

STATEMENT OF COL (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) did not talk to him. He is not in my chain. I talk directly to Gen Reeder (b)(3), (b)(6) will copy me on most traffic. If I think it is really important I will forward it to Gen Reeder and I (b)(3), (b)(6) up at the CFSOC-A as parallel reporting. I will either electronically or physically come over here and work this circuit of the hallway. Make sure the fire officers are tracking and the CJOC is tracking as well.

(b)(3), (b)(6) have you discussed with anyone how we went from 7 to 12 injured MEDEVAC?

(b)(3), (b)(6) haven't. I am not the commander so I try not to inject myself into command issues. That question was being worked, to get to the root of. How could this be this far off?

MG: There was a lot of dialog between LT (b)(3), (b)(6) and COL (b)(3), (b)(6) Do you know anything about it?

(b)(3), (b)(6) just here say. He's being fed information from all angles. (b)(3), (b)(6) instinct was to slow everyone down, and reassess the situation. He's biggest lesson learned he needed to assert that direction into the situation.

MG: Would you be surprised, that LT (b)(3), (b)(6) did not talk to the guys on the ground?

(b)(3), (b)(6) probably hadn't.

MG: When did you first know that there were CIVCAS?

(b)(3), (b)(6) when I received that email updating the numbers from 7 to 12.

(b)(3), (b)(6) At 1845, we had a horizontal VTC with everyone. CFSOC briefed the boss that there no CIVCAS, was that because we hadn't clarified?

(b)(3), (b)(6) get in that VTC and Gen Reeder jumped to give the facts of what things were.

MG: What were those facts?

(b)(3), (b)(6) not sure; I think he was going off the original report, of 7 and no CIVCAS.

(b)(3), (b)(6) The most surprising thing we are finding out is that the day after they were still reporting no CIVCAS. Our reporting procedures continued to show goose egg evening that next morning.

(b)(3), (b)(6) know Gen Hodges briefed that concern to (b)(1)1.4c as well. The commander's report was very specific but inaccurate. That was baffling to me. Gen Reeder, everyone is frustrated that this has happened. Then for the reporting to be so messed up was also frustrating.

MG: Is that anything else you like to share?

(b)(3), (b)(6) Yes as we continue to evolve and how we apply the military to these types of problem set. We need to update our lexicon as well. CIVCAS, they are all civilians, whether male, female, or child. Our language is not clear. We need to adopt criminal terms in terms of how we describe people. You are either innocent or liable, or accomplice liability. So applying a teenage boy driving five rifle touting guys

STATEMENT OF COL (b)(3), (b)(6)

to the firefight then there is some accomplice liability. We have to think about this, this is only part of insurgency, when you study insurgency over time people always wrestle with this. The reference of terms to describe the enemy. But at the end of the day they are members of the populace and are all civilians. The first step is to get our terminology straight. What you say, is what you do.

MG: Are any other recommendations you'd like to add?

(b)(3), (b)(6) sir.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT _____ DATED 2010/02/28

STATEMENT (Continued)

STATEMENT ATTACHED

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 10. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____ at _____

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 10 OF 10 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
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5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS LTC/AD
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8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
15th Recon Squadron

9. I, LTC (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Original statement was taken on 8 March 2010. The statement begins on page 2 and ends on page 11.
The rest of this page was intentionally left blank.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF <u>12</u> PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

AF LTC (b)(3), (b)(6), CDR, 15th RECON SQDN

Explanation of investigation.

Sworn, Privacy Act Statement, Recording.

No objections.

(b)(3), (b)(6) What was shared with you that caused some concern?

(b)(3), (b)(6) Nothing in-particular was shared. Some of the folks that you already spoke to expressed a little bit of concern as far as the questions that were asked of them, they didn't get into details because they weren't allowed to, but more of a background of maybe not everyone understanding or beginning at a common reference point with the roles and responsibilities with the predator crew and some of the ROE implementations and the requirements for us to employ.

(b)(3), (b)(6) You are going to have to articulate more clearly what the concern was or what was communicated by the type of questions. What was shared with you that caused this concern?

(b)(3), (b)(6) It's hard for me to say specifically. It was as the folks came through in my office talking to me about it, and said that some of the questions they got the impression that maybe there wasn't a really good understanding or a common reference point on what their role and responsibility was and again in reference to them vs. DGS vs. the JTAC. Also what is required of us to employ. The other thing was that they got the impression from you guys that in some way some of the questions they were concerned with the impression that maybe they were out to employ weapons no matter what.

(b)(3), (b)(6) Have you read the internal transcript all 75 pages?

(b)(3), (b)(6) Yes.

(b)(3), (b)(6) I'm interested in your assessment or why you think it isn't stated in there about 14 times the desire to employ doesn't mean that.

(b)(3), (b)(6) When you say the desire to employ in what particular do you mean desire to employ?

(b)(3), (b)(6) We will get to that and I will go through the multiple times where your sensor operator or pilot in their discussions both the first and second sensor operator their comments, their predisposition their overruling of the assessments of the screener their disbelief of the screener callouts. Which clearly is confusing as it doesn't get translated in the same manner from the screener down to the ground. We have cross-walked all of the chat logs and there is a disconnect in there. It is ok if you are going to tell me that the pilot and sensor operators have the authority to overrule the screener. We are really confused with the duties and responsibilities if in fact the pilot and sensor operator, routinely during this

operation made their own assessment and either added or took away from the screener assessment. If you haven't done that kind of rigger, that is ok, but I would recommend you consider doing that for your own internal AAR so you can tighten up your shot group a little bit. We have done that line by line. I just suggest to you and I am interested for you to coach us here and we are going to get it all on tape and it will be a great educational experience for us. I sense something in your phone call as well. That is what we have done to cross walk this dog. Linked with the education you're giving us. I want you to characterize this discussion it is not taken out of context. If you don't have a copy of this in front of you, just trust me that I am not making this up. This starts at 0107Z on the internal chat. MC: Screener said at least one child near SUV. Sensor: Bullshit, where? Sensor: Send me a "blinking" still I don't think they have kids out at this hour, I know they are shady but come on. Pilot: At least one child really? Listing a MAM that means he is guilty. Sensor: Well maybe a teenager but I having seen anything that short, granted they are all group together but come on. MC: They are reviewing. Pilot: Yeah review that "blinking" why didn't he say possible child? Why are so quick to call "blinking" kids but not to call a "blinking" rifle? I get internal discussions and I get crew discussions. I am an infantry guy. I lived on the ground most of my career. I am just giving you one snapshot. As we are reading this in laymen, in this kind of dialogue it permeates the internal chat. It permeates the internal chat when it is in reference to this could be something other than a threat. Whether it's "they are going west to egress" the response is "they are flanking". Whether it is a kid, I get a response like "bullshit". Whether it is an assessment of a woman, I get a response of "bullshit it is a man dressed in women's clothes with earrings. I understand what you just coached us on and that really was helpful and it colors it in for us, but when we are reading this and cross-walking against the mIRC chat and seeing what is being reported down. There is a real disconnect. We have a problem when we are seeing this. Look it is not the colorful language. I am an infantry dude I get it. I got that I got the colorful language. It is not that my sensors are offended, they aren't. What I am bothered by is what came from the screener, what goes to this crew discussion, and the output piece is different. Where in that discussion that I just read you, do you sense that they missed it, the screeners didn't have it, or something? Where in that dialogue, and again I am not taking this out of context, I can keep reading. It is not out of context. What am I missing as I take those three examples as a point of illustration from what you are coaching me on right now?

(b)(3), (b)(6) The only thing I can really say, that I have to say, between you and me, well it's on the record but.... There was some inappropriate language and I know you said you are not offended, but it is not very professional and I have already been talking to my pilot and sensor about this. If you look it is an internal dialogue. Part of it comes from, in the past DGS has a tendency to not commit to certain things. When I say commit to certain things that is both a weapons firing or a military age male or the other way around children. I think it is a frustration you are seeing in the crew with DGS not actually making a final call because we get possible this and possible that.

(b)(3), (b)(6) You know what, I do get the unfortunate privilege of having 20/20 vision. So I know for example there were no weapons on the objective. I know for example because of all the other technologies that we have applied to this that it wasn't a threat formation. I know for example that there were 10 men

and women in the convoy. So when I am at the screeners readiness to confirm and then their factual representation of what they are seeing vs. the embellished target description and the assessment by the predator guys fed to the people on the ground. I can see, because I know what the end state is. I get to see this movie from the end back. Watching it from the end back it becomes pretty clear where we started to create inadvertently based upon past scabs an impression on the ground that doesn't actually exist. Here is another one just to cycle through.

(b)(3), (b)(6) this particular one it is just a quick internal conversation then about a minute later the pilot passes (b)(1), (b)(4) possible rifle and then two possible children near the SUV. In addition the GFC has the screener saying that two children near the rear of the SUV and nowhere in there does the pilot or the MC discuss any dissenting opinion on that.

(b)(3), (b)(6) that I am trying to show you right now and you made the comment "intent to shoot". I am going to paint a couple of things for you and if we have it wrong we have no problem being corrected. We are investigating, we don't have a dog in the fight, other than trying to paint this thing. At every point, and you look at this log, and every time there is a representation of something other than a target until after the strike there is push-back.

(b)(3), (b)(6) that push-back with any outside agencies or is it just internal to the pilot, sensor, and MC?

(b)(3), (b)(6) internal to the pilot and sensors. I am going to give you another example go to 0059 where it says "that is what they have been doing lately they wrap their "blank" up in their man dresses so you can't PID it" Sensor: yeah just like the one a couple of weeks ago, they were on those guys for hours, never saw them like a sling, but the pictures we got them blown up on the ground had all sorts of stuff. I am assuming that is what he meant probably shit or whatever it doesn't matter. Again how does that come into imagery analyst? That's tactical....

(b)(3), (b)(6) again they are not doing the imagery analysis; they are not in that discussion with the folks who are doing that imagery analysis. They don't let that cloud their conversations with the outside agencies. What they are discussing right there is that we have seen a history recently where they do hide their weapons and when you say dresses so you can't PID it. That is PID so they can't positively identify the weapon. They saw in a previous instance that they had PIDd something prior, were hiding something, and were called in to strike and they had weapons and explosive and mortar rounds and all that other kind of stuff.

(b)(3), (b)(6) you this is all innocent; this is not a predisposition to do anything?

(b)(3), (b)(6) is not innocent.

(b)(3), (b)(6) don't care about the language I don't. That is not my issue and if you want to work on their language and professionalism that is fine I have no problem with that. That doesn't mean much to me. I am just looking at the themes.

(b)(3), (b)(6) understand. It looks like my guys are leaning for a strike, part of that is that they kind of have to in some ways based on the platform they are flying. Very specific, very definitive things have to happen before they can squeeze the trigger and have a missile off the rail.

(b)(3), (b)(6) will come to that. We are blind on that and the comment of proclivity to fire vs. actually firing could be as narrow line or as broad as the Atlantic and you are going to educate us on that. I want you to go to O111 it says "yeah I saw those two dudes wrestling". Then the next line and you can explain to me this imagery or tactical maneuver because I don't get it. Pilot: They probably are really using "blank blank" human shields here, that is probably what that is, SENSOR: Let's see if the SUV is in toe here. Pilot: (b)(1)1.4c be advised there was a brief scuffle in the bed of the hilux prior to its departure looks to be potential use of human shields; but definite suspicious movement and definite tactical movement. Now I am with you, but this is the second that I am highlighting but the first particular one where.... Walk me through how your pilot can determine potential use of human shields translate that to the GFC and then tell me if you are on the ground what you think that it.

(b)(3), (b)(6) at I cannot answer you right now. The guy who is flying has been doing this a few years now and has been looking at a lot of video feed. I will be honest with you saying that it looks to be potential human shields is not his call.

(b)(3), (b)(6) am with you and that makes sense to me, that does, but what I am going to ask you to do is tonight over a glass of wine or whatever is to go over this thing. That is not an isolated example. If my count is right there is about 19 entries where it kind of communicated a predisposition or proclivity to make sure that this was confirmed a good target. Then there were about 13 instances where there was either an embellishment or a change up or down of the screener assessment. We are ok with that is that is the pilot or sensors job. We just think that it is probably not their exact lane and for us to put that together we are linking things. You who have done this obviously a heck of a long time who oversees all of it probably can put a finer comb through this and figure out what you can do training wise if in fact those things are accurate.

(b)(3), (b)(6) agree. As far as the embellishment or the changing of what the screener is saying, you said there is like 13 times now. Granted I haven't gone through it as detailed as you guys are sifting through this stuff. The keys are adolescent vs. child and passing that to (b)(1)1.4c When my pilots passes that to (b)(1)1.4c in particular I have not seen the change from the screener to (b)(1)1.4c

(b)(3), (b)(6) you only look at that you will find the dialogue reference the teenagers, enemy, and MAM you will see the pilot's personal assessment to that, which is different from the screener. There is also a linkage from the screener saying adolescent and your guys tie it to military age capable etc. You can focus on that and you will find two or three off the top of my head where there is an adjustment to that. Our assessment is if you are on the ground and you believe you have enough to designate this as a threat and your eye in the sky is telling you that he thinks he seen the use of human shields. As the guy on the ground that reinforces assessments and assumptions when we are really looking for the predator

guys to give us facts and pictures and technical assessments. That goes into and contributes to some of the picture making that the GFC was going through. Does that make sense to you?

(b)(3), (b)(6) Yes I understand where you are going with that. I understand and for the most part agree with you. That's one small piece obviously in a larger picture when it says possible use of human shields. If someone is going to fire based on that then there is a lot more problems that we are looking at here.

(b)(3), (b)(6) Absolutely, but when you get 19 or so inputs that help paint that picture that add to what I absolutely agree with you the growing but gapped assessment that the GFC makes because he just doesn't have what he needs to have. That is why you guys are there. Then it all starts to come together. It is not the smoking gun don't misunderstand me. It contributes to the picture that the GFC is making.

(b)(3), (b)(6) that I would agree with you. To me there is a certain number of key things here the adolescent vs. child, the weapons that were PIDd from the screeners. My read on this and looking through here the last thing you read to me I will agree with you, it is not the right call on the pilot, he shouldn't have thrown in what he thinks is happening especially if the screener is not saying that. As far as the adolescents are concerned the DGS called out adolescents a couple of times and the pilot passed that to JAG specifically.

(b)(3), (b)(6) got both of those. The disconnect with that was you had the discussion with (b)(1)1.4c and the pilot where (b)(1)1.4c sharing hey we see some teens who are big enough to pick up a weapon and the discussion between the pilot and the screener is the screener confirms adolescent. The screeners assessment of adolescent is 7-13 and person on the grounds assessment of adolescent is 15. The pilot is taking this information and saying yep after (b)(1)1.4c says could be old enough to pick up a weapon the pilot then says yep screener confirmed adolescent. That dialogue if you are only on the ground and you can't see the screener or hear the screener because you don't have mIRC on the ground. You only hear the pilot confirming yep teen, military aged, military capable move out. That is how it gets interpreted because you don't hear the only report that the screener said adolescent. The screener never said combatant, teen, military age, or combat capable. That is dialogue between ground and pilot not ground and screener. That is where that seem comes in, is it a hair kind of, but the screener never said anything other than adolescent.

(b)(3), (b)(6) understand.

(b)(3), (b)(6) because you are the Commander this testimony is really for you to educate us on everything you all do, but also to consider a review of this thing and figure out whether this was just a bad day or in fact is this some trends that you may need to look at because you guys run such a high OPTEMPO supporting all of these conflicts. I don't know only you can put a finger on that. I could keep going through these I have a handful of other examples that are only going to demonstrate a disconnect between the screener pilot and ground guy. Of which each of them because there isn't a common vocabulary are a little disconnected

(b)(3), (b)(6)S.

(b)(3), (b)(6) Could you educate us on this what is the duty of the sensor operator?

(b)(3), (b)(6) is a specific crew responsibility. It is to manipulate the sensor ball as far as focus zoom in and zoom out as well as turning on and off the laser whether it is the IR strobe or the LRD to guide a missile in if a shot gets taken. As a crew member you are expecting them to utilize judgment and input into what is happening.

(b)(3), (b)(6) is you have a sensor operator whose response to a call out of children is "bullshit" do you think he is likely to be focusing on potential for children or is he only looking for weapons or trying to confirm that this is a target?

(b)(3), (b)(6) that is not the sensors responsibility to confirm weapons either way.

(b)(3), (b)(6) but he manipulates the sensor ball right?

(b)(3), (b)(6)S.

(b)(3), (b)(6) yes he use judgment on where to focus that sensor ball.

(b)(3), (b)(6) some circumstances yes. The pilot is really the Mission Commander and is telling the sensor to move that ball up, down, left, right, zoom in, or zoom out. For instance if it is a JTAC on the radio or someone who is in mIRC the bottom line is the GFC owns the sensor so if they are saying zoom in or out that is what they should be doing as well.

(b)(3), (b)(6) would you expect your pilot to give instructions that tells the sensor "you do whatever you think is right, you put it wherever you think is right you are as experienced as I am"?

(b)(3), (b)(6) know what you are referencing right now. The directions for following the strike and as far as where to look, yes there is a possibility of the pilot saying use your judgment to put the ball where you think it needs to be. He is a fairly experienced sensor operator and he is going to follow whether it is the largest group or he is looking for weapons, he thinks he sees children he will follow the children whatever it is there are times the pilot will say hey make sure you put the sensor where you think it needs to go.

(b)(3), (b)(6) back to the question; do you think if you have a sensor operator whose response to a call out of children is "bullshit" do you think that sensor operator when he is using his own judgment is looking for children or are they just looking to confirm that this is a target?

(b)(3), (b)(6) don't think that they are just going to be looking to confirm the target. I think they are going to continue looking to see if there are children or if they think there are children they are going to try to focus on that as well. If you look at the video it is not a one or another thing. The video itself is going to be, depending on how far zoomed in they are, you can do both at the same time. I know that sounds

like I am being evasive but I am not. It is not just one thing or the other, you don't look for weapons but disregard children and vice versa. Everyone is looking at the feed and doing trend analysis they will be looking at the overall conduct of the mission.

(S)(b), (b)(6) This is the last one I will pull out to read. This is from the pilot and I know you said he is experienced. At 0158 Sensor: Try to stay with the largest group but I imagine they are going to run like hell all over the place Pilot: Like I said do whatever makes the most sense to you don't wait for me to tell you what to do you can do it just as well as I can. So whatever you think makes sense I am with you, just follow whoever gives you the best opportunity to do something and ends in us shooting.

(S)(b), (b)(6) know how that sounds. What they are doing is setting a squirter contract which is what happens with us. If there is a strike that happens that takes out a vehicle or building or a raid goes down something like that. Obviously in a dynamic situation things go down quickly. What he is saying that if someone hits the vehicle and you have squirters, make sure you follow what you think makes sense for our follow on contract if we are going to be shooting. I know it ends with us shooting, he is setting himself up to employ weapons if he needs to. I think they are on the assumption of someone else hits the vehicles first that there is a possibility to be asked in a follow on circumstance to be able to continue shooting. That one right there I know what it looks like, but I can tell you right now that is a plan for follow on and there may not be time for the pilot to tell him where to go. He is telling the sensor to follow the group that makes sense in that particular circumstance.

(S)(b), (b)(6) guess what we are struggling with is this captain in your command shared with us that he is an expert communicator and his strength is that. As we read through this frankly we believed him until we got the internal chat. What you just described is not in here. What you just described is excellent communication. Clear, I am an infantry guy and I got it. I didn't get any of that from here, none of it, and nor do any of the other eight guys on our team that are looking through this thing. It doesn't even come close to that, what you just described is perfect.

(S)(b), (b)(6) do have some concerns with the communication and the professionalism in the way the pilot and sensor communicated back and forth. I am already dealing with that. But you also have two folks who essentially live and breathe with each other and this pilot and sensor have probably spent hundreds of hours sitting in the same seat next to each other so when they say that there have been multiple briefs prior to that on who has what responsibility and how they are going to operate as a crew. These two guys for the last couple of years have been together on shift together they have the same weekends, they cycle through the schedule over and over together. I am not making an excuse for that particular brief that he is giving the sensor, I am just looking at it having sat in the seat before I can read that and know exactly what he is talking about and what he wants him to do. It was not communicated in the correct manner by any means.

BATTERY BREAK

(S)(b), (b)(6) explain to us what the safety observer does.

(b)(3), (b)(6) a kinetic situation where we are going to employ weapons or we asked to buddy laser to guide in a weapon, whether it is a Hell Fire from an Apache or a GPU12 from an F16, any time we are going to be involved in with a kinetic situation the crew calls out a safety observer. The safety observer is usually an experienced supervisor within the squadron to act as an extra set of eyes and ears while that is going down.

(b)(3), (b)(6) let you know when the safety observer came on in this case, he was able to identify some things that did not appear to be accurate or appear to be what was being developed. I thought it pretty remarkable with the little SA that he had he was able to come in and make some pretty quick analysis and decisions and have some pretty insightful questions.

(b)(3), (b)(6) you have a particular time that you are referring to?

(b)(3), (b)(6) came on board around 0416Z. On the first entry he was putting in some input to assist the pilot or the sensor. Then he started providing his input to the team. That is why I thought the safety observer had a larger part other than just kinetic. I thought he had a responsibility of QCing the team or providing coaching to the team.

LTC: It is mandatory if we are going to employ or guide weapons in. There are times, and we have a pretty inexperienced Squadron right now a lot of Lieutenants right now, they use the safety anytime there is weather in the air or they are trying to make a tricky hand over. There is always someone that you can pick up the phone and say hey I need a little help over here. Now as far as the safety observer getting SA it is my understanding that he comes in right around when rounds start impacting. Then obviously they are doing strange things after the weapons impact. Had the safety observer not been there I believe the sensor operator would have started picking up those sorts of weird things happening, because after seeing a number of us doing the shooting or someone else doing the shooting, there is almost a predictable set of actions that happen to enemy forces after a kinetic strike.

(b)(3), (b)(6) guess the reason why I wouldn't agree with that is the following: 0423 Safety: Are they wearing burkaks? Sensor: That is what it looks like. Pilot: They were all PIDd as males though no females in the group. Sensor: That guy looks like he is wearing jewelry and stuff like a girl, but he isn't, if he is a girl he is a big one. When you read that don't you think to yourself "my sensor did not notice or could not tell or did not believe his eyes about the burkakh and jewelry and for whatever reason he had a predisposition to believe that it was a guy? If he is not able to discern that why would we think he is going to pick up something that is not as obvious?

(b)(3), (b)(6) that is also the sensor saying that is weird, as some of these things are happening.

(b)(3), (b)(6) you go back it is the safety observer who first says that is weird and plants that term into their head. Because you don't see it until the safety observer comes into the game and then you see that line of thinking. We don't know what you know. We are cross-walking this with a pure eye and just trying to figure this out. It is hard for us not to come to some assessments of our own. A predisposition an