

United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit

Kyle Lawson, et al.,)
)
Appellees,)
)
v.) No. _____
)
State of Missouri,)
)
Appellant.)

Motion to Vacate Stay or, in the Alternate, Expedite Appeal

Come now Appellees/Cross-Appellants, pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 2, 8 and 27, and move this Court for entry of an order vacating the district court’s stay of its judgment of November 7, 2014, or, in the alternate, expediting the consideration of this appeal.

In particular Appellees request this Court vacate the district court’s *sua sponte* stay of its injunction and declaratory judgment. No party has requested or argued in favor of such a stay—and for good reason. As a result of a final state court judgment, which Missouri elected not to appeal, Missouri now recognizes the legal marriages of same-sex couples from other jurisdictions and will continue to do so regardless of the outcome of this appeal. Moreover, as a result of another state court judgment, which the State has appealed while electing not to seek a stay, the Recorder of Deeds for the City of St. Louis is authorized to issue legally valid marriage licenses to same-sex couples and will continue to do so regardless of the outcome of this appeal. Under these circumstances, the district court’s stay does not prevent marriage licenses from being issued in Missouri or

prevent those marriages from being recognized; rather, the effect of the stay is to perpetuate a status quo in which some couples in Missouri may marry while other couples in other parts of the state may not.

In the alternative, Appellees request that this appeal be expedited.

1. In support of their motion, Appellees state: Plaintiffs filed this action in Missouri state court, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking a declaration that Missouri's laws excluding same-sex couples from marriage—Mo. Rev. Stat. § 451.022, Mo. Const. art. I, § 33, and any other provision of Missouri statutory or common law barring same-sex couples from marrying—violate the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
2. The State of Missouri intervened and removed this case to the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri.
3. On November 7, 2014, the district court entered final judgment, finding that the challenged laws violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. # 50).¹
4. Although no party had requested a stay, the district court stayed its judgment pending completion of appeals. *Id.*
5. In separate litigation between Missouri and the Recorder of Deeds for the City of St. Louis, a Missouri state court entered a judgment that, like the district court's judgment in this case,, declared that section 451.022 of the Revised

¹ A copy of the district court's order is attached as Ex. A.

Missouri Statutes and Article I, section 33 of the Missouri Constitution violate the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. *State of Missouri v. Florida*, No. 1422-CC09027, 2014 WL 5654040 (Mo. Cir. Nov. 5, 2014). The court in that case did not stay its judgment, and the State of Missouri announced that it will not seek a stay in that case. As a result of the State court's ruling in *Florida*, marriage licenses have been issued to same-sex couples in St. Louis since November 5.

6. In addition, another Missouri State court has already struck down Mo. Rev. Stat. § 451.022 and Mo. Const. art. I, § 33, in so far as they deny legal recognition to the marriages of same-sex couples from other jurisdictions. Missouri, through the Attorney General in his official capacity, declined to appeal the *Barrier* decision, which is now final and conclusive. As a result, Missouri now fully recognizes the legal marriages of same-sex couples entered into in Missouri and elsewhere.
7. On November 25, 2014, the district court denied Plaintiffs' motion to vacate the stay of judgment, even though no party opposed the motion. (Doc. # 58).
8. The district court did not explicitly address the traditional four factors the Supreme Court has instructed courts to consider when determining whether to issue a stay pending appeal. *See Nken v. Holder*, 556 U.S. 418, 418-426 (2009). Instead, the Court explained that it did "not want to cast a cloud on the validity of marriages performed under its Judgment's auspices" and would not

lift the stay “unless the Intervenor – as representative for the State as a whole – affirmatively accedes in this request.” (Doc. # 58).

9. Further, the court noted that “[a]t this point there is little time before the stay expires. Defendant and Intervenor have until December 8, 2014 to file a Notice of Appeal. If neither appeals, the stay expires on December 9. If either appeals, Plaintiffs are free to ask the Court of Appeals to lift the stay.” *Id.*
10. At the time of the district court’s consideration of the motion to lift stay, the district court did not have the benefit of Missouri’s explanation for not seeking a stay of the judgment in this case. In a letter to state legislative leaders, the Attorney General explained that he will not ask for a stay pending appeal. He explained:

We are guided by the repeated decisions of the United States Supreme Court in recent weeks declining to issue stays in Idaho, Alaska, and Kansas, effectively permitting same-sex marriages to proceed in these jurisdictions while the cases involving the constitutionality of their state prohibitions are pending on appeal. By refusing to issue stays, the Supreme Court has effectively ratified the decisions of its agents—the lower federal courts—in striking down state constitutional bans and permitting same-sex marriages to go forward. In its most recent action, the Court lifted the stay requested by Kansas even after the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld

the traditional definition of marriage, creating a circuit split. The circumstances here are identical to those posed in other circuits and do not support a different approach.

Ex. B.

11. In evaluating the factors related to whether an injunction should issue, the district court concluded that the challenged laws are unconstitutional, Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm from being deprived of the opportunity to marry, and the balance of hardships as well as the public interest favor an injunction. In particular, the district court noted that “[t]here is no hardship in requiring that public officials adhere to the Constitution, and the public interest is always served when the Constitution is obeyed.”

The stay should be vacated

12. A stay pending appeal is an intrusion into the ordinary process of judicial review, and “[t]he parties and the public, while entitled to both careful review and a meaningful decision, are also generally entitled to the prompt execution of orders.” *Nken*, 556 U.S. 418, 427 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In the ordinary case “the judgment of a district court becomes effective and enforceable as soon as it is entered.” *In re Copper Antitrust Litig.*, 436 F.3d 782, 793 (7th Cir. 2006).
13. This Court requires that “[t]he party seeking a stay pending appeal must show (1) that it is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) that it will suffer irreparable injury unless the stay is granted; (3) that no substantial harm will come to other

- interested parties; and (4) that the stay will do no harm to the public interest.”
- James River Flood Control Ass’n v. Watt*, 680 F.2d 543, 544 (8th Cir. 1982).
- “The party requesting a stay bears the burden of showing that the circumstances justify an exercise of that discretion.” *Nken*, 556 U.S. at 433-34.
14. In this case, no party has sought a stay, nor has any party advanced any reasons that satisfy the “burden” of showing why a stay should be granted.
15. None of the requirements for entering a stay pending appeal is satisfied in this case.
16. Missouri cannot – and has not attempted to – show it has a likelihood of success on the merits. Since the Supreme Court decided *United States v. Windsor*, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), the overwhelming majority of federal courts – including every federal court to consider the issue in the Eighth Circuit – has concluded that State laws excluding same-sex couples from marriage violate the Fourteenth Amendment. See *Jernigan v. Crane*, No. 4:13-CV-00410 KGB, 2014 WL 6685391 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 25, 2014) (entering summary judgment); *Rosenbrahn v. Daugaard*, No. 4:14-CV-04081-KES, 2014 WL 6386903 (D.S.D. Nov. 14, 2014) (denying a motion to dismiss); see also *Latta v. Otter*, No. 12-17668, 2014 WL 4977682 (9th Cir. Oct. 7, 2014); *Baskin v. Bogan*, 766 F.3d 648, 664 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, No. 14-277, 2014 WL 4425162 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) and cert. denied sub nom. *Walker v. Wolf*, No. 14-278, 2014 WL 4425163 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014); *Bishop v. Smith*, 760 F.3d 1070, 1074 (10th Cir.) cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 271 (2014); *Bostic v. Schaefer*, 760 F.3d

352 (4th Cir.) *cert. denied sub nom. Rainey v. Bostic*, 135 S. Ct. 286 (2014) and *cert. denied*, 135 S. Ct. 308 (2014) and *cert. denied sub nom. McQuigg v. Bostic*, 135 S. Ct. 314 (2014); *Kitchen v. Herbert*, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir.) *cert. denied*, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014); *but see DeBoer v. Snyder*, No. 14-1341, 2014 WL 5748990 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 2014), *cert. pending*, 14-571 (U.S.).

Indeed, in addition to the district court's ruling in this case, two state courts have also struck down Missouri's marriage bans as unconstitutional. *See Barrier v. Vasterling*, No. 1416-CV03892, 2014 WL 4966467 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Oct. 3, 2014), *amended by*, 2014 WL 5469888 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Oct. 27, 2014); *State of Missouri v. Florida*, No. 1422-CC09027, 2014 WL 5654040 (Mo. Cir. Nov. 5, 2014), *appeal docketed* No. SC94595 (Mo.).

17. Similarly, Missouri cannot – and has not attempted to – show that it will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a stay. In other cases, State officials have argued that the State will suffer irreparable harm if they are forced to issue marriage licenses that are invalid under State law. But, as a result of the State court litigation in *Florida*, marriage licenses already are being issued to same-sex couples in Missouri and will continue to be issued whether or not a stay is granted.

18. The district court expressed concern that if marriages are entered into pursuant to its judgment is subsequently overturned on appeal, then a “cloud” could be cast on the validity of those marriages. But ever since the Supreme Court denied petitions for *certiorari* for five marriage equality cases on October 6,

2014, the Supreme Court has consistently denied requests to stay lower court decisions pending appeal. *See Wilson v. Condon*, 14A533, 2014 WL 6474220, *1 (U.S. Nov. 20, 2014) (denying stay of judgment finding South Carolina’s marriage exclusion laws unconstitutional); *Moser v. Marie*, 14A503, 2014 WL 5847590, at *1 (U.S. Nov. 12, 2014) (denying stay of preliminary injunction preventing enforcement of Kansas’ marriage exclusion); *Parnell v. Hamby*, 14A413, 2014 WL 5311581, *1 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2014) (denying stay of district court decision declaring Alaska’s marriage exclusion unconstitutional); *Otter v. Latta*, 14A374, 2014 WL 5094190 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2014) (denying application for stay of Ninth Circuit’s judgment finding Idaho’s marriage exclusion laws unconstitutional).

19. The district court believed these stay denials were inapposite because the district courts were located in circuits where the court of appeals had already issued a final, binding decision. But the Eleventh Circuit refused to stay a district court decision preliminary injunction against enforcement Florida’s marriage ban, even though the Eleventh Circuit had not yet ruled on whether such bans are unconstitutional. *Brenner v. Armstrong*, No. 14-14061 (11th Cir. Dec. 3, 2014) (Ex. C).²

20. Moreover, even if Missouri’s marriage bans were ultimately upheld on appeal, there would be no “cloud” over the validity of the marriages because of the

² In contrast, the Fifth Circuit granted a stay pending appeal, but did so while ordering an extremely expedited consideration of the case. *See infra*.

final and conclusive judgment in *Barrier*. The non-recognition provisions of Missouri's marriage ban are no longer in effect. In contrast, when officials in Utah and other states purported to stop recognizing the legal marriages of same-sex couples entered into pursuant to a lower court injunction that was subsequently stayed, they argued that they could no longer recognize those marriages once their marriage recognition bans once again became enforceable. *Evans v. Utah*, No. 14-55-DAK, --- F.Supp.2d ----, 2014 WL 2048343 (D. Utah, May 19, 2014). Because Missouri's recognition bans will remain unenforceable regardless of the outcome of this appeal, such concerns are not present in this case. In any event, the only court to rule on the issue rejected Utah's attempt to withdraw recognition from marriages that were entered into pursuant to a binding lower court injunction *See id.* While lifting the stay, which Missouri never requested or defended, would inflict no harm on the State, continuing the stay would impose substantial hardship on Plaintiffs and other same-sex couples.

21. For similar reasons, a stay is not in the public interest. In the district court, the State based its defense of Missouri's marriage bans on the need for uniformity in the definition of marriage (Doc. # 29); however, as a result of a state court decision that the Attorney General elected not to appeal and another state court decision for which the Attorney General elected not to seek a stay, Missouri now recognizes the out-of-state marriages of same-sex couples, and the Recorder of Deeds for the City of St. Louis continues to issue marriage

licenses for same-sex couples within Missouri. *Barrier v. Vasterling*, No. 1416-CV03892, 2014 WL 4966467 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Oct. 3, 2014), *amended by*, 2014 WL 5469888 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Oct. 27, 2014); *State of Missouri v. Florida*, No. 1422-CC09027, 2014 WL 5654040 (Mo. Cir. Nov. 5, 2014), *appeal docketed* No. SC94595 (Mo.). As a result, maintaining the stay defeats the interest in a uniform and consistent state definition of marriage, instead, creating a situation in which same-sex couples in part of the State have the freedom to marry while same-sex couples in other parts of the State do not.

Consideration of this Appeal Should be Expedited

22. “On its own or a party’s motion, a court of appeals may--to expedite its decision or 6:12 (for other good cause--suspend any provision of these rules in a particular case and order proceedings as it directs[.]” Fed. R. App. P. 2.
23. This appeal raises important issues that reach far beyond the parties. *See Nat’l City Bank v. Battisti*, 581 F.2d 565, 569 (6th Cir 1977) (noting that “prompt resolution of the issues is essential” where an appeal “involve[s] important issues which reach far beyond the particular controversy between” the parties).
24. The other Circuits, when addressing the issue of whether states may exclude same-sex couples from marriage, have granted expedited appeals. *See* Ordering Granting Motion to Expedite Consideration, *Campaign for Southern Equality v. Bryant*, No. 14-60837 (5th Cir. Dec. 4, 2014); Order Granting Motion to Expedite Oral Argument, *De Leon v. Perry*, No. 14-50196 (5th Cir. Oct. 7, 2014); Order Granting Motion to Expedite Appeal, *Robicheaux v. Caldwell*,

No. 14-31037 (5th Cir. Sept. 25, 2014; Order Granting Motion to Expedite and Consolidate Cases for Argument, *Baskin v. Bogan*, No. 14-2386 (7th Cir. July 11, 2014); Order Expediting Briefing and Calendaring of Appeals, *Latta v Otter*, No. 14-35420 (9th Cir. May 20, 2014); Order for Accelerated Briefing, *Bostic v. Schaefer*, No. 14-1167 (4th Cir. Mar. 10, 2014); Order Expediting Appeal, *Kitchen v. Herbert*, No. 13-4178 (10th Cir. Dec. 24, 2013). This case, which presents the same issues, should similarly be expedited.

25. An abbreviated briefing schedule will not prejudice the parties. The factual record on appeal is straightforward and uncomplicated, consisting of stipulations between the parties and uncontroverted facts derived from four declarations. In litigating Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and Intervener's motion for judgment on the pleadings, both sides extensively briefed all issues that will be presented to this Court on appeal.

26. If the stay is not vacated, its continuance militates strongly in favor of expediting the briefing, argument, and resolution of this appeal. *See, e.g.*, 1 Fed. Appellate Prac. Guide Ninth Cir. 2d § 6:12 (2013) ("Motion for ... a stay ... pending appeal also should request expedited consideration of the appeal on the merits."). Indeed, when a final judgment is stayed pending appeal, it is frequently noted that the appeal is expedited. *See, e.g., San Diegans For Mt. Soledad Nat. War Mem'l v. Paulson*, 548 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2006) (Kennedy, J., in chambers) (granting stay while noting that appeal is expedited); *Doe v.*

Gonzales, 546 U.S. 1301, 1308 (2005) (declining to vacate stay while noting that appeal is expedited).

27. As the district court found, and no party has disputed, while continued enforcement of an unconstitutional exclusion from marriage causes irreparable harm to Plaintiff and others deprived of the opportunity to marry, the balance of hardships as well as the public interest are advanced by removing the barrier to marriage.

28. Should this Court expedite the proceedings, Appellees/Cross-Appellees submit that an appropriate schedule would be as follows:

Appellant's principal brief:	January 2, 2015
Appellees' principal and response brief:	January 16, 2015
Appellant's response and reply brief:	January 30, 2015
Appellee's reply brief:	February 6, 2015.

This proposed schedule would allow this Court to hear argument in February or March.

WHEREOFRE Appellees/Cross-Appellants respectfully request that this Court issue an order vacating the district court's stay of the judgment of November 7, 2014, or, in alternate, expediting the consideration of this case.

Respectfully submitted,

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Certificate of Service

I certify that a copy of the forgoing was filed electronically with the Clerk and delivered by operation of the CM/ECF system to the counsel of record on December 10, 2014.

/s/ Anthony E. Rothert

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WESTERN DIVISION

KYLE LAWSON, et al.,)	
)	
Plaintiffs,)	
)	
vs.)	Case No. 14-0622-CV-W-ODS
)	
ROBERT T. KELLY, in his official)	
Capacity as Director of the Jackson)	
County Department of Recorder of)	
Deeds,)	
)	
Defendant.)	
_____)	
)	
STATE OF MISSOURI,)	
)	
Intervenor.)	

ORDER AND OPINION (1) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS, (2) GRANTING
IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, (3) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION FOR PERMANENT INJUNCTION, AND (4) STAYING EFFECT OF
JUDGMENT PENDING COMPLETION OF APPEALS

Plaintiffs seek to vindicate their fundamental right to marry, irrespective of the gender of the person they wish to wed. They have sued Robert Kelly, in his official capacity as Director of the Jackson County Department of Recorder of Deeds, seeking to enjoin enforcement of state law – including provisions of the Missouri Constitution and the Revised Missouri Statutes – that would preclude Defendant from issuing the marriage license they seek.

The State of Missouri (“the State”) intervened as of right pursuant to section 527.110 of the Revised Missouri Statutes in order to defend the constitutionality of these provisions. The State then removed the case to federal court and Kelly has



taken no action other than to consent to the removal.¹ Now pending are three motions, all of which are ready for ruling:

1. The State's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings,
2. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, and
3. Plaintiffs' Motion for Permanent Injunction.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Kyle Lawson and Even Dahlgren, both of whom are male, desire to be married. Plaintiffs Angela Curtis and Shannon McGinty, both of who are female, desire to be married. Both couples comply with all marriage requirements imposed by Missouri law save one: they seek to marry a person of the same gender. In June 2014, Lawson and Dahlgren went to the Jackson County Recorder of Deeds to obtain a marriage license; their application was rejected. Separately (but also in June 2014), Curtis and McGinty went to the Jackson County Recorder of Deeds to obtain a marriage license; their application was also rejected.

In 1996, the Missouri General Assembly passed (and the Missouri Governor signed) a law declaring that “[i]t is the public policy of this state to recognize marriage only between a man and a woman” and further directing that no Recorder of Deeds “shall issue a marriage license, except to a man and a woman.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 451.022. In August 2004, the citizens of Missouri approved an Amendment to the Missouri Constitution declaring “[t]hat to be valid and recognized in this state, a marriage shall exist only between a man and a woman.” Mo. Const. Art. I, § 33.

These statutory and constitutional provisions provide the basis for Kelly's refusal to issue Plaintiffs the marriage licenses they sought. Plaintiffs present three claims. Count I asserts these provisions deprive Plaintiffs of the fundamental right to

¹Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Remand, then sought and obtained leave to withdraw that motion. The Motion to Remand did not challenge the Court's subject matter jurisdiction; instead, it argued there was a defect in the removal process. There is no question the Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and defects in the removal process can be waived, e.g., Nolan v. Prime Tanning Co., 871 F.2d 76, 78 (8th Cir. 1989), so there is no reason for the Court to delve into the matter further.

marry in violation of the Due Process Clause. Count II alleges these provisions discriminate based on sexual orientation in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Finally, Count III alleges these provisions discriminate based on gender in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

The Court first considers the State's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. The State contends the Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals have both ruled that provisions limiting marriage to members of opposite genders are constitutional. This Court is bound by decisions of the Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit, so if the State is correct the Court would be obligated to rule in the State's favor. However, the Court disagrees with the State's interpretation of precedent.

1. The Supreme Court's Precedent

(a). *United States v. Windsor*

The State finds support in two prior Supreme Court decisions. The first is *United States v. Windsor* – which, interestingly, Plaintiffs also cite as support. The Court disagrees with both sides and concludes *Windsor* does not aid either of them. The Court will discuss *Windsor* once now and explain why it is inapplicable to the issues at hand to avoid the need to discuss the matter twice.

The State is correct when it describes *Windsor* as discussing the states' historic role in regulating marriage. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689-91 (2013). However, the Supreme Court did so only to demonstrate the curiosity of the federal government's endeavor to regulate the matter through passage of the Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA"). As the majority explained, "[i]n order to assess the validity of [DOMA's]

intervention, it is necessary to discuss the extent of the state power and authority over marriage as a matter of history and tradition.” *Id.* at 2691. Given this historical state prerogative and responsibility, the Court found DOMA’s “unusual” attempt to draw distinctions between various types of valid marriages violated the Fifth Amendment. *Id.* at 2681, 2693.²

Critically for present purposes, *Windsor* did not purport to establish what kinds of marriages *states* are obligated to regard as proper; it simply accepted the existence of a marriage deemed lawful by the State of New York and held the federal government could not deem that marriage a nullity. The following passages from the *Windsor* majority’s penultimate paragraph make the point:

The class to which DOMA directs its restrictions and restraints are those persons who are joined *in same-sex marriages made lawful by the State*. *DOMA singles out a class of persons deemed by a State entitled to recognition and protection to enhance their own liberty*. It imposes a disability on the class by refusing to acknowledge a status the State finds to be dignified and proper. . . . The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity. By seeking to displace this protection and treating those persons as living in marriages less respected than others, the federal statute is in violation of the Fifth Amendment.

133 S. Ct. at 2695-96 (emphasis supplied). The very next sentence cautions against interpreting the opinion as imposing requirements on the states when it declares “[t]his opinion and its holding are confined to those lawful marriages.” *Id.* at 2696.

The State is wrong when it contends *Windsor* holds that state statutes forbidding same-sex marriage are constitutional. Plaintiffs are wrong when they contend *Windsor* holds states are constitutionally required to allow same-sex marriages. Thus, both parties are incorrect when they contend *Windsor* dictates a favorable outcome for their positions.

²One might think *Windsor* was a case about federalism. However, the majority said “it is unnecessary to decide whether this federal intrusion on state power is a violation of the Constitution because it disrupts the federal balance,” 133 S. Ct. at 2690, and couched the violation in terms of the Fifth Amendment. Therefore, according to the majority, *Windsor* is not a case about federalism.

(b). Baker v. Nelson

The second Supreme Court decision arises from *Baker v. Nelson*, a 1971 decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court. In *Baker*, the plaintiffs contended Minnesota's statutes did not require couples wishing to marry be of opposite genders. Alternatively, they argued that if the statutes were interpreted to preclude same-sex marriage, the statutes violated the United States Constitution. The Minnesota Supreme Court first interpreted its statutes to require that marriage be between a man and a woman. The court then addressed the constitutional arguments and held that such an interpretation did not unconstitutionally deny the plaintiffs the fundamental right to marry, deprive the plaintiffs of liberty or property without due process, or violate the plaintiffs' Equal Protection rights. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).

At that time, Supreme Court review of constitutional challenges was different than it is today. Now, of course, the Supreme Court has discretion to grant certiorari to review such decisions. However, in 1971, 28 U.S.C. § 1257 permitted an appeal as of right to the Supreme Court from the final decision of a state court "where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any state on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution" This does not mean the Supreme Court issued rulings in every such appeal; frequently, it disposed of the case summarily. This is what the Court did in *Baker*: in a one-sentence order, the Court ruled "[t]he appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question." *Baker v. Nelson*, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). The State argues the Supreme Court's decision is a substantive and binding determination that there is no constitutional concern – much less an impingement of a constitutional right – when a state forbids same-sex marriage.

A summary disposition by the Supreme Court is a decision on the merits and has precedential value. E.g., *Hicks v. Miranda*, 422 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1975).³

³This is in contrast to the denial of certiorari. The Supreme Court's decision to deny certiorari has no precedential value. E.g., *Teague v. Lane*, 489 U.S. 288, 296 (1989) (citing *United States v. Carver*, 260 U.S. 482, 490 (1923)). Accordingly,

However, the precedential value is not as great as a full-fledged opinion because “a summary affirmance is an affirmance of the judgment only, [so] the rationale of the affirmance may not be gleaned solely from the opinion below.” Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977). All that is affirmed is the judgment, and not necessarily the reasoning employed by the lower court. Id. Thus, “summary affirmances obviously are of precedential value [but] [e]qually obviously, they are not of the same precedential value as would be an opinion of this Court treating the question on the merits.” Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974). An outright reversal or explicit repudiation is not necessary to deprive a summary disposition of its precedential value.⁴ “[I]nferior federal courts had best adhere to the view that if the Court has branded a question as unsubstantial, it remains so except when *doctrinal developments* indicate otherwise.” Hicks, 422 U.S. at 344 (quotation omitted; emphasis supplied).

The Court concludes doctrinal developments indicate the Supreme Court’s summary ruling is not reliable or binding. Since its summary disposition in Baker, the Supreme Court has issued additional decisions discussing the right to marry. E.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). The Court has also issued decisions addressing laws that draw distinctions between homosexual and heterosexual conduct or homosexuals and heterosexuals as a class. E.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). As the Second Circuit observed in Windsor, “[w]hen *Baker* was decided in 1971, ‘intermediate scrutiny’ was not yet in the Court’s vernacular. Classifications based on illegitimacy and sex were not yet deemed quasi-suspect.” Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 179 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2014).

the Court rejects Plaintiffs’ entreaties to divine some meaning from the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in several appellate decisions upholding the rights of homosexuals to marry.

⁴This rule may be a product of the large number of cases disposed of summarily, and the great difficulty involved in expecting the Supreme Court to list every summary disposition that might be impacted by a written opinion. Cf. Port Auth. Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Port of New York Auth., 387 F.2d 259, 262 n.3 (2d Cir. 1967) (cited with approval in Hicks).

Given that the Second Circuit concluded *Baker* was not binding, and that the Second Circuit was later affirmed in *Windsor*, “[t]he Supreme Court’s willingness to decide *Windsor* without mentioning *Baker* speaks volumes regarding whether *Baker* remains good law.” Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 374 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 2014 WL 3924685 (U.S. 2014). The undersigned joins those courts that have similarly determined that doctrinal developments have superseded *Baker* and that *Baker* is not binding. E.g., Latta v. Otter, 2014 WL 4977682 at *3 (9th Cir. Oct. 7, 2014); Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 659-60 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 2014 WL 4425162 (U.S. 2014); Bostic, 760 F.3d at 374-75; Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1205-06 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 2014 WL 3841263 (U.S. 2014); but see Massachusetts v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2887 (2013) (“*Baker* does not resolve our own case but it does limit the arguments to ones that do not presume or rest on a constitutional right to same-sex marriage.”).⁵

⁵The plaintiffs in *Baker* were Richard Baker and the man he sought to marry, James McConnell. McConnell filed subsequent lawsuits in federal court; neither party mentions these suits or discusses their impact on this case, but the Court must do so because the appeals were decided by the Eighth Circuit.

Shortly after *Baker* was decided, McConnell sought additional VA benefits on the theory that Baker was his dependent spouse. The effort failed, and in 1976 the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of relief. McConnell v. Nooner, 547 F.2d 54 (1976) (per curiam) (hereafter “McConnell I”). The Eighth Circuit noted that while *Baker* was pending Baker and McConnell had actually obtained a marriage license and participated in a wedding ceremony. The Court of Appeals relied on *Baker* to hold that the marriage was invalid under state law – an issue over which the Minnesota Supreme Court was the ultimate arbiter. The Court of Appeals also held “the Supreme Court’s dismissal of the appeal for want of a substantial federal question constitutes an adjudication of the merits which is binding on the lower federal courts. . . . They, therefore, are collaterally estopped from relitigating these issues once more.” Id. at 56. This decision from 1976 does not mean that *Baker* is still binding for two reasons. First, it is not clear what constitutional issues were raised. Obviously, the Supreme Court’s decision could only be binding for the issues actually raised in *Baker*, and the Eighth Circuit’s decision could address *Baker*’s viability only for issues raised in McConnell I. Second, and more importantly McConnell I was decided before most of the aforementioned doctrinal developments occurred. Intermediate scrutiny for gender based classifications was applied for the first time a mere one day before McConnell I when the Supreme Court decided

2. The Eighth Circuit's Precedent

The State also argues the Eighth Circuit conclusively rejected Plaintiff's claims in 2006 when it decided *Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning*. The Court disagrees because the issue in *Bruning* did not involve the constitutionality of a state's prohibition of same-sex marriages.

Bruning involved an amendment to the Nebraska Constitution that declared that only marriages between a man and woman would be recognized in that state and that same-sex marriages would not be recognized. While this makes it appear that *Bruning* involves the same issues as this case, this conclusion is false: the plaintiffs in *Bruning* attacked the constitutional amendment by arguing that it deprived them of

Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), and the rest of the developments in that area – and the other cases cited in the text – occurred thereafter.

Decades later, McConnell sought an income tax refund, contending he and Baker were lawfully married and thus entitled to file as a married couple. The district court denied McConnell's claim and the Eighth Circuit affirmed in an unpublished opinion. The Court of Appeals again referenced *Baker*, observing that "[t]he United States Supreme Court upheld that decision on appeal by dismissing the appeal for want of a substantial federal question" and citing *Hicks* for the proposition that "dismissal of appeal for want of substantial federal question constitutes adjudication of merits which is binding on lower federal courts." McConnell v. United States, 188 Fed. Appx. 540, 542 (8th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (unpublished) (hereafter "McConnell II"). However, the Eighth Circuit's opinion does not describe any constitutional issues raised in the case. Neither does the district court's opinion that formed the basis of the appeal. McConnell v. United States, 2005 WL 19458 (D. Minn. 2005). The Court has examined the Appellant's Brief, and it similarly does not specify the nature of any constitutional attack on Minnesota's prohibition on same-sex marriage. To the contrary: McConnell argued that he was not seeking a right to *become* married because he and Baker were *already* married: he theorized that because the couple had obtained a marriage license and participated in a ceremony, the subsequent "revocation" of that marriage constituted a violation of their Due Process rights. Appellant's Brief at 25-26. This is the only time the Constitution is mentioned in connection with the issue of marriage. The Court concludes *McConnell II* does not require the Court to apply *Baker* for two reasons. First, *McConnell II* is an unpublished disposition, and unpublished opinions are binding in limited circumstances, none of which appear present in this situation. Second, the plaintiffs in *McConnell II* asserted a completely different claim and did not raise the constitutional issues raised in this case. Thus, to whatever extent *McConnell II* dictates that *Baker* is still binding, it cannot be understood as confirming *Baker* applies to the claims at issue here.

access to the political process. The Eighth Circuit characterized the plaintiffs' claims as follows:

Appellees do not assert a right to marriage or same-sex unions. Rather, they seek a level playing field, an equal opportunity to convince the people's elected representatives that same-sex relationships deserve legal protection. The argument turns on the fact that § 29 is an amendment to the Nebraska Constitution. Unlike state-wide legislation restricting marriage to a man and a woman, a constitutional amendment deprives gays and lesbians of "equal footing in the political arena" because state and local government officials now lack the power to address issues of importance to this minority.

Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 865 (8th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted; emphasis supplied). The plaintiffs did not assert a right to same-sex marriage, so nothing in *Bruning* directly disposes of whether such a right exists.

In rejecting the plaintiffs' challenges, the Eighth Circuit first observed that many constitutional provisions impair the ability to participate in the political process, but such impairments are not automatically unconstitutional. *Id.* at 865-66 & n.2. The plaintiffs in *Bruning* argued for a higher degree of scrutiny because homosexuals are a suspect classification, but the Eighth Circuit rejected this argument. *Id.* at 866-67. As the Eighth Circuit explained, "[i]f sexual orientation, like race, were a 'suspect classification' for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause, then [the plaintiffs'] focus on the political burden erected by a constitutional amendment would find support" in several Supreme Court cases. *Id.* at 866. The Eighth Circuit then applied rational basis review and upheld the amendment to the Nebraska Constitution. *Id.* at 867-68.

Critically for present purposes, the *Bruning* plaintiffs did not argue the classification created by the amendment impaired a fundamental right – so the Eighth Circuit's ruling cannot be construed as passing on this issue. Similarly, the *Bruning* plaintiffs did not argue the amendment drew distinctions based on gender – so once again, the Eighth Circuit's ruling cannot be construed as passing on this issue. Indeed, *Bruning* makes no mention of these arguments – which is unsurprising, given that the plaintiffs were not even seeking to vindicate their right to

marry. *Bruning* does not control because it does not address the claims raised in this case.

However, there is one aspect of *Bruning* that relates to the issues in this case. As noted above, *Bruning* holds that sexual orientation is not a suspect class and that classifications based on sexual orientation are not subject to heightened review of any kind. This directly impacts Count II, and requires the Court to uphold section 451.022 and Article I, section 33 if they are rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest, keeping in mind that such provisions enjoy a strong presumption of validity. In applying this standard, the *Bruning* court clearly expressed its belief that laws prohibiting same-sex marriage would pass rational basis review. 455 F.3d at 867-68. On this basis, the Court grants the State judgment on the pleadings with respect to Count II.

But to reiterate – *Bruning* did not consider whether laws prohibiting same-sex marriage would pass intermediate or strict scrutiny. More importantly, *Bruning* did not consider – *because it was not asked to consider* – whether there is a constitutional right to same-sex marriage, either because laws forbidding it burden a fundamental right or draw impermissible distinctions based on gender. Therefore, *Bruning* does not control with respect to Count I or Count III.

B. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment

Plaintiffs seek summary judgment on each of the three counts they have advanced. The Court already has granted Defendant judgment on the pleadings with respect to Count II, and further discussion of that count is unnecessary. Plaintiffs' motion is denied to that extent, but it is granted with respect to Counts I and III.

As a general matter, the State emphasizes its prerogative to regulate marriage. The extent of this power will be discussed in greater detail below. However, while many cases have confirmed the states' power to regulate marriage, this power is not a talisman that automatically wards off all constitutional challenges. Numerous cases confirm that the states' power in this arena – like the states' power in all

arenas – is subject to constraints imposed by the Constitution. Thus, it is no answer to the issues at hand to observe merely that the State has the power to impose regulations on the institution of marriage; the question is whether the regulations at issue comport with the Constitution.

1. Due Process: Abridgment of a Fundamental Right

In 1967, the Supreme Court considered “a constitutional question never addressed by this Court: whether a statutory scheme . . . to prevent marriages between persons solely on the basis of racial classifications violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967). The Court concluded the statute violated both clauses. With respect to the Due Process Clause, the Court wrote: “These statutes also deprive the Lovings of liberty without due process of law in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” 388 U.S. at 12. The Court concluded this “fundamental freedom” could not be denied based on racial classifications. Despite this apparent merging of the Due Process and Equal Protection analyses, the Court has since adhered to the view that marriage is a fundamental right entitled to protection under the Due Process Clause. “Although *Loving* arose in the context of racial discrimination, prior and subsequent decisions of [the Supreme] Court confirm that the right to marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals.” Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978); see also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 94-95 (1987) (noting the petitioners “concede[d] that the decision to marry is a fundamental right” under Supreme Court precedent).

The existence of a Due Process right to marry – separate and apart from any Equal Protection concerns – is further confirmed by *Zablocki* and *Turner* because neither of those cases involved a suspect or quasi-suspect class. *Zablocki* considered a state statute that prohibited non-custodial parents subject to a child support order from marrying absent judicial approval. While the statute drew a

distinction between those who were subject to child support orders and those who were not, it was not this classification that warranted higher scrutiny. Instead, it was the understanding “that the right to marry is part of the fundamental ‘right of privacy’ implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.” 434 U.S. at 384. The Court noted “that the decision to marry has been placed on the same level of importance as decisions relating to procreation, childbirth, child rearing, and family relationships.” *Id.* at 386. *Turner* involved a regulation that required a prison warden’s approval to marry. The specter of requiring a state official’s approval of person’s worthiness for marriage caused the Supreme Court to brand the regulation as “unreasonable,” even in a prison setting.

The difficulty is that the Court has not clearly enunciated the Due Process contours of the right to marry. Indeed, it has refrained from doing so. The *Zablocki* Court admitted as much when it held that the right to marry – unlike other rights regarded as “fundamental” – is susceptible to significant state regulation. “By reaffirming the fundamental character of the right to marry, we do not mean to suggest that every state regulation which relates in any way to the incidents of or prerequisites for marriage must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny. To the contrary, reasonable regulations *that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital relationship* may legitimately be imposed.” *Id.* at 386 (emphasis supplied). The difficulty then becomes: what kinds of regulations “may legitimately be imposed” and what kinds “must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny?”⁶

Regulations related to the effects or consequences of the marital state are not subject to exacting scrutiny. For instance, in *Califano v. Jobst*, 434 U.S. 47 (1977), the Supreme Court upheld a provision terminating Social Security benefits for a disabled dependent child upon the child’s marriage. Anti-nepotism policies that preclude the hiring of a husband and a wife are constitutional. *E.g.*, *Parsons v. Del*

⁶This difficulty was raised by Justice Powell in his concurrence, where he noted that the majority opinion “does not present, however, any principled means for distinguishing between the two types of regulations. . . . Since state regulations in this area typically take the form of prerequisite or barrier to marriage . . . the degree of ‘direct’ interference with the decision to marry . . . is unlikely to provide either guidance for state legislatures or a basis for judicial oversight.” *Zablocki*, 434 U.S. at 396-97 (Powell, J., concurring).

Norte County, 728 F.2d 1234 (9th Cir. 1984). The critical difference between these provisions and the one at issue in *Zablocki* is that the latter “interfere[d] directly and substantially with the right to marry,” Zablocki, 386 U.S. at 387, while the first two regulations do not restrict a person’s decision to marry or who that person marries.

It also appears accepted that the State may restrict (or even prohibit) marriage for reasons related to public health or to insure the participants are of an appropriate age to consent to a marital relationship. In concurring with the majority in *Zablocki*, Justice Stewart opined that a state could absolutely forbid marriage in certain circumstances: “for example, a State may legitimately say that no one can marry his or her sibling, that no one can marry who is not at least 14 years old, that no one can marry without first passing an examination for venereal disease, or that no one can marry who has a living husband or wife.” Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 392 (Stewart, J., concurring); see also Bruning, 455 F.3d at 867. However, while Justice Stewart was certain such regulations were permissible, “just as surely, in regulating the intimate human relationship of marriage, there is a limit beyond which a State may not constitutionally go.” Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 392 (Stewart, J., concurring). The Court thus accepts that these are additional regulations a state may constitutionally impose – but that this justification does not extend to every restriction a state might want to impose on a citizen’s right to decide whether – and whom – to marry.

The question then becomes: what is the State’s justification for requiring those who are to be married to be of opposite genders? Such a restriction is not a mere consequence of being married: it is a prohibition on marriage, and thus cannot be supported by cases like *Califano* and *Parsons*. The State does not suggest the prohibition is designed to promote public health or insure the consent or maturity of the participants, and any such suggestion would be unavailing in any event. These provisions flatly prohibit consenting adults from getting married for reasons unrelated to health or any other reason espoused in Justice Stewart’s concurrence. This is the type of restriction condemned by *Zablocki* because it significantly interferes with decisions to enter into the marital relationship. The prohibition must be examined with strict scrutiny, and viewed in that light the restriction fails to satisfy the Due Process Clause’s dictates.

The State suggests the restriction is rationally related to its interest in promoting consistency, uniformity and predictability.⁷ This is a circular argument that probably would not satisfy rational basis review and that certainly fails the level of review required in this case. The State essentially argues the restriction satisfies governmental interests because it creates a rule that can be applied by the recorders of deeds and others – but then, *all* restrictions create rules, so by the State’s logic any restriction is automatically constitutional simply because it creates rules that can be followed. As stated, this is circular: the rule is alleged to be constitutional because it can be followed. But then, a rule restricting marriage to those with one-syllable names promotes consistency, uniformity and predictability. A rule restricting marriage to people within a specified age difference promotes consistency, uniformity and predictability. Neither of these rules would be constitutional – the state’s ability to interfere with the personal decision as to who can and cannot get married is not so far-reaching. Merely prescribing a “followable” rule does not demonstrate the rule’s constitutionality.

The Court is left, then, with no real reason for the State’s decision to dictate that people of the same gender cannot be married. The State’s power to dictate who can and cannot be married is limited to the promotion of certain interests, none of which are served by the limitation advanced. Of course, the question is not whether the restriction satisfies the rational basis test; the Court has held the restriction burdens a fundamental right so it is subject to strict scrutiny. This requires the State to demonstrate the restriction is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest – but the only interest advanced is not compelling and the restriction is not

⁷In a footnote the State “reiterate[s] that there are many diverse motives and interests that have been advanced and analyzed by [other] courts and may certainly be applicable in this case.” Defendant’s Suggestions in Opposition (Doc. # 43) at 10 n.1. The State argues Plaintiffs bear the burden of disproving all of these unnamed motives and interests to demonstrate the restrictions fail under rational basis review. There is no need to delve into this matter because the Court has concluded a higher degree of scrutiny is required. Regardless, the better course would have been for the State to advance its justifications.

narrowly tailored to that interest. Accordingly, the Court holds the prohibition on same-sex marriage violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.

2. Equal Protection: Classification Based on Gender

The restriction on same-sex marriage is a classification based on gender. The State's "permission to marry" depends on the gender of the would-be participants. The State would permit Jack and Jill to be married but not Jack and John. Why? Because in the latter example, the person Jack wishes to marry is male. The State's permission to marry depends on the genders of the participants, so the restriction is a gender-based classification.⁸

Restrictions based on gender are subject to intermediate scrutiny. The State bears the burden of demonstrating that the classification serves important governmental objectives and that the use of a gender-based classification is substantially related to the achievement of that objective. E.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-33 (1996). The State has not carried its burden. Its sole justification for the restriction is the need to create rules that are predictable, consistent, and can be uniformly applied. Assuming this is a valid justification for a restriction, there is no suggestion as to why the gender-based classification is substantially related to that objective. A rule that ignores gender would be just as related to that objective and be just as easy to apply (and arguably would impose less of a burden on the Records of Deeds because they would not have to conduct any gender-based inquiry whatsoever). Regardless, administrative convenience is not a valid reason to differentiate between men and women.

⁸The State did not present any arguments specific to Count III, and thus did not make any argument suggesting the restriction is not a gender-based classification. However, the State conceded that intermediate scrutiny applies to such classifications. Defendant's Suggestions in Support of Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. # 8) at 7.

C. Plaintiffs' Motion for Permanent Injunction

In anticipation of winning on one or more counts on summary judgment, Plaintiffs filed a separate Motion for Permanent Injunction. The motion seeks an injunction prohibiting the “State of Missouri, including its political subdivisions, their officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and all persons acting in concert with them, or in connection with them, from enforcing § 451.022 RSMo; Mo. Const. art. I, § 33; and any other provision of Missouri or statutory or common law barring same sex couples from marrying.” Suggestions in Support (Doc. # 29) at 2. The problem is: the only defendant in this case is Robert T. Kelly in his official capacity as Director of the Jackson County Department of Recorder of Deeds. Plaintiffs offer no binding authority explaining why a broader injunction is permissible, and the Court concludes it cannot enjoin people and officers who are not defendants in this action.

In reaching its decision in this case the Court has necessarily declared the State’s prohibition on same-sex marriages violates the Constitution. However, the only other relief that can spring from that declaration is an injunction prohibiting the sole Defendant – Kelly, acting in his official capacity – from enforcing the prohibition. In this regard, the Court agrees that Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm from being deprived of the opportunity to marry. The balance of hardships and the public interest favor enjoining Defendant Kelly because this is the only way to vindicate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. There is no hardship in requiring that public officials adhere to the Constitution, and the public interest is always served when the Constitution is obeyed.

D.

The Court does not take lightly a request to declare that a state law is unconstitutional. Statutes are passed by the duly elected representatives of the people. Article I, section 33 constitutes the direct expression of the people’s will. It

is not on a whim that the Court supplants the will of the voters or the decisions of the legislature.

But it should not be forgotten that the Constitution is also an expression of the people's will. Indeed, it is the paramount expression of the people's will; it cannot easily be cast aside or circumvented by a vote of the citizens of a single state. Just as Missouri citizens cannot abridge the First Amendment by amending the Missouri Constitution, they cannot abridge the Fourteenth Amendment in that manner. As Alexander Hamilton explained in describing the Constitution's preeminent place in the rule of law:

There is no position which depends on clearer principles than that every act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it is exercised, is void. No legislative act, therefore, contrary to the Constitution, can be valid. To deny this would be to affirm that the deputy is greater than his principal; that the servant is above his master; that the representatives of the people are superior to the people themselves; that men acting by virtue of powers may do not only what their powers do not authorize, but what they forbid.

The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). Later, Hamilton described the importance of the judiciary's role in insuring the Constitution's role as the preeminent law of the Nation, stating the judiciary's role includes:

guard[ing] the Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill humors which the arts of designing men, or the influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people themselves, and which, though they speedily give place to better information, and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the meantime, to occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the minor party in the community.

Id.

It is the Court's view that the provisions of this statute and this section of the Missouri Constitution contravene the United States Constitution. Having reached that conclusion, it is the Court's obligation to give effect and force to the United States Constitution.

III. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court

1. Grants the State's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings with respect to Count II, but denies it in all other respects,
2. Grants Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to Counts I and III, but denies it with respect to Count II,
3. Declares, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, that section 451.022 of the Revised Missouri Statutes and Article I, section 33 of the Missouri Constitution, and any other provision of state law that precludes people from marrying solely because they are of the same gender⁹ violates the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
4. Permanently enjoins Robert T. Kelly, in his official capacity as Director of the Jackson County Department of Recorder of Deeds, from declining to issue a marriage license based on the genders of the applicants or otherwise enforcing the prohibition on issuing a marriage license except to a man and a woman.

The effects of the judgment will be stayed until the judgment is final.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATE: November 7, 2014

/s/ Ortrie D. Smith
ORTRIE D. SMITH, SENIOR JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

⁹There are other provisions in the statute, notably provisions related to the recognition of marriages performed elsewhere. Article 1, section 33, also has implications for the recognition of marriages performed in other states. The Court's Order and Opinion does not address this aspect of Missouri's laws because it is beyond the purview of the claims presented.



ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MISSOURI

JEFFERSON CITY

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ATTORNEY GENERAL

P.O. Box 809
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November 17, 2014

The Honorable Tom Dempsey
201 W Capitol Ave., Rm. 326
Jefferson City, MO 65101

The Honorable Timothy Jones
201 W Capitol Ave., Rm. 308
Jefferson City, MO 65101

The Honorable John Diehl
201 W Capitol Ave., Rm. 302A
Jefferson City, MO 65101

Dear Senator Dempsey, Speaker Jones, and Speaker-designee Diehl,

Thank you for your November 7, 2014, letter expressing your thoughts about the three cases—*Barrier v. Vasterling* (No. 1416-CV03892), *State v. Florida* (No. 1422-CC09027), and *Lawson v. Kelly* (No. 4:14-CV-00622-ODS)—currently pending in Missouri state and federal courts regarding same-sex marriage.

We have announced our intent to appeal the rulings of the circuit and district courts in *Florida* and *Lawson*, respectively. These cases squarely present the central question regarding same-sex marriage: does a state constitutional provision or statute prohibiting same-sex marriage licenses from being issued within the state violate the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution? As you acknowledge in your letter, my office has defended the validity of Missouri's definition of marriage in both the state and federal courts, and we intend to continue that defense in the appellate courts.

In pursuing these appeals, my office will continue to defend Missouri's laws with the arguments that in our judgment are legally supportable. I understand, however, that other arguments may exist that you believe should also be presented to the court. To that end, my office will not oppose the submission of an *amicus* brief by the General Assembly in defense of Missouri's definition of marriage, and we are willing to share a portion of our oral argument time in these cases with the author of the brief. By filing an

EXHIBIT
33 of 37

B

amicus brief and participating in oral argument, the legislature can ensure that no argument is left unmade on appeal, though my office may disassociate itself from any argument that we believe is offensive or unsupportable.

As you note, my office has decided not to appeal the Jackson County Circuit Court's ruling in *Barrier*. In that case, the Court held that Missouri is obligated, under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, to recognize same-sex marriages lawfully entered into in other states. As the Court observed in its judgment, Missouri has a policy of recognizing out-of-state marriages even if those marriages could not lawfully have been performed here in Missouri (*e.g.* Missouri recognizes out-of-state marriages between first cousins or between individuals under the age of 18, even though performing such marriages is illegal in this State). The Court found no rational basis for Missouri to treat out-of-state same-sex marriages differently from those out-of-state opposite-sex marriages. In our view, while our federal system empowers Missouri to set policy for itself, it requires us to honor out-of-state contracts in a manner that is both fair and consistent. Further, continuing the litigation is not costless—the State was ordered to pay over \$137,000 to the ACLU in attorney's fees for litigating the case in circuit court. We did not believe there was a lawful basis to appeal the Court's judgment in *Barrier*, and thus we chose not to expend further resources on such an appeal.

Additionally, while the *Florida* and *Lawson* cases are pending on review, we will not ask the lower courts to stay their rulings. We are guided by the repeated decisions of the United States Supreme Court in recent weeks declining to issue stays in Idaho, Alaska, and Kansas, effectively permitting same-sex marriages to proceed in these jurisdictions while the cases involving the constitutionality of their state prohibitions are pending on appeal. By refusing to issue stays, the Supreme Court has effectively ratified the decisions of its agents—the lower federal courts—in striking down state constitutional bans and permitting same-sex marriages to go forward. In its most recent action, the Court lifted the stay requested by Kansas even after the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the traditional definition of marriage, creating a circuit split. The circumstances here are identical to those posed in other circuits and do not support a different approach.

I hope that this explanation addresses the concerns expressed in your letter. I look forward to continuing to work positively with the General Assembly on this and the many other issues important to the citizens we serve.

Respectfully,



CHRIS KOSTER
Attorney General

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-14061-AA

D.C. Docket No. 4:14-cv-107-RH/CAS

JAMES DOMER BRENNER, *et al.*,

Plaintiffs - Appellees,

versus

JOHN H. ARMSTRONG, *et al.*,

Defendants - Appellants.

No. 14-14066-AA

D.C. Docket No. 4:14-cv-138-RH/CAS

SLOAN GRIMSLEY, *et al.*,

Plaintiffs - Appellees,

versus

JOHN H. ARMSTRONG, *et al.*,

Defendants - Appellants.

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida

Before: HULL, WILSON, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.

BY THE COURT:

On November 18, 2014, the Appellants in the above appeals, the Secretary of the Florida Department of Health, the Secretary of the Florida Department of Management Services, and the Clerk of Court of Washington County (collectively, Appellants), jointly filed a Motion to Extend Stay of Preliminary Injunctions Pending Appeal and for Expedited Treatment of This Motion (the Motion). Appellees James Domer Brenner, *et al.*, and Appellees Sloan Grimsley, *et al.*, filed separate responses in opposition to the Motion.

Appellants' request for expedited review of the Motion is granted. Having reviewed and fully considered the Motion, the parties' briefs, and the orders issued by the District Court in the proceedings below, the Court hereby denies Appellants' Motion. The stay of preliminary injunctions entered by the District Court expires at the end of the day on January 5, 2015.

**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT**

ELBERT PARR TUTTLE COURT OF APPEALS BUILDING
56 Forsyth Street, N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

John Ley
Clerk of Court

For rules and forms visit
www.call.uscourts.gov

December 03, 2014

Adam Scott Tanenbaum
Office of the Attorney General
THE CAPITOL PL-01
TALLAHASSEE, FL 32399-1050

Appeal Number: 14-14061-AA ; 14-14066 -AA
Case Style: James Brenner, et al v. John Armstrong, et al
District Court Docket No: 4:14-cv-00107-RH-CAS

This Court requires all counsel to file documents electronically using the Electronic Case Files ("ECF") system, unless exempted for good cause.

The enclosed order has been ENTERED.

Sincerely,

JOHN LEY, Clerk of Court

Reply to: David L. Thomas, AA/rvg
Phone #: (404) 335-6169

MOT-2 Notice of Court Action