

BACKGROUND (U)

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) A previous SIGINT assessment report on radicalization indicated that radicalizers appear to be particularly vulnerable in the area of authority when their private and public behaviors are not consistent. (A) Some of the vulnerabilities, if exposed, would likely call into question a radicalizer's devotion to the jihadist cause, leading to the degradation or loss of his authority. Examples of some of these vulnerabilities include:

- Viewing sexually explicit material online or using sexually explicit persuasive language when communicating with inexperienced young girls;
- Using a portion of the donations they are receiving from the susceptible pool to defray their own personal expenses;
- Charging an exorbitant amount of money for their speaking fees and being singularly attracted by opportunities to increase their stature; or
- Being known to base their public messaging on questionable sources or using language that is contradictory in nature, leaving them open to credibility challenges.

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Issues of trust and reputation are important when considering the validity and appeal of the message. It stands to reason that exploiting vulnerabilities of character, credibility, or both, of the radicalizer and his message could be enhanced by an understanding of the vehicles he uses to disseminate his message to the susceptible pool of people and where he is vulnerable in terms of access.

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA) The third chart includes the radicalizers' presumed areas of authority, countries of resonance, and vulnerabilities as reported and documented in [3/RA/501518-12](#) 202017Z JUN 12, "Terrorism/Islamic Radicalization: Global Radicalizers Vulnerable in Terms of Authority."

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA)

RADICALIZERS	AUTHORITY	ARGUMENT	COUNTRIES WITH HIGHEST RESONANCE	VULNERABILI- TIES
name redacted	Imprisoned for inciting hatred against non-Muslims	Non-Muslims are a threat to Islam	identifying information redacted	-Online promiscuity -May misdirect donations -Desire to stay out of jail results in inconsistent arguments
name redacted	Respected academic, promotes al-Qai'da (AQ) propaganda	Offensive jihad is justified	identifying information redacted	- Online promiscuity - Publishes articles without checking facts

name redacted	Well-known cleric, extremist financier, and al-Qai'da supporter	Killing of non-Muslim occupiers is justified	identifying information redacted	-Disagrees with AQ on some issues (e.g. targeting civilians) -Pragmatic on "Arab Spring"
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name redacted	Writings appear on numerous jihadi websites	The U.S. brought the 9/11 attacks upon itself	identifying information redacted	-Deceitful use of funds -Potential for contradictory statements
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name redacted	Well-known cleric, famous for hostility towards non-Sunni Muslims	Preaches intolerance for all non-Sunni Muslims	identifying information redacted	-Charges exorbitant speaking fees -Attracted to fame
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name redacted	Well-known media celebrity	The U.S. perpetrated the 9/11 attacks	identifying information redacted	-Glamorous lifestyle -Misinterprets Qur'an -Possibly misdirects donations
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ZEN/JUSTICE
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PREFACE (U)

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA) This SIGINT assessment examines access as one element in the process of Islamic radicalization in order to identify vulnerabilities. Using six prominent, globally-resonating foreign radicalizers as exemplars, this report focuses on the means they use to reach their intended audience and reveals potential vulnerabilities for exploitation. It should be read in conjunction with NSA report [3/RA/501518-12](#), which identifies vulnerabilities of authority.

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Information herein is based largely on Sunni extremist communications and includes disseminated SIGINT as well as collateral available between January 2008 and September 2012. The SIGINT information is from primary sources with direct access and is generally considered reliable. Greater specificity on the SIGINT sourcing is provided in the text. Included in the appendix are charts on ways that access has been affected and countermeasures taken; a comparison of radicalizers' access mechanisms; and a matrix that compares their authority, argument, countries where they resonate, and their personal vulnerabilities.

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Examining how the six radicalizers establish and maintain access with different pools of people susceptible to their message -- and their perceptions of the difficulties in doing so -- suggests that there are vulnerabilities that can be exploited in terms of this access, and emerging radicalizers may be vulnerable on this point as well. Focusing on access reveals potential vulnerabilities that could be even more effectively exploited when used in combination with vulnerabilities of character or credibility, or both, of the message in order to shape the perception of the messenger as well as that of his followers.

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA) Six globally-resonating, radicalizers are used as exemplars in this assessment. The first three listed target an English-speaking audience, while the second three target an Arabic-speaking audience.

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(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA) One indicator of the potential effectiveness of these radicalizers is the extent of their resonance, i.e., the number and locations of individuals who respond to a radicalizer's message by contacting him using his publicly-known contact information. A significant proportion of the audience associated with the specified English-language radicalizers is located in Pakistan, yet none of these radicalizers appear to have any communicants in common. In addition, communications profiles of these English-language radicalizers reveal that very few of the contacts noted were associated with terrorism, suggesting that the target audience includes individuals who do not yet hold extremist views but who are susceptible to the extremist message.