From:	/O=DHS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=HSAC
To:	"'Farah Pandith' (b) (6) (b) (6)
CC:	"Morgenthau, Sarah </O=DHS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=(b) (6) "Walls, Erin </O=DHS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=(b) (6) "; "Wenger, Lauren </O=DHS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=(b) (6) "; "Woodhams, Katrina </O=DHS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=(b) (6) "; "Selim, George </O=DHS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=George.selim>"
Subject:	Homeland Security Advisory Council CVE Subcommittee: Follow up and Next Steps
Date:	2015/12/10 11:45:11
Due Date:	2015/12/10 19:00:00
Priority:	Normal
Type:	Note

Homeland Security Advisory Council CVE Subcommittee Members,

It was great to speak with you all last week, and we are very excited about what we will be able to accomplish together via this new subcommittee.

Per our discussion, please find attached a variety of suggested read-ahead materials on CVE. In addition, please review the focus areas outlined in the attached FRN and tell us which area(s) you want to focus on in your role as a subcommittee member. Please also give some specific thought to SMEs the Subcommittee should engage vis a vis education, mental health, and Silicon Valley/venture capital fund sectors. The current subcommittee membership and proposed SME list are attached for your consideration.

A reminder that our first in-person meeting will be held on January 11th, 2016 from 12-5pm in Washington, DC. Further details will be provided.

Thank you again for your participation. We look forward to working with each of you on some very important issues.

Farah and Adnan

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DHS S&T Countering Violent Extremism Primer

Homeland Security

Science and Technology

Table of Contents

Strategy and Background

EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES

AUGUST 2011

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Sadly, the threat of violent extremism in America is nothing new. Throughout our history, misguided groups – including international and domestic terrorist organizations, neo-Nazis and anti-Semitic hate groups – have engaged in horrific violence to kill our citizens and threaten our way of life. Most recently, al-Qa'ida and its affiliates have attempted to recruit and radicalize people to terrorism here in the United States, as we have seen in several plots and attacks, including the deadly attack two years ago on our service members at Fort Hood.

As a government, we are working to prevent all types of extremism that leads to violence, regardless of who inspires it. At the same time, countering al-Qa'ida's violent ideology is one part of our comprehensive strategy to defeat al-Qa'ida. Over the past 2 1/2 years, more key al-Qa'ida leaders – including Usama bin Laden – have been eliminated in rapid succession than at any time since the September 11 attacks. We have strengthened homeland security and improved information sharing. Thanks to coordinated intelligence and law enforcement, numerous terrorist plots have been thwarted, saving many American lives.

Protecting American communities from al-Qa'ida's hateful ideology is not the work of government alone. Communities – especially Muslim American communities whose children, families and neighbors are being targeted for recruitment by al-Qa'ida – are often best positioned to take the lead because they know their communities best. Indeed, Muslim American communities have categorically condemned terrorism, worked with law enforcement to help prevent terrorist attacks, and forged creative programs to protect their sons and daughters from al-Qa'ida's murderous ideology.

The strategy that follows outlines how the Federal Government will support and help empower American communities and their local partners in their grassroots efforts to prevent violent extremism. This strategy commits the Federal Government to improving support to communities, including sharing more information about the threat of radicalization; strengthening cooperation with local law enforcement, who work with these communities every day; and helping communities to better understand and protect themselves against violent extremist propaganda, especially online.

Most of all, this strategy reaffirms the fundamental American principles that guide our efforts. As we approach the 10th anniversary of the September 11 attacks, we remember that al-Qa'ida tried to spark a conflict between faiths and divide us as Americans. But they failed. As this strategy makes clear, we will not waver in defense of our country or our communities. We will defeat al-Qa'ida and its affiliates. We will uphold the civil rights and civil liberties of every American. And we will go forward together, as Americans, knowing that our rich diversity of

Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States

"Several recent incidences of violent extremists in the United States who are committed to fighting here and abroad have underscored the threat to the United States and our interests posed by individuals radicalized at home. Our best defenses against this threat are well informed and equipped families, local communities, and institutions. The Federal Government will invest in intelligence to understand this threat and expand community engagement and development programs to empower local communities. And the Federal Government, drawing on the expertise and resources from all relevant agencies, will clearly communicate our policies and intentions, listening to local concerns, tailoring policies to address regional concerns, and making clear that our diversity is part of our strength—not a source of division or insecurity."

—National Security Strategy, May 2010

A. THE CHALLENGE

The seal of the United States of America is inscribed with the Latin dictum *E Pluribus Unum*—out of many, one. It is our great strength that the American social fabric continues to weave together waves of immigrants to the United States and people from all backgrounds and walks of life as part of an indivisible community. We are a pluralistic Nation and a society that does not just accept diversity; we embrace it, and we are stronger as a result. We surmount the many challenges that we face by remaining committed to the American ideals of freedom, equality, and democracy, which transcend differences of religion, ethnicity, and place of birth. Since America's founding, our country and our ideals have been assailed by forces of hate and division, yet we remain strong, unified, and resilient.

Throughout history, violent extremists—individuals who support or commit ideologically-motivated violence to further political goals—have promoted messages of divisiveness and justified the killing of innocents. The United States Constitution recognizes freedom of expression, even for individuals who espouse unpopular or even hateful views. But when individuals or groups choose to further their grievances or ideologies through violence, by engaging in violence themselves or by recruiting and encouraging others to do so, it becomes the collective responsibility of the U.S. Government and the American people to take a stand. In recent history, our country has faced plots by neo-Nazis and other anti-Semitic hate groups, racial supremacists, and international and domestic terrorist groups; and since the September 11 attacks, we have faced an expanded range of plots and attacks in the United States inspired or directed by al-Qa'ida and its affiliates and adherents as well as other violent extremists. Supporters of these groups and their associated ideologies come from different socioeconomic backgrounds, ethnic and religious communities, and areas of the country, making it difficult to predict where violent extremist narratives will resonate. And as history has shown, the prevalence of particular violent extremist ideologies changes over time, and new threats will undoubtedly arise in the future.

We rely on our local, state, and Federal law enforcement to deter individuals from using violence and to protect communities from harm. But we also must ensure that the right tools are applied at the right time to the right situation. Countering radicalization to violence is frequently best achieved by engaging and empowering individuals and groups at the local level to build resilience against violent extremism. Law enforcement plays an essential role in keeping us safe, but so too does engagement and partnership with communities.

While we can and must prioritize our efforts, our approach should be enduring and flexible enough to address a variety of current and possible future threats. Individuals from a broad array of communities and walks of life in the United States have been radicalized to support or commit acts of ideologically-inspired violence. Any solution that focuses on a single, current form of violent extremism, without regard to other threats, will fail to secure our country and communities. Our threat environment is constantly evolving, which is why we must consistently revisit our priorities and ensure our domestic approach can address multiple types of violent extremism.

Today, as detailed in the *National Security Strategy* and the *National Strategy for Counterterrorism*, al-Qa'ida and its affiliates and adherents represent the preeminent terrorist threat to our country. We know that these groups are actively seeking to recruit or inspire Americans to carry out attacks against the United States, particularly as they are facing greater pressure in their safe-havens abroad. The past several years have seen increased numbers of American citizens or residents inspired by al-Qa'ida's ideology and involved in terrorism. Some have traveled overseas to train or fight, while others have been involved in supporting, financing, or plotting attacks in the homeland. The number of individuals remains limited, but the fact that al-Qa'ida and its affiliates and adherents are openly and specifically inciting Americans to support or commit acts of violence—through videos, magazines, and online forums—poses an ongoing and real threat.

This type of violent extremism is a complicated challenge for the United States, not only because of the threat of attacks, but also because of its potential to divide us. Groups and individuals supporting al-Qa'ida's vision are attempting to lure Americans to terrorism in order to create support networks and facilitate attack planning, but this also has potential to create a backlash against Muslim Americans. Such a backlash would feed al-Qa'ida's propaganda that our country is anti-Muslim and at war against Islam, handing our enemies a strategic victory by turning our communities against one another; eroding our shared sense of identity as Americans; feeding terrorist recruitment abroad; and threatening our fundamental values of religious freedom and pluralism. Violent extremists prey on the disenchantment and alienation that discrimination creates, and they have a vested interest in anti-Muslim sentiment. It is for this reason that our security—preventing radicalization that leads to violence—is inextricably linked to our values: the protection of civil rights and civil liberties and the promotion of an inclusive society.

B. A COMMUNITY-BASED APPROACH

The United States relies on a broad range of tools and capabilities that are essential to prevent violent extremism in the United States, emphasizing, in particular, the strength of communities as central to our approach. The best defenses against violent extremist ideologies are well-informed and equipped families, local communities, and local institutions. Their awareness of the threat and willingness to

work with one another and government is part of our long history of community-based initiatives and partnerships dealing with a range of public safety challenges. Communities are best placed to recognize and confront the threat because violent extremists are targeting their children, families, and neighbors. Rather than blame particular communities, it is essential that we find ways to help them protect themselves. To do so, we must continue to ensure that all Americans understand that they are an essential part of our civic life and partners in our efforts to combat violent extremist ideologies and organizations that seek to weaken our society.

We are fortunate that our experience with community-based problem solving, local partnerships, and community-oriented policing provides a basis for addressing violent extremism as part of a broader mandate of community safety. We therefore are building our efforts to counter radicalization that leads to violence in the United States from existing structures, while creating capacity to fill gaps as we implement programs and initiatives. Rather than creating a new architecture of institutions and funding, we are utilizing successful models, increasing their scope and scale where appropriate.

While communities must often lead this effort, the Federal Government has a significant responsibility. Our research and consultations with local stakeholders, communities, and foreign partners have underscored that the Federal Government's most effective role in strengthening community partnerships and preventing violent extremism is as a facilitator, convener, and source of information. The Federal Government will often be ill-suited to intervene in the niches of society where radicalization to violence takes place, but it can foster partnerships to support communities through its connections to local government, law enforcement, Mayor's offices, the private sector, local service providers, academia, and many others who can help prevent violent extremism. Federal departments and agencies have begun expanding support to local stakeholders and practitioners who are on the ground and positioned to develop grassroots partnerships with the communities they serve.

C. GOAL AND AREAS OF PRIORITY ACTION

Our central goal in this effort is to prevent violent extremists and their supporters from inspiring, radicalizing, financing, or recruiting individuals or groups in the United States to commit acts of violence. The U.S. Government will work tirelessly to counter support for violent extremism and to ensure that, as new violent groups and ideologies emerge, they fail to gain a foothold in our country. Achieving this aim requires that we all work together—government, communities, the private sector, the general public, and others—to develop effective programs and initiatives.

> "As extremists try to inspire acts of violence within our borders, we are responding with the strength of our communities, with the respect for the rule of law, and with the conviction that Muslim Americans are part of our American family."
>
> *—President Barack Obama, State of the Union, January 2011*

To support a community-based approach, the Federal Government is working to strengthen partnerships and networks among local stakeholders. There is no single issue or grievance that pushes individuals toward supporting or committing violence, and the path to violent extremism can vary considerably. As a result, it is essential that we empower local partners, who can more readily identify problems as they emerge and customize responses so that they are appropriate and effective for

Leveraging Existing Models

The United States has rich experience in supporting locally-based initiatives that connect communities and government to address community challenges through collaboration and the development of stakeholder networks. While recognizing that different challenges require the involvement of different stakeholders, we view community-based problem solving as an effective model of organizing communities and government to counter violent extremism in the homeland. The following provides three examples of this model in practice.

Example One: Comprehensive Gang Model

The Department of Justice's *Comprehensive Gang Model* is a flexible framework that communities can use to reduce or prevent gang activity, involving strategies of community mobilization, social intervention, opportunities for educational and vocational advancements, and organizational change. Local community organizations and government offices responsible for addressing gangs—police, schools, probation officers, youth agencies, grassroots organizations, government, and others—help identify causes, recommend appropriate responses, and select activities for local implementation, supported by integrated Federal, state, and local resources to incorporate state-of-the-art practices in gang prevention, intervention, and suppression. This multi-dimensional, community-led response to gangs—driven by local stakeholders and supported by the Federal Government—has reduced serious gang-related crimes in affected locations across the country.

Example Two: Building Communities of Trust Initiative

The Departments of Justice and Homeland Security established the *Building Communities of Trust (BCOT) Initiative* to improve trust among police, fusion centers, and the communities they serve in order to address the challenges of crime and terrorism prevention. In support of BCOT, a National Planning Team comprised of representatives from Federal, state, and local governments; community organizations; and privacy and civil liberties groups convened and, in select locations, conducted roundtables to explore how to build and maintain relationships of trust. Lessons learned from these roundtables have resulted in official guidance highlighting the importance of meaningful information sharing, responding to community concerns, and distinguishing between innocent cultural behaviors and conduct that may legitimately reflect criminal activity or terrorism precursors.

Example Three: Safe Schools/Healthy Students Initiative

Responding to a series of lethal school shootings in the late 1990's, which culminated with the tragedy at Columbine High School, the Departments of Education, Justice, and Health and Human Services launched the *Safe Schools/Healthy Students (SS/HS) Initiative* to create broader, more comprehensive local programs to prevent violence and substance abuse among our Nation's youth, schools, and communities. In order to receive an SS/HS grant, school districts must partner with local mental health experts, juvenile justice officials, and law enforcement. Proposals must include programs that address violence and substance abuse prevention; social, emotional, and behavioral development; school and community-based mental health services; and early childhood development. According to an ongoing evaluation, the Initiative has resulted in fewer students experiencing or witnessing violence, increased school safety, and an overall decrease in violence in communities where the program is active.

particular individuals, groups, and locations. To that end, we have prioritized three broad areas of action where we believe the Federal Government can provide value to supporting partnerships at the local level and countering violent extremism. Our work will evolve over time as we enhance partnerships and further our understanding of what tools and methods are most effective.

1. Enhancing Federal Engagement with and Support to Local Communities that May be Targeted by Violent Extremists

Communication and meaningful engagement with the American public is an essential part of the Federal Government's work. Our open system of governance requires that we respond to inquiries; educate and share information on our programs, policies, and initiatives; and provide a platform for communities to air grievances and contribute their views on policy and government. We do this consistently in a variety of ways: we convene forums, develop brochures, respond to correspondence, post information on websites, and we make available for comment proposed regulations in the *Federal Register*. We also reach out to communities directly to answer questions and provide information and guidance, offering opportunities for communities to provide valuable suggestions about how government can be more effective and responsive in addressing their concerns. As such, engagement with local communities provides an opportunity for us to reexamine and improve how we perform our functions. For these reasons, we view effective community engagement as an essential part of good governance and an important end in itself.

The vast majority of our engagement work relates to issues outside the national security arena, such as jobs, education, health, and civil rights. We must ensure that in our efforts to support community-based partnerships to counter violent extremism, we remain engaged in the full range of community concerns and interests, and do not narrowly build relationships around national security issues alone. Where appropriate, we are relying on preexisting Federal Government engagement efforts to discuss violent extremism, ensuring that these forums continue to focus on a wide variety of issues. There are instances when the government needs to build new relationships to address security issues, but these must be predicated upon multifaceted engagement. Indeed, we refuse to limit our engagement to what we are against, because we need to support active engagement in civic and democratic life and help forge partnerships that advance what we are for, including opportunity and equal treatment for all.

Engagement is essential for supporting community-based efforts to prevent violent extremism because it allows government and communities to share information, concerns, and potential solutions. Our aims in engaging with communities to discuss violent extremism are to (1) share sound, meaningful, and timely information about the threat of radicalization to violence with a wide range of community groups and organizations, particularly those involved in public safety issues; (2) respond to community concerns about government policies and actions; and (3) better understand how we can effectively support community-based solutions.

In addition to engaging communities on a wide range of issues, the Federal Government is using its convening power to help build a network of individuals, groups, civil society organizations, and private sector actors to support community-based efforts to counter violent extremism. Myriad groups with tools and capabilities to counter radicalization to violence often operate in separate spheres of activity and therefore do not know one another. The Federal Government, with its connections to diverse

networks across the country, has a unique ability to draw together the constellation of previously unconnected efforts and programs to form a more cohesive enterprise against violent extremism.

2. Building Government and Law Enforcement Expertise for Preventing Violent Extremism

Although we have learned a great deal about radicalization that leads to violence, we can never assume that the dynamics will remain the same. We must be vigilant in identifying, predicting, and preempting new developments. This necessitates ongoing research and analysis, as well as exchanges with individuals, communities, and government officials who work on the frontlines to counter the threats we all face. In addition, we will continue to hold meetings with foreign partners to share experiences and best practices, recognizing that while not all lessons are transferable to the American context, this sharing can help us improve our approach and avoid common pitfalls.

Government and law enforcement at the local level have well-established relationships with communities, developed through years of consistent engagement, and therefore can effectively build partnerships and take action on the ground. To help facilitate local partnerships to prevent violent extremism, the Federal Government is building a robust training program with rigorous curriculum standards to ensure that the training that communities; local, state, and tribal governments; prison officials; and law enforcement receive is based on intelligence, research, and accurate information about how people are radicalized to accept violence, and what has worked to prevent violent extremism. Misinformation about the threat and dynamics of radicalization to violence can harm our security by sending local stakeholders in the wrong direction and unnecessarily creating tensions with potential community partners. We also are working to support and expand community-oriented policing efforts by our state, local, and tribal partners, and to assist them in enhancing cultural proficiency and other foundations for effective community engagement.

3. Countering Violent Extremist Propaganda While Promoting Our Ideals

Radicalization that leads to violent extremism includes the diffusion of ideologies and narratives that feed on grievances, assign blame, and legitimize the use of violence against those deemed responsible. We must actively and aggressively counter the range of ideologies violent extremists employ to radicalize and recruit individuals by challenging justifications for violence and by actively promoting the unifying and inclusive vision of our American ideals.

Toward this end, we will continue to closely monitor the important role the internet and social networking sites play in advancing violent extremist narratives. We protect our communities from a variety of online threats, such as sexual predators, by educating them about safety on the internet, and we are using a similar approach to thwart violent extremists. We will work to empower families and communities to counter online violent extremist propaganda, which is increasingly in English and targeted at American audiences.

For example, in the case of our current priority, we must counter al-Qa'ida's propaganda that the United States is somehow at war with Islam. There is no single profile of an al-Qa'ida-inspired terrorist, but extensive investigations and research show that they all believe: (1) the United States is out to destroy Islam; and (2) this justifies violence against Americans. Al-Qa'ida and its supporters spread messages of

hate, twist facts, and distort religious principles to weave together a false narrative that Muslims must attack Americans everywhere because the United States is waging a global war against Islam. While al-Qa'ida claims to be the vanguard of Islam, the overwhelming majority of its victims are Muslim.

We will challenge this propaganda through our words and deeds, defined by the very ideals of who we are as Americans. As the President has stated repeatedly, the United States is not, and never will be, at war with Islam. Islam is part of America, a country that cherishes the active participation of all its citizens, regardless of background and belief. We live what al-Qa'ida violently rejects—religious freedom and pluralism. We have emphasized a paradigm of engagement with Muslim communities around the world, based on mutual respect and interest manifest in our new partnerships and programming to promote entrepreneurship, health, science and technology, educational exchanges, and opportunities for women.

But we must remember that just as our words and deeds can either fuel or counter violent ideologies abroad, so too can they here at home. Actions and statements that cast suspicion toward entire communities, promote hatred and division, and send messages to certain Americans that they are somehow less American because of their faith or how they look, reinforce violent extremist propaganda and feed the sense of disenchantment and disenfranchisement that may spur violent extremist radicalization. The Federal Government will work to communicate clearly about al-Qa'ida's destructive and bankrupt ideology, while dispelling myths and misperceptions that blame communities for the actions of a small number of violent extremists.

D. GUIDING PRINCIPLES

How we define and discuss the challenge of radicalization to violence matters. Violent extremism, while of paramount importance given the potential for harm, is only one among a number of threats our Nation is facing. Communities face an array of challenges to their safety, including gang violence, school shootings, drugs, hate crimes, and many others. Just as we respond to community safety issues through partnerships and networks of government officials, Mayor's offices, law enforcement, community organizations, and private sector actors, so must we address radicalization to violence and terrorist recruitment through similar relationships and by leveraging some of the same tools and solutions. In doing so, we are guided by the following principles:

We must continually enhance our understanding of the threat posed by violent extremism and the ways in which individuals or groups seek to radicalize Americans, adapting our approach as needed. As al-Qa'ida and its affiliates and adherents increasingly aim to inspire people within the United States to commit acts of terrorism, we must closely monitor and understand their tactics, both online and offline, remaining nimble in our response, increasing our understanding of the factors that lead individuals to turn to violence, and calibrating our efforts.

We must do everything in our power to protect the American people from violent extremism while protecting the civil rights and civil liberties of every American. Protecting our fundamental rights and liberties is an important end in itself, and also helps counter violent extremism by ensuring nonviolent means for addressing policy concerns; safeguarding equal and fair treatment; and making it more difficult for violent extremists to divide our communities.

As the President said at the National Archives in May 2009, "We uphold our fundamental principles and values not just because we choose to, but because we swear to. Not because they feel good, but because they help keep us safe. They keep us true to who we are . . . So as Americans, we reject the false choice between our security and our ideals. We can and we must and we will protect both."

We must build partnerships and provide support to communities based on mutual trust, respect, and understanding. We must have honest dialogue between communities and government that is transparent and promotes community-based problem solving.

We must use a wide range of good governance programs—including those that promote immigrant integration and civic engagement, protect civil rights, and provide social services—that may help prevent radicalization that leads to violence. This necessitates a whole-of-government approach, based on the expertise of our traditional national security departments and agencies, as well as other parts of the government, including those with experience in addressing community safety issues.

We must support local capabilities and programs to address problems of national concern. While the demographics of communities and the priorities of local government, communities, and law enforcement vary, our efforts to prevent radicalization to violence and terrorist recruitment must harness the knowledge, expertise, and relationships of local actors, both in and out of government.

Government o cials and the American public should not stigmatize or blame communities because of the actions of a handful of individuals. We must instead support communities as partners, recognizing that a particular ethnic, religious, or national background does not necessarily equate to special knowledge or expertise in addressing violent extremism. Where communities have been active in condemning terrorism and confronting violent extremism, we must recognize their efforts; help them build upon their work; and connect them with other communities and stakeholders in order to share best practices.

Strong religious beliefs should never be confused with violent extremism. Freedom of religion is a fundamental American right and one of our most strongly held values. Since our founding, people of diverse and strongly held religious faiths have thrived in America.

Though we will not tolerate illegal activities, opposition to government policy is neither illegal nor unpatriotic and does not make someone a violent extremist. It is a basic tenet of our democracy that citizens of good conscience can respectfully disagree with one another and resolve their differences through peaceful means. Our Nation is built upon the principles of debate, dialogue, and cooperation.

The Complexity of Violent Extremism

Violent extremists are defined as "individuals who support or commit ideologically-motivated violence to further political goals." Violent Extremist threats within the United States can come from a range of violent extremist groups and individuals, including Domestic Terrorists and Homegrown Violent Extremists (HVEs). DHS defines Domestic Terrorism as: Any act of violence that is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources committed by a group or individual based and operating entirely within the United States or its territories without direction or inspiration from a foreign terrorist group. The act is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any state or other subdivision of the United States and appears to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping. A domestic terrorist differs from a homegrown violent extremist in that the former is not inspired by, and does not take direction from, a foreign terrorist group or other foreign power. DHS defines a HVE as: A person of any citizenship who has lived or operated primarily in the United States or its territories who advocates, is engaged in, or is preparing to engage in ideologically-motivated terrorist activities (including providing material support to terrorism) in furtherance of political or social objectives promoted by a terrorist organization, but who is acting independently of direction by a terrorist organization.

The threat posed by violent extremism is neither constrained by international borders nor limited to any single ideology. Groups and individuals inspired by a range of personal, religious, political, or other ideological beliefs promote and use violence. Increasingly sophisticated use of the Internet, social media, and information technology by violent extremists adds an additional layer of complexity. Accordingly, DHS has designed a countering violent extremism (CVE) approach that addresses all forms of violent extremism, regardless of ideology, and that focuses not on radical thought or speech but instead on preventing violent attacks. This approach provides numerous physical and virtual environments to promote information sharing and collaboration between Federal, State, Local, Territorial, Tribal, Private, Civilian, and International entities working to counter the threat of violent extremism.

DHS Priorities for Understanding and Countering Violent Extremism

Our approach to CVE emphasizes the strength of local communities. We begin with the premise that well-informed and well–equipped families, communities, and local institutions represent the best defense against violent extremist ideologies. And while our primary purpose is to prevent attacks by individuals or groups recruited by violent extremist organizations, or

inspired by violent extremist ideologies, we also support strong and resilient communities as important ends themselves.

The Department's efforts are focused on three broad objectives:

Understand Violent Extremism - Support and coordinate efforts to better understand the phenomenon of violent extremism, including assessing the threat it poses to the nation as a whole and within specific communities;

Support Local Communities - Bolster efforts to catalyze and support community-based programs, and strengthen relationships with communities that may be targeted for recruitment by violent extremists; and

Support Local Law Enforcement – Deter and disrupt recruitment or individual mobilization through support for local law enforcement programs, including information-driven, community-oriented policing efforts, which for decades have proven effective in preventing violent crime.

To address these objectives, we work closely with our Federal and International partners, as well as our many partners at the Community, State, Local, Territorial, and Tribal levels across the country. We are an important partner in supporting the White House's *National Strategy on Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States* and the *Strategic Implementation Plan (SIP) for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States,* which President Obama released in 2011; as well as the strategy for *Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.*

Supporting Local Communities

Efforts to prevent crime, and in particular violent crime, are most effective when law enforcement establishes strong and trusting partnerships with community members themselves. One important result of this is that community members will be more inclined to share suspicious information with law enforcement. As part of our effort to support local communities in countering violent extremism, DHS has launched a number of core initiatives:

DHS Outreach on CVE: In coordination with our Federal partners, DHS hosts conferences, workshops, and online forums for Federal, State, Local, Territorial, Tribal, Private Sector, Civilian community, and International partners in order to share information about CVE.

Training Initiatives: DHS, in collaboration with DOJ and State and Local law enforcement partners, has trained thousands of front line officers, first responders, and community leaders, and continues to provide CVE training to interested communities. These efforts work to improve communication, build trust, and encourage collaboration between officers and the communities they serve and protect. Training topics include

effective policing without the use of ethnic or racial profiling, and best practices in community outreach.

Grants: DHS prioritizes CVE activities through grants that directly support State and Local partners and community outreach efforts to understand, recognize, report, and respond to potential indicators of terrorist activity.

Analysis and Research: DHS produces substantial analysis and research on trends in homegrown violent extremism, domestic terrorism, and terrorist propaganda to support Federal, State, Local, Territorial, and Tribal officials in identifying and mitigating violent extremist threats to the Homeland.

- Building Communities of Trust Fact Sheet
- DHS Countering Violent Extremism Training Guidance & Best Practices Pamphlet
- DHS Community Engagement Poster
- FBI's Crisis Communications Quick Reference Guide
- Joint DHS/FBI Suspicious Behavior Awareness Poster

DHS CVE Structure and Office Functions

The Department's CVE efforts have continued to adapt as the threat has evolved. Efforts have been undertaken to catalogue, coordinate, and institutionalize CVE efforts and resources across DHS. In furtherance of this, a CVE Working Group (reflecting the missions of components and equities across DHS) led by a CVE Coordinator has been formalized to oversee and coordinate all CVE activities. The Department's CVE efforts are comprehensive and fall into four function areas:

- Policy Formation and Coordination Activities
- Strategic CVE Activities (those explicitly conducted for the purpose of CVE)
- CVE Support Activities (those that aid the department and its partners in conducting their CVE missions)
- CVE-Relevant Activities (the regular activities of DHS components shaped to improve CVE or lessen the negative impact on CVE. For instance, training of screeners, better redress procedures, and proper messaging of policies that could impact communities where VE occurs.)

The CVEWG is led by the CVE Coordinator and includes participation from the Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL); Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD), Office of Policy, Office of Privacy (PRIV), and the Office of Science and Technology (S&T). The CVEWG also has members from DHS Components, such as Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), Office of the General Counsel (OGC), US

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Office of Operations Coordination and Planning (OPS), Office of Public Affairs (OPA), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), US Coast Guard (USCG), and the US Secret Service (USSS).

International Partnerships

DHS works with foreign governments, international organizations, and various U.S. Embassies across the world to develop and implement CVE programs.

DHS also has CVE partnerships with the Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, the European Union, and the UK, as well as partnerships with international law enforcement organizations such as the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), Europol, the Global Counter Terrorism Forum (GCTF), and the Hedayah Center.

- DHS has developed and implemented Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programs, such as the CVE Exchange Program. This program, in its third year, pairs two cities in the US with two in a European nation with exchange delegations representing civil society and local government exchanging operational community engagement best practices that may support CVE but also promote integration, youth empowerment, resolution of grievances, and protection of rights and liberties.
- DHS signed a U.S.-Australia Joint Statement on Countering Transnational Crime, Terrorism, and Violent Extremism in Canberra in May 2012.
- DHS, Europol, and EU partners have exchanged information on U.S. and EU information sharing and analytic best practices, CVE training standards, and research and case studies. In 2012, DHS and Europol released a joint assessment on the pathway to violence and operational planning of the terrorist responsible for the 2011 Norway attacks.
- DHS has partnered with its Canadian counterparts to share best practices and research related to CVE, produce joint analysis, and promote community-based and community driven efforts.

DHS Science and Technology Directorate
Countering Violent Extremism

Understanding and countering violent extremism

The United States was attacked by violent extremists more than 2,600 times between 1970 and 2013, and these events continue as we have seen most recently in Boston. Single events can be catastrophic, causing hundreds of casualties and untold financial and psychological damage. Gaining a better understanding of the nature of this threat is a key element in the U.S. strategy.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate has been working closely with researchers in academic institutions, nonprofit organizations, and the national laboratories to conduct groundbreaking research on violent extremism. The Countering Violent Extremism Project is supporting DHS and U.S. government efforts to assess and counter violent extremism by developing an integrated database on terrorism and extremist violence in the United States and analyzing terrorist disengagement, re-engagement, and recidivism.

Findings from this project are regularly transitioned to analysts and policymakers and have been used to support the assessment of potential terrorist threats and the development of programs focused on countering them.

Analyzing events and perpetrators

Terrorism and Extremist Violence in the U.S. Database: Develops an integrated database that incorporates incident, perpetrator, and geospatial information that will be accessible through a web interface that includes graphing, mapping, and analysis functions.

These data have been used to analyze trends in terrorist attacks, the characteristics of those who perpetrate them, geospatial patterns of terrorist precursor behaviors, and the organizational dynamics of violent extremists in the United States.

Motivations and Pre-Attack Behaviors of Lone-Actor Terrorists: Identified recurring pre-attack behaviors and developed a typology of lone-actor terrorists who had been convicted of terrorism offenses in Europe and North America.

Understanding contexts

Public Attitudes toward Violent Extremism and Government Countermeasures: Examines public perspectives on the government's role and effectiveness in responding to extremist violence, using online surveys.

County-level Analyses of Violent Extremism: Analyzed data from counties that have, and have not, experienced violent extremism to identify the characteristics of locations where violent extremists have planned, prepared for, and conducted attacks.

Outreach Focus Groups: Conducted focus groups with various communities throughout the United States to support the development of outreach activities related to countering violent extremism.

Assessing countermeasures

Disengagement from Terrorism: Investigates how and why people leave terrorism behind; whether there are differences based on type of terrorist group or an individual's role within the group; and how disengagement can be encouraged.

Countermeasures Data Collection and Analysis: Analyzed patterns of intervention in terrorism-related cases and developed in-depth studies of specific countermeasure campaigns.

Building Resilience to Violent Extremism: Conducted research within the Somali-American community in Minneapolis-St.Paul to identify risk and protective factors that may impact vulnerability to terrorist recruitment and recommend socially and culturally appropriate prevention strategies.

Homeland Security
Science and Technology

To learn more about the Countering Violent Extremism Project in the Resilient Systems Division, please contact SandT.RSD@hq.dhs.gov.

2014-10-16

Homeland Security
Science and Technology

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)

A DHS Center of Excellence

START
NATIONAL CONSORTIUM FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM AND RESPONSES TO TERRORISM

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Research Areas

- Societal, behavioral and cultural factors that influence violent extremism
- Emergence, operations and interactions of domestic terrorists
- Collecting, coding and using data to inform decisions
- Terrorist group formation and recruitment, persistence and dynamics
- Societal impacts of terrorism
- Resilience and risk communication

"For several years START has provided the [DHS] Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) with timely and efficient research and analysis...Specifically for DNDO, START has conducted in-depth studies on the potential nexus between organized crime and radiological and nuclear terrorism and recommendations for enhancing national and regional nuclear detection architectures in Europe. These efforts by START have provided essential decision-making tools to government leaders with the responsibility of protecting the nation from radiological and nuclear terrorism."

– Mark Wittrock
Deputy Assistant Director
International Cooperation, DNDO

Mission: *To advance science-based knowledge about the human causes and consequences of terrorism as a resource for homeland security policymakers and practitioners.*

Quick Facts

- START is the national leader in cutting-edge research on the behavior of terrorists, terrorist organizations, and communities threatened by terrorism.
- START maintains the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), the world's largest and most comprehensive open-source database on international and domestic terrorism events.
- Consortium researchers have published hundreds of homeland security-related papers and articles in leading peer-reviewed journals.
- START's large network of premier subject matter experts is immediately accessible for responding to short- and long-term national security issues.

Partners

- Led by the University of Maryland, START directly partners with more than 50 academic research institutions and homeland security agencies.
- START collaborates across the DHS Centers of Excellence network to help law enforcement officials: 1) examine terrorist threats; 2) identify patterns of U.S. border crossings by individuals who have planned or launched terrorist attacks against the United States; and 3) understand the components of community resilience to help officials develop strategies to mitigate damage from future terrorist attacks.

Background

- Established in 2005 as a U.S. Department of Homeland Security Center of Excellence, START was tasked with using state-of-the-art theories, methods, and data from the social and behavioral sciences to improve the understanding of the origins, dynamics, and social and psychological impacts of terrorism.

Key Accomplishments

- Conducted more than 175 training events for more than 5,800 law enforcement and homeland security personnel.
- Developed a Global Terrorism Minor from which 90 percent of students go on to careers or graduate work related to homeland security.
- Worked with more than 2,200 students through internships on research projects and educational programs such as the Global Terrorism Minor, the Graduate Certificate in Terrorism Analysis and other sponsored research programs.
- Created more than 25 terrorism datasets that are publicly available for use in research or fact gathering at: *http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/start*.

Research Partners

START partners with leading social scientists at 50-plus academic and research institutions throughout the world, including:

American University
Bilkent University
Bowie State University
Bryn Mawr College
California State University, Fullerton
Center for Biosecurity, University of Pittsburgh Medical Center
Columbia University
Dartmouth College
Decision Path, Inc.
Florida International University
George Mason University
Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya
John Jay College, City University of New York
King's College London
Liverpool University
Marquette University
Michigan State University
Morehouse College
National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago
Naval Postgraduate School
North Carolina Central University
North Dakota State University
Pennsylvania State University
Phoenix College, Maricopa Community College
Rush University Medical Center
Rutgers University
Southern Illinois University
Stanford University
State University of New York (SUNY)
University of Arizona
University of Arkansas
University of Colorado
University of Haifa
University of Illinois, Chicago
University of Nebraska, Omaha
University of Oklahoma
University of South Carolina
University of Wisconsin
Villanova University
Wesleyan University

START Highlights

Global Terrorism Database

A centerpiece of START's work is the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), the world's largest open-source database on international and domestic terrorism events. Unlike many other event databases, the GTD includes systematically collected data on over 104,000 domestic, transnational and international terrorist incidents that have occurred around the world from 1970 through 2011. For each GTD incident, information is available on the date and location of the incident, the weapons used and nature of the target, the number of casualties, and – when identifiable – the group or individual responsible. START makes the GTD available to the public at *www.start.umd.edu/gtd* in an effort to increase understanding of terrorist violence so it can be more readily studied and defeated.

Education and Training

START trains and mentors the next generation of homeland security scholars and analysts with an in-depth understanding of the causes and consequences of terrorism, while giving current homeland security officials opportunities to expand their knowledge and skills.

- START's Graduate Certificate in Terrorism Analysis provides participants with advanced education on the causes, dynamics, and impacts of international and domestic terrorism, drawing on cutting-edge START research and data.
- START's undergraduate Global Terrorism Minor is a cross-disciplinary program within the University of Maryland's College of Behavioral and Social Sciences.
- START sponsors student research through the Terrorism Research Award and Undergraduate Research Program.
- Since its inception in 2005, START's internship program has welcomed 1,080 students from a wide array of institutions and academic disciplines to work on research projects and projects with government partners including the Department of State, Naval Research Laboratories and National Counterterrorism Center.

TCOTRN Project



The Transnational Criminal Organizations, Terrorists and Radiological/Nuclear Materials (TCOTRN) project identifies transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and networks operating in the Central American Region (including the Caribbean) capable of engaging in RN smuggling. The research team determined existing or potential links between these TCOs and nuclear smuggling or terrorism; analyzed possible smuggling routes and methods that could be used by TCOs smuggling RN materials on behalf of terrorists; and explored vulnerabilities to develop recommendations for end users to enhance the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture.

Understanding the Threat

START

TEVUS

Terrorism & Extremist Violence in the U.S. Database and Portal

ABOUT TEVUS

The Terrorism and Extremist Violence in the United States (TEVUS) Portal is a public-facing online interface and visualization tool that will provide access to the TEVUS Database. Using the portal, users will be able to conduct sophisticated analyses of the **behavioral, geographic, and temporal** characteristics of extremist violence within the United States dating back to 1970. The underlying TEVUS Database is a relational database comprised of four types of data:

- **Events** (2,800 terrorist incidents; 3,000 pre-incident activities; 120 extremist crimes)
- **Perpetrators** (1,400 perpetrators)
- **Groups** (300 groups)
- **Court cases** (300 federal court cases)



USING TEVUS

The four dynamic and synchronized visualization panels of the Portal will display these data in a relational graph (top left) that highlights connections between the different types of data, geospatially (top right), in a narrative summary format (bottom right), and on a timeline (bottom left). As users focus on different data points and filter out unwanted information using an advanced search tool, the four panels will populate simultaneously with the query results.

Searches can be conducted by keyword or by:

- Geographic area
- Date or date range
- Incident details
- Preparatory activity
- Group
- Ideology
- Perpetrator
- Weapon
- Target

BUILDING TEVUS

TEVUS is the result of over 40 years of data collection and is built from four related databases:

- The **American Terrorism Study (ATS)** includes individual, geospatial, and temporal data on the incidents and pre-incident activities associated with federal terrorism cases between 1980 and 2013.
- The **U.S. Extremist Crime Database (ECDB)** is a relational database that includes information on all of the crimes and terrorist attacks committed in the United States from 1990 through 2013 by violent extremists associated with al-Qa'ida, the far right, and the Animal and Earth Liberation Fronts.
- The **Global Terrorism Database (GTD)** is an open-source database that includes systematic data on the locations, perpetrators, targets, and tactics associated with the terrorist attacks that have occurred around the world from 1970 through 2012.
- **Profiles of Perpetrators of Terrorism in the United States (PPT-US)** includes detailed information on the more than 140 organizations known to have engaged in terrorist attacks against targets in the U.S. homeland between 1970 and 2012.

TEVUS is supported by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, Resilient Systems Division.

START NATIONAL CONSORTIUM FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM AND RESPONSES TO TERRORISM

TERRORIST ATTACKS IN THE U.S. BETWEEN 1970 AND 2013: DATA FROM THE GLOBAL TERRORISM DATABASE (GTD)

AUTHOR

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PROJECT INVESTIGATORS

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PURPOSE

CATALOGUE comprehensive data from a variety of open media sources about the terrorist attacks that have occurred in the United States.

ANALYZE trends pertaining to the dates, locations, tactics, targets, perpetrators, and outcomes of attacks.

PROVIDE objective data on terrorist violence to the public, practitioners, and policymakers.

Background

START's Global Terrorism Database (GTD) contains information on more than 125,000 domestic and international terrorist attacks* that occurred between 1970 and 2013. Collectively, these attacks have resulted in more than 266,000 deaths and more than 354,000 injuries. This research highlight focuses on the terrorist attacks that occurred in the United States between 1970 and 2013.

Overall Attack Trends

From 1970 through 2013, more than 2,600 terrorist attacks took place in the United States, resulting in more than 3,500 fatalities.



- Approximately 85% of all deaths from terrorist attacks during this period occurred in the coordinated attacks on September 11, 2001.
- Nearly 80% of all terrorist attacks involved no casualties (fatalities or injuries).
- More than half of terrorist attacks took place during the 1970s. Between 2000 and 2013, there were fewer than 20 attacks per year on average.

Attack Targets

The most frequently attacked type of target in the United States between 1970 and 2013 was business targets. Nearly one-third of all attacks on business targets were on banks/commerce, and an additional 23% were on retail entities.

Terrorist attacks frequently targeted buildings and infrastructure rather than individuals.

94% of attacks against **abortion-related targets** were on clinics, while 6% targeted providers or personnel.

78% of attacks against **educational targets** were on schools, universities, or other buildings, while 22% targeted teachers or other educational personnel.

73% of attacks against **government targets** were on government buildings, facilities, or offices, while 27% targeted personnel, public officials, or politicians.

*Terrorism is defined as the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious or social goal through fear, coercion or intimidation. More information available at www.start.umd.edu/gtd.

Perpetrators, 2000-2013

- Between 2000 and 2013, the vast majority of attacks in which named organizations were identified were carried out by environmental and animal rights violent extremist groups.
- However, attacks were most frequently carried out by individuals not known to be affiliated with a perpetrator group. These include Wade Michael Page's assault at a Sikh temple in Wisconsin in 2012, as well as Nidal Hasan's attack at Ft. Hood in 2009.
- Twelve of the 28 attacks in 2012 and 2013 were attributed to unaffiliated individuals.

Known Perpetrators**	Attacks 2000-2013
Unaffiliated Individual(s)	64
Earth Liberation Front	60
Animal Liberation Front	42
Anti-Abortion Activists	15
Coalition to Save the Preserves	8
Al-Qa'ida	4
Neo– Nazi Group	2
Revolutionary Cells-Animal Liberation Brigade	2
White Extremists	2
Al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula	1
Anarchists	1
The Justice Department	1
Ku Klux Klan	1
Minutemen American Defense	1
Revenge of the Trees	1
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan	1
Veterans for Non-Religious Memorials	1

***Information on the perpetrator(s) responsible for an attack is unknown in 72 attacks. Nine attacks were conducted by both ELF and ALF.*

Weapons Used by Decade



Incendiary refers to a weapon capable of catching fire, causing fire, or burning readily and producing intensely hot fire when exploded.

Melee refers to a weapon that can only be used at very close range, e.g., blunt objects, knives, materials that can be used to strangle or suffocate victims.

Locations

- **1970-2013:** Terrorist attacks occurred in all 50 U.S. states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, however 50% of all attacks took place in California, New York, and Puerto Rico.
- **2000-2013:** Although fewer attacks occurred compared to earlier periods, terrorist attacks still occurred in 35 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. Three states — California, New York, and Washington State — accounted for 35% of all attacks.

Unsuccessful Attacks, 1970-2013

- 82% of all attempted attacks, i.e., those in which perpetrators were "out the door" intending to imminently attack their targets, were successful.
- The percentage of attempted attacks that were unsuccessful (e.g., the bomb failed to detonate or was defused) has varied considerably over time, particularly as terrorism in the country has declined.
- It peaked in 2011 when 44% of attempted attacks were unsuccessful, and was at its lowest in 1990 and 2012, when all attempted attacks were successful.

Terrorism & Extremist Violence in the U.S. Database

This research is part of a larger effort to develop a comprehensive database on Terrorism and Extremist Violence in the U.S. (TEVUS) that integrates data from the Global Terrorism Database, the American Terrorism Study, Profiles of Perpetrators of Terrorism in the U.S., and the U.S. Extremist Crime Database. Led by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), the research team is creating a resource that will allow operational and academic end-users to conduct unprecedented analyses that incorporate incident, perpetrator, and geospatial information.

TEVUS
Terrorist & Extremist Violence in the U.S.

This research was supported by the Resilient Systems Division of the Science and Technology Directorate of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security through Award Number 2009-ST-108-LR0003 made to the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

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START NATIONAL CONSORTIUM FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM AND RESPONSES TO TERRORISM

Profiles of Perpetrators of Terrorism in the United States

Authors

Erin Miller
Global Terrorism Database (GTD) Manager, START Consortium at the University of Maryland

Kathleen Smarick
Special Adviser to the Director, START Consortium at the University of Maryland

Purpose

Create a dataset of groups and movements that have conducted terrorist attacks within the United States

Manage data with regular review and updates

Provide a critical tool to assist counterterrorism researchers and analysts

Background

This research highlight provides findings based on START's Profiles of Perpetrators of Terrorism in the United States (PPT-US) dataset, which includes detailed information on the 147 organizations known to have engaged in terrorist attacks against targets in the U.S. homeland from 1970 through 2012.

Terrorism is defined as the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious or social goal through fear, coercion or intimidation. More information is available at www.start.umd.edu/gtd.

PPT-US Data: The dataset includes information on each group's:

- terrorist attacks
- history and base of operations
- ideology and goals
- financial resources
- engagement in other criminal and political activities
- alliances
- network and structure

Preliminary Findings

There is no single "profile" of organizations that target the U.S. homeland with terrorism. Rather, the groups that attacked the United States between 1970 and 2012 had widely varied ideologies, beliefs, and goals.

Of these **147** groups that attacked targets in the United States during this time:

87% had headquarters in the United States

63% carried out attacks for less than one year

97% emerged before the year 2000

87% also engaged in non-violent political activities

52 Perpetrator Groups Participated in Criminal Activities Including:

Financial Crime

A counterfeiting operation was based at the compound of the leader of the Aryan Nations.

Public Order Crime

The Animal Liberation Front participates in releasing animals from research facilities.

Violent Crime

Symbionese Liberation Army members participated in multiple bank robberies.

Drug Trafficking

A leader of Omega-7 had ties with major narcotics dealers. The group was financed in part by trafficking activities.

Dominant Ideologies of Terrorist Groups that Emerged Each Decade

Over the decades the proportion of <u>emerging</u> groups with

- ⇩ *Extreme left-wing or ethnonationalist/ separatist ideologies declined*
- ⇧ *Religious ideologies increased*



Locations of PPT-US Groups' Headquarters

- California
- New York
- Puerto Rico
- Florida
- Illinois
- Oregon
- Arkansas • Idaho
- Washington
- District of Columbia • Michigan
- New Jersey • Texas • Wisconsin • Colorado • Mississippi
- Missouri • North Carolina • Oklahoma • South Carolina

Length of Time Groups Conducted Attacks



Organizational Size at Peak of Activity



Terrorism & Extremist Violence in the U.S. Database

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TEVUS
Terrorist & Extremist Violence in the U.S.

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START NATIONAL CONSORTIUM FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM AND RESPONSES TO TERRORISM

VIOLENCE PERPETRATED BY SUPPORTERS OF AL-QA'IDA AND AFFILIATED MOVEMENTS (AQAM): FATAL ATTACKS AND VIOLENT PLOTS IN THE UNITED STATES

AUTHORS

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PURPOSE

COLLECT data on AQAM-related attacks and plots against the United States

DEVELOP a comprehensive understanding of the patterns of violence of AQAM-related perpetrators

INFORM the U.S. homeland security community in its efforts to thwart future AQAM-related attacks

BACKGROUND

This research highlight provides an overview of violent incidents and plots committed or attempted by supporters of al-Qa'ida and affiliated movements (AQAM) who targeted the United States between 1990 and 2013. Data are drawn from the United States Extremist Crime Database (ECDB), which includes information on the **35 homicide events* and 196 violent plots** perpetrated by AQAM-related supporters during this time period.

*The "Beltway Snipers" were responsible for 15 homicide events, and throughout this highlight, findings that do not include these 15 attacks will be indicated in parentheses.

KEY DEFINITIONS

◊ Violent plot - a violent incident that is set into motion and stopped before it reaches completion. An offender or group of offenders who plans to attack several different targets would be responsible for several unique plots.

◊ Homicide event - an attack by one or more offenders that results in the death of at least one victim. Each event involves a spatially unique target; for example, the 9/11 attacks consisted of four homicide events.

AQAM-RELATED HOMICIDE EVENTS

PERPETRATORS

- 34% (60%) of fatal incidents were committed by lone actors who were often fueled by ideology, personal grievances and mental illness.
- 44 (42) unique offenders were responsible for all AQAM-related homicide events.

TARGETS

- 71% (50%) of homicide events targeted the general public, 14% (25%) law enforcement, 9% (15%) the military, and 6% (10%) social minorities.
- Mass casualty events were rare—69%(45%) of fatal AQAM-related attacks targeted and killed one victim.

WEAPONS

- 75% (45%)of homicide events were perpetrated with firearms.
- The 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings were the only fatal attacks committed using explosives.

REGIONS

- AQAM-related homicides were scattered from coast to coast.
- Due in large part to 9 attacks conducted by the "Beltway Snipers," the D.C. metro area experienced 11 homicide events. New York, 5, and California , 4, also experienced relatively high numbers of events.

AQAM-Related **Violent Plots:**



Perpetrators

- 53% of the identified plots were planned by lone actors, while the remainder were planned by multiple offenders.

Targets

- The most common intended target types were:
  - Military-related (18%)
  - Political and government figures or structures (15%)
  - Business-related (13%)
  - Transportation-related (12%)

Weapons

- The most common types of intended weapons were bombs/explosives. This suggests that most violent plots were intended to be mass casualty events.
- Firearms were the second most common intended weapon type.

Regions

- AQAM supporters often planned to strike targets in the Northeast (65 plots) and South (62 plots) of the United States, with fewer plots targeting the Midwest (32) and West (20).
- The most commonly targeted cities were New York City and Washington, D.C.

Future Research Questions

AQAM-related lone actors remain a significant threat to homeland security. As a consequence, more comparative research needs to be done on:

- Potential precipitating factors associated with attacks by lone actors, small cells, and group-based actors, including the role of mental illness in the process of radicalization to violence
- The different ways that violent plots by AQAM-related lone actors, small cells, and group-based actors have been prevented

Terrorism & Extremist Violence in the U.S. Database

This research is part of a larger effort to develop a comprehensive database on Terrorism and Extremist Violence in the U.S. (TEVUS) that integrates data from the Global Terrorism Database, the American Terrorism Study, Profiles of Perpetrators of Terrorism in the U.S., and the U.S. Extremist Crime Database. Led by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), the research team is creating a resource that will allow operational and academic end-users to conduct unprecedented analyses that incorporate incident, perpetrator, and geospatial information.

TEVUS
Terrorist & Extremist Violence in the U.S.

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START
NATIONAL CONSORTIUM FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM AND RESPONSES TO TERRORISM

BACKGROUND REPORT

Bombings at the 2013 Boston Marathon

In light of the series of bombs that exploded near the finish line at the Boston Marathon on April 15, START has compiled data on the history of terrorism in Boston, Massachusetts, terrorist usage of coordinated attacks in the United States, and terrorist attacks at previous marathons around the world.

TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN BOSTON

START's Global Terrorism Database (GTD) records 16 terrorist attacks that have occurred in Boston since 1970, but only three since 1990. The most recent recorded terrorist attack occurred in November 1995 when an explosion occurred at the Boston-based headquarters of the Christian Science community. This 1995 bombing caused no fatalities.

According to the GTD, Boston has been the 14th most frequently targeted U.S. city by terrorists in the past 40+ years. Houston, Texas, has similarly experienced 16 attacks during this period. New York (430 attacks) is by far the most frequently targeted U.S. city, with Los Angeles (103 attacks) the second most common target.

The majority of Boston's terrorist activity occurred in the 1970s, with Black nationalists responsible for five of the 12 attacks during that decade. Violent White supremacists and violent far-leftists were also active in Boston during this time.

There have been two fatal terrorist attacks in Boston since 1970, both classified as assassinations: In 1992, Iwao Matsuda—the president of a Japanese university—was assassinated in his hotel during a visit to Boston; in 1995, Paul McLaughlin—a prosecutor specializing in gang-related cases—was shot in his car in a parking lot in the city.

MASS-CASUALTY TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES

While catastrophic events like those of September 11, 2001, demonstrate how deadly terrorists can be, data shows that most terrorist attacks do not inflict a large number of casualties (injuries and fatalities). Historically, each U.S. terrorist attack has resulted in 3.3 casualties on average. Excluding the 9/11 attacks, the average number of casualties per U.S. attack drops to 1.4 casualties per attack. Mass-casualty terrorism is rare in the United States, but it does occur. (*Those average figures do not include 1993 data, for which START does not have a complete annual dataset.)

There have been 28 terrorist attacks in the United States since 1970 known to have resulted in more than 10 casualties. In addition to the attacks of September 11, 2001, mass-casualty terrorism in the United States includes:

Attack	Year	Casualties
World Trade Center	1993	1048 (including 6 deaths)
Murrah Federal Building, Oklahoma City	1995	818 (including 168 deaths)
Salmonella poisoning in Oregon	1984	751
Atlanta Olympics Bombing	1996	111 (including 1 death)
Bombing at LaGuardia Airport, NY	1974	85 (including 11 deaths)
Amtrak Rail Sabotage, Arizona	1995	79 (including 1 death)

*The Fort Hood attack was the fourth most lethal attack in terms of fatalities, with 13 dead and 32 wounded.

COORDINATED ATTACKS IN THE UNITED STATES

Reports indicate that two bombs exploded near the finish line of the 2013 Boston Marathon. Early reports had indicated that additional devices in the area were defused prior to detonation, but those reports have been discredited.

Globally, 12 percent of the more than 100,000 terrorist attacks that have occurred since 1970 have been part of a coordinated attack, where the perpetrators have targeted multiple targets within a short period of time. The rate of such complex, coordinated attacks in the United States is consistent with the global average, with 300 of the 2,362 attacks in the United States between 1970 and 2011 qualifying as part of a "multiple" attack.

At different points in history, though, this tactic has been particularly popular among terrorists targeting the United States. The figure below presents trend data on the percentage of terrorist attacks each year that are categorized as such coordinated attacks (versus singular attacks). During the last 15 years, the percentage of such attacks in the United States has tended to exceed the global average. Given the complications that such attacks create for counterterrorism efforts as well as first responders, this could be an important trend to consider for the United States.



INCENDIARY DEVICES AND EXPLOSIVES IN THE US

The most common weapons used in the 207 terrorist attacks in the United States from 2001 to 2011 were incendiary devices and explosives. For the entire duration covered by START study, "Integrated United States Security Database (IUSSD): Data on the Terrorist Attacks in the United States Homeland, 1970 to 2011," these two categories accounted for more than 81 percent of all the weapons used in the attacks.

Incendiary devices accounted for more than half of all weapons used over the last decade, representing a large increase in the use of such weapons compared with the norm for the 1970 to 2011 time period. However, from 2001 to 2011, the use of explosives such as dynamite, grenades and "car bombs," is markedly lower, accounting for only 20 percent of all weapons used compared with 52 percent for the entire sample from 1970 to 2011.

MARATHON-RELATED ATTACKS

APRIL 2008: COLOMBO, SRI LANKA

On April 6, 2008, a Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam militant blew himself up, killing 14 civilians, including the minister of highway and road development, Jeyaraj Fernandopulle. The attack occurred as the minister was flagging the start of a road marathon. The attack injured 83 others in Weliweriaya, northeast of Colombo, Sri Lanka.

JANUARY 2006: LAHORE, PAKISTAN

1. On Jan. 28, 2006, in a series of related incidents, protesters of a marathon in which women and men would participate together in Lahore, Pakistan, set at least two buses on fire with unspecified weapons. The protesters were supporters of the Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal, or the United Action Forum coalition. There were no casualties and no reported claims of responsibility.

2. In a related incident, on Jan. 27, 2006, marathon protesters threw stones at policemen and at public property, and set four buses on fire with unspecified weapons. The protesters were supporters of the Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal, or the United Action Forum coalition. At least four people were injured in the protests, two of them police officers.

MAY 2005: GIDEON'S GREEN, NORTHERN IRELAND

On May 2, 2005, suspected Irish Republican Army members planted a pipe bomb at Gideon's Green, Newtownabbey in Belfast along the route of the Belfast Marathon. It was disabled before it could harm anyone, including the target of the attack, Chief Constable Hugh Orde. An unidentified perpetrator called in a warning about the bomb indicating that Hugh Orde was the intended target of the attack.

MAY 2003: BELFAST, NORTHERN IRELAND

On May 5, 2003, a substantial bomb was left in a van by two masked men in Belfast, North Ireland, in front of the motor tax office a few hours before the annual Belfast marathon. The owner of the van called the police who defused the bomb before it exploded. Police suspected that the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) was responsible for the incident.

MAY 1998: BELFAST, NORTHERN IRELAND

On May 3, 1998, suspected Irish Republican Army (IRA) militants fired two Mark 6 mortars at the Grosvenor Road Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) station in Belfast, Northern Ireland. The mortars, however, did not detonate and no injuries or damage were reported. The discovery of the mortars disrupted the Belfast Marathon, which was to be held the day after this incident.

NOVEMBER 1994: MANAMA, BAHRAIN

On November 25, 1994, protestors attacked participants of a marathon along the al-Budayyi' Highway using a number of blunt objects, including sticks and rocks. Three marathon runners were injured, including a British national and a person from Saudi Arabia. While the specific motive for the attack is unknown, it is believed that the perpetrators were protesting the route of the marathon because of its proximity to a site believed to be the remains of a mosque. Protesters were also angered by the dress of female participants in the race.

ABOUT THIS REPORT

The primary authors of this report are Kathleen Smarick and Erin Miller. Questions should be directed to infostart@start.umd.edu.

The data presented here are drawn from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and reports from news media. The GTD contains information on more than 104,000 terrorist incidents that have occurred around the world since 1970. For more information about the GTD, visit www.start.umd.edu/gtd.

The GTD is a project of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). START aims to provide timely guidance on how to reduce the incidence of terrorism and disrupt terrorist networks, as well as enhance the resilience of society in the face of terrorist threats at home and abroad. Additional information about START is available at www.start.umd.edu.

The study, "Integrated United States Security Database (IUSSD): Data on the Terrorist Attacks in the United States Homeland, 1970 to 2011," was funded through START by the Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate's Resilient Systems Division. The full report is available at: http://www.start.umd.edu/start/publications/START_IUSSDDataTerroristAttacksUS_1970-2011.pdf.

The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) is supported in part by the Science and Technology Directorate of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security through a Center of Excellence program based at the University of Maryland. START uses state-of-the-art theories, methods and data from the social and behavioral sciences to improve understanding of the origins, dynamics and social and psychological impacts of terrorism. For more information, contact START at infostart@start.umd.edu or visit www.start.umd.edu.

START NATIONAL CONSORTIUM FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM AND RESPONSES TO TERRORISM

Bombing and Arson Attacks by Environmental and Animal Rights Extremists in the United States, 1995-2010

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Purpose

Collect data on bombings and arsons committed by individuals associated with ALF or ELF

Analyze incident and perpetrator characteristics to support analysts and law enforcement in assessing the threat posed by these groups

Background

This research highlight provides an overview of the arsons and bombings conducted by perpetrators affiliated with the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) and Animal Liberation Front (ALF) between 1995 and 2010, and analyzes the characteristics of the individuals convicted of these crimes. Data are drawn from the U.S. Extremist Crime Database.

Summary of Findings

- Between 1995 and 2010, 239 arson and bombing attacks were committed by ELF and ALF, with 55% attributed to ELF and 45% to ALF.
- Of these 239 incidents, 62% were bombings and 38% were arsons.
- 66% of incidents occurred in the West, 14% in the Midwest, 13% in the Northeast, and 7% in the South.
- Only 39% of incidents were isolated, or, not related to other incidents.
- One or more arrest was made in only 34% of incidents.
- The majority of offenders were male (74%), white (100%), not married (88%), and had at least some college education (69%).
- Some offenders had ties to only ALF (6%) or ELF (39%), but most of them (55%) were connected to both groups.
- 45% of the incidents were motivated by the need to protect animals and/or prevent testing with animals, 23% by anti-sprawl concerns, and 20% by anti-corporation/business development views.

ELF & ALF Arsons and Bombings by Year



TARGETS



PERPETRATORS

Number of Offenses	Number of Offenders
1	32
2	13
3	4
4	3
7	3
8	1
10	1
11	1
15	1
147 Offenses	**59 Offenders**

INVOLVEMENT & RECRUITMENT

	All Offenders	Offenders with One Offense	Repeat Offenders
Lone Actor	5.3%	7.4%	4.8%
Acted with Others	6.9%	25.9%	1.9%
Formal Group	9.2%	11.1%	8.7%
Informal Group	78.6%	55.6%	84.6%
	All Offenders	**Offenders with One Offense**	**Repeat Offenders**
Personal Connection	50.0%	14.3%	100.0%
Individual Decision	33.3%	57.1%	0.0%
Internet	16.7%	28.6%	0.0%

* A perpetrator who was convicted of multiple attacks would be included in these analyses more than once, as the nature of their involvement or means of recruitment might change with each offense.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

- A relatively small group of individuals was responsible for a large number of offenses.
- ALF and ELF's focus to date on property over human targets has influenced where and when they have attacked.
- ALF and ELF perpetrators have often been difficult to identify as they tend to join the movement through personal contacts, commit offenses working in small cells, and rarely engage in other movement-related activities.

TERRORISM & EXTREMIST VIOLENCE IN THE U.S. DATABASE

This research is part of a larger effort to develop a comprehensive database on Terrorism and Extremist Violence in the U.S. (TEVUS) that integrates data from the Global Terrorism Database, the American Terrorism Study, Profiles of Perpetrators of Terrorism in the U.S., and the U.S. Extremist Crime Database. Led by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), the research team is creating a resource that will allow operational and academic end-users to conduct unprecedented analyses that incorporate incident, perpetrator, and geospatial information.

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START NATIONAL CONSORTIUM FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM AND RESPONSES TO TERRORISM

Understanding Lone-actor Terrorism: A Comparative Analysis with Violent Hate Crimes and Group-based Terrorism

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Purpose

Analyze timing, locations, methods, targets, and geographic distributions of lone-actor terrorist attacks

Compare lone-actor terrorism to group-based terrorism and violent hate crimes

Inform strategies for preventing lone-actor terrorism

Background

This research highlight examines the characteristics of the 101 lone-actor terrorist attacks that occurred in the United States between 1992 and 2010 and compares them with the violent hate crimes and group-based terrorist attacks that occurred during the same period.

Summary of Findings

- Year-to-year changes in lone-actor terrorism are moderately correlated with group-based terrorism, indicating that the two seem to ebb and flow together rather than one replacing the other. There is no discernible correlation between lone-actor terrorism and violent hate crimes from year to year. (See Figure below.)
- The proportion of lone-actor terrorism that occurs in less populous states (e.g., New Mexico, Nebraska, Iowa) is higher than the proportion of violent hate crimes and group-based terrorism in those states.
- Similar to group-based terrorism and violent hate crimes, lone-actor terrorism is more likely to occur in counties with larger populations, lower levels of home ownership, and higher percentages of non-Hispanic whites.
- Unlike group-based terrorism and violent hate crimes, lone-actor terrorism is not more likely to occur in counties with higher percentages of residents living in urban environments, higher percentages of male residents between 15 and 24 years of age, or higher unemployment rates.
- Overall, locations where lone-actor terrorism occurs tend to share more demographic similarities with the locations of violent hate crime offending than with the locations of group-based terrorism.

Terrorism and Violent Hate Crimes, 1992-2010



Source: Global Terrorism Database and FBI Uniform Crime Reports

Attack Method	Percent of Group-based Attacks	Percent of Lone-actor Attacks
Facility/ Infrastructure Attack*	53%	49%
Bombing/Explosion	26%	36%
Armed Assault	10%	9%
Assassination	6%	2%
Unarmed Assault	3%	2%
Hijacking	1%	0%
Hostage Taking (Barricade Incident)	0%	1%
Hostage Taking (Kidnapping)	0%	0%
Total	**100% (n= 404)**	**100% (n= 99)**

**Facility and infrastructure attacks are directed towards non-human targets such as buildings, monuments, and transportation infrastructure.*

Attack Methods

- Evidence suggests that very few violent hate crimes involve weapons other than fists and blunt objects.
- The use of more advanced weapons and explosives is far more common in terrorist attacks, and in this respect group-based attacks and lone-actor attacks are generally similar.

Target Types

- Nearly 50% of lone-actor terrorist attacks are abortion-related compared with 17% of group-based terrorist attacks.
- 6% of lone-actor terrorist attacks target businesses versus 27% of group-based terrorist attacks.

Target Type	Percent of Group-based Attacks	Percent of Lone-actor Attacks
Abortion-related	17%	48%
Private Citizens & Property	19%	22%
Government (General)	13%	8%
Businesses	27%	6%
Religious Figures & Institutions	4%	6%
Educational Institutions	7%	3%
Military	2%	2%
Airports & Airlines	1%	1%
Government (Diplomatic)	<1%	1%
Other	9%	3%
Total	**100% (n=418)**	**100% (n=101)**

Policy Implications

- It may be possible to learn more about where and when lone-actor terrorism occurs by examining patterns in violent hate crime, a type of violence that both academics and practitioners understand more fully.
- Knowing the types of targets and means of attack common among lone-actor terrorists can assist with 'target hardening' or other law enforcement strategies.

Terrorism & Extremist Violence in the U.S. Database

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START NATIONAL CONSORTIUM FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM AND RESPONSES TO TERRORISM

COUNTY-LEVEL CORRELATES OF TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES, 1990-2010

AUTHORS

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PURPOSE

PRESENT descriptive information on the geographic clustering of terrorism

CONSTRUCT a list of likely predictors of terrorism based on variables found to be important in predicting crime

EXAMINE whether these variables predict terrorism at the county level

BACKGROUND

This study examines whether characteristics of U.S. counties can explain the geographic clustering of terrorist attacks in the United States from 1990-2010. It builds upon data from a previous study (LaFree and Bersani, 2012) that examined the connection between the distribution of terrorism and the distribution of ordinary crimes over nearly four decades.

MAJOR FINDINGS

Geographic Concentration of Terrorism

Attacks tended to cluster in specific areas, especially large metropolitan areas, from 1990-2010. Yet, they were also widely dispersed—each of the 48 continental U.S. states experienced at least one attack.

The 'Typical' U.S. County that Experienced a Terrorist Attack was characterized by higher rates/greater proportions of:

- *Residential instability*

- *Language diversity**

- *Foreign-born residents**

- *Men aged 15-24 yrs.*

Additionally, counties with higher levels of language diversity and residential instability were associated with a higher **frequency** of terrorist attacks.

These results do not suggest that terrorist attacks were more likely to be completed by individuals who were foreign-born or those who primarily speak a language other than English at home. Rather, they describe the **characteristics of counties that were more likely to be the **targets** of terrorist attacks.*

GEOGRAPHIC CONCENTRATION OF TERRORIST ATTACKS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1990—2010

Of 581 attacks that took place from 1990 –2010, 25% occurred in just 10 counties:

- New York County, NY (Manhattan) (30)
- Los Angeles County, CA (19)
- San Diego County, CA (16)
- Washington, D.C. (15)
- Miami-Dade County, FL (14)
- Bernalillo County, NM (13)
- Maricopa County, AZ (12)
- King County, WA (9)
- Lane County, OR (8)
- Tulsa County, OK (8)

Frequency and Lethality of Terrorist Attacks in the United States, 1990—2010

The number of terrorist attacks in the United States generally decreased from 1990-2010. However, the rate of decrease was not equal among counties:

- From 2001-2010, those counties with higher levels of concentrated disadvantage and residential instability saw the greatest decrease in terrorism rates.
- Those with higher levels of foreign-born population and language diversity saw lesser reductions.

Further, these numbers don't take into account foiled plots or the rise in the likelihood of fatalities among more recent terrorist attacks (LaFree and Bersani, 2012).

Do Geographic Predictors of Crime also Predict Terrorism From 1990-2010?

	Ordinary Crime	Terrorism
Concentrated Disadvantage— *level of poverty, joblessness, employment in menial jobs, etc.*	Higher crime rates **linked** to higher rates of concentrated disadvantage	Lower terrorism rates **linked** to higher rates of concentrated disadvantage in the 1990s, but the two rates **not linked** in the 2000s
Residential Instability— *level of mobility within neighborhoods*	Higher crime rates **linked** to higher rates of residential instability	Higher terrorism rates **linked** to higher rates of residential instability
Ethnic Heterogeneity— *percentage of population that is foreign-born*	Lower crime rates **linked** to higher rates of ethnic heterogeneity	Higher terrorism rates **linked** to higher rates of ethnic heterogeneity
Demographics— *population size and racial, ethnic, and gender composition*	Higher crime rates **linked** to larger populations	Higher terrorism rates **linked** to larger populations

Policy Considerations

- Terrorism, like ordinary crime, is not randomly distributed but rather concentrated in time and space.
- The same types of statistical data that are now routinely used by police departments to help forecast crime hot spots and deploy police officers can also be a helpful tool for those countering terrorism.
- While the rate of terrorist attacks has declined in the past several decades, a rise in the likelihood of fatalities among recent attacks deserves continued attention.

Terrorism & Extremist Violence in the U.S. Database

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The full report is available at: http://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/files/publications/START_IUSSD_CountylevelCorrelatesofTerrorismintheUS_March2013.pdf

START NATIONAL CONSORTIUM FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM AND RESPONSES TO TERRORISM

Identifying the Characteristics of Communities where Perpetrators Live and Pre-Incident Activity Occurs

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Purpose

Identify the characteristics of locations where perpetrators lived, planned, and prepared prior to carrying out terrorist attacks

Examine differences in areas with residential and pre-incident activity, compared to those without, by group type.

Background

This study examines the locations of the residences and pre-incident activities associated with 144 terrorism incidents investigated by the FBI between 1990 and 2010. Using tract-level data from the 2000 U.S. Census, it compares the socioeconomic, housing, and sociodemographic characteristics of locations where environmental, far-right, and al-Qa'ida and Associated Movements (AQAM) perpetrators lived, planned, and prepared. It also compares these locations to ones that experienced no perpetrator residential or pre-incident activity. Data are drawn from the American Terrorism Study.

Major Findings

- 61% of perpetrator residences and 51% of pre-incident activities are located in counties different from the location of the subsequent terrorist incidents.
- 46% of all census tracts where perpetrators lived, planned or prepared for terrorist incidents are in the West, 23% in the Northeast, 16% in the South, and 15% in the Midwest.
  - In the West, 50% of activities were conducted by far-right perpetrators, 30% by environmental, and 20% by AQAM.
  - In the Northeast, 67% of activities were conducted by AQAM perpetrators, 25% by far-right, and 8% by environmental.
  - In the South, 56% of activities were conducted by AQAM perpetrators, 40% by far-right, and 4% by environmental.
  - In the Midwest, 65% of activities were conducted by far-right perpetrators, 31% by AQAM, and 4% by environmental.

Locations with Residential or Pre-Incident Activity



Source: American Terrorism Study 2012, U.S. Census 2000

Due to the small size of census tracts these data were aggregated to the county level for graphic display. However, all of the analyses were conducted at the census tract level.

Alaska and Hawaii (not shown) had no census tracts with activity.

Counties with census tract(s) where residential and/or pre-incident activity occurred are indicated in white.

Characteristics of Locations Where Different Groups' Residential and Pre-Incident Activities Occur, Compared to Locations without Activity			
	Environmental Perpetrators	**Far-Right Perpetrators**	**AQAM Perpetrators**
Socioeconomic Status	Locations are not significantly different from those without activity.	Locations are generally less affluent, with lower average incomes and higher percentages of households living below the poverty level.	Locations tend to have higher unemployment rates and higher percentages of households living below the poverty level.
Housing	Housing tends to be newer, and values for owner-occupied homes tend to be higher.	Housing tends to be less expensive, with lower rents and lower owner-occupied home values.	Housing tends to be older, but rents and home values tend to be higher.
Sociodemographic Characteristics	Locations tend to have lower percentages of non-white and foreign-born residents and higher percentages of married families.	Locations tend to have lower percentages of foreign-born residents.	Locations tend to be more urban, have higher percentages of non-white and foreign-born residents, and have lower percentages of married families.

Next Steps

- Data will be expanded to include cases before 1990 and after 2010.
- Residential locations will be examined to see if it is possible to distinguish between long-term, permanent residences and residences utilized solely in preparation for an attack.
- Analyses will be conducted to determine whether the characteristics of locations where specific types of groups live, plan, and prepare vary by region.

Terrorism & Extremist Violence in the U.S. Database

This research is part of a larger effort to develop a comprehensive database on Terrorism and Extremist Violence in the U.S. (TEVUS) that integrates data from the Global Terrorism Database, the American Terrorism Study, Profiles of Perpetrators of Terrorism in the U.S., and the U.S. Extremist Crime Database. Led by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), the research team is creating a resource that will allow operational and academic end-users to conduct unprecedented analyses that incorporate incident, perpetrator, and geospatial information.

TEVUS
Terrorist & Extremist Violence in the U.S.

This research was supported by the Resilient Systems Division of the Science and Technology Directorate of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security through Award Number 2009-ST-108-LR0003 made to the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

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START
NATIONAL CONSORTIUM FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM AND RESPONSES TO TERRORISM

RESEARCH BRIEF

The Organization and Leadership of Violence

OVERVIEW

The primary goal of *The Leadership of the Extreme and Dangerous for Innovative Results* (LEADIR) study is to examine ideological organizations using theory and methods that are typically applied to more conventional, for-profit organizations. For example, we know from organizational psychology that leadership and organizational structure are explicitly tied to organizational performance, but to date these concepts have been given limited attention in the domain of violent groups.

PROJECT OBJECTIVES

- Integrate existing START resources (e.g., the organizational data in Victor Asal's and Karl Rethemeyer's BAAD dataset) with new data collected on organizations to examine organizational determinants of violence and performance.
- Identify organizational characteristics that differentiated violent from non-violent ideological organizations.
- Assess how these organizational characteristics (e.g., structure, leadership style) predict violence and performance in ideological groups using START's Global Terrorism Database (will be completed in Year Two (2014).

METHOD

To examine organizational and leadership characteristics, the team identified 85 ideological/belief-based organizations whose height of power fell between 1972 and 2011. To ensure that the sample represented a diverse population of ideological organizations, they evenly sampled organizations according to three criteria: organizational structure, use of violence, and geographic region. The team then developed behaviorally-anchored benchmark rating scales to assess structure, culture, tactics, and leadership characteristics of the organizations for each year of their height of power. Based on these ratings, the team then used discriminant function analysis to determine characteristics of the organizations and their leaders that differentiate between violent and non-violent ideological organizations.

Organizational Structure	Cell-Based
	Hierarchical
Method of Goal Achievement	Violent
	Non-Violent
Geographic Region	Western
	Non-Western

INTERIM FINDINGS

While Year Two of the LEADIR study should give information about the implications of differences among violent organizational structures and leaders, preliminary findings in Year One indicate that violent versus non-violent ideological organizations are quite different in how they operate. Specifically, they showed that **a cluster of certain characteristics are a hallmark of ideological groups poised for violent action in the name of their beliefs or cause.** It is known that ideological organizations in general (e.g., focus on sharing beliefs, delineation between in-group and out-group members) are unique when compared to more conventional for-profit organizations, but less is known about the salient organizational and leadership characteristics of ideological groups that adopt violent strategies.

Violent ideological groups are more *insularly aggressive*.

Even in groups with a "global" mission, violent organizations are much more tied to local grievances and issues than non-violent counterparts. In addition, violent groups use more aggressive themes in storytelling to potential recruits and the media. Both of these mission characteristics—identifying a target for proximal problems and a history of heroic violence—likely have mobilizing influence on new members.

Violent ideological groups have elements of hierarchy.

Even groups that appear "leaderless" have elements of hierarchy that facilitate decision making, knowledge sharing, and expertise development.

Even in organizations that were primarily cell-based, violent groups have elements of hierarchy that likely facilitate decision-making and planning. One of the most oft-found distinctions between violent and non-violent groups is that violent groups tend to use titles to distinguish members. While titles (e.g., Brother, Father, Comrade) are often used in non-violent ideological groups, in violent groups many of the titles were actually codification of status differences among members. These titles codified differences in functional expertise (e.g., the Punishment Squad members versus the Media Arm members), tenure in the organization (e.g., "Senior"), or even individual lines of authority (e.g., Aum Shinrikyo had a Chief Technology Officer). While organizations might look more cell-based externally, the use of titles

to signify status differences facilitates knowledge transfer (i.e., members know who to ask for specific information), decision making authority, and expertise development (i.e., the use of performance-based titles connotes the need to achieve such distinctions through action and performance). This has implications for the ways in which members of such organizations interact, and also explains why some organizations that appear to be "leaderless" actually do have an element of leadership to guide decisions and shape performance.

Leadership styles differ between nonviolent and violent organizations.

Preliminary findings suggest that leadership looks very different in violent versus non-violent ideological organizations. While we examined 13 types of leadership characteristics and how they relate to violence, one of the most interesting early results was identified by applying House and Howell's (1992) theory of power orientation to top leaders of ideological organizations. By examining the content of how leaders described their vision and power/authority in their organization, the team was able to assess whether leaders manifested a predominantly socialized versus personalized orientation. Socialized leaders promote a vision for the betterment of the organization or even movement at large, and deemphasize their places in that movement, share decision-making, and sacrifice themselves if the organization requires it.

Conversely, personalized leaders (e.g., Shoko Asahara) enhance their own place in the mission, reflecting their personal need for power. Personalized leaders tend to view close followers as objects meant to support their own advancement, and often will have difficulty maintaining a long-term cadre of close lieutenants.

The team found that personalized leaders are much more likely to rise to power in violent ideological organizations (38% of leaders were personalized) when compared to non-violent organizations (only 7% were personalized). This has implications for how such leaders make decisions, as well as errors they are likely to commit. For example, personalized leaders are more likely to value decisions that will help them to "save face" with followers than those that socialized leaders endorse. In addition, personalized leaders are likely more affronted by slights, threats to power, and personal attacks than socialized leaders. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, personalized leaders often feel threatened by others who could claim power. Thus, they are unlikely to groom their successors in a way that would allow them to resume command of the organization in the event of leader decapitation (i.e., the forced removal of top leadership via death or capture) or departure (i.e., exiting the group in non-violent ideological groups).

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

The goal of Year Two is to identify how these organizational characteristics in structure, practices, and leadership relate to organizational destruction and performance. Thus, the team is coding attacks of violent organizations in the sample to identify which organizational characteristics and leaders predict the most malevolently creative attacks in terms of destruction to people, property, processes, and symbols of the target group.

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START

The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) is supported in part by the Science and Technology Directorate of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security through a Center of Excellence program based at the University of Maryland. START uses state-of-the-art theories, methods and data from the social and behavioral sciences to improve understanding of the origins, dynamics and social and psychological impacts of terrorism. For more information, contact START at infostart@start.umd.edu or visit www.start.umd.edu.

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START
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FACT SHEET

The Evolution of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL): Relationships 2004-2014

ISIL RELATIONSHIPS, 2004-2014



Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) Significant Relationships

Source: Big Allied and Dangerous (BAAD) Data

NEGATIVE RELATIONSHIPS THAT WERE PREVIOUSLY POSITIVE

1) The group currently known as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) was originally founded by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Al-Zarqawi's first connection with **al-Qa'ida** began in 2000 when he sought out Osama Bin Laden in Afghanistan and requested assistance in creating al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, a network focused on overthrowing the Jordanian government.[1] Zarqawi initially avoided the post 9/11 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led surge in Afghanistan by relocating to Iran and then, in 2002, to Iraq.[2] At the request of al-Qa'ida leaders, Zarqawi began facilitating the move of militants into Iraq to combat coalition forces. However, Zarqawi did not formally

swear allegiance to and join under the umbrella of al-Qa'ida until 2004.[3] This strengthened relationship was reflected in Zarqawi's network changing their name to Tanzim Qa-idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn, commonly referred to as al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI).[4] The association persisted as AQI continued to develop, forming the Mujahidin Shura Council (MSC) in 2006 and, after Zarqawi's death later that year, changing their name to the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) under the command of Abu Umar al-Baghdadi in October.[5] ISI's relationship with al-Qa'ida was characterized by ideological schisms, with al-Qa'ida leaders voicing concern that the organization's indiscriminate and brutal tactics were isolating them from public support in Iraq.[6] The relationship continued to deteriorate in 2013 when Abu Umar al-Baghdadi attempted to claim al-Nusrah Front under his command—a claim that was rejected by al-Nusrah Front leader Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani who instead pledged allegiance directly to Al-Qa'ida.[7,8] Al-Qa'ida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri attempted to mediate, supporting Jawlani as the official Syrian branch of al-Qa'ida.[9] In defiance, ISIL increased operations in Syria including targeting members of al-Nusrah Front. As a result, Ayman al-Zawahiri denounced ISIL on February 2, 2014, officially ending al-Qa'ida's affiliation with the group.[10]

2) **Al-Nusrah Front** was originally founded when Abu Umar al-Baghdadi sent Abu Mohammad al-Jawlani along with militants to Syria to set up a front.[11] In April 2013, al-Baghdadi announced the expansion of ISI to Syria, officially rebranding the organization as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIL).[12] Al-Nusrah Front leader Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani was not consulted before the announcement and denounced al-Baghdadi's claims, confirming instead his allegiance directly to al-Qa'ida's leadership.[13] Subsequently, the groups clashed in Syria, with each targeting militants from the opposing organization and solidifying their break.

3) On February 16, 2012, the United States Department of Treasury designated the **Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS)** as a supporter of terrorism for provided funding and arms to ISIL (then al-Qa'ida in Iraq)—however their report does not provide specific evidence or dates.[14] Iran has collaborated with al-Qa'ida based on their common opposition to the United States' involvement in the region. In 2001 when Zarqawi fled coalition forces in Afghanistan, the MOIS allowed him and others safe haven in Iran.[15] However, subsequent to ISIL's 2014 advancement in Iraq, the Iranian government has voiced their support of military action against the group.[16]

GROUPS THAT AQI/ISI/ISIL HAS TARGETED HISTORICALLY

4) Since 2003 the organization has been working to overthrow the **Iraqi government**, expel United States forces and establish a government under their interpretation of Islamic law.[17] They have continued to clash with the government and the military has led campaigns against the group.

5) In 2003 the organization began targeting **United States**-led forces in Iraq. They have also criticized the influence of Western actors, such as the U.S., but choose to focus on the "near enemy" rather than threaten the U.S. homeland.[18]

6) The **1920s Revolutionary Brigades** was originally formed to combat the United States-led coalition forces in Iraq. However, according to the Long War Journal, in 2007 they began coordinating with U.S. forces in order to expel ISIL militants from the region and have focused their efforts on mitigating the influence of ISIL.[19]

7) ISIL began campaigns against the **Assad regime in Syria** in 2011, gaining notoriety for their highly brutal tactics including decapitations and enforcement of Sharia wherever they gained territory.[20] As ISIL's relationship with other rebel groups continued to fracture, they increasingly changed the focus of their attacks to other Islamic coalitions striving to overthrow the Syrian regime.[21]

8) Since gaining a foothold in Syria, ISIL has clashed with other rebel groups in the region, including assassinating commanders of the **Free Syrian Army**.[22]

9) Since 2014, ISIL has been publically denounced by and exchanged fire with several active groups in Syria, including the umbrella **Islamic Front (IF)**, the **Jaish al-Mujahedin (JM)**, and **Syrian Revolutionaries Front** (SFR).[23,24]

10) In 2011 **Hezbollah** sent troops to Syria on behalf of the Assad regime and has clashed with rebel forces there, including ISIL.[25] The groups are ideologically opposed and have targeted each other in Syria and in Lebanon.

11) In early 2014, ISIL declared **Lebanon** as a target due to Hezbollah's involvement in Syria.[26] Violence has spilled across the Lebanese-Syrian border as ISIL and al-Nusrah have both perpetrated suicide attack against Hezbollah.[27]

GROUPS THAT CONTINUE TO SUPPORT ISIL*

12) According to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, as of the beginning of 2014, **Jamaat Ansar Bayt al-Maqdisi** and **Ansar al-Sharia (Tunisia)** have both continued to offer verbal support for the ISIL and their actions.[28]

**current reports from Iraq indicate that ISIL does have some degree of support from local Sunni communities and groups who oppose the current regime led by Nouri al-Maliki.*

ABOUT THIS FACT SHEET

START is a U.S. Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence headquartered at the University of Maryland.

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Corina Simonelli is the primary author of this report. Questions should be directed to infostart@start.umd.edu.

Data are drawn from the Big Allied and Dangerous (BAAD) project, which focuses on the creation and maintenance of a comprehensive database of terrorist organizational characteristics and linking that data to prominent event, insurgency and country-level characteristics datasets. The project is led by START investigators Victor Asal and R. Karl Rethemeyer through the Project of Violent Conflict at Rockefeller College, University at Albany-SUNY.

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Countering the Threat

Building Resilience to Violent Extremism Among **Somali-Americans** in Minneapolis-St. Paul

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University of Illinois at Chicago

PURPOSE

CHARACTERIZE how social experiences impact involvement in violent extremism for diaspora youth and young adults.

UNDERSTAND how resilience could prevent violent extremism in communities under threat.

SUPPORT the development of prevention strategies that incorporate security and psychosocial dimensions and are based on theory, evidence, and community collaboration.

SPECIFIC AIMS

INTERVIEW Somali-Americans in Minneapolis-St. Paul so as to characterize the potentially modifiable multilevel risk and protective factors that may impact young adult males' vulnerability to radicalization and recruitment.

ENGAGE parents, community advocates, providers, and policymakers so as to inform the development of socially and culturally appropriate strategies for preventing violent extremism.

METHODS This study involved ethnographic data collection in the Somali-American community in Minneapolis St. Paul including youth (n=19), parents (n=18), and providers (n=20). This study utilized a grounded theory approach to qualitative data analysis using Atlas/ti software after establishing coder reliability. Findings were affirmed through team consensus and reviewed by community members.



Figure 1

FINDINGS: RISK

NO ONE RISK FACTOR explained teenage boys' and young men's involvement in violent extremism. Rather it was the interaction of multiple risk factors at multiple levels.

RISK FACTORS COMBINED to create an opportunity structure for violent extremism (Table 1). The key opportunities were: 1) youths' unaccountable times and unobserved spaces; 2) perceived social legitimacy for violent radicalization and terrorist recruitment; 3) the presence of recruiters and associates.

THE INVERTED PYRAMID in Figure 1 indicates that: 1) involvement in violent extremism depended on all three opportunities; 2) decreasing proportions of teenage boys/young men are exposed to the mid and lower opportunities.

RISK FACTORS are social and psychosocial factors that may be associated with violent radicalization and terrorist recruitment.

PROTECTIVE RESOURCES are social and psychosocial factors that can stop, delay, or diminish negative outcomes, including violent radicalization and terrorist recruitment.

RISKS FACTORS AND PROTECTIVE RESOURCES

1. Transnational
2. Multilevel (global, state, & societal/ community/family/youth)
3. Multitemporal (persistent or transient)



Figure 2

FINDINGS: RESILIENCE

PREVENTION STRATEGIES involving government, community, family and youth are needed to strengthen opportunity-reducing capacities (Table 2). Priorities are to: 1) diminish unaccountable times and unobserved spaces; 2) diminish the perceived social legitimacy of violent extremism; 3) diminish the potential for contacts with terrorist recruiters or associates.

BUILDING COMMUNITY RESILIENCE to violent extremism should be approached through community collaboration and capacity building (Figure 2). Shared goals could be to: 1) collaboratively strengthen families; 2) develop community support for families and youth; 3) adopt new governmental strategies for community support and protection.

RISK FACTORS COMBINED TO CREATE AN OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE FOR VIOLENT EXTREMISM

LEVELS	RISK FACTORS	OPPORTUNITIES
Global, State & Societal	• Secondary migration • Being an underserved U.S. refugee community	
Community	• Lack of support for youth • Unsafe neighborhoods • Social exclusion • Unmonitored spaces in community forums	
Family and Youth	• Family separation or loss • Weak parental support • Absolute trust in everyone who attends mosque • Mistrust of law enforcement • Overemphasis on government power • LACK OF AWARENESS OF VIOLENT RADICALIZATION AND RECRUITMENT • Lack of accurate info on violent radicalization and recruitment • Little parental involvement in education • Lack of opportunities • Lack of warning signs	**Youth's Unaccountable Times & Unobserved Spaces**
Global, State & Societal	• Viewing Somalia as a failed state • Violent extremism on the Internet • PERCEPTION OF A NEW THREAT TO SOMALIA • Objections to U.S. government foreign policy	
Community	• COMMUNITY SUPPORT FOR AL SHABAAB • Hearing bad news about Somalia • Social exclusion • Being a divided community • Remittance sending • Having a nomadic heritage • Interaction with migration brokers	**Perceived Social Legitimacy Of Violent Extremism**
Family and Youth	• Little family talk about war • Identity issues among members of Generation 1.5 • Being passionate about Somalia • Being uninformed about Islam • Being uninformed about Somalia • Social identity challenges • Indirect and direct traumas	
Global, State & Societal	• Terrorist organization's recruitment • Violent extremism on the Internet	**Presence Of Recruiters Or Associates**
Community	• Sources of radical ideology	

CAPS = Transient risk

Table 1

RESILIENCE MEANS STRENGTHENING PROTECTIVE RESOURCES

SECTOR	AIMS	PROTECTIVE RESOURCES
Family and Youth	Diminish Youth's Unaccountable Times and Unobserved Spaces	• Awareness of risks and safeguards • Parental monitoring and supervision • Family confidants • Family social support • Family involvement in education • Access to services and helpers • Parental and youth help-seeking • Parental involvement in mosques & religious education
	Diminish the Perceived Social Legitimacy of Violent Extremism	• Focus on youth's future in the U.S. • Parental support for youth socialization • Rejecting tribalism and war • Parental talk with youth regarding threats • Youth civic engagement • Youth political dialogue
	Diminish Recruiters and Associates Presenting Opportunities	• Parents informing law enforcement • Parental messaging in community re youth protection
Community	Diminish Youth's Unaccountable Times and Unobserved Spaces	• Trusted accurate information sources • Increased activities in supervised community spaces • Mentoring of youth • Increased civilian liaisons to law enforcement • Interactions with community police • Social entrepreneurship • Interfaith dialogue • Social support networks
	Diminish the Perceived Social Legitimacy of Violent Extremism	• Islamic education & Imam network • Community support for youth socialization • Understanding of Islam as a peaceful religion • Youth civic engagement • Youth political dialogue • Youth opportunities for peace activism • Messaging to challenge legitimacy of violent extremism
	Diminish the Potential for Contacts with Recruiters and Associates	• Cooperation with law enforcement • Monitoring by community members • Messaging to warn off recruiters • Bloggers and websites against violent extremism • Critical voices in the community
Government (in part through supporting community-based NGOs)	Diminish Youth's Unaccountable Times and Unobserved Spaces	• Trusted accurate information sources • Community policing • Support for parenting and parent education • Support for after-school programs and mentoring • Support for youth and family social services
	Diminish the Perceived Social Legitimacy of Violent Extremism	• Empowering critical voices • Support for youth community services • Support for youth leadership training • Support for parenting and parent education
	Diminish Recruiters and Associates Presenting Opportunities	• Community policing • Training for community leaders and providers • Support for community messaging • Support for bloggers and websites

Table 2

Further Considerations

RISK AND PROTECTION

ACKNOWLEDGE community members' concerns that violent radicalization and terrorist recruitment will not disappear from U.S. Somali-American communities anytime soon, though over time it will change in form and intensity.

SHIFT from analyses overly focused on individual-level factors to multi-level analyses that include structural, social, political, economic, community, and family-level risk factors and protective resources.

UNDERSTAND why some communities are more at risk than others in terms of presenting more opportunities for transformative contact with recruiters and violent extremists in the everyday lives of diaspora youth.

RESILIENCE APPROACH

REALIZE that community resilience is not a single factor and cannot simply be dialed up.

ENSURE that resilience-focused programs and policies are well supported by theory, empirical evidence, and community collaboration.

APPRECIATE the risks and limitations of government, communities, and families when focusing on resilience.

INCLUDE family resilience as an important component of community resilience and acknowledge the family as a key locus of both risk factors and protective resources.

PREVENTION

ACCEPT that there is no magic bullet of prevention.

CONCEPTUALIZE that primary prevention in an immigrant and refugee community is more than only better cooperation with law enforcement.

TARGET prevention efforts towards the most vulnerable people and places.

UTILIZE a capacity building approach to enhance government, community, and family capacities to reduce opportunities for involvement in violent extremism.

PARTNERSHIPS

WORK towards countering violent extremism through collaborative partnerships between government and community groups, organizations and leaders.
REALIZE that building prevention through partnership is a long-term process.
UTILIZE a comprehensive approach to countering violent extremism with key contributions from law enforcement, immigration, public health, social services, education and media.
ADOPT balanced, fair and transparent approaches to partnerships not limited by the biases of particular gatekeepers.

FURTHER RESEARCH

IDENTIFY reliable short-term proximal indicators of violent radicalization and terrorist recruitment as well as community and family protective resources.
CONDUCT feasibility assessments of prospective interventions to demonstrate whether they are acceptable, appropriate, and practically achievable.
PERFORM efficacy studies of potentially effective interventions to demonstrate whether they lead to statistically significant differences in key outcomes.
ADAPT effective interventions that have worked under one set of circumstances, and investigate applying them to new or larger circumstances with community collaboration.

For additional information on this research contact
STEVAN WEINE at smweine@uic.edu or 312-355-5407

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CENTER *for* TERRORISM *and* SECURITY STUDIES

UMASS LOWELL

Pathways, Processes, Roles and Factors for Terrorist Disengagement, Re-engagement and Recidivism

Final Report

October 2014

ABOUT THE REPORT

The research summarized in this report was sponsored by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate and coordinated through the U.K. Home Office. The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the Department of Homeland Security or the Home Office.

ABOUT CTSS

The Center for Terrorism and Security Studies (CTSS) at the University of Massachusetts Lowell leads and facilitates scientific research, education and training to help understand and respond to the evolution, convergence and complexity of domestic and foreign security challenges. We examine practitioner-oriented and policy-relevant issues from multiple academic perspectives and methodologies. Our research is evidence-driven and non-partisan.

Our research is disseminated to various audiences. We produce academic books, journal articles and textbooks for undergraduate and graduate programs; we write blog posts and record educational podcasts for the general public; and we deliver technical reports, pragmatic briefs and notes for policy considerations for the practitioner. We teach undergraduate and graduate courses in several academic programs at the University, and provide training workshops and seminars for practitioners throughout the intelligence, law enforcement and military communities.

For more information visit http://www.uml.edu/ctss
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ABOUT THIS PROJECT



How, when and why do people disengage?



Is disengagement affected by the role held by a member?

How, when and why do people re-engage?

WHAT WE DID

Literature reviews



Nationalist, Left-wing, Right-wing, Religious , Single issue

Analyzed 85 autobiographies written by members of violent extremist groups



10 interviews with disengaged members of violent extremist groups

INTERVIEWING THE INTERVIEWER: 5 QUESTIONS FOR THE PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR

Why is the study of disengagement important?

Getting involved in terrorism is not the one-way street we once thought it was. People can and do leave all the time. Some write books, some become celebrities, but most fade into obscurity. Finding out how and why they leave might tell us something important about the reality of life inside these groups, and might help us understand what to do about preventing more people from getting involved in the first place.

How can practitioners use the insights you have gained from this project in their day-to-day role of countering terrorism?

Most terrorists want to leave because they eventually become disillusioned. They learn that the **fantasy and the reality are often very different**. This means that recognizing the signs of disillusionment can be critical for encouraging members to acknowledge those feelings, and in turn, to begin to walk away. And this is relevant at all stages of a person's trajectory into terrorism, whether early on in their involvement, or much later.

What do you see as the biggest barrier for an individual wishing to disengage from a terrorist group?

Many disillusioned terrorists stay involved because **they don't think they have any options to get out**. They fear a lifetime in prison, being on the run, or being victimized by their former comrades. Many stay involved, despite being disillusioned, because of this.

If you had to give one piece of advice to support efforts to increase disengagement, what would it be?

Know your group. Disillusionment and disengagement work differently from group to group. If you suspect an individual may wish to disengage, understand the relevant group dynamics at play. Do not explore particular push or pull factors unless you know them to be relevant.

Did anything surprising come out of this project?

Lots of things, but one interesting discovery is the importance of **self-concealment**. We know that individuals involved in violent extremism have to constantly hide things from their family, friends and of course the authorities. But they also often have to hide things from other members of their own group. It might be the fact that they are becoming disillusioned, or might relate to their sexuality (i.e., being gay in a group where that's unacceptable), drug use, or something else. Members sometimes display "cover" behaviors (e.g., becoming *more* violent) to conceal inner turmoil.

"Identifying how and why people leave terrorist groups can help us understand how to prevent more people from getting involved in terrorism in the first place or find ways to help them leave."

Every terrorist experiences three phases: Involvement, Engagement, and Disengagement

Involvement

Individuals are usually gradually socialized into involvement in terrorism, for instance, via exposure to ideological teachings; or family, friends, or charismatic individuals within a terrorist group. Involvement is a process. There is no single factor that explains it.

Risk factors for involvement in terrorism may include:

- Dissatisfaction with current identity or activity
- Limited alternatives and opportunities
- Need for validation and approval of others
- Acceptance of extremist views
- Placing a premium on action
- Positive expectations about involvement with specific individuals/groups

Engagement

Engagement in terrorism may refer to a wide variety of actions, ranging from direct involvement in terrorist activity (e.g., shootings or bombings) to ancillary and indirect activity (e.g., raising funds). Not all actions performed by members of terrorist groups may be clearly illegal, and often, engagement in illegal behavior may supplement engagement in a wide variety of innocuous behavior.

Disengagement

Disengagement is the process of ceasing terrorist activity. It does not always involve a change in ideology or beliefs, as de-radicalization does, but does require an end to terrorist behavior. While disengagement is distinct from the process of de-radicalization, they are sometimes related. Disengagement can be a collective or an individual process. It may be clear-cut or a slow, phased process.

*"In the beginning ... it was anarchy symbols and a "[expletive] the world" approach to life. When I started to become active in the far-right groups, their anarchy symbols became swastikas. Their beliefs, and what I was learning there, started to mold me. I didn't seriously consider what happens if I decide to walk away, because I made a decision to be completely involved—and that meant staying. It meant **commitment**."*

Sarah*

*Not her real name

COMMON STAGES OF THE DISENGAGEMENT PROCESS

Disengagement is a highly personal process, but follows identifiable phases.

Doubts: Individuals may experience doubts after particular events, or as a result of disillusionment.

Seeking out and Weighing Alternatives: They may look for alternatives outside of the group and weigh them against continued involvement.

Deciding to Leave: If there are viable alternatives and a clear pathway out, they may decide to leave.

Exit and New Role: After leaving, they may adopt new roles outside of terrorism, which is critical to prevent re-engagement.

Post-Exit Re-Socialization: They may re-integrate into society.



Our stages of the disengagement model are adapted from Ebaugh's (1998) model of voluntary role exit.

Individual Differences in the Disengagement Process:

- Some leave terrorism after an event that triggers serious doubts; others disengage after years of deliberation and gradual withdrawal.
- Some are psychologically disengaged but physically still committed to action.
- Some become "trapped" in a particular phase or revert back to being a committed member.
- Some may decide that they want to disengage but may not be able to safely exit the group.

There is no single reason why individuals walk away from terrorism.
However, certain factors may make individuals more likely to disengage.

Push Factors

- Disillusionment with key personnel
- Disillusionment with the strategy or actions of the terrorist group
- Unmet expectations
- Loss of faith in the ideology
- Difficulty adapting to the clandestine lifestyle
- Inability to cope with physiological and psychological effects of carrying out attacks
- Burnout



Pull Factors

- Competing loyalties
- Positive interactions with those who hold moderate views
- Longing for the freedoms of a conventional life
- Employment/educational demands or opportunities
- Desire to marry and establish a family or the demands of having a family
- Promise of amnesty

A CASE STUDY OF DISENGAGEMENT: AHMED'S STORY

When Ahmed* entered the organization he had "absolutely no expectations" about what his involvement would entail.

1 Doubts: Once Ahmed was involved, he began to experience doubts about his involvement. These doubts originally emerged after a friend of his died while engaged in terrorist activity. Ahmed's doubts continued to grow as he became more and move involved in the group. This was fueled by both the reality that he might be killed and the nature of certain individuals within the group's leadership who he viewed as "psychopathic."

2 Seeking out and Weighing Alternatives: Ahmed began to think of ways to leave the organization. However, leaving for him was more difficult because his disillusionment centered on the organization's ideology. Ahmed also realized that leaving the group was far harder because of his direct involvement in operations and the likelihood that forensic evidence existed that could lead to his prosecution and conviction. Ahmed came close to leaving while abroad, but was quickly pulled back into the organization when several members of the organization died in an attack.

3 Deciding to Leave: At the age of 20 Ahmed was arrested and decided to act on his doubts and disillusionment, doubts that had been simmering for more than four years. For Ahmed, arrest provided a sense of relief (*see right*). While in prison Ahmed also learnt that the terrorist organization had hidden attacks against civilians from certain cells and members. This reinforced Ahmed's decision to leave. It was also during this time that Ahmed began to realize that the terrorist group had *"blinded itself"* to the extensive human rights abuses that it was causing.

4 Exit and New Role: Ahmed decided to exit the terrorist organization through, in his words, *"religious conversion,"* or more accurately, a newfound respect for fundamental human rights and the realization that his organization had violated these rights through its use of violence. He explains that the way in which he exited the organization was very risky; however, for Ahmed, the same commitment and determination that made him a successful terrorist gave him the courage to leave.

5 Post-exit Re-socialization: Ahmed was eventually released from prison after 14 years, and he enrolled in school. Today, he works in a conventional job, actively seeks to promote terrorist disengagement, and engages in voluntary community service activities. He recently married and is living happily in society.

"I remember when I was arrested and was in the police station, when the police were trying to interrogate me, they didn't realize that there was this—it was like a Niagara Falls of relief—and my mind went into this cool zone of intense relief because as I was sitting there, my mind far away from the interrogation, taking no part in it whatsoever, my mind was thinking, 'My God, I've survived, I've been captured, I never expected to ...' They must have been wondering why this guy wasn't responding to interrogation at all. I was sitting there going —'[expletive] I'm alive'. But it's curious with the belief too—it's a sign that people often don't appreciate the fact that the [terrorist] that they've captured may have been looking for a way out."

*Ahmed**

*Not his real name

ANALYZING TERRORIST MEMOIRS

85 autobiographies of disengaged terrorists were analyzed to investigate the self-reported causes of terrorist disengagement.

The Sample: *Nationalist (n = 57) Left-wing (18) Right-wing (n = 6) Religious (n = 3) Single issue (n = 1)*

Individual Disengagement:
In 29% of all cases individuals disengaged voluntarily—that is, they walked away from a still active terrorist organization. Of those cases in which individuals disengaged involuntarily, most were due to imprisonment, while some were the result of an individual's expulsion from the group.

Ideology and Disengagement:
In cases of individual, voluntary disengagement, loss of faith in the ideology played a large role in 16% of cases and a small role in 12% of cases. A loss of faith in the terrorist groups' ideology played no role in 72% of cases of individual voluntary disengagement.

Top Push Factors	Top Pull Factors
• Disillusionment with the strategy or actions of the group • Disillusionment with leaders • Disillusionment with members • Disillusionment with day-to-day tasks	• Desire to dedicate more time to family • Desire to seek employment and education • Too hard to balance with family life • Others convinced to leave

ROLES AND FUNCTIONS

Terrorist Roles: Group members may perform one type of task or several when engaged in a terrorist group. Individuals often begin in one role and migrate to another. This can cause role strain (inability to perform a job) and role conflict (stress resulting from occupying roles with conflicting demands).

How do roles impact disengagement? It is highly plausible, that the role(s) held by an individual within a terrorist organization may be closely associated with the rewards or satisfaction that he or she derives from membership and therefore affect his or her decisions regarding whether or not to exit.

Findings

Analyzing terrorist memoirs, we find that the role that individuals hold may impact the likelihood that they will disengage, as well as the reasons for and process through which disengagement will occur:

1. Certain roles are likely to produce more role conflict and role strain.
2. Certain roles are likely to require more investment in the group and therefore allow for fewer alternatives outside of the group.

"I wanted to make jihad on the front lines ... I hadn't come all the way from America to sit and watch other mujahideen train and fight in Tajikistan ... They didn't conceal their anger either and told me to hit the road if I didn't like the way things were going … I was young and hotheaded and told them good-bye."

An example of role dissatisfaction (Aukai Collins, 2002)

ARE CERTAIN TYPES OF TERRORIST GROUPS EASIER TO LEAVE THAN OTHERS?

84 autobiographies of disengaged terrorists were analyzed to investigate how the prevalence and process of disengagement differed among individuals who belonged to different types of terrorist group

In nationalist violent extremist groups (n=57):

- Groups members are more likely to be ideological at the outset.
- Ideological commitment tends to stay high throughout involvement in the group and people tend to stay engaged until they are apprehended.
- People are more likely to cite the desire to gain employment or education as a reason for leaving.

In right-wing violent extremist groups (n=6):

- People are more likely to have abused drugs and alcohol and be motivated by a sense of belonging or opportunistic gains than by ideological beliefs.
- Ideological commitment tends to decrease as people spend more time in the group, and disillusionment with ideology is especially prevalent. In fact loss of faith in the group's ideology was cited in half of the cases as a reason for the individual's exit.
- Voluntary disengagement tends to be more common.

In left-wing violent extremist groups (n=18):

- Individuals are less likely to re-engage than those in right-wing violent extremist groups.
- Individuals are more likely to cite burnout and the pressure of being "on the run" as contributing to their exit.

In religious violent extremist groups (n=3):

- Ideological commitment tends to decrease as people spend more time in the group.

RIGHT-WING VIOLENT EXTREMISTS IN THEIR OWN WORDS

We conducted analyses of seven **interviews** conducted with, and six **autobiographies** written by, former members of right-wing violent extremist groups in order to identify similarities and differences in the issues discussed.

Similarities between Interviews and Autobiographies

Abuse and victimization: In both, individuals discussed abuse they endured as part of their early family lives and pointed to similar external causes for their involvement in terrorism (e.g., their "victimization" as white Americans).

Factions: In both, individuals described violent extremist organizations as divided into small factions. This is in contrast to the image of cohesiveness that groups seek to communicate to their recruits and the public.

Family: In both, nearly all individuals identified at least one family member who disapproved of their violent activity, thereby constituting a source of pressure to disengage.

Differences between Interviews and Autobiographies

Recruits: While autobiographers tended to describe recruits as "elite," interviewees tended to describe former comrades as unskilled and uneducated with no meaningful commitment to the group's ideology.

Socio-emotional needs: Interviewees often described their involvement as motivated by a need to fulfill socio-emotional needs (e.g., a need for affiliation, need for friendship).

Terrorist Autobiographies	Semi-Structured Interviews
Pros	**Pros**
- Open-source and easy to acquire - Provide valuable perspective on internal structures, processes, and dynamics of terrorist organizations	- Provide valuable perspective on internal structures, processes, and dynamics of terrorist organizations - Flexible, allowing for elaboration and exploration of emerging topics
Cons	**Cons**
- Passive with no opportunity to request elaboration - Unknown effect of publication/editing process	- Small sample sizes of available interviewees - Several important ethical considerations.

SELF-CONCEALMENT

For someone to be an effective member of a violent extremist group, they might sometimes conceal information about themselves from other members. Individuals in violent extremist groups may conceal information about varied aspects of their selves, including their sexuality, habits, changing interests and even signs of increasing disillusionment with the group.

" when I tried … and kind of fell back into it, … I knew, like now I have to be super racist skinhead because I fell off the racist wagon. And I literally made a point … to be more hardcore and start more fights. And, you know, because I felt 'Now I have to re-prove myself because they knew that I faltered'."

Sarah*

*Not her real name

Concealing aspects of oneself can be difficult. It can have negative psychological, physiological and behavioral consequences for individuals and those around them. Understanding the process and effects of self-concealment within an extremist group, and specifically what leads individuals to conceal rather than reveal elements of themselves, may be useful in impacting the disengagement process

Throughout his involvement in extreme right-wing terrorism in the United Kingdom, **Nicky Crane** lived a 'double life', concealing his homosexuality from his fellow group members.

RETURNING TO THE FIGHT

Who is at risk of returning to terrorism? Little is known about terrorist recidivism, but criminologists have identified a series of risk factors used to predict the likelihood that an individual will, in the future, re-engage in criminal activity. These factors are described as "static or dynamic."

Based on research on non-terrorist offenders, we expect that:

Age: Former terrorists **are less likely to re-engage as they age, and** are more likely to re-engage if **they became involved in terrorism at an early age**

Socio-economic status: Former terrorists are more likely to re-engage **if they come from a poor socio-economic background**.

Ties to current members: Former terrorists who ***retain ties to members of an active terrorist organization*** or individuals supportive of terrorism are more likely to re-engage.

History of involvement: Former terrorists are more likely to re-engage if they have a longer history of involvement.

Static (trait) risk factors

Static risk factors are ***constant characteristics of an offender*** that never change.

Examples: Age at first offense; past history of pre-adult antisocial behavior; past history of criminal behavior; past history of deviant family members and peers

Dynamic (state) risk factors

Dynamic risk factors are ***characteristics that may vary over time***; they can be "stable" (changing slowly over time) or "acute" (changing rapidly).

Examples: Antisocial attitudes or values; antisocial associates; lack of social achievements (marriage and stable employment); substance abuse and addiction

LESSONS FOR RESPONDING

It may be possible to encourage disengagement by:

- Raising doubts about the terrorist organization, its actions, leadership or ideology (This can help plant the seeds for potential disillusionment.)
- Ensuring that disillusioned individuals have sufficient economic, educational, and social opportunities, which can lure them away from the organization
- Providing a safe exit route for disillusioned individuals once they have decided they want to leave

Be open to the possibility that a sudden or unexpected increase in violent behavior may not necessarily indicate sincere commitment.

- Always remember that recruits are under pressure from two directions—from their external enemies, and from their own group.
- Fearing detection of their disillusionment from others within their group, recruits may feel self-imposed pressure to visibly escalate their commitment.

Know the group

- If you suspect an individual may wish to disengage, understand the relevant group dynamics at play (e.g. how does the group deter/manage/threaten those who wish to leave?)
- Do not explore particular push or pull factors unless you know them to be relevant either to the group or the individual in question.

An individual may be disillusioned with the group, but there is a risk in the short term of what might appear to be spontaneous re-engagement.

- We don't know much at this point about recidivism, but even someone who is disillusioned might be lured back into a group because of pre-existing social bonds rather than ideological commitment.

Further Reading

Altier, M.B., Thoroughgood, C., & Horgan, J. (2014), "Turning Away from Terrorism: Lessons from Psychology, Sociology, andCriminology," *Journal of Peace Research, 51* (5), 647-661.

Horgan, J. (2014). *The Psychology of Terrorism 2nd Edition*. London: Routledge.

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START NATIONAL CONSORTIUM FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM AND RESPONSES TO TERRORISM

U.S. Attitudes toward Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Examining Results From a Four-Wave Survey Conducted Between September 2012 and July 2014

Authors

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Amy Adamczyk
Associate Professor, John Jay College of Criminal Justice

Purpose

Collect comprehensive baseline information about U.S. attitudes toward terrorism and counterterrorism activities.

Examine results across multiple survey waves.

Inform government policies and programs.

Background

This project examined Americans' beliefs and attitudes about terrorism and government efforts to counter terrorism based on responses to more than 5,500 questionnaires administered in four waves between September 2012 and July 2014. Because the Boston Marathon bombings occurred during the course of the project, researchers were able to assess possible changes in respondents' attitudes following a major, well-publicized terrorist attack.

Americans' Concerns About Terrorist Attacks

Respondents answered questions gauging their level of concern about terrorism. There was little change in their responses across the four waves, although in wave 3, nine months after the Boston Marathon bombings, there was a significant uptick in the percentage of respondents who indicated they had changed their behavior in the past year because of the possibility of an attack. This effect largely dissipated by wave 4, which occurred 15 months after the bombings.

Thought about a terrorist

Wave 1: 14.7%
Wave 2: 17.2%
Wave 3: 15.6%
Wave 4: 14.6%

Said U.S. attack is somewhat/very/extremely likely in next year

Wave 1: 14.0%
Wave 2: 14.7%
Wave 3: 15.8%
Wave 4: 13.3%

Did something differently because of possible attack*

Wave 1: 6.0%
Wave 2: 5.6%
Wave 3: 8.1%
Wave 4: 5.2%

Likelihood of Calling Police in Various Situations

Survey responses were generally stable across waves, but after the Boston Marathon bombings (wave 3) an increased proportion of the public said they would be very likely to notify police if they heard about a person traveling overseas to join a terrorist group. This increase dissipated by wave 4.

Proportion of Respondents Very Likely to Call Police, by Item and Wave

About a situation in which a person is...	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4
...talking about planting explosives	76.1%	76.5%	**80.4%**	75.2%
...traveling overseas to join terrorist group	52.0%	52.3%	**59.4%**	52.7%
...distributing handouts supporting terrorism	46.2%	45.7%	**51.4%**	45.8%
...talking about joining terrorist group	41.4%	41.7%	**45.6%**	40.6%
...reading material from terrorist group	20.6%	20.1%	**23.3%**	20.7%

Perceived Effectiveness of Government Efforts to Prevent Terrorism in the United States

There was a marginally significant decline in the (high) proportions of respondents who said that the government has been very or somewhat effective at preventing terrorism in the United States.

There was no change in the (slightly lower) proportions who said that terrorists will always find a way to carry out major attacks in the United States. The responses to this item could be indicating either a lack of faith in the government or reasonable expectations about what the government can accomplish.



"If You See Something, Say Something" Campaign

Percentage of Respondents Who Had Heard of Campaign, by Wave



- *The proportion of those who said they had heard of the campaign increased across all waves. Some of this may have been artificial since the question was repeated with each survey, but, even among those who completed the survey for the first time (new cases), there was a significant increase in awareness.*
- *Respondents with the highest education (college degree or above) showed the greatest awareness in wave 1 and the sharpest increase in awareness across all four waves.*

Trends in American Attitudes

- Results demonstrated considerable stability in American attitudes toward terrorism and government responses to it.
- The most evidence for change appeared in select responses before and after the Boston Marathon bombings and in the proportions of respondents who had heard of the "If You See Something, Say Something" campaign.

Implications

- The public may be more willing to help authorities counter terrorism in the wake of a highly publicized terrorist event, such as the Boston Marathon bombings.
- Results also suggest it is possible to increase awareness for specialized programs like the "If You See Something, Say Something" campaign, evidenced by growth in the proportion of people who were familiar with it.

This research was supported by the Resilient Systems Division of the Science and Technology Directorate of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security through Award Number 2010-ST-108-LR0004 made to the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

More information about this project, as well as findings and reports from each wave, can be found at http://www.start.umd.edu/research-projects/us-attitudes-towards-terrorism-and-counterterrorism.

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START NATIONAL CONSORTIUM FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM AND RESPONSES TO TERRORISM

U.S. Attitudes toward Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Reporting Terrorism-related Activity

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Roger Tourangeau
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Purpose

Collect comprehensive baseline information about U.S. attitudes toward terrorism and counterterrorism activities.

Examine public perspectives on reporting terrorism-related activity.

Inform government engagement with the public on terrorism-related issues.

Background

This research highlight examines results from a survey of 1,392 American adults conducted in January and February of 2014, and specifically focuses on responses to questions regarding reporting terrorism-related activity to law enforcement. When possible, it also compares findings to an earlier wave of the same survey conducted in the spring of 2013 before the Boston Marathon bombings.

Major Findings

Reporting Terrorism-related Activity

Respondents were presented with several terrorism-related situations and asked how likely they would be to call the police in each circumstance. (See table below.) In general, respondents were:

- ***Most likely*** to say they would call the police if they overheard talk about planting explosives.
- ***Least likely*** to say they would call the police if they became aware of an individual reading material from a terrorist group.

LIKELIHOOD OF CALLING THE POLICE, BY SCENARIO

If Aware of Person(s)	Very Likely	Somewhat Likely	Not too Likely	Not at all Likely
Talking about Planting Explosives	80.4	12.6	4.7	2.2
Traveling Overseas to Join a Terrorist Group	59.4	21.7	14.8	4.2
Distributing Handouts Supporting Terrorism	51.4	28.7	15.7	4.2
Talking about Joining a Terrorist Group	45.6	30.4	19.7	4.3
Reading Material from a Terrorist Group	23.3	28.0	37.8	10.9

Before and After Boston Marathon Bombings

Respondents were also ***more likely*** to say they would call the police if they became aware of terrorism-related situations after (versus before) the Boston Marathon bombings.*

- After the bombings, all five scenarios showed a significant increase, ranging from 3% to 8%, in those saying they would be *very* or *somewhat likely* to call the police.

**Many events besides the Boston Marathon bombings occurred between April 2013 and February 2014, so we cannot know with certainty that respondents' attitudes were only--or even mainly--affected by the bombings.*

Of respondents who said they were NOT too likely or NOT at all likely to call the police, we asked, "Why not?" Here are some common themes in responses:

Quotation marks indicate direct quotes from respondents

"If You See Something, Say Something" Campaign

- **36 %** of respondents said they had heard of the campaign.
- **18 %** of respondents said they were not sure if they had heard of the campaign
- **4 in 5** of respondents who had previously heard of the campaign said they thought it would be "very" or "somewhat" effective.

Although the proportion of respondents who said they had heard of the campaign was higher after the Boston Marathon bombings than before, we believe that this may be due to the fact that many respondents had been asked the question in the earlier surveys.

Respondents who said that the campaign would be *not too effective* or *not effective at all* were asked to indicate why they felt that way. The chart to the right displays their responses. Of the "other reasons" offered by those who responded, most had to do with concerns about individual rights and privacy. A few, however, mentioned their fear of retribution from terrorists.

- One respondent said, "I think many think the government is too intrusive right now."
- Another person noted that "(They) need to implement an anonymous tip line. No one wants their name on a list that can get leaked to those crazy idiots."

Reasons why some felt the campaign would not be effective



- "Many people do not care enough to get involved"
- "People will report things that aren't related to terrorism"
- "Terrorists will avoid being noticed"
- Other reason

**Respondents could choose more than one response.*

Policy Considerations

- Following the Boston Marathon bombings, respondents expressed a significantly greater willingness to call the police, which suggests that the public might become an even more important resource in responding to future terrorist threats in the wake of a widely publicized terrorist event.
- When respondents indicated that they would not call the police in response to terrorism-related situations, it was most often out of concerns that citizens should be able to speak and act freely.
- Public education on the criminality of behaviors such as joining a terrorist group, which would constitute material support for a designated terrorist organization, may help highlight the significance of those activities and result in higher reporting levels in the future.

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Appendix

Research and Evaluation Program on Domestic Radicalization to Violent Extremism (DRVE)

October 2014

The Research and Evaluation Program on Domestic Radicalization to Violent Extremism is a central part of NIJ's Program on Transnational Issues (PTI). The goal of the program is to develop knowledge of radicalization to violent extremism in the United States that bolsters efforts to prevent or counter violent extremism. The program primarily invests in extramural research and evaluation projects to accomplish this goal, but uses expert working groups, intramural research and international coordination with other research agencies to supplement investments. The program adds a new focus on NIJ's broader portfolio of research on violent extremism, and parallels work already underway in the PTI such as transnational organized crime. Violent extremists are those individuals who support or commit ideologically motivated violence to further political, social or religious goals.

The DRVE focuses on answering three major questions in the first five years of its existence:

1. What are the primary drivers of radicalization to violent extremism, and how do these drivers vary across cohorts (e.g., by grievance, by age, by socioeconomic categories, etc.)?
2. How is radicalization to violent extremism analogous to other forms of extreme violence, such as mass casualty events and gangs?
3. What policy choices and/or programmatic interventions reduce or prevent radicalization, to induce disengagement from violent extremism, or to ensure de-radicalization and desistance?

For each of these questions, a crucial aspect of the answer is to detail the role of criminal justice agencies and their community partners in all aspects of a comprehensive effort to counter violent extremism (CVE).

Origins and Program Year 1 (FY12)

Since 2002, NIJ has invested in dozens of research projects focused on violent extremism as it impacts state and local criminal justice agencies and the communities they serve. In 2012, Congress provided NIJ with new funding for "research targeted toward developing a better understanding of the domestic radicalization phenomenon, and advancing evidence-based strategies for effective intervention and prevention." After a lengthy review of the existing research, discussions with other DOJ components, consultations with other Federal agencies and

discussions with representatives from state and local agencies, NIJ focused its call for proposals on achieving four objectives:

1. Empirical evaluation of social science theories of domestic radicalization;
2. Examination of radicalization processes for individuals, including "lone wolf" extremists;
3. Comparative analysis of violent extremists, organized criminals, gangs, hate groups and/or cults; and
4. Influence of community level and policing strategies on domestic radicalization.

A competitive selection process concluded with the selection of six research grants and one evaluation contract. The six research grants that NIJ made from the 2012 solicitation are:

1. *Identity and Framing Theory, Precursor Activities, and the Radicalization Process* (University of Arkansas): This project examines theories about how violent extremists develop their ideology and move to violence. Using data collected from the United States between 1980 and 2012, the project will assist law enforcement, intelligence and fusion centers, and prosecutorial agencies in determining optimal timeframes for early intervention. The results of this study will advance our understanding of how radicalization does and does not occur, translating into important insights for prevention and countering violent extremism programs.

2. *The Role of Social Networks in the Evolution of Al Qaeda-inspired Violent Extremism in the United States, 1993-2013* (Brandeis University): The study examines the evolution of American jihadist organizations over the past twenty years and will identify the mechanisms that motivate Americans to volunteer for Islamist extremist violence and terrorist actions. The project will focus on over 500 individual violent extremists and will draw data from their online communications. The results of this study will render a picture of how violent extremism has evolved over the past two decades and how useful social network analysis tools are for understanding the evolution of radicalization.

3. *Understanding Pathways to and away from Violent Radicalization among Resettled Somali Refugees* (Children's Hospital of Boston): The objective of the study is to understand pathways to diverse outcomes among Somali refugees: why do some embrace greater openness to violent extremism, while others with shared life histories move towards gangs, crime, or resilient outcomes such as non-violent activism? To what degree do these outcomes overlap? The project expects to provide empirical evidence of specific *modifiable* indicators related to changes in openness to violent extremism. The results of the study will aid in the development of more targeted prevention programs.

4. *Community Policing Strategies To Counter Violent Extremism* (Duke University): Little is known about the extent to which police departments around the country have adopted community policing practices, the methods they are using to address the threat of violent extremism, and what they consider to be best practices in the field. This project addresses the current gap in knowledge by using a nationwide survey, in-depth interviews, and focus groups to better understand the extent to which law enforcement agencies are using

community policing to combat violent extremism. The results will provide a road-map for rolling out future engagement and prevention programs at the state and local level.

5. *Lone Wolf Terrorism in America: Using Knowledge of Radicalization Pathways to Forge Prevention Strategies* (Indiana State University): The purpose of the research is to create a database on lone wolf terrorism, along with a theory-informed case study component and a comparative analysis, in order to distinguish lone wolves from those who undergo radicalization in a group context. The project also explores potential signatures of lone wolves preparing to engage in violent extremism. The results will provide much needed information on the important though contested topic of lone wolf terrorism, as well as render indicators of this form of violent extremism.

6. *Empirical Assessment of Domestic Radicalization* (University of Maryland): This project examines 1800 individuals in the U.S. associated with violent extremism in order to advance the empirical basis for understanding domestic radicalization. The study focuses on differences radicals and/or the radicalization processes of those who accept the personal use of violence for political purposes and those who only engage in non-violent criminality, the relationship between radical beliefs and radical behavior, and how strongly the evidence supports theories of radicalization in general. The results of this study will provide evidence-supported conclusions of how radicalization works, allowing for the development of more focused prevention and countering violent extremism programs.

In addition, NIJ awarded a contract to the RAND Corporation to evaluate the State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training (SLATT) program. The SLATT program is a prime example of community level programs that have shown promise to prevent or otherwise counter violent radicalization in the U.S.

Taken as a whole, the first year awards addressed all four goals that NIJ outlined in its research solicitation. Grants to the University of Arkansas' Terrorism Research Center and to the University of Maryland's National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) are comprehensively testing theories of why some individuals radicalize into violent extremism while others do not. Likewise, NIJ selected an application from Indiana State University to study the lone wolf phenomenon in a comprehensive fashion. The program also contained studies that compared radicalization to violent extremism to other malevolent social organizations such as organized crime, gangs and hate groups.

These research projects use a variety of databases and scientific methods that complement one another. For example, the grant to Brandeis University is developing a detailed social network analysis of online radicalization and is constructing a new database of these online communications for future study. In addition, each of the projects will generate a new dataset that NIJ will make available for future research at the conclusion of the program.

Last, the seven awards set the foundation for the program by examining a broad spectrum of motivations for domestic radicalization for violent extremism. Four of the six projects focus on domestic radicalization for violent extremism motivated by political, environmental and religious

motivations. This ensures that the conclusions from this program are not limited to one form of domestic radicalization to violence, but will speak to the phenomenon in its entirety.

Program Year 2 (FY13)

Two major activities drove the second year of this program. The first was the establishment and proper coordination of the awards made in FY12. Of prime importance for a program this size is for the grantees to understand how their projects complement each other. Equally important is for new grantees to speak with stakeholders early in their work to obtain a better understanding of how their research informs practice. To accomplish these complementary goals, NIJ hosted all of the grantees and key stakeholders from Federal, state and local criminal justice agencies for a kickoff meeting in February 2013. The meeting reinforced the importance of the intended research and the need for this work to engage not just criminal justice agencies but also key stakeholders in the communities they serve.

The other major thrust of the program in FY13 was the expansion of the research and evaluation portfolio itself. While the FY12 awards responded to each of the three research questions driving the DRVE, consultations with stakeholders and a review of the results from FY12 made it clear that further research was needed to provide answers to these questions. The resulting solicitations for proposals focused on four objectives:

1. Comparative analysis of individual violent extremists, mass casualty perpetrators, gang members, hate group members and/or organized criminals;
2. Online radicalization to violent extremism;
3. Evaluations of promising practices;
4. The relationship between and convergence of organized crime and either violent extremist groups or transnational gangs.

A competitive selection process concluded with the selection of six additional research grants:

1. *Transnational Crimes Among Somali-Americans: Convergences of Radicalization and Trafficking* (University of Illinois-Chicago): This project focuses on the Somali-American diaspora and its involvement in two transnational crimes: radicalization to violent extremism and trafficking in persons. This study aims to build scientific knowledge on these crimes with an emphasis on transnational issues and convergence in contexts of profound community vulnerability and active criminal networks. The co-occurrence of radicalization and trafficking in disadvantaged refugee and immigrant communities warrants an examination to better understand the transnational and convergence issues involved, and how they can inform evidence-based community practices. The results of this project can inform the development of resilient neighborhood as well as specific policies designed to improve responses to radicalization and other transnational issues in vulnerable populations.

2. *Across the Universe? A Comparative Analysis of Violent Radicalization Across Three Offender Types with Implications for Criminal Justice Training and Education* (University of Massachusetts-Lowell): This award develops a series of studies comparing the behavioral underpinnings of three types of U.S.-based offenders since 1990: solo-terrorists, lone-actor terrorists, and individuals who engage in mass casualty violence but lack an ideological motivation. In particular this research program compares the developmental, antecedent behavioral and ideological factors that crystallize within the offender and are later expressed behaviorally via the offense itself. This program of research seeks to understand whether (dis)similarities are observable across these offender types and what the relevant implications are for law enforcement. The results from this study will help to determine the appropriateness of profiles for these offenders as well as develop indicators and warnings for law enforcement and other community organizations.

3. *Evaluating the Federal CVE Initiative* (Duke University): This project will collect information on the engagement efforts being conducted by U.S. Attorneys' Offices, the Department of Homeland Security, and the National Counterterrorism Center. These data collection efforts will include a survey of U.S. Attorneys' Offices and in-depth interviews with key officials to catalogue federal outreach and engagement work. The impact of these efforts will begin to be assessed through focus groups of Muslim American community leaders in three cities. While the study is not a formal evaluation of engagement efforts, the resulting catalogue will provide the basis for future evaluations and the focus groups will provide valuable feedback concerning outreach efforts in the United States.

4. *Prisoner Recollections: The Role of Internet Use and Real-Life Networks in the Early Radicalization of Islamist Terrorist Offenders* (Brandeis University): This award will collect the life histories from approximately forty "homegrown" terrorist offenders inspired by Al Qaeda. The project will ascertain the importance of the Internet and online networking in shaping the early stages of radicalization trajectories. Complementing the existing FY12 award charting domestic Islamist terrorist networks, the results of this project will improve our understanding of the motivations and processes that moved subjects to become terrorists or to engage in criminal activities in support of terrorism.

5. *Sequencing Terrorists' Precursor Behaviors: A Crime Specific Analysis* (University of Arkansas): The goal of this project is to identify the temporal dimensions of terrorists' precursor conduct to determine if these behaviors occur in a logical sequenced pattern. The project will particularly focus upon identification of sequenced patterns that vary by group type, group size, and incident type. The project is interested in ascertaining whether characteristics of the planning process associated with these three issues are correlated with the successful completion or prevention of terrorist incidents. The results of this study would again aid in the development of indicators for law enforcement or other community organizations.

6. *Evaluation of a Multi-Faceted, U.S. Community-Based, Muslim-Led CVE Program* (University of Massachusetts-Lowell): This award responds to a need both to counter domestic terrorism and to evaluate programs focused on countering such violent extremism. The proposed evaluation will be done in Montgomery County, MD, in collaboration with the

community-based, Muslim-led CVE program (The World Organization for Resource Development and Education), the Montgomery County Department of Police, and the Montgomery County Office of Community Partnerships. The results of this study can provide an evidence-based model for outreach at the community level, as well as explore what works in terms of engagement among communities organizations (including criminal justice agencies).

Taken as a whole, the second year awards address all four objectives that NIJ outlined in its research solicitations. Three of the grants will address how individuals radicalize to violent extremism: Brandeis, University of Arkansas and the University of Massachusetts-Lowell's "Universe" project). The Brandeis award will also provide us insights into online radicalization. While the Duke University award sets the baseline for future evaluations, the University of Massachusetts-Lowell's evaluation of WORDE will give us insights into current efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism. And both the University of Illinois-Chicago and University of Arkansas grants will address the comparative study of group-level radicalization dynamics that NIJ sought in its solicitation.

Like the FY12 awards, diversity remains a key facet of the program. Each of these projects approach radicalization from a variety of scientific methods and use a striking breadth of information on radicalization. Likewise, the studies as a whole examine the full spectrum of grievances that drive radicalization to violent extremism.

Program Year 3 (FY14)

For the third year of the program, the emphasis remained on coordination and retrenchment on sponsoring research responding to the original three research questions. In terms of coordination, NIJ continued to work closely with the interagency "Group of 4" (i.e., the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Homeland Security and the National Counterterrorism Center). A second program status meeting was held in June 2014 that brought together representatives of all 13 existing research efforts as well as close to 100 practitioners. Finally, NIJ stepped up its coordination with foreign research agencies, including Public Safety Canada and the U.K. Home Office.

An audit of the initial findings of the 13 existing projects led NIJ to the conclusion that the most appropriate use of funds was to focus on one more round of solicited research. The major objectives of this solicitation were:

1. Re-examination of violent extremism originating in the United States, with an emphasis on non-religious forms of violent extremism;

2. Disengagement and deradicalization;

3. Violent extremism and gangs: analogies and prevention;

4. The Role of the Internet and online discourse in radicalization to violent extremism;

5. Evaluations.

The solicitation again harvested a number of excellent proposals for research. In the end, NIJ selected six applications for awards:

1. *A Comparative Study of Violent Extremism and Gangs* (University of Maryland-College Park): This award will provide an evidence-based assessment of the similarities between violent extremist groups and criminal gangs. Given that criminal justice policy makers have designed and implemented gang prevention and amelioration strategies for decades, there is hope that this study can support the belief that programs developed for gang interventions might have relevance for reducing violent extremism.

2. *An Assessment of Extremist Groups Use of Web Forums, Social Media, and Technology to Enculturate and Radicalize Individuals to Violence* (Michigan State University): There is currently limited knowledge of the role of technology and computer mediated communications (CMCs), such as Facebook and Twitter, in the dissemination of messages that promote extremist agendas and radicalize individuals to violence. The proposed study will address this gap through a series of qualitative and quantitative analyses of posts from various forms of CMC used by members of both the far-right and Islamic extremist movements. The project will result in a detailed typology of the ideological content of posts, the value of online messages, the technological skill of those posting to social media, and the matching of posts online to actual terrorist activity.

3. *Empirical Assessment of Domestic Disengagement and Deradicalization (EAD3)* (University of Maryland-College Park): This award will provide a more systemic and generalizable understanding of the various equifinite and multifinite processes by which individuals exit extremism. This understanding is a crucial first step in identifying opportunities for effective interventions and evaluating the appropriate programs and initiatives to take advantage of these opportunities.

4. *Gang Affiliation and Radicalization to Violent Extremism within Somali-American Communities* (Children's Hospital Corporation of Boston): The overall goal of this project is to conduct in-depth analyses of risk and resiliency in relation to both gang affiliation and radicalization to violent extremism among Somali youth resettled in North America. The project will result in increased understanding of how psychosocial and demographic factors relate to support for violent activism and gang affiliation, and of the role of gang affiliation (or lack thereof) in the radicalization to violent extremism of Somali youth who left Minneapolis to join al-Shabaab. The project will develop a theoretical model of the overlap and divergence of gang affiliation and radicalization to violent extremism among Somali youth in the U.S.

5. *Radicalization on the Internet: Virtual Extremism in the US from 2012-2017* (Arkansas State University): This award will identify active online extremist groups based in the United States by collecting information about a variety of groups, including extremist religious, nationalist, political, and ethnicity-based groups. The project will create preliminary virtual profiles of predominant extremist groups, resulting in the construction of ideological maps and the identification frame intersections, and will discern the effect

online extremist material has on individuals who see it and which types of material is most influential.

6. *Research and Evaluation on Domestic Radicalization to Violent Extremism: Research to Support Exit USA* (Research Triangle Institute): The project will provide a comprehensive understanding of deradicalization processes among domestic violent extremists to inform community level prevention and intervention strategies. The study will include 52 former right-wing extremists and will partner with Life After Hate (LAH) as subject matter experts to study the onset, persistence, and desistance from extremism. This will provide a comprehensive understanding of the relationships between individual-level factors (e.g., identity work, motivations) and structural forces (e.g., community and criminal justice organizations, barriers) with disengagement and deradicalization. The final result will include an "Exit USA" classification instrument for identification of those extremists most likely to disengage and/or deradicalize.

Program Impact and the DOJ Counterterrorism Mission

The DRVE will further our understanding of domestic radicalization and provide a number of important insights for the field. The program will analyze all incidents of domestic radicalization to violence in the U.S. and describe the frequency of their occurrence as well as basic commonalities across the cases. More importantly, this analysis will provide the basis for identifying which models of radicalization are valid and under what conditions. This is especially important in the area of lone wolf terrorists, which remain largely a blind spot in the research community. Last, the program will also help sharpen our knowledge of how U.S. communities view radicalization to violence and how they are responding to it.

Further, the anticipated findings from NIJ's research program on domestic radicalization will speak directly to key sections of the *Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States* (the "SIP"). The SIP discusses five priority areas of research to "improve our understanding of violent extremism through increased research, analysis and partnerships with foreign governments, academia and nongovernmental organizations." This program addresses all five areas (and more). For example, the awards to Brandeis University address the role of the Internet in radicalization to violence, while and the awards to Indiana State University and University of Massachusetts-Lowell address lone wolf terrorism. All of the remaining awards from address the three additional items in the SIP: disengagement from violent extremism, non-al-Qa'ida related radicalization to violence and analysis of known case studies of extremist violence in the United States.

Last, the research from this program is feeding directly into DOJ and interagency efforts to counter violent extremism. The research teams have provided initial briefings and interim findings to many components of DOJ and the FBI. Likewise, NIJ research teams support the development of the three CVE pilot studies in Los Angeles, Minneapolis and Boston. Finally, NIJ researchers have attended interagency meetings such as the CVE Leadership Forum. In all, NIJ's DRVE is tightly coordinated with DOJ's counterterrorism mission and provides real-time information in support of that mission.