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18 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
19 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

20 SULEIMAN ABDULLAH SALIM,
21 MOHAMED AHMED BEN SOUD, OBAID
22 ULLAH (AS PERSONAL
23 REPRESENTATIVE OF GUL RAHMAN),

24 Plaintiffs,

25 v.

26 JAMES ELMER MITCHELL and JOHN
"BRUCE" JESSEN

Defendants.

No. CV-15-0286-JLQ
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Oral Argument Requested

NOTE ON MOTION
CALENDAR:

JULY 28, 2017,
9:30 A.M., AT
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INTRODUCTION

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2
3 Plaintiffs seek summary judgment on their claim that Defendants aided and
4 abetted the torture and other cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment (“CIDT”)
5 that they suffered in the CIA interrogation program. Specifically, Plaintiffs were
6 subjected to systematic and prolonged abuse in CIA custody, including the
7 repeated infliction of physical assault, sleep deprivation (accomplished by forcing
8 Plaintiffs to stand for days in diapers with their arms chained overhead), and
9 confinement in coffin-like boxes. The use of these specific methods on Plaintiffs
10 was not happenstance; it was part of a standardized program of systematic abuse
11 that Defendants designed, tested, implemented, and promoted, and from which
12 they handsomely profited.
13

14 Defendants’ undisputed actions in this case readily satisfy the standard for
15 aiding and abetting liability for torture and CIDT under the Alien Tort Statute,
16 which derives, under Ninth Circuit precedent, from customary international law.
17 That law is clear with respect to both the act and intent elements that form the
18 basis for aiding and abetting liability. The act element is established when a
19 defendant provides assistance that has a substantial effect on the perpetration of
20 the crime, such that the violation would not otherwise have occurred in the same
21 way. The intent element is established if the defendant supported the violation of
22 international law and obtained a direct benefit from it. The undisputed facts
23 before the Court establish that no genuine issue of material fact exists with
24 respect to either of these elements.
25
26

1 Defendants, by their own admission, played a “significant and formative
2 role” in developing the CIA program, which they based in part upon their training
3 in Chinese Communist techniques used to coerce false confessions from
4 American prisoners of war during the Korean War. Defendants recommended
5 specific “pressures” for the CIA program—including various physical assaults,
6 stress positions, the use of diapers, prolonged sleep deprivation, cramped
7 confinement, and simulated drowning. Defendants told the CIA that these
8 methods had been selected to “instill fear and despair.” The “psychologically
9 based interrogation program” Defendants designed boiled down to a simple
10 premise: Defendants and the CIA would apply the “pressures” to prisoners, and,
11 in Defendant Jessen’s words, prisoners would be given “a choice: you can start
12 talking or you can get some more physical pressure.”
13

14
15 Defendants not only designed the CIA program; they personally tested it
16 on the first CIA prisoner, Abu Zubaydah. The brutal and repeated abuse they
17 inflicted is plainly documented in the record. Also clearly documented is
18 Defendants’ awareness of the harm their methods caused. Defendants observed
19 firsthand as Abu Zubaydah trembled, shook, cried, begged, pleaded, vomited, and
20 became hysterical during the long weeks of his torture.
21

22 The record also establishes that Defendants’ torture of Abu Zubaydah
23 became the template for the program, and that the methods Defendants used on
24 him were standardized throughout the CIA’s secret prisons. There can be no
25 genuine dispute that Defendants’ “significant and formative role” in the CIA
26

1 program had a “substantial effect” on the torture of Plaintiffs, nor about the
2 benefit Defendants received in implementing and helping the CIA to expand the
3 program: they were paid millions in taxpayer dollars to do so, and formed a
4 company that was paid \$81 million on a no-bid contract.

5
6 The record, including CIA documents, confirms that Plaintiffs were
7 subjected to the methods that Defendants devised for the torture program. The
8 abuse Plaintiffs endured as a result caused them severe mental and physical pain
9 and suffering, and constituted torture. Plaintiffs were also subjected to methodical
10 degradation and humiliation, violating the prohibition against CIDT. Because
11 Defendants assisted and profited from the systematic abuse of CIA prisoners,
12 including Plaintiffs, they are liable under the Alien Tort Statute for aiding and
13 abetting torture and CIDT.
14

15 **FACTUAL BACKGROUND**

16 *A. Defendants design methods and test them on the CIA’s first prisoner*

17 Defendants “played a significant and formative role” in developing the
18 CIA program, which began in 2002. Statement of Undisputed Material Facts
19 (“SUMF”) ¶ 1. At the time, the CIA Counterterrorism Center had no experience
20 in interrogation. SUMF ¶ 2. Neither Defendant had ever interrogated a prisoner
21 before, but Defendant Mitchell asserted that they were qualified to “put together a
22 psychologically based interrogation program,” based in part on Defendants’
23 understanding of “Pavlovian Classical Conditioning.” SUMF ¶¶ 3, 11–14.
24 Defendants first tested the program on Abu Zubaydah.
25
26

1 The abusive interrogation of Abu Zubaydah proceeded in distinct phases,
2 beginning in Spring 2002. Initially, Defendant Mitchell recommended that the
3 CIA disrupt Abu Zubaydah's sleep, feed noise into his cell, and deprive him of
4 "amenities"—such as clothing. SUMF ¶¶ 4–7. In addition, Defendant Mitchell
5 and two CIA staff members recommended extreme sensory deprivation, which
6 included total deprivation of natural light and sound. SUMF ¶¶ 6, 7. Together,
7 this “deliberate manipulation of the environment” was “intended to cause
8 psychological disorientation . . . as well as an increased sense of learned
9 helplessness.” SUMF ¶ 8.

12 In July 2002, Defendant Mitchell assessed Abu Zubaydah as insufficiently
13 compliant, and convinced the CIA to contract with his friend, Defendant Jessen,
14 to help “put together an interrogation program” and implement it on Abu
15 Zubaydah. SUMF ¶¶ 13, 19. That month, Defendants drafted and proposed a list
16 of specific techniques, which would become the standardized “enhanced
17 interrogation techniques” used on CIA prisoners. SUMF ¶¶ 20, 60. Defendants
18 called for the use of these coercive methods to “instill fear and despair.” SUMF ¶
19 20. The prisoner would be faced with “a choice: you can start talking or you can
20 get some more physical pressure.” SUMF ¶15. Defendants based their list of
21 methods on techniques used in training in the Department of Defense's Survival,
22 Research, Evasion and Escape (“SERE”) program, claiming that a program based
23 on these methods would be safe and effective at extracting information. SUMF ¶¶
24 21, 28.

1
2 In fact, the SERE program was based in part on Chinese Communist
3 methods inflicted on American prisoners during the Korean War in order to
4 compel American soldiers to make false confessions, not to tell the truth. SUMF
5 ¶ 22. And in practice, the CIA program was far harsher than SERE training, both
6 in the frequency and intensity of the methods and, critically, because SERE is a
7 voluntary program of very short duration with a known end date; trainees can
8 also stop at any time. SUMF ¶¶ 24–26.
9

10 In August 2002, after Abu Zubaydah had been kept in isolation and
11 subjected to a deliberately hopeless and disorienting environment, Defendants
12 embarked on the “aggressive phase” of his interrogation. For weeks, they
13 personally inflicted the abusive methods they had advanced, including slamming
14 Abu Zubaydah into walls (“walling”), physically assaulting him (“facial and
15 abdominal slaps”), depriving him of sleep, waterboarding him, and stuffing him
16 into boxes (“cramped confinement”). SUMF ¶ 29. Defendants repeatedly
17 subjected him to their methods in varying combinations, with the goal of
18 inducing “complete helplessness” and “reach[ing] the stage where we have
19 broken any will or ability of subject to resist.” SUMF ¶ 43.
20

21 Throughout, Defendants demanded that Abu Zubaydah disclose new
22 information about threats to U.S. interests, and punished him when he did not.
23 SUMF ¶¶ 30–45. Defendants saw with their own eyes that their methods caused
24 Abu Zubaydah to vomit, cry, and beg Defendants to believe that he did not
25 possess the information they demanded. *Id.* By the third day of his torture, the
26

1 CIA interrogation team noted that, “[a]t the risk of stating the obvious,” perhaps
2 Abu Zubaydah did not actually possess new threat information. SUMF ¶ 32.
3
4 Within six days, Defendants assessed that it was “highly unlikely” that Abu
5 Zubaydah was withholding the information they demanded. SUMF ¶ 35. But that
6 did not stop Defendants from continuing to torture Abu Zubaydah as they
7 “develop[ed] and refine[d]” their assessment of whether he was being truthful. *Id.*
8 Defendants continued to inflict their methods on Abu Zubaydah while demanding
9 information they themselves believed it was “highly unlikely” he possessed.
10 SUMF ¶¶ 36–46.

12 After seventeen days of abusing Abu Zubaydah without acquiring the
13 information they demanded, Defendants were satisfied that they had “induce[d]
14 complete helplessness” and “broken any will or ability of subject to resist or deny
15 providing us information.” SUMF ¶ 43. But Defendants had originally claimed
16 Abu Zubaydah was a skilled resistor, and CIA headquarters was not convinced
17 that Defendants had fully broken their prisoner. SUMF ¶ 44. As a result,
18 Defendants requested that CIA witnesses observe as Defendants deployed their
19 methods on Abu Zubaydah yet again. SUMF ¶ 45. Defendant Mitchell wrote of
20 this final demonstration session: “It was ugly and hard to do.” *Id.* All involved
21 agreed that it was pointless to abuse Abu Zubaydah further. SUMF ¶ 48.

24 Defendants’ methods were documented on videotapes: CIA cameras
25 contemporaneously recorded as Abu Zubaydah cried, begged, pleaded, vomited,
26 trembled, shook, and became so hysterical he could not communicate. SUMF

1 ¶¶ 30–45. Defendant Mitchell “had a visceral reaction to the tapes,” and “thought
2 they were ugly.” SUMF ¶ 49. He “didn’t like the fact that the tapes were out
3 there” and recommended they be destroyed. *Id.* A senior CIA official, Jose
4 Rodriguez, agreed: he believed the tapes “would make the CIA look bad,” and, if
5 released, would “almost destroy the clandestine service.” *Id.* On Rodriguez’s
6 orders, the CIA destroyed the tapes. *Id.*

7
8 Once the “aggressive phase” was over, the interrogation team assessed that
9 Abu Zubaydah had, in fact, been telling the truth when he consistently told
10 Defendants he did not have the threat information they demanded. SUMF ¶¶ 46–
11 47, 50–51. Nonetheless, Defendants pronounced their program a success.
12 Defendant Mitchell summed up Defendants’ interrogation of Abu Zubaydah,
13 writing: “I left feeling good about what we had accomplished.” SUMF ¶ 52.

14
15 *B. Defendants expand and develop the program*

16 While applying Defendants’ methods on Abu Zubaydah, the interrogation
17 team, which included Defendants, wrote to CIA headquarters that “the aggressive
18 phase . . . should be used as a template for future interrogation of high value
19 captives.” SUMF ¶ 53. Defendants’ methods subsequently became the basis for
20 the CIA’s “enhanced interrogation” program, and Defendants participated in the
21 program’s expansion; their contracts expanding accordingly. SUMF ¶¶ 54–55.

22
23 In January 2003, the use of Defendants’ methods on CIA prisoners was
24 formalized in instructions sent to COBALT, a secret CIA prison where Plaintiffs
25 were held and tortured. SUMF ¶ 63. The formal instructions sent to COBALT list
26

1 as “standard techniques” several of the methods making up the initial phase of
2 Abu Zubaydah’s interrogation, and as “enhanced techniques” the methods that
3 Defendants proposed in July 2002 for the “aggressive phase” (excepting “mock
4 burial,” which Defendants were never able to test). SUMF ¶ 60–61. The January
5 2003 guidance also standardized the use of the “abdominal slap,” an “aggressive
6 phase” technique Defendants tested on Abu Zubaydah, but had not listed in their
7 July 2002 proposal. SUMF ¶ 61.
8
9

10 *C. Plaintiffs are subjected to the CIA program at COBALT*

11 In accordance with the CIA program, Plaintiffs were subjected both to
12 conditions mirroring the initial phase of Abu Zubaydah’s interrogation (*e.g.*,
13 constant noise, deliberate disruption of day and night cycles), as well as to
14 Defendants’ “aggressive phase” methods. Thus, Plaintiffs were deprived of any
15 natural light; stripped of “amenities” so that they had nothing in their cells
16 “except a bucket used for human waste” and no clothing with which to cover
17 themselves; subjected to constant noise and loud music; and were dependent on
18 their interrogators to earn “rewards for cooperation,” such as lights to cut the
19 endless darkness, earplugs to block out the constant noise, bedding to sleep on,
20 and blankets against the cold. SUMF ¶¶ 64–65. Likewise, “aggressive phase”
21 methods also followed Defendants’ design: in accordance with Defendants’
22 proposal that diapers be used to “leverage” a prisoners’ sensitivity to humiliation,
23 Plaintiffs and other prisoners at COBALT were kept in diapers “solely to
24 humiliate the prisoner for interrogation purposes.” SUMF ¶¶ 66, 73. They were
25
26

1 subjected to sleep deprivation by being forced to stand for days, their hands
2 shackled to an overhead bar. SUMF ¶ 62. Special walls, a waterboard, and
3 confinement boxes were constructed for the use of Defendants' methods. CIA
4 records confirm Plaintiffs' undisputed testimony: Plaintiffs were subjected to
5 Defendants' methods while at COBALT. SUMF ¶¶ 70, 72–75, 91, 113.

7 *i. Mr. Rahman is subjected to torture and CIDT*

8 Shortly after Defendants declared the use of their methods on Abu
9 Zubaydah a success, Mr. Rahman was kidnapped by the CIA and taken to
10 COBALT. SUMF ¶ 67. Defendants traveled there in November 2002, and
11 personally participated in his interrogations. SUMF ¶¶ 67, 69. Defendant Jessen
12 was in charge of assessing Mr. Rahman's "resistance posture," and tested at least
13 one of Defendants' "enhanced interrogation techniques" on him. SUMF ¶¶ 68,
14 70–71. Defendant Jessen concluded that Mr. Rahman "was impervious to it," and
15 advised that, rather than using the more active "enhanced interrogation
16 techniques," Mr. Rahman's interrogators should instead focus on "deprivations."
17 *Id.* Mr. Rahman was subjected to Defendants' sleep deprivation method; his
18 hands were shackled overhead as he was kept standing for days at a time. SUMF
19 ¶ 74. Also at his interrogators' direction, Mr. Rahman was stripped naked or kept
20 in a diaper in order to humiliate him. SUMF ¶¶ 72–73. It worked: Mr. Rahman
21 was "particularly concerned with being naked in front of . . . the guards," and
22 consistently "asked to be covered." SUMF ¶ 73. He was deprived of clothing for
23 the brief period that he remained alive. SUMF ¶ 72.

1 Defendant Jessen also observed a prolonged physical assault of Mr.
2 Rahman, stating afterwards that Mr. Rahman had abrasions on his head and leg
3 and crusty contusions on his face, leg, and hands. SUMF ¶ 76. Defendant
4 Jessen's reaction to witnessing this assault was to opine that it was worth trying,
5 and he suggested to another interrogator that the interrogator "leverage" the
6 assault "in some way," by speaking to the prisoner afterwards to "give them
7 something to think about." *Id.* Defendant Jessen stated that the assault was a
8 "good technique, but these kinds of things need to be written down and codified
9 with a stamp of approval or you're going to be liable." SUMF ¶ 77.
10

11 Defendant Jessen advised the CIA that Mr. Rahman displayed a
12 "sophisticated level of resistance training," because he "complained about poor
13 treatment," and because Mr. Rahman told interrogators that he couldn't think
14 because he was so cold. SUMF ¶ 68. After several days during which Mr.
15 Rahman had been kept in a diaper, his hands chained overhead in accord with
16 Defendants' sleep deprivation method, and after Defendant Jessen observed that
17 Mr. Rahman displayed early signs of hypothermia, Defendant Jessen nonetheless
18 recommended that the CIA "continue the environmental deprivations [Mr.
19 Rahman] is experiencing." SUMF ¶ 78.
20

21 Defendant Jessen claims to have at one point asked for Mr. Rahman to be
22 given a blanket; still, he instructed that interrogators should view Mr. Rahman's
23 pleas about poor treatment and cold as strategic "resistance" tactics, rather than
24 as sincere signs of distress. SUMF ¶¶ 68, 79, 81. Four days after Defendant
25
26

1
2 Jessen left COBALT, an interrogator had a brief session with Mr. Rahman “based
3 on Jessen’s recommendation that Rahman be left alone and environmental
4 deprivations continued.” SUMF ¶ 80. Two days later, Mr. Rahman— starved,
5 sleepless, and freezing—died of hypothermia. SUMF ¶ 81.

6 After Plaintiff Rahman’s death, Defendant Jessen told an investigator:

7
8 [I]f a detainee is strong and resilient, you have to establish control in some
9 way or you’re not going to get anywhere. If bound by the Geneva
10 Convention, this person would not break. You have to try different
11 techniques to get him to open up. . . . You want to instill fear and despair.

12 SUMF ¶ 83. He further told the investigator that that the atmosphere at COBALT
13 “was excellent for the type of prisoners kept there—‘nasty but safe,’” and that the
14 officer who had ordered in Mr. Rahman’s final days that he be chained, pantless,
15 to a freezing concrete floor “was very level headed and acted in a measured
16 manner.” SUMF ¶ 84. Defendant Jessen stated he would work with the officer
17 “anytime, anyday.” *Id.*

18 *ii. Mr. Salim is subjected to torture and CIDT*

19 Mr. Salim was held at COBALT for about six weeks in spring 2003, after
20 Defendants’ methods had been standardized at the prison. SUMF ¶ 85. During
21 that time, many of the methods used in the initial phase of Abu Zubaydah’s
22 interrogation were also inflicted upon Mr. Salim: he was subjected to constant
23 ear-splitting noise and music, deprived of adequate food and water, deliberately
24 prevented from knowing whether it was day or night, and kept naked. SUMF ¶¶
25 86–88. In addition, Mr. Salim was subjected to many of the methods that
26

1 Defendants had tested on Abu Zubaydah during the “aggressive phase”: Mr.
2 Salim was kept in a diaper, slammed into walls, physically assaulted (including
3 facial and abdominal slaps), shackled to an overhead bar in a painful position to
4 deprive him of sleep, and stuffed into boxes. SUMF ¶¶ 87–95. Interrogators
5 interspersed these methods with interrogation sessions. SUMF ¶ 96.
6

7 Mr. Salim was also subjected to two additional water-based methods that
8 were closely related to those Defendants had proposed and tested: he was
9 strapped to a waterboard and threatened with having water forced into his mouth,
10 but was instead spun around several times. SUMF ¶¶ 97–98. He was also
11 repeatedly forced onto the center of a large plastic sheet and doused with gallons
12 of icy water. *Id.* At times, a hood was placed over his head and water was poured
13 directly over it. *Id.* The soaked hood would cling to Mr. Salim’s face, simulating
14 drowning and approximating the terror produced by waterboarding. *Id.*
15
16

17 As Defendants had claimed, their methods successfully “instill[ed] fear and
18 despair.” Like Abu Zubaydah, Mr. Salim vomited, choked, and suffered
19 excruciating pain, terror, and dread. SUMF ¶¶ 90–99. As much as he suffered
20 from each of Defendants’ methods individually, their combined use proved too
21 much to endure. Not knowing when or if his torture would end, Mr. Salim
22 reached a point where even death was preferable to any further terrifying,
23 degrading, and painful abuse. SUMF ¶ 101. Mr. Salim began to secretly stockpile
24 painkillers he was given by CIA medical staff, and after weeks of torture,
25 attempted suicide by taking all his pills at once. *Id.*
26

1 After his suicide attempt, the aggressive phase of Mr. Salim’s interrogation
2 ended. He was eventually transferred to Department of Defense custody. SUMF
3 ¶¶ 102–103. After five years of imprisonment without charge or trial, the Defense
4 Department examined the evidence and determined that the CIA had erred: Mr.
5 Salim had never been involved in terrorist operations. SUMF ¶ 104. He was
6 released with the certification that he “has been determined to pose no threat to
7 the United States Armed Forces or its interests in Afghanistan.” SUMF ¶ 105.
8
9

10 *iii. Mr. Ben Soud is subjected to torture and CIDT*

11 Mr. Ben Soud was taken to COBALT in April 2003, after Defendants’
12 methods had been standardized at the prison. SUMF ¶ 107. He was held at
13 COBALT for nearly a year. *Id.* During that time, he was subjected to many of the
14 conditions used on Abu Zubaydah and Mr. Salim. SUMF ¶¶ 108–111. Like Mr.
15 Salim, he was subjected to many of the methods that Defendants had tested on
16 Abu Zubaydah during the “aggressive phase”: Mr. Ben Soud was kept naked or
17 in a diaper for approximately two months, slammed into walls, physically
18 assaulted (including facial and abdominal slaps), shackled to an overhead bar to
19 deprive him of sleep, forced to contort his body into painful “stress positions,”
20 and stuffed into boxes. SUMF ¶¶ 112–116. The use of these “aggressive”
21 methods was interspersed with repeated interrogation sessions. SUMF ¶ 119. The
22 pain caused by Defendants’ methods was exacerbated because Mr. Ben Soud’s
23 foot was broken and in a cast during the “aggressive phase” of his interrogation.
24
25
26

1 SUMF ¶¶ 112–116. While enduring prolonged standing sleep deprivation, he
2 began to hallucinate and became hysterical. SUMF ¶ 116.

3
4 Like Mr. Salim, Mr. Ben Soud was also subjected to two additional water-
5 based methods that were closely related to those Defendants had proposed and
6 tested: he was strapped to a waterboard, spun around, and doused with water
7 while interrogators threatened to force water directly into his mouth. SUMF ¶
8 118. In addition, he was repeatedly forced onto the center of a large plastic sheet
9 and doused with gallons of icy water. SUMF ¶ 117. At times, a hood was placed
10 over his head and water was poured directly over the hood. *Id.* When the hood
11 was soaked it would cling to his face, also simulating drowning. *Id.*

12
13 As Defendants had claimed, their methods successfully “instill[ed] fear and
14 despair.” Mr. Ben Soud was humiliated, degraded, and suffered excruciating pain
15 because of the relentless abuse he endured. SUMF ¶¶ 108–121. After his torture
16 was over, the CIA eventually turned Mr. Ben Soud over to the Quaddafi
17 dictatorship in Libya, which immediately imprisoned him. SUMF ¶ 122. Mr. Ben
18 Soud, who had fought and fled from the Quaddafi regime, never fought against
19 the United States. *Id.* In 2011, the Libyan people overthrew the dictatorship and
20 President Obama announced that “the dark shadow of tyranny has been lifted.”
21 SUMF ¶ 123. That year, Mr. Ben Soud was freed. SUMF ¶ 122.

22
23
24 *D. Defendants profit from the CIA program*

25 Defendants earned millions of dollars for their lead roles in devising,
26 testing, implementing, and advocating for the interrogation program. SUMF ¶¶

1 124–29. In addition to their personal contracts for “research and development”
2 and “operational services,” they formed a company that acquired a sole source
3 contract for the program, which included interrogation, training, evaluation of
4 methods, and development of new methods. SUMF ¶ 125, 129. When Secretary
5 of State Condoleezza Rice requested a personal briefing on the CIA program
6 from its “original architects” in 2007, it was Defendants who met with her and
7 tried to allay her concerns with some of their methods. SUMF ¶ 127. Defendants
8 continued to refine the program, eventually concluding that several methods they
9 had called for were “completely unnecessary,” while claiming others were
10 essential to the program’s effectiveness. SUMF ¶ 126. Defendants continued to
11 profit from the interrogation program until 2009, when the CIA’s secret prisons
12 were shuttered. SUMF ¶ 131.

15 ARGUMENT

16
17 The standard for summary judgment is well known to the Court. “The
18 moving party is entitled to summary judgment when, viewing the evidence and
19 the inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
20 party, there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute.” *Travelers Cas. &*
21 *Sur. Co. v. Washington Tr. Bank*, 86 F. Supp. 3d 1148, 1152 (E.D. Wash. 2015).
22 Once the moving party has made such a showing, the opposing party must do
23 more than identify the “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” in support of its
24 position, *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986), or “show
25 there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” *Travelers Cas.*, 86 F.
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1 Supp. 3d at 1152. “Rather, the opposing party must come forward with specific
2 facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” *Id.*

3
4 Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment because there is no genuine
5 dispute of material fact that Defendants aided and abetted the CIA’s torture
6 program, to which Plaintiffs were subjected, by designing, testing, implementing,
7 advocating for it, and profiting from it.

8
9 **I. There is no genuine dispute of material fact that Defendants aided and
10 abetted Plaintiffs’ torture and CIDT.**

11 Defendants’ crucial role in developing, refining, and supporting the CIA’s
12 systematic abuse of prisoners is indisputable, as is the profit they made over years
13 from promoting and assisting the abuse. These undisputed facts establish their
14 liability.

15 The Ninth Circuit makes clear that “[c]ustomary international law . . .
16 provides the legal standard for aiding and abetting ATS claims.” *Doe I v. Nestle*
17 *USA, Inc.*, 766 F.3d 1013, 1023 (9th Cir. 2014). The Circuit’s decision in *Nestle*
18 surveys the sources of customary international law, and finds “widespread
19 substantive agreement” that the action element for aiding and abetting claims “is
20 established by assistance that has a substantial effect on the crimes.” *Id.* at 1026–
21 27 (quoting *Prosecutor v. Taylor*, Case No. SCSL-03-01-A, ¶ 475 (SCSL Sept.
22 26, 2013)). Substantial assistance does not require that an aider and abettor
23 actually carry out the violation, or even be a but-for cause of it. Rather, a
24 defendant “may be found liable even if the crimes could have been carried out
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1 through different means or with the assistance of another.” *In re S. African*
2 *Apartheid Litig.*, 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 257–58 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); *see also*
3 *Prosecutor v. Karadzic*, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Judgment (Mar. 24, 2016).

4
5 Thus, the required “substantial effect” is established where the violation
6 “most probably would not have occurred in the same way [without] someone
7 act[ing] in the role that the [aider and abettor] in fact assumed.” *Prosecutor v.*
8 *Tadic*, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion & Judgment, ¶ 688 (May 7, 1997); *see also*
9 *Prosecutor v. Furundžija*, Case No. IT-95-17/1/T, Judgment, ¶ 219 (Dec. 10,
10 1998) (defendant need not have exerted any control over the principal; that the
11 defendant’s actions served to “modify” the way in which the act was committed
12 suffices). “[P]rovision of the means by which a violation of the law is carried out
13 is sufficient to meet the *actus reus* requirement of aiding and abetting liability
14 under customary international law.” *S. African Apartheid*, 617 F. Supp. 2d at 259.

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16
17 With regard to intent, the Ninth Circuit has held that “the *mens rea*
18 required of an aiding and abetting claim under either a knowledge or purpose
19 standard” is satisfied if defendants “sought to accomplish their own goals” by
20 “purposefully supporting” violations of international law. *Nestle*, 766 F.3d at
21 1024–1026. In making this determination, it is relevant if a defendant “obtained a
22 direct benefit from the commission of the violation of international law.” *Id.* at
23 1024. Specific intent is not required. *See Doe I v. Cisco Sys., Inc.*, 66 F. Supp. 3d
24 1239, 1248 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (applying “standard identified by the Ninth Circuit
25 in *Nestle*, which does not require the allegation of specific intent for *mens rea*”).
26

1 An aider and abettor need not share the goals of the primary violator to be
2 held liable. As the Ninth Circuit made clear, a defendant corporation could be
3 liable for aiding and abetting child slavery even where the corporation's only
4 "motive was finding cheap sources of cocoa." *Nestle*, 766 F.3d at 1025.
5 Similarly, a company selling equipment that enabled the apparatus of apartheid
6 need not have shared the regime's racial animus or goals to be liable for aiding
7 and abetting its crimes. *See S. African Apartheid*, 617 F. Supp. 2d at 262. Finally,
8 any belief by an aider and abettor that the criminal conduct he abets is officially
9 authorized does not negate *mens rea*. Indeed, official authorization is an *element*
10 of the offense: "[t]he norm of customary international law prohibiting official
11 torture" specifically bars actions "perpetrated under color of official authority."
12 *Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina*, 965 F.2d 699, 716 (9th Cir. 1992).

13 Here, there is no genuine dispute of fact that Defendants meet the *actus*
14 *reus* requirements for aiding and abetting liability. Defendants provided the
15 "means" by which the systematic abuse of CIA prisoners was carried out. *S.*
16 *African Apartheid*, 617 F. Supp. 2d at 259. They indisputably advocated for,
17 tested, developed, and refined the program, and provided guidance and support
18 for it. SUMF ¶¶ 11-29, 53-61, 124-41. Because Defendants directly participated
19 in and assisted Mr. Rahman's torture and CIDT, and because CIA records
20 confirm that Mr. Salim and Mr. Ben Soud were subjected to a systematic
21 program based directly on Defendants' design (and relying on the precise
22 methods they promoted and tested), SUMF ¶¶ 67-81, 91, 113 there can be no
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1 question but that Defendants’ “assistance” had a “substantial effect” on the ways
2 in which Plaintiffs were abused. *Nestle*, 766 F.3d at 1026.
3

4 It does not matter that Defendants did not personally torture all three
5 Plaintiffs or even know who they were—aider and abettor liability does not
6 require any such direct action. *See, e.g., Doe v. Drummond Co.*, No. 2:09-CV-
7 01041-RDP, 2010 WL 9450019, at *11 n.24 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 30, 2010) (finding
8 “no authority” for argument that an aider and abettor in an ATS action “must
9 have known of specific identities” of victims and sought to harm “those specific
10 individuals”). Defendants’ arrangement was that they “designed a program for
11 the CIA to get prisoners to talk, but the CIA would decide which prisoners to
12 apply it to.” SUMF ¶ 57. This arrangement constitutes aiding and abetting.
13

14 There is no genuine dispute of fact that Defendants possessed the culpable
15 *mens rea* for aiding and abetting violations of customary international law.
16 Certainly, they “sought to accomplish their own goals by supporting violations of
17 international law” and “obtained a direct benefit from the commission of the
18 violation of international law.” *Nestle*, 766 F.3d at 1024. Defendants
19 unquestionably intended to provide assistance in the extreme abuse of prisoners;
20 indeed, they described instilling “fear and despair” in prisoners as the primary
21 purpose of the methods they recommended. SUMF ¶ 20. And Defendant Jessen
22 admitted that their methods were based on training that reflected “what we
23 thought our enemy might do if they weren’t adhering to the Geneva
24 Conventions,” which bar torture and CIDT. SUMF ¶ 23; Convention Against
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1 Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, S.
2 Exec. Rep. 101–30, at 15 (1990) (“[T]he Geneva Conventions, to which the
3 United States and virtually all other countries are Parties, . . . generally reflect
4 customary international law.”).

5
6 Nor can Defendants claim ignorance of the severe pain and suffering that
7 prisoners could endure in the program. Defendants assisted and encouraged the
8 expansion of their program to additional prisoners even after they observed
9 firsthand that the use of their methods caused Abu Zubaydah to vomit, cry, beg,
10 plead, shake, tremble, whimper, moan, desperately pray, and become so
11 hysterical and distressed he could not communicate. SUMF ¶¶ 29–45.

12 Defendants called this outcome a success, supporting the use of their methods
13 even on apparently cooperative prisoners, simply to establish a “high degree of
14 confidence” that a prisoner “wouldn’t hold back.” SUMF ¶¶ 50–54. And, brutal
15 as their program was when Defendants personally inflicted it on prisoners,
16 Defendants were also keenly aware of “abusive drift”: they knew once coercion
17 was employed, interrogators would tend to exceed approved limits, resulting in
18 even more severe abuse of prisoners. SUMF ¶ 56. It cannot be disputed that
19 Defendants’ actions purposefully supported violations of international law.
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22 Defendants indisputably “obtained a direct benefit” from the systematic
23 abuse they assisted. *Nestle*, 766 F.3d at 1024. They were personally paid millions
24 of dollars as independent contractors for “research and development as well as
25 operational services” in support of the interrogation program. SUMF ¶129. By
26

1 2005, Defendants formed Mitchell, Jessen and Associates, which acquired a “sole
2 source contract to support CTC’s rendition, detention, and interrogation
3 program.” SUMF ¶ 125. The contract included everything from Defendants’
4 “professional services,” and a commitment to “continue developing and refining
5 the program” to program evaluation, “training services,” and even the provision
6 of security. *Id.* Although the CIA later acknowledged the “conflict of interest,”
7 created when “the contractors who helped design and employ the enhanced
8 interrogation techniques were also involved in assessing the fitness of detainees
9 to be subjected to such techniques and the effectiveness of those same
10 techniques,” Mitchell, Jessen, and Associates profited to the tune of \$81 million
11 in taxpayer money before their contract was terminated. SUMF ¶¶ 130–31.

12 In sum, Defendants substantially assisted the abuse of CIA prisoners and
13 profited enormously from doing so. There is no genuine dispute of fact that
14 Defendants aided and abetted the use of their abusive methods on CIA prisoners,
15 including Plaintiffs.

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19 **II. There is no genuine dispute of material fact that Plaintiffs were**
20 **subjected to torture and CIDT.**

21 That the prolonged and methodical abuse of Plaintiffs constituted torture and
22 CIDT is also undisputable. Under Ninth Circuit law, torture under the ATS is
23 defined in accordance with Article 1.1 of the Convention Against Torture or
24 Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment (“CAT”). *See Hilao v. Estate of*
25 *Marcos*, 103 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1996) (approving jury instructions using
26

1 CAT definition). The prohibition against torture extends to “any act by which
2 severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on
3 a person” for purposes including “obtaining from him or a third person
4 information.” CAT art. 1.1, Dec. 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984).

5
6 When evaluating claims of torture, U.S. courts examine the totality of
7 treatment, rather than artificially isolating individual abuses, to determine if it
8 collectively meets the “severe pain” threshold. *See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo*,
9 72 F.3d 844, 845 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding torture where a detainee was forced to
10 undress, had her arms and legs bound, and was subjected to physical assault and
11 threats); *Al-Saher v. INS*, 268 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 2001) (detainee’s
12 binding, blindfolding, and severe beating amounted to torture); *Surette v. Islamic*
13 *Republic of Iran*, 231 F. Supp. 2d 260, 264 (D.D.C. 2002) (torture established by
14 treatment including “cruel, inhumane conditions,” “constant and deliberate
15 demoralization,” “beating[s],” and denial of medical treatment). Likewise,
16 international criminal tribunals assess torture claims by viewing abuses
17 comprehensively. *See, e.g., Aydin v. Turkey*, No. 23178/94, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep.
18 251, ¶ 86 (1997) (examining “the accumulation of acts of physical and mental
19 violence inflicted on the applicant”). The International Criminal Tribunal for the
20 former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the decisions of which are cited by the Ninth Circuit
21 and other courts in ATS cases as evidence of customary international law, has
22 explained:
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26 [T]o the extent that an individual has been mistreated over a prolonged
period of time, or that he or she has been subjected to repeated or various

1 forms of mistreatment, the severity of the acts should be assessed as a
2 whole to the extent that it can be shown that this lasting period or the
3 repetition of acts are inter-related, [or] follow a pattern[.]

4 *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*, Case No. IT-97-25-T, Judgment, ¶ 182 (Mar. 15 2002).

5 It is indisputable that the CIA intentionally subjected Plaintiffs to severe
6 pain and suffering for the purpose of extracting information or admissions, thus
7 constituting torture. *See Prosecutor v. Akayesu*, Case No. ICTR-96-4-A,
8 Judgment, ¶ 523 (Sept. 2, 1998) (intent to inflict torture may be inferred from the
9 facts and circumstances of the abuse); SUMF ¶¶ 67-121; (describing CIA
10 treatment of Plaintiffs); *Aksoy v. Turkey*, No. 21987/93, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R.
11 2260, ¶ 64 (finding torture when “treatment” of prisoner—hung naked by his
12 arms—“could only have been deliberately inflicted” and was “administered with
13 the aim of obtaining admissions or information”).

15 For its part, “CIDT is the intentional infliction of mental or physical
16 suffering, anguish, humiliation, fear, or debasement against a person in the
17 offender’s custody or control that nevertheless falls short of torture. *S. African*
18 *Apartheid*, 617 F. Supp. 2d at 253 (same). “The difference between torture and
19 cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment derives principally from a
20 difference in the intensity of the suffering inflicted.” *Id.* (quoting Restatement
21 (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 702).

23 ATS claims for CIDT turn on whether the conduct is “universally
24 condemned as cruel, inhuman, or degrading.” *See Bowoto v. Chevron Corp.*, 557
25 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1094 (N.D. Cal. 2008), *aff’d*, 621 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2010).
26

1 International courts have emphasized that “in considering whether a punishment
2 or treatment is ‘degrading’ . . . the Court will have regard to whether its object is
3 to humiliate and debase.” *See, e.g., Raninen v. Finland*, No. 20972/92, 26 Eur.
4 H.R. Rep. 563, ¶ 55 (1997); *Keenan v. United Kingdom*, No. 27229/95, 2001-V
5 Eur. Ct. H.R. 242, ¶ 110. The CIDT prohibition thus turns on whether the
6 treatment “arouse[s] feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of
7 humiliating or debasing the victim and possibly breaking their physical or moral
8 resistance.” *Id.*; *see also Van der Ven v. Netherlands*, No. 50901/99, 38 Eur. Ct.
9 H.R. 46, ¶ 48 (2003) (same). Like claims of torture, courts determine whether
10 conduct constitutes CIDT by assessing mistreatment in its totality, not individual
11 abuses in isolation. *See, e.g., Bowoto*, 557 F. Supp. 2d at 1092–1095 (multiple
12 abuses collectively constituted CIDT).

13
14
15 There can be no genuine issue of material fact here: Defendants’ methods,
16 even when viewed in isolation, constituted torture, and the CIA inflicted those
17 methods on Plaintiffs. For example, forced sleep deprivation for purposes of
18 interrogation has long been found to constitute torture. In *Ashcraft v. Tennessee*,
19 322 U.S. 143, 154 n.6 (1944), the Supreme Court quoted a report finding that
20 “deprivation of sleep is the most effective torture and certain to produce any
21 confession desired.” International courts are in accord. *See, e.g., HCJ 5100/94*
22 *Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Israel*, 53(4) PD 817 ¶¶ 14, 23, 31
23 (1999) (deliberate sleep deprivation violates either international prohibition on
24 torture or CIDT). Similarly, the U.S. State Department’s 2004 Human Rights
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1 Reports criticized sleep deprivation as a method of torture. *See* Country Reports
2 on Human Rights Practices: Tunisia (2004) (“The forms of torture included: . . .
3 sleep deprivation.”). And the then-applicable Army Field Manual classifies
4 “abnormal sleep deprivation” as torture. U.S. Dep’t of Army, Field Manual 34-
5 52, Intelligence Interrogation (Sept. 28, 1992) (“Army Field Manual 34-52”).
6 Defendants’ method for inducing sleep deprivation was particularly brutal, as it
7 called for shackling Plaintiffs in diapers and forcing them to stand for days with
8 their arms chained overhead. SUMF ¶¶ 74, 95, 109, 116.

9
10
11 The U.S. judicial and executive branches have also recognized that stress
12 positions can constitute torture. For example, in *Simpson v. Socialist People's*
13 *Libyan Arab Jamahiriya*, the D.C. Circuit explained that torture includes “tying
14 up or hanging in positions that cause extreme pain.” 326 F.3d 230, 234 (D.C. Cir.
15 2003) (quotation marks omitted). The State Department has consistently
16 recognized stress positions as a form of torture. *See, e.g.*, Country Reports on
17 Human Rights Practices: Iran (2004) (citing “long confinement in contorted
18 positions” as a common method of torture and severe prison abuse), Country
19 Reports on Human Rights Practices: North Korea (2004) (torture methods
20 included “being forced to kneel or sit immobilized for long periods; being hung
21 by one's wrists”). The Army Field Manual defines torture as including “forcing
22 an individual to stand, sit, or kneel in abnormal positions for prolonged periods of
23 time.” Army Field Manual 34-52. Plaintiffs indisputably suffered excruciating
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1 pain when they were chained in contorted, unnatural positions for days at a time.
2
3 SUMF ¶¶ 87, 94–95, 109, 115–16.

4 The State Department has also repeatedly condemned as torture and CIDT
5 the humiliation of victims through forced nudity. *See, e.g.*, Country Reports on
6 Human Rights Practices: Syria (2004) (“being stripped naked in front of others”
7 was an example of “various forms of torture and ill-treatment.”), Country Reports
8 on Human Rights Practices: North Korea (2004) (same). Defendants themselves
9 eventually came to the conclusion that nudity should not be used to degrade
10 prisoners. SUMF ¶ 126. But it was too late for Plaintiffs, who suffered anguish at
11 the deliberate debasement Defendants had urged. SUMF ¶¶ 73, 89, 111.

13 In short, even taken individually, Defendants’ methods constituted torture.
14 But because the program that Defendants aided and abetted called for their
15 methods to be used repeatedly and in combination for weeks at a time, there can
16 be no question that they met the threshold for severe pain and suffering. The
17 United Nations Committee Against Torture, which monitors the implementation
18 of the CAT, has found that “(1) restraining in very painful conditions, (2)
19 hooding under special conditions, (3) sounding of loud music for prolonged
20 periods, (4) sleep deprivation for prolonged periods, (5) threats, including death
21 threats, (6) violent shaking, and (7) using cold air to chill” constitute torture. Rep.
22 of Comm. Against Torture, 52d Sess., ¶ 257 U.N. Doc. A/52/44 (Sept. 10 1997).
23 The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture explained: “Each of these measures on
24 its own may not provoke severe pain or suffering. Together—and they are
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1 frequently used in combination—they may be expected to induce precisely such
2 pain or suffering, especially if applied on a protracted basis of, say, several
3 hours.” Special Rapporteur on Torture, Rep. to the U.N. Commission on Human
4 Rights, ¶ 119, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/7 (Jan. 10, 1997).

5
6 The brutality of the CIA program cannot be seriously disputed, based as it
7 was on the use of many abuses in combination over a prolonged period.
8 Combinations of methods were applied to CIA prisoners not “on a protracted
9 basis of, say, several hours,” *cf. id.*, but for *weeks* at a time to instill fear and
10 despair, SUMF ¶¶ 29, 90, 120. The goal was not to force a quick disclosure of
11 some scrap of vital intelligence from prisoners, but to terrorize a prisoner so
12 completely that he would remain obedient indefinitely—after which interrogators
13 would “drain him dry” of intelligence over months or years. SUMF ¶ 47. When a
14 prisoner’s “distress level increased the moment [interrogators] entered the cell,”
15 this was taken as “a sign that the conditioning strategy was working.” SUMF ¶
16 33. Further abuse loomed as a threat for as long as a prisoner was in the CIA’s
17 hands: even after Abu Zubaydah was assessed to have been reduced to the
18 desired state of “complete subjugation,” Defendants committed to “stand by to
19 ‘tune him up’ as required.” SUMF ¶¶ 46–47.

20
21 Plaintiffs were tortured. They experienced severe mental and physical pain
22 and suffering as a result of being subjected to the program’s combined methods,
23 over and over, for weeks. Plaintiff Salim’s terror and suffering were so severe
24 that he attempted to end his life rather than continue to endure the program.
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1 SUMF ¶¶ 90–101. Plaintiff Ben Soud experienced hallucinations, became
2 hysterical, suffered excruciating pain, and experienced constant fear and
3 complete hopelessness. SUMF ¶¶ 108–121. And Plaintiff Rahman endured
4 “environmental deprivations” until he died of hypothermia. SUMF ¶¶ 70–82.
5

6 Even if the Court were somehow to find that all the abuses that Plaintiffs
7 endured, taken together, did not rise to the level of torture, their combined use
8 nonetheless violated the prohibition on cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.
9 This standard has been met in U.S. cases by conduct including beating plaintiffs,
10 holding them in inhuman conditions, and subjecting them to stress positions. *See*
11 *Bowoto v. Chevron Corp.*, 557 F. Supp. 2d at 1092–1095; *see also Jama v. INS*,
12 22 F. Supp. 2d 353, 358 (D.N.J. 1998) (CIDT where detainees were forced to
13 sleep under bright lights 24 hours a day and live in filth and constant smell of
14 human waste, packed in rooms with twenty to forty detainees, beaten, deprived
15 of privacy, subjected to degradation and sexual abuse).
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18 And as the Ninth Circuit has recognized, international courts have for
19 decades concluded that the combined use of “stress positions, hooding,
20 subjection to noise, sleep deprivation and deprivation of food and drink
21 ‘undoubtedly amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment’ in violation of
22 Article 3 [of the Geneva Conventions].” *Padilla v. Yoo*, 678 F.3d 748, 765 (9th
23 Cir. 2012) (quoting *Ireland v. United Kingdom*, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
24 (1978)). The Ninth Circuit has also cited *Public Committee Against Torture in*
25 *Israel*, which similarly found that “hooding, violent shaking, painful stress
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1 positions, exposure to loud music and sleep deprivation” *were each illegal*,
2 violating either the prohibition against torture or against CIDT. *Id.* Likewise, in
3 1988, the U.N. specifically condemned as CIDT conditions that were later made
4 integral to the CIA program: “the holding of a detained or imprisoned person in
5 conditions which deprive him, temporarily or permanently, of the use of any of
6 his natural senses, such as sight or hearing, or of his awareness of place and the
7 passing of time.” G.A. Res 43/173, annex, at 6 n.1 (Dec. 9, 1988).
8
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10 The CIA program was even more cruel and degrading than these cases,
11 incorporating many of the methods above as well as repeated physical assault,
12 cramped confinement, and water torture, and incorporating deliberate
13 humiliation as a key element. There is no genuine issue of material fact that
14 Defendants designed their program specifically to produce results that violate
15 the CIDT prohibition—that is, to “arouse feelings of fear, anguish and
16 inferiority capable of humiliating or debasing the victim and possibly breaking
17 their physical or moral resistance.” *Keenan v. United Kingdom*, No. 27229/95,
18 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 242, ¶ 110. Prisoners subjected to the CIA program,
19 including Plaintiffs, were undisputedly stripped, clad in diapers, and shackled to
20 the ceiling for days at a time. Eventually, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
21 expressed concern that Defendants’ method of sleep deprivation was similar to
22 the torture and humiliation at Abu Ghraib. SUMF ¶ 127. It cannot be genuinely
23 disputed that the abuse Plaintiffs suffered at COBALT constituted CIDT, or, as
24 set forth above, that Defendants aided and abetted this conduct.
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The record establishes that Plaintiffs were subjected to methodical abuse intended to reduce them to a state of utter subjugation. The goal was to reduce human beings to mere shells: fearful, submissive, and desperate to avoid further suffering. Plaintiffs were bombarded with noise, stripped of their clothing, forced to stand for days wearing a diaper with their hands chained overhead. They were hurled into walls, over and over, while being physically assaulted with hard slaps to their face and stomach. They were deprived of sleep and any way of telling time, doused with icy water, and stuffed into coffin-like boxes. They were systematically brutalized, terrified, and deprived of any shred of control, predictability, or dignity. The prolonged, uncontrollable, and pervasive abuse they endured caused Plaintiffs severe mental and physical pain and suffering, and constituted torture. It also debased and humiliated them, violating the prohibition against CIDT. This treatment was of Defendants' design. Their aiding and abetting liability is not a matter of genuine dispute.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment should be granted.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on May 22, 2017, I caused to be electronically filed and served the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to the following:

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