

**DRONES / CENTCOM / 2163 DIF**



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# AGENDA

- Why is this important?
- Defining the terms
- Lead Up
- Shift Change
- The Call
- BDA
- Reporting
- Improvements

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## Why Is This Important?

- **SOTF-SOUTH** was responsible for a significant **CIVCAS** incident
- We need to learn from this mistake and ensure it does not happen again
- We must protect the population
- We can help the **GFC** make sound decisions by asking the right questions and utilizing our procedures to prevent future **CIVCAS**

TAB CC  
3 of

002103



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# DEFINITIONS

**TIC** - AN ENGAGEMENT OCCURRING WHEN FRIENDLY FORCES RECEIVE **DIRECT OR INDIRECT FIRES** (NOT A LEGAL OR DOCTRINAL TERM) WE ARE ALSO STATING THAT THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A TIC AND AN AIR TIC, ONLY THE ASSETS THAT ARE PUSHED.

**PID** - A REASONABLE CERTAINTY THAT THE OBJECT OF THE ATTACK IS A **LEGITIMATE MILITARY TARGET\*** IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ROE. (CENTCOM ROE, 15 DEC 06)

\* **HOSTILE INTENT OR COMMITTING HOSTILE ACT**

**HOSTILE INTENT** - THE **THREAT OF IMMINENT USE OF FORCE** AGAINST THE US, US FORCES, OR OTHER DESIGNATED PERSONS AND PROPERTY. IT IS ALSO INCLUDES THE THREAT OF FORCE USED TO PRECLUDE OR IMPEDE THE MISSION AND/OR DUTIES OF US FORCES INCLUDING THE RECOVERY OF US PERSONNEL AND VITAL US GOVERNMENT PROPERTY. (SROE, 13 JUNE 2005)

**IMMINENT USE OF FORCE**- THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST US FORCES IS IMMINENT\* WILL BE **BASED ON AN ASSESSMENT OF ALL FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES KNOWN TO US FORCES AT THE TIME** AND MAY BE MADE AT ANY LEVEL. IMMINENT DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN IMMEDIATE OR INSTANTANEOUS. (SROE, 13 JUNE 2005)

\* IMMINENT MEANS ABOUT TO HAPPEN OR OCCUR; SOMETHING THAT WILL TAKE PLACE VERY SOON

**HOSTILE ACT**- AN **ATTACK OR OTHER USE OF FORCE** AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, US FORCES OR OTHER DESIGNATED PERSONS OR PROPERTY. IT ALSO INCLUDES FORCES USED DIRECTLY TO PRECLUDE OR IMPEDE THE MISSION AND/OR DUTIES OF US FORCES, INCLUDING THE RECOVERY OF US PERSONNEL OR VITAL USG PROPERTY. (SROE, 13 JUNE 2005)

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4 of



# SOTF-SOUTH OPERATIONAL TERMS

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## LEAD UP

02 2206Z FEB10: ODA [redacted] / ANA / ANP INFIL OBJ KHOD TO CONDUCT CLEARANCE. (b)(1)1.4a

02 2211Z FEB10: RECEIVING [redacted] (b)(1)1.4c

02 2216Z FEB10: [redacted] ESTABLISHED ASSAULT AND SBF POSITIONS (b)(1)1.4a

02 2230Z FEB10: [redacted] (b)(1)1.4c

02 2245Z FEB10: [redacted] (b)(1)1.4c

02 0015Z FEB10: PREDATOR OBSERVED TWO MOVING VEHICLES NORTH OF THE OBJECTIVE DROPPING OFF PAX IN STAGGERED LOCATIONS. ALSO OBSERVED 25 MAMS MOVING SOUTH ON THE EAST SIDE OF THE RIVER.

02 0056Z FEB10: [redacted] REPORTED 2-3 VEHICLES WITH 25-30 DISMOUNTS AND EQUIPMENT IN ONE ELEMENT MOVING SOUTH. 18-25 PAX IN A SECOND ELEMENT AND THAT THE PREDATOR PID WEAPONS IN A GROUP OF 50 MAMS. (b)(1)1.4a

02 0106 Z FEB10: PREDATOR REPORTED ONE CHILD NEAR VEHICLES.

02 0107 Z FEB10: PREDATOR REPORTED TWO CHILDREN IVO VEHICLES.

02 0108Z FEB10: AC-130 WENT OFF STATION. THIRTY MINUTES LATER, A THIRD VEHICLE JOINS THE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED VEHICLES.

02 0137Z FEB10: PAIR OF OH-58'S ENROUTE. GFC REQUESTED THAT ALL AIR ASSETS LOITER SOUTH OF FB [redacted] IN AN ATTEMPT TO LET THE SITUATION DEVELOP. DECLARED AIR TIC IOT PUSH A-10'S TO ASSIST GF WITH PERCEIVED IMMINENT USE OF FORCE BY AAF (b)(1)1.4a

02 0156Z FEB10: PREDATOR REPORTED THAT A MAM PICKED A WEAPON UP.

02 0215Z FEB10: F-15 ON STATION FLIES DIRECTLY OVER OBJ. FSO CLOSES AIR TIC AND PUSH ALL AIR ASSETS OFF OBJECTIVE AT THE REQUEST OF THE GFC.

02 0302 Z FEB10: PREDATOR REPORTED A MAM PASSING A RIFLE TO ANOTHER MAM.

02 0306Z FEB10: PREDATOR REPORTED ONE ADOLESCENT NEAR VEHICLE AND NO FEMALES OBSERVED.

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002105  
5 of 5



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# LEAD UP (cont.)

•WHAT SHOULD HAVE HAPPENED THAT DIDN'T

•NBC SHOULD HAVE RECONFIRMED WITH THE GFC THAT HIS DECISION TO KEEP CCA/CAS OFF THE OBJ AND TO LET THE SITUATION DEVELOP HAD NOT CHANGED. NBC DID NOT VERIFY ANY CHANGES IN THE GFC'S PREVIOUS DECISION BASED ON HIS ASSUMPTION THAT AS THE VEHICLES WERE MOVING AWAY FROM THE OBJECTIVE, RATHER THAN TOWARDS, THE GFC WOULD NOT CHANGE HIS PLAN AND WOULD CONTINUE TO LET THE SITUATION DEVELOP.

•BASED ON THE FACT THAT A TIC WAS OPENED, REGARDLESS OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE NBC SHOULD HAVE INITIATED THE WAKE UP CRITERIA, WAKING THE OPCEN DIRECTOR, OPCEN SGM, [redacted] AND SOTF CDR. NIGHT OPCEN PAX HAVE BEEN BRIEFED: UTILIZE THE WAKE UP CRITERIA IN PROGRESSIVE ESCALATION, EVERY TIC DOES NOT NECESSARILY MERIT INITIATING WAKE UP CRITERIA, AND UNLESS THE TIC IS SUCH THAT OUR PAX ARE RECEIVING EFFECTIVE FIRE, WE SHOULD WAIT UNTIL THE SITUATION DEVELOPS BEFORE INITIATING WAKE UP CRITERIA.

TAB CC  
6 OF  
002106



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# SHIFT CHANGE

- 0315Z, NBC INFORMED THE DBC OF THE SITUATION CONCERNING THE THREE VEHICLES AND PAX. NBC GAVE DBC A COPY OF ALL SALT REPORTS, EXPLAINING THE [REDACTED] AND PROGRESS OF FOX 24, AND INFORMED DBC OF THE LOCATION AND PROGRESS OF THE VEHICLES. NBC ALSO INFORMED DBC OF THE REPORTS OF CHILDREN AND WEAPONS.
- NBC DID NOT INFORM DBC OF THE GFC'S CURRENT INTENT FOR CCA / CAS
- WHAT WAS THE PICTURE PAINTED FOR THE DAY SHIFT
  - VEHICLES WERE POTENTIALLY RESPONDING TO ENEMY CDR'S CALL TO MUSTER FORCES AND MANEUVERING TO ATTACK FROM THE SOUTH
- WHAT WERE DAY SHIFT'S ACTIONS
  - INFORMED THE [REDACTED] OF THE CURRENT SITUATION
- WHAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DONE DIFFERENTLY
  - ALERTED THE OPEN DIRECTOR / SGM UPON LEARNING OF SITUATION
- WHY WASN'T THIS DONE
  - DBC WAS STILL ALLOWING THE SITUATION TO DEVELOP

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# THE CALL

- APPROXIMATELY 0345Z, CJSOTF-A CDR CALLED, LOOKING TO SPEAK WITH THE SOTF CDR
- DBC AWAKE THE CDR AND EXPLAINED THE CURRENT SITUATION
- WHAT WAS THE PICTURE THAT WAS PAINTED FOR THE SOTF CDR
  - THE SUMMARY OF WHAT THE LAST 4 HOURS OF ISR HAD OBSERVED AND A SUMMARY OF THE SALT-A REPORTS FROM THE ODA. ENEMY FORCES WERE POTENTIALLY MANEUVERING TO THE SOUTHWEST AND POSSIBLY POSITIONING TO ATTACK THE GAF.
- WHAT COA WAS DECIDED UPON
  - 0350Z-0415Z, FSO, DBC, AND SOTF CDR DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITY OF **CONDUCTING AVI** OF VEHICLES TO DETERMINE THEIR INTENTIONS. CDR DECIDES UPON THIS COA AND OPCEN BEGINS COORDINATIONS.
- WAS THIS RELAYED TO THE TEAM
  - NO – THERE WAS VIRTUALLY SECONDS AFTER THIS COA WAS ANNOUNCED BY THE CDR AND THE 1<sup>ST</sup> VEHICLE WAS ENGAGED
- WHAT EVENTS LED UP TO THE STRIKE
  - 0350Z, TF [REDACTED] REPORTS OH-58'S BINGO AND RTB TO TK FOR REFUEL.
  - 0407Z, PREDATOR REPORTS THAT THE **TWO CHILDREN PREVIOUSLY SEEN WERE ASSESSED AS ADOLESCENTS**.
  - 0415Z, PREDATOR REPORTS THAT OH-58S WERE **CLEARED TO ENGAGE** THE VEHICLES. ONE MINUTE LATER, **SPLASH** WAS REPORTED.
- WHAT ACTIONS COULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN JUST PRIOR TO THE STRIKE
  - COULD HAVE VERIFIED THE GFC'S INTENT WITH THE AIR ASSETS

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002108


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# BDA

- HOW LONG AFTER THE STRIKE WAS BDA
  - OVER 3 HOURS, ADDITIONALLY, ISR HAD TO BE PULLED OFF THE SITE DUE TO THE WEATHER
- WAS CIVCAS CONFIRMED DURING BDA
  - WHAT WAS REPORTED WAS 15X EKIA, WITH 3X WOMAN AND 3X CHILDREN UNINJURED
- WERE REPORTS AT THAT TIME ACCURATE AND TIMELY
  - GFC REPORTED 15XKIA AND 7X WIA, BTL CPT SUBMITTED THIS TO CJSOTFA
- WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN DONE TO ENSURE A BETTER BDA WAS CONDUCTED
  - BETTER CONNECTION WITH THE GFC VIA SAT-V, FOLLOWED BY AN IRIDIUM CALL EVERY 10 MINUTES.

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# REPORTING

- HOW LONG AFTER CIVCAS WAS CONFIRMED WAS 1IR AND 2IR SENT UP
  - 1IR WAS SUBMITTED AFTER CJSOTF REQUESTED IT
- DID THIS MEET THE TIME STANDARD FOR REPORTING
  - IT DID NOT FOLLOW THE ISAF REPORTING CRITERIA FOR CIVCAS
- WHAT STEPS DID THE OPCEN TAKE TO ENSURE REPORTS WERE TIMELY AND ACCURATE
  - BTL CPT REPORTED THE INFORMATION THAT WAS PASSED FROM THE GFC
- WHAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DONE THAT WASN'T AFTER THE STRIKE
  - BOG BDA CONDUCTED WITHIN 2 HOURS
  - CONFIRMATION WITH GFC OF WHAT WAS AT THE SITE
  - REPORTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SENT UP REGARDLESS OF WHAT CJSOTF WANTED AT THAT

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# IMPROVEMENTS

- WE MUST ENSURE WE KNOW GFC'S INTENT AND UNDERSTAND HIS PERCEPTION OF THE SITUATION BY ASKING A SERIES OF STANDARD QUESTIONS
- WAKE UP CRITERIA MUST BE ADHERED TO WITHOUT EXCEPTIONS
- ENSURE TEAMS KNOW CDR'S GUIDANCE CONCERNING FIRES WITH POTENTIAL FOR CIVCAS

TAB CC  
11 of 11  
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# QUESTIONS?

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