IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF WAYNE FAZLUL SARKAR,

Plaintiff, vs.

Case No. 14-013099-CZ
JOHN and/or JANE DOE,
Defendant.
$\qquad$ /

MOTIONS
HELD BEFORE THE HONORABLE SHEILA ANN GIBSON
COURTROOM 1719
Detroit, Michigan - Thursday, March 19, 2015

APPEARANCES:

NICHOLAS ROUMEL P37056
117 N. Pst Street, Suite 111
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104
Appearing on Behalf of the Plaintiff

NICHOLAS JOLLYMORE
One Rincon Hill
425 First Street
San Francisco, California 94105
Appearing on Behalf of Defendant PubPeer
(Appearances continued)

H. WILLIAM BURDETT, JR. P63185 14950 E. Jefferson Avenue, Suite 200 Grosse Pointe Park, Michigan 48230

Appearing on Behalf of Defendant Doe REPORTED BY: Sherry E. Baker, CSR-1326

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DEFENSE WITNESSES

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Detroit, Michigan
Thursday, March 19, 2015
At About 11:08 a.m.
THE CLERK: This is Case Number 14-013099, Sarkar versus Doe.

THE COURT: Appearances.
MR. BURDETT: Good morning, Your Honor. Bill Burdett on behalf of the John Doe, defendant.

MR. JOLLYMORE: Nicholas Jollymore on behalf of PubPeer.

MR. ROUMEL: Mr. Nicholas Roumel on behalf of the plaintiff, Dr. Sarkar.

THE COURT: Okay. Refresh my memory where we left off.

MR. ROUMEL: Well, we issued a subpoena, Your Honor, and they moved up PubPeer, the nonparty --

THE COURT: I remember that. Remind me where we left off.

MR. ROUMEL: So you asked for the supplemental brief, that one paragraph where we could get the identity of the person who posted that comment. I think it's paragraph 40 C of our Complaint. And you asked for supplemental
briefing which we exchanged.
We also have a Motion to Extend Summons while all of this is being played out. They wanted to extend their summons. That's a separate motion.

THE COURT: Wait a minute. Is that, who was that -- was that noticed up?

MR. ROUMEL: That is just a new one I filed and noticed up for today.
(Off the record)
MR. ROUMEL: We actually filed the stipulation first, but it was rejected because you have to file a motion on that. It's not opposed as far as $I$ know, but that motion is up for today.

Then we have Mr. Burdett on behalf of his John Doe defendant who has a separate Motion for Summary Disposition which is presently scheduled March 31st. Prepared that and signed --

MR. BURDETT: Are we depending on the outcome of this motion because -- I actually have a Motion for -- which Mr. Roumel filed. It may be unnecessary to reach the conclusion of the summary disposition at this time. I withdraw it without prejudice if the Court is inclined to have the, if it Court's order from two weeks ago stands
insofar as there wouldn't be any need to reveal anyone because none of the statements that my client made would be revealed, and there would be no point in moving forward.

THE COURT: Okay. Now who did the motion for re -- 'cause we're sort of going around.

MR. ROUMEL: It probably makes sense for Mr. Jollymore to go first because it is really their Motion to Quash.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. ROUMEL: -- unless you have an objection.

MR. JOLLYMORE: No, that's fine.
THE COURT: Let me get the Motion to Quash. And then do you want to, if we need to then deal with -- was your motion up?

MR. BURDETT: My motion is not up. It's scheduled for March 31st. Mr. Roumel filed his response yesterday. My reply isn't due until next Tuesday, and then we will schedule it sometime in April --

THE COURT: Okay, because you're not available --

MR. BURDETT: On March 31st, I'm going to be in federal trial.

THE COURT: So that may need to be adjourned. And then there is also you said a Motion to Extend Summons, correct?

MR. ROUMEL: Yes. That's up for today.
(Off the record)
THE COURT: I don't have a copy of it.

MR. ROUMEL: The Motion to Extend?
THE COURT: Right, right, and she says she doesn't have a e-praecipe.

MR. ROUMEL: I have it.
THE COURT: Let's just deal with this. Okay. Now where we left, it was relative to -- we entered an order from --

MR. JOLLYMORE: We entered an order
where Your Honor quashed the subpoena for the identities of people who posted comments on Pubpeer.com except for one, I think you asked us to come back.

THE COURT: Okay. And we were going to make a determination as to whether or not that person's identity needs to be disclosed relative to paragraph --
MR. JOLLYMORE: Exactly.

THE COURT: All right.
MR. JOLLYMORE: So what I'd like to do is walk the Court through the language of the statement. I mean I have printed -- it's also in page three of our papers and page two.

THE COURT: Of your, of your --
MR. JOLLYMORE: Of our brief.
THE COURT: The supplemental?
MR. ROUMEL: Supplemental.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. ROUMEL: Find it on page three.
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. JOLLYMORE: So just to go back a little bit, Michigan law tells us that the standard on a motion to quash a subpoena for anonymous speech is you look at the sufficiency of the pleadings.

And what that means in this case is you look at under Rule (C) (8) whether plaintiff has stated a claim by pleading this language; that is, is it defamatory because it is a libel action.

And in order to determine whether it's defamatory, you look at the language. Now the question, the issue of whether a statement is defamatory is a decision for the judge. The judge
doesn't make a factual decision of whether it's true or false, but the judge looks at the language and interprets the language.

It's a question of interpreting language which is why the judges rule as a matter of law 'cause you'll find a large body of precedents saying this is defamatory. This is not defamatory. And we've cited some of those cases here.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. JOLLYMORE: The Court makes that
decision. Now when you look at the language, you will find the simple rule of reason. The question is what would the reasonable reader understand this language to mean?

And you look at the language first, and you can also look at inferences that can reasonably be made from the language, not wild speculation, but reasonable inferences that a reasonable reader would infer in understanding the meaning of this language.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. JOLLYMORE: So this particular comment posted on PubPeer, there is three parts. There is a question. It has an answer. And then
at the bottom, it has a cut and paste of an e-mail from Wayne State University.

So I'd like to go through the language, the reasonable reader standard and talk about what inferences could be made from this language without taking undue time.

So the first part of it is has anybody reported this to the institute. Now that's a question. And if you look at the language, no reasonable reader would understand that to defame Dr. Sarkar. He's not even mentioned.

THE COURT: Okay, but what led into that? What was the this that they were referring to?

MR. JOLLYMORE: If you look at the context in which this statement appeared, there are other posts on PubPeer.com that discuss similarities between images and different research studies that Dr. Sarkar had published.

There was a lot of discussion on PubPeer about why are these images similar. So read in context, the this has to refer to the similarity of images and questions that were raised about that and also Dr. Sarkar because it was his research. So those are reasonable inferences to
make -- (inaudible).
So then there's an answer to this question, and the answer is: On September and October of 2013, the president of Wayne State was informed several times.

On its face, that would not be defamatory, but the inference he made was that the president of Wayne State was informed about these questions about the similarity of images in Dr. Sarkar's research. That's not defamatory either -(inaudible) that issue.

But then let's go down to the cut and pasted paragraph that says the -- paragraph that says thank you for your e-mail. That's the one that raises the issue, that plaintiff raises the issue.

So what that statement does is it addresses an e-mail that was sent to Wayne state. This was a response to an e-mail. We don't know from whom that e-mail was sent, but a reasonable inference probably that it was sent by the person who posted this comment on PubPeer.

And what it says is thank you for your e-mail. We sent it to the appropriate person. So it says the e-mail was sent to someone.

And at the bottom of it, it says, we can't tell you whether this e-mail that contained allegations resulted in an (inaudible).

Now in the middle of it is the sentence that Dr. Sarkar focuses on. It says, "As you are aware, scientific misconduct investigations are by their nature confidential".

So I submit that this language on its face is not defamatory. You need inferences in order --

THE COURT: Well, what about the inference that he committed some scientific misconduct? Because that's what I see. As you're aware, scientific misconduct investigations are by their nature confidential. So that would be inferring that there was some scientific misconduct.

MR. JOLLYMORE: I think that's not a reasonable inference, and I'll tell you why. One is we don't have the e-mail that the poster presumably sent to Wayne state. That's missing. That's not here. PubPeer doesn't have it, I don't believe. Dr. Sarkar doesn't have it.

Wayne State has it. And if we
looked at that e-mail, we could tell if this
commenter made some defamatory allegations, like you're guilty of research misconduct, against Dr. Sarkar.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. JOLLYMORE: May I just say one more thing, Your Honor?

THE COURT: (No response.)
MR. JOLLYMORE: I think a reasonable inference from the beginning of the second sentence in this passage is that whoever was there at Wayne State who referred this e-mail that we don't have to the appropriate person is a person whose job it is to refer e-mails for investigation about whether or not there was scientific misconduct.

And that's the most $I$ think it can reasonably be inferred from this that this person's job is to receive inquiries, and Wayne state encourages them, if you look at the --

THE COURT: Okay, but the fact of the matter remains is that this person saying this is supposed to be confidential, and this person made it public.

MR. JOLLYMORE: Investigations --
THE COURT: As you're aware --
MR. JOLLYMORE: -- but which person
made it public?
THE COURT: Whoever the author of this yes, in September and October, the president of Wayne State was informed several times. The Secretary of the Board of Governors who is also -wrote back, you know. It's like somebody had access to this.

Like I said, this does raise -- to me I would say if this is confidential, this person put it out there. They put it out there to raise some sort of inquiry to the situation. And these things are supposed to be confidential, so he put it out here.

MR. JOLLYMORE: Actually if you look at the website -- we included the link in our papers -- Wayne State encourages people to submit inquiries, and those are not confidential. Please send us stuff about research if you have questions.

What this e-mail says is that whatever was referred here was sent off for a possible investigation of scientific misconduct.
It's not a conclusion. It's not even a statement that there was an allegation in the e-mail of scientific misconduct. It's just a statement of what happened when this e-mail
arrived.
THE COURT: But that would raise my eyebrows when $I$ receive something like this. MR. JOLLYMORE: Well, that's what plaintiff argues, but $I$ don't think it's a reasonable inference. I think that plaintiff should look at this e-mail, should go to wayne State and -- find out if it said this is misconduct, or if it said please look at the similarities between the images 'cause the only reasonable inference you can draw in this language I submit are that similarities were questioned and sent it to Wayne State.

And Wayne State sent it off a determination of whether it's scientific misconduct and said sorry, we can't do anymore about that because it's confidential.

MR. ROUMEL: Thank you, Your Honor. I'd like to do two things. First of all, try to bring us back to what $I$ believe where we, I believe where we are at procedurally, and the second thing is to respond to counsel. Because of the flow, I think $I$ want to respond to counsel first.

The most important thing to say is that Mr. Jollymore may be correct. His inference
is something he is entitled to argue at a trial, but on summary disposition standard, all those inferences must be taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

And the way that that is read, I believe the Court has raised some questions, it can be inferred. I have said, I have informed the president several times.

And then they talk about scientific misconduct investigations are, by their nature, confidential which they're also confidential by law. And Wayne does not deal with comments on whether inquiry into allegations are under way.

And as the court pointed out, this person posted this to a public website. By law, any of those inquiries, you make a good faith allegation of scientific misconduct, it has to be confidential.

So right there, that's where you're talking the defamation. That may support our invasion of privacy count, and so that would entitle us to do that.

But it gets me back to what this motion is really about. We started out, we filed our lawsuit. We subpoenaed PubPeer. We just asked
for identifying information about who these people were. It's discovery.

This person by indicating that they
made several inquiries to Wayne State to the president, it indicated a familiarity with Wayne State. It indicated a familiarity obviously with Dr. Sarkar's research.

This person may very well have knowledge about the person who distributed the fliers at Wayne state. It might not be the same person. It might be.

But here's a person simply in the spirit of discovery who has knowledge. I would be entitled to find out who this person is, to possibly depose this person. And if the person is not a defendant, I don't need to make them a defendant; but they have knowledge about the case, and as such, I'm entitled to depose them.

Now in this protective order under MCR 2.302, they, PubPeer, are entitled to come back and say we want some protection here. Dr. Sarkar is not asking to unmask this person at this point in the litigation.

We are happy to enter into a protective order that protects this person's
identity. We won't publicize it. We won't put it in any court papers. We just want to be able to deal with counsel and depose this person and find out what they want. If they're not a defendant, we don't bring them in.

Having said all that, there are some red flags in that e-mail that indicate that this person might very well be a defendant. But that's what discovery is all about, Your Honor, and that's what a plaintiff is entitled to when you file a lawsuit.

The final thing $I$ do want to say is that there are really two main cases in Michigan on anonymity, and we talked about the last one. To summarize very briefly, we strongly believe this case is governed by the Cooley case, not the Ghanam case.

The main difference is Cooley applies if there is a defendant who is a peer who can assert a motion for summary because a party is the only one that can make a motion for summary. That's why Mr. Burdett is here. He represents the defendant.

Ghanam applies if there is no defendant. The reasoning is that if there is no
defendant who's appeared, somebody should be able to stand in for those anonymous defendants and argue akin to a summary disposition motion.

Here it's not necessary, nor is it really permitted under our interpretation of the Cooley case for PubPeer to argue this summary judgment, summary disposition standards.

All they can do, as Cooley says, is argue for conditions to protect. Cooley says that Michigan Court Rules and the ability of the appearing defendant to argue summary disposition or -- protection.

And so in that spirit, we don't agree that this, that they can argue those summary disposition standards; but even if they can, if you take them in the spirit of all inferences in the plaintiff's favor, and if any meaning that can capably, I believe the standard is it can be capably read to support defamation in any way, then it could possibly be defamatory.

It could also support the intentional interference claim if that person distributed the fliers, and it could also support the invasion of privacy claim.
Again it's discovery -- protection,
and the person may not be a defendant.
MR. JOLLYMORE: May I respond, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.
MR. JOLLYMORE: The standard that counsel says applies is not correct. Yes, indeed, the Court must read the allegations -- Complaint in a way most favorable to the plaintiff.

So we assume the standards are false -- the statements are false; but the rule of construing libel statements is a reasonable reader, not construing the statements that were published most favorably.

The plaintiff must look at the language and make a judgment of what would a reasonable reader understand this to mean. So that's not a correct statement of the law.

Counsel also says that this person obviously has a great familiarity with Wayne State. That's not the conclusion I would make. No.

I would draw the conclusion that whoever sent this e-mail sent it under their name and their title, Secretary of the Board of Governors, Executive Assistant to the President. That's a reasonable assumption, not that someone
because they know the title of someone has an intimate familiarity with Wayne State.

Now counsel says this is civil
discovery. Let us look into this. Indeed it is, but there are special standards when counsel seeks to unmask the identity of an anonymous speaker because the First Amendment comes into play. So it's not just ordinary discovery.

If we're required to produce what information we have and if Mr. Roumel can depose this witness, it sends a signal that anybody who posts a comment on PubPeer is liable to be hauled into court and deposed by plaintiff's counsel.

That under cuts the mission of PubPeer which is to provide a forum where scientists can discuss science.

THE COURT: Okay. I understand, but still above what PubPeer's mission is, there still is the law that has to be adhered to relative to supporting claims for defamation, invasion of privacy and the like. Those legal premises have to be supported above and beyond what PubPeer's -MR. JOLLYMORE: Mission.

THE COURT: -- mission, mission should be.

MR. JOLLYMORE: Yes, but Michigan law tells us how to approach this. The Cooley case and the Ghanam case.

THE COURT: Right.
MR. JOLLYMORE: Now the Cooley case, counsel says, it could only, it applies because the defendant is before the Court. Well, this defendant, this, the person whoever it was that posted this is not one of Mr. Burdett's clients.

THE COURT: I mean does it say this defendant, or does it say a defendant?

MR. JOLLYMORE: Well, in Cooley, there was only one defendant, and that defendant was before the Court. And in fact, the identity of that defendant had been disclosed inadvertently by the website.

So the only obvious remedy was a protective (inaudible). And it didn't matter if he disclosed the identity of the Doe number one in that case to the plaintiff's counsel because that counsel already had it.

So issuing a protective order saying don't spread it any further is okay in that case, and that's what the Court said.

The Court also remanded it for
reconsideration of the alternative Motion to Quash the Subpoena which in this case where there's no counsel other than PubPeer's counsel representing the poster of this one. In this case, Cooley really doesn't apply. The facts are most closer to Ghanam. In Ghanam, the poster of the comment, was not -- and the Court said, what you do -- in fact, Cooley said this, too.

You look at the standard, to get back to Your Honor's comment, the standard of how we determine what the elements of civil discovery should be is a motion under $2.116(C)(8) . \quad$ The standards are summary disposition --

THE COURT: Okay --
MR. JOLLYMORE: Not that there's a summary disposition motion made --

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. JOLLYMORE: -- but if you look at that rule to determine the standards.

THE COURT: Okay, and then that takes us back to one, looking at the language, the rules of reason and what reasonable inferences could be drawn, correct?

MR. JOLLYMORE: Indeed, yes.

THE COURT: So that's where we are. That's the standard that we have to look to.

MR. JOLLYMORE: It is.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. JOLLYMORE: NOW I mean there is other arguments that counsel has raised, a couple of which I'd like to address.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. JOLLYMORE: The issue of
clients, now --
THE COURT: But you know, I don't think I'm at the client.

MR. JOLLYMORE: Pardon me.
THE COURT: I'm not even at the client. I'm not there. I'm here with the language that's set forth on the website. I don't even want to get to the flyer because the flyer isn't really germane in my mind to the motion that we have.

MR. JOLLYMORE: So all $I$ can say is we have to be very careful that the inferences we make from this language don't even mention Dr. Sarkar.

And the only context that it appears in this discussion of generals and similarity is no special scientific misconduct anywhere in these
posts that making an inference that says just because Wayne State has a procedure for investigating scientific misconduct --

THE COURT: Well, someone asked the first writer that you cited on page three, the June 18th one indicates has anybody reported because I'm sure there was a discussion that there was some discrepancies above.

And you know, I'm just dealing with
what you gave me, but I'm sure you said there was some discussion about the images and the similarity of the images and not --

MR. JOLLYMORE: Yes -- full context
of --
THE COURT: Right, and not knowing, you know, not being, this outside of my lane, as I usually say. All I can see is that there was a discussion, and someone questioned the validity of Dr. Sarkar's study. That's what it appears. MR. JOLLYMORE: But look at the Michigan case law. Ghanam itself says the statement that I think I have to turn this over to the investigators, that's not defamatory. THE COURT: No, I'm -MR. JOLLYMORE: There is another

Michigan state case appellate decision that says the statement in effect, I'm here to investigate. It's not defamatory.

So if they're questioning something about Dr. Sarkar's work and send it to Wayne State, all they're doing is asking for an investigation. THE COURT: Oh, yeah, but see, you know --

MR. JOLLYMORE: By case law, that's not defamatory.

THE COURT: But the fact of the matter remains is that, even though we're looking at the summary disposition standard here, we're still dealing with a discovery request. This is a discovery request.

MR. JOLLYMORE: Yes, but special standards apply to this particular --

THE COURT: And I think, that's what I'm saying is that we are relying on, as you indicated, the summary disposition standard.

MR. JOLLYMORE: One more thing. The Ghanam case that we should be guided by, although they are both Eirst Amendment decisions, the court said you both grew. Beyond that, you challenge the interests involved. The interest, the First

Amendment interest of protecting anonymous speakers from retaliation or injury to their professional career versus the interest in finding out whether -- (inaudible; papers shuffling). And it's a weighty interest versus a not very significant.

So if you follow the law which is
Ghanam and you look at the summary disposition standard which leads you to look at whether this is defamatory and apply the reasonable reader test and then you balance, further balance the First Amendment interests against the importance of discovery.

I have to say just turning over what identifying information that PubPeer has to Dr. Sarkar's counsel -- even if he says, okay, I won't tell anybody, all I want to do is depose the guy, has a very serious, chilling effect on the kind of speech that has made PubPeer a website that scientists are basically flocking to.

THE COURT: Mr. Roumel.
MR. ROUMEL: Yes, I can respond.
There is language in Ghanam that says, specifically says no. When there is a defendant who can argue the summary judgment, the summary disposition standards, Cooley applies, not our case, Ghanam.

And I put that language --
THE COURT: When there is a
defendant?
MR. ROUMEL: I think the -- draw
distinction about the number of defendants. I don't think it mattered because the reasoning behind the case was there's going to be a defendant to argue the summary disposition.

And that's why you don't need to argue summary disposition where this defendant, Mr. Burdett's, motion is up later, but we're arguing this motion alternatively.

We're saying even if you do apply those standards that we still should prevail because those inferences have to be drawn.

And it's not a rule of reason in
Michigan. The Robbins (pht.) case says that the standard is sufficient. Any meaning is capable of defamatory meaning.

Once you look at the pleadings,
accept all the pleadings as -- take all inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Any capable meaning that's defamatory, at this stage in the proceedings has to be accepted. So Cooley said kind of style it then as a protective order under 2.302 .

Let's take an analogy. Let's say the person posted and said, I saw this shooting downtown. And $I$ saw this and that. I might want to depose that person 'cause they're a witness because they know about that shooting.

Now maybe that person knows more than they're letting on, what they posted. And maybe as they investigate further, I'll find that person might be worth bringing some sort of complaint or action against.

But for now, this person has shown I have knowledge. I have made several complaints to the president of Wayne State. And by the nature of the response, they're saying allegations of scientific misconduct are taken very seriously.

The inference from that is that the person has made an allegation of scientific misconduct. The person has posted this on a public website, and we know from federal regulations that I quoted in my brief that they're just supposed to be private.

And so that person in and of itself might be liable for invasion of privacy. And under that basis, the defendant equally put defamation aside.

So we're asking for something very
narrow. We want the identity of this person. We want to keep this person's confidentiality. We are not interested in exposing them, but there's one thing.

If the Court would allow me to sort of make a conclusion about the first amendment. It is kind of ironic there. Thank you 'cause I know the court probably -- but here's the thing.

The law protects public employees who -- from being fired in their job. That's what our firm does. Our firm is an employment law firm. We do this all the time. A public employee raises First Amendment protected speech, and they're retaliated against, the law protects them. They can't be fired.

PubPeer says right on their website the reason we're anonymous is because we are afraid for our jobs. But if they really believe that the First Amendment protects their speech, then they need to put their name out there and have the courage to go forward and say I can't be fired for what I'm saying because the First Amendment protects it.

But by their act of not identifying
themselves, they know deep in their hearts that the First Amendment doesn't protect. It doesn't protect them here. We are entitled to discovery. MR. BURDETT: Your Honor, I have to make one quick comment. First of all, I do not represent, I have only filed an appearance with regard to 14 statements. Paragraph $40 C$ that is at issue today is not one $I$ represent. I'm not here to argue it on behalf for anyone that made that comment. I have not been retained to do that.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. BURDETT: So therefore is there is no one standing up for whoever the John Doe defendant is in that instance other than PubPeer.

I would also have to respond to Mr. Roumel's comments about the issue of anonymity. The Federalist Papers were anonymous. There is a long history. All of Thomas Paine's papers criticizing the king were anonymous because there is a fear of extrajudicial response and retaliation.

And the idea that somehow someone might not be able to be fired when there is something like this, it is just, it shocks me that Mr. Roumel would have that opinion about the First

Amendment because it is no where to be found in the history of the Constitution at all.

We endorse anonymous speech in this country. We allow it to move forward. That is the subject of my Motion for Summary Disposition, but I couldn't let that comment go by.

MR. JOLIYMORE: May I make two
points in response to Mr. Roumel, please?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. JOLLYMORE: One is the Robbins
case may say, although I didn't find it very clear, that any defamatory meaning may be considered. But even so, you have to determine whether the meaning is defamatory. You have to look at the words. You have to look at reasonable inferences.

Let me address privacy. Dr.
Sarkar's counsel makes a lot of comments about investigations being private. That's right. People at Wayne State cannot publicize their investigations.

But if $I$ can say anything I please about somebody's scientific misconduct, if $I$ post it on Pubpeer.com, I'm not violating any confidentiality issues -- I mean privacy issues. I'm not bound -- I'm not an investigator for Wayne

State. And I'm entitled, as all of us are, to speak my mind. If I were an investigator that might be different.

And at any rate, the law of privacy says if it's already public, then it's not private anymore. Well, this commenter, if this commenter says anything that was an invasion of privacy here, which I don't see, but maybe you can reach it by inference, it's already been posted by PubPeer by many other comments.

THE COURT: Well, no. I'm talking about I'm really looking at the paragraph that's in quotes. Are you saying someone else printed and published this e-mail from the Secretary of the Board of Governors?

MR. JOLLYMORE: No. It appears that the commenter --

THE COURT: Because --
MR. JOLLYMORE: -- commenter.
THE COURT: Yeah, because it says they wrote back. So you know, the inference is there that whoever, you know, and you know, it might be an improper inference, but it appears that whoever, you know, is commenting in this chain here has something to do with submitting the information
to the Wayne State Board of Governors.
MR. JOLLYMORE: Let's assume that's true, and that's a -- inference, but it's not a reasonable inference to infer what was referred.

THE COURT: Scientific, something about scientific misconduct.

MR. JOLLYMORE: Not really. We don't know it was referred.

THE COURT: Okay. So that's a question of fact.

MR. JOLLYMORE: No, it isn't.
THE COURT: You indicated that it's the Court's duty to look at it, and the Judge interprets the language to determine whether or not there is, it's defamatory. And what the court does do is take the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.

And there could be an inference drawn that there is an attempt to defame Dr. Sarkar by putting this information out there because of the person from wayne in writing back say if you understand that scientific misconduct investigation by their nature are confidential, but yet and still, this individual publishes the information that they got from Wayne State University alluding
to the fact that there was something that was inappropriate in Dr．Sarkar＇s studies，whatever． And we subsequently know at this point in time that $\operatorname{Dr}$ ．Sarkar had multiple job opportunities that were sort of squelched as a result of a series of events．And this was one of those in the chain of the series of events．

And what＇s being attempted to，I＇m sorry，to be done by Mr．Roumel．I said Nicholas first，but excuse me for that，using your first name－－

MR．ROUMEL：That＇s fine，Your
Honor．
THE COURT：But for Mr．Roumel making the request is to be able to further his discovery in the case in chief which this is just one aspect of．

And really taking the evidence in
light most favorable to the non－moving party，the Court feels that there is the inference can be drawn，a reasonable person，like I say，I＇m a judicial person，an attorney，and the fact remains if you＇re looking at lay person＇s，their level of understanding of a subject matter would be at a lower level．

So the Court finds that there would be a reasonable inference, not a legal, even from a legal perspective, the Court sees that from a reasonable inference, there could be an inference, a reasonable reason that there could be a reasonable inference that there was -- I don't want to say inference again, but there could be an inference that this was of a nature to attempt to defame Dr. Sarkar.

So taking evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the Court finds that this, based upon the three criteria that were set forth by Ms. -- that this could be a situation that deemed inflammatory nature. That being said the Court would order that, not that, that the information be released to Mr. Roumel.

And the Court will further note that there will be a protective order put in place relative to this statement. And I know that, Mr. Burdett, this really doesn't have a bearing on you, but we need to deal with getting you a new date for your --

MR. BURDETT: Well, Your Honor, if you wanted to --

MR. JOLLYMORE: I'd like to just add
one comment. When we were here on March 5, Your Honor talked about disclosing information in camera.

THE COURT: Right.
MR. JOLLYMORE: I'd like you to consider, please, that we disclose what identifying information PubPeer has, and it isn't much. It's one IP address --

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. JOLLYMORE: -- to Your Honor ex parte for consideration.
the Court: Okay.
MR. JOLLYMORE: -- of whether the order should really go that far.

THE COURT: Okay. So what we'll do is we'll say the Court will do an in camera inspection and then make a determination what, if any, protective order needs to be put in place.

MR. JOLLYMORE: All right.
MR. ROUMEL: Right. And I'm assuming pursuant to the Court's order that that IP address will be turned over to us and whatever the protective order says that we can or can't do with that information.

THE COURT: Right. So what we want
to do, we've got to take -- there's a step prior to the protective order. We have to have that presented to the Court for in-camera inspection and --

MR. ROUMEL: But it's just an IP address, right?

MR. JOLLYMORE: That's it.
MR. ROUMEL: It's just a series of numbers. So why don't we just turn it over to counsel with protective order in place?

MR. JOLLYMORE: Because --
THE COURT: Tell me what your desire is.

MR. JOLLYMORE: Our desire is meet with Your Honor and talk about what an IP address means, what information can we obtain from it and how hard it is and whether or not it makes sense to give it to Dr. Sarkar under protective order as opposed to just quashing the subpoena.

We'd like the opportunity that Your Honor set out before to do an in camera review. THE COURT: Okay. We'll take baby steps. We'll take baby steps.

MR. JOLLYMORE: Whatever the Court decides, Your Honor.

THE COURT: We'll have an in camera inspection.

MR. ROUMEL: Couldn't we do that right now since it's just a short amount of numbers?

MR. JOLLYMORE: I'm not prepared to do that. I don't have the IP address.

MR. ROUMEL: Okay. Next time we're in court we can do it.

THE COURT: Which is?
MR. ROUMEL: We've got to set that date for Mr. Burdett's motion.

THE COURT: Do you want to wait that long? You said you had an issue.

MR. ROUMEL: Does anybody object to me presenting this motion to present summons? I have an order prepared.

MR. JOLLYMORE: How long are you --
MR. ROUMEL: I am asking for the
years. You didn't object before.
MR. JOLLYMORE: -- a year.
MR. ROUMEL: But you didn't--
THE COURT: To extend summons? You
said to extend --
MR. ROUMEL: The point is we've been
here for several months trying to determine who the defendants have been. So we've been hung up on our 90 days.

THE COURT: Okay, because I only
usually extend summons 60 days.
MR. ROUMEL: Can we extend it 60
days from today?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. ROUMEL: I'll prepare an order to be sent.

THE COURT: Yes.
MR. BURDETT: Your Honor, the order entered on March 8th quashing the subpoena there really isn't any need for my Motion for Summary Disposition because of the fact that there is no risk of my client being revealed through the subpoena process.

I don't want to necessarily burden the Court with it; although, I'd love to come back and argue it. I think if we withdrew it without prejudice --

THE COURT: Without prejudice, that's fine.

MR. BURDETT: Mr. Roumel has a Motion for Reconsideration for that March 8 th order
up, depending on the outcome of that, we would revisit the need for summary disposition at that time.

THE COURT: Okay. So at this point in time, you're indicating you will withdraw?

MR. BURDETT: Yes, it is withdrawn without prejudice.

THE COURT: Without prejudice.
MR. ROUMEL: Is there any dispute that Mr. Burdett's appeared in the action regarding the defendant?

MR. BURDETT: I don't think there is any dispute that I appeared. I'm standing here.

MR. ROUMEL: So is there any reason why I cannot depose your client?

MR. BURDETT: You cannot depose my client. He's in office.

THE COURT: That is a separate
issue.
MR. ROUMEL: (Inaudible).
MR. BURDETT: If you have some information that you want to disclose, you know, but I do not believe that there is any information on the record that would identify my client. At this point, I'm not disclosing it.

MR. ROUMEL: The point is officially withdrawing the motion, so we don't need to come back for that.

THE COURT: Correct. And what I was saying, so we won't be coming --
(Off the record)
THE COURT: Okay. So we're back on the record. The 24 th at 11 o'clock we'll convene for one, the Court to have an ex parte inspection of whatever it is Mr. Roumel presents.

Eollowing that, based upon what we have, we'll make the determination at that time whether or not there needs to be a protective order and what will be included.

MR. JOLLYMORE: I think that actually may be helpful because we may be able to do a better job of outlining what steps we would take once we have an IP address and go through those steps to show what protections --

THE COURT: And you need to be prepared to fully discuss that so that we can walk away with proposed order that will be presented to the Court.

MR. ROUMEL: Understood, Your Honor. THE COURT: Is there anything else,

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MR. ROUMEL: No.
THE COURT: We'll look for the order. Thank you.
(At 11:56 a.m., proceedings
concluded.)

        gentlemen?
    4 order. Thank you.
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DATED: This 27th day of April, 2015.

