terrorist plots.

Here in the United States, acts perpetrated by violent extremists can have far-reaching consequences. Countering violent extremism (CVE) has therefore become a key focus of DHS's work to secure the homeland. CVE aims to address the root causes of violent extremism by providing resources to communities to build and sustain local prevention efforts and promote the use of counter-narratives to confront violent extremist messaging online. Building relationships based on trust with communities is essential to this effort.

DHS HSAC CVE Working Group

Overview: recommendations focused largely on law enforcement – best practices comilating and resource, information driven community based efforts to reduce violent crime, better incorporate community policing efforts, support local efforts, training

https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hsac_cve_working_group_recommendations.pdf

https://preview.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/cve-training-guidance.pdf

Foreign Fighter Implications/Recommendations for Homeland Security

a) Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) efforts can be strengthened by incorporating travel behaviors of foreign fighters.
b) Relying on a range of international, federal, state, local, community partners, and families is critical for the U.S. to continue focusing on efforts to identify potential foreign fighters as early as possible.
c) Law enforcement and intelligence agencies will need to constantly reevaluate the intent to attack the United States by terrorist organizations that draw foreign fighters.
d) It will also be important to understand the current capabilities of foreign fighters.[1]

e) Raise legal standards and build infrastructure to protect civil liberties.
f) Take steps to end racial profiling.
g) Overhaul the Fusion Center development process at the federal level.
h) Encourage coordination of Fusion Center development at the state level.
i) Expand investments in better human capital acquisition and training.
j) Encourage further research and adoption of community-oriented policing practices.[2]

k) Strengthening digital literacy and critical consumption among young people:
    a. Governments should support mainstream digital literacy and critical consumption programmes through state schools and also support provision through youth and community organisations
    b. Governments should support at arm's length projects working with at risk youth to deconstruct extremist messages
l) Increasing counter-messaging, counternarrative and alternative narrative activity:
    a. Government strategic communications need to be centralised and coordinated, either through a dedicated unit or by assigning lead status to a single unit or department
    b. Governments need to be realistic about the challenges that limit their ability to play an active 'messenger' role in counternarrative, apart from in limited circumstances.
    c. Governments should make significant investments in funding non-governmental organisations able to offer credible alternatives.
m) Building the capacity of credible messengers:
    a. Governments should make significant investments in building the skills and expertise of the most effective countermessengers to build their capacity in technology, production, communications, and campaigning.
    b. Governments should use their convening power to bring the private tech sector to the table as their expertise can help the voices of credible messengers.
    c. Governments should fund centralised information gathering to provide economies of scale and ensure that effective counter-messengers have the information they need to work, such as analytics, audience profiling, and the sharing of good practice in alternative and counter-narratives.

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[1] U.S. Department of Homeland Security. *American Foreign Fighters: Implications for Homeland Security Final Report.* August 31, 2015. Pages 43-44. Publication RP14-01.03.11-01. Accessed at file:///C:/Users/AArchuleta/Downloads/nps79-122315-03%20(1).pdf

[2] Beutel, Alejandro J. *Building Bridges to Strengthen America: Forging an Effective Counterterrorism Enterprise Between Muslim Americans & Law Enforcement.* Executive Summary. Muslim Public Affairs Council. Accessed at http://www.mpac.org/assets/docs/publications/building-bridges/MPAC-Building-Bridges--Executive_Summary.pdf

      d.   Government must work multilaterally to pool resources in this area, taking an active role in streamlining the crossborder exchange of expertise and lessons learned in capacity building.[3]

n) Expand community-oriented policing initiatives
o) Increase support for research on combating biased policing
p) Expand investments in better human capital acquisitions
q) Highlight citizen contributions to national security
r) Reform the fusion center process to increase coordination among law enforcement
s) Adopt MPAC's "four essential principles" to successful engagement with Muslim American communities[4]

t) If the U.S. government truly wants to engage in robust CVE, it will need to provide sufficient funding.
u) The administration should appoint one department as the lead for CVE efforts to ensure more focused programs and a single point of contact for public advocacy and congressional oversight.
v) The next steps in America's CVE efforts need to be clearly defined.
      a.   Various signs indicate that authorities want to add targeted intervention to augment an initial approach based solely on community engagement. Introducing intervention measures as an as-needed alternative to traditional counterterrorism measures should be encouraged. But interventions can be counterproductive if conducted without a clear strategy and legal basis. Working with civil rights and civil liberties advocates, the government should provide guidance on minimum standards for intervention efforts. Such guidance should address the role of government and communities in interventions for radicalized individuals, as well as the legal parameters of interveners who currently place themselves at risk of civil (if not criminal) liability if interventions go awry.
w) Engagement and other trust-building initiatives are useful and should be continued. The most pressing need at this stage is for the administration to build a carefully crafted system for interventions that provides families, communities, and authorities a potential alternative to prosecution. While these initiatives are best implemented at the local level, they require a high-level framework and clear guidance from federal officials.[5]

x) Build Trust in American Muslim Communities
      a.   Apply community policing to CVE more broadly
      b.   End blanket surveillance programs
      c.   Regulate the use of informants, especially in religious settings
      d.   Develop alternatives to criminal prosecution
      e.   Highlight contributions of American Muslims to civic life
y) Enhance Community Support for Law Enforcement CVE Efforts

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[3] Briggs, Rachel and Sebastien Feve. *Policy Briefing: Countering the Appeal of Extremism Online.* Institute for Strategic Dialogue. Pages 2 and 4. Accessed at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Countering%20the%20Appeal%20of%20Extremism%20Online_1.pdf

[4] Muslim Public Affairs Council. *Policy Report: Data on Post-9/11 Terrorism in the United States*. Accessed at http://www.mpac.org/assets/docs/publications/MPAC-Post-911-Terrorism-Data.pdf

[5] Vidino, Lorenzo and Seamus Hughes. *Countering Violent Extremism in America*. The George Washington University Center for Cyber & Homeland Security: Program on Extremism. Pages 18-19. Accessed at https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/CVE%20in%20America%20.pdf

        a. American Muslim leaders should publicly support positive law enforcement CVE activities

        b. Train communities about intelligence-driven policing

z) Develop Accountability for CVE at the Federal Level

aa) Maintain the Appropriate Federal and Local Roles[6]

bb) Identifying the federal agency in charge of administering the U.S. CVE strategy

cc) Developing a more robust and actionable national CVE framework

dd) Refocusing the federal government on support and not local engagement of CVE

ee) Requiring all CVE related terms be defined in every document

ff) Requiring regular evaluations and updates of the U.S. CVE strategy
file:///C:/Users/AArchuleta/Downloads/14Sep_Davis_Tom.pdf[7]

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[6]Schanzer, David H. October 2012. Policy Brief: *The Way Forward on Combatting Al-Qaida-Inspired Violent Extremism in the United States: Suggestions for the Next Administration.* Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, the Duke Islamic Studies Center, ISLAMiCommentary, and the Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security. Pages 5-9. Accessed at file:///C:/Users/AArchuleta/Downloads/nps56-102412-03.pdf.

[7] Davis, Thomas J. September 2014. *Now is the Time For CVE-2. Updating and Implementing a Revised U.S. National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism.* Naval Postgraduate School. Accessed at file:///C:/Users/AArchuleta/Downloads/14Sep_Davis_Tom.pdf