J6DAcoaA1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 1 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 2 3 AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, 4 AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION, 5 Plaintiffs-Appellees, 6 v. 18-2265-cv 7 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 8 9 Defendant-Appellant, 10 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, UNITED STATES 11 DEPARTMENT OF STATE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 12 INCLUDING ITS COMPONENTS THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL AND 13 OFFICE OF INFORMATION POLICY, 14 Defendants, 15 16 New York, N.Y. June 13, 2019 17 11:45 a.m. Before: 18 HON. ROSEMARY S. POOLER, 19 HON. DENNY CHIN, HON. PIERRE N. LEVAL, 20 Circuit Judges 21 22 23 24 25

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1	APPEARANCES
2	AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION BY: DROR LADIN  GEOFFREY S. BERMAN
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7	ALSO PRESENT: CAROLINE SMITH, CIA
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(Case called)

 $\label{eq:JUDGE POOLER: Good afternoon. Please, sit down. } \\$  Thank you.

Now I will call the last case on the calendar, a portion of which we will hear in open court and that case is American Civil Liberties Union v. the Central Intelligence Agency. We will hear from the ACLU as appellees but they will do this here in open Court.

MR. LADIN: Thank you, your Honor. Dror Ladin here for the American Civil Liberties Union.

JUDGE POOLER: I know.

MR. LADIN: This is unusual so I'm going to do my best without the benefit of what the government is offering. I think in order to do that I would like to begin with just a couple legal points on Exemptions 1 and 3, and then maybe offer our view as to how the *ex parte* proceeding should take place.

So, first of all, your Honor, we would submit that the most relevant case for considering the Exemption 1 issue in this case is New York Times v. Department of Justice which it is in both briefs, obviously. There the key piece of information that this Court was analyzing was an undisclosed discussion of a statutory authority that the government was analyzing as part of a drone mission and the government's argument there was that Exemption 1 covered the statutory analysis notwithstanding the fact that the statutory analysis

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would ordinarily not be an intelligence source or method, the idea was that in some contexts this public information could be properly withheld because this disclosure would tend to reveal a classified fact or increase the risk of such revelation. This Court evaluated that claim and it said, given everything else that has been disclosed in this document, which is to say the facts that were disclosed, the other statutory analysis that had been disclosed, this additional statute, which both sides agreed was not public, could be disclosed without any further risk to any properly classified facts. And that's highly relevant here because a large part of what the parties have been discussing, again to the extent that we know what we are discussing which is limited under the circumstances, is the redaction of public newspaper articles from this retrospective account and those public newspaper articles, both sides would agree, are not ordinarily classified, they are in fact public.

Under certain circumstances, and we don't take issue with it, public materials may be properly withheld as part of a classified document but there has to be a logical and plausible reason why. So, in New York Times this Court made precisely the kind of can he novo judgment as to whether it was still logical and plausible to hold this undisclosed public discussion -- or excuse me, undisclosed discussion of public materials and decided that this could be disclosed.

The second sort of exemption arena we are discussing

is Exemption 3 and there I think, if I am reading the government's briefs correctly, they're stretching Exemption 3 far beyond what the Supreme Court contemplated in CIA v. Sims, or what the D.C. Circuit was talking about in Fitzgibbons.

I think some of the government's arguments about Exemption 3 suggest that in a way it swallows Exemption 1, that there is no document that this Court could review de novo as to Exemption 1 that it could nonetheless order release under Exemption 3. And I think that's problematic in this case and out of step with CIA v. Sims.

So, in Sims what was being discussed by Court and the analysis the Court was rejecting was the lower Court's decision that certain identities of acknowledged CIA sources could be disclosed without threat to national security and the Court said simply under Exemption 1 we do a threat analysis, we did say does it meet the prong that this is properly classified. Under Exemption 3, that's baked into the analysis. Congress has passed a law that says you withhold the identities of sources and identities. We don't second guess whether the release of these specific sources is dangerous or not. That's it.

In *Fitzgibbons* there is one additional wrinkle added which is that Congress also permitted, under Exemption 1, some analysis of whether the passage of time has obviated whatever risk existed and, here again, the D.C. Circuit said well, *Sims* 

told us we don't do that for Exemption 3. The Exemption 3 statute doesn't include anything about a passage of time, we are not going to read that into the statute, Courts don't have a free wheeling engagement with it.

We don't disagree with any of that, that's not as far as we can tell, at issue and at least a majority of what the government is challenging that the District Court did.

So, turning just to what the -- or sorry, if I may close that out? I think what is dangerous is to read Exemption 3 to say so long as this document touches on or relates to intelligence sources or methods, it may be withheld in full under Exemption 3, that's the end of the analysis, because if that were true, then obviously virtually everything the CIA does is related to intelligence, it would be withheld under Exemption 3 and that would contradict, entirely, Congress' repeated legislation in this arena both to force de novo review of Exemption 1 and also to specifically refuse consistent legislative efforts to exempt the CIA entirely from FOIA.

JUDGE LEVAL: Are you contending that the mere fact that something has been published previously negates or overcomes the CIA's argument?

MR. LADIN: Not at all, your Honor.

I just want to be clear about what we are arguing. We don't take issue with the general idea that sometimes public

materials can be classified within CIA files. The government pointed to one case in the Seventh Circuit in which people's CIA intelligence files were kept classified in their entirety. And the idea was no one knows what is these files. No one knows what the CIA's intelligence gathering was doing as regarding a particular person or topic. And so, if you were to get a list of every single thing in that file or if you were to get a list of every single thing in that file with all the classified information scrubbed and just a list of every public material the CIA had collected about someone or something, you would then possibly be able to infer what the CIA was interested in.

That is an example of -- I mean, I am not saying the Seventh Circuit necessarily decided that specific case correctly, but that's at least an example of a logical and plausible reason where the CIA said these are intelligence gathering files, they contain the results of our intelligence gathering. If we disclose what is in those files, then you may be able to infer our intelligence interests. That's something.

On the other hand what we have here, as far as we are aware, is a retrospective document written by the Chief of the Office of Medical Services looking back at his office's role in the CIA's torture program. It is a historical document, it is an intelligence --

JUDGE CHIN: Much of it has already been disclosed.

MR. LADIN: Yes, your Honor. Absolutely. And we think that bears very greatly on the analysis.

Just as in New York Times v. DOJ, the fact that so much else had been disclosed about that document meant that this additional statutory analysis added nothing to the risk.

Here, too, as we describe in our brief, this is a document the government acknowledges discusses news reports — publicly available news reports and takes issue with various parts of their description and other times just summarizes the contents of those news reports. The topic is known, it is the CIA's role in the torture program and specifically the medical official's role. And it goes through chronologically and different topics and discusses them.

Now, the government has allowed the disclosure of certain articles and denied others. We, of course, don't know the basis. The only thing that the government points to in their brief is originally this public declaration that says if you comment on the accuracy of what's in the articles, that could tend to disclose a classified fact.

JUDGE POOLER: And even the selection of what is in this report gives some indication to the thinking of the author. That's the other argument they make.

MR. LADIN: Well, your Honor, sure they make that argument but I want to distinguish those two very strongly because the first one they say is made by the CIA's declarant.

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The CIA's declarant says commenting on accuracy can disclose or not a classified fact. We can understand that, we don't argue with it. We didn't make the argument that -- and the District Court critically didn't either.

Now, they might say the District Court actually let through some description of accuracy even though he ordered That's fine. The Court can correct that. otherwise. Obviously. But they're making a far broader argument here. They're not saying -- well actually whatever articles he selected are independently entitled and I think there the key question is well, why? Have they provided a reason for that? Because if you are talking about, say, an unknown CIA file in which we don't know what the topic is, we don't know when it was generated, we don't know what it is about, then perhaps seeing the selection might reveal something. Here we know this is an author going through, step by step, taking different articles that describe the torture program and his office's role in it and so they have to meaningfully describe how it is that the selection actually reveals anything.

JUDGE POOLER: Would you explain a little of the history of this case to me?

This document was referred to in the Senate Select Committee report; is that correct?

MR. LADIN: Yes, your Honor.

JUDGE POOLER: That's where you heard of it; and you

asked for just this document or other things as well? 1 So, this was originally a case involving, 2 MR. LADIN: 3 I believe, 66 either documents or slightly broader categories of documents but it was documents that were largely 4 5 specifically referenced in the report. The government 6 originally argued that this document was withholdable in 7 full --JUDGE POOLER: This is called document 66 but did you 8 9 ask for other things besides this when the case began? 10 MR. LADIN: Yes, your Honor. There were a whole 11 series of cables, investigator general reports --12 JUDGE POOLER: And you have received none of those? 13 Or you received all of them? 14 MR. LADIN: I would say it's -- I would say we 15 received the vast majority of them, your Honor, subject to various withholdings. This document was the subject of the 16 17 most specific litigation. 18 JUDGE POOLER: Correct. And now we are dealing with the redactions that Judge Hellerstein allowed and the CIA is 19 20 objecting to some of the redactions that he didn't allow. 21 That's where we stand now, right? Is that your understanding? 22 And that's the CIA's understanding? 23 MR. LADIN: Yes, your Honor.

JUDGE POOLER: So, you have you have the redacted

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version of the document?

MR. LADIN: Yes, your Honor.

JUDGE POOLER: Document 66?

MR. LADIN: Yes.

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JUDGE POOLER: And you want more of the redactions removed?

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$  LADIN: We are not actually here appealing anything, your Honor, so we are here --

JUDGE POOLER: You won below.

MR. LADIN: Yes.

No, your Honor, we weren't given the opportunity to brief or argue about the specific redactions below. government, as you have seen, is not making whatever arguments it is making on the public record and so there were a series of ex parte reconsideration motions and otherwise. We didn't arque that these specific pieces of information had to or didn't have to be disclosed. Under FOIA it is the government's burden, once the District Court orders disclosure, to justify whatever they seek to protect. They offered, the first time around, an incredibly conclusory boiler plate description of the document. Judge Hellerstein said, okay, I don't accept that, and then they took several reconsideration opportunities to try to really explain why it is that these specific passages needed to be withheld. Over the course of the litigation below, several passages that they claimed and several citations that they claimed had to be withheld on national security

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grounds were, in fact, disclosed, because the government ended up agreeing with the District Court that they had erred.

We are suggesting that we are not necessarily at the The District Court made further end of that road. disagreements with the government as to whether additional public materials, shorn of characterizations of accuracy, can be disclosed. The government might tell you in chambers right now, well, that article says CIA secret prison in Afghanistan and so we can't release that, or that article says CIA prison in Thailand, which is a category that we can't release. what we submitted to you in our opposition brief is that that doesn't logically or plausibly make sense given that they have already permitted other articles, in this very document that contain descriptions of facts that the CIA believes are classified. The CIA doesn't believe that they have waived classification over those facts through disclosure of those articles. It does not make sense that additional public articles, again shorn of characterizations of accuracy, themselves reveal classified information.

JUDGE POOLER: I understand. Well, all right.

JUDGE LEVAL: That doesn't seem to me implausible, the argument doesn't seem to be implausible that foreign agents, studying the records of this case and studying whatever is made available to them in the public record to study, could draw valuable intelligence information simply from the

identification of the fact that the CIA discussed a particular article in a secret memo while not discussing other articles that the revelation of the one that is discussed and the comparison of it with others that were not discussed. I don't see anything improbable about the argument that that could reveal — that could reveal valuable secret information to foreign agents as to who to focus on.

Why would they have talked about this public article in their confidential secret memorandum while not talking about one that seems very similar that was published elsewhere?

Let's compare the two and see and try to understand why this would have been the focus of discussion while another was not.

That doesn't seem to me an improbable argument.

MR. LADIN: Your Honor, this is where I think context is critical because this is not a document that's a black box, that we don't know what it is about, that we don't know what the author is discussing. The author lays out his or her reason for writing it in the first place which is this was an extraordinary moment in American history where medical professionals engaged in what certainly many people, including many courts have described as torture. And so, it's not that this is some sort of black box file where the discussion of what its contents might be would be revelatory.

That also, I think, the second piece of it that is contextual is that in  ${\it CIA~v.~Sims}$ , for example, when you are

talking about otherwise sort of seemingly innocuous information that a foreign adversary could piece together, there is at least some logical way — it is not just that the Court accepts on faith from the government that some super foreign intelligence agency might draw some conclusions that are not apparent to any judge. There was a logical explanation given. They said if you disclose the names of the research institutions where people are affiliated who conducted CIA research, that would be enough for people who are knowledgeable about the type of research the CIA is conducting to try to figure out the identities of those people. If you gave the journals they it publish in, they would know the subject matter.

Here, again, the subject matter is no secret. We are talking about the CIA's torture program, and obviously you know more than I do and will be looking in chambers at it, but I urge you not to accept as plausible the basic premise that foreign adversaries have the wherewithal to discover any number of things but, instead, to require a logical description of how these specific articles might lead to that revelation because that's the government's burden.

And finally, on that point, I think here the amicus brief filed by I think 22 different media organizations is useful background because it shows over and over and over and over that we receive, as a society from the intelligence

agencies, blanket statements about how important these secrets are to keep and they, over and over, when those people testify in front of Congress, they say, actually, we overclassified very badly and even provide what I thought was a useful example in there of a public article in which the CIA simultaneously said one element of the public articles couldn't be released for national security reasons and in the same release released it, and the entire time it was of course a public article, the sentence that was redacted didn't add anything to any possible harm that existed but there was, you know, a human error and overclassification impulse that has been well documented.

All of these things are the reasons why Congress overrode a presidential veto and a Supreme Court decision to give Article III courts the power to look and demand logical and plausible explanations that hold up under some scrutiny.

JUDGE POOLER: Thank you.

MR. LADIN: Thank you, your Honors.

JUDGE POOLER: We will confer in the robing room and invite the CIA and any other persons allowed, to be there in 10 minutes. We are going to take 10 minutes to confer. Thank you.

(Recess)

(Pages 16-52 CLASSIFIED and EX PARTE by order of the Court)

(Open session; in robing room)

JUDGE POOLER: Counsel, I know you aren't supposed to be here but we concluded you should be able to hear the CIA's arguments in response to your legal arguments.

MR. LADIN: Thank you, your Honor.

JUDGE POOLER: I hope it wasn't inconvenient.

MR. LADIN: Not at all.

JUDGE POOLER: And, counsel will respond to the arguments you made in open court.

MR. LADIN: Thank you, your Honor. I appreciate the opportunity.

MR. NORMAND: Thank you, your Honor. I will be brief.

I would like to make a couple of legal points and then refer to some of the more factual points.

My colleague identified New York Times as the most relevant case here. The government doesn't believe that New York Times is relevant here except insofar as it agrees with the standard of review identified in many of the Court's cases, a standard that requires the Court to give substantial weight to the logical and plausible justifications of the Central Intelligence Agency with regard to both when information relates to an intelligence source and methods protected under the National Security Act and when its disclosure would be harmful. The portion of the New York Times case that my colleague was referring to has to do with the discussion of

official acknowledgment.

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Official acknowledgment is a doctrine that applies when the question is whether the government's prior disclosure, official disclosure of specific information is, overrides an exemption whether it be Exemption 1 or Exemption 3. And the Court in that case, I think it is important to point out, ordered the disclosure only of the legal analysis in an OLC opinion -- Official of Legal Counsel opinion. It allowed the government to withhold the entire factual sections of the same opinion. So, the point that counsel was making about the Court's statement that there was no, the discussion of an additional statute in that OLC opinion added nothing to the risk, was made in the context of determining whether, essentially, the legal analysis underlying a proposed legal operation against Anwar al-Awlaki had previously been disclosed by the government in an official government disclosure. doctrine just has no application here because the question is not whether the government has previously made public the particular facts that are being withheld here. The government has not made public those facts.

In this case, the government has released, in this document, large portions of information that relate to the former detention and interrogation program. The facts that have been withheld as classified and statutorily protected are facts that have not been declassified and have not been

publicly and officially disclosed by the government and other locations. So, we don't believe that portion of the New York Times -- or that the New York Times is a relevant case here for that reason.

Counsel also alluded to or argued that the government was stretching Exemption 3 here and talked a little bit about the Sims case. Sims is, we agree, a seminal case and it is very important here. What Sims said was that the government need not make a showing of harm to national security because Congress has made that assessment, that disclosure of intelligence sources and methods would be harmful.

JUDGE POOLER: That's Exemption 3 you are talking about?

MR. NORMAND: Correct, your Honor; Exemption 3, which is statutory protection and it could apply to a number of statutes but in this particular case and in Sims, the statute at issue was the National Security act and, particularly, the section of the National Security Act that permits the Central Intelligence Agency director, now the Director of National Intelligence to withhold, to protect sources and methods — intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.

What happened in Sims was the Supreme Court rejected the D.C. Circuit's effort there to impose sort of a narrower definition on the intelligence sources and methods that would be protected under the Act. The Court in that case believed

that really what was intended to be protected by the statute was —— I am talking now about the D.C. Circuit, was sources and methods that were protected by assurances of confidentiality and it went up to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court said, no, there is no such limiting definition in the statute.

Instead, Congress left it to the CIA director to determine what sources and methods needed to be protected and that protection extends even to sources and methods that might be superficially or seemingly innocuous.

So, we do agree that Sims is a seminal case but we don't believe any stretching of Exemption 3 is necessary here because Sims is quite clear that the statute has a broad sweep and encompasses anything that the CIA determines is within its mandate to conduct foreign intelligence, provided it gives a plausible and logical explanation why that is so, which is done here.

Focusing on the specific information that has been withheld here, I recognize that it is difficult for the ACLU to discuss it because of the redactions. Their focus seems to be on the media reports and the notion that if they are shorn of characterizations of accuracy, that the disclosure of media reports should be fine and shouldn't be harmful.

JUDGE POOLER: Well, their argument is that it is already public and what are we doing not making public what is already public?

MR. NORMAND: Well, it is not already public, is the short answer to that question. And the reason it is not already public is because what has been withheld by the CIA in this particular report is not just summaries and the District Court believed, but summaries with commentary that reflect the author's understanding and comments on the particular document so it is not — this has to do — this does tell you something about what this senior CIA OMS official thought about particular articles and particular portions.

JUDGE POOLER: The selection of the articles is also source and method?

MR. NORMAND: It is, your Honor.

The author's selection of the articles is revealing in this case and, just to give you an example, if you have -- let me back up.

One of the suggestions that the ACLU made in its brief was, well, even if you protect the commentary you could release the citations in the footnote. What that would leave you with, your Honor, is a big redaction followed by a citation to a particular article, very much raising the inference that there is something in that article that is confirmatory about a particular article and I would, in making this point, I would also like to draw the Court's attention to the fact that this author was a senior official within the agency with personal involvement in this program and he was in a position to know

what facts were true and not true about the program.

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JUDGE POOLER: So, just including them gives us some inclination about authentication.

MR. NORMAND: That's right, your Honor. It was certainly logical and plausible for the CIA to conclude that even providing the citations to particular articles following a redaction would be revealing that the author thought there was something within that and that the CIA believes there is something within that article that would reveal facts about the program that remain classified, and in relation to this I would point out that the author begins this document by talking about significant leaks about the program.

So, I think it is accurate to say that the author's selection of particular articles and then the fact that the CIA determined that that particular discussion needed to be redacted would be quite revealing.

JUDGE LEVAL: The article talks about quite significant leaks and then it cites and quotes from selected articles that contain significant leaks and the inference is that these were leaks.

> MR. NORMAND: That's exactly right, your Honor.

JUDGE LEVAL: And one who is made aware that that is the article, that that is the article that was cited all the more so if it is quoted, shows that the CIA includes this as a discussion of what the CIA regards as having been significant

1 leaks.

MR. NORMAND: That's exactly the inference, your Honor, that the CIA believes would be drawn and is the basis for that.

Saying, while the article is public and anybody can read it, what is not public is that the CIA saw fit -- a senior person at the CIA saw fit to discuss this particular article and not others in the CIA report apparently revealing there is something about that article which is of sufficient significance to the CIA to discuss it as something that needs discussion in our intelligence.

MR. NORMAND: That's right, your Honor. And I would add that even some years later, when the document is reviewed by an original classification authority, the fact that the CIA saw fit to redact certain discussions would add additional authentication to that inference, your Honor.

We do agree, your Honor, with my colleague's statement in court that context is critical. We have gone through, in earlier discussion, piece by piece each withholding, and this is not a case where the CIA is attempting to withhold anything relating to intelligence sources and methods. It has identified very specific targeted information in this document that would reveal protected sources and methods the release of which, in the CIA's judgment, would be harmful to national

security. The District Court rejected that showing, effectively substituting his own view of the harmfulness or lack of harmfulness of release of the information. We think that violated the rule that this Court has repeated over and over from Willner, to ACLU, to most recently last year in ACLU v. DOD, that it is bad law and bad policy for Judges to second guess the predictive judgments of the intelligence community when it comes to whether particular information would be harmful, if released.

JUDGE POOLER: Thank you.

MR. NORMAND: Thank you.

JUDGE POOLER: We didn't plan on rebuttal but since you are here, if you wanted to take a minute or two at the podium, counsel, I would allow to you do so.

MR. LADIN: Thank you so much, your Honor and I will be very brief.

I think fundamentally we are pretty close on the law so I just want to speak about the facts again. Judge Leval, you sort of articulated a way in which, if you disclose the information, the agency thought this leak significant and then attached a bunch of articles, a person could infer something about that article. With respect to my colleague, we are not looking at a document in which the fact that this CIA decision-maker was looking at articles is an unknown fact, or the fact that this person is looking at articles that he

considers error-filled, wrong, and takes issue with over and over throughout the argument. Some of those are cited in our brief.

So, I think this is, again, where the judicial role comes in. The question is, is it logical or plausible to infer from a list of citations and here at this point I understand we are talking even shorn of any discussion of them. So, a mere list of citations to newspaper articles, to suggest that that confirms that this CIA decision-maker thought something secret about them and that that secret thought will be conveyed to a very sophisticated adversarial reader, and I think again --

JUDGE LEVAL: We are not talking about a list of newspaper articles, we are talking about a placement of a quotation from an article in a particular report written by a CIA person.

MR. LADIN: Absolutely; and the report is a history of the CIA's and his or her office's actions in this program and throughout the author has taken great pains to say this was inaccurate, this was wrong, and the articles themselves are filled with information that my colleague would agree has not been confirmed by the fact that it is now in the public record. So, we cited several examples in the brief but these articles discuss, for example, to be concrete, a CIA prison in Thailand. If you ask my colleague she will tell you, nothing has been confirmed about the existence or nonexistence of a CIA prison

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in Thailand. The word "Thailand" is not released, it is not public. No matter how many articles describe it, it is not public and no matter how many articles in this document are publicly released by the CIA, it still hasn't been confirmed.

So, to say that on the one hand, and on the other hand to say even if you black out all discussion, the mere citation of an article in a document that purports to discuss inaccurate articles in a document that purports to discuss a broad history of various things that have been written about the CIA's actions, to say that the citation to one of those articles would nonetheless cast an inference that that article was true, that every aspect of that article was true, or anything like that, to me, that strains credulity. Again, I haven't seen, obviously, what your Honors have seen. To the extent that that is backed up by some concrete, plausible showing of what actually would be inferred, obviously that's the judicial role here. All we are saying is there has been nothing public about that beyond the sweeping idea that a sophisticated adversary could infer any number of things.

And, while that might be true as a general matter, we need to look at it in the context of this document where we already have before us statements by that author saying these articles are wrong, this didn't happen, we never gave Abu Zubaydah this particular medicine, none of this is accurate.

1 Again, we understand arguments when they're talking 2 about the accuracy or inaccuracy of articles and Judge 3 Hellerstein understood those arguments as well and allowed them though redact that. But, we are now here moving pretty far 4 from that into the release of articles that are themselves 5 6 seemingly echoed by other articles and other discussions 7 released in this document. 8 JUDGE POOLER: Thank you. 9 MR. LADIN: Thank you, your Honor. 10 JUDGE POOLER: Thank you, all. We will excuse 11 everyone. The panel will stay here. 12 I thank you, all. We will send the transcript, CIA 13 will redact the transcript. We will, your Honor. 14 JUDGE POOLER: Thank you. 15 MR. NORMAND: We will file a redacted version. 16 JUDGE POOLER: Thank you, all. I thank you, 17 especially for waiting. Sorry we didn't get organized early 18 enough. 19 Thank you, all. 20 000 21 22 23 24 25