



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Washington DC

10 Apr 2010

MEMORANDUM THRU

Major General Timothy P. McHale, USA, Deputy Commander Support, U.S. Forces - Afghanistan

FOR General, Stanley A. McChrystal, USA, Commander, U.S. Forces – Afghanistan

FROM: Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6), USAF

SUBJECT: USAF review of AR 15-6, 21 February 2010, Uruzgan Province CIVCAS incident

1. (U) **Overall Assessment.** Having reviewed the AR 15-6 on the 21 February 2010, Uruzgan Province civilian casualty incident conducted by MG Timothy P. McHale, DCG-S, USFOR-A, I have found the report to be exceptionally thorough and generally an accurate representation of the facts. My team was specifically requested to independently review MG McHale's preliminary findings and provide subject matter expertise to determine how best to avoid these incidents in the future. To that end, I would recommend future teams investigating incidents with any joint involvement be formulated at the onset from the joint force to provide the best possible joint solutions.
2. (U) **What I disagree with and why.** The investigation has determined the Predator crew actions, specifically inaccurate and unprofessional reporting, as a causal factor in the Ground Force Commander's (GFC) decision to strike. The burden levied on the GFC to defend his forces and the people of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan while involved in a Counter Insurgency is significant and his decision to strike a target or not is based on the totality of intelligence and a dynamic and evolving threat. The Predator crew's observations of the target, as reported over UHF communications to the JTAC, are one of the sources. Therefore, it is my belief a more accurate representation throughout the investigation of the Predator crew's involvement in the causal factors would be; had the Predator crew provided more accurate and professional reporting, the GFC would have had a more clear understanding of what was being targeted to update his overall tactical risk assessment and could have prevented the GFC's decision to strike.
3. ~~(S//REL ISAF)~~ **Recommendations for improvement.** Recommend edit the wording of TAB B, Cause 2 – Predator Actions and offer the following draft ideas.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

Recommendation to Address Cause 2:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6)
Colonel, USAF

BOOK 2

21 FEBRUARY 2010 – URUZGAN PROVINCE CIVCAS

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A.	USCENTCOM Consolidated Serial Rules of Engagement for Operation Enduring Freedom	152307Z DEC06
B.	CENTCOM Serial One Rules of Engagement For Operation Enduring Freedom MOD 002, CHANGE 002	041918ZDEC08
C.	CENTCOM Positive Identification (PID) Policy (2 copies)	200053ZDEC08
D.	HQ ISAF Tactical Directive	1 July 2009
E.	HQ ISAF Night Raids Tactical Directive (Attachment 4, intentionally withheld)	23 January 2010
F.	USFOR-A CIVCAS Battle Drill Procedures (Appendix 2 to Annex C to FRAGO 08.003)	NOT DATED
G.	FM 3-05.20 Special Forces Operations	October 2006
H.	CJSOTF-A OPORD 10-01 OEF XV(Afghanistan)	26 October 2009
I.	CJSOTF-A FRAGO 2, Expanded Further Guidance for the Conduct of Combat Operations during OEF XV (2 copies)	031200ZJAN10
J.	CJCSI 3121.01B Encl. A Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces	13 June 2005
K.	E-Mail from SOTF-SOUTH BATTLE CAPTAIN to SOTF-SOUTH OPCEN DIRECTOR Subject: FIRST_IMPRESSION_REPORT, 4 pages	21 February 2010 4:18 PM
L.	E-Mail from SOTF-SOUTH BATTLE CAPTAIN to SOTF-SOUTH SURGEON Subject: TK FST Casualties	21 February 2010 12:20 PM

M. E-Mail from SOTF-SOUTH BATTLE CAPTAIN to Various Recipients 21 February 2010 10:42 AM
Subject: SFODA(b)(1)1.4aNOBLE JUSTICE SALT-A

N. E-Mail from (b)(1)1.4a -ODB-MED to (b)(1)1.4a -ODB-OPS 21 February 2010 2:24 PM
Subject: Wounded Personnel at FB (b)(1)1.4aFST and Dutch Uruzgan Medical Center, 3 pages

O. mIRC Chat Provided by CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) , 2 pages 21 February 2010

P. E-Mail from SOTF-SOUTH BATTLE CAPTAIN to CJSOTF-A JOC CHIEF 21 February 2010 9:28 AM
Subject: 5W

Q. E-Mail from SOTF-SOUTH BATTLE CAPTAIN to SOTF-SOUTH S2 OIC; SOTF-SOUTH MID CDR 21 February 2010 3:05 PM
Subject: Pocket Litter found on POI

R. E-Mail from SOTF-SOUTH BATTLE CAPTAIN to CJSOTF-A JOC CHIEF 21 February 2010 9:37 AM
Subject: RE: 5W, 2 pages

S. E-Mail from SOTF-SOUTH BATTLE CAPTAIN to CJSOTF-A JOC CHIEF 21 February 2010 9:56 AM
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T. E-Mail from SOTF-SOUTH BATTLE CAPTAIN to SOTF-SOUTH OPCEN DIRECTOR 21 February 2010 2:38 PM
Subject: General Answers to CDR's RFIs

U. E-Mail from CJSOTF-A CDR to SOTF-12 CDR 21 February 2010 3:18 PM
Subject: RE: FOX (b)(1)1.4a Engagement in West Oruzgan: CDR's initial cut 1000z, 6 pages

V. E-Mail from SOTF-SOUTH BATTLE CAPTAIN to SOTF-SOUTH CDR 21 February 2010 3:46 PM
Subject: RE: Answers to CDR's RFIs, 2 pages

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X.	E-Mail from SOTF-SOUTH CDR to CJSOTF-A CDR Subject: FW: Decision-making in Oruzgan, 3 pages	21 February 2010 5:22 PM
Y.	E-Mail from SOTF-SOUTH BATTLE CAPTAIN to SOTF-SOUTH CDR Subject: FW: General Answers to CDR's RFIs, 3 pages	21 February 2010 3:30 PM
Z.	E-Mail from SOTF-SOUTH BATTLE CAPTAIN to CJSOTF-A JOC CHIEF Subject: NOBLE JUSTICE V2.pptx, 9 pages	21 February 2010 11:20 AM
AA.	Intelligence Reporting Appendix	25 March 2010
BB.	TF (b)(1)1.4a FIR	21 February 2010
CC.	KIOWA Radio Traffic	21 February 2010
DD.	(b)(1)1.4a Supplement to COMISAF Tactical Directive	09 August 2009
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FF.	(b)(1)1.4a Air Crew Brief	21 February 2010
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HH.	(b)(1)1.4a Engagement Storyboard	21 February 2010
II.	11th Intel Squadron Processing Exploitation and Dissem.	21 February 2010
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RR.	9Line MEDEVAC Report MM(S) 02-21 (TK-GRID-TK NLD R2-TK)	21 February 2010
SS.	MEDEVAC Incident Patients Reports	211405DFEB10

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USCENTCOM CONSOLIDATED SERIAL ONE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR OPERATION ENDURING
FREEDOM MOD 002

152307Z Dec 06

1. (U) THIS DOCUMENT SUPERCEDES PRIOR ISSUED USCENTCOM CONSOLIDATED OEF ROE SERIAL ONE MOD 001, INCLUDES ALL MOD 002 CHANGES SUMMARIZED IN PARAGRAPH 10, AND CONSOLIDATES AND INCORPORATES PREVIOUSLY ISSUED CJCS AND USCENTCOM ROE MEASURES AND GUIDANCE FOR OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, INCLUDING A CONSOLIDATION OF CJCS ROE SERIAL TWO, WITH MODIFICATIONS 001 THROUGH 004, INTO ONE UNIFIED USCENTCOM ROE APPROVAL SERIAL FOR OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM IN THE AFGHANISTAN AREA OF OPERATIONS. SEE PARAGRAPH 8 FOR THOSE MEASURES WHICH REMAIN IN EFFECT OR ARE CANCELLED BY THIS MESSAGE. NOTHING IN THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED TO CONFER ANY ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY ABOVE THAT POSSESSED BY OR DELEGATED TO CDRUSCENTCOM. ANY SUPPOSED CONFLICTS BETWEEN THIS MESSAGE AND PRIOR AUTHORITY SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO THE IDENTIFIED POINTS OF CONTACT (POCS).

2. (U) U.S. NATIONAL POLICY.

3. (U) MILITARY POLICY. THE ROE CONTAINED IN THIS MESSAGE DO NOT LIMIT A COMMANDER'S INHERENT AUTHORITY AND OBLIGATION TO USE ALL NECESSARY MEANS AVAILABLE AND TO TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE ACTION IN SELF-DEFENSE OF THE COMMANDER'S UNIT AND OTHER U.S. FORCES IN THE VICINITY. SOUND JUDGMENT WILL BE REQUIRED AT ALL LEVELS OF COMMAND IN DETERMINING THE DEGREE OF FORCE NECESSARY FOR MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT. IN ADDITION TO ROE, A COMMANDER WILL BE REQUIRED TO CONSIDER THE ASSIGNED MISSION, THE CURRENT SITUATION, THE HIGHER COMMANDER'S INTENT, AND ALL OTHER AVAILABLE GUIDANCE IN DETERMINING HOW TO USE FORCE FOR MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT. IF USE OF FORCE IS NECESSARY FOR MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT OR TO RESPOND TO A HOSTILE ACT OR DEMONSTRATION OF HOSTILE INTENT, THAT USE OF FORCE WILL BE PROPORTIONAL IN THAT IT SHOULD BE REASONABLE IN INTENSITY, DURATION, AND MAGNITUDE, BASED ON ALL FACTS KNOWN TO THE COMMANDER AT THE TIME.

3.A. (U) ROE POLICY.

(b)(1)1.4a

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4.A. (U) ROE.

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