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MAJ [REDACTED] No I just do it automatically. It's a part of our reporting requirement; I have to do that...

COL [REDACTED] Let me clarify that, do you have to report to your Commander before you report to CFSOC?

MAJ [REDACTED] Not necessarily sir.

COL [REDACTED] Do you have to report potential CIVCAS to your Commander before you report to CFSOC?

MAJ [REDACTED] He never told me I have to, but that's something I make sure he knew before I go calling up to CFSOC.

LTC [REDACTED] Were any of the other leadership team in the JOC that morning?

MAJ [REDACTED] Not when I came in sir.

LTC [REDACTED] Correct. Who is in your Command team?

MAJ [REDACTED] No, Commander obviously COL [REDACTED], the DCO is COL [REDACTED] he's our XO in the rear, our SGM... SGM [REDACTED] and then our Command Chief Warrant Officer [REDACTED].

LTC [REDACTED] Who is your J3?

MAJ [REDACTED] J3 is COL [REDACTED]

LTC [REDACTED] Is COL?

MAJ [REDACTED] COL [REDACTED]

LTC [REDACTED] Did you discuss the strike with the Deputy Commander?

MAJ [REDACTED] No, In fact I didn't see him most of the morning sir.

LTC [REDACTED] How about with the J3?

MAJ [REDACTED] The J3 was in and out of the office and I believe he was on the phone with the 3 down at the SOTF as well.

LTC [REDACTED] Did you personally have a conversation with COL [REDACTED] about the strike that had occurred?

MAJ [REDACTED] Not beyond what I had with the COL, no I didn't.

LTC [REDACTED] So the only one you were updating was COL [REDACTED]?

MAJ [REDACTED] Right... and the J3 and the DJ3 MAJ [REDACTED] were in and out of the office when I updated as well. They came to the floor; I know SGM [REDACTED] updated them on some things if I was on the phone. COL [REDACTED] and MAJ [REDACTED] come on and off the floor 1,000 times a day, they were in and out a couple

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of times and I'm not the only person who briefs someone that comes on the floor. I might be the only one on the phone and then the NCOIC or the Battle CPT or the SGM.

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6) Other than the women and children on the strike site, what's the next time that you have any information about civilians being involved with the incident?

MAJ (b)(3),(b)(6) Alleged was the report that came out from TF (b)(1)1.4c that we talked about in the first interview. I took that directly down to the Commander and said hey the SOTF just reported that TF (b)(1)1.4c is going to be sending up a FIR on alleged CIVCAS. I believe that was on or about the time are GFC was on the ground as well.

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6) You said we took it down?

MAJ (b)(3),(b)(6) I took it down. I took it to the COL, not the FIR information.

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6) How did you find out that there was going to be a FIR?

MAJ (b)(3),(b)(6) From CPT (b)(3),(b)(6) he came up on the net and let me know.

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6) Before he actually sent you the FIR, you go down to COL (b)(3),(b)(6) office?

MAJ (b)(3),(b)(6) Yes sir, before I had it. COL (b)(3),(b)(6) was aware as well and I ran into him in the hallway and told him that the report I had just gotten from CPT (b)(3),(b)(6) right before I got into the office, and then we let COL (b)(3),(b)(6) know.

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6) To the best of your recollection what was in the report that CPT (b)(3),(b)(6). what did he tell you about the FIR?

MAJ (b)(3),(b)(6) Just that the OHS8 were now claiming that there were civilians on the target and they are putting up a FIR, and they were going to send that up through the RC.

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6) That there were civilians on the target or that there were civilians injured?

MAJ (b)(3),(b)(6) That there were civilians on the target, He may have said injured but there were civilians on the target, still a possible CIVCAS event. So obviously that would lend itself to believe that civilians were injured. We tracked that down to the Commander and like I said I don't remember if it was on or about when our GFC was on the ground, about that time.

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6) Okay, when you go down to COL (b)(3),(b)(6) describe that conversation?

MAJ (b)(3),(b)(6) We laid out for him [interrupted]

MG: Whose we?

MAJ (b)(3),(b)(6) It was I and COL (b)(3),(b)(6) sir. COL (b)(3),(b)(6) had been briefed on it as well, I don't know from whom. Maybe he was briefed by MAJ (b)(3),(b)(6) the 3 down there, that's who I'm assuming he talked to.



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As I said before that generally I like to grab DJ3 or J3 on my way to the office and let them know real quick, here's an update that I'm about to hit the Commander with. We told them about the report. COL (b)(3),(b)(6) acknowledged it and said, "Okay, got it." I remember COL (b)(3),(b)(6) saying we haven't had that report yet from CPT (b)(3),(b)(6) we don't have anything from (b)(3),(b)(6) that says this occurred or that this has happened and we got these casualties. That is where the discrepancy I think came in for CPT (b)(3),(b)(6) my communication error in telling him that we didn't require that FIR right now, we were still waiting on the information from our GFC. That was basically what I, COL (b)(3),(b)(6), and COL (b)(3),(b)(6) spoke of. I believe that matter of fact the JAG was in there with us as well. We said, "Yeah okay, that's what we're going to do, wait and determine what CPT (b)(3),(b)(6) has to say once he does his boots on the ground BDA."

MG: But at that point we knew; excuse me, we suspected that there were civilians on the target, is that correct?

MAJ (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes Sir.

MG: And on the one side, what, when we war-gaming it, waiting conformation, but we suspected there were civilians on the target site, tied to the objection, not on the theory that earlier they came from the nearby town, is that correct?

MAJ (b)(3),(b)(6): Yes Sir.

MG: That they were tied to those three vehicles.

MAJ (b)(3),(b)(6): Right.

MG: We draw a line now that they didn't come up; run up there 700 meters and they were on at the moment at the site.

MAJ (b)(3),(b)(6): Based on the aircraft commanders, yes sir. Based on his assessment.

MG: What was coming in from the Predator's feed immediately thereafter. At that time safely project, suspect, that they were tied to these three vehicles. Correct?

MAJ (b)(3),(b)(6): I think looking at it now, yes sir that is correct

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): Okay you, J3 and the lawyer all went into COL (b)(3),(b)(6) office. You told him what?

MAJ (b)(3),(b)(6): What I told you from CPT (b)(3),(b)(6) that the FIR was coming up of TF (b)(1)1.4c.

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): What did COL (b)(3),(b)(6) say?

MAJ (b)(3),(b)(6): He said, "Got it." Then we discussed what are our actions right now. Do we need to be doing concurrent reporting, do we need to be doing the same thing, we do not have a report from our GFC right now.

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6): As specifically as possible, when you say we discussed, what did COL (b)(3),(b)(6) what was his guidance to you for what you were suppose to do at that point?

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MAJ [REDACTED] Wait for the GFC's report.

LTC [REDACTED] At that point, best to your recollection, had you had any report from the GFC?

MAJ [REDACTED] No we were having a lot of difficulty determining what was going on the ground that day. I know the SOTF was as well.

LTC [REDACTED] When did you get the first report from the GFC?

MAJ [REDACTED] The time, I don't know sir.

LTC [REDACTED] Did you ever get a report that there were 7 MAMs evacuated from the site?

MAJ [REDACTED] We got that later on. It was a change from CPT [REDACTED] in one of the reports I had sent him to scrub, one of the storyboards, and he had said there were 7 EKIA. I am trying to remember where that was in the timeline. We got updates on the KIA it was always MAMs.

LTC [REDACTED] I am not talking about the KIA now, I am talking about the WIA. Did you ever get a report that it was 7 injured?

MAJ [REDACTED] That may have been the number. I know I reported WIA, I know I did that, and that they were EVAC'd off the site.

LTC [REDACTED] You mentioned storyboard, is this the storyboard that you did?

MAJ [REDACTED] Yes sir. That is the one that came back with the updates.

LTC [REDACTED] And how many WIA did you put down?

MAJ [REDACTED] Okay so maybe that was from the follow-on reports from CPT [REDACTED]

LTC [REDACTED] And how many did he change it to?

MAJ [REDACTED] 12.

LTC [REDACTED] And from your knowledge how did it go from 7 to 12?

MAJ [REDACTED] This update to me, and that right there, and I am assuming [REDACTED] from the GFC to him. We never heard from the GFC again after he left the village of Khod. We never heard anything on our JOC floor, it was all coming from what I could get on email and voice phone from CPT [REDACTED] What he gave me is what I reported up to Commander.

LTC [REDACTED] You don't know the source of the report that there were 7 injured.

MAJ [REDACTED] I assume it was the GFC.

LTC [REDACTED] Do you know the source of the 12 was?



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MAJ (b)(3),(b)(6) Passume the GFC. I don't know where else that would have come from, because that would have been contact between the SOTF and the ODA itself.

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6) Could you look at what is listed as update five on there?

MAJ (b)(3),(b)(6) Yes.

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6) Was that sent by you?

MAJ (b)(3),(b)(6) It was.

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6) Could you read that out loud.

MAJ (b)(3),(b)(6) ODA reports all personnel reconsolidating on objective Khod at this time; conducting BOGS FSC of (b)(1)1.4c strike site. ODA has updated BDA 15 KIA and 12 WIA, 6 WIA are located with Dutch and 6 WIA are located at FB Ripley with AOB. ODA commander reports he is already coordinating a follow-up KLE Shura within the next 24 hours to clear up any misconceptions related to strike earlier. Still awaiting ODA final assessment of ANP local atmospheric in the area. Then it goes on exfill planned for 1500Z, climax, incoming weather. Still need all available assets to support the litter, more to follow.

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6) What time is that report?

MAJ (b)(3),(b)(6) 1222Z, correction 1226Z.

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6) 1226Z so what time is that local?

MAJ (b)(3),(b)(6) Late afternoon. 15, 16; 1700 hours?

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6) Just prior to 1700. Is that correct?

MAJ (b)(3),(b)(6) Roger.

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6) Okay, now at this point you know where the wounded are correct?

MAJ (b)(3),(b)(6) Right

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6) So where would that information had come from?

MAJ (b)(3),(b)(6) The GFC, he gets relayed on MEDEVACs, those guys on the ground get relayed on the MEDEVAC. Anytime I send the wounded out, I know exactly where they are going, no matter who it is. He would have had that information.

LTC (b)(3),(b)(6) To your knowledge that information would not have come from Pegasus?

MAJ (b)(3),(b)(6) It could have come from anywhere else sir. It could have come from TK itself. From my understanding from CPT (b)(3),(b)(6) was, is that was the report from the GFC, so he sent it out. I mean he didn't get on the net and tell me that it came from anywhere else other than hey the ODA reports this.

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LTC [REDACTED] Did you ever get a copy of the [REDACTED] FIR?

MAJ [REDACTED] Somewhere along the line I did. I ended up sending the email to you a couple of days ago. It came in from, I think from, SGM [REDACTED]. But at the time I wasn't tracking its flow or trying to get it based on what was discussed with COL [REDACTED] and LTC [REDACTED] as we talked about earlier. LTC [REDACTED] had made a point that he said that he was going to get his hands on it. I never followed up with trying to get it.

LTC [REDACTED] So when you leave the meeting with COL [REDACTED], LTC [REDACTED] is suppose to get a copy of the FIR?

MAJ [REDACTED] He said he would run it to ground with MAJ [REDACTED] and find out where and what it was.

LTC [REDACTED] And what was your task?

MAJ [REDACTED] On that, nothing. I wasn't told go get the FIR or follow-up with the FIR, or what's the deal with the FIR. I simply reported that the report came in and it's pretty clear to me LTC [REDACTED] was going to run to ground MAJ [REDACTED]. S3 channels there are just some things that we elevate up to the J3 and the DJ3 that, that's fine; I don't have a responsibility for it at that point at all.

LTC [REDACTED] But when you left that meeting what tasks did you have from COL [REDACTED] any?

MAJ [REDACTED] Waiting on the GFC's update on what's going on, on the objective so I could come back and let us know so we could either start reporting if we need to, or do whatever or follow-on reporting is required for the operation. But that's implied tasks; he didn't directly stand up and say that is what you are going to do. That's what I was supposed to go do. Continue to battle track with what's going on and once the update comes up, let him know what the deal is.

LTC [REDACTED] Did you report the information that you got concerning the FIR to CFSOC?

MAJ [REDACTED] Came up on the net with MAJ [REDACTED] and I told the COL and LTC [REDACTED] that I would just let them know that was a report coming up. That we are watching for it and waiting on the GFC.

LTC [REDACTED] And you did have a conversation?

MAJ [REDACTED] I did with MAJ [REDACTED].

LTC [REDACTED] And what was the content of that conversation?

MAJ [REDACTED] Exactly what I just said sir that we knew that report was being generated and that it would come up from the [REDACTED] element.

LTC [REDACTED] What was his reaction?

MAJ [REDACTED] Roger.



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LT [REDACTED] To the best that you can recall, what time did you actually see that FIR, before or after you contacted the surgeon?

MAJ [REDACTED] The FIR, didn't see it until after. Looking back, I was trying to look for the time that it came in. I never read that thing until after we did our FIR. I never read the report.

LT [REDACTED] What time did you do your FIR?

MAJ [REDACTED] It came in sometime after 1545Z, because I didn't see the FIR until the next morning that never came in to me, the JOC Chief, itself until later after I came on shift. I never reviewed the FIR as part of the staffing process to go on to the J3 or anybody. And generally speaking the JOC Chief and SGM are not in the staffing process for the FIR. We might receive it and push it to the J3 but we won't take that FIR and break it down, and say these are things that need to go in it or not. We just push it through the J3 or the DJ3, or in this case I am sure [REDACTED] pushed it directly to the command team.

LT [REDACTED] At some point you contact your surgeon and ask him to check on the casualties correct?

MAJ [REDACTED] After I received the email files.

LT [REDACTED] He initiated that?

MAJ [REDACTED] They were tracking them through med channels. We knew that they are going to track the wounded through med channels. And then when he sent that report up and it came in and had the wounded women and child that's when it immediately came up on the net. "Okay this is a CIVCAS event or CJSOTF this is ours," and that was the point, of which at least I know between me and the J3 and the DJ3, that reporting was initiated; our official FIR documentation that needs to go down for that.

LT [REDACTED] I'm going to take you back to the storyboards. You stated the last time we spoke, you drafted the initial storyboard, correct?

MAJ [REDACTED] I did.

LT [REDACTED] You emailed that to CPT [REDACTED] correct?

MAJ [REDACTED] Yes sir.

LT [REDACTED] Did you have a conversation with CPT [REDACTED] on the phone, by the time you pushed him your draft and the time he sent you his corrections?

MAJ [REDACTED] I don't remember having one. I'd had one before. This is plain language what I told him, "You know the deal we are going to need a storyboard on this strike. Everyone and their brother just watched this strike go down on a thread screen. I know you are trying to get all the follow-on information right now; can I create the storyboard for you? Will that relieve some of the burden?" "Absolutely sir got it." I made it, we sent it down, and basically I sent it down for a sanity check. And then this is what he sent back in the red, I made the changes and then that's what we took down to COL

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[REDACTED] and said this is our initial cut of the storyboard. Knowing that he was going to have to let BG Reeder, basically come up on the net and give BG Reeder some kind of update of what's going on, on the ground.

LTC [REDACTED] Approximately what time did you create that storyboard?

MAJ [REDACTED] It's on the email, I don't even want to guess sir, and I know it is documented in there has the changes that he made and the one that I sent, but I couldn't tell what time it was.

LTC [REDACTED] Is that his email back to you?

MAJ [REDACTED] Yes that is it sir. This is the one that I brought back and highlighted during our first email.

LTC [REDACTED] And what time was that sent to you?

MAJ [REDACTED] 1202.

LTC [REDACTED] So by this point, do you already know that TF Pegasus has an FIR out there?

MAJ [REDACTED] At the time I don't know sir, I don't want to guess. And I am not trying to hide it, if I knew that it was before that I would tell you.

LTC [REDACTED] When you sent the email, or storyboard down to CPT [REDACTED] what if any direction did you give him as to what corrections to make?

MAJ [REDACTED] I sat him down and said "Can you give me a sanity check on this; am I tracking the same thing you are?"

LTC [REDACTED] At any point did you tell him not to mention women and children on the site?

Absolutely not.

LTC [REDACTED] If he tells us that you did, in your estimation, is he being untruthful?

MAJ [REDACTED] Since I didn't say that, at no time whatsoever, did I ever tell CPT [REDACTED] not to report that there was civilians on the objective whether written or verbal.

LTC [REDACTED] Did you ever show the FIR to COL [REDACTED]

MAJ [REDACTED] Which one sir?

LTC [REDACTED] The TF [REDACTED].

MAJ [REDACTED] I do not know.

LTC [REDACTED] Did COL [REDACTED] ever indicate that he did not want to read the FIR report?