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      UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
      SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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      AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
      UNION, et al.,
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                     Plaintiffs,
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                 v.
                                               04-CV-4151 (AKH)
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      DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, et al.,
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                     Defendants.
                                               Oral Argument
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                                               New York, N.Y.
                                               July 20, 2011
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                                               3:24 p.m.
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      Before:
                         HON. ALVIN K. HELLERSTEIN,
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                                               District Judge
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                                 APPEARANCES
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      AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
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          For Plaintiffs
      BY: ALEXANDER A. ABDO, ESQ.
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           JAMEEL JAFFER, ESQ.
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      BY: ALICIA L. BANNON, ESQ.
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      UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
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      SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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          For Defendants
      BY: AMY A. BARCELO, AUSA
           TARA LA MORTE, AUSA
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     CHARLES G. MILLS, ESQ.
           Attorney for Amicus Curiae The American Legion
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(In open court)

(Case called)

THE CLERK: Counsel, please state your name for the record.

MR. ABDO: Alexander Abdo for the plaintiffs, your Honor.

MR. JAFFER: Jameel Jaffer for plaintiffs, your Honor.

MR. LUSTBERG: Lawrence S. Lustberg, Gibbons, P.C., on behalf of plaintiffs.

MS. BANNON: Alicia Bannon, Gibbons, P.C., on behalf of plaintiffs.

MS. BARCELO: Amy Barcelo, assistant United States attorney, on behalf of the government.

MS. LA MORTE: Tara La Morte, assistant United States attorney, on behalf of the government.

MR. MILLS: Charles G. Mills on behalf of the amicus curiae, the American Legion.

THE COURT: All right. Who's going to argue for the plaintiff?

MR. ABDO: I will, your Honor. Alexander Abdo.

THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Abdo.

MR. ABDO: Your Honor, at issue today is the government's withholding of approximately 2,000 photographs depicting the abuse of detainees in US custody throughout detention facilities in Iraq and Afghanistan. The vast

majority of the photographs have never been publicly described.

This court and the Second Circuit ordered their release, as you will recall. Now, however, the government --

THE COURT: Vividly.

MR. ABDO: Well, now, as I'm sure your Honor recalls, the government is withholding the photographs under new statutory authority provided by Congress. That statute authorizes the government to withhold certain photographs if the Secretary of Defense determines that release of the photographs would endanger US citizens, civilians, or employees, and the Secretary has made such a determination.

The question today for the court is a very simple one: whether there is any judicial review whatsoever of the Secretary's determination that release of the photographs would endanger those individuals. We think there are -- there is, for three simple reasons.

The first is that the photo statute is an Exemption 3 withholding statute because it establishes particular criteria for the withholding of agency records.

Second, one of those criteria -- indeed, the most important -- is that the Secretary determines that release of the requested records would endanger US individuals.

And finally, FOIA requires additional review of that determination, as it does of all criteria established under Exemption 3 statutes.

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As the briefing to this court shows, the majority of 1 2 the caselaw supports that simple analysis. The Ninth Circuit, 3 in a case known as Long, and a number of circuits following that decision, encountered a very similar situation that this 4 court is in now. The Ninth Circuit had ordered the release of 5 certain tax-related information, and Congress responded by 6 passing a statute that provided new statutory authority for the 7 withholding of that information if the Secretary of the 8 Treasury determined that release would cause a particular harm. 9 The district court in that case found that the statute, 10 invocation of the statute was sufficient to discharge the 11 government's obligations to withhold the tax-related 12 information, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that FOIA 13 14 provides --Tell me, Mr. Abdo, the nature of the 15 THE COURT: 16

information that was sought in that case.

MR. ABDO: The information was return information submitted by taxpayers that was withheld by the Secretary of the Treasury on the claim that disclosure would adversely impact the administration of the tax laws.

THE COURT: You mean the Freedom of Information Act requests were for the precise returns filed by taxpayers?

MR. ABDO: I don't recall whether it was for particular information within returns, but it was for information covered by the portion of the tax act that

protected return information.

THE COURT: I think I need to know more about that to consider if Long is a good precedent for you. Some areas, by the very nature of those areas, the court naturally has a great deal of information and is in possession of a better ability to evaluate the nature of the withholding than perhaps in other areas, and I'd like to compare what a court might well appreciate in Long to the very difficult job a judge sitting in New York City, insulated in a courtroom from a battlefield, might be able to evaluate in the case applied.

MR. ABDO: There's no doubt, your Honor, that the context of the two cases are distinct. What we are asking the court to do, however, is engage in the very type of analysis that courts examining FOIA requests engage in all the time, to determine --

THE COURT: No, they don't. They don't. Once the head of an agency has a deliberate consideration and determination, courts tend to respect that.

MR. ABDO: Respectfully, your Honor, there is some deference given to heads of agencies in making those determinations, but all we're requesting at this point is that the government provide a justification for the invocation of the statute, which it has yet to do.

For example, in the context of Exemption 1, courts are called upon routinely to determine whether the government's

determination of national security harm satisfies its obligation to withhold records that would allegedly endanger the national security. There may be some measure of deference in that context, but that deference on the question of the substance has never been held to negate the availability of judicial review in the first instance for the government withholdings.

THE COURT: I've done a lot of those reviews in this case. Mr. Lustberg has been involved in any number of them.

And I looked at the particular statement that is subject to the withholding request. And I looked for a reasonable relationship by the nature of the subject matter to the general classification -- for example, in the CIA papers -- that a method of investigation or inquiry would be disclosed. And it's not a very detailed evaluation; it is rather superficial, by its very nature.

And here, as I understand what happened, the United States was all set to make the publication ordered by me and affirmed by the Second Circuit when the Prime Minister of Iraq importuned President Obama not to allow it for fear that a great deal of civil unrest and insurrection would occur in Iraq, endangering the Iraqi government, the officials of the Iraqi government, the United States military, and civilian forces supporting that government. And it went up through the chain of command, and Secretary of Defense Gates made the

determination, based on recommendations made at every step along the way.

When I initially made the determination to release the photographs, I considered an affidavit from the then commander in chief Richard Myers, who wrote as to his concern that the release of the photographs would endanger American military and civilian forces in Iraq and lead to insurrection and the like. And I ruled that these were really speculative, that the terrorists in Iraq needed no pretext to attack American forces, and the core values of the Freedom of Information Act were more cogent and more dear than the speculation of even the commander in chief of the United States military. And the Second Circuit affirmed.

And then we have this presidential order, and an act of Congress. What more could I do?

MR. ABDO: Respectfully, your Honor, the determination or the public statements you're referring to are from several years ago, and we're simply not in a position to know now whether those are the same types of concerns that are animating the government's withholdings. A year and a half ago, when the government -- when the President determined not to release the photographs as he had initially determined to do, he made a very time-sensitive statement about the nature of the facts on the ground at the time. We are now two years removed from that determination and yet we have no record from the Secretary of

Defense explaining the entirely conclusory explanation in his certification that disclosure of these records now would cause harm. Moreover, we don't have any connection drawn --

THE COURT: It's evident. It's evident. It's the same concern about harm that's been expressed throughout the case, which I did not follow but which Congress commands me to follow. I'm just a judge.

MR. ABDO: We understand that, your Honor. But there's a crucial role for judges to play in the FOIA process. The process of FOIA is not simply for the government to come into court, invoke an exemption, and for courts then to simply ratify that invocation of an exemption.

THE COURT: I don't think the government did that. It Secretary of Gates had done what you said, I might be tempted to require more. But in the context of the history of this case, I think the concerns are real, and they've been expressed. It was a very interesting statement that was made, when the United States was ready, willing, and able to produce the redacted photographs, an amazing statement, and it, in effect, could not be ignored by the President or the Congress. The history makes it quite clear, I think.

MR. ABDO: Your Honor, we respect that the court is inclined to defer to determinations of the agency, but there has to be something to defer to. Currently before the court, the only document provided by the government attempting to

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justify the withholding of these records on this motion is a Secretary certification, which does no more than essentially copy and paste the language of the statute relating to the required harm that must be demonstrated. The Secretary has not attempted, nor has any declarant on behalf of the government, to explain how any one of the photographs would lead to that harm. Given the sheer volume of the photographs, 2,000, we think it unlikely that the release of even one of them, much less the least inflammatory of them, would cause the type of harm that the Secretary predicts. But we're also --

THE COURT: You want me to go through all 2,000 and rank them? This one is benign, we'll let that go through, but this one shows something more dramatic? What would I be looking for? What kind of criteria would I use to go through this?

MR. ABDO: We would invite in camera review, your Honor, but the initial posture of most FOIA cases is to require the government, through a Vaughn declaration and a Vaughn index, to make that showing, because the government bears the burden under FOIA in the first instance of attempting to justify its withholdings. It has yet to produce a Vaughn index or declaration with respect to these 2,000 photographs. So we think the first step for the court would be simply to order the government to produce a Vaughn declaration explaining how release of each of the photographs would result in the harm it

claims and an index that provides sufficient textual detail, describing each photograph, to allow the court to connect the alleged harm with the actual records.

And it's notable that the statute at issue says not a word about textual descriptions of these photographs. It protects simply the photographs themselves. And so the court wouldn't be in any way endangering the asserted interests of the government if it merely required a textual description to be provided by the government to the plaintiffs. All it would be doing would be vindicating FOIA's core purposes by allowing adversarial testing of the government's claim of harm by providing a sufficient record for the court to conduct the de novo review mandated and, importantly in this case, by creating a full record of the government's reasons for withholding and the contents of the records it seeks to withhold.

THE COURT: Mr. Abdo, I'm looking at your brief, and I take it that you want me, as stated at the bottom of page 9, to conduct a *de novo* review, finding if the release of the photographs actually would cause the harm specified by the act.

MR. ABDO: The phrase --

THE COURT: How am I equipped to do that?

MR. ABDO: We respectfully disagree, your Honor. FOIA mandates that courts engage in that type of *de novo* review --

THE COURT: Actually would cause the harm.

MR. ABDO: We perhaps misquoted the statute, but

| whatever --

THE COURT: This is argument. You didn't quote anything. You just asked. This is argument. That's what you want me to do. You want me to conduct a *de novo* review to find whether the photographs actually would cause the harm. What is the harm specified by the law?

MR. ABDO: Subsection (d), your Honor, of the statute authorizes withholding if the Secretary of Defense determines that disclosure of that photograph would endanger citizens of the United States, members of the United States armed forces, or employees of the United States government deployed outside the United States. That is the very type of determination, albeit with some deference in these contexts, that courts engage in when, for example, they ask whether release of a document would compromise national security under Exemption 1. It is the same type of question that this court asked when the CIA sought to neither confirm nor deny the existence of a particular legal memorandum, an explanation that this court, after conducting de novo review, rejected, notwithstanding the context of that withholding, and the same type of determination that this court more recently --

THE COURT: I recall that the government volunteered that information.

MR. ABDO: Ultimately, your Honor, I don't recall whether that's true, but --

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THE COURT: I don't remember well enough, but I don't 1 2 remember having made that determination. Maybe Mr. Lustberg 3 remembers that. MR. ABDO: It was in the September 2005 order, your 4 Honor. 5 In any event, your Honor --6 I called on Mr. Lustberg because I think 7 THE COURT: only he has memory long enough to the beginning of the case. 8 MR. LUSTBERG: And I had hair when this case started, 9 10 Judge. What shall I say, Mr. Lustberg? 11 THE COURT: 12 MR. LUSTBERG: I don't have a specific word. I think the issue in that case was that some of those 13 memoranda had already been disclosed in the public record, so 14 there was a different determination that your Honor had to 15 16 make. I think that's right. 17 THE COURT: Then I'll point your Honor to a more recent MR. ABDO: 18 determination that the alleged source and method withheld by 19 20 the CIA in one of those memoranda was not in fact a source or method but was in fact a source of authority and would not 21 22 cause the harm claimed by the CIA. 23 In any event, the point is a larger one, your Honor, that FOIA requires that courts conduct that type of review. 24

Although styled de novo by FOIA, it varies, of course,

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according to the circumstances, but the review in any of those circumstances fulfills an important role of the court in ensuring that it is the rule of law respected when records are withheld and not simply a mere ratification of withholding decisions.

THE COURT: I wrestled with that consideration at some earlier time, because the statute seems to be saying two things. It does call upon a de novo review of sorts, but that review seems to be satisfied by looking at the procedure used by the particular head of an agency in claiming an exemption, and the court did not seem -- particularly in matters of defense and intelligence, the courts give a great deal of respect for the decision made.

And I remember very well the Glomar case, where

President Carter ordered the release of information that showed

that what the United States had been calling an exploration and

scientific research ship actually was used for spying purposes

in the Pacific, and notwithstanding the disclosure by the

United States, a subsequent claim to withhold disclosure under

an exemption was upheld by the District of Columbia circuit

because even the provenance of a particular disclosure could

embarrass our foreign relations. I was very struck by that

decision, which I thought was something that the Second Circuit

would follow, and which I would follow, that matters of defense

and intelligence are of such a sensitive nature, it's very

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difficult for a judge, and maybe impossible, to make the kinds of calculations and evaluations that are necessary for the normal kind of *de novo* review. And I applied it here.

Going back to what happened, here is the certification by Secretary Gates that you quote on page 5 of your brief. "After hearing recommendations of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commander of US Central Command, and the Commander of Multinational Forces, Iraq, that public disclosure of these photographs would endanger citizens of the United States, members of the United States armed forces, or employees of the United States government deployed outside the United States." I've seen photographs similar to this in an in camera review, and it's clear from all the public information as well that what is depicted in these photographs are scenes of inappropriate corrections officers behavior towards detainees. There are scenes where dogs are used, there are scenes where there's public nakedness, there are scenes of compromising behavior. All of this is on the public record in word Photographs have not been depicted. And I felt, descriptions. after seeing these pictures, that the dimension of visual knowledge of what was going on is different in kind and quality from the intellectual knowledge that comes from reading words on a page, and it was for that reason that I held that it was appropriate to publish these photographs. And I had before me certifications by the military that the publication would

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endanger lives. We were in a wartime situation there, and we were being attacked regularly. And I believed from everything known to me that the danger of our forces and civilians were at such a high level that there need be no pretext for additional terrorist activity against us, and so the photographs would do nothing, and I felt that the speculation of the commander in chief, although entitled to great deference, did not outweigh the core values of FOIA. But there's now a specific statute that says that these kinds of certifications need to be given conclusive respect.

Then, as now, there are still the same issues of the visual image of American troops committing improper and inappropriate acts towards Iraqis which fuel insurrection and terrorist activity, endangering our forces. We've drawn down our forces. There are more civilians, many more civilians than military, and we're in the process of continuing to draw down The dangers that are certified by Secretary Gates our forces. become much more vivid in this kind of an environment. although one can argue that the conditions existing now are of a more benign nature than existed when Congress enacted the statute, one could argue the contrary as well. We continue to hear and read of terrorist activities in Iraq, one Iraqi against another and one Iraqi against the forces of the United States. We're not out of danger. And for the same rationale that animated the passage by Congress of the act -- what is the

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name, the Protected National Defense --1 2 MR. ABDO: The Protected National Security Documents 3 Act. That should be applied. I cannot THE COURT: Yes. 4 5 conduct the evaluation that you want. The certifications are 6 I just read that particular certification. The other 7 criteria of the law is that the photographs were taken during the period beginning on September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001 through 8 9 January 22, 2009, and relate to the treatment of individuals engaged, captured, or detained after September 11, 2001, by the 10 11 armed forces of the United States and operations outside of the 12 United States. There's no serious question that the photographs, each of the 2,000, qualify, is there? 13 14 MR. ABDO: We have the Secretary's representation but 15 that's it, your Honor. 16 THE COURT: You do not --17 MR. ABDO: We're not contesting that, your Honor. 18 THE COURT: You're not. I think it's enough. 19 Mr. Abdo, I'm sympathetic to your argument, but I think I have to follow this. 20 21 MR. ABDO: Your Honor, if I could make just one point. THE COURT: Yes. 2.2

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court's belief that Congress has conclusively acted, and I'd

just like to push back up against that a little bit.

MR. ABDO: It seems that the primary motivation is the

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THE COURT: You may.

MR. ABDO: Congress could easily have written a statute that would have prohibited the disclosure of these photographs without the availability of any judicial review of a determination of harm. It could, for example, have drafted a statute like the CIA Act, which protects the operational files of the CIA without any intervention of a court; it could have protected these photographs in the same way it protects information provided by census takers, which is protected in the Census Act, or to visa applicants, protected by the U.S. Instead it seeks to hinge its holding on the determination of harm, and that determination of harm, under hornbook law of FOIA, is an Exemption 3 criterion that is subject to judicial review. And at this point there's simply no record before the court to allow that type of review. Secretary's certification, with all due respect to the Secretary, is nothing more than a recitation of the statutory It provides no explanation for its determination of harm; it doesn't explain anything about the contents of the 2,000 photographs. It may very well be that some of them are withholdable for the reasons that the court provided, but we simply don't know whether all 2,000 of them are or whether all 2,000 have the same type of content that would, you know, self-evidently cause the type of harm that the court has discussed. And that's because we simply have no record of what

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the photographs are. We don't know even how many there are conclusively from the government. We don't know where they were taken, and we don't know what they show. Without that type of record, the Secretary's conclusory statement that disclosing them would cause a harm is entirely unreviewable. It would simply be wholesale deference without any other type of review that FOIA calls for to ratify that withholding without, at the very least, satisfying the procedural requirements of FOIA.

And to be frank, it's a very modest request, your We're simply asking that the government provide what it does, even in all of the national security cases that your Honor was talking about. Even in the Glomar context, even in the Exemption 1 and national security Exemption 3 context. Even in those contexts, the government provides a Vaughn declaration and it provides an index that describes the withheld records in as much detail as possible without compromising the interests that it is trying to protect. has yet to do that here, and the only basis we can discern for that judgment is that the government thinks the statute has legislated the withholding of these photographs, but that is emphatically not the case. Congress did not enact the type of categorical ban that it has done in so many contexts. hinged withholding on specific criteria -- criteria that are reviewable by courts' determinations of harm, that, albeit

often reviewed in the context where deference is appropriate, are reviewed nonetheless on the basis of a record provided by the government. And here all we have is a declaration that recites the photographs, and upon that record, we think it would be improper for the court to uphold the withholding of the photographs without more.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Ms. La Morte?

MS. BARCELO: Actually, Ms. Barcelo.

THE COURT: Ms. Barcelo. Sorry.

MS. BARCELO: No problem, your Honor.

THE COURT: Whenever I become familiar with the assistants, you switch on me.

THE COURT: Should the government have issued a Vaughn declaration?

MS. BARCELO: Yes. I understand. The court --

MS. BARCELO: There is no requirement for a Vaughn index -- declarations or index here, your Honor. The basis -- as your Honor noted, this case has a unique history, or this -- the coming about of this statute.

THE COURT: I'm not sure it's unique, but it sure is extensive.

MS. BARCELO: Yes. Well, I do think -- I mean, I think the issue of these specific photos has a unique history, and it resulted in an enactment of a unique statute. As a

result of the enactment of the Protected National Security

Documents Act, we're now operating under FOIA Exemption 3.

That's the basis under which the government is withholding these documents. And FOIA Exemption 3 is different from the other FOIA exemptions under which this court has previously considered the documents -- these photographs. Excuse me.

FOIA Exemption 3 requires only that a statute be a FOIA Exemption 3 statute. Here plaintiffs argue that it is, and that the document -- secondly, that the documents fall within the scope of that statute. Here the government's argument, the basis for the withholding -- the basis for the documents -- the photographs falling within the scope of the statute is the existence of the Secretary's certification which fulfills all of the requirements of the statute, because each and every one of the photographs falls within the scope of this certification --

THE COURT: How do we know that?

MS. BARCELO: We know that because the certification says so, your Honor. The certification refers specifically to the photographs that are, I quote, "contained in or derived from records of investigations of allegations of detainee abuse," including the records -- including the records of investigation, process and release in this very case, citing the index number for this very case.

THE COURT: Well, the statute seems to make a

distinction between the certificate, which is that disclosure would endanger citizens of the United States, etc., and that the photograph qualifies objectively. They're two different criteria, and I don't think we can accept the certificate to cover each and all of the photographs.

MS. BARCELO: I'm sorry. I'm not sure that I understand the question.

THE COURT: The certificate has to do with danger to persons.

MS. BARCELO: That's correct.

THE COURT: The photographs are qualified documents under the act if they were taken during a certain period and if they related to treatments engaged, captured, or detained by the United States armed forces. So I can't accept the certificate as conclusively saying that each of these 2,000 photographs qualifies under subsection (b) of the act.

MS. BARCELO: The certificate does also address both of those points.

THE COURT: But I can't accept that. The law does not require me to accept that. It requires me to accept the point of danger. It doesn't require me to accept that these photographs were taken during a certain period and related to certain individuals.

MS. BARCELO: As an initial matter, plaintiffs are not disputing that either one of those criteria are met here, and I

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do think the Secretary's certification, which is issued by the Secretary of Defense himself, does speak precisely to both of those issues, the time period during which the photographs were taken.

THE COURT: I don't think that's relevant. That's not what the statute says. I do think it would be an idle act to go over each of these 2,000 photographs to see if they qualify under this period. We won't know from the photograph necessarily exactly when it was taken, although they may be time stamped. We will be able to see from each of the photographs what they relay. And I think for the purposes of this motion, we don't have to go into that exercise, but I do not hold that the government's certificate is conclusive on the aspect of subsection (b).

MS. BARCELO: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Let's talk a little bit about Long and A. Michael's Piano, two cases that are cited by the plaintiffs. In Long, what was sought are standards used or to be used for the selection of income tax returns for examination or that they used for determining such standards. In other words, what the applicant wanted to know was what criteria did the IRS use in deciding which returns were audited; a valuable piece of information for taxpayers.

The government argued that disclosure would qualify under the act, that it authorized these kinds of criteria and

data, to establish those criteria, to be exempted from disclosure.

The Court of Appeals in the Ninth Circuit held that the court had to make that determination. The case is not binding on me, since we sit in the Second Circuit, and I don't think I would agree with the Court of Appeals in the Ninth Circuit. I think this kind of information is inconsistent with the effective tax administration. But that would be on the substance. I could understand a rule that says a district judge has to delve into it because these are the kinds of things that judges are aware of. You have to understand.

For the reasons I expressed before, I don't think we have a very good understanding of what may or may not be dangerous on the battlefield in the crazy conditions that exist in Iraq at this point in time. And even there, the history of what's involved, with which I've become as familiar as almost any person outside the CIA or the Department of Defense, shows to me that the Secretary of Defense has a rational basis for how he wishes to conclude. I might disagree with him. I might agree that the core values of FOIA are more important and more cogent. In fact, I expressed those views. But I cannot say that there is a lack of a rational basis for what Secretary Gates has certified, and if you want me to do a de novo review, I've done it, by reason of my familiarity with the case, and that's as far as I'll go. I will not opine that there is or is

not a danger in the battlefield because of the disclosure of pictures of this sort. And I should say that issuing the rulings I did was probably the most difficult judicial decision that I've had to do in 12 years. We put people in the line of fire every day. Regardless of whether we agree or disagree with one or more aspects of national policy, we cannot gainsay the fact that these are very brave soldiers and sailors and airmen who carry out very dangerous missions every day to protect the United States and advance its policies. And it's a very difficult act on the part of a district judge to arrogate the function of deciding what measure of danger is permissible and what not.

So I will not do the *de novo* review except to the extent of looking for the rational basis of what the Secretary of Defense has done, and I've done that.

Before leaving, there's just one other case I wanted to discuss with you, and that's A. Michael's Piano v. FTC. Can you tell me a little bit about that case. That's a Second Circuit decision.

MS. BARCELO: Certainly, your Honor.

In that case, that was an Exemption 3 FOIA case, similar to this -- the issues that we are now discussing. A. Michael's Piano, of course, dealt with a different Exemption 3 withholding statute than what we're talking about here. But the fundamental issue that the Second Circuit was addressing

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here was, how do we determine whether or not a record is protected under Exemption 3? Do we interpret the statute using, you know, different principles of statutory interpretation when considering it as a FOIA Exemption 3 statute than we would for any other sort of -- any other statute that has been enacted by Congress?

It looks at, in considering -- excuse me. considering the different ways that a FOIA Exemption 3 statute could be interpreted, the Second Circuit looks at the ways other -- other circuits -- excuse me -- had interpreted 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code, which is the statute the plaintiffs argue we should interpret the PNSDA in a manner similar. What the Second Circuit held was that in those cases, where other circuits had argued or had held that principles of FOIA de novo review should be imposed upon the interpretation of the scope of the FOIA Exemption 3 statute and other circuits had arqued or had held that APA principles of arbitrating capricious review should be imposed upon the interpretations of the scope of the Exemption 3 statutes, the Second Circuit considered both of those options and rejected them. Instead, the Second Circuit held, in light of the Supreme Court precedent in the CIA v. Sims case -- which I know the court is very familiar with, as it's come up a number of times in the previous case -it held that a FOIA Exemption 3 statute could only be interpreted according to its plain language, its plain meaning,

taking into account its structure, its purpose, and the
legislative history of the statute, with the ultimate goal of
determining Congressional purpose in enacting the statute and
determining what Congress intended. Did Congress intend for
the types of documents that we're talking about here to be
protected under this statute. Here, there is no question that
that is what Congress is intending with respect to the
photographs at issue here. That I think is what we can the
sense in which A. Michael's Piano was instructive, that a FOIA
Exemption 3 statute should be interpreted in the same manner as
any other Congressional enactment, on its own terms, its own
plain language, and Congressional intent on enacting the
statute.
THE COURT: The Second Circuit held this is a 1994

THE COURT: The Second Circuit held -- this is a 1994 case -- that the burden of proof on de novo judicial review rests with the agency asserting the exemption. What did Secretary Gates have to do? Was his certificate sufficient?

MS. BARCELO: His certificate -- certification absolutely was sufficient.

THE COURT: Because that's what the statute says.

MS. BARCELO: Because that's what the statute requires; exactly, your Honor. The statute requires --

THE COURT: And clearly the materials withheld fall within the scope of the statute.

MS. BARCELO: That's exactly right, your Honor.

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THE COURT: And that's the end of the inquiry. 1 MS. BARCELO: That is also exactly right. 2 THE COURT: Anything else? 3 MS. BARCELO: Unless the court has any further 4 5 questions. THE COURT: No. Thank you. 6 7 MS. BARCELO: Thank you. 8 THE COURT: Do we have any legislative history that 9 commands judicial review to a greater extent than I've expressed? 10 11 MS. BARCELO: There is none, your Honor. THE COURT: Last word, Mr. Abdo? 12 MR. ABDO: Yes, your Honor. Respectfully, the inquiry 13 about judicial review isn't whether Congress has expressed an 14 15 intent to maintain the default rule of judicial review under FOIA. The inquiry under Long and all of the other -- the vast 16 17 majority of the circuits to consider a question similar to this 18 is whether Congress has tried to negate judicial review or get rid of it. In this context it hasn't. It has left FOIA as it 19 20 stands --21 THE COURT: It says nothing about judicial review. 22 MR. ABDO: That's exactly right. That's --23 THE COURT: It says nothing about what standards of inquiry the court should look to. 24

MR. ABDO: That's the case with all Exemption 3

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statutes, your Honor. Not a single one expresses a view on whether the traditional FOIA review should apply, and the only context in which Congress does express a view in those cases is when it does try to extract a withholding statute from the purview of FOIA, which Congress has not done here. And even today the government concedes for the first time that the proper framework is Exemption 3. And so it seems to us that the only real question is whether a criterion under the statute for withholding is that the Secretary determined harm or, as your Honor has said a couple times, whether the Secretary merely needs to certify that harm would exist. We think that's a distinction without a difference. The statute requires both. The only reason for the existence of a certification process was to allow Congress to impose a temporal limit on the certification, not to allow a single certification or a single determination of harm to preclude release of these photographs for all time. And the reason for that should be straightforward. These are records that obviously cut to the core of governmental transparency and to the core of the purposes of FOIA. And so Congress was careful not to enact a statute that allowed the withholding of these photographs on the basis of one determination, no matter how long ago made. THE COURT: What's the time period I look to in deciding whether your request for FOIA disclosure were

appropriate or not? As of today or as of the time you made the

request?

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MR. ABDO: I believe it's the government's burden to justify its withholding as of this moment. And that's consistent with how the court has, for example, treated withholdings under Exemption 7, where there are temporal considerations. So for example, when Special Prosecutor Durham withheld certain records under Exemption 7(a), the court asked for periodic updates that might affect the relevance of his withholding analysis at any given moment. And so I think the question is whether the Secretary's simple statement that the records should be withheld suffices to discharge the government's burden to demonstrate that there would be harm if the photographs were released today with respect to 2,000 photographs which we know nothing about.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much, Mr. Abdo.

I deny the plaintiff's motion for disclosure of these documents and hold that the government properly showed the applicability of Exemption 3 of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3), and Section 565 of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act 2010, Public Law No. 111-83, 123, Statute 2142 and 2184-85 of 2009, better known as the Protected National Security Documents Act of 2009.

So I deny plaintiff's motion for disclosure and I grant the government's cross-motion for partial summary judgment.

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This controversy has a rather long history.

Plaintiffs started the matter in October 2003 when they submitted a FOIA request to a number of federal government agencies, including the Department of Defense, and several components, seeking the release of all records concerning the treatment of detainees taken into United States custody after September 11, 2001, and held at military bases or detention facilities abroad.

This lawsuit, seeking to implement the FOIA request, was filed in June of 2004.

I examined in camera each of the photographs that were then in issue and I ordered that there be a redaction on most of these photographs to mask the identity of the detainee and, subject to such redaction, that most of these had to be disclosed.

My opinion in writing is American Civil Liberties

Union v. Department of Defense, 389 F.Supp.2d 547 at 568-79,
issued in 2005 and affirmed by the Court of Appeals at
543 F.3d 59, decided in 2008, and then vacated after subsequent
proceedings by the United States Supreme Court at
130 U.S. 777 (2009).

These photographs, known as the Darby photographs, from the person who took them, further claim exemption under Exemption 6 and 7(c) of FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) and (b)(7)(C). It was argued by the government that release of the

photographs would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal property or privacy. It's very interesting to note that the government at that time did not argue any aspect of national security or endangerment of any military persons. I denied the government's motion because I reasoned the photographs had been redacted to eliminate all identifying characteristics of the persons shown.

The government added its Exemption 7(f) argument, arguing that publication of the Darby photographs would likely incite violence against our troops and Iraqi and Afghan personnel and civilians and that redactions would not avert the danger. I overruled that objection. That is reflected at 389 F.Supp.2d at 574-79. After thorough review of all the precedents and all the photographs, I concluded that the core values that Exemption 7(f) was designed to protect are not implicated by the release of the Darby photographs but that the core values under which FOIA commands the disclosure were very much implicated. Accordingly, I ordered the government to release the Darby photographs.

Following that, a third party published the Darby photographs online, and that resulted in a withdrawal by the government of its appeal, at least as to the aspect of the Darby photographs.

However, more and more photographs came into being, or at least came out of hiding. It appears that there were an

additional 29 photographs and two videos taken by individuals serving in Iraq and Afghanistan that the government believes were responsive to the FOIA requests. Again, the government claimed exemption under Section 6, 7(c), and 7(f).

On June 8<sup>th</sup>, 2006, I reviewed the 29 photographs ex parte and in camera, and that's reflected in an order, 04-CV-4151, Document 193, June 9, 2006.

I just want to interject that at all times during this case I've been concerned to balance as properly as I could the commands of secrecy and national defense and the commands of publicity for a court record. I'm very much concerned that as a United States district judge, I should be accountable for all that I do, and at every step along the way I've tried to put on the public record as much as I could about the subject matter of my ruling and my rulings themselves. And some of this required a good deal of intensive negotiations and stubbornness with various government officials.

But in any event, I rejected the government's claimed exemptions for the same reasons I expressed earlier and I ordered the release of 21 of the 29 photographs, subject to redaction to eliminate all identifying facial features. And as to the other eight photographs, I ruled they were not responsive to the request. That order was issued, June 9, 2006. It's Document 193. And it's also reflected in 2006 US District LEXIS 40894 at \*3-4.

That was not the last of the photographs. By letter of June 29, 2006, the government advised that the Department of Defense had an additional 23 images of detainees and claimed exemptions on the same bases as before. However, it was clearly unnecessary to have further argument and further opinion writing on the subject because what I said earlier on several occasions the parties expected and I believe to be consistently applied so there was a stipulation that these 23 would be governed by the rulings on the 21 for the purposes of the appeal that followed.

So the government appealed my orders for the 21 and the 29 photographs. On September 22, 2008, a unanimous panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed my order, directing the release of the photographs.

American Civil Liberties Union v. Department of Defense,
543 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 2008), and that was vacated subsequently, and a hearing en banc was denied.

The government advised on April 23, 2009, that it would not seek certiorari review and that it was prepared to release the 21 and the 23 photographs. There may be somewhat different numbers, but there were two tranches of photographs that were involved. And the government added that it was processing for release a substantial number of other images contained in the CIC (Criminal Investigation Command) report that it disclosed during the pendency of the case. The

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government represented that it would process these other images in a manner consistent with the court's previous rulings on responsive images. Again, the government did not petition for certiorari.

The Second Circuit issued a mandate on April 27, 2009.

However, just a few weeks later, matters turned around. On May 13<sup>th</sup>, 2009, President Barack Obama stated publicly that he would oppose the release of additional detainee photographs. That followed -- and I'm not sure this is in the record or from my recollection of the news reports, but that followed an urgent request by the Prime Minister of Iraq to the United States government not to publish the photographs. The Prime Minister of Iraq, which had a more fragile governmental structure at the time than it is today, was concerned that the publication of these photos would fuel insurrection and make it impossible to have a functioning In reaction to that, President Obama expressed his government. belief that the publication of these photos would not add any additional benefit to the public's understanding of what was carried out in the past by a small number of individuals; rather, the most direct consequence of releasing the photographs, the President added, would be to further inflame antiAmerican opinion and to put our troops in greater danger.

Pursuant to the President's statements, on the application of the government, the Second Circuit granted the

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1	government's motion to recall the mandate and to stay the
2	effect of the mandate pending disposition of a new petition for
3	certiorari. The government filed a petition, and it was three
4	months later that the Protected National Security Documents Act
5	of 2009 was signed into law. The PNSDA specifically exempts
6	from disclosure under FOIA any protected documents, defined as
7	a photograph taken between September 11, 2001, and January 2,
8	2009, relating to the treatment of individuals engaged,
9	captured, or detained, after September 11, 2001, by the United
10	States armed forces in their operations overseas, and for which
11	the Secretary of Defense issued a certification stating that
12	disclosure would endanger United States citizens, military
13	personnel, or federal government employees. Subsequently, the
14	Secretary of Defense, Robert M. Gates, issued a certification
15	of November 13, 2009, addressing a collection of photographs
16	between the indicated dates and relating to the subject matter
17	of the law. The collection includes the 23 and 21, or 44,
18	photographs that were involved in these proceedings. They do
19	not affect the photographs that were, I think I'd like to
20	confirm.
21	The first tranche of photographs that I ruled on are

The first tranche of photographs that I ruled on are out in the public domain, are they not, Mr. Abdo?

MR. ABDO: I believe so, your Honor.

THE COURT: So we're talking about the second tranche, third tranche, and the fourth tranche documents?

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MR. ABDO: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you agree, Ms. Barcelo?

MS. BARCELO: I do, your Honor.

THE COURT: And I mentioned before on the record the basis that was cited by Secretary Gates and my ruling that, given the history of how this came about, it was clear to me that Secretary Gates had a rational basis for his certifications and that I could not second-guess it, and notwithstanding the statement made this week by the ACLU, no one really wants me to conduct a second review of that which is in the purview of the Secretary of Defense, beyond looking for a rational basis the way it did. I find that rational basis.

On November 30, 2009, continuing with the history of the case, the United States Supreme Court granted the government's petition for certiorari, vacated the Second Circuit's judgment, and remanded for further consideration, in light of the enactment of the Protected National Security Documents Act and the certification of the Secretary of Defense. 130 U.S. 777 (2009).

In turn, the Second Circuit vacated my orders and remanded for further proceedings. And thus I'm blessed with another appearance by everyone in this courtroom.

So I've expressed my holdings in the discussions we've had. I hold that Exemption 3 makes clear that an agency need not disclose records that are, by separate qualifying statute,

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specifically exempted from disclosure, and that separate qualifying statute is the Protected National Security Documents Act. I hold that the government has satisfied its burden to support the claimed Exemption 3 from disclosure, and that was the holding of A. Michael's Piano, Inc. v. FTC, which we discussed earlier today, 18 F.3d 138, 143 (2d Cir. 1994), implementing 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(D).

I've expressed my disagreement, as applied to the proceedings before me, of Long v. United States Internal Revenue Service, 742 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1984), and I don't need to elaborate further.

And the Second Circuit held, in A. Michael's Piano, which I previously cited, following the Supreme Court decision in CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, that we look in all statutes to the plain language of the statute and its legislative history in order to determine its legislative purpose. The legislative purpose here was to provide authorizing legislation to support the President's determination that these images should not be disclosed, should be exempt from FOIA.

We saw before the statements in the Congressional record of Senator Lieberman and Senator Graham, who sponsored the bill. There is no legislative history suggesting any further de novo review or any kind of review by the court. The legislative history is not helpful. The language of the statute makes clear what has to be done in terms of qualifying

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for exemption, that is, the certificate of which we spoke before by the Secretary of Defense and the objective criteria of the photographs, 2,000 photographs qualifying by date and by relation to the criteria of the statute. So therefore I hold that the photographs now in question are not subject to disclosure under FOIA.

It seems to me that as a judge, my obligation is to follow the law. We're not involved with the constitutional determination; we're involved with the application of statutory law, where, as here, the Executive branches and the Legislative branches have spoken clearly as to the appropriateness of exempting these photographs. My job as a judge is to follow and not arrogate my own thinking and policy considerations and derogations of the Legislative and Executive branches, which, after all, have the job of making laws that I have to implement and that pertain to the national defense.

Accordingly, the government's sixth motion for partial summary judgment is granted.

Plaintiff's sixth motion for partial summary judgment is denied.

The clerk shall mark the motions, Documents Number 443 and 456, terminated. These are my findings and conclusions.

Thank you very much.

ALL COUNSEL: Thank you, your Honor.