

EXHIBIT 2

Vaughn Index Entry No. 1

C06114243

Approved for Release: 2019/05/29 C06114243

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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December 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

FROM:

Chief, Counterintelligence Evaluation Branch
Counterespionage Group
Counterintelligence Center

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Subject: Rahman Death Investigation - Interview of

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1. On November 2002, OGC, and I interviewed regarding the death of Gul Rahman. is an Operations Officer and is responsible for coordinating the debriefing activities of Station personnel guard force facility known to Station personnel as

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2.

[Redacted]

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The prisoners are fed once a day. Although the prisoners only receive one meal, it is a large meal. The food is brought to the prisoners by the guards. stated that the guards do not talk to the prisoners. Although the guards respond to tasking, nothing prevents them from acting independently toward the prisoners. If the guards noticed that a prisoner was cold, nothing prevented them from giving him a blanket.

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3. [redacted] stated that Gul Rahman was brought to [redacted] circa [redacted] November 2002. Rahman was a Pashtun member of Hizbi Islami. [redacted] guards did not know the identity of Rahman, but they did know that Rahman and other prisoners confined to [redacted] were very bad people.

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A few days

after his arrival at [redacted] Rahman told the guards that he had seen their faces and would find and kill them after his release. On the afternoon of the [redacted] November, Rahman threw his food and water at the guards and was screaming at them. [redacted] stated that the prisoners are fed one large meal each day. Since Rahman threw his food on the [redacted] November, his previous meal would have been on [redacted] November. Rahman was the only prisoner who had given the guards any trouble.

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4. [redacted] first learned of Rahman's death at mid-morning on [redacted] November 2002. According to [redacted] Doc informed him that Rahman had died. [redacted] could not recall specifically what Doc told him. [redacted] stated that he immediately informed COS of Rahman's death. [redacted] stated that he traveled to [redacted] approximately four hours after Rahman was

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discovered. [redacted] said he questioned the guards about what happened and cabled Headquarters with his findings. [redacted] stated that according to the guards, they made their routine rounds to check on the prisoners at 0400 and 0800. [redacted]

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The guards stated that during [redacted] these checks, Rahman was seated upright and his neck was straight.

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[redacted] stated that at 1000, [redacted] guards made the rounds again and found Rahman dead. At the time of the discovery, several of our officers were

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present at [redacted]

They were [redacted]

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approached by the guards who said that one of the prisoners was on the floor.

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After the body was discovered, [redacted] called [redacted]. No photographs were taken of the body prior to its removal from [redacted].

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5. [redacted] stated that when Rahman was found, his hands and feet were shackled together and he was wearing a sweatshirt with no bottoms. [redacted] stated that sometimes the bottoms were taken from uncooperative prisoners because it was an embarrassment to Muslims. [redacted] stated that he was laying on his right side. [redacted] stated that he had a number of scratches on his body and face, as well as an abrasion on his shoulder. [redacted] stated that these minor injuries occurred [redacted] before his death.

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6. [redacted] stated that there were no unusual smells in the cell when he arrived and did not hear anyone discuss any unusual smells. [redacted] stated that the cell smelled of urine.

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[redacted] stated that he did find it unusual that when Rahman was discovered, the guard Commander was not present at the facility. He was told that the

Commander was at [redacted].

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7. [redacted] stated that in the days preceding Rahman's death, the temperature was [redacted] cold in [redacted].

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[Redacted]

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It was between 32-34 degrees. [Redacted] added that there is no insulation in the building and no thermometers.

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8. The evening of Rahman's death, [Redacted] brought a freezer where Rahman could be stored until a determination was made regarding what to do with him.

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9. [Redacted] was asked to show us the cell Rahman was housed in.

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[Redacted] stated that the cell had been "redecorated" since Rahman was removed and now has carpeting on the floor and some furniture.

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[Redacted] stated that they were trying to turn it into a cell so they could show prisoners what life could be like if they cooperated.

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10. [Redacted] was asked if the guards could hear the prisoners began yelling from their cell. [Redacted] stated that given the music that was playing and the separation of the prison into two parts; one where the prisoners were kept and the other where prisoners were interrogated and guards congregated, it was unlikely that the guards would be able to hear them. Even if they did hear them, [Redacted] wasn't sure the guards would respond.

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11. [Redacted] was asked to draw a diagram of [Redacted] which he provided the next day.

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Vaughn Index Entry No. 2

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*Central Intelligence Agency
Inspector General*

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION



**(S//NF) DEATH OF A DETAINEE IN
(2003-7402-IG)**

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

27 April 2005

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

*John L. Helgerson
Inspector General*

[Redacted]
**Acting Assistant Inspector General
for Investigations**

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6) [Redacted] **Supervisory
Special Agent**

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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS

NOFORN-	Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
PROPIN-	Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
ORCON-	Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator
REL...-	This Information has been Authorized for Release to...

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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APPENDIX
Chronology of Significant Events

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EXHIBIT

[redacted] 30211, Subject: [redacted] - Gul Rahman:
Chronology of Events

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

~~(S//NF)~~ **DEATH OF A DETAINEE IN
(2003-7402-IG)**

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

27 April 2005

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

INTRODUCTION

1. ~~(S//NF)~~ On [redacted] November 2002, an individual detained by the CIA in [redacted] Gul Rahman, died. On [redacted] November, the Deputy Director for Operations (DDO) informed the Deputy Inspector General that the DDO had dispatched a team to investigate the death. In January 2003, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) initiated an investigation. This report reviews the events leading to Rahman's death.

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SUMMARY (b)(1)
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2. ~~(S//NF)~~ Rahman, a suspected Afghan extremist associated with the Hezbi Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) organization, who was approximately 34 years old, was captured in Pakistan [redacted]

[redacted] on [redacted] October 2002.¹

On [redacted] November 2002, [redacted] aircraft rendered Rahman from [redacted]

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[redacted] to a detention and interrogation facility, [redacted] in [redacted] security guards reportedly found Rahman dead in his cell on the morning of [redacted] November 2002

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

3. (S//NF) Between [redacted] and [redacted] November 2002, Rahman

underwent at least six interrogation sessions by Agency personnel.

The interrogation team included the [redacted] Site Manager,

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[redacted] an independent contractor (IC) psychologist/interrogator, (C) Bruce Jessen; the Station's [redacted] and an IC [redacted] linguist, [redacted]

[redacted] had no interrogation experience or relevant training before his arrival in [redacted] in July 2002. However, he acquired some on-the-job training and experience during the four months he had been [redacted] prior to Rahman's death.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

4. (S//NF) Rahman was subjected to sleep deprivation

sessions of up to 48 hours, at least one cold shower, and a "hard takedown" termed "rough treatment" as reported in pre-death cables addressing the progress of the interrogation. In addition, Rahman reportedly was without clothing for much of his time at [redacted]

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

Despite these measures, Rahman remained uncooperative and provided no intelligence. His only concession was to acknowledge his identity on [redacted] November 2002 and, subsequently, to explain what village he came from; otherwise, Rahman retained his resistance posture, and demeanor. The cable from [redacted] on [redacted] November 2002

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

reporting that Rahman had admitted his identity stated, "Rahman spent the days since his last session with Station officers in cold conditions with minimal food and sleep." A psychological assessment of Rahman, prepared by Jessen and reported in a cable on [redacted] November 2002, noted Rahman's remarkable physical and psychological resilience and recommended, in part, "continued environmental deprivations."

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² (U//FOUO) Not all members of the interrogation team were involved in every interrogation session.

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5. (S//NF) On the afternoon of [redacted] November 2002, when [redacted] guards delivered food to Rahman, he reportedly threw his food, water bottle, and defecation bucket at the guards. In addition, he reportedly threatened the guards and told them he had seen their faces and would kill them upon his release. When [redacted] was informed of this incident, he approved or directed the guards to shackle Rahman's hands and feet and connect the shackles with a short chain. This position forced Rahman, who was naked below the waist, to sit on a cold concrete floor and prevented him from standing up.

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6. (S//NF) The following morning, the guards reported that Rahman was slumped over in his cell. The ambient temperature was recorded at a low of [redacted] degrees Fahrenheit. Rahman was still in the "short chain position," wearing only a sweatshirt.

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7. (S//NF) [redacted] Station reported Rahman's death that day in an [redacted] cable to the DDO. The DDO dispatched an investigative team [the Directorate of Operations (DO) Investigative Team] consisting of a senior security officer assigned to the [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct an Office of General Counsel (OGC) (b)(3) CIAAct attorney, and an Agency pathologist to [redacted]. The DO Investigative Team conducted interviews, and the pathologist performed an autopsy of Rahman. The autopsy indicated, by a diagnosis of exclusion, that the death was caused by hypothermia.³

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8. (S//NF) On 22 January 2003, the General Counsel informed the Inspector General (IG) that Rahman died as a result of the conditions at a facility substantially controlled by Agency officers. OIG initiated an investigation into the circumstances surrounding this incident and reported the death to the Department of Justice

³ (U) Hypothermia is subnormal temperature within the central body. The term hypothermia is used when an individual's body temperature is below 95 degrees Fahrenheit. This will occur when the loss of body heat exceeds heat production.

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(DoJ) by letter on 13 February 2003.⁴ On 29 December 2003, the Chief of the Counterterrorism Section, DoJ reported by memorandum that DoJ would not pursue a federal prosecution of criminal charges regarding Rahman's death. The matter is under review by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia.

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9. (S//NF) At the time of his assignment in [redacted] was a first-tour [redacted] operations officer who had no training or experience to prepare him to manage a detention facility or conduct interrogations. At the time of Rahman's death, [redacted] had not received interrogation training and was operating the facility with a modicum of Headquarters guidance and [redacted] Station direct supervision.

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10. (S//NF) This OIG investigation concludes that [redacted] treated Rahman harshly because of his alleged stature, lack of cooperation, pressure to break Rahman, and [redacted] inexperience with a committed interrogation resister. [redacted] approved or ordered placing Rahman in the short chain position while naked below the waist in near freezing confinement conditions and this directly led to Rahman's death by hypothermia. [redacted] exhibited reckless indifference to the possibility that his actions might cause injuries or result in Rahman's death.

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11. (S//NF) OIG found that Rahman did not receive a physical examination during his detention at [redacted] and concludes that the Station's Physician's Assistant (PA) [redacted] did not attend to Rahman in the same manner and with the same

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⁴ (S//NF) This referral is a requirement of Title 50 United States Code (U.S.C.), § 403q(b)(5) that mandates OIG to report information concerning possible violations of federal criminal law to DoJ. The General Counsel had orally advised the Chief of the Criminal Division, DoJ, of the circumstances of Rahman's death on 24 January 2003.

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

standard of care as the other detainees.⁵ Further [redacted] as a medical care provider, was aware of the increasingly cold conditions in [redacted] during the period of time he and Rahman were both in [redacted] November 2002) and did not advocate more humane treatment for Rahman. (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

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12. ~~(S//NF)~~ OIG also concludes that [redacted] did not provide adequate supervision for [redacted] activities at [redacted]. Moreover, [redacted] bears direct responsibility for failing to include pertinent facts in his official written account of Rahman's death that led to material omissions and inaccuracies being provided to the Congressional oversight committees. (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

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BACKGROUND

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13. ~~(S//NF)~~ Soon after the establishment of [redacted] Station in early 2002, the Station took the initiative to begin conducting interrogations of detainees using Station linguists. [redacted]

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14. ~~(S//NF)~~ In April 2002, [redacted] Station proposed the construction of a [redacted] detention facility [redacted] to meet the Station's requirement for "secure, safe, and separated handling of terrorist detainees." In June 2002, Headquarters' Counterterrorist Center (CTC) [redacted] approved the funds to establish the [redacted] detention facility [redacted]. The [redacted]

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facility was an Agency operation [redacted]

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15. (S//NF) [redacted] received its first detainee on [redacted] September 2002. After the first month of operation, the [redacted] population had grown to its maximum capacity of 20 detainees.

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16. (S//NF) [redacted] was secured by [redacted] guards and supported by a small [redacted] cooking/cleaning cadre [redacted]. The guard force was divided with [redacted] guards working inside the facility, and the remainder securing the outside perimeter. [redacted]

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17. (S//NF) [redacted] had overall responsibility for the facility, and Agency staff officers and contractors traveled on temporary duty (TDY) [redacted] to conduct interrogations at the facility. [redacted]

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PROCEDURES AND RESOURCES

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18. (S//NF) Two OIG officers traveled to [redacted] inspected [redacted] and conducted interviews there as a part of the investigation. OIG reviewed the material collected during the Special Review, *Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program (2003-7123-IG)*, that is relevant to this investigation. Included within that material are policy documents, cables, and internal and external communications. OIG also drew material for this Report from [redacted] of the interview reports prepared during the Special Review. OIG reviewed all materials assembled for the DO Investigative Team and that team's final report, including a final autopsy report.

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

FINDINGS

~~(S//NF)~~ GUL RAHMAN'S CAPTURE, RENDITION AND DETENTION

(b)(3) NatSecAct

19. ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] Rahman was a suspected Afghan extremist from Lowgar Province, who was associated with the HIG organization.⁷ CTC identified him as a close associate of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Abu Abd Al-Rahman Al-Najdi, an alleged member of Al-Qa'ida.⁸ Rahman was an ethnic Pashtun who spoke Pashtu, Dari, and Farsi and was approximately 34 years old.

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21. ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] Rahman was apprehended in Islamabad, Pakistan, on [redacted] October 2002, during an early morning raid [redacted]

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⁷ ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] During an interrogation session after he admitted his true identity, Rahman said he was from Kolangar Village, Pol-E-Alam Region, Lowgar Province. Lowgar Province is immediately southwest of Kabul.

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[redacted]
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

22. (S/ [redacted] On [redacted] October 2002, [redacted] Station sent a

cable [redacted]

[redacted] advised that [redacted] during a

[redacted] interrogation session [redacted] had identified one of

his fellow detainees as Gul Rahman. [redacted] requested that the

[redacted] of the

apprehension. In a reflection of how important a detainee Rahman

was believed to be, Headquarters subsequently advised [redacted]

and [redacted] Stations that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld had

requested an update on t[redacted] case.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

23. (S/ [redacted]

[redacted] (b)(1)

[redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

On

[redacted] November 2002. Rahman was rendered to [redacted]

[redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] (b)(1)

[redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

24. (S/ [redacted] Following Rahman's rendition to [redacted]

[redacted] generated six cables regarding Rahman, including two cables

following his death. Only one of these cables, which reported the

chronology of Rahman's death, provided a characterization of

Rahman, describing him as an "enemy combatant."¹²

¹² (U//~~FOUO~~) The Department of Defense defines an "enemy combatant" as an individual who, under the laws and customs of war, may be detained for the duration of the conflict. (Letter from William J. Haynes II to Senator Carl Levin, 26 November 2002.)

8
~~SECRET~~ / [redacted] ~~NOFORN~~ // MR
(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~ / ~~NOFORN~~ / ~~MR~~

25. (S/

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

He was targeted because of his role in Al-Qa'ida. Rahman was considered an Al-Qa'ida operative because he assisted the group. Being both a HIG member and an Al-Qa'ida operative is not inconsistent. there is no formal definition of the term "operative." In Rahman's case, it would be similar to the term "facilitator." viewed a facilitator as somewhat less involved than an operative.

(S//NF) MANAGEMENT AND CONDITIONS AT

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

27. (S//NF) The detention facility consisted of 20 individual concrete structures used as cells.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Four of the cells had a metal bar above eye level that ran between two walls to which detainees could be secured by their hands in a standing sleep-deprivation position. The facility's windows were covered to

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

13 (S//NF) A replacement facility for was completed in 2004 and detainees were removed from

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct
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suppress outside light. Stereo speakers in the cellblock constantly played loud music to thwart any attempt to communicate between detainees.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

29. ~~(S//NF)~~ [] was not insulated and had no central air conditioning or heating; an Agency-purchased generator supported its power requirements. When [] received its first detainee in September 2002, by many accounts the temperature was hot and remained generally hot or warm until November 2002.¹⁵ Individual cells were designed with a recess for electrical space heaters; however, electrical heaters were not placed in the cells.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

30. ~~(S//NF)~~ [] estimated there were between six and 12 gas heaters in the cellblock at the time of Rahman's death. [] [] officer who participated in the DO Investigation Team, reported there were five gas heaters in the detainee area of the facility before Rahman's death.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

31. ~~(S//NF)~~ According to [] the customary practice at [] was to shave each detainee's head and beard and conduct a medical examination upon arrival. Detainees were then given uniforms and moved to a cell. Photographs were taken of each detainee for identification purposes. While in the cells, detainees were shackled to the wall. The guards fed the detainees on an alternating schedule of one meal on one day and two meals the next day. In anticipation of the cold weather, [] directed []

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

~~(S//NF)~~ According to [] the door had to be opened to deliver water bottles and access the excrement bucket.

¹⁵ (U) In November 2002, the temperature [] ranged from a high of [] to a low of [] degrees Fahrenheit.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

10
~~SECRET~~ / [] ~~NOFORN~~ // MR

(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~ / ~~NOFORN~~ // MR

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

assistant, [redacted] to acquire warmer uniforms, heaters, propane, and blankets. According to [redacted] he was successful in purchasing the uniforms, blankets and some heaters. It was difficult to purchase heaters because they were in high demand. If a detainee was cooperative, he was afforded improvements in his environment to include a mat, blankets, a Koran, a lamp, and additional food choices. Detainees who were not cooperative were subjected to austere conditions and aggressive interrogations until they became compliant.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

32. (S//NF) [redacted] for the U.S. Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to send a [redacted] training team to [redacted] from [redacted] to [redacted] November.¹⁶ This team worked with the interior guard force concentrating on techniques such as entry and escort procedures, application of restraints, security checks, pat down and cell searches, and documenting prescribed checks of detainees.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

33. (S//NF) [redacted]

[redacted] characterized [redacted] as "so many accidents waiting to happen." For example, there could be an attack from the outside, the detainees could hurt themselves, [redacted] COS [redacted] described [redacted] as a "high risk, high gain intelligence facility."¹⁷

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

[redacted] In an electronic message (e-mail) to the DDO two days after Rahman's death [redacted] wrote, in part,

On an employee impact note, I have made it clear to all hands involved that the responsibility is mine alone, nothing more need

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

¹⁷ (S//NF) [redacted] served [redacted] (b)(1) from August 2002 until July 2003.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

be said on that, and I am and have been coordinating with appropriate senior hqs levels since the inception of this program.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

35. (S//NF) [redacted] said he did not know what his duties would be when he arrived in [redacted]. He believed the primary factors in his assignment as [redacted] Site Manager were the vacancy in the detention program and that [redacted]

[redacted] had no formal instruction relating to interrogations until April 2003, [redacted] months into his [redacted] tour.²¹

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

36. (S//NF) In [redacted] assigned [redacted] responsibility for all detention-related functions [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

[redacted] was also responsible for renditions to and from other countries and detainee transfers. [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

²¹ (S//NF) [redacted] was not designated as a Certified Interrogator until he completed the two-week interrogation course and 40 hours of supervised interrogations with an experienced interrogator. [redacted] certification was awarded on [redacted] April 2003.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

12
~~SECRET~~ / ~~NOFORN~~ // MR
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

[Redacted]

37. (S//NF) [Redacted] explained that he selected [Redacted] based on several factors, including the fact [Redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

[Redacted] added that he watched [Redacted] discharge his duties and was very satisfied with the job he performed. [Redacted] said that he, [Redacted] and [Redacted] talked a lot about issues. [Redacted] had free access to the [Redacted] Station front office, and [Redacted] recalled consulting with [Redacted] at least once a day.

38. (S//NF) [Redacted] stated that he and [Redacted] briefed [Redacted] on CIA policies, and [Redacted] learned from on-the-job training. [Redacted] believed that [Redacted] received whatever guidance was available at CTC before he arrived, but [Redacted] did not know what that was.

[Redacted] said that the guidance he passed to [Redacted] included such issues as CIA's prohibition on torture; being vigilant [Redacted] to ensure there is no torture; and the fact that it is permissible to use certain tactics in debriefing that cannot injure, threaten with death, or induce lasting physical damage to the detainees.

39. (S//NF) [Redacted] said he was briefed on particular interrogations on a case-by-case basis. If there was a new or important detainee at [Redacted] he was briefed every day as the interrogation ran its course.

40. (S//NF) [Redacted] advised that he had discussions with Station management—including [Redacted]—every other day, or when issues arose. [Redacted] stated that someone from Station management visited [Redacted] about once a month.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

~~SECRET~~ / ~~NOFORN~~ / ~~MR~~

~~SECRET~~ // [redacted] ~~NOFORN~~ // ~~MR~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
 (b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(3) NatSecAct
 (b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c)

41. ~~(S//NF)~~ The Director of CTC—in written comments on the draft report endorsed by the DDO, who served as the previous Director of CTC—said that, by the fall of 2002, the shortage of veteran operations officers had hit [redacted] Station hard. To accomplish critical missions, [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

CTC often relied on talented young officers—such as [redacted] to take on responsibilities beyond their training and experience. In [redacted] case, he was asked to take on enormous responsibilities at [redacted] principally because of his [redacted] [redacted] and relative maturity, which qualified him better than most for this entirely new DO mission.

(b)(1)
 (b)(3) NatSecAct

~~(S//NF)~~ POLICY FOR CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS AT THE TIME OF RAHMAN'S DEATH

42. ~~(S//NF)~~ Prior to the time of Rahman's death, CTC and OGC disseminated policy guidance, via cables, e-mail, or orally, on a specific case-by-case basis to address requests to use specific interrogation techniques. Agency management did not require those involved in interrogations to sign an acknowledgement that they had read, understood, or agreed to comply with the guidance provided; nor did the Agency maintain a comprehensive record of individuals who had been briefed on interrogation procedures.

(b)(1)
 (b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(3) NatSecAct
 (b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c)

43. ~~(S//NF)~~ According to [redacted] in [redacted] [redacted] 2002, a senior operations officer (b)(1) [redacted] interrogated a particularly obstinate d (b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted]

[redacted] The officer drafted a cable that proposed techniques that, ultimately, became the model for [redacted] [redacted] recalled that the proposal included use of darkness, sleep deprivation, solitary confinement, and noise; the use of cold temperatures was not addressed.²³ The response from Headquarters was that the proposal was acceptable, based on the fact

(b)(1)
 (b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6)

²³ ~~(S//NF)~~ As noted below, [redacted] (b)(7)(c) appears mistaken about the absence of a proposal to use cold as a technique.

~~SECRET~~ // [redacted] ~~NOFORN~~ // ~~MR~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~ / ~~NOFORN~~ // MR

(b)(3) NatSecAct

that no permanent harm would result from any of the proposed measures.²⁴ Prior to the death of Rahman, that cable from Headquarters served as the Station's guidance on what could be done in interrogations.

44. (S//NF) [redacted] explained that Station guidance was to adhere to the four techniques approved by Headquarters. Guidance to individual interrogators initially was "catch as catch can." It was [redacted] responsibility to monitor things at [redacted] [redacted] stated that the issue of when the Station needed to seek Headquarters approval was a grav area.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) NatSecAct


(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

45. (S/ [redacted] [redacted] 2002, [redacted] submitted to Headquarters a proposed interrogation plan for the detainee at the [redacted] It requested "specific Headquarters concurrence and definitive CTC/Legal authority" to employ specified interrogation techniques with the detainee. It proposed sound disorientation, time deprivation, light deprivation, physical comfort level deprivation, lowering the quality of the detainee's food, and unpredictable round-the-clock interrogation that would lead to sleep deprivation. The cable offered a specific description of each of the proposed techniques. One specific proposal was,

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Physical comfort level deprivation: With the use of a window air conditioner and a judicious provision/deprivation of warm clothing/blankets, believe we can increase [the detainee's] physical discomfort level to the point where we may lower his mental/trained resistance abilities.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)



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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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~~SECRET~~ / [] ~~NOFORN~~ // MR

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
 (b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(3) NatSecAct
 (b)(5)
 (b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
 (b)(3) NatSecAct

48. (S/ [] A review of cables to or from [] between
 (b)(1) [] August and [] November disclosed only one cable proposing
 (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
 (b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~ / [] ~~NOFORN~~ // MR

(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~ / ~~NOFORN~~ / ~~MR~~ (b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1) additional interrogation methods for [redacted] detainees. This cable,
 (b)(3) CIAAct written by Jessen for a different detainee, requested permission to
 (b)(3) NatSecAct apply "the following [moderate value target] interrogation pressures
 (b)(6) . . . as deemed appropriate by [Jessen], . . . isolation, sleep
 (b)(7)(c) deprivation, sensory deprivation (sound masking), facial slap, body
 slap, attention grasp, and stress positions."

(b)(1) 49. (~~S~~/~~NF~~) According to [redacted] the initial interrogations
 (b)(3) NatSecAct conducted at [redacted] in September and October 2002 were more
 custodial interviews, with the added psychological impact of being in
 that facility with total darkness and separation from other detainees.
 When Agency officers came to conduct interviews or interrogations,
 the only guidance he provided them was how to get in and out of the
 facility securely. [redacted] stated that the interrogators enjoyed the
 freedom to do what they wanted. He did not possess a list of "do's
 and don'ts" for interrogations.

(b)(1)
 (b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(3) NatSecAct
 (b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c)

50. (~~S~~/~~NF~~) The Director of CTC—in written comments on the
 draft report endorsed by the DDO said that, at the time of Rahman's
 death, there was a lack of clear, applicable program guidance for
 operations to detain and interrogate terrorists captured on the
 battlefield. He stated,

[T]he opening of [redacted] in September 2002 came as a practical
 response to a clear-cut and urgent operational need.
 Unfortunately, [redacted] began operation while CIA was still in
 the process of establishing uniform and detailed program
 guidance on detention and interrogations practices, and prior to
 development of the structured, tightly controlled CTC detention
 and interrogation program managed by CTC . . . today. While
 that program—which was launched in November 2002 from a
 low base of experience, personnel, and overall expertise—also
 came together without well developed and detailed CIA policies
 on detention and interrogation,

(b)(1)
 (b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted]

(b)(1)
 (b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~ / ~~NOFORN~~ / ~~MR~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

51. (S//NF) Accordingly, when [redacted] arrived in [redacted] on [redacted] November 2002, for his first TDY assignment [redacted] reportedly advised [redacted] "You cannot harm or kill the detainees, but you can handle the debriefings/interrogations as you see fit." It was not apparent to [redacted] that [redacted] knew what the rules were.²⁶

(S//NF) RESPONSIBILITY FOR RAHMAN'S INTERROGATION (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

52. (S//NF) [redacted] stated that it was his normal practice to meet all rendition aircraft flights [redacted] unless he needed to be elsewhere. However, he said he did not have a specific recollection of the rendition of Rahman [redacted] on [redacted] November 2002.²⁷ There was no logbook documenting the arrivals and departures of Agency personnel at the facility.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

53. (S//NF) [redacted] contends that Rahman was the responsibility of Jessen. [redacted] was not certain whether Jessen was sent to [redacted] with Rahman or another case.²⁸ Jessen conducted several interrogation sessions with Rahman. (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

54. (S//NF) According to [redacted] Jessen met with Rahman every day.²⁹ Those sessions were documented in a series of cables that [redacted] indicated were drafted by Jessen. [redacted] said he participated in some of the interrogations Jessen conducted but could not remember how many. When informed that a pre-death cable reported that Jessen conducted six sessions with Rahman, [redacted] estimated he participated in about three of those. [redacted] stated that (b)(1) (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct

²⁶ (S//NF) [redacted] served in [redacted] from [redacted] November 2002 until [redacted] January 2003. [redacted]

[redacted] (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct

²⁸ (S//NF) According to a [redacted] October 2002 CTC/UBL cable, Jessen was being sent to [redacted] "to conduct in-depth interrogations of several key Al-Qa'ida operatives recently detained in [redacted] Rahman was not captured until [redacted] October 2002.

²⁹ (S//NF) Jessen was in [redacted] (b)(1) on [redacted] October until [redacted] November 2002. (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1) he did not recall which interpreter participated in the interrogation
 (b)(3) CIAAct sessions with Rahman. According to [redacted] after Jessen left [redacted]
 (b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] November 2002, Rahman became [redacted] case by default, adding
 (b)(6) that all of the detainees who were not being interrogated were under
 (b)(7)(c) his general control.

55. (S//NF) Jessen, who holds a Ph. D in clinical psychology,
 (b)(1) was experienced from nearly two decades of work in the Department
 (b)(3) NatSecAct of Defense SERE program and had conducted interrogations of CIA's
 first high value detainee at a different location.³⁰ Jessen explained
 (b)(1) that he was directed to go to [redacted] to conduct an evaluation of
 (b)(3) CIAAct another detainee, [redacted] While there, he evaluated
 (b)(3) NatSecAct several other detainees, prepared interrogation plans, and forwarded
 (b)(6) them to Headquarters. [redacted] also asked Jessen to evaluate Rahman,
 (b)(7)(c) described as a "hard case." Jessen said Rahman, got a lot of attention
 and he became the focus of [redacted] and the Station's High Value
 Target cell.

56. (S//NF) Jessen explained that [redacted] asked Jessen to look
 (b)(1) at Rahman in addition to the other detainees Jessen was evaluating at
 (b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] According to Jessen, [redacted] was responsible for all of the
 detainees that came to [redacted] When detainees arrived, it was
 (b)(1) [redacted] responsibility to interrogate them. When asked if Rahman
 (b)(3) CIAAct was his case, Jessen responded, "Unequivocally, no." When informed
 (b)(3) NatSecAct that [redacted] asserted that Rahman was Jessen's case, Jessen averred
 (b)(6) that [redacted] was wrong.
 (b)(7)(c)

(b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c)

³⁰ (e) Jessen became a CIA independent contractor on [redacted] 2002, following his retirement from active duty with the U.S. Air Force.

~~SECRET~~ / [] ~~NOFORN~~ // MR

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

57. (S//NF) According to [] a second independent contractor psychologist/interrogator, (C) James Mitchell, came to [] to work with another detainee during November. Mitchell participated in one of Jessen's sessions with Rahman.³¹ Both psychologists left [] on [] November 2002.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

58. (S//NF) Mitchell stated that he observed [] interrogate Rahman on one occasion for about 10 minutes; Rahman was uncooperative. Mitchell stated Rahman appeared healthy; however, he had scratches on his face, bruises on his ankles, and his wrists were black and blue. Mitchell requested that the PA examine Rahman's hands.³²

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

59. (S//NF) [] described Rahman as a significant figure at [] [] did not have an opportunity to interrogate Rahman and did not see him when he was alive. [] was informed that Rahman was someone else's case, possibly []

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

60. (S//NF) [] [] advised that she was in [] when Rahman was detained there.³³ She participated in his initial interrogation [] and traveled to [] after he was rendered there.³⁴ [] said she participated in an undetermined number of interrogations of Rahman but estimates it was fewer than 10. She participated with [] and Jessen on two occasions. She estimated she participated in five interrogations of Rahman after Jessen left

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

³¹ (S//NF) Cable records indicate Mitchell arrived [] on [] November 2002. Mitchell had a background with the SERE program similar to Jessen's. He became a CIA IC in September 2001 following retirement from the U.S. Air Force. Like Jessen, Mitchell had been involved in the interrogation of the Agency's first high value detainee.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

³² (S//NF) According to [] the Station PA, no one ever requested that he examine Rahman, his hands, or any other detainee.

[]

20
~~SECRET~~ / [] ~~NOFORN~~ // MR

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] November 2002. When asked who had the interrogation responsibility for Rahman, [redacted] responded, "no one in particular—so I guess [redacted] and me."

(S//NF) RAHMAN'S TREATMENT DURING DETENTION AND INTERROGATION

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

61. (S//NF) [redacted] said he did not specifically recall Rahman's treatment upon arrival at [redacted]. [redacted] stated that Rahman's clothes would have been removed early in his detention, and most of the time Rahman was naked or would have been wearing only a diaper.

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

62. (S//NF) [redacted] said that Rahman was either in his cell or in a sleep deprivation cell when he was not being interrogated.³⁵ [redacted] did not know exactly how much time Rahman spent in the sleep deprivation cell but estimated it was about 50 percent of the time. [redacted] contended that no sleep deprivation was conducted on Rahman after Jessen departed [on [redacted] November] and added there would have been no point in continuing it then because Rahman was not being interrogated.³⁶ According to [redacted] Rahman arrived at [redacted]

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] in a diaper and it was removed at some point. He was probably put back in a diaper when he was put in a sleep deprivation cell.³⁷ However [redacted] said there would have been no reason to use a diaper when Rahman was not in a sleep deprivation cell.

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

63. (S//NF) [redacted] characterized Rahman as stoic and very stubborn, unlike the other detainees. He was the most stubborn individual they detained at the facility.³⁸ Although most of the other detainees were "compliant" almost immediately, Rahman was hard-

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

³⁵ (S//NF) As mentioned earlier, four of the 20 cells at [redacted] were constructed with an iron bar across the top of the cell and secured to two walls. These cells could be used to force the detainee to stand during sleep deprivation sessions.

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

³⁶ (S//NF) Despite [redacted] contention, [redacted] recalled that Rahman was in a sleep deprivation cell on [redacted] November 2002 when she checked on the detainees.

³⁷ (S//NF) During the OIG visit to [redacted] on [redacted] and [redacted] May 2003, two detainees were undergoing standing sleep deprivation in these cells. Both were naked.

³⁸ (S//NF) At the time of Rahman's death, [redacted] (b)(1) [redacted] been in operation for 69 days.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~ / [redacted] ~~NOFORN~~ // MR

(b)(3) NatSecAct

core Pashtun. He had been a combatant all his life and had been wounded many times. Rahman did not complain and simply said, "Thanks to God, all is well." When reminded that in his videotaped 19 December 2002 interview with the DO Investigative Team, [redacted] stated that Rahman complained incessantly, [redacted] said he just recalled Rahman being stoic.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

64. (S//NF) [redacted] According to cables reporting Rahman's interrogations, he did complain about conditions. After the first two days of interrogation, [redacted] reported that Rahman "complained about poor treatment, complained about the violation of his human rights, and claimed inability to think due to conditions (cold)." The subsequent cable reporting Rahman's interrogation sessions described Jessen's impression that Rahman "continues to use 'health and welfare' behaviors and complaints as a major part of his resistance posture."

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

65. (S//NF) The DO Investigative Team interviewed [redacted] guard commander four days after Rahman's death.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

According to the guard commander, Rahman wore pants for approximately his first three days at [redacted] then spent the remainder of his detention without pants. [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

66. (S//NF) Jessen said that Rahman's diaper and clothes would have been removed at the interrogators' direction. The guards would not have removed them without direction. According to Jessen, Rahman was without his clothes more than he was with them. The interrogators gave Rahman some clothing after he admitted his identity on [redacted] November 2002.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

67. (S//NF) The linguist, [redacted] explained that it was difficult for him to remember how often he assisted in Rahman's interrogation at [redacted] but estimated it was approximately five to seven times.³⁹ He assisted [redacted] in the interrogation of two detainees, including

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~ / [redacted] ~~NOFORN~~ // MR

(b)(3) NatSecAct

Rahman. [redacted] stated that during the entire time he saw Rahman at [redacted] Rahman was either wearing a diaper or was naked below [redacted] [redacted] said that he could not be precise about when Rahman wore a diaper as opposed to being naked, but his condition seemed to alternate from one to the other. The [redacted] shirt that Rahman wore was not sufficient to cover his genital area. Rahman was particularly concerned with being naked in front of [redacted] [redacted] the guards. Every time Rahman came to the interrogation room, he asked to be covered. [redacted] did not observe a supply of diapers at the [redacted] but it was evident to him that Rahman had received a replacement diaper at some [redacted] juncture. [redacted]

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

68. (S//NF) According to [redacted] prior to the first interrogation session, [redacted] stated that Rahman was a "really bad guy." [redacted] was present when Rahman was rendered to [redacted] and was present when Rahman was first interrogated at [redacted] That was either the night Rahman was rendered to [redacted] or the succeeding day. The first interrogation session included [redacted] Jessen, and possibly [redacted] The only other person [redacted] remembered being present during one of Rahman's interrogations was Mitchell. The interrogation sessions with Rahman were normally brief because of his unwillingness to cooperate. They were mostly around 15 minutes in duration; the longest was one or two hours.

69. (S//NF) Jessen estimated that he interrogated Rahman two to four times.⁴⁰ He employed an "insult slap" with Rahman once but determined it was only a minor irritant to Rahman and worthless as a continuing technique. Jessen occasionally observed [redacted] encounters with Rahman and said he was the hardest case in captivity that Jessen had ever observed. Even when Rahman was depleted psychologically, he would routinely respond that he was [redacted]

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

⁴⁰ (S//NF) A cable reported that Jessen was involved in six interrogation sessions with Rahman.

~~SECRET~~ // [redacted] ~~NOFORN~~ // MR

(b)(3) NatSecAct

"fine" when asked about his condition. The only concession Rahman made was to admit his identity when it was clearly established and irrefutable. (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct 70. (S/[redacted]) Jessen prepared the interrogation plan for Rahman before departing [redacted] and noted that there was no quick fix to get him to cooperate. It would take a long time and it was necessary to keep up the pressure on Rahman and to provide medical assessments. Jessen did not foresee that the interrogation plan on Rahman would be implemented for some time, at least not until the Station was augmented by graduates of the interrogation classes.⁴¹ Jessen wrote in a cable dated [redacted] November 2002 as a part of the Interrogation Plan Recommendation:

It will be important to manage the [proposed interrogation] deprivations so as to allow [Rahman] adequate rest and nourishment so he remains coherent and capable of providing accurate information. The station physician should collaborate with the interrogation team to achieve this optimum balance.⁴² It is reasonable to expect two weeks or more of this regimen before significant movement occurs.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c) 71. (S//NF) [redacted] described Rahman as "incredibly stalwart," and said he would not talk. [redacted] did not remember what clothes Rahman was wearing. [redacted] added that Rahman would have been naked during the interrogation sessions. She said she is not certain, but believed that F(b)(1)an received clothes, a top and bottom, after Jessen departed [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

72. (S//NF) [redacted] stated that he is not certain how many detainees at [redacted] (b)(1) have been naked from the waist down. It [redacted] (b)(1) [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] according to a Headquarters cable sent [redacted] November 2002, the first interrogation course was scheduled to run from [redacted] November 2002, with 10 students scheduled to attend that session. [redacted] responded on [redacted] November 2002, with concurrence for a (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct DY interrogation team to travel to [redacted] following completion of the course. Later, the senior interrogator in CTC wrote an e-mail regarding the request and noted in part, "... At least one of the guys they have in mind is Gul Rahman, who is an Afghan, and I do not think he is truly a [High Value Target] or [a Medium Value Target.] How do you think we should proceed on this?"⁴² (S//NF) There was no Station physician, only Physicians' Assistants.

~~SECRET~~ // [redacted] ~~NOFORN~~ // MR

(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~ / ~~NOFORN~~ // ~~MR~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

depends upon how they are acting; "It may be needed to break them."
It was used in Rahman's case to break him down to be more compliant. He was defiant and strong and made threats, according to [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

73. (S/ [redacted] Rahman's Medical Care. According to the November 2002 [redacted] cable that reported the chronology of events connected with Rahman's death, Rahman was brought to [redacted] on

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

November and given a physical examination. However, despite this official reporting, the PA who accompanied Rahman [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] stated that neither he nor any other

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

PA conducted physical examinations at [redacted] on Rahman or other detainees who were rendered there during that period. The brief check the PA performed on rendition detainees in [redacted] could not

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

be considered a physical examination because, in part, it did not involve questioning the detainees about their health history and current condition [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

74. (S/ [redacted] On [redacted] November 2002, [redacted] Station reported [redacted] by cable that [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] medics made [redacted] visits to [redacted] evaluate the [redacted] detainees.⁴³ [redacted]

"approximately a fourth of the prisoners have one or more significant pre-existing medical problems upon [redacted] (b)(1), 1" (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

75. (S/ [redacted] The [redacted] November 2002 cable reported that during two monthly assistance visits to [redacted] by the medics, all detainees were taken from their cells to a room and given a private medical evaluation where they were interviewed by an Office of Medical Services (OMS) officer and a urine specimen was taken to determine the specific nutrition and hydration levels. It reported that the last routine visit was [redacted] November 2002 and the urine testing determined all of the [redacted] detainees were receiving sufficient nourishment and hydration. The cable further reported that all the

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

⁴³ (S//NF) When [redacted] (b)(1) [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct
[redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~ // ~~NOFORN~~ // MR

(b)(3) NatSecAct

detainees were cooperative with the medical personnel regarding their health and welfare except for Rahman, who simply stated,


(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct "Thanks to God, all is well."⁴⁴
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c) 76. (S//NF) PA [redacted] advised that he visited [redacted] shortly after his [redacted] November 2002 arrival [redacted]. The facility had opened since his prior assignment [redacted]. He consulted with OMS by telephone and received guidance to treat the detainees at [redacted] if they are ill. [redacted] then examined the detainees, heard their health concerns, and tested their urine to determine if they had sufficient nourishment. [redacted] said he did not perform any arrival medical examination on Rahman or any other newly arrived detainee at [redacted] and was unaware of detainee arrivals and departures from the facility. [redacted] was confident he would remember if he had examined Rahman.⁴⁵

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct



(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

78. (S//NF) According to [redacted] in an interview with the OIG, on a subsequent date, possibly [redacted] November 2002, he checked on the detainees and observed Rahman for the first time. [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct reported that Rahman was wearing a blue sweatshirt and blue [redacted]
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c) ⁴⁴ (E) [redacted] stated that he provided [redacted] with some of the information that appeared in this cable.

⁴⁵ (S) As reported previously, Rahman arrived there on [redacted] November 2002. [redacted] stated that he did not prepare treatment notes or medical records while [redacted] (b)(1)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct [redacted]
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

~~SECRET~~ // ~~NOFORN~~ // MR

(b)(3) NatSecAct

SECRET//NOFORN//MR

(b)(3) NatSecAct

sweatpants, and possibly socks, and was standing in his cell with his arm chained to a pin on the wall. [redacted] believed Rahman had abrasions on his wrists, similar to the other detainees. [redacted] stated that he did not know what language Rahman spoke, but Rahman indicated that he was okay and did not make any complaints. Consequently, according to [redacted] he did not examine Rahman nor test his urine and did not know if there were any abrasions beneath his clothes.⁴⁷ [redacted] did not know of any medical contact with Rahman by the other two medical care providers at the Station.⁴⁸

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

79. (S//NF) [redacted] recollection that Rahman was wearing sweatpants is at odds with others who spent considerable time at [redacted] during that period. No other interviewee mentioned that Rahman was wearing pants after his first couple of days. The guard commander said that Rahman's pants were removed after approximately three days and he was without pants. The deputy guard commander said that Rahman was naked most of the time.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] the interpreter, recalled that Rahman was naked below the waist or wore a diaper during his entire period of detention. [redacted] said that Rahman's clothes were removed early and he was naked or wore a diaper most of the time.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

80. (S//NF) [redacted] Reports of Rahman's Interrogation. [redacted] first cable report of Rahman's interrogation was issued three days after his rendition to [redacted]. It reported that [redacted] and Jessen had interrogated Rahman over a 48-hour period and noted that the psychological and physiological pressures available for use were unlikely to make Rahman divulge significant information. The cable

[redacted]

⁴⁸ (S//NF) A TDY physician [redacted] reported they did not have any interaction with Rahman while he was alive.

SECRET [redacted]²⁷/NOFORN//MR

(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~ / [redacted] / ~~NOFORN~~ // MR

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] **ted that, although the other detainees who had been brought to [redacted] dropped their resistance within 48 hours, Rahman remained relatively unchanged. It added,**

Despite 48 hours of sleep deprivation, auditory overload, total darkness, isolation, a cold shower, and rough treatment, Rahman remains steadfast in maintaining his high resistance posture and demeanor.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct **81. (S/ [redacted] A second, post-rendition cable was sent from [redacted] to [redacted] on [redacted] November 2002. It reported that Rahman appeared to be physically fatigued but defiant during interrogations.**

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct **It sought material to employ as psychological pressure and requested [redacted] that [redacted] prepare a videotape of [redacted]**

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct **82. (S/ [redacted] [redacted] sent a third post-rendition cable on [redacted] November 2002, "Subject: Gul Rahman Admits His Identity." It reported that [redacted], Jessen, and [redacted] interrogated Rahman on [redacted] November 2002, and that Rahman had spent the days since his last interrogation session in cold conditions with minimal food and sleep.⁵⁰ It further reported that Rahman was confused for portions of the interviews due to fatigue and dehydration.⁵¹ The cable reported that Rahman provided his true identity and biographical information but provided fictitious and rehearsed responses about his relationship with [redacted]. [redacted] reported that Rahman was afforded improved conditions and would be reinterviewed on [redacted] November 2002.**

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

⁴⁹ (S//NF) There is no indication that [redacted] met this request.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct ⁵⁰ (S/ [redacted] [redacted] estimated that she participated in seven to 10 interrogation sessions with Rahman at [redacted]. However, this was the only occasion when her presence is documented in [redacted] cable. (b)(3) NatSecAct

⁵¹ (S/ [redacted] As previously reported, the [redacted] November 2002 [redacted] cable reported the Station's medical support to detainees. The cable cited that, during the [redacted] to [redacted] November 2002 medical assistance visit to [redacted] (b)(1) it was determined that all detainees were receiving sufficient hydration. (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~ / [redacted] / ~~NOFORN~~ // MR

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1) ~~SECRET~~ [redacted] ~~NOFORN~~//MR (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

83. (S// [redacted] [redacted] sent a fourth cable on [redacted] November 2002. That cable was prepared by Jessen and reported a mental status examination and a recommended interrogation plan for Rahman.⁵² It reported that Rahman had demonstrated a rigid and intractable resistance posture and would not be affected by continuing interrogations. The cable recommended continuing environmental deprivations and instituting a concentrated interrogation regimen of 18 out of 24 hours. It also recommended that the Station [redacted] (b)(6) collaborate with the interrogation team to achieve the optimum (b)(7)(c) balance and noted it was reasonable to expect two or more weeks of the regimen before seeing any progress. Finally, it recommended using the newly trained interrogators from Headquarters' recent training class. (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

84. (S// [redacted] On the reported day of Rahman's death, [redacted] November 2002, [redacted] sent a cable to the DDO, [redacted] - Gul Rahman: Chronology of Events." It reported that Rahman appeared calm and controlled to his interrogators but had reportedly threatened [redacted] guards previously, vowing to kill them all or have them killed following his release.⁵³ This was cited as the reason that Rahman was constantly restrained with hand and ankle restraints in his cell.⁵⁴ It also reported that [redacted] last saw Rahman on the afternoon of [redacted] November 2002, and that Rahman was found dead on the morning of [redacted] November 2002. The Station concluded it was not possible to determine the cause of Rahman's death without an autopsy. The cable did not include the information

(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct threatened [redacted] guards previously, vowing to kill them all or have them killed following his release.⁵³ This was cited as the reason that Rahman was constantly restrained with hand and ankle

(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct restraints in his cell.⁵⁴ It also reported that [redacted] last saw Rahman on the afternoon of [redacted] November 2002, and that Rahman was found dead on the morning of [redacted] November 2002. The Station concluded it was not possible to determine the cause of Rahman's death without an autopsy. The cable did not include the information

(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

⁵² (S// [redacted] The mental status exam was requested by CTC/UBL on [redacted] November 2002. CTC/UBL noted "[Headquarters] UBL is motivated to extract any and all operational information on Al-Qa'ida and [HIG] from Rahman . . . [and] achieving Rahman's cooperation [is] of great importance. We would like to work quickly to create circumstances in which he will cooperate."

⁵³ (S//NF) Jessen reportedly heard from [redacted] before [redacted] November 2002 that Rahman sensed the guards were [redacted] and threatened to kill them, but Jessen said he never witnessed the guards mistreat Rahman.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

⁵⁴ (S// [redacted] Despite the assertion that Rahman was constantly restrained with hand and ankle restraints in his cell, the same cable reported that Rahman's hand restraints were removed on [redacted] November 2002.

(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

that Rahman was naked below the waist or that a series of chains and restraints (the short chain position) was used on Rahman that forced him to sit bare-bottomed on the concrete floor of his cell.⁵⁵

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

85. (S//NF) Cold Conditions. [redacted]

[redacted] stated that on [redacted] November 2002, [redacted] was occupied with other duties and asked her to check on each detainee because it was getting cold. [redacted] went from cell to cell and gave apples to detainees. Also, she gave a few of them blankets and, if they did not have socks, she provided socks to them.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

86. (S//NF) [redacted] did not provide a blanket, socks, or an apple to Rahman. She returned his apple to [redacted] and stated she did not know what [redacted] did with the apple but doubted he would have given it to Rahman because he was noncompliant. [redacted] said she saw all of the detainees, except Rahman. He was in one of the sleep deprivation cells when she provided apples to the detainees.⁵⁶ The other detainees she observed all wore sweatshirts and sweatpants and most had socks; none of the detainees was without clothes. Some wore wool knit sweaters on top of the sweatshirts.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

87. (S//NF) [redacted] stated that it was very cold in [redacted] when he was there on a brief TDY and the issue of hypothermia crossed his mind as he saw Rahman wearing only socks and a diaper.⁵⁷ He commented on the cold and hypothermia to the other Headquarters officer traveling with him, but not to [redacted] [redacted] explained that he was at [redacted] only to [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

⁵⁵ (S//NF) [redacted] This cable was the basis for the information provided in the 29 November 2002 Congressional Notification on Rahman's death. It was not until a second Congressional Notification was made on [redacted] May 2003, three months after the DO Investigative Team's report was issued, that CIA informed Congress that Rahman was naked below the waist and shackled in the short chain position that prevented Rahman from standing upright.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

⁵⁶ (S//NF) This account places Rahman in a sleep deprivation cell on [redacted] November 2002, and appears to conflict with [redacted] account that Rahman's sleep deprivation was discontinued on [redacted] November 2002, when Jessen departed [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(S//NF) [redacted] believed he visited [redacted] a few days after Rahman's arrival there, approximately [redacted] November 2002. [redacted] also witnessed the hard takedown of Rahman while at [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1) observe and assumed that the officers there would realize it was cold
 (b)(3) CIAAct and would not leave a prisoner unclothed for a long period.
 (b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] had observed blankets in other cells and assumed Rahman
 (b)(6) would get a blanket soon. [redacted] recognized that someone could not
 (b)(7)(c) be left naked for long without unwanted complications.

88. (S//NF) [redacted] recalled that both Rahman and another
 detainee complained about being cold. [redacted] did not approach [redacted]
 about the cold conditions at [redacted] and was not aware of anyone
 else doing so.

(b)(1)
 (b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(3) NatSecAct
 (b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c)

89. (S//NF) Jessen remembered it was cold in [redacted] prior
 to his departure [redacted] on [redacted] November 2002. There were some
 electrical heaters in the cellblock area but none in the individual cells.
 Jessen remembered receiving a heater from [redacted]
 because the room was cold.⁵⁸

(b)(1)
 (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
 (b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(3) NatSecAct
 (b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
 (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~ / ~~NOFORN~~ / ~~MR~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

90. ~~(S//NF)~~ Within the [redacted] days of arriving in [redacted] November, a contract [redacted] linguist, [redacted] was assigned by [redacted] or his assistant, [redacted] to perform a daily check of the detainees in their cells at [redacted].⁹ It was during that period that the temperature dropped precipitously; checks were normally conducted in the morning, and also in the evening if the weather was colder. They had observed the detainees shivering around the period of [redacted] November. Some detainees with blankets were shivering. Those without blankets were those who were not cooperating.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

91. ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] remembered that sometime around [redacted] November 2002, [redacted] mentioned the temperature was dropping, it was getting cold, and they should try to keep the detainees warmer. It was a general statement made to a group including [redacted] and [redacted]. [redacted] was also present during a discussion between [redacted] and [redacted] about supplying warmer clothes. They were concerned that the provision of blankets to all of the detainees at that time could send the wrong signal; they tried to use desired items like blankets as something to earn by cooperation.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

92. ~~(S//NF)~~ A [redacted] contract linguist, [redacted] stated that he asked [redacted] a few days before Rahman died (probably on [redacted] November) at what temperature hypothermia occurred.⁶⁰ [redacted] reportedly responded that he believed it occurred when the atmospheric temperature dropped to 58 degrees Fahrenheit.⁶¹ According to [redacted], [redacted] did not respond in a manner indicating he was going to do something about it; he just said "okay." [redacted] was certain, however, that [redacted] had heard him. [redacted] explained that he did not raise the issue of the cold with [redacted] because of anything he s[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1), heard about
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

⁵⁹ ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted]
⁶⁰ ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] (b)(1)
[redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

⁶¹ ~~(S//NF)~~ During an interview with the DO Investigative Team on [redacted] November 2002, [redacted] cited that [redacted] did not know at what temperature one would reach hypothermia.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

32
~~SECRET~~ / ~~NOFORN~~ / ~~MR~~
(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET//NF~~ ~~NOFORN//MR~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

Rahman. Rather, it was based on what [redacted] observed with two other detainees he was working with, as well as the fact that he was cold even when wearing a jacket.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

93. (S//NF) [redacted] told OIG that, based on his knowledge of thermodynamics and conductivity, if a person's body temperature drops to 95 degrees Fahrenheit, the brain would be impacted. At 90 degrees Fahrenheit the person will die. However, if the room temperature is 70 degrees Fahrenheit or above and a person is sitting naked on the floor, the person will be all right. If the room temperature is 30 degrees Fahrenheit, a person could sit on the floor and be unaffected if he is clothed. [redacted] explained that he was aware that a concrete floor would suck the heat out of someone who was sitting on the floor without pants. From his knowledge of thermodynamics, [redacted] opined that Rahman had only a 30 percent chance of surviving the night while sitting on the cold floor of his cell without pants.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

94. (S//NF) Five days after Rahman's death, the DO Investigative Team interviewed [redacted]. The one and one-half page report that resulted from that interview contained the following:

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

[redacted] that after his first or second visit to [redacted] (b)(1) he mentioned the temperature at the facility to [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] told them that it was cold in the facility, the prisoners were shivering, and it was not cold outside yet.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

95. (S//NF) During an OIG interview, less than four months later, when asked if he had concerns regarding the temperature at [redacted] at the time of Rahman's death, [redacted] responded, "not really." When asked if he had a conversation with anyone about the temperature at [redacted] [redacted] responded that he believed he told [redacted] that [redacted] had mentioned to someone that it was cold. [redacted] added that he did not remember the identity of the person with whom he discussed the issue of the cold temperature; "it could have been anyone." When asked what prompted his comment about the cold, [redacted] stated that it was

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

~~SECRET//NF~~ ~~NOFORN//MR~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~ / ~~NOFORN~~ // MR

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1) starting to get cold. "I walked by and must have said it was getting
 (b)(3) CIAAct cold." [redacted] said he had forgotten the comment; it was not made in
 (b)(3) NatSecAct a formal context. However, [redacted] reminded him
 (b)(6) of his comment. When asked if this comment could have been made
 (b)(7)(c) to [redacted] who had the responsibility for [redacted] [redacted] (b)(1)
 responded, "It could have been [made to] anyone."⁶² (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1) 96. (S//NF) To assist [redacted] in remembering the identity of
 (b)(3) NatSecAct the person with whom he spoke about the cold condition in
 [redacted] [redacted] read the interview report prepared by the DO
 Investigative Team [redacted] after the death of Rahman. [redacted] then
 (b)(1) observed, "I guess it could be [redacted] he would have been the most
 (b)(3) CIAAct likely officer." When asked to quantify that likelihood as a
 (b)(3) NatSecAct percentage, [redacted] responded it was 50 percent. [redacted] denied he
 (b)(6) told the two members of the DO Investigative Team that the
 (b)(7)(c) detainees were shivering. When asked if cold was used as a
 technique at [redacted] [redacted] responded, "Not that I know." He
 explained that he was more focused on the use of loud music there.

(b)(1) 97. (S//NF) [redacted] recalled that, at the
 (b)(3) NatSecAct time of Rahman's death, [redacted] lamented that he previously raised
 the issue of the cold with someone at [redacted] [redacted]
 stated that [redacted] specifically said, "I told those people that they had
 to do something about the cold there." [redacted] said it was
 (b)(1) clear from the context that [redacted] was not referring to [redacted]
 (b)(3) CIAAct [redacted] some low-level person, but [redacted] did not identify whom
 (b)(3) NatSecAct he was describing.
 (b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c)

98. (S//NF) [redacted] stated that he has no recollection of having
 a conversation with [redacted] regarding the cold weather. However,
 [redacted] did recall [redacted] mentioning that he thought Rahman's death
 was induced by the cold.

(b)(1)
 (b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(3) NatSecAct
 (b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c)

⁶² (C) Additionally, the notes prepared by the OGC attorney during [redacted] interview with the
 DO Investigative Team read, "The first and second time [redacted] mentioned temperature to
 them; meaning [redacted] and others unknown."

~~SECRET~~ / ~~NOFORN~~ // MR

(b)(3) NatSecAct

SECRET// [redacted] NOFORN//MR

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

99. (S//NF) According to [redacted] no one brought to his attention or to the front office any concerns about the cold. [redacted] said it was not apparent in talking with [redacted] that there was a problem with cold at [redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

100. (S//NF) [redacted] In December 2002, less than one month after Rahman's hypothermia-induced death, [redacted] reported the following regarding another [redacted] detainee [redacted]

[The detainee] was submitted [sic] to sensory deprivation, cold, and sleep deprivation within the parameters of [a referenced cable] . . . When moved to the interrogation room for interrogation sessions [the detainee] was stripped and had to earn his clothing with cooperation and information. When he demonstrated resistance, [the detainee] was left in a cold room, shackled and stripped, until he demonstrated cooperation.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

101. (S//NF) Cold Showers. [redacted] who was present at [redacted] in November 2002, reported that she witnessed "the shower from hell" used on Rahman during his first week in detention.⁶³ [redacted] asked Rahman his identity, and when he did not respond with his true name, Rahman was placed back under the cold water by the guards at [redacted] direction. Rahman was so cold that he could barely utter his alias. According to [redacted] the entire process lasted no more than 20 minutes. It was intended to lower Rahman's resistance and was not for hygienic reasons. At the conclusion of the shower, Rahman was moved to one of the four sleep deprivation cells where he was left shivering for hours or overnight with his hand chained over his head. (b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

102. (S//NF) Jessen, who was present at [redacted] at the same time, recalled the guards administering a cold shower to Rahman as a "deprivation technique." Jessen subsequently checked on Rahman after he had been returned to his cell. Jessen detected that Rahman was showing the early stages of hypothermia and ordered the guards to give the detainee a blanket [redacted] who interpreted for Rahman, [redacted]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

SECRET// [redacted] NOFORN//MR

(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~ / ~~NOFORN~~ / ~~MR~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1) also witnessed [redacted] order a cold shower for Rahman. Rahman was
(b)(3) CIAAct being uncooperative at the time, and [redacted] stated it was evident that
(b)(3) NatSecAct the cold shower was not being ordered for hygienic reasons.
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1) 103. (S//NF) A Bureau of Prisons officer, conducting training
(b)(3) NatSecAct for the [redacted] guards at [redacted] witnessed a tall detainee wearing
a blindfold and a diaper fastened by duct tape arrive at an unheated
and cold area where the shower was located.⁶⁴ The diaper was
removed and discarded. The detainee was placed under the stream
of the shower for approximately five minutes and he was shivering.
Because of the detainee's height, a guard wearing rubber gloves stood
on a stool to ensure the detainee was covered head to foot with the
water spray. There was soap in a bucket, but it was not used. The
(b)(1) BOP officer was informed that a contractor was coming to [redacted]
(b)(3) NatSecAct that day to repair the water heater. There was no towel present; the
detainee was dried with his shirt and then escorted back to the cell
wearing a new diaper and his wet shirt. In the cell, the guards
restrained the detainee's hands to a bar at the approximate height of
his head. It occurred to the BOP officer that the cold shower might
have been intended as a deprivation or interrogation technique.⁶⁵

(b)(1) 104. (S//NF) Based on the length of time Rahman was at
(b)(3) CIAAct [redacted] [redacted] estimated that Rahman would have received
(b)(3) NatSecAct two showers. [redacted] witnessed only one shower and it was a
(b)(6) cold shower. Rahman did not like the shower, but the guards
(b)(7)(c) were able to get him clean. [redacted] was not certain if the BOP
officers witnessed the showers.

(b)(1) 105. (S//NF) Several of the officers interviewed about the
(b)(3) CIAAct possible use of cold showers as a technique cited that the water
(b)(3) NatSecAct heater was inoperable and there was no other recourse except for
(b)(6) cold showers. However, [redacted] explained that if a detainee were
(b)(7)(c) cooperative, he would be given a warm shower if possible. [redacted]

(b)(1) [redacted]
(b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted]

⁶⁵ (S//NF) [redacted] BOP officer provided a similar account of the cold shower. He did not believe it was employed as an interrogation technique because the water heater was broken at the time.

~~SECRET~~ / ~~NOFORN~~ / ~~MR~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct

stated that when a detainee was uncooperative, the interrogators accomplished two goals by combining the hygienic reason for a shower with the unpleasantness of a cold shower.

(b)(1) 106. (S//NF) According to [] cold was not supposed
 (b)(3) CIAAct to play a role in the interrogation. Cold was not a technique; it was a
 (b)(3) NatSecAct change of season. When asked in February 2003, if cold was used as
 (b)(6) an interrogation technique, [] responded, "not per se." He
 (b)(7)(c) explained that physical and environmental discomfort was used to
 encourage the detainees to improve their environment. []
 observed that cold is hard to define. He asked rhetorically, "How
 cold is cold? How cold is life threatening?" [] stated that
 Rahman was not given cold water. He stated that cold water
 (b)(1) continues to be employed at [] however, showers were
 (b)(3) NatSecAct administered in a heated room. He stated there was no specific
 guidance on it from Headquarters, and [] was left to its own
 discretion in the use of cold. [] asserted that there was a cable
 (b)(1) [] documenting the use of "manipulation of the
 (b)(3) NatSecAct environment."⁶⁶

(b)(1) 107. (S//NF) Hard Takedown. During the course of
 (b)(3) CIAAct Rahman's autopsy, the Agency pathologist noted several abrasions
 (b)(3) NatSecAct on the body.⁶⁷ Jessen, who was present during the first 10 days of
 (b)(6) Rahman's confinement, reported that, while in the company of []
 (b)(7)(c) [] Jessen witnessed a team of four or five
 [] officers execute a "hard takedown" on Rahman.⁶⁸
 (b)(1) According to Jessen, the team dragged Rahman from his cell, cut his
 (b)(3) CIAAct clothes off, secured his hands with Mylar tape and put a hood over
 (b)(3) NatSecAct his head. They ran Rahman up and down the long corridor adjacent
 to his cell. A couple of times he stumbled and was momentarily
 dragged along the ground until they were able to get Rahman back

(b)(1) []
 (b)(3) CIAAct []
 (b)(3) NatSecAct⁶⁷ (S//NF) The Final Autopsy Findings noted "superficial excoriations of the right and left
 (b)(6) upper shoulders, left lower abdomen, and left knee, mechanism undetermined."
 (b)(7)(c) []

(b)(1) []
 (b)(3) NatSecAct []

~~SECRET~~ / ~~NOFORN~~ // MR
(b)(3) NatSecAct

on his feet. Rahman was slapped and punched in the stomach during this episode, but Jessen could determine that the officers were pulling their punches to limit the pain. Jessen said the takedown was rehearsed and professionally executed. The process took between three to five minutes, and Rahman was returned to his cell. Rahman had crusty contusions on his face, leg, and hands that looked bad, but nothing that required treatment. Jessen heard that other hard takedowns were also executed at [redacted] 59 Three other officers who were present at the same time provided similar accounts of the incident.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

108. (~~S~~//NF) Jessen saw a value in the hard takedown in order to make Rahman uncomfortable and experience a lack of control. Jessen recognized, however, that the technique was not approved and recommended to [redacted] that he obtain written approval for employing the technique.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

109. (~~S~~//NF) According to [redacted] the hard takedown was employed often in interrogations at [redacted] as "part of the atmospherics." It was the standard procedure for moving a detainee to the sleep deprivation cell. It was performed for shock and psychological impact and signaled the transition to another phase of the interrogation. He said that the act of putting a detainee into a diaper also could cause abrasions if the detainee struggles because the floor of the facility is concrete.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

110. (~~S~~//NF) [redacted] contended that he ordered the hard takedown on Rahman to make him think he was being taken to a different cell, [redacted] This was accomplished by running him up and down the corridor. As Rahman was being moved down the corridor, he fell and got a scrape on his shoulder. [redacted] did not remember where else Rahman received injuries. [redacted] explained that the scraping was not

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(~~S~~//NF) According to one BOP officer who traveled to [redacted] before he departed from Washington, D.C., a [redacted] supervisor, name unknown, requested that the BOP team teach the hard takedown technique to the guards at [redacted] After the BOP team arrived [redacted] the request was not repeated, and BOP did not teach the technique.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

38
~~SECRET~~ / ~~NOFORN~~ // MR

(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~ / ~~NOFORN~~ // ~~MR~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
 (b)(3) CIAAct expected to be part of the process, and he was displeased with the
 (b)(3) NatSecAct results because Rahman was injured. [redacted] asserted that he had no
 (b)(6) interest in hurting the detainees. He observed that abrasions cause
 (b)(7)(c) management problems because there is a need to summon the
 physician to the facility to tend to the detainees' wounds to prevent
 (b)(1) infection.⁷⁰ [redacted] stated that neither he, [redacted] Station management,
 (b)(3) NatSecAct or anyone else involved with the program ever authorized or
 encouraged anyone to hit, slap, or intentionally inflict pain on a
 detainee.

(b)(1)
 (b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(3) NatSecAct 111. (~~S~~//NF) [redacted] stated that this hard takedown was the
 (b)(6) only time Rahman could have received the abrasions on his body.
 (b)(7)(c) He recalled only one instance when the hard takedown was used on
 Rahman. According to [redacted] the reference to rough treatment in the
 [redacted] November 2002 [redacted] cable refers to the hard takedown, as well as
 the insult slap given to Rahman by Jessen.⁷¹

(b)(1)
 (b)(3) NatSecAct 112. (~~S~~//NF) [redacted] noted there was an alternative to the hard
 takedown that he called the "gentle takedown." It was reserved for
 detainees who had been cooperative and were being transferred from

(b)(1) [redacted] In those instances, the detainee is advised what to expect
 (b)(3) CIAAct in advance and instructed to lie on his stomach and not resist.
 (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1)
 (b)(6) (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(7)(c) 113. (~~S~~//NF) [redacted] stated he did not discuss the hard
 takedown with Station managers; he thought they understood what
 techniques were being used at [redacted] [redacted] stated that,
 after completing the interrogation class, he understood that if he was
 going to do a hard takedown, he must report it to Headquarters.⁷²

(b)(1)
 (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c)
 70 (~~S~~//NF) If [redacted] treated Rahman for those abrasions, it was not reported to OIG
 during the contact with the three medical care providers present during Rahman's detention.

(b)(1)
 (b)(3) CIAAct 71 (~~S~~//NF) According to [redacted] who led the DO Investigative Team, [redacted] was not
 (b)(3) NatSecAct forthcoming about the hard takedown. During two interviews with the DO Investigative Team,
 (b)(6) [redacted] reported that Rahman was pushed and shoved a bit. It was only after [redacted] interviewed
 (b)(7)(c) Jessen that he learned of the hard takedown. At that point, after two interviews with [redacted]
 [redacted] did not see any purpose in recontacting [redacted] a third time to question him on this issue.

~~SECRET~~ / ~~NOFORN~~ // ~~MR~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~ / ~~NOFORN~~ / ~~MR~~
(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

114. (S/) When the November 2002 cable reporting the treatment of Rahman reached CTC, a senior CTC/Renditions Group officer forwarded this cable via an e-mail message to a CTC attorney. The officer highlighted part of the paragraph that reported, "Despite 48 hours of sleep deprivation, auditory overload, total darkness, isolation, a cold shower, and rough treatment, Rahman remains steadfast in maintaining his high resistance posture and demeanor." The CTC officer commented, "Another example of field interrogation using coercive techniques without authorization."

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

115. (S//NF) a CTC attorney, stated that she was not familiar with the "hard takedown" technique and was not aware that this technique had been used at . She explained that if had sought approval to employ the hard takedown, intentionally cold conditions, and the short chain restraint, she would have responded that they were not available for approval since they did not fit the legal parameters. Although a cold shower for Rahman was an available technique, she would have recommended that it not be approved if had provided all the relevant details including that Rahman's cell was cold and he was not fully-clothed.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

116. (S//NF) stated that he was generally familiar with the technique of hard takedowns. He asserted that it is authorized and believed it had been used one or more times at in order to intimidate a detainee.⁷³ stated that he would not necessarily know if it had been used and did not consider it a serious enough handling technique to require Headquarters approval. When asked about the possibility that a detainee might have been dragged on the ground during the course of a hard takedown, responded that he was unaware of that and did not understand the point of dragging someone along the corridor in

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

⁷³ (S//NF) There is no evidence that hard takedowns or short chain restraints are or were authorized. They are not listed in relevant Agency guidance as approved interrogation measures.

~~SECRET~~ / ~~NOFORN~~ / ~~MR~~
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

117. (~~S//NF~~) [redacted] contended that he observed Rahman's dead body and the abrasions did not appear to be fresh. [redacted] stated that he understood from [redacted] that the abrasions on Rahman's shoulders predated his transfer to [redacted]. However, after examining three postmortem photographs taken during the autopsy, [redacted] advised OIG that, in his professional judgment, the abrasion on Rahman's shoulder was between two and five days old. He estimated the abrasion on Rahman's hip as ranging from three or four days to a maximum of seven days old.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

118. (~~S//NF~~) Following his return to Headquarters subsequent to the autopsy, the pathologist learned that Rahman had been subjected to a technique that was used to disorient him and he had fallen; that was presumably the hard takedown. It was the pathologist's medical opinion that the abrasions on the shoulders and hip occurred fairly simultaneously. He estimated they occurred from one to three days, at most, before Rahman's death and certainly did not occur two weeks before his death. The pathologist did not ask [redacted] who assisted during the autopsy whether he had seen the abrasions prior to [redacted] path. (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

119. (~~S//NF~~) [redacted] Despite the visible presence of abrasions on Rahman's body, [redacted] Station reported in the [redacted] November 2002 cable that constituted the official report of Rahman's death to the DDO, "The Station medic inspected the body and noticed no obvious contusions, abrasions, marks, swelling, or other indications of specific cause of death." This same language was incorporated in the 29 November 2002 Congressional Notification of Rahman's death.

~~(S//NF)~~ RAHMAN'S LAST THREE DAYS (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

120. (~~S//NF~~) In the [redacted] November 2002 cable sent to the DDO, [redacted] Station reported a chronology of the events regarding Rahman, with specific reference to the last days of his detention and his death. No other cables documented Rahman's activities or status after [redacted] November 2002.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

41
~~SECRET~~ / ~~NOFORN~~ // MR

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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~~SECRET~~ [redacted] /NOFORN//MR

(b)(3) NatSecAct

121. (S//NF) [redacted] stated that he drafted this cable. [redacted] stated that he is familiar with this cable. He does not remember much of the contents of the cable, but the necessary documentation of circumstances of the death would be in the cable. It was drafted by [redacted] and released by [redacted]. [redacted] edited it for clarity, as was his custom for a [redacted] (b)(1) les he released from [redacted] (b)(1). He had no recollection regarding (b)(3) NatSecAct tance of the (b)(3) NatSecAct the cable.

122. (S//NF) [redacted] November 2002. The [redacted] November 2002 chronology cable reported:

The last time Rahman was seen by [redacted] officer prior to his death was on the afternoon of Monday [redacted] November 2002. At that time Rahman was assessed to be in good overall health. Station noted that Rahman had small abrasions on his wrists and ankles as a result of the restraints. His ankle restraints were loosened and his hand restraints were removed when Rahman was returned to his cell.⁷⁴

123. (S//NF) [redacted] recalled that he had one brief session with Rahman on [redacted] November 2002, four days after Jessen left [redacted]. [redacted] stated that this was based on Jessen's recommendation that Rahman be left alone and environmental deprivations continued.⁷⁵ The purpose of the session in an interrogation room, according to [redacted] was just to check on Rahman to determine if he was more compliant. Rahman never went any further than admitting his identity. [redacted] did not recall if Rahman was wearing a diaper at that time but noted there would have been no reason to use a diaper because Rahman was not in a sleep deprivation cell.

124. (S//NF) [redacted] contended he has little specific recollection of the session on [redacted] November 2002. (b)(1) [redacted] also did not [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

⁷⁴ (S//NF) This is the only passage in the cable that addressed the events of [redacted] November 2002. [redacted] would have made this assessment of Rahman's health.

⁷⁵ (S//NF) [redacted] sent an e-mail message on [redacted] November 2002, to her supervisors at Headquarters [redacted]. She wrote, "I am the primary interrogator on six detainees. . . [redacted] is concentrating on Gul Rahman and other new detainees and already has a full plate."

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

42
~~SECRET~~ [redacted] /NOFORN//MR

(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

recall which interpreter was used in this session, but he would have used one, [redacted] to conduct an interrogation. [redacted] stated the session was neutral in tone and not confrontational. Accordingly, he would consider it a debriefing, not an interrogation.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

125. (S//NF) [redacted] recalled that, during the last few days of his detention, Rahman did something that caused [redacted] to order the guards to give Rahman a sweatshirt and possibly some socks and to loosen his restraints. [redacted] stated Rahman must have been somewhat compliant because his hand restraints were removed. The fact that his wrists had pretty bad scabs on them was also a factor in having the restraints removed. According to [redacted] the sweatshirt was not the result of Rahman complaining of being cold or [redacted] surmising Rahman was cold because he saw Rahman shivering. They were in the interrogation room, which was relatively warm with two 1000-watt lights and an electric heater. [redacted] stated that he might have given Rahman the sweatshirt because it was getting cooler; [redacted] was trying to find a way to do something positive for Rahman. [redacted] stated he did not recall having a conversation with anyone about the cold conditions at the time. He could not, however, discount the possibility that concerns raised by others might have played a role in his decision to give Rahman the sweatshirt. [redacted] explained that he did not prepare a cable as a result of the

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) NatSecAct on [redacted] (b)(1) number because not much happened (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

126. (S//NF) [redacted] November 2002. The [redacted] November 2002 chronology cable reported:

At 1530 local on [redacted] November 2002, the [redacted] commander told station that when Rahman had been given food at 1500 local, he had thrown it, his plate, his water bottle and defecation bucket at the guards who had delivered the food. Station requested that

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~ // ~~NOFORN~~ // MR

(b)(3) NatSecAct

the [redacted] commander to replace [sic] Rahman's hand restraints to prevent this from reoccurring, or prevent him from undertaking any other violent actions.⁷⁶

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c) 127. (S//NF) [redacted] recalled that, on [redacted] November, he was at [redacted] and was approached by a guard. [redacted]

[redacted] The guard(s) reported that Rahman had been acting violently and had thrown his food and defecation bucket at the guards. Rahman had also threatened the guards, noting that he had seen their faces and would kill them when he got out of the facility. [redacted] confirmed it is likely that Rahman had seen the guards' faces, because they were sometimes lax about using their kerchiefs to cover their faces.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

128. (S//NF) [redacted] did not recall whether [redacted] [redacted] were present at [redacted] when Rahman threw his food. He did not specifically recall telling others about the incident but acknowledged that he may have told [redacted] and [redacted], who would have had an interest in the case.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

129. (S//NF) [redacted] approached [redacted] and [redacted] on [redacted] November 2002, between 1500 and 1800 hours, according to [redacted] [redacted] was laughing and revealed that Rahman had been violent in his cell, threatened the guards, and had thrown his food. [redacted] added that he would take care of it. [redacted] interpreted this as a lighthearted comment and assumed [redacted] was laughing because no detainee had done this previously. [redacted] further assumed that when [redacted] said he would take care of it, he meant he would have the cell cleaned and have Rahman chained. [redacted] believed he departed [redacted] with [redacted] shortly following the comment by [redacted] [redacted] did not recall for certain whether [redacted] came back [redacted] with him or remained [redacted] with [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

⁷⁶ (E) This is the only passage in the cable that addresses the events of [redacted] November 2002. It has been established that the term "station" in this paragraph means [redacted]

~~SECRET~~ / [] / ~~NOFORN~~ // ~~MR~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

[] did not remember hearing that Rahman had thrown anything else besides his food. [] did not recall a discussion of the Rahman incident on [] November 2002.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

130. (S//NF) [] recalled that, approximately a day before Rahman's death, [] casually mentioned Rahman had thrown his food and defecation bucket at the guards. To her, this appeared to be a normal update on Rahman. [] interpreted [] tone as indicative that the throwing of the items was "not a big deal," but rather an indication of Rahman's stature of being hard core. [] stated that [] did not mention that Rahman had threatened the guards. She did not remember [] being present during this discussion.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

131. (S//NF) [] stated he did not know what might have prompted Rahman to act in this manner. He was the only detainee who had ever threatened the guards or thrown food at them. As a result of this conduct, [] ordered the guards to shackle Rahman's hands. [] was not certain who proposed the idea to short chain Rahman. [] suspected the guard(s) recommended it and he approved. Regardless of the origin, [] acknowledged that he would have authorized Rahman's short chaining on [] November 2002.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

132. (S//NF) [] explained that the short chain was necessary to prevent Rahman from throwing things.⁷⁷ [] reasoned if only Rahman's hands had been shackled together, he still would have been able to throw objects. That is, manacled one hand to the other still permitted the limited range of movement that would

[]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

~~SECRET~~ / []⁴⁵ / ~~NOFORN~~ // ~~MR~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

allow Rahman the ability to throw something.⁷⁸ In [] view, trying to harm others when they entered the cell crossed the line; a detainee who acted in this manner needed to be restrained. [] did not want Rahman throwing things even though the tray was constructed of cardboard and the bucket and water bottle were made of plastic. [] did not know if the defecation bucket was empty at the time it was thrown.⁷⁹

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

133. (S//NF) According to [] the short chaining was not the result of the verbal threat to the guards. [] did not have any firsthand knowledge of the threat; the guards told him about it. They did not appear very worried or frightened by the threat. [] found this surprising because [] Rahman had reportedly threatened the guards previously. [] did not recall Rahman being punished for the previous threats; [] thought he would recall if Rahman had been punished.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

134. (S//NF) [] stated it never occurred to him that short chaining Rahman while wearing no pants would have consequences. In retrospect, [] said he can see there were problems caused by that action. At the time, he viewed short chaining as just a mechanism to safely secure Rahman. [] did not think he had crossed the line in ordering the short chaining. It was not done to induce pain or suffering. His only thought at the time was to make Rahman immobile. [] stated they are not in the punishment game at [] are in the business of getting information.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

135. (S//NF) According to [] it was evident to him during his investigation that [] directed how Rahman was to be treated and interrogated. The guards would not have chained

⁷⁸ (S//NF) Despite this view, there was no need for the guards to enter the cell to deliver food. The doors for each cell were constructed with a small slot near the bottom of the doors. The purpose of the slot was for the safe delivery of food to the detainee without opening the doors. The same slot was used by the guards to inspect the cell and monitor detainees during security checks.

⁷⁹ (S//NF) Four of the officers who responded to Rahman's cell on [] November 2002 said they did not see or smell urine or excrement in or around the cell. (b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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SECRET / [] NOFORN // MR

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1) Rahman without being instructed to do so. []

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6) Anything that happened to Rahman would have come through

(b)(7)(c)

[]

(b)(3) NatSecAct

136. (S//NF) [] the BOP officers explained that []

[] taught the use of a short chain to the guards and mentioned

it as an alternative method of securing a prisoner.⁸⁰ [] BOP

(b)(3) NatSecAct

officer said "short chaining" is used by BOP officers in cases where the inmate has been violent or kicks at the guards and would never be used for an inmate who threw food at a guard. The guards

practiced the technique for approximately an hour and were told to practice all the techniques in the evening on each other. According to

the BOP officers, they did not offer any scenarios for the use of the

short chain, that is, under what circumstances it should be used; they

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct simply taught the technique.

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

137. (S//NF) [] who assisted [] at [] from late

September to early December 2002, and had considerable contact

with the guards, stated that the [] guards used a form of short

shackling prior to the arrival of the BOP officers. The original

technique involved chaining both the hands and the feet to the wall.

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

The wall hook was less than two feet from the floor. The detainee

would have to sit on the floor of the cell with his arm elevated and

bent.⁸¹ [] stated that he saw Rahman short chained in his cell.

He never saw any other detainee placed in that position.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

138. (S//NF) [] November 2002. The [] November 2002

chronology cable reported:

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

Interviewed separately on [] November 2002, each of the two []

guards reported that during normal cell checks at 2200, 2300, 0400,

and 0800 on [] November, they saw Rahman was alive in his

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

⁸¹ (S//NF) The difference between the two techniques is that, with the original technique, the detainee is chained to the wall, and there is no third chain connecting the hands to the feet.

SECRET / [] NOFORN // MR

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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~~SECRET~~ / ~~NOFORN~~ // MR

(b)(3) NatSecAct

cell. Rahman was visually inspected through the door cell slot but no guard entered his cell. Both of the two guards on the 0900 cell check said independently that Rahman was definitely alive, with his eyes open, seated in his cell at 0800 hours on [] November 2002. . . . Shortly after 1000 hours on [] November 2002, Station personnel then present at the facility to conduct an interrogation of another individual were notified by [] guards that Gul-Rahman was sleeping in his cell but there was some problem. These officers were escorted to the cell by the guards. These officers realized Rahman was deceased and they subsequently requested via secure radio that Station medic visit the facility. Officers reported that a small amount (palm-sized pool) of dried blood was present in and around the mouth and nose of subject. Rahman was observed still shackled, and slumped over in the seated position

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

At approximately 1030 hours, Station medic arrived at the location. The Station medic inspected the body and noticed no obvious contusions, abrasions, marks, swelling, or other indications of specific cause of death. He noted that the blood in evidence was dark, not in keeping with a wound to the nose or mouth area. The medic's notes on Rahman's condition are filed at Station. His estimation was that Rahman had been dead less than a few hours.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

139. (S//NF) According to the two TDY officers who were present at [] when Rahman was reported dead, he was lying on his side; his hands were shackled together as were his feet. His hands were then secured to his feet and his feet were chained to a grate on the wall with a six- to 12-inch cha

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

140. (S//NF) [] stated he was unaware that Station officers tried to contact him on the morning of [] November 2002 when Rahman's death was discovered. He indicated the radio was not always on. [] said he was not certain where he was at the time Rahman's body was found. [] thought perhaps he was at the Station [] but he acknowledged that had he been at the Station and the trio called, someone would have located him.⁸²

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

⁸² (S//NF) None of the personnel, including [] who were present in [] and became aware of Rahman's death that date could account for [] whereabouts throughout the morning when Rahman's death was reported to the Station.

~~SECRET~~ / ~~NOFORN~~ // MR

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~ / ~~NOFORN~~ // ~~MR~~
(b)(3) NatSecAct

When the officers subsequently returned to the Station from

(b)(1) [redacted] they informed selected Station personnel of Rahman's
(b)(3) CIAAct death. One of them, identity unrecalled, informed [redacted] they had
(b)(3) NatSecAct found Rahman dead in his cell.⁸³ When [redacted] went to see [redacted] he
(b)(6) was already aware of Rahman's death.⁸⁴
(b)(7)(c) (b)(3) NatSecAct

141. (S/ [redacted] [redacted] acknowledged that the account of the
guards checking on Rahman at 2200 and 2300 and 0400 hours, as
reported in the cable, was odd and inconsistent with the policy of the
rounds conducted every four hours. He maintained, however, that
this was what the guards told him [redacted] said he thought it was
unusual that the guard commander was not present at [redacted]
when Rahman's death was reported. Other officers also cited that
(b)(1) this absence appeared unusual.
(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct

142. (S/ [redacted] From what he heard, [redacted] said he was
confident Rahman died of hypothermia. Being on the bare floor was
likely a factor. [redacted] stated he had no more experience than the
average person with hypothermia. From life experience [redacted]
(b)(1) recognized that if the ground is colder than your body, it is prudent
(b)(3) CIAAct to have something between your body and the ground.
(b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted]

[redacted] assumed
that other detainees did not die because they were more warmly
dressed. Rahman was the only prisoner short chained in his cell at
the time; he was different from the other prisoners. When asked if he
thought Rahman would have been alive on [redacted] November 2002 if he
had cooperated, [redacted] responded that if Rahman had been
(b)(1) cooperative, he would probably still be alive.
(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

⁸³ (S//NF) When interviewed by the DO Investigative Team three days after Rahman's death,
(b)(1) [redacted] stated he learned of the death from [redacted] [redacted] confirmed this during his OIG
(b)(3) CIAAct interview.

(b)(3) NatSecAct (S//NF) No photographs were taken of Rahman or the condition of his cell. The only
(b)(6) photographs of Rahman were the photographs taken in conjunction with the autopsy on
(b)(7)(c) [redacted] November 2002.

(b)(1) ~~SECRET~~ / ~~NOFORN~~ // ~~MR~~
(b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] 49
(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~ / ~~NOFORN~~ / ~~MR~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

143. (S//NF) [redacted] stated that he is hesitant to conclude that hypothermia was the cause of Rahman's death. He is not convinced that there were not other unspecified medical conditions that existed with Rahman that contributed to his death. [redacted] stated that it is hard for him to square with hypothermia as the cause of death since Rahman was alive through the night.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~(U//FOUO)~~ THE INVESTIGATION BY THE DO INVESTIGATIVE TEAM

(b)(3) NatSecAct

144. (S//NF) [redacted] Station reported Rahman's death in an [redacted] cable to the DDO on [redacted] November 2002, the day of Rahman's death. Shortly thereafter the DDO dispatched three Agency officers (the "DO Investigative Team") to [redacted] on a [redacted] to investigate the circumstances of the death.⁸⁵ The DO Investigative Team, consisting of [redacted] who was the senior security officer assigned to [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

[redacted] conducted interviews, and the pathologist performed an autopsy of Rahman.⁸⁶

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

145. (S//NF) [redacted] advised the DO Investigative Team that detainees were examined and photographed upon their arrival to protect the Agency in the event they were beaten or otherwise mistreated [redacted] prior to rendition. However, when [redacted] on [redacted] January 2003, two months after Rahman's arrival in [redacted] requested the identity of the medical officer, the results of Rahman's medical examination, and copies of the rendition photographs, [redacted] did not produce them. [redacted] reported that no medical documents were retained from the renditions, and the Station did not retain medical documentation of detainees. [redacted] said he could not

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

~~SECRET~~ / [redacted] / ~~NOFORN~~ / ~~MR~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~ / ~~NOFORN~~ / ~~MR~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct

identify the medic who reportedly examined Rahman and also said the digital photographs of Rahman had been overwritten. (b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

146. (~~S~~/~~NF~~) The DO Investigative Team interviewed [redacted] CIA employees and contractors and the [redacted] inside guards. [redacted] was interviewed a second time when he returned to Headquarters while on leave from [redacted] and by an e-mail message that was sent to [redacted] later attempting to locate additional information. On [redacted] January 2003, [redacted] completed a 33-page report with 50 attachments, including the post-mortem photographs.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

147. (~~S~~/~~NF~~) [redacted] stated he delivered tissue samples and histologies (microscopic examination of structure of the tissues) to government laboratories. From the toxicology and laboratory studies, he learned there were no traces of cyanide, opiates, truth serums, or poisons. He said he was "99.9 percent" certain that the cause of death was hypothermia and asserted that, if Rahman's death had occurred in the United States, it would have been listed as death by hypothermia. [redacted] stated that, from a clinical perspective, he is skeptical of the accuracy of the reporting of the time of death. He believes the account of the guards that Rahman was shivering at 0800 hours "does not fit."

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

148. (~~S~~/[redacted]) On [redacted] November 2002, [redacted] sent an e-mail message to several OGC attorneys assigned to the DO that was intended to be a preliminary report of his findings.⁸⁷ Included in the e-mail message was the following:

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

[redacted] (b)(5)

⁸⁷ (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] said he did not prepare any other report on this matter.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

~~SECRET~~ / ~~NOFORN~~ / ~~MR~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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
~~SECRET~~ / [redacted] ~~NOFORN~~ / ~~MR~~ (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

149. (S/ [redacted]) On [redacted] November 2002, prior to departing [redacted] sent an e-mail message to his supervisors [redacted] which was forwarded to the DDO and Associate DDO. The e-mail reported in part:

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] which is where our Subject was housed, is a newly constructed concrete facility that has no heating or cooling. Temperatures have recently dropped into the thirties at night. Having walked through the facility in the afternoon, it was still very cold. Most prisoners are fully clothed, however this prisoner was somewhat difficult to handle and uncooperative. He had thrown food and threatened to kill the guards. As punishment his pants were taken from him. He had not worn pants (meaning he was naked from the waste [sic] down) for several days. There was no carpeting or matting on the floor, which means that when he was shackled, his naked body sat against the bare concrete.



52
~~SECRET~~ / [redacted] ~~NOFORN~~ / ~~MR~~
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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~~SECRET~~ / ~~NOFORN~~ // ~~MR~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct

151. (~~S~~//~~NF~~) The autopsy indicated, by a diagnosis of exclusion, that Rahman's death was caused by hypothermia.⁸⁸ The Final Autopsy Findings reported the cause of death as "undetermined," the manner of death as "undetermined," and the clinical impression as hypothermia.

152. (~~S~~//~~NF~~) The DO Investigative Team concluded:

- ◆ There is no evidence to suggest that Rahman's death was deliberate.
- ◆ There is no evidence to suggest that Rahman was beaten, tortured, poisoned, strangled, or smothered.
- ◆ Hypothermia was the most likely cause of death of Rahman.
- ◆ Rahman's death was not deliberate but resulted from incarceration in a cold environment while nude from the waist down and being shackled in a position that prevented him from moving around to keep warm. Additionally, this kept him in direct contact with the cold concrete floor leading to a loss of body heat through conduction.

Rahman's actions contributed to his own death. By throwing his last meal, he was unable to provide his body with a source of fuel to keep him warm. Additionally, his violent behavior resulted in his restraint, which prevented him from generating body heat by moving around and brought him in direct contact with the concrete floor leading to a loss of body heat through conduction.

⁸⁸ (U) A diagnosis of exclusion in a death case is one where all other causes of death are excluded and the clinical environment in which the victim was found is examined along with the immediate history developed during the investigation. However, no definitive tests or findings establish that diagnosis.

53
~~SECRET~~ / ~~NOFORN~~ // ~~MR~~

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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~~SECRET~~/

~~NOFORN~~//MR

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

(C) OTHER TECHNIQUES EMPLOYED OR APPROVED BY

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

153. ~~(S//NF)~~ A senior CTC operations officer stated that when he was at [redacted] between 13 September and 3 October 2002, [redacted] offered to fire a handgun outside the interrogation room while the operations officer was interviewing a detainee who was thought to be withholding information. Reportedly, [redacted] staged the incident, which included screaming and yelling outside the cell by other CIA officers and local guards. When the guards moved the detainee from the interrogation room, they passed a guard who was dressed as a hooded detainee, lying motionless on the ground and made to appear as if he had been shot to death. The operations officer added that [redacted] openly discussed his plan for the mock execution for several days prior to and after the event with [redacted] Station officers.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

154. ~~(S//NF)~~ Station officer [redacted] recounted that around [redacted] 2002, she heard that this same senior CTC operations officer staged a mock execution. She was not present but understood it went badly; she was told that it was transparently a ruse and no benefit was derived from it.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

155. ~~(S//NF)~~ Four other officers and ICs who were interviewed admitted to either participating in such an incident or hearing about one of them.⁸⁹ An IC who led a CTC review of procedures at [redacted] after Rahman's death stated that [redacted] described staging a mock execution of a detainee. Reportedly, a detainee who witnessed the "body" in the aftermath of the ruse "sang like a bird."

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

156. ~~(S//NF)~~ [redacted] admitted that he participated in a "mock execution" at [redacted] when the first detainees arrived. He contended the detainees were there only one day, and he hoped to shake them up quickly. [redacted] explained he discharged a firearm in a safe manner while an [redacted] officer lay on the floor and

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

⁸⁹ ~~(S//NF)~~ It is difficult to determine how many mock executions were staged during this period. There appear to be at least two. [redacted] admits to participating in only one.

~~SECRET~~/

~~NOFORN~~//MR

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

~~SECRET~~ / ~~NOFORN~~ // MR (b)(6)
(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(7)(c)

chicken blood was splattered on the wall. The technique was [redacted] idea and was based on the [redacted] concept of showing something that looks real, but is not. According to [redacted] in that case it was not effective because it appeared to be staged. (b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

157. (S//NF) [redacted] stated that [redacted]

[redacted] also employed the mock execution technique once; the officer informed [redacted] about it afterwards. The [redacted] reportedly tried the technique because the detainee knew it was [redacted] facility and the officer wanted to induce the belief that [redacted] would do anything. [redacted] contended that he did not know when this incident occurred or if it was successful.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

158. (S//NF) When asked about the possibility that handguns had been used as props or mock executions had been staged at [redacted]

[redacted] responded, "We don't do that . . . there's none of that." [redacted] said he would be surprised if someone said that a gun was used; it was not part of an interrogation technique. He explained that handguns were not allowed in the vicinity of detainees, for fear that the weapons could be taken away or turned on the interrogators.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

159. (S//NF) Upon further discussion, [redacted] revealed that approximately four days before his interview with OIG, [redacted] told [redacted] of an instance when [redacted] conducted a mock execution at [redacted] in approximately [redacted] 2002.⁹⁰ Reportedly, the firearm was discharged outside of the building, and it was done because the detainee reportedly possessed critical threat information.

[redacted] stated that he did not hear of a similar act occurring at [redacted] subsequently.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

~~(S//NF)~~ NOTIFICATIONS OF RAHMAN'S DEATH TO CONGRESS (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

160. (S//NF) [redacted] As discussed previously, [redacted] reported Rahman's death to Headquarters in a [redacted] November 2002 [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

⁹⁰ (S//NF) [redacted] was interviewed on [redacted] February 2003. (b)(3) CIAAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)

(h)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

cable to the DDO. (See Exhibit.) On [] November 2002, [] reported [] - [] Station Medical Support to Detainees in [] to the DDO. This addressed the medical care provided to detainees in general along with a comment about the medical treatment provided to Rahman.

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

161. (S/ []) On 29 November 2002, the Director of Congressional Affairs (D/OCA) provided the Chairman and ranking member of each Intelligence Committee and the Chairman and Ranking Member of the House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees on Defense a background paper entitled "Death of Detainee Gul Rahman." The paper identified Rahman as "an Al-Qa'ida operative and Hezbi-Islami Gulbuddin/Hekmatyar associate who was also a close contact of senior Al-Qa'ida facilitator Abu Abdul Rahman Al-Najdi." It reported CIA was sending a team of officers to [] to conduct an inquiry into Rahman's death,

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

including an autopsy to determine the cause of death. The background paper reported, "Rahman arrived at the [] detention facility on [] November [2002] and was given a physical examination

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

which indicated no medical issues or preexisting medical conditions."⁹¹ (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

162. (S/ []) On 23 January 2003, the IG reported to the DCI by memorandum that the General Counsel had informed the IG on 22 January 2003 of the death of Gul Rahman. Further, the IG stated that the OIG was investigating the issue. On 30 January 2003, the DCI forwarded the IG's memorandum to the Congressional oversight committees and reiterated the DCI had notified the committees of this matter by formal notification on 29 November 2002. The DCI's letter added that the DO Investigative Team's report was nearing

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

⁹¹ (S/ []) The first portion of this statement appears to be drawn from the [] November 2002 [] cable reporting the death of Rahman. As explained earlier, this information is inaccurate. There is no evidence that Rahman received a physical examination upon his arrival at [] or at any time following his arrival in []. It cannot be determined where the Office of Congressional Affairs obtained the information that Rahman did not have any medical issues or a preexisting medical condition because that conclusion was not reported in either the [] or [] November 2002 cables.

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

completion and CIA would be sending the committees a follow-up notification in the near future.
(b)(3) NatSecAct

163. (S// [redacted] On 2 May 2003, the D/OCA provided an update to the Intelligence Committees of Congress and Chairman and Ranking Member of the House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense in the form of a background paper entitled "Death of Detainee Gul Rahman." The background paper, "Investigation by the Directorate of Operations," which included an autopsy and toxicology, disclosed that Rahman's death was accidental and most likely resulted from hypothermia."⁹² The background paper reported that Rahman was nude from the waist down and that "an autopsy disclosed several surface abrasions which he obtained within the first few days of his incarceration."⁹³ The background paper reported, "During his incarceration, Rahman threatened several times to kill [redacted] guards."⁹⁴ . . . At 1500 [hours] on [redacted] November 2002 . . . Rahman again threatened to kill the guards and threw his food, water bottle, and waste bucket at the guards." Finally, the background paper reported, "As a result of his violent behavior, and following procedures recommended by the U.S. BOP, Rahman was shackled to the wall in a short chain position which prevents prisoners from standing upright."⁹⁵

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

⁹² (S// [redacted] As reported above, in actuality, the autopsy reported the cause of death as "undetermined," the manner of death as "undetermined," and the clinical impression as hypothermia. The investigative report concluded, "There is no evidence to suggest that Rahman's death was deliberate."

(b)(3) NatSecAct

⁹³ (S// [redacted] The initial report to Congress on 29 November 2002 did not report that Rahman was naked below the waist and chained in a position that forced him to sit on the concrete floor. The autopsy did not address the age of the abrasions. As explained earlier, the pathologist opined to OIG that the abrasions to the shoulders and hips occurred from one to three days, at most, before Rahman's death.

(b)(3) NatSecAct

⁹⁴ (S// [redacted] According to [redacted] Rahman reportedly threatened the guards two times only, during the week of [redacted] November and on [redacted] November.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

⁹⁵ (S// [redacted] As reported previously [redacted] advised OIG that he did not recall punishing Rahman for the first alleged verbal threat. [redacted] BOP officers, [redacted]

[redacted] who taught the short chain position, indicated that they had never seen the short chain position used in a cell situation. Additionally, they did not offer scenarios for use of the short chain position and would not employ the technique on a detainee for throwing food. They simply taught the technique.

(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

Approved for Release: 2019/05/29 C06541713

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

(U) APPLICABLE LAWS, REGULATIONS AND POLICIES

164. (U) Title 18 U.S.C. §112, *Manslaughter*, provides in pertinent part :

Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. It is of two kinds:

Voluntary – Upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.

Involuntary – In the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony, or in the commission in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection, of a lawful act which might produce death.

165. (U) Title 18 U.S.C. §2441, *Torture*, provides penalties for "who[m]ever outside the United States commits or attempts to commit torture." The statute defines the crime of torture, in pertinent part, as:

an act committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or physical control.

166. (U) Title 18 U.S.C. §2441, *War Crimes*, provides penalties for "whomever, whether inside or outside the United States, commits a war crime" wherein "the person committing such war crime or the victim of such war crime is a member of the Armed Forces of the United States or a national of the United States." The statute defines a war crime as any conduct defined as a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions [or any protocol to such convention to which the United States is a party].⁹⁶ The proscribed conduct includes the following

⁹⁶ (U) The United States is not yet a party to either of the two "Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions."

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

Approved for Release: 2019/05/29 C06541713

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

relevant offenses: willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, willfully causing great suffering to body or health.⁹⁷

167. (U) On 7 February 2002, President Bush issued a memorandum noting that the "provisions of Geneva will apply to our present conflict with the Taliban" [in Afghanistan] but would not apply to Al-Qa'ida.⁹⁸ Neither the Taliban nor Al-Qa'ida would be entitled to enemy Prisoners of War status, however. Nonetheless, the President ordered, "As a matter of policy, the United States Armed Forces shall continue to treat detainees humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva."

168. (~~S~~//NF) On 24 January 2003, the General Counsel orally informed the Chief of the Criminal Division, DoJ of Rahman's death. On 13 February 2003, OIG reported Rahman's death in detention to the U.S. DoJ by memorandum.

169. (~~S~~//NF) On 29 December 2003, the Chief, Counterterrorism Section, Criminal Division, DoJ, reported by letter that it declined to pursue a federal prosecution of criminal charges in this matter. As of April 2005, the matter is under review by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia pursuant to the direction of the Attorney General.

⁹⁷ (U) Grave breaches are defined in the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Persons in Time of War are listed in Article 147. (Article 130 of the Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War lists these same offenses as "grave breaches.")

⁹⁸ (U) Memorandum from the President to the Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Chief of Staff to the President, Director of Central Intelligence, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees," dated and signed 7 February 2002.

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

170. (U//~~FOUO~~) Agency Regulation 13-6, Appendix I, Standards for Employee Accountability provides:

- a. Consequences will follow an employee's failure to comply with a statute, regulation, policy or other guidance that is applicable to the employee's professional conduct or performance.
- b. The lack of knowledge of a statute, regulation, policy or guidance does not necessarily excuse the employee. However, lack of knowledge may affect the level of employee responsibility and the extent to which disciplinary action is warranted. Therefore the following factors will be considered prior to holding an employee accountable for a particular act or omission:
 - (1) Agency efforts to make employees aware of the statute, regulation, policy or guidance;
 - (2) The extent of employee awareness of the statute, regulation, policy or guidance;
 - (3) The importance of the conduct or performance at issue;
 - (4) The position or grade of the employee.
- c. Any finding of deficient performance must be specific and may include omissions and failure to act in accordance with a reasonable level of professionalism, skill, and diligence.
- d. Determinations under the above standard will be based in part on whether the facts objectively indicate a certain action should have been taken or not taken and whether the employee had an opportunity and the responsibility to act or not act.
- e. Managers may be held accountable in addition for the action(s) or inaction of subordinates even if the manager lacks knowledge of the subordinate's conduct. Such accountability depends on:
 - (1) Whether the manager reasonably should have been aware of the matter and has taken reasonable measures to ensure such awareness.

SECRET// [] NOFORN//MR

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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- (2) Whether the manager has taken reasonable measures to ensure compliance with the law and Agency policies and regulations.

CONCLUSIONS

171. ~~(S//NF)~~ CIA had not issued any applicable custodial interrogation guidelines by the time of Rahman's detention. The practice at that time was for interrogators to propose interrogation techniques to CTC for pre-approval. [] did not take this step prior to the interrogation of Rahman. Further, a CTC legal advisor said Headquarters would not have knowingly approved several of the techniques that [] employed, including cold showers, cold conditions, hard takedowns, and the short chain restraint.

172. ~~(S//NF)~~ [] treated Rahman harshly because of Rahman's alleged stature, his uncompromising reaction to the interrogation and lack of cooperation, the pressure on [] to "break him," and [] lack of experience with a committed interrogation resister. (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

173. ~~(S//NF)~~ On [] November 2002, [] ordered or approved the guards placing Rahman in the short chain position whereby he was compelled to sit on the concrete floor of his cell. Rahman was only clothed in a sweatshirt. This act directly led to Rahman's death by hypothermia. [] was fully cognizant that the temperature in [] had fallen sharply in November. Two individuals said that they raised the subject of the cold temperatures with [] On [] November, [] directed that actions be taken to help other detainees ward off the cold. Other officers and contractors present at [] in November 2002 stated they recognized it was very cold and some detainees were inadequately protected against the cold. They stated they were personally aware of the possibility of hypothermia, but some said they assumed it was the responsibility of someone else to address.

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
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Approved for Release: 2019/05/29 C06541713

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

174. (S//NF) [] exhibited reckless indifference to the possibility that his actions might cause injuries or result in Rahman's death. There is no indication that [] intended that Rahman should be severely harmed or killed.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

175. (S//NF) The initial account of [] guards that Rahman died in the mid-morning of [] November 2002 is unreliable and self-serving. It is likely that Rahman died during the night and the guards waited until Station officers were present at [] to report his death. Nonetheless, there is no evidence that the [] guards assaulted or independently mistreated Rahman.

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

176. (S//NF) Rahman did not receive a physical examination following his rendition from [] or at any time while detained [] despite [] report to the contrary. Although [] the physician's assistant at that time, reported that he examined all the other detainees held at [] he did not examine Rahman. [] allowed Rahman's statement that all was well to supplant a physical examination.

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(b)(3) CIAAct
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

177. (S//NF) [] who was in [] during the first [] days of Rahman's detention, did not attend to Rahman in the same manner and with the same standard of care as the other detainees. [] was aware of the cold conditions; indeed the temperature in [] had reached a low of 31 degrees the day before he departed [] on [] November. As a medical care provider, he should have advocated more humane treatment for Rahman that would ensure his health and safety.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

178. (S//NF) [] Station's reporting of the details of Rahman's detention and death in Station cables contained false statements and material omissions. Consequently, the Congressional notification drawn from the cable information bore inaccuracies and material omissions. The inaccurate reporting obscured or minimized the circumstances of the death, the involvement of [] in the mistreatment of Rahman, and the absence of adequate supervision by []

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

A follow-up report to the Congressional oversight

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
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(b)(3) NatSecAct

Approved for Release: 2019/05/29 C06541713

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

committees was prepared on 2 May 2003. That report, drawn from the DO Investigative Report, accurately reported salient circumstances that contributed to Rahman's death that were initially omitted.

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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

179. (S//NF) [redacted] bears direct responsibility for failing to include pertinent facts in his [redacted] November 2002 official written account of Rahman's death. The cable specifically withheld information known to [redacted] and [redacted] that [redacted] directed the guards to place Rahman in the short chain position while he was naked below the waist, thereby forcing him to sit bare bottomed on the bare concrete floor of his cell in what were known to be very cold temperatures.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

180. (S//NF) [redacted] bears responsibility for not providing adequate supervision of [redacted] activities at [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
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[redacted]
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)


Approved for Release: 2019/05/29 C06541713

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. (~~S~~/~~NF~~) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency should convene an Accountability Board to review the performance of [redacted] in regard to the events that contributed to the death of Gul Rahman.



(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(5)

CONCUR:

[redacted]
(b)(6)
John L. Helgeson
Inspector General

4/27/05
Date

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

Vaughn Index Entry No. 3

OCA-01561-03

~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(1) [redacted] //X1
(b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted]

No. _____

COPY _____

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMATION

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~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(1) [redacted] //X1
(b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted]

[redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted]

ROUTING			
TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1			
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			
7			
REMARKS:			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.		DATE	

(Security Classification)

EYES ONLY

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(Security Classification)

EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~ // (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct /X1

(b)(3) CIAAct
DCI/OCA/LG/ (25 April 2003)
OCA 2003-1188 (b)(3) NatSecAct

Distribution:

- Original - Pat Murray, HPSCI (w/encl) OCA 2003-1188
- Original - L. Christine Healy, HPSCI (w/encl) OCA 2003-1188/1
- Original - Bill Duhnke, SSCI (w/encl) OCA 2003-1188/2
- Original - Chris Mellon, SSCI (w/encl) OCA 2003-1188/3
- Original - Jerry Lewis, HAC/DEF (w/encl) OCA 2003-1188/4
- Original - Ted Stevens, SAC/DEF (w/encl) OCA 2003-1188/5
- 1 - EA/DCI (w/encl)
- 1 - D/OCA (w/encl)
- 1 - OCA/EXO (w/encl)
- 1 - DAC (Official OCA Record) (w/encl)
- 1 - Notification (w/encl)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct /X1

~~TOP SECRET~~ / (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct //X1

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 2003-1188

2 May 2003

Mr. Pat Murray
Staff Director
Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Pat:

SUBJECT: Notification (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

COUNTRY: [redacted]

(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct ISSUE: (PS) [redacted] Death of Detainee Gul Rahman

(U) Enclosed is a background paper regarding the subject mentioned above.

(U) Because of the sensitivity of the information, access to this notification should be limited only to those individuals on your staff briefed into this compartment.

(U) Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please do not hesitate to call.

Sincerely,

(b)(6)

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(1)
~~TOP SECRET~~ // [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct /X1

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 2003-1188/1

2 May 2003

MS. L. Christine Healey
Democratic Counsel
Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Chris: (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

SUBJECT: Notification

COUNTRY: [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

ISSUE: ~~(TS)~~ [redacted] Death of Detainee Gul Rahman

(U) Enclosed is a background paper regarding the subject mentioned above.

(U) Because of the sensitivity of the information, access to this notification should be limited only to those individuals on your staff briefed into this compartment.

(U) Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please do not hesitate to call.

Sincerely,

[redacted] (b)(6)

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

[redacted] (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct /X1

(b)(1)
~~TOP SECRET~~ / (b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] /X1

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 2003-1188/2

2 May 2003

Mr. Bill Duhnke
Staff Director
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Bill:

SUBJECT: Notification (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

COUNTRY: [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

ISSUE: (TS) [redacted] Death of Detainee Gul Ruhman

(U) Enclosed is a background paper regarding the subject mentioned above.

(U) Because of the sensitivity of the information, access to this notification should be limited only to those individuals on your staff briefed into this compartment.

(U) Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please do not hesitate to call.

Sincerely,

[redacted signature box]
(b)(6)

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

[redacted box]
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted box]
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] /X1

~~TOP SECRET~~ // (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct X1

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 2003-1188/3

2 May 2003

Mr. Chris Mellon
Minority Staff Director
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Chris:

SUBJECT: Notificatio(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
COUNTRY: [redacted]

ISSUE: (TS) [redacted] Death of Detainee Gul Rahman

(U) Enclosed is a background paper regarding the subject mentioned above.

(U) Because of the sensitivity of the information, access to this notification should be limited only to those individuals on your staff briefed into this compartment.

(U) Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please do not hesitate to call.

Sincerely,

(b)(6)

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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~~TOP SECRET~~ / (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct /x1

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 2003-1188/4

2 May 2003

The Honorable Jerry Lewis
Chairman
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman: (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct
SUBJECT: Notification (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct
COUNTRY: [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct
ISSUE: (TS) [redacted] Death of Detainee Gul Rahman

(U) Enclosed is a background paper regarding the subject mentioned above.

(U) Because of the sensitivity of the information, access to this notification should be limited only to those individuals on your staff briefed into this compartment.

(U) Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please do not hesitate to call.

Sincerely,

[redacted signature box] (b)(6)

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct

~~TOP SECRET~~ / (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct /x1

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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/X1

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 2003-1188/5

2 May 2003

The Honorable Ted Stevens
Chairman
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

SUBJECT: Notification (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

COUNTRY: [Redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct ISSUE: ~~TOP SECRET~~ / [Redacted] Death of Detainee Gul Rahman

(U) Enclosed is a background paper regarding the subject mentioned above.

(U) Because of the sensitivity of the information, access to this notification should be limited only to those individuals on your staff briefed into this compartment.

(U) Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please do not hesitate to call.

Sincerely,

[Redacted Signature]

(b)(6)

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

[Redacted]
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[Redacted]
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~TOP SECRET~~ /

[Redacted]

X1

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

C06548229

Approved for Release: 2019/05/29 C06548229

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(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct SUBJECT: Death of Detainee Gul Rahman

(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (TS/ [redacted] This is to advise you of the results of a CIA Directorate of Operations investigation into the [redacted] November 2002 death of Gul (Rahman), an Al Qa'ida operative and HIG/Hekmatyar associate, who was being detained at [redacted]

[redacted] prison facility that is funded by CIA and operated [redacted]

(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct You were initially notified of his death on [redacted] November 2002.

(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (TS/ [redacted] Investigation by the Directorate of Operations, which included an autopsy and toxicology, disclosed that Rahman's death was accidental and most likely resulted from hypothermia. Rahman was incarcerated in the prison facility from [redacted] November 2002 until his death on [redacted] November 2002.

(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (TS/ [redacted] During his incarceration, Rahman threatened several times to kill [redacted] guards. At 1500 on [redacted] November 2002, [redacted] guards entered Rahman's cell to deliver his food. Rahman had last eaten the prior day. Rahman again threatened to kill the guards and threw his food, waterbottle, and waste bucket at the guards. At the time, Rahman was nude from the waist down. As a result of his violent behavior, and following procedures recommended by the US Bureau of Prisons, Rahman was shackled to the wall in a "short chain" position which prevents prisoners from standing upright. Rahman was then chained to a metal grill located low on the wall of his cell.

(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (TS/ [redacted] [redacted] prison guards made their normal rounds and checked Rahman's cell at 2200 and 2300 on [redacted] November and found him alive and seated upright. Rahman's cell was checked again on [redacted] November at 0400 and 0800. Again, he was found alive and seated upright. Guards noted that he was shivering; however, they noted that all prisoners frequently shiver. The guards checked Rahman's cell again at 1000 and found him lying on his side. The guards attempted to rouse Rahman by knocking on his metal cell door with their nightsticks; however, he did not move. [redacted] notified several CIA officers who were present at the facility in conjunction with the interrogation of another prisoner. The CIA personnel entered Rahman's cell and found him lying on the floor with a small amount of blood coming from his nose and mouth. CIA personnel checked his pulse and, finding none, unsuccessfully tried to resuscitate Rahman. CIA Station medical personnel were also notified. They examined Rahman's body and declared him dead.

(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct

~~TOP SECRET~~ / (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct //X1

~~TOP SECRET~~ / (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct //X1

(b)(1) SUBJECT: Death of Detainee Gul Rahman

(b)(3) NatSecAct (TS/ [redacted] An autopsy on Rahman disclosed several surface abrasions which he obtained within the first few days of his incarceration. These abrasions were caused by rough treatment designed to frighten and disorient the prisoner. Additionally, the autopsy found no evidence that Rahman had been beaten, tortured, poisoned, strangled, or smothered. The clinical diagnosis of death was determined to be hypothermia. The pathologist based his conclusion on the following factors:

- Rahman's urine had high catecholamine levels, which is consistent with hypothermic deaths.
- Rahman was seen shivering for a number of hours immediately prior to his death.
- The environment in which he was housed was extremely cold. On the night of his death, the outside temperature was 31 degrees Fahrenheit and the prison facility is not insulated.
- Rahman had not eaten in approximately 36 hours. No food was found in his stomach during the autopsy. Rahman's glycogen levels would have been depleted. Glycogen is a fuel source used by the body to stay warm.
- Rahman was unclothed from the waist down and was in direct contact with the cold concrete floor of his cell. Direct conduction would have caused significant heat loss in the body.
- Rahman was dehydrated which is a contributing factor to hypothermia.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1) (TS/ [redacted] Soon after learning of Rahman's death, CIA's Counterterrorist Center, in conjunction with [redacted] Station, (b)(3) NatSecAct assessed the detainee management and welfare practices at the prison facility and recommended improvements. The most important of these was to ensure that temperatures inside the facility are monitored and kept within a range that would not cause health (b)(1) risks to the detainees. (b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] CIA personnel at the facility also were instructed to check on the welfare of detainees on a more frequent basis. TDY officers from CTC have been instructed to assist [redacted] Station in identifying and implementing further improvements to the prison facility, its operations and management, and the training of [redacted] guard force.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~TOP SECRET~~ / (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct //X1

~~SECRET~~ (When Filled In)

Priority Handling

Congressional Action

SUBJECT: ~~(S)~~ (b)(1) / ~~(NF)~~ Death of Detainee Gul Rahman
 (b)(3) NatSecAct

FROM: DCI/OCA/LG (b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(3) CIAAct

EXTENSION: DATE SENT: 25 April REQUEST NUMBER: OCA 2003-1188

	TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after comment.)
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1.	OCA/LG (b)(3) CIAAct				
2.	DC/OCA/LG	5/1	5/1	(b)(3) CIAAct	
3.	C/OCA/LG	5/1	5/1		
4.	EXO/OCA		5/1		
5.	DD/OCA				
6.	D/OCA				
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					
11.					
12.					

Coordination: (b)(3) CIAAct
 Scott Mueller (GC)
 (b)(3) CIAAct

SUSPENSE DATE:

RETURN TO: DCI/OCA/LG (b)(3) CIAAct
 ATTN: (b)(3) CIAAct

Vaughn Index Entry No. 4

28 January 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

VIA: Associate Deputy Director for Operations/Counterintelligence

FROM: [Redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

SUBJECT: Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN

SCOPE OF INVESTIGATION (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

1. (S) The scope of this investigation was to determine the cause of the [Redacted] November 2002 death of Gul RAHMAN, a member of Hezbi Islami, who was being detained at an [Redacted] prison facility [Redacted] known to CIA personnel as [Redacted] RAHMAN had been undergoing interrogation by CIA personnel, [Redacted] Information [Redacted] contained in this report regarding the background of [Redacted] as well as the treatment of detainees at [Redacted] is provided for background and context as it relates to the investigation of the death of Gul RAHMAN. It is not intended to be a comprehensive review, survey or inspection of the operational procedures at [Redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[Redacted]
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~TOP SECRET//X1~~

A24-2

~~TOP SECRET//X1~~

SUBJECT: (S) Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN

BACKGROUND ON (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

2. (TS) [redacted] is a prison located (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

This prison, which became operational on [redacted] September 2002, is designed to house high value terrorist targets during the screening and interrogation phase of their detention, and is viewed by [redacted] Station as critical to Station's efforts to exploit these targets for intelligence and imminent threat information.^{2 3 4} [redacted] was set up with isolation of the detainee being the primary goal. Each detainee's interaction with the outside world was intended to be limited to brief contact with the guards and more extensive contact with his CIA interrogators. This allows CIA personnel to control almost all aspects of the detainees' existence.⁵

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

3. (TS) The construction of the prison was funded by CIA

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted]

There are 20 cells located inside the prison. The cells are

stand-alone concrete boxes.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

All cells have a metal ring

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

- ¹ Director 492873, [redacted] Sep 2002 (Attachment 1)
- ² [redacted] 27054, [redacted] Sep 2002 (Attachment 2) (b)(1)
- ³ [redacted] 21743, [redacted] May 2002 (Attachment 3) (b)(3) NatSecAct
- ⁴ [redacted] 22975, [redacted] Jun 2002 (Attachment 4)
- ⁵ [redacted] 23587, [redacted] Jun 2002 (Attachment 5)
- ⁶ Director 297415, [redacted] Jun 2002 (Attachment 6) (b)(1)
- ⁷ [redacted] 27768, [redacted] Oct 2002 (Attachment 7) (b)(3) NatSecAct

~~TOP SECRET//X1~~

A24-3

(b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct

~~TOP SECRET//X1~~

SUBJECT: (S) Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN

attached low to the wall to which prisoners are secured. Four of the cells have high bars that run between two walls to which prisoners can be secured. These four cells are designed for sleep deprivation.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

The cellblock windows are covered with two coats of black paint and heavy curtains making the cellblock completely dark. Stereo speakers in the cellblock play constant music to prevent communications between detainees.^{8 9}

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

4. (TS) The prisoner is protected by guard force.¹⁰ Guards protect the exterior of the facility. Guards are stationed in the interior of the building and handle the prisoners.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

interior guards are present almost constantly.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

According to Station personnel, although the prison guards lack significant training, all are very professional in duties. No station officer has ever witnessed or documented an instance of prisoner mistreatment by guard or witnessed any animosity by the guards toward the prisoners. No interrogator has ever seen or documented signs of physical abuse on any of the prisoners.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

- 22682, May 2002 (Attachment 8)
- 28246, Oct 2002 (Attachment 9)
- 24021, Jun 2002 (Attachment 10)
- 27365, Sep 2002 (Attachment 11)
- 12 Interview of Nov 2002 (Attachment 12)
- 13 Interview of Nov 2002 (Attachment 13)
- 14 Interview of Nov 2002 (Attachment 14)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(7)(c)

3
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

A24-4

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

C06555318

Approved for Release: 2019/05/29 C06555318

~~TOP SECRET//X1~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct SUBJECT: ~~(S)~~ Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

[Redacted]

According to COS [Redacted] the guards are very professional [Redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

[Redacted] For the most part, the guards are unaware of the identities of the prisoners. According to [Redacted] in some instances the prisoners have told the guards their identities. [Redacted] (b)(1)

[Redacted]¹⁵ According to [Redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct guards are not privy to information derived from the (b)(1) interrogations of the prisoners.¹⁶ (b)(3) CIAAct

5. ~~(TS)~~ Since the establishment of [Redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct Station has made an effort to provide training to the guards [Redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[Redacted] With no exception, individuals interviewed stated that the guards treated prisoners well and "by-the-book," following all [Redacted] directions regarding the treatment and handling of prisoners. On [Redacted] June 2002, two and a half months prior to [Redacted] receipt of its first prisoner, Station cabled Headquarters outlining the need to provide comprehensive training to the [Redacted] guards in regard to their safe and (b)(1) secure handling of the prisoners, [Redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct

On [Redacted] June 2002, Headquarters concurred in principle with the need to adequately train [Redacted]

[Redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

On [Redacted] June 2002, Station sent a cable

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

¹⁵ Interview of [Redacted] Dec 2002 (Attachment 15) (b)(1)
¹⁶ Interview of [Redacted] Nov 2002 (Attachment 13) (b)(3) CIAAct
¹⁷ [Redacted] 27768 Oct 2002 (Attachment 7) (b)(3) NatSecAct
¹⁸ [Redacted] 23587 Jun 2002 (Attachment 5) (b)(6)
¹⁹ Director 320797, [Redacted] Jun 2002 (Attachment 16) (b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

A24-5

~~TOP SECRET//X1~~

SUBJECT: (S) Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN

to Headquarters requesting that Headquarters identify staff personnel or independent contractors who could provide the training [redacted]²⁰ On 3 July 2002,

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Headquarters cabled [redacted] and notified them that they were still attempting to identify a training program, but had been unable to do so thus far.²¹ Some time between 3 July 2002 and 18 August 2002, the idea of using the US Bureau of Prisons (BOP) personnel to provide training to the (b)(1)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

guard force was suggested. On [redacted] August 2002, (b)(3) NatSecAct Station sent a cable to Headquarters stating the following regarding the guard force:

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Request update on the status of BOP personnel TDY [redacted] to train the [redacted] guards and prison staff. Station believes this training will be essential. given the near certainty that we will be called to account for our efforts at some future date; either within the USG or to the international community (through the ICRC.)" ²²

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Some time between [redacted] September and the arrival of the first prisoner on [redacted] September 2002, [redacted] Station utilized its own resources to provide initial training for the interior [redacted] guards.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Station provided training to the guards on how to handle, move, restrain prisoners, lock them in cells, and handle them safely and securely.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct

Between [redacted] August and [redacted] September 2002, Headquarters was able to make arrangements with the BOP to provide training in [redacted] guard force at [redacted] On [redacted] September 2002, [redacted] cabled Headquarters and noted that they looked forward to receiving a timeline for the TDY of BOP personnel (b)(1)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

²⁰ [redacted] 23637, [redacted] Jun 2002 (Attachment 17)
²¹ Director 344348, [redacted] Jul 2002 (Attachment 18)
²² [redacted] 25994, [redacted] Aug 2002 (Attachment 19)
²³ Interview of [redacted] Dec 2002 (Attachment 15)

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

A24-6

~~TOP SECRET//X1~~

(b)(1) SUBJECT: ~~(S)~~ Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1) indicating "sooner is better."²⁴ On [redacted] November 2002 (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct BOP officers arrived in [redacted] and trained the [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct
guards from [redacted] November. BOP instructors trained [redacted]
[redacted] guards in restraint techniques, escort procedures,
security checks, entrance procedures, cell searches, watch
calls, and patdown searches. BOP also made a number of
recommendations to improve the security of the prison.²⁵

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

[redacted]

6. ~~(TS)~~ (b)(1) [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct ison guards are [redacted]

[redacted] highly cooperative with [redacted] personnel.

[redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1) ²⁸ The guards [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct do whatever they are told to do by [redacted] personnel, and often will not do anything until [redacted] personnel.²⁹ All activities that Station officers wish to undertake at the facility are fully supported and rapidly carried out by the guard force. [redacted] stated, that although they will do anything he asks of them, nothing prevents the guards from taking independent action. If a guard noticed that a prisoner was cold, he could give the prisoner a blanket.³⁰ That said, [redacted] believed that the guards would take no independent action at that prison without permission from [redacted]. [redacted] the [redacted] guards [redacted] does not want any of the prisoners to die, no matter how good or bad they are. He told the guards that this (ensuring the well being of the prisoner) was their responsibility.³¹ According to [redacted] Station has recently made an effort to instill this responsibility in the guard force by (b)(1) appointing one of the (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

²⁴ [redacted] 26908 [redacted] Sep 2002 (Attachment 20)

²⁵ [redacted] 30589 [redacted] Nov 2002 (Attachment 21)

²⁶ Interview of [redacted] Nov 2002 (Attachment 13)

²⁷ Interview of [redacted] Dec 2002 (Attachment 15)

²⁸ [redacted] 27365 [redacted] Sep 2002 (Attachment 11)

²⁹ Interview of [redacted] Nov 2002 (Attachment 13)

³⁰ Interview of [redacted] Nov 2002 (Attachment 13)

³¹ Interview of [redacted] Nov 2002 (Attachment 22)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

A24-7

~~TOP SECRET//X1~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

SUBJECT: (S) Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN

guards responsible for detainee safety. This particular guard, [redacted] has been identified by Station personnel and BOP personnel as one of the best [redacted] guards.³²

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

7. (S) Heating and cooling are problematic at the prison facility. There is no insulation in the building and no central heating or cooling. [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

The facility is hot in the summer and cold in the winter. There are ceiling fans that help cool the facility in the summer. According to [redacted] in late September 2002, Station purchased 10 electric heaters that were delivered in early October 2002. Five of the electric heaters were placed in the administrative section of the prison and five were placed in the guard shacks. They could not place any of the electrical heaters in the prisoner housing area [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

[redacted] In mid-October 2002, five gas heaters were purchased and delivered sometime shortly thereafter. All five gas heaters were placed in the guard towers. In early November 2002, five more gas heaters were purchased and delivered at a later date. These heaters were placed in the housing area of the prison. These heaters were in place prior to RAHMAN's death. On [redacted] November 2002, the day of RAHMAN's death, five more gas heaters were ordered and set up in the housing area circa [redacted] November 2002. On [redacted] November 2002, 15 more gas heaters were ordered and set up sometime in December 2002. Some were used to replace broken heaters.³⁴ According to [redacted] there are approximately 15 gas heaters currently set up in the prisoner housing area.³⁵ [redacted] has now placed a thermometer inside the housing area [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

³² Interview of [redacted] Dec 2002 (Attachment 15)
³³ Interview of [redacted] Dec 2002 (Attachment 15)
³⁴ Lotus Note fr [redacted] Nov 2002 (Attachment 23)
³⁵ Interview of [redacted] Dec 2002 (Attachment 15)

(b)(7)(c)

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A24-8

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

~~TOP SECRET//X1~~

SUBJECT: ~~(S)~~ Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] stated that he has requested that the guards record the temperatures in the housing area each day.³⁶

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

8. ~~(S)~~ From the conception of [redacted] Headquarters and [redacted] Station have made efforts to ensure the physical health of the detainees. On [redacted] June 2002, [redacted] Station cabled Headquarters and stated the following: (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

"Station can support initial, non-emergency medical treatment with use of Station medics. [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct Station has

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

requested that a small medical room be constructed [redacted] so that detainees may receive medical care via visiting medical personnel within the facility."³⁷

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

³⁶ Interview of [redacted] 19 Dec 2002 (Attachment 15)

³⁷ [redacted] 22722, [redacted] Jun 2002 (Attachment 24) (b)(1)

³⁸ [redacted] Jul 2002 (Attachment 25) (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~TOP SECRET//X1~~

A24-9

~~TOP SECRET//X1~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

SUBJECT: (S) Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN

[Redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

Note: CIA was already funding the operation of t (b)(1)
facility to include all prison expenses. (b)(3) NatSecAct

10. (S) According to [Redacted] a CIA medical officer TDY to [Redacted], at the end of August 2002, [Redacted] had agreed to provide [Redacted] physician to examine the prisoners. As of [Redacted] November 2002, [Redacted] has failed to do so. As a result, Station assumed by default the responsibility of taking care of the prisoner's health care needs. [Redacted] stated that he first visited [Redacted] on [Redacted] November 2002, shortly after his arrival for his second TDY to [Redacted]. [Redacted] stated that if a prisoner becomes ill, he and another Station medic go to [Redacted] and treat them. [Redacted] stated that his guidelines for treating the prisoners were vague and needed to be further defined. [Redacted] stated that he called the Acting Chief of the Office of Medical Services, (b)(3) CIAAct [Redacted] (OMS [Redacted]) and asked for guidance. [Redacted] was told, "the Hippocratic Oath states that if someone is sick, you treat them" 40

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

11. (S) [Redacted] dated [Redacted] November 2002, provides a detailed outline of Station's medical support to the detainees at [Redacted]. The cable is quoted below in its entirety:

SUBJECT: (b)(1) [Redacted] STATION MEDICAL SUPPORT TO
DETAINEEES (b)(3) CIAAct [Redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct [Redacted]

REF: NONE

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: NONE, FYI ONLY.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[Redacted] Aug 2002 (Attachment 26)
40 Interview of [Redacted] Nov 2002 (Attachment 27)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

~~TOP SECRET//X1~~

A24-10

~~TOP SECRET//X1~~


SUBJECT: (S) Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct 2. [] STATION MEDICAL PERSONNEL PROVIDE SUPPORT TO CIA RENDITIONS AND [] DETAINEE PROGRAMS. [] MEDICAL PERSONNEL ARE ALL [] PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS OR NURSE PRACTITIONERS. ONE TO TWO [] PERSONNEL ARE ASSIGNED TDY [] AT ANY GIVEN TIME.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct 3. [] STANDARD RENDITION PROCEDURE REQUIRES THAT ONE MEDICAL OFFICER PARTICIPATE IN ALL RENDITIONS. THE REASON FOR THIS IS THREEFOLD. FIRST, TO ENSURE THAT THE DETAINEE DOES NOT HAVE ANY ITEMS CONCEALED ON HIS PERSON WHICH MIGHT BE USED AS A WEAPON (THROUGH A COMPLETE FULL-BODY AND CAVITY SEARCH). SECOND, TO DETERMINE THE INITIAL MEDICAL CONDITION OF THE DETAINEE; AND THIRD, TO STABILIZE THE CONDITION OF THE DETAINEE DURING THE RENDITION - INCLUDING SEDATION IF NECESSARY.



(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[] STATION MEDICAL PERSONNEL ALSO PROVIDE SUPPLEMENTAL MEDICAL SUPPORT ON AN AS-NEEDED BASIS. THIS TYPICALLY CONSISTS OF TREATMENT FOR ACUTE MEDICAL PROBLEMS AND FOLLOW-UP TREATMENT FOR PRE-EXISTING MEDICAL CONDITIONS.

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A24-11

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SUBJECT: (S) Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1) (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct

THE
LAST REGULAR ASSISTANCE VISIT TO [REDACTED] WAS CONDUCTED
FROM [REDACTED] NOVEMBER 2002. THE NEXT PLANNED VISIT WILL BE
DURING [REDACTED] WEEK OF NOVEMBER 2002. BASED ON THE LAST
[REDACTED] VISIT, FOLLOW-UP CARE WAS PROVIDED TO SEVERAL
INMATES FROM [REDACTED] NOVEMBER 2002.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1) (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

DURING THE MOST RECENT
SCHEDULED VISIT TO [REDACTED] DETAINEES WHO PREVIOUSLY
IDENTIFIED THEMSELVES AS DIABETICS WERE TESTED FOR BLOOD
SUGAR LEVELS (WHICH WERE NORMAL), [REDACTED] DETAINEE WITH A
VARIETY OF PRE-EXISTING CONDITIONS WAS PRESCRIBED FIVE
DIFFERENT MEDICATIONS, AND SEVERAL DETAINEES WERE
PRESCRIBED MILD PAIN RELIEVERS. URINE TESTING OF THE
INMATES INDICATED ALL OF THE [REDACTED] DETAINEES WERE
RECEIVING SUFFICIENT NOURISHMENT AND HYDRATION. ALL OF THE
DETAINEES AT [REDACTED] (WITH THE EXCEPTION OF GUL RAHMAN)
HAVE BEEN FULLY COOPERATIVE WITH THE MEDICAL PERSONNEL IN
RESPONDING TO QUESTIONS ABOUT THEIR HEALTH AND WELFARE.
THE ONE EXCEPTION, GUL RAHMAN, WOULD ONLY STATE THAT
"THANKS TO GOD, ALL IS WELL" IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONING.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

12. (S) Additionally, prisoners with significant
health problems are not accepted at [REDACTED] During a
proposed rendition of a detainee with a [REDACTED] condition,
[REDACTED] Station provided the following guidance: "If Subject
does have a significant [REDACTED] condition, Subject should not
be transferred to [REDACTED] Appropriate specialized
medical care is not available [REDACTED] No
unlawful enemy combatant with pre-existing medical
conditions can be brought to [REDACTED] (b)(1) If there is reason

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1) (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct

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A24-12

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SUBJECT: (S) Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN

to believe that Subject has (b)(1) condition, he should be transferred (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

TREATMENT OF PRISONERS

13. (S) [redacted] was constructed as a result of shortcomings in the handling of detainees [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1)
(b)(6) (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(7)(c) (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] was designed to isolate and enhance control over the prisoners.⁴² (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

14. (S) [redacted] a [redacted] Officer, is responsible for detainee affairs at [redacted] Station, and is viewed by Station management and personnel as the "site manager." [redacted] arrived in [redacted] on [redacted] August 2002. Prior to his arrival in [redacted] [redacted] did not know he would be responsible for detainee affairs. [redacted] stated that he learned that he would have this responsibility approximately three days after his arrival in [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

[redacted] had no prior experience in interrogation or prison operations prior to his arrival in [redacted] aside from four days as a detainee during Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape (SERE) training [redacted]. According to [redacted] this training provided him with some understanding as to how prisoners would react to various handling, treatment, and interrogation methods. [redacted] was approximately one month short of being operational at the time of [redacted] arrival. In addition to assuming control over the final construction details of [redacted] [redacted] was also responsible for coordinating interrogations [redacted] and coordinating renditions of high and medium value terrorist targets throughout [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1) In conjunction with his (b)(3) NatSecAct

⁴¹ [redacted] 28914 [redacted] Oct 2002 (Attachment 28)
⁴² [redacted] 21147 [redacted] Apr 2002 (Attachment 29)

~~TOP SECRET//X1~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

A24-13

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

SUBJECT: (b)(1) Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
duties as [redacted] "site manager," [redacted] was responsible for devising the operating procedures for [redacted]. These procedures concerned the handling and treatment of prisoners and the operation of the facility.⁴³

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

15. (S) John B. Jessen (known by the name Bruce), a Psychologist who works for CIA as an independent contractor, and is involved in the use of enhanced interrogation techniques with high value targets, spent two and a half weeks at [redacted] from early-to mid-November 2002. Jessen worked directly with [redacted] on RAHMAN and other detainees at [redacted]. Jessen has a Ph.D. in Clinical Psychology, and spent 20 years on active duty with the US Air Force as a Psychologist. After his retirement from the Air Force, Jessen spent eight years as a DOD civilian Psychologist. During his tenure with the Air Force and DOD, Jessen worked on captivity related issues. While on active duty, he served as a Psychologist with the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency. While employed as a civilian with DOD, Jessen was the Senior Psychologist for the SERE program. Jessen was able to observe operations at [redacted] and had discussions with [redacted] regarding methods of handling, treating, and interrogating prisoners. Jessen also made some recommendations to [redacted] to improve operations at the facility. Jessen stated [redacted] did a great job setting up [redacted]. Jessen described [redacted] as being very bright, motivated, and possessing good intuition. Jessen said [redacted] was doing a great job with the guard force. [redacted] was very level headed and acted in a measured manner. Jessen said the atmosphere of the facility was excellent for the type of prisoners kept there - "nasty, but safe." Jessen commented that although [redacted] had never worked in this line of business prior to arriving in [redacted] he did not see any "hiccups" in security or prisoner safety. Jessen commented that he would be pleased to work with [redacted] in the future, and believed that [redacted] should be a member of [redacted].

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

Jessen has a Ph.D. in Clinical Psychology, and spent 20 years on active duty with the US Air Force as a Psychologist. After his retirement from the Air Force, Jessen spent eight years as a DOD civilian Psychologist. During his tenure with the Air Force and DOD, Jessen worked on captivity related issues. While on active duty, he served as a Psychologist with the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency. While employed as a civilian with DOD, Jessen was the Senior Psychologist for the SERE program. Jessen was able to observe operations at [redacted] and had discussions with [redacted] regarding methods of handling, treating, and interrogating prisoners. Jessen also made some recommendations to [redacted] to improve operations at the facility. Jessen stated [redacted] did a great job setting up [redacted]. Jessen described [redacted] as being very bright, motivated, and possessing good intuition. Jessen said [redacted] was doing a great job with the guard force. [redacted] was very level headed and acted in a measured manner. Jessen said the atmosphere of the facility was excellent for the type of prisoners kept there - "nasty, but safe." Jessen commented that although [redacted] had never worked in this line of business prior to arriving in [redacted] he did not see any "hiccups" in security or prisoner safety. Jessen commented that he would be pleased to work with [redacted] in the future, and believed that [redacted] should be a member of [redacted].

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

⁴³ Interview of [redacted] Dec 2002 (Attachment 15)
⁴⁴ Interview of John B. Jessen, 9 Jan 2003 (Attachment 30)

~~TOP SECRET//X1~~

A24-14

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(b)(1) SUBJECT: (S) Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

16. (S) Although [] does not have a written set of Standard Operating Procedures (a flaw noted by Jessen), [] has established a standard method of operation. For security reasons, prisoners are brought to the facility with their hands and feet shackled. Blindfolds are placed over their eyes and a hood is placed over their heads. Ear plugs are also placed in their ears. This is done so that prisoners have no knowledge of where they are being housed, cannot hear what is being said around them, and have no idea if they are alone or with other prisoners. Additionally, it prevents any form of communication between prisoners. Prisoners are handled by guards in complete silence. Hand signals are used by the guards to communicate with each other. Prisoners are dressed in sweatsuits and adult diapers. The diapers are used for sanitary reasons during transportation, and as a means to humiliate the prisoner. When prisoners are delivered to their cell, one hand or foot is shackled to the wall. This is done for the safety of the guard. Later, the manner in which a prisoner is shackled is based on his level of cooperation and the danger he presents to the guards. However, all prisoners are shackled in some manner. If they are not shackled to the wall, their hands and feet may be shackled. If a prisoner is uncooperative, or presents a significant physical threat to the guards, he may be shackled in a "short chain" position. This method was taught to the guards by BOP instructors as a safer alternative to hog-tying prisoners. Hog-tying prisoners has resulted in a number of deaths in the US, and the "short chain" method is safer for the prisoners while still providing a higher degree of safety and security for the guards. In the "short chain" method, the prisoner's hands are shackled together as are his feet. Then a short chain is used to shackle the hands to the feet. This keeps a prisoner's hand shackled within several inches of his feet. The prisoner's feet are then shackled to the wall. This provides for the maximum degree of control over the prisoner while allowing for prisoner safety.⁴⁵

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

⁴⁵ Interview of (b)(1) [] Dec 2002 (Attachment 15)

(b)(3) CIAAct

14

(b)(3) NatSecAct ~~TOP SECRET//XI~~

(b)(7)(c)

A24-15

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

~~TOP SECRET//X1~~

SUBJECT: ~~(S)~~ Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

17. ~~(S)~~ Prior to the guards' departure from the cell, the hood, blindfold, and ear plugs are taken from the prisoner. Prisoners are housed in total darkness. [redacted] stated that this is done for a couple of reasons. [redacted] stated that he wanted to disorient prisoners so they didn't know if it was day or night. [redacted]

Additionally, music is played in the prisoner housing area 24 hours a day. This is done to prevent prisoners from communicating with each other.⁴⁶

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

18. ~~(S)~~ Sleep deprivation is also used to enhance successful interrogation. The decision to use sleep deprivation is made by the individual CIA officer who is working with a particular prisoner. When sleep deprivation is utilized, the prisoner is chained by one or both wrists to a bar running across the ceiling of the cell. This forces the prisoner to stand. [redacted] stated that he consulted with Jessen and was told that no prisoner should undergo more than 72 hours of sleep deprivation because lucidity begins to decline and questioning become ineffective.⁴⁷ During our interview with Jessen, he stated that sleep deprivation could be used indefinitely without harming the prisoner; however, you could not chain him overhead indefinitely.

19. ~~(S)~~ Often, prisoners who possess significant or imminent threat information are stripped to their diapers during interrogation and placed back into their cells wearing only diapers. This is done solely to humiliate the prisoner for interrogation purposes. When the prisoner soils a diaper, they are changed by the guards. Sometimes the guards run out of diapers and the prisoners are placed back in their cells in a handcrafted diaper secured by duct tape. If the guards don't have any available diapers, the prisoners are rendered to their cell nude.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Interview of [redacted] Dec 2002 (Attachment 15)
⁴⁷ Interview of [redacted] Dec 2002 (Attachment 15)
⁴⁸ Interview of [redacted] Dec 2002 (Attachment 15)
[redacted] 15
(b)(6) ~~TOP SECRET//X1~~
(b)(7)(c)

A 24-16

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SUBJECT: (S) Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN

20. (S) Prisoners' cells are austere. A prisoner begins his confinement with nothing in his cell except a bucket used for human waste. Prisoners are given rewards for cooperation. Rewards can consist of a light, "foamies" for the prisoners' ears (blocks out the music), a mat to sleep on, extra blankets, etc. Additionally, a luxury room has been built which has a light, a rocking chair, a table, and carpeting on the floor. Prisoners are not punished for lack of cooperation. Instead, rewards that they have received for cooperation are taken from them if they become uncooperative.⁴⁹

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

21. (S) When guards move prisoners from their cell to the interrogation room, usually [redacted] guards enter the cell with a flashlight. A hood is placed over the prisoner's head and he is lead to the interrogation room in shackles. The guards do not speak to the prisoners and all communication between the guards is completed with hand signals. Once the detainee is placed in the interrogation room the guards depart, and the hood is removed by [redacted] personnel. Every effort is made to ensure that the only person a detainee communicates with is his CIA interrogator.⁵⁰

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

DEATH OF GUL RAHMAN

22. (S) Gul RAHMAN was a Hezbi Islami official from Wardak province, Afghanistan, who was known to interact with and support Al Qa'ida. He was known to be a close associate of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Abu Abd Al-RAHMAN Al-Najdi.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

[redacted] (b)(1)
[redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct
Jessen stated that [redacted]

Station

⁴⁹ Interview of [redacted] Dec 2002 (Attachment 15)
⁵⁰ Interview of [redacted] Dec 2002 (Attachment 15)
⁵¹ Alec 189493, [redacted] Oct 2002 (Attachment 31)
⁵² Alec 191539, [redacted] Nov 2002 (Attachment 32)
⁵³ [redacted] 29520, [redacted] Nov 2002 (Attachment 33)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

A24-17

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SUBJECT: ~~(S)~~ Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

was very optimistic that they had somebody who was going to have some good information.⁵⁴

23. ~~(S)~~ RAHMAN was apprehended in Islamabad, Pakistan on October 2002, during an early morning raid

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

⁵⁴ Interview of John B. Jessen, 9 Jan 2003 (Attachment 30)

Oct 2002 (Attachment 34)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~TOP SECRET//X1~~

A 24-18

~~TOP SECRET//X1~~

SUBJECT: ~~(S)~~ Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN

(b)(1)
 (b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(3) NatSecAct
 (b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
 (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
 (b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
 (b)(3) NatSecAct

27. ~~(S)~~ On November 2002, Headquarters agreed in

(b)(1)
 transferring him to (b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
 (b)(3) CIAAct
 (b)(3) NatSecAct
 (b)(6)
 (b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

⁵⁶ Oct 2002 (Attachment 34)
⁵⁷ Nov 2002 (Attachment 35)
⁵⁸ Alec Nov 2002 (Attachment 36)
⁵⁹ Alec T90864 Nov 2002 (Attachment 37)

~~TOP SECRET//X1~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

A24-19

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SUBJECT: (S) Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

29. (S) Later that day, RAHMAN [redacted] were flown from [redacted] where they were subsequently transferred to [redacted].⁶¹ Upon RAHMAN's arrival at [redacted] he was given a physical examination and all of his personal clothes and effects were removed. He was dressed in standard prison garb and placed in a single cell.⁶² [redacted] described the standard prison garb as a sweatshirt and sweat pants. RAHMAN was also wearing an adult diaper that was placed on him in [redacted]. This is done because prisoners are not allowed to use bathroom facilities on the airplane during rendition, and later as a means of humiliation. According to standard operating procedures, one of RAHMAN's hands or feet would have been shackled to the wall when he was placed in his cell. According to [redacted] the physical examination of RAHMAN took place in [redacted]. [redacted] stated that there are a number of reasons for the physical examination. One reason is so that Station can conduct a body cavity search to ensure the prisoner is not carrying a weapon or some other substance. The second reason is so that Station can ensure that the prisoner is in good enough condition to travel and be housed at [redacted]. Lastly, [redacted] indicated that the physical examination serves to document if a prisoner has been beaten or traumatized. The person conducting the

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

⁶⁰ [redacted] Nov 2002 (Attachment 38)
⁶¹ [redacted] 36124, Nov 2002 (Attachment 39)
⁶² [redacted] 30211, [redacted] Nov 2002 (Attachment 40)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

~~TOP SECRET//XI~~

SUBJECT: (S) Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN

physical exam would note such observations. [] also indicated that the prisoner would be photographed. A search of cable traffic related to RAHMAN found no record of any reporting indicating that any injuries or health conditions were noted. [] stated that they keep no medical records on the prisoners and the digital photographs taken of RAHMAN at rendition have long been overwritten.^{63 64}

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

30. (S) According to Jessen, he was at [] in early November 2002, in conjunction with the interrogations of a few other prisoners. Although Jessen's recollections were fuzzy, Jessen recalled that he might have been present during the first interrogation of RAHMAN at []. Jessen recalled that [] approached him, and they discussed strategies to use during his interrogation. Jessen stated that he believes [] conducted the first interrogation, and he watched from behind the lights. Jessen stated that they talked afterwards and collaborated on some approaches he might want to take.⁶⁵

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

31. (S) Cable traffic reflects that on [] and [] November 2002, [] and Jessen interrogated RAHMAN. The cable goes on to state that despite 48 hours of sleep deprivation, auditory overload, total darkness, isolation, a cold shower, and rough treatment, RAHMAN maintained a high interrogation resistance posture and continued to deny that he was RAHMAN, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. His resistance posture suggested a sophisticated level of resistance training. The cable cited several examples of his interrogation resistant behavior:

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
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- o Remained steadfast in outright denials (ignored obvious facts).
- o Was unresponsive to provocation.
- o Claimed inability to think due to conditions (cold)
- o Complained about poor treatment.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

⁶³ Lotus Note from [] to [] Jan 2003 (Attachment 41)
⁶⁴ Interview of [] Dec 2002 (Attachment 15)
⁶⁵ interview of John B. Jessen, 9 Jan 2003 (Attachment 30)

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A24-21

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SUBJECT: (S) Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN

- o Complained about the violation of his human rights.
- o Remained consistently unemotional, calm, and composed.
- o Blatantly lied while attempting to appear sincere in his desire to cooperate.
- o Consistently used his cover story.
- o Displayed no anxiety (calmly picked at his skin/nails during confrontations with damning evidence against him.
- o Was unfazed by physical and psychological confrontations.⁶⁶

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

32. (S) Cable traffic reflects that sleep deprivation for RAHMAN began almost immediately after his arrival at [redacted] Jessen stated that he believed that RAHMAN's sleep deprivation started from the beginning. According to [redacted] RAHMAN's clothes were taken from him at this point, and he was left wearing a diaper. During the period of sleep deprivation, RAHMAN's arms were shackled to a bar that ran between the walls of the cell. This prevented RAHMAN from sitting down.^{67 68}

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

33. (S) During the first few days of RAHMAN's incarceration at [redacted] cable traffic also reflects that he received a cold shower. During our interview with [redacted] he indicated that RAHMAN received a cold shower because the water heater was not working. Jessen stated that he was deliberately given a cold shower as a deprivation technique. Cable traffic tends to support Jessen's statements. Jessen stated that after RAHMAN received the cold shower, he saw RAHMAN standing with the guards. Jessen stated that RAHMAN was shivering and showing early signs of hypothermia. Jessen instructed the guards to provide RAHMAN with a blanket, which they did.^{69 70}

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

34. (S) Cable traffic also reflects that during his first two days of incarceration, RAHMAN underwent "rough

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

⁶⁶ [redacted] 29520 [redacted] Nov 2002 (Attachment 33)
⁶⁷ Interview of John B. Jessen, 9 Jan 2003 (Attachment 30)
⁶⁸ Interview of [redacted] Dec 2002 (Attachment 15)
⁶⁹ Interview of [redacted] Dec 2002 (Attachment 15)
⁷⁰ Interview of John B. Jessen, 9 Jan 2003 (Attachment 30)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
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SUBJECT: (S) Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

treatment." [redacted] stated that they occasionally pushed and shoved RAHMAN while he had a hood over his head to disorient him and scare him. Jessen described witnessing what he termed "a rough takedown." Jessen stated that when a detainee is strong and resilient, you have to establish control or you are not going to get anywhere. So you try different techniques to try to get him to open up. One of them is rough threatening treatment. The treatment is never to the point that you hurt the prisoner physically, you simply want to instill fear and despair in the prisoner. [redacted] came up with the idea of the hard takedown and asked Jessen for his thoughts. While Jessen has not used this technique at facilities at which he has worked, and had never seen one conducted, he thought it was worth trying. According to Jessen, there were approximately [redacted] CIA officers from the [redacted] team. Each one had a role during the takedown and it was thoroughly planned and rehearsed. They opened the door of RAHMAN's cell and rushed in screaming and yelling for him to "get down." They dragged him outside, cut off his clothes and secured him with Mylar tape. They covered his head with a hood and ran him up and down a long corridor adjacent to his cell. They slapped him and punched him several times. Jessen stated that although it was obvious they were not trying to hit him as hard as they could, a couple of times the punches were forceful. As they ran him along the corridor, a couple of times he fell and they dragged him through the dirt (the floor outside of the cells is dirt). RAHMAN did acquire a number of abrasions on his face, legs, and hands, but nothing that required medical attention. (This may account for the abrasions found on RAHMAN's body after his death. RAHMAN had a number of surface abrasions on his shoulders, pelvis, arms, legs, and face.) At this point, RAHMAN was returned to his cell and secured. Jessen stated that [redacted] may have spoken to RAHMAN for a few moments, but he did not know what [redacted] said. Jessen stated that after something like this is done, interrogators should speak to the prisoner to "give them something to think about."^{71 72}

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

⁷¹ Interview of [redacted] Dec 2002 (Attachment 15)(b)(1)

⁷² Interview of John B. Jessen, 9 Jan 2003 (Attachment 30) (b)(3) CIAAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

A24-23

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SUBJECT: (S) Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

35. (S) On [] November 2002, [] Station forwarded a cable to Headquarters indicating that to date, RAHMAN had provided no information to his interrogators. He still refused to admit his true name was Gul RAHMAN. He appeared somewhat fatigued relative to his appearance upon arrival at [] and remained resolutely defiant as interrogators attempted to obtain information from him. Station believed that physical pressure was unlikely to change RAHMAN's attitude, but alternative psychological pressures may have more success.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[]
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

36. (S) On [] November 2002, Station Officers [] Jessen, [] again met with RAHMAN. "RAHMAN had spent the days since his last session with Station officers in cold conditions with minimal food or sleep. RAHMAN appeared incoherent for portions of this session, but was completely lucid by mid-session.⁷⁴ During this session, RAHMAN finally admitted that he was indeed Gul RAHMAN.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

[]
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

⁷³ [] 29626, [] Nov 2002 (Attachment 42)

⁷⁴ [] 29770, [] Nov 2002 (Attachment 43)

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

A24-24

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SUBJECT: (S) Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] cable detailing this session reads as follows:

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

"Assessment: RAHMAN was finally showing the results of his stay at [redacted] during this session. While he was still clearly resisting, we believe he may have chosen to compromise somewhat in exchange for improved conditions. However, it was also possible that RAHMAN was so fatigued that he was unable to consistently stay with his cover story even if he wished to do so. During portions of interrogation, RAHMAN was confused as to his location, and the passage of time. At other times he would forget what he had been asked [redacted] would have to recapture his attention. It is difficult to know precisely how much of his behavior was feigned and how much was a result of his physical and psychological condition; however, IC Jessen's impression was that he continues to use 'health and welfare' behaviors and complaints as a major part of his resistance posture. After the session, RAHMAN was afforded some improvement in his conditions.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Interrogators plan to reinterview RAHMAN on [redacted] November."⁷⁵

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

37. (S) [redacted] and Jessen both attributed this small interrogation breakthrough to the pressure techniques used on RAHMAN. Jessen stated that he believed RAHMAN would have never made the admission without the pressures placed on him. Jessen stated that he considered RAHMAN's

admission of his identity as a breakthrough but did not believe that RAHMAN had been "broken." Jessen stated that he believes RAHMAN made a compromise. He knew he was in trouble and knew we had a lot of evidence that he was RAHMAN. Jessen believes that RAHMAN knew that he could give up his identity and possibly get a little better treatment, but still protect the information that was important to him.^{76 77}

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

⁷⁵ [redacted] 29770, [redacted] Nov 2002 (Attachment 43)
⁷⁶ Interview of John B. Jessen, 9 Jan 2003 (Attachment 30)
⁷⁷ Interview of [redacted] Dec 2002 (Attachment 15)

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(7)(c)

A 24-25

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct ~~TOP SECRET//X1~~

SUBJECT: (S) Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN

38. (S) On [] November 2002, Headquarters requested that psychologist ICs Jessen and James E. Mitchell conduct a psychological assessment exam of RAHMAN to determine which interrogation measures would be required to render RAHMAN compliant. The cable stated that Headquarters was motivated to extract any and all operational information on Al-Qa'ida and Hezbi Islami from RAHMAN. The cable noted that it was the assessment of the debriefers that RAHMAN may need to be subjected to enhanced interrogation measures to induce him to comply.

[Redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Headquarters requested that the results of the examination be sent to Headquarters where a determination on the course of action could be made.⁷⁸

39. (S) On that same day [] November 2002), Jessen conducted a psychological captivity assessment of RAHMAN. Jessen found that RAHMAN was able to accurately describe the circumstances, time, and location of his capture he was able to identify those captured with him. He was slow to answer some questions, which Jessen attributed to fatigue and active resistance. He was able identify all members of his family, their ages, and places of birth. Questions that were non-sensitive to his resistance posture were answered quickly and accurately. Sensitive questions yielded stalling and prevarication. Throughout this evaluation and the six interrogation sessions Jessen participated in up to that point, Jessen saw no signs of psychopathology. RAHMAN did feign incoherence and profound confusion at times, but would immediately revert to a coherent dialogue when it was in his best interest. Jessen assessed RAHMAN as being of above average intelligence. Jessen stated that RAHMAN was a mentally stable individual exhibiting extraordinary resilience in his ability to withstand the vicissitudes of captivity and persist in

⁷⁸ Alec.191539, [] Nov 2002 (Attachment 32)

~~TOP SECRET//X1~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

A 24-26

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SUBJECT: ~~(S)~~ Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN

an effective resistance posture. There was no indication that RAHMAN suffered from any psychopathology nor that he would be profoundly or permanently affected by continuing interrogations, to include HVT enhanced measures.⁷⁹

40. ~~(S)~~ In the last paragraph of Jessen's mental examination report, Jessen recommended an interrogation plan for RAHMAN. The last paragraph of the cable reads as follows:

"Interrogation Plan Recommendation: Because of his [RAHMAN's] remarkable physical and psychological resilience and determination to persist in his effective resistance posture, employing enhanced measures is not the first or best option to yield positive interrogation results. In fact, with such individuals, increasing physical pressures often bolsters their resistance. The most effective interrogation plan for Gul RAHMAN, is to continue environmental deprivations he is experiencing and institute a concentrated interrogation exposure regimen. This regimen would consist of repeated and seemingly constant interrogations (18 out of 24 hours per day). These interrogations should be coordinated and present with the same set of key subject areas. Interrogators should have the flexibility and insight to deviate with the Subject when he begins to move in a desired direction. It will be the consistent and persistent application of deprivations (sleep loss and fatigue) and seemingly constant interrogations, which will be most effective in wearing down this Subject's resistance posture. It will be important to manage the deprivations so as to allow Subject adequate rest and nourishment so he remains coherent and capable of providing accurate information. The station physician should collaborate with the interrogation team to achieve this optimum balance. It is reasonable to expect two weeks or more of this regimen before significant movement occurs."⁸⁰

⁷⁹ [] 29909, [] Nov 2002 (Attachment 44)
⁸⁰ [] 29909, [] Nov 2002 (Attachment 44)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

A24-27

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct ~~TOP SECRET//X1~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

SUBJECT: (S) Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

41. (S) On [] November 2002, [] Station Medical Officer, [] examined Gul RAHMAN and found no health problems.⁸¹

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

42. (S) The afternoon of [] November 2002, was the last time [] saw RAHMAN alive. At that time, [] assessed RAHMAN to be in good overall health. [] noted that RAHMAN had small abrasions on his wrist and ankles as a result of the restraints. His ankle restraints were loosened, and his hand restraints were removed when RAHMAN was returned to his cell.⁸² According to [] RAHMAN had complained that he was cold, so [] gave him a sweatshirt.⁸³

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

43. (S) According to [] Guard [] RAHMAN was fed at 2100 on [] November 2002. Because prisoners are fed one large meal a day, and because of RAHMAN's actions on the following day, this is the last meal RAHMAN consumed prior to his death.⁸⁴

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

44. (S) According to [] RAHMAN was fed again at 1500 on [] November 2002.⁸⁵ According to numerous sources, when the guards gave RAHMAN his food, he threw the plate, waterbottle, and waste bucket at the guards. He began yelling at the guards, repeating his threat, last stated approximately one week prior, that he knew their faces and he would kill them when he got out of the prison. As a result of his violent behavior, [] ordered that the guards put RAHMAN's hand restraints back on to prevent him from taking any other violent actions.⁸⁶ The guards proceeded to shackle RAHMAN to the wall of his cell in a short chain position. (In the "short chain" method, the prisoner's hands are shackled together as are his feet. Then a short chain is used to shackle the hands to the

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

⁸¹ Interview of [] Nov 2002 (Attachment 27)

⁸² [] 30211 [] Nov 2002 (Attachment 40)

⁸³ Interview of [] Dec 2002 (Attachment 15)

⁸⁴ Interview of [] Nov 2002 (Attachment 45) (b)(1)

⁸⁵ Interview of [] Nov 2002 (Attachment 45) (b)(3) CIAAct

⁸⁶ [] 30211 [] Nov 2002 (Attachment 40) (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

27
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

A24-28

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

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SUBJECT: (S) Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN

feet. This keeps a prisoner's hand shackled within several inches of his feet. The prisoner's feet are then shackled to the wall). The only clothing being worn by RAHMAN at this point was the sweatshirt given to him by [redacted] the day before. RAHMAN was nude from the waist down. RAHMAN had been nude, with the exception of a diaper for most of his incarceration. There is uncertainty as to when RAHMAN's diaper had been removed. As of approximately 1500 on [redacted] November 2002, RAHMAN was shackled in a sitting position on bare concrete while nude from the waist down. The manner in which he was shackled prevented him from standing upright.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

45. (S) The [redacted] guards made their normal rounds to check on the prisoners on [redacted] November 2002, at 2200 and 2300. The guards did not enter RAHMAN's cell, but visually inspected him from the outside using a flashlight.⁸⁷ According to [redacted] guard [redacted] he and [redacted] checked RAHMAN's cell at 0400 on [redacted] November 2002. [redacted] stated that they looked into his cell and whistled. RAHMAN was sitting in his cell, alive and shaking.⁸⁸ At 0800, [redacted] guards [redacted] made the rounds to check on the prisoners. According to the guards, RAHMAN was alive, sitting on the floor and shaking. [redacted] noted that RAHMAN's eyes were open and blinking. [redacted] said RAHMAN's shaking did not seem unusual because all of the prisoners shake.⁸⁹ According to [redacted] guard [redacted] he checked RAHMAN's cell at 1000. He noted that the prisoner was lying on his side. [redacted] tapped the door with his nightstick; however, the prisoner did not move. At that point, [redacted] sought out [redacted], a CIA TDY'er who was at [redacted] to debrief other detainees.⁹⁰

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

46. (S) According to interviews conducted with Agency personnel present at [redacted] when RAHMAN's body was discovered, [redacted] were

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

⁸⁷ [redacted] 30211, [redacted] Nov 2002 (Attachment 40)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct, ⁸⁸ Interview of [redacted] Nov 2002 (Attachment 45)
(b)(3) NatSecAct, interviews of [redacted] Nov 2002 (Attachment 45)
(b)(6) interview of (b)(1) [redacted] Nov 2002 (Attachment 45)
(b)(7)(c) (b)(3) NatSecAct 28
(b)(7)(c) (b)(7)(c) ~~TOP SECRET//X1~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
SUBJECT: (S) Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

all at [redacted] to interrogate other prisoners. At approximately 1000 on [redacted] November 2002, one of the guards walked up to [redacted] and informed him that one of the prisoners was not moving. The [redacted] officers went with the guard to RAHMAN's cell. The guard unlocked the cell and opened the door. RAHMAN was lying motionless on his right side with his hands and feet shackled together and his feet shackled to the wall. There was a small amount of blood coming from his nose and mouth. RAHMAN was clothed in a sweatshirt but had no pants. [redacted] noted that the only things in his cell were an empty red waste bucket, and a food tray with a small piece of bread on it. [redacted] stated that there was rice strewn all over cell. [redacted] entered the cell and checked RAHMAN's pulse. When he could not find a pulse, he began CPR chest compressions. With each chest compression, [redacted] noted that more blood would come from his mouth and mucous from his nose. [redacted] returned to the area where interrogations are conducted and called one of the Station medics on the radio. [redacted] also tried to contact [redacted] but he could not find him. Station medic [redacted] stated that he received the radio call, but it was very cryptic. [redacted] stated that he did not know why he was being summoned to [redacted]. [redacted] stated that he and [redacted] (the other Station medic) grabbed their medical bags, obtained transportation, and traveled to [redacted].
91 92 93 94

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

47. (S) When [redacted] noted that CPR was unsuccessful in reviving RAHMAN, he ordered that the cell be sealed until the doctor arrived. [redacted] arrived 30-45 minutes later. Upon arrival, Station personnel greeted [redacted] and informed him that a prisoner was dead. [redacted] went to RAHMAN's cell and found him lying on his side. [redacted] examined RAHMAN's body and rolled it on both sides. [redacted] stated that there was no evidence that the prisoner had been abused and no evidence of a cause of death. [redacted] noted that the blood coming

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

91 Interview of [redacted] Nov 2002 (Attachment 14)
92 Interview of [redacted] Nov 2002 (Attachment 46)
93 Interview of (b)(1) Nov 2002 (Attachment 47)
94 Interview of (b)(3) CIAAct Nov 2002 (Attachment 27)
(b)(3) NatSecAct 29
(b)(7)(c)

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

A24-30

C06555318

Approved for Release: 2019/05/29 C06555318

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
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SUBJECT: ~~(S)~~ Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

from the nose and mouth was dark and inconsistent with a wound to that area. [redacted] estimated that RAHMAN (b)(1) died within the past few hours.^{95 96} (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

48. ~~(S)~~ [redacted] noted that they found it unusual that the [redacted] guard commander was not present at the prison at the time of RAHMAN's death. The interior prison guards live inside the prison and rarely leave. When [redacted] questioned the guards about the Commander's absence he was told that the Commander was at [redacted] (b)(1) [redacted] said he heard second hand that the guards told [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct that the Commander had a family emergency.^{97 98}

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

49. ~~(S)~~ It is important to note that during this investigation several officers made reference to an unexpected temperature drop [redacted] immediately prior to RAHMAN's death. The following are the Accuweather temperatures [redacted] during the month of November 2002:

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

50. ~~(S)~~ No photographs were taken at the scene of RAHMAN's death. Later that evening, [redacted] delivered a freezer to the facility and RAHMAN's body was frozen until investigating personnel could arrive to conduct an autopsy.⁹⁹ (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

- ⁹⁵ Interview of [redacted] Nov 2002 (Attachment 14)
- ⁹⁶ Interview of [redacted] Nov 2002 (Attachment 27)
- ⁹⁷ Interview of [redacted] Nov 2002 (Attachment 12)
- ⁹⁸ Interview of [redacted] Nov 2002 (Attachment 46)
- ⁹⁹ Interview of [redacted] Nov 2002 (Attachment 12)

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A24-31

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

SUBJECT: (S) Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

AUTOPSY

51. (S) Dr. [redacted] conducted an autopsy on RAHMAN on [redacted] November 2002. His findings are presented in his report entitled, "Final Autopsy Findings, CASE # [redacted]" which is attached to this report. In summary, Dr. [redacted] listed the cause of death as "undetermined." [redacted] stated, however, that it was his clinical impression that RAHMAN died of hypothermia.¹⁰⁰

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

52. (S) [redacted] stated that hypothermia is a diagnosis of exclusion. In essence, other potential causes are ruled out one by one until you are left with no other possibility. [redacted] stated that he conducted a full anterior neck dissection. [redacted] found no evidence of hemorrhage in the tissue, muscles, and cartilage around the neck and no evidence of damage to the Hyoid bone. Injuries such as these are common in cases of strangulation. [redacted] examined the soft tissue on the inside of the mouth and found no evidence that pressure was placed over the mouth as is common in cases of smothering. There was no trauma to the teeth. The head and skull were examined and displayed no evidence of facial or skull fractures and no blood in the anterior chambers of the eyes. [redacted] examined the chest, trunk, abdomen, and genitals and found no evidence of trauma. RAHMAN had abrasions to both wrists and ankles, but there was no evidence of infection. RAHMAN had a number of scrapes on his shoulders, legs, and hips; however, there was no bruising around the abrasions suggesting that there was no blunt force trauma.¹⁰¹

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

53. (S) The toxicology was conducted by the [redacted]. The toxicology included testing for all of the classic poisons to include cyanide. Additionally, they tested for substances used in truth serums and found no evidence of toxic substances. During the autopsy, [redacted] specifically looked for injection marks on the body and searched for pill fragments in the mouth and stomach and found no indication that he had ingested any pills or received any injections.¹⁰²

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct

¹⁰⁰ Final Autopsy Findings, [redacted] (Attachment 48)
¹⁰¹ Interview of Dr. [redacted] (b)(1) Dec 2002 (Attachment 49)
¹⁰² Interview of Dr. [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct Dec 2002 (Attachment 49)
[redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct 31
~~TOP SECRET//X1~~
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

A24-32

~~TOP SECRET//XI~~

(b)(1) SUBJECT: (S) Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

54. (S) In making the clinical diagnosis of death by hypothermia, [] based his conclusion and the clinical environment in which RAHMAN was found and the information compiled during the investigation. [] based his conclusions on the following factors

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

- o RAHMAN's urine had high catecholamine levels, which is consistent with hypothermic deaths.
- o RAHMAN was seen shivering for a number of hours immediately prior to his death.
- o The environment in which he was housed was extremely cold. On the night of his death, the outside temperature was 31 degrees. The prison facility is not insulated.
- o RAHMAN had not eaten in approximately 36 hours. No food was found in his stomach during the autopsy. RAHMAN's glycogen levels would have been depleted. Glycogen is a fuel source used by the body to stay warm.
- o RAHMAN was unclothed from the waist down and was in direct contact with cold concrete. Direct conduction is a significant cause of heat loss in the body.
- o RAHMAN was chained in a short chain position. This prevented him from standing up and moving around to warm his body.
- o RAHMAN was dehydrated which is a contributing factor to hypothermia.¹⁰³

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

¹⁰³ Interview of Dr. [] Dec 2002 (Attachment 49)

32

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A24-33

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SUBJECT: (S) Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN

CONCLUSIONS

The evidence developed during the course of this investigation suggests the following:

- o There is no evidence to suggest that RAHMAN's death was deliberate.
- o There is no evidence to suggest that RAHMAN was beaten, tortured, poisoned, strangled, or smothered.
- o Hypothermia was the most likely cause of death of Gul RAHMAN.
- o His death was not deliberate, but resulted from his incarceration in a cold environment while nude from the waist down, and shackled in a position that prevented him from moving around to keep warm. Additionally, this kept him in direct contact with the cold concrete floor leading to a loss of bodyheat through conduction.
- o Gul RAHMAN's actions contributed to his own death. By throwing his last meal he was unable to provide his body with a source of fuel to keep him warm. Additionally, his violent behavior resulted in his restraint which prevented him from generating body heat by moving around and brought him in direct contact with the

concrete floor leading to a loss of bodyheat through conduction.

Attachments
As stated

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

A24-34

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SUBJECT: ~~(S)~~ Death Investigation - Gul RAHMAN

[Redacted]

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

Distribution:

(b)(3) NatSecAct

Original & 1 - Addressee

(b)(6)

1 - ADDO/CI

(b)(7)(c)

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A24-35

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ATTACHMENTS

(b)(3) NatSecAct

- 1. DIRECTOR 492873, [redacted] Sep 2002 (b)(1)
- (b)(1) 2. [redacted] 27054, [redacted] Sep 2002 (b)(3) NatSecAct
- (b)(3) NatSecAct 3. [redacted] 21743, [redacted] May 2002
- 4. [redacted] 22975, [redacted] Jun 2002
- 5. [redacted] 23587, [redacted] Jun 2002 (b)(3) NatSecAct
- 6. DIRECTOR 297415, [redacted] Jun 2002
- (b)(1) 7. [redacted] 27768, [redacted] Oct 2002 (b)(3) NatSecAct
- (b)(3) NatSecAct 8. [redacted] 22682, [redacted] May 2002
- 9. [redacted] 28246, [redacted] Oct 2002 (b)(3) NatSecAct
- 10. [redacted] 24021, [redacted] Jun 2002
- (b)(1) 11. [redacted] 27365, [redacted] Sep 2002 (b)(1)
- (b)(3) NatSecAct 12. Interview of [redacted] Nov 2002 (b)(3) CIAAct
- 13. Interview of [redacted] Nov 2002 (b)(3) NatSecAct
- 14. Interview of [redacted] Nov 2002 (b)(6)
- (b)(1) 15. Interview of [redacted] Dec 2002 (b)(7)(c)
- (b)(3) NatSecAct 16. DIRECTOR 320797, [redacted] Jun 2002
- 17. [redacted] 23637, [redacted] Jun 2002
- 18. DIRECTOR 344348, [redacted] Jul 2002 (b)(3) NatSecAct
- (b)(1) 19. [redacted] 25994, [redacted] Aug 2002
- (b)(3) NatSecAct 20. [redacted] 26908, [redacted] Sep 2002 (b)(3) NatSecAct
- 21. [redacted] 30589, [redacted] Nov 2002
- 22. [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct
- (b)(1) 23. [redacted]
- (b)(3) NatSecAct 24. [redacted] 22722, [redacted] Jun 2002 (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1)
- 25. [redacted] Jul 2002 (b)(3) CIAAct
- 26. [redacted] Aug 2002 (b)(3) NatSecAct
- (b)(1) 27. [redacted]
- (b)(3) NatSecAct 28. [redacted] 28914, [redacted] Oct 2002 (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6)
- 29. [redacted] 21147, [redacted] Apr 2002 (b)(7)(c)
- 30. Interview of John B. Jessen, 9 Jan 2003
- (b)(1) 31. ALEC 189493, [redacted] Oct 2002
- (b)(3) NatSecAct 32. ALEC 191539, [redacted] Nov 2002
- 33. [redacted] 29520, [redacted] Nov 2002 (b)(3) NatSecAct
- 34. [redacted] Oct 2002
- 35. [redacted] Nov 2002 (b)(1)
- (b)(1) 36. ALEC 190842, [redacted] Nov 2002 (b)(3) NatSecAct
- (b)(3) NatSecAct 37. ALEC 190864, [redacted] Nov 2002
- 38. [redacted] Nov 2002 (b)(1)
- 39. [redacted] 36124, [redacted] Nov 2002 (b)(3) NatSecAct
- (b)(1) 40. [redacted] 30211, [redacted] Nov 2002
- (b)(3) NatSecAct 41. [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct
- 42. [redacted] 29626, [redacted] Nov 2002 (b)(1)
- (b)(3) NatSecAct 43. [redacted] 29770, [redacted] Nov 2002 (b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~TOP SECRET//X1~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

A24-316

C06555318

Approved for Release: 2019/05/29 C06555318

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~TOP SECRET//X1~~

- 44. [redacted] 29909, [redacted] Nov 2002
- 45. [redacted] Nov 2002
- 46. Interview of [redacted] Nov 2002
- 47. Interview of [redacted] Nov 2002
- 48. Final Autopsy Findings, (b)(3) CIAAct
- 49. Interview of Dr. [redacted] Dec 2002
- 50. Interview of [redacted] Nov 2002
- 51. Gul Rahman Autopsy Photographs

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

~~TOP SECRET//X1~~

A24-37

Vaughn Index Entry No. 5

(b)(1) Approved for Release: 2019/05/29 C06598254
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct DATE: [] NOV 02
(b)(3) NatSecAct
CITE [] 30211

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - GUL RAHMAN: CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

[Redacted Box]
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1) NOV 02 [] 30211
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
SECRET [] NOV 02 (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
CITE [] 30211

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR. (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
FOR: [Redacted Box] (b)(3) NatSecAct
[Redacted Box]

SUBJECT: EYES ONLY - GUL RAHMAN: CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

REF: NONE

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

TEXT:

- 1. ACTION REQUIRED: NOTE FOLLOWING CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS.
- 2. THE FOLLOWING CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS RELATING TO THE DEATH OF ENEMY COMBATANT GUL RAHMAN AT [Redacted Box] FACILITY WAS ASSEMBLED BY STATION OFFICERS FROM THE ACCOUNTS OF [Redacted Box] PERSONNEL AND [Redacted Box] GUARDS WHO HAD KNOWLEDGE RELEVANT TO THIS EVENT.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

- 3. BACKGROUND: GUL RAHMAN WAS BROUGHT TO THE FACILITY ON [Redacted Box] NOVEMBER. HE WAS GIVEN A PHYSICAL EXAMINATION AND ALL HIS PERSONAL CLOTHES AND EFFECTS REMOVED. HE WAS DRESSED IN STANDARD PRISON GARB AND PLACED IN A SINGLE CELL. RAHMAN HAD BEEN CONSISTENTLY UNCOOPERATIVE SINCE ARRIVAL AND DISPLAYED EVIDENCE OF A HIGH LEVEL OF RESISTANCE TRAINING. HIS DEMEANOR IN THE PRESENCE OF HIS [Redacted Box] INTERROGATORS WAS EXTREMELY CALM AND CONTROLLED. HOWEVER, RAHMAN'S

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)

Approved for Release: 2019/05/29 C06598254

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

ATTITUDE TOWARDS HIS [] GUARDS WAS REPORTEDLY VERY DIFFERENT. THE SENIOR [] OFFICER PRESENT AT [] NOTIFIED STATION ABOUT ONE WEEK AGO THAT RAHMAN HAD DIRECTLY THREATENED HIS GUARDS. [] OFFICERS NEVER WITNESSED THIS BEHAVIOR FIRSTHAND). SPECIFICALLY, RAHMAN REPORTEDLY TOLD THEM THAT HE KNEW THEIR FACES AND THAT HE WOULD KILL OR HAVE THEM ALL KILLED AFTER HIS RELEASE. AS A RESULT OF THE PHYSICAL THREAT HE POSED TO HIS GUARDS, HE WAS KEPT CONSISTENTLY RESTRAINED WITH HAND AND ANKLE RESTRAINTS IN THE CELL HE OCCUPIED BY HIMSELF.

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

4. CHRONOLOGY:

A. THE LAST TIME RAHMAN WAS SEEN BY [] OFFICER PRIOR TO HIS DEATH WAS [] NOV 2002. AT THAT TIME RAHMAN WAS ASSESSED TO BE IN GOOD OVERALL HEALTH. STATION NOTED THAT RAHMAN HAD SMALL ABRASIONS ON HIS WRISTS AND ANKLES AS A RESULT OF THE RESTRAINTS. HIS ANKLE RESTRAINTS WERE LOOSENED AND HIS HAND RESTRAINTS WERE REMOVED WHEN RAHMAN WAS RETURNED TO HIS CELL.

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

B. AT [] ON [] NOV 2002, THE [] COMMANDER TOLD STATION THAT WHEN RAHMAN HAD BEEN GIVEN FOOD AT 1500 LOCAL, HE HAD THROWN IT, HIS PLATE, HIS WATER BOTTLE AND DEFECATION BUCKET AT THE GUARDS WHO HAD DELIVERED THE FOOD. STATION REQUESTED THAT THE [] COMMANDER TO REPLACE RAHMAN'S HAND RESTRAINTS TO PREVENT THIS FROM REOCCURRING, OR PREVENT HIM FROM UNDERTAKING ANY OTHER VIOLENT ACTION.

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

C. INTERVIEWED SEPARATELY ON [] NOV, EACH OF THE [] GUARDS REPORTED THAT DURING NORMAL CELL CHECKS AT 2200, 2300, 0400, AND 0800 HOURS ON [] NOV, GUL RAHMAN WAS ALIVE IN HIS CELL. RAHMAN WAS VISUALLY INSPECTED THROUGH THE DOOR CELL SLOT BUT NO GUARD ENTERED HIS CELL. [] GUARDS ON THE 0800 CELL CHECK SAID INDEPENDENTLY THAT RAHMAN WAS DEFINITELY ALIVE, WITH HIS EYES OPEN, SEATED IN HIS CELL AT 0800 ON [] NOV.

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

D. SHORTLY AFTER 1000 HOURS ON [] NOV 2002, STATION PERSONNEL THEN PRESENT AT THE FACILITY TO CONDUCT AN INTERROGATION OF ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL WERE NOTIFIED BY [] GUARDS THAT GUL RAHMAN WAS SLEEPING IN HIS CELL BUT THERE WAS SOME PROBLEM. STATION OFFICERS WERE ESCORTED TO THE CELL BY THE GUARDS. THESE OFFICERS REALIZED RAHMAN WAS DECEASED AND THEY SUBSEQUENTLY REQUESTED [] THAT STATION MEDIC VISIT THE FACILITY. OFFICERS REPORTED THAT A SMALL AMOUNT (PALM-SIZED POOL) OF DRIED BLOOD WAS PRESENT IN AND AROUND THE MOUTH AND NOSE OF SUBJECT. RAHMAN WAS OBSERVED STILL SHACKLED, AND SLUMPED OVER IN THE SEATED POSITION.

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

E. AT APPROXIMATELY 1030 HOURS, STATION MEDIC ARRIVED AT THE LOCATION. THE STATION MEDIC INSPECTED THE BODY AND NOTICED NO OBVIOUS CONTUSIONS, ABRASIONS, MARKS, SWELLING, OR OTHER INDICATIONS OF SPECIFIC CAUSE OF DEATH. HE NOTED THAT THE BLOOD IN EVIDENCE WAS DARK, NOT IN KEEPING WITH A WOUND TO THE NOSE OR MOUTH AREA. THE MEDIC'S NOTES ON RAHMAN'S CONDITION ARE FILED AT STATION. HIS

(b)(1)

(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

ESTIMATION WAS THAT RAHMAN HAD BEEN DEAD LESS THAN A FEW HOURS.

5. PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT: WITHOUT AN AUTOPSY IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE OF DEATH OF RAHMAN. [REDACTED] PLANS ARE TO PLACE THE BODY IN IMPROVISED COLD STORAGE PENDING DECISION ON DISPOSITION.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
[REDACTED]

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

Vaughn Index Entry No. 6

NR

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~

DECEMBER 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

FROM: [redacted]
CHIEF, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EVALUATION BRANCH
COUNTERESPIONAGE GROUP
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CENTER

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

SUBJECT: RAHMAN DEATH INVESTIGATION - INTERVIEW OF [redacted]

1. ON [redacted] NOVEMBER 2002, [redacted] OGC, AND I
INTERVIEWED [redacted] REGARDING THE DEATH OF GUL RAHMAN.
[redacted] IS AN OPERATIONS OFFICER [redacted] AND IS RESPONSIBLE FOR
COORDINATING THE DEBRIEFING ACTIVITIES OF STATION PERSONNEL [redacted]
GUARD FORCE [redacted]
FACILITY KNOWN TO STATION PERSONNEL AS [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[REDACTED] THE PRISONERS ARE FED ONCE A DAY [REDACTED] (b)(1)
[REDACTED] ALTHOUGH THE PRISONERS ONLY [REDACTED] (b)(3) CIAAct
RECEIVE ONE MEAL, IT IS A LARGE MEAL. THE FOOD IS BROUGHT TO THE PRISONER (b)(3) NatSecAct
BY THE GUARDS. [REDACTED] STATED THAT THE GUARDS DO NOT TALK TO THE PRISONER (b)(6)
ALTHOUGH THE GUARDS RESPOND TO [REDACTED] TASKING, NOTHING PREVENTS THEM (b)(7)(c)
FROM ACTING INDEPENDENTLY TOWARD THE PRISONERS. IF THE GUARDS NOTICED
THAT A PRISONER WAS COLD, NOTHING PREVENTED THEM FROM GIVING HIM A
BLANKET.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

[REDACTED] STATED THAT GUL RAHMAN WAS BROUGHT TO [REDACTED] CIRCA [REDACTED] (b)(1)
NOVEMBER 2002. RAHMAN WAS A PASHTON MEMBER OF HIZBI ISLAMI. THE (b)(3) CIAAct
GUARDS DID NOT KNOW THE IDENTITY OF RAHMAN, BUT THEY DID KNOW THAT (b)(3) NatSecAct
RAHMAN AND OTHER PRISONERS CONFINED TO [REDACTED] WERE VERY BAD,
DANGEROUS PEOPLE. TERRORISTS. THE GUARDS ALSO KNEW THAT THEY HAD TO BE

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct

[REDACTED] CAREFUL AROUND THEM. A FEW DAYS AFTER HIS ARRIVAL AT [REDACTED] RAHMAN (b)(1)
TOLD (b)(3) NatSecAct

THE GUARDS THAT HE HAD SEEN THEIR FACES AND WOULD FIND AND KILL THEM AFTER (b)(1)
HIS RELEASE. ON THE AFTERNOON OF THE [REDACTED] NOVEMBER, RAHMAN THREW HIS FOOD (b)(3) NatSecAct
AND WATER AT THE GUARDS AND WAS SCREAMING AT THEM. [REDACTED] STATED THAT

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

THE PRISONERS ARE FED ONE LARGE MEAL EACH DAY. SINCE RAHMAN THREW HIS (b)(1)
FOOD ON THE [REDACTED] NOVEMBER, HIS PREVIOUS MEAL WOULD HAVE BEEN ON [REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct
[REDACTED]MBER. RAHMAN WAS THE ONLY PRISONER WHO HAD GIVEN THE GUARDS ANY (b)(1)
TROUBLE. (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

4. [REDACTED] FIRST LEARNED OF RAHMAN'S DEATH AT MID-MORNING ON [REDACTED] (b)(1)
NOVEMBER 2002. ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] DOC INFORMED HIM THAT RAHMAN HAD (b)(1)
DIED. [REDACTED] COULD NOT RECALL SPECIFICALLY WHAT DOC TOLD HIM. [REDACTED] STATED (b)(3) CIAAct
THAT HE IMMEDIATELY INFORMED COS OF RAHMAN'S DEATH. [REDACTED] STATED THAT (b)(3) NatSecAct
HE TRAVELED TO [REDACTED] APPROXIMATELY FOUR HOURS AFTER RAHMAN WAS (b)(1)
DISCOVERED. [REDACTED] SAID HE QUESTIONED THE GUARDS ABOUT WHAT HAPPENED (b)(3) CIAAct
CABLED HEADQUARTERS WITH HIS FINDINGS. [REDACTED] STATED THAT ACCORDING (b)(3) NatSecAct
TO THE GUARDS, THEY MADE THEIR ROUTINE ROUNDS TO CHECK ON THE PRISONERS AT (b)(1)
0400 AND 0800. THE BUREAU OF PRISONS HAD BEEN AT [REDACTED] THE 'PREVIOUS (b)(3) NatSecAct
WEEK TO ASSIST IN TRAINING THE GUARDS. ESTABLISHING A SCHEDULE OF ROUNDS WAS (b)(1)
ONE OF THEIR OBJECTIVES, FOR PURPOSES OF ACCOUNTABILITY. THE GUARDS STATED (b)(3) NatSecAct
THAT DURING THESE CHECKS, RAHMAN WAS SEATED UPRIGHT AND HIS NECK WAS (b)(1)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

STRAIGHT. [REDACTED] STATED THAT AT 1000, [REDACTED] GUARDS MADE THE ROUNDS AGAIN (b)(1)
AND FOUND RAHMAN DEAD. AT THE TIME OF THE DISCOVERY, SEVERAL OF OUR (b)(3) NatSecAct
GUARDS WERE PRESENT AT [REDACTED] THEY WERE (b)(1)
APPROACHED BY THE GUARDS WHO SAID THAT ONE OF THE PRISONERS WAS LYING (b)(3) CIAAct
ON THE FLOOR. [REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[REDACTED] AFTER THE BODY WAS DISCOVERED, [REDACTED] CALLED [REDACTED] (b)(1)
NO PHOTOGRAPHS WERE TAKEN OF THE BODY PRIOR TO ITS REMOVAL FROM THE CELL. (b)(3) CIAAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

5. [REDACTED] STATED THAT WHEN RAHMAN WAS FOUND, HIS HANDS AND FEET (b)(1)
WERE SHACKLED TOGETHER AND HE WAS WEARING A SWEATSHIRT WITH NO (b)(3) CIAAct
[REDACTED] (b)(3) NatSecAct
[REDACTED] (b)(6)
[REDACTED] (b)(7)(c)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

BOTTOMS. [] STATED THAT SOMETIMES THE BOTTOMS WERE TAKEN FROM UNCOOPERATIVE PRISONERS BECAUSE IT WAS AN EMBARRASSMENT TO MUSLIMS. [] STATED THAT HE WAS LAYING ON HIS RIGHT SIDE. [] STATED THAT HE HAD A NUMBER OF SCRATCHES ON HIS BODY AND FACE, AS WELL AS AN ABRASION ON HIS SHOULDER. [] STATED THAT THESE MINOR INJURIES LOOKED TO HAVE BEEN INCURRED MORE THAN 10 DAYS BEFORE HIS DEATH AS THEY CLEARLY HAD BEGUN TO

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

6. [] STATED THAT THERE WERE NO UNUSUAL SMELLS IN THE CELL WHEN HE ARRIVED AND DID NOT HEAR ANYONE DISCUSS ANY UNUSUAL SMELLS. [] STATED THAT HE DID NOT NOTICE ANYTHING OTHER THAN THE CELL SMELLED OF URINE FROM THE BUCKET THAT WAS KEPT THERE FOR THAT PURPOSE.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[] STATED THAT HE DID FIND IT UNUSUAL THAT WHEN RAHMAN WAS DISCOVERED, THE GUARD COMMANDER WAS NOT PRESENT AT THE FACILITY. HE WAS TOLD THAT THE COMMANDER WAS AT []

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

7. [] STATED THAT IN THE DAYS PRECEDING RAHMAN'S DEATH, THE TEMPERATURE WAS COLD [] IT WAS BETWEEN 32-34 DEGREES. [] ADDED THAT THERE IS NO INSULATION IN THE BUILDING AND NO THERMOMETERS.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

8. THE EVENING OF RAHMAN'S DEATH [] BROUGHT A FREEZER WHERE RAHMAN COULD BE STORED UNTIL A DETERMINATION WAS MADE REGARDING WHAT TO DO WITH HIM.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

9. [] WAS ASKED TO SHOW US THE CELL RAHMAN WAS HOUSED IN. [] STATED THAT THE CELL HAD BEEN FIXED UP SINCE RAHMAN WAS REMOVED NOW HAS CARPETING ON THE FLOOR AND SOME FURNITURE. [] STATED THAT [] WERE TRYING TO TURN IT INTO A MODEL CELL SO THEY COULD SHOW PRISONER WHAT LIFE COULD BE LIKE IF THEY COOPERATED.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

10. [] WAS ASKED IF THE GUARDS COULD HEAR THE PRISONERS IF THEY BEGAN YELLING FROM THEIR CELL. [] STATED THAT GIVEN THE MUSIC THAT WAS PLAYING AND THE SEPARATION OF THE PRISON INTO TWO PARTS; ONE WHERE THE PRISONERS WERE KEPT AND THE OTHER WHERE PRISONERS WERE INTERROGATED AND GUARDS CONGREGATED, IT WAS UNLIKELY THAT THE GUARDS WOULD BE ABLE TO HEAR THEM. EVEN IF THEY DID HEAR THEM, [] WASN'T SURE THE GUARDS WOULD RESPOND.

11. [] WAS ASKED TO DRAW A DIAGRAM OF [] WHICH HE PROVIDED THE NEXT DAY.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Vaughn Index Entry No. 7

SECRET/ [] /NOFORN//MR

CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

2002	EVENT
	arrives in []
	arrives in []
September []	[] operational as interrogation/detention facility; receives first detainee.
September []	[] receives eight detainees. [] writes in cable, [] officers are present daily and have the maximum possible degree of control."
October []	Gul Rahman is apprehended in Pakistan.
	Psychologist (C) Bruce Jessen arrives in []
	Physician's Assistant [] arrives in []
	(Approximate) [] first goes to []
November []	Rahman is rendered to []
	[] and Jessen interview Rahman.
November []	[] and Jessen interview Rahman.
	(Approximate) Rahman given cold shower.
	Rahman is subjected to Hard Takedown.
November []	(Approximate) Rahman's pants removed.
	(Approximate) Counterterrorist Center supervisor visits [] Rahman wearing only socks and diaper; supervisor has concern regarding hypothermia.
	[] cable reports Rahman subjected to 48 hours of sleep deprivation, rough treatment, cold shower and other measures but remained noncompliant. [] requests Headquarters consider planning for alternative interrogation measures.
November []	[] cable reports Rahman is uncooperative

SECRET/ [] /NOFORN//MR

SECRET/[] NOFORN//MR

2002	EVENT
November []	Rahman admits identity during interrogation [] [] Rahman will be reinterviewed on [] November. Cable notes Rahman had been subjected to cold conditions and minimum food and sleep, and he was confused due to dehydration and fatigue.
November []	Bureau of Prisons officers arrive [] training program for local guards begins and runs until [] November.
	Psychologist (C) James Mitchell arrives []
November []	[] concurs with Headquarters proposal to send newly graduated interrogators to []
	Headquarters requests psychological assessment and assessment on interrogation measures to render Rahman compliant.
	Jessen conducts psychological captivity assessment on Rahman; Jessen's sixth session with Rahman.
	(Approximate) [] sees Rahman at [] but does not examine him.
	(Approximate) Local guard commander reports that Rahman told the guards he would kill them or have them killed after his release.
November []	Mitchell, Jessen, and [] depart []
November []	[] cable recommends future use of continued environmental deprivations with interrogations 18 out of 24 hours daily.
	Rahman given second cold shower.
November [] to November []	[] PA provides follow-up care at [] to certain detainees, but not Rahman.
November []	(Approximate) Linguist [] questions [] about the temperature at which hypothermia occurs.
	(Afternoon) [] last sees Rahman alive, gives him sweatshirt.

SECRET/[]² NOFORN//MR

SECRET / [] NOFORN / MR

2002	EVENT
	2100 hrs - Rahman consumes last meal; hand restraints removed.
November []	[] returns to []
	1500 hrs - Rahman provided food; throws food and bucket and threatens guards. 1530 hrs - Guard informs [] of incident. [] directs guards to replace Rahman's hand restraints.
	Late afternoon - [] informs two officers at [] about Rahman's conduct.
	2200 hrs - guard check - Rahman is alive.
	2300 hrs - guard check - Rahman is alive.
November []	0400 hrs - guard check - Rahman is alive.
	0800 hrs - guard check - Rahman is alive.
	1000 hrs - guard check - Rahman is dead.
	1200 hrs - Bureau of Prisons officers depart []
	[] cable reports chronology of events connected with the death of Rahman.
November []	[] cable describes [] medical support to detainees in [] custody. Reports all detainees have been cooperative with medical personnel except Rahman.
November []	DO Investigative Team arrives at []
November []	Pathologist conducts autopsy.

SECRET / [] NOFORN / MR

Vaughn Index Entry No. 8

~~SECRET//X1~~

FINAL AUTOPSY FINDINGS

CASE #: OMS A-01-02 (b)(1)
IDENTIFICATION: (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

NAME: GUL RAHMAN **STATUS:** Detainee

SSN/ID NO: (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

AGE: (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

DATE OF BIRTH: (b)(1) **SEX:** Male

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

DATE AND TIME OF DEATH: Early morning hours of (b)(1) November 2002. (b)(1)

PLACE OF AUTOPSY: (b)(1) Detention Facility (b)(1)

PROSECTOR: (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct

ASSISTANTS: (b)(6)

TYPE OF AUTOPSY: (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Included anterior neck dissection with examination of
hyoid bone. (b)(1)
(b)(1) -urinary
catecholamines. (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

MEDICAL OPINION

CAUSE OF DEATH: Undetermined.
MANNER OF DEATH: Undetermined.
CLINICAL IMPRESSION: Hypothermia.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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SUMMARY OF PATHOLOGIC DIAGNOSIS

Anatomic Findings:

External Evidence of Injury (Past and Present)-

1. **Circumferential superficial excoriations of the left and right wrists and the left and right lower legs consistent with shackle restraint abrasions.**
2. (b)(1)
3. (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Pertinent negative findings- No evidence of head, facial, or neck injuries. No fractures or significant internal traumatic inju

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Internal Examination-

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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Histologic Findings:

(b)(3) NatSecAct

Toxicology: Negative for cyanide,

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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Laboratory studies: Elevated Urinary Catecholamines were detected.

Urine catecholamine fractionation:

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Brief Clinical History

Gul Rahman (detainee) was a detainee at the [redacted] Detention Facility [redacted] who was in good health prior to the morning of [redacted] November 2002. He was found dead in his cell at approximately 10 a.m. [redacted] by the facility guards.

The detainee had been incarcerated for [redacted] days prior to his death. On admission to the facility he was examined by a health care practitioner and was found to be without medical complaints or significant physical ailment. [redacted] days prior to his death the detainee was uncooperative and made verbal threats against the [redacted] facility guards and threatened to kill their families. At this time, he was placed in short restraints (wrists and feet shackled and connected by a short chain) and his pants were taken. At 3 p.m. on [redacted] November the detainee was given his daily meal by the guards, which he threw around the room and again made threats to the guards. The last meal that the detainee had eaten was the prior day at [redacted] November 2002 (approximately 36 hours prior to his death). When the detainee was checked on at 8 a.m. [redacted] November, he was observed sitting upright in restraints, sitting in direct contact with the concrete floor. He was reportedly shivering, but did not speak or look at the guards. At 10 a.m. the detainee was found unresponsive and cold lying on his right side. [redacted] Agency officers were summoned and they attempted basic cardiac resuscitation without success. The officers noted that the deceased was in short chain restraints and was in the fetal position laying on his right side on the concrete floor of the cell. The station health care practitioner was called and found the patient to be deceased [redacted]

[redacted] The deceased was dressed only in a sweatshirt. The temperature the morning of [redacted] November was 31 degrees Fahrenheit. There had been a rapid downward change in climactic temperature over the prior week. No heating was available in the facility at this time.

Prior to autopsy on the [redacted] of November the body was stored in an upright freezer [redacted]

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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted]
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted]
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Autopsy Report Protocol

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct An autopsy was performed on the body of Gul Rahman at the [redacted] Facility, [redacted] on [redacted] November 2002 at approximately [redacted]

External Examination

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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

The teeth were natural and in good condition. Examination of the neck revealed no evidence of injury. The chest was unremarkable. No evidence of injury of the ribs or sternum was evident externally. The abdomen was flat and without signs of significant injury.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted]

The extremities showed circumferential superficial excoriations of the left and right wrists and the left and right lower legs consistent with abrasions from shackle restraints.

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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Internal Examination

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Neck:

A complete anterior neck dissection was performed. Examination of the neck, including strap muscles, thyroid gland, and large vessels, revealed no abnormalities. The hyoid bone was intact. The laryngeal cartilages were intact and without fracture or hemorrhage.

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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
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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Toxicology and Chemistry

Toxicology:

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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Analysis revealed no presence of cyanide.

Laboratory studies: Elevated Urinary Catecholamines were detected.

Urine catecholamine fractionation:

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[Redacted]

Medical Opinion

Cause of Death: Undetermined.

Manner of Death: Undetermined.

Clinical Impression: Hypothermia.

The anatomic findings are non-specific and are not pathognomonic for a specific cause or manner of death. Based upon the investigative history and the lack of contradictory pathologic findings the clinical impression is that this individual's death is consistent with hypothermia.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[Redacted]

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
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
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	ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
	CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
REMARKS:			
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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1) SUBJECT: (S/ [redacted] /NF) Outcome of Accountability Board
(b)(3) NatSecAct Review of Death of Detainee Gul Rahman

1. (TS/ [redacted] /NF) Pursuant to a recommendation of the CIA Inspector General (IG), at the direction of the DCIA the Executive Director in September 2005 convened a Special Accountability Board to review the actions of three CIA employees named by the IG in connection with the death on [redacted] November 2002 of high-value detainee Gul Rahman while in CIA custody at the [redacted] detention facility. An autopsy conducted by a certified Agency pathologist listed the cause of death to be "undetermined," but indicated hypothermia, by a diagnosis of exclusion. This incident was the subject of previous notifications provided to the intelligence committees in November 2002 and May 2003. It was referred to the Department of Justice, which declined prosecution.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

2. (TS/ [redacted] /NF) The Executive Director concurred with the findings of the Board with respect to two officers, for whom the Board recommended no disciplinary action, and disagreed with respect to the third. Thus, no sanctions will be imposed on these officers.

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(b)(3) CIAAct
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

SUBJECT: ~~(S)~~ Outcome of Accountability Board Review of
Death of Detainee Gul Rahman

[Redacted]

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(b)(5)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

3. ~~(TS/)~~ [Redacted] ~~(NF)~~ The Executive Director acknowledged performance shortfalls [Redacted] but found no disciplinary culpability. Although the [Redacted] manager exhibited poor judgment in his decision to short chain Rahman and leave him in that condition overnight, there is no evidence, as determined by the IG report of investigation and confirmed by the Special Accountability Board, of any intent to harm or kill Rahman. Moreover, the manager was a first-to-operations officer with no experience or training in interrogations or prison operations, and the act of short chaining was a restraining technique taught to the guards just prior to Rahman's death by a visiting training team from the US Bureau of Prisons. This visit was arranged by Headquarters. With respect to the Executive Director ratified the Board's recommendation. Although [Redacted] should have provided closer supervision of the [Redacted] manager, given his inexperience and lack of training,

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

In addition, the evidence indicates that [Redacted] and others in the chain of command were satisfied with the [Redacted] manager's performance based in part on first hand observations, an appropriate awareness of the interrogation techniques used on Rahman, and the conditions of Rahman's confinement. The Executive Director ratified the Board's recommendation of

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2 (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

SUBJECT: (S) Outcome of Accountability Board Review of
Death of Detainee Gul Rahman

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)

no discipline with respect to [redacted] No factual basis
could be found for the IG's conclusion that [redacted]

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(7)(c)

specifically assigned to [redacted] on a sustained and regular
basis was a resource management failure at the Headquarters
level that has been identified and programmatic corrective
action has already been taken.

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

4. (S/[redacted]/NF) The Executive Director accorded
significant weight to several key mitigating factors, owing
to systemic problems associated with initial implementation
of the Agency detention and interrogation program, which
applied to all three employees under review. The systemic
problems, also identified by the IG and largely corrected
in the aftermath of the Rahman incident, denied responsible
officials at Station appropriate levels of programmatic
guidance, oversight, resources, and training, which may
have prevented Rahman's death. At the time of Rahman's
detention, the Agency had not yet fully developed formal
detention and interrogation guidelines; guidance was *ad hoc*
and there was an ambiguous chain of command from
Headquarters. In stark contrast to the more detailed
guidance and far greater resources and support the Agency
provided contemporaneously to officers at two other Agency-
run detention facilities, the Agency failed to provide
adequate staffing, guidance, and support to [redacted] (b)(1)
according to the IG. Staffing shortages, for example, (b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

(b)(3) NatSecAct

5. (S/[redacted]/NF) Taken as a whole, these facts and
circumstances led the Executive Director to conclude that
although the performance of the [redacted] manager [redacted] (b)(6)

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(1)

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

SUBJECT: (S) Outcome of Accountability Board Review of
Death of Detainee Gul Rahman

could have been better, their performance in regard to
these events did not warrant the imposition of any
disciplinary action.

6. (U) The IG and the three named employees have
been notified of the Executive Director's decisions.

(b)(1)

4 (b)(3) NatSecAct

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[Redacted]

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