From: Blank, Thomas

Sent: Tue. 15 May 2018 18:54:34 +0000 To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) richs, Alysa

Cc: Turner, James

Subject: RE: IMSI Catchers/Stingrays

Importance: Normal

Thanks(b)(6);

Thomas Blank Chief of Staff

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
U.S. Department of Homeland Security

202 732 (b)(6); Cell 202 591 (b)(6):

From:(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Sent: Tuesday, May 15, 2018 2:04 PM

To: Erichs, Alysa(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) pice.dhs.gov>; Blank, Thomas (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) pice.dhs.gov>

Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: IMSI Catchers/Stingrays

Thanks! Understood, just wanted you all to be aware (b)(5)

From: Erichs, Alysa

Sent: Tuesday, May 15, 2018 2:03:06 PM **To:**(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Blank, Thomas

Cc: (b)(6):

Subject: RE: IMSI Catchers/Stingrays

I will (b) (5), (b) (7)(E)

(b) (5), (b) (7)(E) Would recommend sending to OCIO as well.

Thanks, Alysa

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Sent: Tuesday, May 15, 2018 1:41 PM

To: Blank, Thomas (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Cc(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Erichs, Alysa(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: IMSI Catchers/Stingrays

Importance: High

(b)(6); (b)(7)(0

As discussed, attached is the deck with all proposed redactions, comments removed, and ready for the inter/intra agency coordination requested by leadership. We are sending the attached to ICE, USSS and

(h)/F)
FBI for review and comment. As mentioned, this is a very quick turn (b)(5) (b)(5)
IF you have any questions, please don't hesitate to reach out. Adding Alysa Erichs for her awareness,
but haven't had the same conversation with her to explain the backstory(b)(5) Alysa-
feel free to reach out and I can bring you up to speed.
Many thanks
Many thanks, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Director, Office of Legislative Affairs
National Protection and Programs Directorate
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
From: Blank, Thomas (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, May 15, 2018 1:32 PM
To:(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: IMSI Catchers/Stingrays
(/L)(e),
(b)(6); (b)(7)(
Please reach out to (b)(6): as I will be in meetings most of the rest of the day (b)(lis a SA assigned to the
Please reach out to (b)(6); as I will be in meetings most of the rest of the day. (b)(is a SA assigned to the OD
Thanks,
Tom
Thomas Blank
Chief of Staff
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 202 732(b)(6):
Cell 202 591 (b)(6
- (b)(6): (b)(7)(C)
From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, May 15, 2018 1:16 PM To: Blank, Thomas (15/6), (15/7)(0) Blico dbs gov
To: Blank, Thomas ﴿(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Dice.dhs.gov> Subject: IMSI Catchers/Stingrays
Importance: High
·····p - · · ····o··
Sir.

Apologies for reaching out directly, but I have a hot issue that I think ICE may have equities on that I want to bring to your attention and also give you a chance to review. I need to get something to S1
today, so it's a quick turn regarding IMSI catchers/stingrays, (b)(5) (b)(5)
Hope all is well!
Best,
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Director, Office of Legislative Affairs
National Protection and Programs Directorate
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

From: MicrosoftExchange(b) (7)(E) @icegov.onmicrosoft.com on behalf of Blank, Thomas Tue, 15 May 2018 18:55:03 +0000 Sent: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Erichs, Alysa To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Cc: Subject: RE: IMSI Catchers/Stingrays Attachments: RE: IMSI Catchers/Stingrays Importance: Normal Sender: (b)(6); @ice.dhs.gov Subject: RE: IMSI Catchers/Stingrays Message-Id: <(b) (5), (b) (7)(E) amprd09.prod.outlook.

com> To<u>:(b)(6);</u>

Cc(b)(6);

@ice.dhs.gov

aice.dhs.gov

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Subject: FW: IMSI Catchers/Stingrays Proposed redactions marked - 5.15.2018.pdf Attachments: Importance: High (b)(6)NPPD sent this over and HSI looked it over. It was suggested that it be sent to you in case there are concerns. Please have a look and advise (b)(6); if there are. Tom Thomas Blank Chief of Staff U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement U.S. Department of Homeland Security 202 732(b)(6): Cell 202 591(b)(6): (b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

Blank, Thomas

Tue, 15 May 2018 18:50:38 +0000

From: Sent:

To:

(b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

(b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E)	

(5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E)	

From:	(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Sent:	Tue, 15 May 2018 20:33:30 +0000
To:	Erichs, Alysa;Blank, Thomas
Cc:	Turner, James;Benner, Derek N
Subject:	RE: IMSI Catchers/Stingrays
Importance:	Normal
Alysa,	
Great to talk to	you! Thanks again to all of you for taking the time and the quick turn. I
very much appr	
(b)(5)	I will be sure to keep you all posted.
Let me know if	you all ever need anything from this end!
Best,	
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)	
To (b)(6); (b)(7)(C Cc: Turner, James	<u>May</u> 15, 2018 4:29:42 PM
If you need addit	ional information, please let me know.
Thank you, Alysa	
Alysa D. Eric Acting Deputy E: Homeland Securi Washington, DC 202-732 (b)(6);	xecutive Associate Director

b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E)	

(b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (7)(E)

From:

MicrosoftExchange (b) (5), (b) (7)(E)

@icegov.onmicrosoft.com on behalf

of(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Sent: Tue, 15 May 2018 20:34:39 +0000

To: Erichs, Alysa;Blank, Thomas
Cc: Turner, James;Benner, Derek N
Subject: RE: IMSI Catchers/Stingrays
Attachments: RE: IMSI Catchers/Stingrays

Importance: Normal

Sender: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Subject: RE: IMSI Catchers/Stingrays

Message-Id: <(b) (7)(E)

Recipient: (b)(6); @ice.dhs.gov Recipient: (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov Recipient: (b)(6): @ice.dhs.gov Recipient: (b)(6): (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov

From:	(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Sent:	2 Apr 2013 11:47:54 -0400 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
To:	(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Cc:	
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)	
Subject:	RE: Stingray/Portable Cell Tower Technology
(b)(6):	
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(5); (b)(6); (b)(7)(C);	(I.V.Z.V.E.)
(b)(5); (b)(6); (b)(7)(C);	(b)(7)(E)
1	

(b)(5); (b)(7)(E)
Regards
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Unit Chief
Technical Operations Hampland Security Investigations
Homeland Security Investigations Immigration & Customs Enforcement
Department of <u>Homeland Security</u>
Desk: (703) 55 (b)(6);
Cell: (571) 245 (b)(7)(C) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
CANAL MAN
From:(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, April 02, 2013 10:54 AM To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Cc:
Subject: RE: Stingray/Portable Cell Tower Technology
Thanks $(b)(6)$ If I could get a briefing sometime in the next couple of weeks on this, I would appreciate it. Happy to head down to TechOps if that's easier. Just let me know.
(b)(6);
Privacy Officer
Assistant Director for Privacy & Records U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement
Direct: (202) 732(b)(6);
Main: (202) 732-(b)(7)(C)
Questions? Please visit the Privacy & Records Office website at http://intranet.ice.dhs.gov/sites/oop/ .
From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Sent: Monday, April 01, 2013 5:57 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Cc: Subject: RE: Stingray/Portable Cell Tower Technology
Subject. RL. Sungray/Portable Cell Tower Technology
(b)(6);

I have copied in TechOps Unit Chief(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) as the Stingray program for HSI is under his shop with (b) (7)(E) b)(6); can provide you with a briefing and information on the HSI program managed by TechOps.

Thanks

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Deputy Assistant Director

Law Enforcement Support & Information Management (LESIM)

Homeland Security Investigations (HSI)

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)

Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

(202) 732-(b)(6);

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Warning: This email and any attachments are UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (U//FOUO). It contains information that may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted, distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information and is not to be released to the public or other personnel who do not have a valid "need-to-know" without prior approval of an authorized DHS official. No portion of this email should be furnished to the media, either in written or verbal form. If you are not an intended recipient or believe you have received this communication in error, please do not print, copy, retransmit, disseminate, or otherwise use this information. Please inform the sender that you received this message in error and delete the message from your system.

From:(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Sent: Monday, April 01, 2013 5:42 PM

To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Subject: FW: Stingray/Portable Cell Tower Technology

Importance: High

Let's talk...

(b)(6); Privacy Officer

Assistant Director for Privacy & Records

U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement

Direct: (202) 732(b)(6); Main: (202) 732-(b)(7)(C

Questions? Please visit the Privacy & Records Office website at http://intranet.ice.dhs.gov/sites/oop/.

From (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Sent: Monday, April 01, 2013 2:42 PM

To(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Cc

Subject: Stingray/Portable Cell Tower Technology

Importance: High

(b)(6);
<u>b)(7)(C)</u>
(b)(5)
Stingray: A portable, electronic surveillance device for remotely capturing data from cell phones. Designed to simulate a cell phone tower and capture information, including location data, which can be done even when the phone is not making a phone call.
The technology is being used by the FBI and other law enforcement agencies.
 Slate: FBI Files Unlock History Behind Clandestine Cellphone Tracking Tool http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/02/15/stingray_imsi_catcher_fbi_files_unlock_history_behind_cellphone_tracking.html Wall Street Journal: 'Stingray' Phone Tracker Fuels Constitutional Clash
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/little-known-surveillance-tool-raises-concerns-by-judges-privacy-activists/2013/03/27/8b60e906-9712-11e2-97cd-3d8c1afe4f0f_story.html
(b)(5)
I'm out on Tuesday, April 2, 2013, but am free this afternoon and much of the remainder of this week if you need to chat.
Best wishes, (b)(6); (b)(7)(2)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) M.S., J.D., CIPP/US/G
<u>Directorate Privacy Officer Science & Technology Directorate Department of Homeland Security</u> (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)



Privacy Threshold Analysis Version number: 01-2014 Page 1 of 11

LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

PRIVACY THRESHOLD ANALYSIS (PTA)

This form is used to determine whether a Privacy Impact Assessment is required.

Please use the attached form to determine whether a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) is required under the E-Government Act of 2002 and the Homeland Security Act of 2002.

Please complete this form and send it to your component Privacy Office. If you do not have a component Privacy Office, please send the PTA to the DHS Privacy Office:

Senior Director, Privacy Compliance The Privacy Office U.S. Department of Homeland Security Washington, DC 20528 Tel: 202-343-1717

PIA@hq.dhs.gov

Upon receipt from your component Privacy Office, the DHS Privacy Office will review this form. If a PIA is required, the DHS Privacy Office will send you a copy of the Official Privacy Impact Assessment Guide and accompanying Template to complete and return.

A copy of the Guide and Template is available on the DHS Privacy Office website, www.dhs.gov/privacy, on DHSConnect and directly from the DHS Privacy Office via email: pia@hq.dhs.gov, phone: 202-343-1717.



Privacy Threshold Analysis Version number: 01-2014 Page 2 of 11

LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

PRIVACY THRESHOLD ANALYSIS (PTA)

SUMMARY INFORMATION

Project or Program Name:	Cell Site Simulator Technology and Log		
Component:	Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)	Office or Program:	Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) - Technical Operations Unit (TechOps) Title III
Xacta FISMA Name (if applicable):	NA	Xacta FISMA Number (if applicable):	NA
Type of Project or Program:	IT System	Project or program status:	Existing
Date first developed:	January 4, 2005	Pilot launch date:	Click here to enter a date.
Date of last PTA update	April 3, 2015	Pilot end date:	Click here to enter a date.
ATO Status (if applicable)	Choose an item.	ATO expiration date (if applicable):	Click here to enter a date.

PROJECT OR PROGRAM MANAGER

Name:	(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)		
Office:	т-ш	Title:	Section Chief- Communications Intercept
Phone:	(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)	Email:	(b)(6); @ice.dhs.gov

INFORMATION SYSTEM SECURITY OFFICER (ISSO) (IF APPLICABLE)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)			
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)	Email:	(b)(6);	@ice.dhs.gov
		(L)(0), (L)(7)(0)	(h)(0), (h)(7)(0)



Privacy Threshold Analysis Version number: 01-2014 Page 3 of 11

LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

SPECIFIC PTA QUESTIONS

1. Reason for submitting the PTA: Updated PTA
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) is renewing the Over the Air Technology PTA (last adjudicated April 3, 2015) and replacing it with this PTA for Cell Site Simulators (CSS).
HSI uses CSS to track mobile phones within the course of carrying out criminal investigations. HSI's use of this technology has always proceeded under established internal practices (e.g., obtaining first-level supervisor approval prior to applying for a court order) and appropriate legal process. Before this technology is used, HSI obtains court orders or search warrants (depending on the judicial district) through the appropriate United States Attorneys' Offices which authorize the use of this technology. If HSI partners with another department or agency on a case, that office may be responsible for obtaining the court order or warrant. This can include such partnerships with the U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), or state and local law enforcement agencies.
(b)(7)(E)
(b) (5), (b) (7)(E) (b)(7)(E)
(b)(7)(E)
(b)(7)(E)



Privacy Threshold Analysis Version number: 01-2014 Page 4 of 11

-LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE-

(7)(E)		
a Report of	nformation learned through the of use of this techniques investigation (ROI) and placed in an HSI case file	
vestigation (0)(7)(E)	
)(7)(E)		
h 10 .		
evice Indica	ors:	
)(7)(E)		
Walter Bearing	PAGE 1	
A pen register, or	dialed number recorder (DNR), is an electronic device that reterm has come to include any device or program that perform	records all numbers called from a particular
	monitoring Internet communications. More information abo	
ınd at: http://usc	de.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title18/part2/chapt	ter206&edition=prelim.
7)(E)		



Privacy Threshold Analysis Version number: 01-2014 Page 5 of 11

-LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

(b)(7)(E)	
(L) (E) (L) (Z)(E)	
(b) (5), (b) (7)(E)	
b)(7)(E)	
)(r)(<u>=</u>)	
2. Does this system employ any of the	
following technologies: If you are using any of these technologies and	☐ Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) ☐ Social Media
want coverage under the respective PIA for that	
technology please stop here and contact the DHS Privacy Office for further guidance.	Contact Lists
	☐ None of these

(b) (5), (b) (7)(E)



Privacy Threshold Analysis Version number: 01-2014 Page 6 of 11

LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

		(b) (5), (b) (7)(E)
3.	From whom does the Project or Program collect, maintain, use, or	
	disseminate information? Please check all that apply.	
	Please check all that apply.	

No information about individuals is maintained on the CSS device itself.			

⁵ DHS defines personal information as "Personally Identifiable Information" or PII, which is any information that permits the identity of an individual to be directly or indirectly inferred, including any information that is linked or linkable to that individual, regardless of whether the individual is a U.S. citizen, lawful permanent resident, visitor to the U.S., or employee or contractor to the Department. "Sensitive PII" is PII, which if lost, compromised, or disclosed without authorization, could result in substantial harm, embarrassment, inconvenience, or unfairness to an individual. For the purposes of this PTA, SPII and PII are treated the same.



Privacy Threshold Analysis Version number: 01-2014

Page 7 of 11

LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

agent(s)/officer(s) working the case and can include enforcement agency (as applicable) that is part of the	er, or subpoena can also include name and email of the name of the Department/Agency, state, local law are investigation. This information is stored in the ROI. No. Please continue to next question.
4(a) Does the project, program, or system retrieve information by personal identifier?	Yes. If yes, please list all personal identifiers used: Name of the HSI case agent
4(b) Does the project, program, or system use Social Security Numbers (SSN)?	⊠ No. □ Yes.
4(c) If yes, please provide the specific legal basis and purpose for the collection of SSNs:	NA
4(d) If yes, please describe the uses of the SSNs within the project, program, or system:	NA
4(e) If this project, program, or system is an information technology/system, does it relate solely to infrastructure? For example, is the system a Local Area Network (LAN) or Wide Area Network (WAN)?	 No. Please continue to next question. ☐ Yes. If a log kept of communication traffic, please answer the following question.
	e communication traffic log, please detail the data
N/A	
5. Does this project, program, or system connect, receive, or share PH with any other DHS programs or systems? ⁷	(b) (5), (b) (7)(E)

-LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

⁶ When data is sent over the Internet, each unit transmitted includes both header information and the actual data being sent. The header identifies the source and destination of the packet, while the actual data is referred to as the payload. Because header information, or overhead data, is only used in the transmission process, it is stripped from the packet when it reaches its destination. Therefore, the payload is the only data received by the destination system.

(b) (7)(E)



Privacy Threshold Analysis Version number: 01-2014 Page 8 of 11

-LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

	(b) (5), (b) (7)(E)
6. Does this project, program, or system connect, receive, or share PH with any external (non-DHS) partners or systems?	
6(a) Is this external sharing pursuant to new or existing information sharing access agreement (MOU, MOA, LOI, etc.)?	(b) (5), (b) (7)(E)
7. Does the project, program, or system provide role-based training for personnel who have access in addition to annual privacy training required of all DHS personnel?	 No. ✓ Yes. If yes, please list: Per an HSI policy memo, personnel who use this technology are required be trained on how to operate it and with respect to privacy and civil liberties. (b) (5), (b) (7)(E)
8. Per NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4, Appendix J, does the project, program, or system maintain an accounting of disclosures of PII to individuals who have requested access to their PII?	
9. Is there a FIPS 199 determination?8	Unknown.

⁸ FIPS 199 is the <u>Federal Information Processing Standard</u> Publication 199, Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and Information Systems and is used to establish security categories of information systems.



Privacy Threshold Analysis Version number: 01-2014 Page 9 of 11

LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

	Confidentiality:
	Low Moderate High Undefined
	Integrity: Low Moderate High Undefined
	Availability: Low Moderate High Undefined
(TO BE COMPLETED B	THRESHOLD REVIEW EY COMPONENT PRIVACY OFFICE) (b) (6), (b) (7)
(TO BE COMPLETED B	
(TO BE COMPLETED B	(b) (6), (b) (7)
(TO BE COMPLETED B Component Privacy Office Reviewer: Date submitted to Component Privacy	(b) (6), (b) (7)
(TO BE COMPLETED B Component Privacy Office Reviewer: Date submitted to Component Privacy Office: Date submitted to DHS Privacy Office: Component Privacy Office Recommendate	(b) (6), (b) (7) (C) May 29, 2019 Click here to enter a date.
(TO BE COMPLETED B) Component Privacy Office Reviewer: Date submitted to Component Privacy Office: Date submitted to DHS Privacy Office: Component Privacy Office Recommendate Please include recommendation below, included in the privacy of the	(b) (6), (b) (7) (C) May 29, 2019 Click here to enter a date. tion: uding what new privacy compliance documentation is needed. date the information provided in the 2015 Over the Air
(TO BE COMPLETED B) Component Privacy Office Reviewer: Date submitted to Component Privacy Office: Date submitted to DHS Privacy Office: Component Privacy Office Recommendat Please include recommendation below, inclu-	(b) (6), (b) (7) (C) May 29, 2019 Click here to enter a date. Clion: Iding what new privacy compliance documentation is needed. Clate the information provided in the 2015 Over the Air y Division recognizes that (b) (5), (b) (7)(E)
Component Privacy Office Reviewer: Date submitted to Component Privacy Office: Date submitted to DHS Privacy Office: Component Privacy Office Recommendat Please include recommendation below, include ICE is submitting this PTA to renew and upor Tracking Technology PTA. The ICE Privacy	(b) (6), (b) (7) (C) May 29, 2019 Click here to enter a date. tion: uding what new privacy compliance documentation is needed. date the information provided in the 2015 Over the Air



Privacy Threshold Analysis Version number: 01-2014 Page 10 of 11

-LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

PCTS Workflow Number:	July 18, 2019	
Date approved by DHS Privacy Office:		
PTA Expiration Date	July 18, 2020	

DESIGNATION

		DESIGNATION
Privacy Sensitive System: Category of System:		Yes If "no" PTA adjudication is complete.
		IT System If "other" is selected, please describe: Click here to enter text.
Priva		TA sufficient at this time.
		rivacy compliance documentation determination in progress.
		ew information sharing arrangement is required.
	D appli	HS Policy for Computer-Readable Extracts Containing Sensitive PII es.
	□ P	rivacy Act Statement required.
	⊠ P	rivacy Impact Assessment (PIA) required.
	$\boxtimes s$	ystem of Records Notice (SORN) required.
		aperwork Reduction Act (PRA) Clearance may be required. Contact component PRA Officer.
	☐ A Office	Records Schedule may be required. Contact your component Records er.
PIA: New PIA is required.		uired.
TIA.	If covered by existing PIA, please list: Forthcoming ICE Surveillance Technologies PIA	
+776-a	System covered	by existing SORN
SORN: If covered by exist 2010 75 FR 404		isting SORN, please list: DHS/ICE-009 External Investigations January 5,
	acy Office Comme cribe rationale for	ents: privacy compliance determination above.
mobile pho	ones within the couns court orders or se	discuss the use of Cell Site Simulators (CSS), which are used to track rise of carrying out criminal investigations. Before this technology is used, earch warrants (depending on the judicial district) through the appropriate ces which authorize the use of this technology. (b)(7)(E)



Privacy Threshold Analysis Version number: 01-2014 Page 11 of 11

-LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE-

(b)(7)(E)	
HSI captures information from the devices and about the investigation in a CSS sharepoint log, and may create a copy of data form the CSS that is stored locally. (b)(5)	l also



Privacy Threshold Analysis Version number: 01-2014 Page 1 of 8

LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

PRIVACY THRESHOLD ANALYSIS (PTA)

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Please use the attached form to determine whether a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) is required under the E-Government Act of 2002 and the Homeland Security Act of 2002.

Please complete this form and send it to your component Privacy Office. If you do not have a component Privacy Office, please send the PTA to the DHS Privacy Office:

Senior Director, Privacy Compliance The Privacy Office U.S. Department of Homeland Security Washington, DC 20528 Tel: 202-343-1717

PIA@hq.dhs.gov

Upon receipt from your component Privacy Office, the DHS Privacy Office will review this form. If a PIA is required, the DHS Privacy Office will send you a copy of the Official Privacy Impact Assessment Guide and accompanying Template to complete and return.

A copy of the Guide and Template is available on the DHS Privacy Office website, www.dhs.gov/privacy, on DHSConnect and directly from the DHS Privacy Office via email: pia@hq.dhs.gov, phone: 202-343-1717.

Privacy Threshold Analysis Version number: 01-2014

Page 2 of 8

LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

PRIVACY THRESHOLD ANALYSIS (PTA)

SUMMARY INFORMATION

Project or Program Name: Over The Air Tracking Technology			
Component:	Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)	Office or Program:	HSI- Technical Operations /Investigative Intercept
Xacta FISMA Name (if applicable):	n/a	Xacta FISMA Number (if applicable):	n/a
Type of Project or Program:	Choose an item.	Project or program status:	Existing
Date first developed:	January 4, 2005	Pilot launch date:	January 17, 2005
Date of last PTA update	Click here to enter a date.	Pilot end date:	Click here to enter a date.
ATO Status (if applicable)	Choose an item.	ATO expiration date (if applicable):	Click here to enter a date.

PROJECT OR PROGRAM MANAGER

Name:	(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)		
Office:	Investigative Intercept Section	Title:	Section Chief, Investigative Intercept Section
Phone:	(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)	Email:	(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov

INFORMATION SYSTEM SECURITY OFFICER (ISSO) (IF APPLICABLE)

Name:	(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)			
Phone:		Email:	(b)(6);	@ice.dhs.gov



Privacy Threshold Analysis Version number: 01-2014

Page 3 of 8

LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

SPECIFIC PTA QUESTIONS

	rity Investigations in II	J.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement uses
		t permits over-the-air (OTA) tracking of mobile telepho
the course o	criminal investigations	(b)(7)(E)
(7)(E)	Cimmu investigations	(A)
efore this tec	mology is used. HSI ago	ents obtain court orders or search warrants (depending
		ttorney's Offices authorizing the use of this technology
		s proceeded only under appropriate legal process.
(Z)(E)	devices in two operation	nai scenarios: (a)(1)(a)
(7)(E)		



Privacy Threshold Analysis Version number: 01-2014 Page 4 of 8

LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

(b)(7)(E)	
the government. Any relevant information learned as a result of agent in a Report of Investigation and placed in	reement between the equipment manufacturer and use of this technology will be documented by the n an HSI case file to document agent activity in the e OTA tracker are not maintained in the case file.
2. Does this system employ any of the following technologies: If you are using any of these technologies and want coverage under the respective PIA for that technology please stop here and contact the DHS Privacy Office for further guidance.	☐ Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) ☐ Social Media ☐ Web portal (e.g., SharePoint) ☐ Contact Lists ☑ None of these
3. From whom does the Project or Program collect, maintain, use, or disseminate information? Please check all that apply.	 ☐ This program does not collect any personally identifiable information² ☑ Members of the public ☐ DHS employees/contractors (list components): ☐ Contractors working on behalf of DHS ☐ Employees of other federal agencies

LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

¹ Informational and collaboration-based portals in operation at DHS and its components that collect, use, maintain, and share limited personally identifiable information (PII) about individuals who are "members" of the portal or "potential members" who seek to gain access to the portal.

² DHS defines personal information as "Personally Identifiable Information" or PII, which is any information that permits the identity of an individual to be directly or indirectly inferred, including any information that is linked or linkable to that individual, regardless of whether the individual is a U.S. citizen, lawful permanent resident, visitor to the U.S., or employee or contractor to the Department. "Sensitive PII" is PII, which if lost, compromised, or disclosed without authorization, could result in substantial harm, embarrassment, inconvenience, or unfairness to an individual. For the purposes of this PTA, SPII and PII are treated the same.



Privacy Threshold Analysis Version number: 01-2014

Page 5 of 8

LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

The following mobile phone identifiers may be b)(7)(E)	collected or retained (b)(7)(E)
b)(7)(E)	This information on its own
does not identify individuals, however, unless a provider.	dditional information is obtained from a service
4(a) Does the project, program, or system retrieve information by personal identifier?	 No. Please continue to next question. N.B. The mobile phone information that is collected is ultimately placed in an investigative case file, which typically is filed by the name of the investigation. In many cases, the name of the investigation is a person's name. ☐ Yes. If yes, please list all personal identifiers used:
4(b) Does the project, program, or system use Social Security Numbers (SSN)?	⊠ No. □ Yes.
4(c) If yes, please provide the specific legal basis and purpose for the collection of SSNs:	NA
4(d) If yes, please describe the uses of the SSNs within the project, program, or system:	NA
4(e) If this project, program, or system is an information technology/system, does it relate solely to infrastructure? For example, is the system a Local Area Network LAN) or Wide Area Network (WAN)?	 ☑ No. Please continue to next question. ☑ Yes. If a log kept of communication traffic, please answer the following question.

³ When data is sent over the Internet, each unit transmitted includes both header information and the actual data being sent. The header identifies the source and destination of the packet, while the actual data is referred to as the payload. Because header information, or overhead data, is only used in the transmission process, it is stripped from the packet when it reaches its destination. Therefore, the payload is the only data received by the destination system.



Privacy Threshold Analysis Version number: 01-2014 Page 6 of 8

5. Does this project, program, or system connect, receive, or share PII with any other DHS programs or systems 4?	☑ No.☑ Yes. If yes, please list:
other Data programs or systems ;	Click here to enter text.
6. Does this project, program, or system connect, receive, or share PII with any external (non-DHS) partners or systems?	No.☐ Yes. If yes, please list:Click here to enter text.
6(a) Is this external sharing pursuant to new or existing information sharing access agreement (MOU, MOA, LOI, etc.)?	Choose an item. N/A
7. Does the project, program, or system provide role-based training for personnel who have access in addition to annual privacy training required of all DHS personnel?	 No. ✓ Yes. If yes, please list: Personnel who use this technology must be trained on how to operate it.
8. Per NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4, Appendix J, does the project, program, or system maintain an accounting of disclosures of PII to individuals who have requested access to their PII?	 No. What steps will be taken to develop and maintain the accounting: Not applicable. Any accounting of disclosures, to the extent they are authorized, would be from the case file when the information is kept. ☐ Yes. In what format is the accounting maintained:
9. Is there a FIPS 199 determination? ⁴	☐ Unknown. ☐ No. ☐ Yes. Please indicate the determinations for each of the following: Confidentiality:

⁴ PII may be shared, received, or connected to other DHS systems directly, automatically, or by manual processes. Often, these

systems are listed as "interconnected systems" in Xacta.

FIPS 199 is the Federal Information Processing Standard Publication 199, Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and Information Systems and is used to establish security categories of information systems.



PTA Expiration Date

Privacy Office U.S. Department of Homeland Security Washington, DC 20528 202-343-1717, pia@dhs.gov www.dhs.gov/privacy

Privacy Threshold Analysis Version number: 01-2014

Page 7 of 8

	Low Moderate High Undefined Integrity:
	Y THRESHOLD REVIEW BY COMPONENT PRIVACY OFFICE) Lyn Rahilly
	Lyn Ranny
Date submitted to Component Privacy Office:	January 9, 2015
Date submitted to DHS Privacy Office:	Click here to enter a date.
Component Privacy Office Recommendat	
Please include recommendation below, inclub(7)(E)	
Please include recommendation below, inclub(7)(E) (TO BE COMPLETE	ED BY THE DHS PRIVACY OFFICE)
Please include recommendation below, inclub(7)(E)	ED BY THE DHS PRIVACY OFFICE) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) 1063714

DESIGNATION

April 3, 2016

LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE



Privacy Threshold Analysis Version number: 01-2014

Page 8 of 8

LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

Privacy Sensitive System: Category of System:		Yes If "no" PTA adjudication is complete.	
		Form/Information Collection If "other" is selected, please describe: Click here to enter text.	
Determination: PTA		PTA sufficient at this time.	
☐ Priv		Privacy compliance documentation determination in progress.	
		New information sharing arrangement is required.	
		DHS Policy for Computer-Readable Extracts Containing Sensitive PII lies.	
		Privacy Act Statement required.	
		Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) required.	
	\boxtimes	System of Records Notice (SORN) required.	
Pape		Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) Clearance may be required. Contact component PRA Officer.	
		A Records Schedule may be required. Contact your component Records icer.	
PIA:	New PIA is red	quired.	
ria.	If covered by existing PIA, please list: Click here to enter text.		
	System covere	d by existing SORN	
SORN:	If covered by existing SORN, please list: DHS/ICE-009 - External Investigations Januar 5, 2010 75 FR 404		
	acy Office Comm	nents: r privacy compliance determination above.	
PRIV find used by or significant PIA. PRIV	s that Over the Ai ne person and are I ly mitigates impro understands that	r Tracking Technology is a privacy sensitive tool. Mobile phones are often inkable to an individual. Although review by a neutral magistrate before use oper search concerns, PRIV finds that the use of this technology requires a there will be LES portions of this PIA. SORN coverage is provided by the estigations SORN.	

JON TESTER MONTANA

APPHOPRIATIONS

BANKING
INDIAN AFFAIRS
VETERANS' AFFAIRS
HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

United States Senate

Seria re Hant Building Buite 311 Wallington, DC 20810 202-224-2644

Interner.

November 18, 2015

The Honorable Jeh Johnson Secretary of Homeland Security Department of Homeland Security Washington, D.C. 20528

Dear Secretary Johnson,

I am writing regarding the use and transfer of cell-site simulator technology, also referred to as International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) catchers, "DRTBoxes," "Dirtboxes," or "Stingrays." While I am pleased that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) released its *Policy Regarding the Use of Cell-Site Simulator Technology*, I remain concerned that these guidelines are too broad and create loopholes that allow the continued abuse of this technology.

One of my primary concerns is that DHS guidance states that it only applies to "the use of cell-site simulator technology inside the United States in furtherance of criminal investigations." I am concerned that these technologies are also being used for types of investigations other than criminal, raising the possibility of mission creep into any number of areas that fall under the broad umbrella of national security. In order to ensure this technology is not used in opposition to constitutionally guaranteed rights for Americans, at home and abroad, what guidelines apply when this technology is used in investigations and for purposes not outlined in this policy?

Additionally, I am concerned that the guidance does not apply to states and localities that receive federal financial assistance or authorization to purchase or use this technology. In the Department's response to my letter on this topic earlier this year inquiring about the use of this technology, DHS stated that it compels grantees to abide by Standard Form 424B (SF-424B), "Assurances for Non-Construction Programs." How does your Department ensure compliance at the state and local level, and what systems are in place to track and monitor the use of these devices when they are operated by DHS grantees? DHS must conduct comprehensive oversight of the use of this technology and must actively audit metrics associated with the use of IMSI-catchers and related technology. As part of this guidance, DHS should require training for DHS grantees on the use of these devices to ensure they are properly operated and that information collected by this technology is obtained in accordance with the Constitution, all legal authorities, and Department-wide guidance.

Moreover, while I am relieved to see in the guidelines that DHS does not listen to or collect the context of communications using cell-site simulator technology for criminal investigations, failure to apply these guidelines outside the Department leaves open the possibility that federal funding – or authorization – could still be used to support these and other troubling practices.

I am also encouraged that DHS and its agencies now require a search warrant based on probable cause to deploy this technology. This is a positive step towards protecting the privacy of innocent Americans. While I understand the need for an expedited process in specific "exigent" and "exceptional" circumstances, the Department should still be required to meet the probable cause standard, instead of the lower standard under 18 U.S.C. § 3125. In addition, the guidance should specifically state what constitutes an "exceptional circumstance," including the factors that must be considered to permit such a determination. It is important the policy clarifies whether aerial operations utilizing cell-site simulator technology to apprehend fugitives fall under the exigent or exceptional circumstance exception.

Furthermore, additional guidance should include a requirement that an individual be notified in cases where this technology is or has been used to apprehend them or gather evidence relevant to their case. DHS guidance still remains unclear as to whether criminal defendants in pending or future cases will be provided notice of the legal and illegal use of these devices, which is necessary to ensure appropriate judicial oversight.

I believe that the use of such technology requires diligent Congressional oversight. As a member of the Senate Appropriations Committee and the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, I will actively be seeking report language in the appropriations process to ensure the proper use of this technology. Given the scope of use of cell-site simulator technology, I will request that DHS submit to the appropriate Congressional Committees, including the Appropriations Committee—at minimum on an annual basis—reports on the details of DHS and DHS grantees' purchase, deployment, and investigation results of utilizing this technology.

Finally, I have followed reports that Datong plc, a United Kingdom-based company that produces cell phone surveillance systems, counts the U.S. Secret Service and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement as clients. According to reports, Datong's cell site simulators have the capability to intercept calls and messages and shut off phones altogether. More troubling is that Datong was awarded \$1.6 million in contracts between 2004 and 2009 with the Department. I therefore request further details about the capabilities of the Datong devices that DHS purchased, and in what capacity they are being utilized within the Department.

Given the tremendous capabilities this technology affords law enforcement officials, I am pleased that DHS has taken steps to regulate these devices. I am encouraged by the Department's efforts to ensure that the use of these devices is consistent with the Constitution and other legal authorities. I believe it is in everyone's best interest to clarify and strengthen cell-site simulator technology policy guidelines, and I look forward to working with you to increase the transparency and accountability of its use.

Sincerely,

Jon Tester

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MEMORANDUM FOR:	Christian Marrone DHS Chief of Staff			
FROM:	Alan D. Bersin Assistant Secretary for International Affairs & Chief Diplomatic Officer, PLCY			
SUBJECT:	Request for Approval: Response to Senator John Tester' November 18, 2015 Letter Regarding the Department's Policies on Cell-Site Simulators (WF #1112753)			
simulator policy. The resp	ddresses Senator John Tester's questions about DHS's cell-site ponse: (b)(5)			
Clearance:				

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY—

Timeliness: There are no timeliness concerns related to this letter which has been fully cleared and is being submitted to ESEC within the eight business day standard.

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

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(This slide UNCLASSIFIED)

Cellular Threats

Briefing for the Federal Mobile Technology Forum

Hosted by Federal CIO Council's Mobile Technology Tiger Team (MTTT)

6 February 2018

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(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)



National Coordinating Center for Communications (NCC)
National Cybersecurity & Communications
2020-ICLI-00013 1138
Integration Center (NCCIC)

National Cybersecurity & Communications Integration Center (NCCIC)

Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

National Protection & Programs Directorate (NPPD)

Office of Cybersecurity & Communications (CS&C)

National Cybersecurity & Communications Integration Center (NCCIC)

The NCCIC mission is to reduce the likelihood and severity of incidents that may significantly compromise the security and resilience of the nation's critical information technology and communications networks.



National Coordinating Center for Communications

- NCC is a joint government and industry partnership that coordinates efforts to protect, restore, and reconstitute communications infrastructures
- White House designated the NCC as the Information Sharing & Analysis Center (ISAC) for communications
- The NCC facilitates the exchange of vulnerability, threat, and mitigation information amongst government and industry partners

Mobile Ecosystem & the focus of this brief

