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FBI INFO.

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2041

DATE: 04-25-2019

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STANDARD MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES FOR FBI ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND PHYSICAL SEARCH CONDUCTED UNDER THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (U)

Effective upon approval of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court

Classified by: Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General

Reason:

1.4(c)

Declassify on:

May 10, 2038





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I. (U) GENERAL PROVISIONS

A. (U) In accordance with 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h) and 1821(4), these procedures govern the acquisition, retention, and dissemination of nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting United States persons that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) obtains pursuant to orders issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) or emergency authorizations by the Attorney General under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended (FISA), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 and 1821-1829. For the purpose of these procedures, the term "applicable FISA authority" refers to both FISC-ordered and Attorney General authorized electronic surveillance or physical search conducted in a particular case pursuant to FISA. The Attorney General has adopted these procedures after concluding that they meet the requirements of 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h) and 1821(4) because they are specific procedures that are reasonably designed in light of the purpose and technique of the particular surveillance or physical search to minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting United States persons consistent with the need of the United States to obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information and otherwise comport with the statutory definition of minimization procedures. In accordance with 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(f)(6), the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) has provided assistance to the Attorney General with respect to the dissemination procedures set forth herein so that FISA-acquired information may be used efficiently and effectively for foreign intelligence purposes.





B. (%/NF) Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §§ 1806(a) and 1825(a), no information acquired pursuant to FISA may be used or disclosed by Federal officers or employees except for lawful purposes. Information acquired from electronic surveillance or physical search conducted under FISA concerning United States persons may be used and disclosed by Federal officers and employees without the consent of the United States persons only in accordance with these minimization procedures and any modified or supplemental minimization procedures that may apply. These procedures do not apply to publicly available information concerning United States persons, nor do they apply to information that is acquired, retained, or disseminated with a United States person's consent. In addition, except for the provisions set forth below regarding attorney-client

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those for the terms "foreign intelligence information" and "United States person." For purposes of these procedures, if an individual is known to be located in the United States, or if it is not known whether the individual is located in or outside of the United States, he or she should be presumed to be a United States person unless the individual is identified as an alien who has not been admitted for permanent residence or circumstances give rise to the reasonable belief that the individual is not a United States person. If an individual is known or believed to be located outside the United States, he or she should be presumed to be a non-United States person unless the individual is identified as a United States person or circumstances give rise to the reasonable

(U)





belief that the individual is a United States person. In an on-line operation, if it is not known whether an individual is located in or outside of the United States, he or she should be presumed to be a non-United States person unless the individual is identified as a United States person or circumstances give rise to the reasonable belief that the individual is a United States person.

- D. (U) If FBI personnel, which, for the purposes of these procedures, includes all contractors and others authorized to work under the direction and control of the FBI on FISA related matters, encounter a situation that they believe requires them to act inconsistently with these procedures in order to protect the national security of the United States, enforce the criminal law, or protect life or property from serious harm, those personnel immediately should contact FBI Headquarters and the Office of Intelligence of the National Security Division of the Department of Justice (NSD) to request that these procedures be modified. The United States may obtain modifications to these procedures with the approval of the Attorney General and a determination by the FISC that the modified procedures meet the definition of minimization procedures under sections 1801(h) and/or 1821(4) of FISA.
- E. (U) If, in order to protect against an immediate threat to human life, the FBI determines that it must take action in apparent departure from these procedures and that it is not feasible to obtain a timely modification of these procedures from the FISC, the FBI shall report that activity promptly to the NSD, which shall notify the FISC promptly of such activity.
- (II) F. (X/NF) Nothing in these procedures shall restrict the FBI's performance of lawful oversight functions of its personnel or systems, or lawful oversight functions of the NSD or the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General. Similarly, and notwithstanding any other





section in these procedures, the FBI may use information acquired pursuant to FISA to conduct security assessments of its systems in order to ensure that FBI systems have not been and will not be compromised. These security assessments may include, but will not be limited to, the temporary storage of FISA-acquired information in a separate system for a period not to exceed one year. While retained in such a storage system for security assessments, such FISA-acquired information may not be accessed for any other purpose. Any information retained for this purpose may be disseminated only in accordance with the applicable provisions of these procedures.

II. (U) ACQUISITION

A. (U) Acquisition - Electronic Surveillance.

(11)

- 1. (U) Prior to initiating electronic surveillance, the FBI shall verify that the facility or place at which it will direct surveillance is the facility or place specified in the applicable FISA authority. The FBI is under a continuing obligation to verify that the authorized target of the surveillance uses or is about to use the facility or place at which the surveillance is directed during the authorized period of surveillance. The FBI shall terminate electronic surveillance of a facility or place as soon as it determines that the authorized target of the electronic surveillance no longer uses, nor is about to use, the facility or place, and shall promptly notify the NSD of such termination.
- 2. When conducting electronic surveillance of a facility or place pursuant to the applicable FISA authority, the FBI may acquire, using the means and to the extent approved





3.	by the c	court or authorized by the Attorney General for that facility or place	b1 b3 b7
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available information or communications of or concerning unconsenting United States persons that are not foreign intelligence information relating to a target of the surveillance; an B. (S//NF) Acquisition – Physical Search 1. (U) Personnel Authorized to Conduct Physical Search. (S//NF) Physical search shall be conducted only by: (i) appropriately authorized and trained personnel of the FBI, not including contractor (S//NF) Physical search shall be conducted only by: (i) appropriately authorized and		3. NF) Notwithstanding Section II.A.2, the FBI shall, to the extent reasonably	_
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	trained	l personnel of the FBI, not including contractor	- (C)
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
*			**************************************
(S)	(D), other persons	Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1824(c)(2)(B)- may assist in the physical search as	b1 -1 b3 -1 b7E -1,
	specified in the applicable FISA authority	ty.	

- 2. (U) Conducting Physical Search.
- (U) Prior to initiating physical search, the FBI shall verify that the premises or property at which it will conduct physical search is the premises or property specified in the applicable FISA authority. The FBI shall conduct physical search with the minimum intrusion necessary to acquire the foreign intelligence information sought. Personnel conducting physical search shall exercise reasonable judgment in determining whether the information, material, or property revealed through the search reasonably appears to be foreign intelligence information relating to a target of the search or evidence of a crime. The FBI shall conduct the search in accordance with the applicable FISA authority.
- a. (U) Areas of search. For physical search of premises or property, after conducting any necessary protective sweep, the FBI shall, where reasonably feasible, limit search areas to locations within premises or property where the FBI reasonably expects that: (i) foreign intelligence information may be stored or concealed by the target; or (ii) foreign intelligence information related to the target or the activities of the target may be found.
- b. (U) Manner of Search. The FBI may conduct physical search using the methods most suitable for acquiring the foreign intelligence information sought in light of the particular circumstances of the search. When conducting a physical search of electronic data, the





FBI may acquire all information, communications, or data relating to the target in accordance with the applicable FISA authority. Methods used to conduct physical search may include: inspection; examination; reproduction; temporary removal; marking for identification; testing; alteration; substitution; or seizure of information, material, or property.



immediate threat to public safety.


(U)

c. \(S/\NF)\) United States Person Information, Material, or Property

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(S)

emergency when reasonably necessary to protect against





		(S) b1 -1 b3 -1 b7E -1,2
3	(U) Physical Search Involving Mail or Private Couriers.	1
	a. (S//NF)	
		CONTRACTOR OF THE PROPERTY OF
		b1 -1 b3 -1 b7E -1,2
		b7E -1,2
	b. (S//NF)]
		5
		b1 -1 b3 -1
		b3 -1 b7E -1,2

- 4. (U) Record of Information Collected in Physical Search.
- (U) The FBI shall keep records identifying all information, material, or property acquired during a physical search.
 - 5. (U) Report of Physical Search.

(U) (S//NF) Within seven business days following the execution of a physical search, or receiving notice that a search has been executed, and for which the FISC ordered that a search





return be filed, the FBI shall notify the NSD of the date the search took place. The preceding	
requirement shall not apply (S)	b1 -1 b3 -1 b7E -1
C. Acquisition – Third Parties.	
(NF) "Third-party information" is: (a) nonpublicly available information of or	
concerning an unconsenting United States person who is not the authorized target of the	b1 -1 b3 -1
particular FISA collection	b7E -1

III. (U) RETENTION

A. (U) Retention – Storage of FISA-acquired Information.

(U) The FBI must retain all FISA-acquired information under appropriately secure conditions that limit access to such information only to authorized users in accordance with these and other applicable FBI procedures. These retention procedures apply to FISA-acquired



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information retained in any form. FBI electronic and data storage systems may permit multiple authorized users to access the information simultaneously or sequentially and to share FISA-acquired information between systems. "FISA-acquired information" means all information, communications, material, or property that the FBI acquires from electronic surveillance or physical search conducted pursuant to FISA.

(\$\square\$NF) "Raw FISA-acquired information" is FISA-acquired information that (a) is in the same or substantially same format as when the FBI acquired it, or (b) has been processed only as necessary to render it into a form in which it can be evaluated to determine whether it reasonably appears to be foreign intelligence information, to be necessary to understand foreign intelligence information or to assess its importance, or to be evidence of a crime.

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B. (U) Retention – Access to FISA-acquired Information.




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personnel in accordance with policies established by the Director, FBI, in consultation with the Attorney General or a designee. The FBI's policies regarding access will vary according to whether a particular storage system contains raw FISA-acquired information, will be consistent with the FBI's foreign intelligence information-gathering and information-sharing responsibilities, and shall include provisions:

- Permitting access to FISA-acquired information only by individuals who require
 access in order to perform their job duties or assist in a lawful and authorized governmental
 function;
- 2. Requiring the FBI to maintain accurate records of all persons to whom it has granted access;
- 3. Requiring the FBI to maintain accurate records of all persons who have accessed raw FISA-acquired information, and to audit its access records regularly to ensure that raw FISA-acquired information is only accessed by authorized individuals, including FBI personnel and the individuals referenced in Sections III.F and V.A of these procedures;
- 4. Requiring training on these minimization procedures and the FBI's policies regarding access to raw FISA-acquired information before granting access to raw FISA-acquired information; and
- 5. Requiring the primary case agent(s) and his/her/their designees (hereinafter "case coordinator(s)") to control the marking of information in a particular case in accordance with





FBI policy. A marking, for example, would include an indication that the information is or is not foreign intelligence.

effect. Thereafter, the FBI shall provide any new policies or materially modified policies to the Court on a semiannual basis.

personnel on a continuing basis for review, translation, analysis, and use in accordance with these procedures. Authorized personnel may continue to access raw FISA-acquired information to determine whether it reasonably appears to be foreign intelligence information, to be necessary to understand foreign intelligence information or to assess its importance, or to be evidence of a crime notwithstanding the fact that other FBI personnel previously may have reviewed such information and determined that it did not reasonably appear to be foreign intelligence information, to be necessary to understand foreign intelligence information or to assess its importance, or to be evidence of a crime at the time of such review.

C. (U) Retention - Review and Use of FISA-acquired Information.

1. (U) General Provisions.

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review, translate, analyze, and use all such information only in accordance with these procedures and FISA and only for the purpose of determining whether it reasonably appears to be foreign intelligence information, to be necessary to understand foreign intelligence information or to





assess its importance, or to be evidence of a crime. Such personnel shall exercise reasonable judgment in making such determinations.

or analyze raw FISA-acquired information only as necessary to evaluate whether it reasonably appears to be foreign intelligence information, to be necessary to understand foreign intelligence information or assess its importance, or to be evidence of a crime. Once FBI personnel have assessed that raw FISA-acquired information meets one of these criteria, the FBI may retain that information for further investigation and analysis and may disseminate it in accordance with these procedures. Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h)(3) and 1821(4)(C), however, information that is assessed to be evidence of a crime but not to be foreign intelligence or necessary to understand foreign intelligence may only be retained and disseminated for law enforcement

purposes.	
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(U) Before using FISA-acquired information for further investigation, analysis, or dissemination, the FBI shall strike, or substitute a characterization for, information of or concerning a United States person, including that person's identity, if it does not reasonably

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appear to be foreign intelligence information, to be necessary to understand or assess the importance of foreign intelligence information, or to be evidence of a crime.

(U) The FBI may disseminate copies, transcriptions, summaries, and other documents containing FISA-acquired information only in accordance with the dissemination procedures set forth in Part IV below.

S//NF) The FBI shall retain FISA-acquired information that is not foreign intelligence information that has been reviewed and reasonably appears to be exculpatory or impeachment material for a criminal proceeding, or reasonably appears to be discoverable in a criminal proceeding, and shall treat that information as if it were evidence of a crime.

(S/NF)






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3. (U) Sensitive Information.

(II) Particular care should be taken when reviewing information that is sensitive

information, as defined below. No sensitive information may be used in an analysis or report (such as an Electronic Communication (EC)) unless it is first determined that such information reasonably appears to be foreign intelligence information, necessary to understand foreign intelligence information or assess its importance, or evidence of a crime. Information that reasonably appears to be foreign intelligence information, necessary to understand foreign intelligence information, or necessary to assess the importance of foreign intelligence information may be retained, processed, and disseminated in accordance with these procedures even if it is sensitive information. Information that reasonably appears to be evidence of a crime may be retained, processed, and disseminated for law enforcement purposes in accordance with these procedures, even if it is sensitive information. Sensitive information consists of:

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
(II) D. (SI/NF) Retention – Queries of Electronic and Data Storage Systems Containing Raw FISA-acquired Information.

query FBI electronic and data storage systems that contain raw FISA-acquired information may query FBI electronic and data storage systems that contain raw FISA-acquired information to find, extract, review, translate, and assess whether such information reasonably appears to be foreign intelligence information, to be necessary to understand foreign intelligence information or assess its importance, or to be evidence of a crime. Such queries may involve the use of keywords, identifiers, formulas, attributes, or other sophisticated data exploitation techniques. To the extent reasonably feasible, authorized users with access to raw FISA-acquired information must design such queries to find and extract foreign intelligence information or evidence of a crime. Authorized users with access to raw FISA-acquired information may process the results of an appropriate query in accordance with Section III.C above. The FBI shall maintain records of all searches, including search terms, used by those with access to raw FISA-acquired information to query such systems. For purposes of this section, the term query does not include a user's search or query of an FBI electronic and data storage system that contains raw FISA-acquired information, where the user does not receive the raw FISA-acquired





information in response to the search or query or otherwise have access to the raw FISA-acquired information that is searched.



(I) E. (NF) Retention of Attorney-Client Communications.

Cases, however, the Government may propose and/or the FISC may order the use of supplemental procedures. FBI personnel shall consult as appropriate with FBI Division Counsel, the FBI Office of General Counsel, or the NSD to determine whether a communication is privileged.

(IJ) 1. (NF) Target charged with a crime pursuant to the United States Code.

As soon as the FBI knows that a target is charged with a crime pursuant to the United States Code, the FBI shall implement procedures that ensure that the target's attorney-client privilege is protected. These procedures shall include the following, unless otherwise authorized by the FISC:





(S)Establishment of a review team of one or more monitors and/or reviewers, a. who have no role in the prosecution of the charged criminal matter, to initially access and review information or communications acquired from a surveillance or search of a target who is charged with a crime pursuant to the United States Code; b1 -1 b3 -1 b7E -1,2 b3 -1 b7E -1 b1 -1 b3 -1 b7E -1,2 (S)



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			5-
	L	e. As soon as FBI personnel recognize that communications between the	J
		person under criminal charges and his attorney have been acquired	7.41
		the FBI shall ensure that whenever any user reviews information or	Ĵ(S)
	(5)	communications acquired which are in an FBI electronic and	b1 b3
(S)		data storage system containing raw FISA-acquired information, he receives electronic	
		notification that attorney-client communications have been acquired	
		The purpose of the notification is to alert others who may review this information	
		that they may encounter privileged communications.	
		2. Target charged with a non-Federal crime in the United States and persons other than a target charged with a crime in the United States.	
i.	{U} }	//NF) FBI monitors and other personnel with access to FISA-acquired information	
		shall be alert for communications that may be (i) between a target who is charged with a non-	
		Federal crime in the United States and the attorney representing the individual in the criminal	
		matter, or (ii) between a person other than a target charged with a crime in the United States and	
		the attorney representing the individual in the criminal matter. As soon as FBI personnel know	
		that a target is charged with a non-Federal crime in the United States or someone other than the	
		target who appears to regularly use the targeted facility, place, premises or property is charged	



with a crime in the United States, they will notify the Chief Division Counsel, FBI Office of General Counsel, and the NSD to determine whether supplemental procedures or a separate monitoring team are required. In the absence of such supplemental procedures or a separate monitoring team, as soon as FBI personnel recognize that they have acquired a communication between (i) a target who is charged with a non-Federal crime in the United States and the attorney representing the individual in the criminal matter, or (ii) a person other than a target charged with a crime in the United States and the attorney representing the individual in the

the FBI will seal the original record or portion thereof containing that privileged

communication, label it as containing privileged communications, forward the original recording containing the privileged communication to the NSD for sequestration with the FISC, and destroy all other copies of the privileged communication that are accessible to any end user electronically or in hard copy.

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d. As soon as FBI personnel recognize that communications between the person under criminal charges and his attorney have been acquired the FBI shall ensure that whenever any user reviews information or communications acquired which are in an FBI electronic and \{\S\} \frac{\sqrt{5}}{\sqrt{7}} = -1, data storage system containing raw FISA-acquired information, he receives electronic notification that attorney-client communications have been acquired The purpose of the notification is to alert others who may review this information that they may encounter privileged communications. \(\sqrt{1} \) = 3.		·		
the FBI shall ensure that whenever any user reviews information or communications acquired which are in an FBI electronic and (\$) b1 -1 b3 -1 b7E -1, data storage system containing raw FISA-acquired information, he receives electronic notification that attorney-client communications have been acquired [\$\S\\$] The purpose of the notification is to alert others who may review this information that they may encounter privileged communications. [\$\S\\$] **NF** Privileged communications involving targets and other persons not charged with a crime in the United States. [\$\S\\$] **Diff = 1 b3 -1 b7E -1,	7		S	
the FBI shall ensure that whenever any user reviews information or communications acquired which are in an FBI electronic and \$\begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c		d. As soon as FBI personnel recognize that communications between the		
the FBI shall ensure that whenever any user reviews information or communications acquired which are in an FBI electronic and \$\begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c		person under criminal charges and his attorney have been acquired	/ C \	
communications acquired which are in an FBI electronic and (\$) b1 -1 b3 -1 b7E -1, data storage system containing raw FISA-acquired information, he receives electronic notification that attorney-client communications have been acquired (\$) The purpose of the notification is to alert others who may review this information that they may encounter privileged communications. (\$\mathbb{W}\) \(\text{NF} \) \(\frac{\text{Privileged communications involving targets and other persons not charged with a crime in the United States.} (\$\mathbb{S} \) \(\text{b1} \) -1 \(\text{b3} \) -1 \(\text{b3} \) -1 \(\text{b3} \) -1 \(\text{b7} \) -1,		<u> </u>	[u]	
data storage system containing raw FISA-acquired information, he receives electronic notification that attorney-client communications have been acquired [\$\sigma\$ The purpose of the notification is to alert others who may review this information that they may encounter privileged communications. (\$\sigma\$) Privileged communications involving targets and other persons not charged with a crime in the United States.			b 3	-1
The purpose of the notification is to alert others who may review this information that they may encounter privileged communications. (II) 3. (N/NF) Privileged communications involving targets and other persons not charged with a crime in the United States. (S) bit -1 bit		data storage system containing raw FISA-acquired information, he receives electronic		
The purpose of the notification is to alert others who may review this information that they may encounter privileged communications.		notification that attorney-client communications have been acquired		
(S) b1 -1 b3 -1 b7E -1,	S)			
charged with a crime in the United States. (S) b1 -1 b3 -1 b7E -1,		that they may encounter privileged communications.		
b1 -1 b3 -1 b7E -1,		(II) 3. Privileged communications involving targets and other persons not charged with a crime in the United States.		
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			b3	-1
			b71	E -1,

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F. (U) Additional Procedures for Retention, Use and Disclosure of FISA Information.

pursuant to an order authorizing electronic surveillance or physical search under FISA shall be disclosed for law enforcement purposes unless such disclosure is accompanied by a statement that such information, or any information derived therefrom, may only be used in a criminal proceeding with the advance authorization of the Attorney General. When Attorney General authorization is acquired, FISA-acquired information, including raw FISA-acquired information, may be disclosed for law enforcement purposes in criminal proceedings.

States persons, that reasonably appear to be foreign intelligence information, to be necessary to understand foreign intelligence information or assess its importance, or to be evidence of a crime, are accessible when a search or query is conducted or made of FISA-acquired information.





3. (U) Prosecutors.

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FISA-acquired information, and information derived therefrom, to federal prosecutors and others working at their direction, for all lawful foreign intelligence and law enforcement purposes, including in order to enable the prosecutors to determine whether the information: (1) is evidence of a crime, (2) contains exculpatory or impeachment information; or (3) is otherwise discoverable under the Constitution or applicable federal law. When federal prosecutors and others working at their direction are provided access to raw FISA-acquired information, they shall be trained on and comply with these and all other applicable minimization procedures.

policies and procedures, federal prosecutors may also disclose FISA-acquired information, when necessary for the prosecutors to carry out their responsibilities, including to witnesses, targets or subjects of an investigation, or their respective counsel, when the FISA-acquired information could be foreign intelligence information or is evidence of a crime. This provision does not restrict a federal prosecutor's ability, in a criminal proceeding, to disclose FISA-acquired information that contains exculpatory or impeachment information or is otherwise discoverable under the Constitution or applicable federal law.

at their direction with access to FBI electronic and data storage systems containing raw FISA-acquired information unless such access is: (a) for foreign intelligence or law enforcement purposes; (b) consistent with their responsibilities as federal prosecutors; and (c) pursuant to





procedures established by the Attorney General and provided to the FISC. The procedures established by the Attorney General and provided to the FISC shall include the following:

- i. Access to the FBI electronic and data and storage systems

 containing raw FISA-acquired information must be limited to that

 which is consistent with their responsibilities as federal prosecutors

 and necessary to carry out their responsibilities efficiently during a

 specific investigation or prosecution;
- ii. Access must be requested from and approved by an executive at FBI Headquarters in a position no lower than Assistant Director (AD) and in coordination with the Deputy General Counsel of the FBI National Security Law Branch or a Senior Executive Service attorney in the National Security Law Branch, and will be considered on a case-by-case basis;
- iii. A request for access must specify to which FBI electronic and data and storage systems, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) docket numbers, and targeted facilities the prosecutor needs access, why such access is necessary, and the duration of such access;
- iv. All individuals receiving authorization to have direct access must receive user training on the system(s) to which they seek access, and training on the standard minimization procedures and any





- relevant supplemental minimization procedures applicable to the information to which they have access;
- v. Access shall be terminated no later than the conclusion of the relevant investigation or prosecution; and
- vi. Federal prosecutors may immediately be given access to FBI electronic and data and storage systems containing raw FISA-acquired information if FBI personnel determine that an immediate threat to life or of serious damage to property necessitates immediate access, and if such immediate access is given to federal prosecutors, notification shall be made to FBI Headquarters, FBI's Office of General Counsel, and NSD.

G. (U) Time Limits for Retention.

(II) (X/NF) In general, the FBI may retain FISA-acquired information that reasonably appears to be foreign intelligence information, to be necessary to understand foreign intelligence information or assess its importance, or to be evidence of a crime.

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	1.	(X//NF) The FBI is authorized to retain data in electronic and data storage		
system		in accordance with the (S)	3	b1 -1 b3 -1
followi	ng:		ŝ	b7E −1,2
(U)	a	(%/NF) FISA-acquired information that has been retained but not reviewed.	_	
'			(S)	b1 -1 b3 -1
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specific authority is obtained from an Assistant Director of the FBI (AD) and NSD to retain the material, and the FISC approves a new retention period upon a finding that such modification is consistent with the applicable statutory definition of "minimization procedures."

(II) b. FISA-acquired information that has been reviewed but not identified as meeting the applicable standard.

identified as information that reasonably appears to be foreign intelligence, to be necessary to understand foreign intelligence information or assess its importance, or to be evidence of a crime, may be retained and be fully accessible by authorized personnel for further review and analysis form the expiration date of the docket authorizing the collection. Ten years from the expiration date of the docket authorizing the collection, access to such information contained in electronic and data storage systems will be limited to search capabilities that would produce notice to an authorized user that information responsive to a query exists. Approval from an AD, or AD's designee, is required to gain full access to this information.

(II) (NF) FISA-acquired information that has been retained and reviewed, but not identified as information that reasonably appears to be foreign intelligence, to be necessary to understand foreign intelligence information or assess its importance, or to be evidence of a crime, shall be destroyed from the expiration date of the docket authorizing the collection unless specific authority is obtained from an AD and NSD to retain the material, and the FISC approves a new retention period upon a finding that such modification is consistent with the applicable statutory definition of "minimization procedures".

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(S)NF) FISA-acquired information retained by the FBI in any other form shall be destroyed in accordance with the Attorney General Guidelines and relevant National Archives

be destroyed in accordance with the Attorney General Guidelines and relevant National Archives and Records Administration procedures regarding the retention of information in FBI investigations.

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IV. (U) DISSEMINATION AND DISCLOSURE

- A. (U) Dissemination of Foreign Intelligence Information to Federal, State, Local and Tribal Officials and Agencies.
- be foreign intelligence information or is necessary to understand foreign intelligence information or assess its importance in accordance with Sections IV.A.1 and IV.A.2 to federal, state, local and tribal officials and agencies with responsibilities relating to national security that require access to foreign intelligence information. Such information may be disseminated only consistent with the need of the United States to obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information.
 - 1. (U) Foreign Intelligence Information as defined in 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(1).
- FISA-acquired information concerning United States persons that reasonably appears to be necessary to the ability of the United States to protect against: (i) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; (ii) sabotage, international terrorism, or the international proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; or (iii) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power.
 - 2. (U) Foreign Intelligence Information as defined in 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(2).
- (II) The FBI may disseminate to federal, state, local and tribal officials and agencies FISA-acquired information concerning United States persons that reasonably appears to be



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necessary: (i) to the national defense or the security of the United States; or (ii) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States. Such information shall not be disseminated, however, in a manner that identifies a United States person, unless such person's identity is necessary to understand foreign intelligence information or to assess its importance.

B. (U) Dissemination of Evidence of a Crime to Federal, State, Local and Tribal Officials.


information concerning a United States person that reasonably appears to be evidence of a crime but not foreign intelligence information to federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement officials and agencies. The FBI shall disseminate such FISA-acquired information in a manner consistent with the requirements of Section III.F.

C. (U) Dissemination to Foreign Governments.

persons, which reasonably appears to be foreign intelligence information, is necessary to understand foreign intelligence information or assess its importance, or is evidence of a crime being disseminated for a law enforcement purpose, to officials of foreign governments, as follows:

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			b7E -1,: (S)
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2. (S//NF		b1 -1 b3 -1
		b7E −1,:
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		(S)
		b1 -1 b3 -1 b7E -1,2
		b7E -1,2
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(U) 3. (%/NF) The Atto	orney General, in consultation with the DNI or a designee, may	
authorize		b3 -1
	Prior to	b7E −1
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granting such authorization, those officials shall consider, among other things: (1) whether such use is consistent with the national security interests of the United States, and (2) the effect of such use on any identifiable United States person.

	such use on any identifiable United States person.		
and the same of th	(U) 4. (NF) The FBI will make a written record of each d	issemination approved	
	pursuant to this section, and information regarding such dissemination	ns and approvals shall be	
			b3 b7E
	(II) D. (8//NF) Disclosure of Raw FISA-acquired Informatinguistic Assistance.	ation for Technical or	
U)	(SVNF) The FBI may obtain information or communications	that, because of their	
	technical or linguistic content, may require further analysis by other	federal agencies	
	(collectively, "assisting federal agencies") to assist the FBI in determ	ining their meaning or	
	significance. Consistent with the other provisions of these procedure	es, the FBI is authorized to	>
-	disclose FISA-acquired information	(S	1
		to assisting federal	1 01 -1 03 -1
L	agencies for further processing and analysis. The following restriction		55 -1 57E -1
•	materials so disclosed:	•	

1. Disclosure to assisting federal agencies will be solely for translation or analysis of such information or communications. Assisting federal agencies will make no use of any information or any communication of or concerning any person except to provide technical or linguistic assistance to the FBI.





2. ONF) Disclosure will be only to those personnel within assisting federal agencies involved in the translation or analysis of such information or communications. The number of such personnel shall be restricted to the extent reasonably feasible. There shall be no further disclosure of this raw data within assisting federal agencies.

(II) 3. Assisting federal agencies shall make no permanent agency record of information or communications of or concerning any person referred to in FISA-acquired

information

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FBI to assisting federal agencies, provided that assisting federal agencies may maintain such temporary records as are necessary to enable them to assist the FBI with the translation or analysis of such information. Records maintained by assisting federal agencies for this purpose may not be disclosed within the assisting federal agency, except to personnel involved in providing technical assistance to the FBI.

4. (V)/NF) Upon the conclusion of such technical assistance to the FBI, the FISAacquired information

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disclosed to assisting federal agencies, will either be returned to the FBI or be destroyed, with an accounting of such destruction made to the FBI.

(II) 5. S//NF) Any information that assisting federal agencies provide to the FBI as a result of such technical assistance may be disseminated by the FBI in accordance with the applicable minimization procedures.

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	E. (\$//NF) (5)	b1 -1 b3 -1
U)	NF) The FBI may disclose to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and National	b7E −1,2
•	Security Agency (NSA) raw FISA-acquired information that relates to	A Property of the Control of the Con
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		b7E -1,2
e.		
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(U)	2. (SUNF) Nothing in this Section shall prohibit or otherwise limit FBI's authority under	
	other provisions of these procedures to disseminate to CIA or NSA information acquired	
	pursuant to the Act and to which governing minimization procedures have been applied.	e e
(U)	F. (%/NF) Dissemination of Foreign Intelligence Information for Terrorist Screening.	
	(%//NF) In addition to dissemination authorized under other provisions herein, foreign	
(U)	intelligence information, as defined in Section 1801(e), may be disseminated to federal, state,	
	local, territorial, and tribal authorities, foreign officials and entities, and private sector entities	
9	that have a substantial bearing on homeland security for the purposes of and in accordance with	



Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 and the Memorandum of Understanding on the Integration and Use of Screening Information to Protect Against Terrorism and the addenda thereto.

	(S//NF) Disclosure to the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) of Information Acquired in Cases Related to Terrorism or Counterterrorism.	
(U)	1. (S//NF) In addition to other disclosures permitted in these procedures, the FBI	
	ovide to NCTC:	
		b7E −1,
	b. information in FBI general indices, including the Automated Case Support (ACS) system and any successor system, provided that such access is limited to case classifications that are likely to contain information related to terrorism or counterterrorism.	
	NCTC's receipt of information described in (a) and (b) above is contingent upon NCTC's	
applica	ation of NCTC minimization procedures approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance	
	with respect to such information.	
(U)	2. S//NF) Nothing in this Section shall prohibit or otherwise limit FBI's authority	
under o	other provisions of these procedures to disseminate to NCTC information acquired	
pursua	nt to the Act and to which governing minimization procedures have been applied.	
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(U)	4. (%(NF) For every surveillance or search from which FBI discloses raw	
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(II)—H.—(8/NF) Dissemination of Foreign Intelligence Information or Evidence of a Crime Involving Computer Intrusions or Attacks to Private Entities and Individuals.

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be foreign intelligence information, is necessary to understand foreign intelligence information or assess its importance, or is evidence of a crime and that it reasonably believes may assist in the mitigation or prevention of computer intrusions or attacks to private entities or individuals that have been or are at risk of being victimized by such intrusions or attacks, or to private entities or individuals (such as Internet security companies and Internet Service Providers) capable of providing assistance in mitigating or preventing such intrusions or attacks. Wherever reasonably practicable, such dissemination should not include United States person identifying

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information unless the FBI reasonably believes it is necessary to enable the recipient to assist in the mitigation or prevention of computer intrusions or attacks.

V. (U) COMPLIANCE

A. (U) Oversight.

- Assistant Attorney General for National Security or other designee, shall implement policies and procedures that ensure the good faith compliance with all of the requirements set forth herein, and shall conduct periodic minimization reviews, including reviews at FBI Headquarters, field offices, and U.S. Attorney's Offices that receive raw FISA-acquired information pursuant to Section III.F of these procedures. The Attorney General and the NSD or other designee of the Attorney General shall have access to all FISA-acquired information to facilitate minimization reviews and for all other lawful purposes.
- of reviews of documents, communications, audit trails, or other information. They shall include, as appropriate, but are not limited to:
- FISA-acquired information that have been retained for further investigation and analysis or disseminated in accordance with these procedures.
- physical search) in FBI electronic and data storage systems that contain raw FISA-acquired information to assess compliance with these procedures, including whether raw FISA-acquired



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	communications or property have been properly marked as information that reasonably appears	(5)
	to be foreign intelligence information, to be necessary to understand foreign intelligence	
	information or to assess its importance, or to be evidence of a crime. FISA-acquired	
	communications and property in FBI electronic and data storage systems that contain raw FISA-	
	acquired information may also be reviewed to determine whether they were	b1 -1 b3 -1
		□ b7E -1,2
U)	3. (X//NF) Audits of FBI electronic and data storage systems containing	el.
	raw FISA-acquired information to assess the FBI's compliance with the retention procedures for	b7E -1,2
	FISA-acquired information as detailed in Section III of these procedures. The audits may also	D/E -1,2
	include reviewing a sampling of	
	and accesses in FBI electronic and data storage systems containing raw FISA-acquired	
	information. These audits may assist in determining the FISA-acquired information that was	
	accessed in these FBI electronic and data storage systems and the individuals who accessed the	
	information. In turn, the minimization reviews may include verifying that the individuals who	
	accessed the FISA-acquired information in these FBI systems were individuals who had properly	
	been given access under FBI guidelines.	
	B. (U) Training.	
	(U) The Attorney General, or a designee, shall ensure that adequate training on these	
	procedures be provided to appropriate personnel.	

C. (U) Minimization Briefings.



(U) Following the authorization of collection activity, an NSD attorney shall conduct a minimization briefing with appropriate FBI personnel responsible for the FISA surveillance or search.

VI. (U) INTERPRETATION

(U) The FBI shall refer all significant questions relating to the interpretation of these procedures to the NSD.

VII. (U) REVIEW OF PROCEDURES

(U) The Attorney General, or a designee, in consultation with the FBI Office of General Counsel, shall review these procedures and determine whether they remain appropriate in light of the technology and practices used by the FBI no later than November 1, 2013, and every five years thereafter. A written report of such review shall be provided to the Court within six months of the completion of the review.

Eric H. Holder, Jr.

Attorney General of the United States

5-11-13 Date

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