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*Central Intelligence Agency
Inspector General*

SPECIAL REVIEW



(TS//

COUNTERTERRORISM DETENTION AND
INTERROGATION ACTIVITIES
(SEPTEMBER 2001 – OCTOBER 2003)
(2003-7123-IG)

7 May 2004

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threatened Abu Zubaydah by stating, "If one child dies in America, and I find out you knew something about it, I will personally cut your mother's throat."⁴² OIG found 11 interrogation videotapes to be blank. Two others were blank except for one or two minutes of recording. Two others were broken and could not be reviewed. OIG compared the videotapes to [redacted] logs and cables and identified a 21-hour period of time, which included two waterboard sessions, that was not captured on the videotapes.

79. (TS/ [redacted]) OIG's review of the videotapes revealed that the waterboard technique employed at [redacted] was different from the technique as described in the DoJ opinion and used in the SERE training. The difference was in the manner in which the detainee's breathing was obstructed. At the SERE School and in the DoJ opinion, the subject's airflow is disrupted by the firm application of a damp cloth over the air passages; the interrogator applies a small amount of water to the cloth in a controlled manner. By contrast, the Agency interrogator [redacted] continuously applied large volumes of water to a cloth that covered the detainee's mouth and nose. One of the psychologists/interrogators acknowledged that the Agency's use of the technique differed from that used in SERE training and explained that the Agency's technique is different because it is "for real" and is more poignant and convincing.

80. (TS/ [redacted]) From December 2002 until [redacted] September 2003, [redacted] was used to detain and interrogate eight individuals.

[redacted] During this time, Headquarters issued the formal DCI Confinement Guidelines, the DCI Interrogation Guidelines, and the additional draft guidelines specifically

⁴² (U//FOUO) See discussion in paragraphs 92-93 regarding threats.

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208. (TS/) disagreed in its 23 December
2002 response:

Base recommends against resuming enhanced measures with Subj[ect] unless there are specific pieces of information he has provided that we are certain/certain are lies or omissions; or there is equally reliable additional information from other sources which implicates subj[ect] in a heretofore unknown plot to attack U.S. or allied interests. If such is the case, Base would eagerly support returning to all enhanced measures; indeed, we would be the first to request them. Without tangible proof of lying or intentional withholding, however, we believe employing enhanced measures will accomplish nothing except show subj[ect] that he will be punished whether he cooperates or not, thus eroding any remaining desire to continue cooperating. . . .

Bottom line is we think subj[ect] is being cooperative, and if subjected to indiscriminate and prolonged enhanced measures, there is a good chance he will either fold up and cease cooperating, or suffer the sort of permanent mental harm prohibited by the statute. Therefore, a decision to resume enhanced measures must be grounded in fact and not general feelings that subj[ect] is not being forthcoming

It was after this interchange that Headquarters sent a new debriefer, whose unauthorized actions are discussed in paragraphs 90 through 93, to Subsequently, after further deliberation and renewed medical and psychological assessment, EITs, not including the waterboard, were authorized for a brief period.

209. (TS/) The shortage of accurate and verifiable information available to the field to assess a detainee's compliance is evidenced in the final waterboard session of Abu Zubaydah. According to a senior CTC officer, the interrogation team at considered Abu Zubaydah to be compliant and wanted to terminate EITs. CTC/UBL believed Abu Zubaydah continued to withhold information,

at the time it

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generated substantial pressure from Headquarters to continue use of the EITs. According to this senior officer, the decision to resume use of the waterboard on Abu Zubaydah was made by senior officers of the DO. A team of senior CTC officers traveled from Headquarters to [REDACTED] to assess Abu Zubaydah's compliance and witnessed the final waterboard session, after which, they reported back to Headquarters that the EITs were no longer needed on Abu Zubaydah.

210. (TS/ [REDACTED] told OIG that "risk" for CTC/UBL is very different from the "risk" perceived by CTC/RDG and the interrogators. Specifically, for CTC/UBL, risk is associated with not obtaining the actionable information needed to prevent "the next big attack," hence analysts are reluctant to agree that a detainee is not employing resistance techniques. On the other hand, risk for CTC/RDG is associated with the continued use of EITs, which could possibly lead, directly or indirectly, to a detainee's death or cause him permanent harm.

EFFECTIVENESS

211. (TS/ [REDACTED] The detention of terrorists has prevented them from engaging in further terrorist activity, and their interrogation has provided intelligence that has enabled the identification and apprehension of other terrorists, warned of terrorists plots planned for the United States and around the world, and supported articles frequently used in the finished intelligence publications for senior policymakers and war fighters. In this regard, there is no doubt that the Program has been effective. Measuring the effectiveness of EITs, however, is a more subjective process and not without some concern.

212. (TS/ [REDACTED] When the Agency began capturing terrorists, management judged the success of the effort to be getting them off the streets, [REDACTED]