



PRACTICE ADVISORY: *DAMUS V. NIELSEN* PAROLE OF ARRIVING ASYLUM SEEKERS WHO HAVE PASSED CREDIBLE FEAR

Updated as of July 30, 2018

I. Introduction

On July 2, 2018, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia issued an [order](#) in *Damus v. Nielsen*, No. 18–578 (JEB), 2018 WL 3232515 (D.D.C. July 2, 2018), a class action lawsuit challenging the Department of Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) policy of detaining asylum seekers without considering their suitability for release on parole. The Court provisionally certified a class of arriving asylum-seekers found to have a credible fear of persecution or torture who are detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) after having been denied parole under the authority of the following five ICE Field Offices: **Detroit, El Paso, Los Angeles, Newark, and Philadelphia.**¹ The Court entered a preliminary injunction directed at the five ICE Field Offices (1) requiring them to follow the [2009 ICE Parole Directive](#); (2) prohibiting them from detaining class members absent an individualized determination that they present a flight risk or danger to the community; and (3) prohibiting them from denying parole based on categorical criteria applicable to all class members.

This advisory provides a summary of the decision and order and the timeline for DHS to provide new parole redeterminations to class members. The decision, order, ICE Parole Directive, and a sample parole request also are attached. At this time, it is unclear whether the government will seek a stay of the injunction pending any appeal. However, until such time as a stay is granted, DHS must administer parole determinations as set out in the order.

We will update this advisory as circumstances change. In the meantime, we are interested to hear how the Court’s decision is impacting DHS custody determinations. Please contact **Michael K.T. Tan and Stephen B. Kang of the [ACLU Immigrants’ Rights Project](#) (mtan@aclu.org; skang@aclu.org)** if you have any questions about the ruling or require technical assistance.² *If you believe that one of the five ICE Field*

¹ A list of DHS facilities that are covered by the five ICE Field Offices is included at the end of the advisory.

² This advisory is not a substitute for independent legal advice by a lawyer who is familiar with an individual’s case.

Offices is not complying with the Damus injunction, please contact the ACLU immediately.

The *Damus* class is represented by the ACLU, the [Center for Gender and Refugee Studies](#), [Human Rights First](#), and Covington & Burling LLP.

If you are a *Damus* class member, you can contact class counsel by emailing damusparole@aclu.org or by writing us at:

ACLU Immigrants' Rights Project
c/o Class Counsel for *Damus v. Nielsen*
125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
New York, NY 10004

II. Background

Under the immigration statute, a person who is subjected to expedited removal who requests asylum at a port of entry to the United States is entitled to an interview with an asylum officer, where the individual must demonstrate a “credible fear of persecution or torture” in his or her home country.³ If an individual establishes a credible fear, they are entitled to a hearing before an immigration judge to adjudicate the asylum claim.⁴ It typically takes several months before an asylum seeker who has passed credible fear receives a final decision on their asylum claim; it can take more than a year or even several years if there are appeals to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) or a federal court of appeals.

Pursuant to the statute and regulations, asylum seekers who do not pose a flight risk or a danger to the community may be paroled by DHS during the pendency of their immigration cases on a “case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.”⁵

In 2009, DHS issued a policy directive titled “Parole of Arriving Aliens Found to Have a Credible Fear of Persecution or Torture” (the “Parole Directive”) that defines the circumstances in which there is a “significant public benefit” to granting parole. The Parole Directive provides that, absent exceptional overriding factors, an asylum seeker who has established a credible fear of persecution should be granted parole in the “public interest” and released from detention while pursuing his or her asylum claims if the individual (a) establishes his or her identity to the satisfaction of DHS; and (b) presents neither a flight risk nor danger to the community. Parole Directive ¶ 6.2.

The Directive also sets forth several procedural requirements on the adjudication of parole. These include that the agency must:

³ 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v).

⁴ *See id.* § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(f).

⁵ 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(c).

- Provide arriving noncitizens with notice of their right to seek parole, which “shall be explained . . . in a language they understand,” “as soon as practicable” following the credible fear determination, *id.* ¶ 6.1;
- *Automatically* conduct a parole interview within “seven days following a finding that an arriving [noncitizen] has a credible fear,” unless an “additional reasonable period of time is necessary”—*regardless* of whether the individual submits a request for release on parole, *id.* ¶ 8.2;
- Provide written notification of the parole decision that contains “a brief explanation of the reasons for any decision to deny parole” within seven days of the interview, “absent reasonable justification for delay,” along with “reasonable access to translation or interpreter services,” *id.* ¶ 6.5-6.6;
- Notify applicants whose applications are denied that they may request a redetermination based on changed circumstances or additional evidence relevant to identity, flight risk, or danger, *id.* § 8.2;
- “Review all relevant documentation offered” by the asylum seeker, as well as “any other information available,” in determining identity, *id.* ¶ 8.3.1.b;
- “[C]onsider whether setting a reasonable bond and/or” an alternative to detention program would mitigate any flight risk concerns, *id.* ¶ 8.3.2.c; and
- Engage in supervisory review of individual officers’ decisions, *id.* ¶ 8.5-8.6.

The Parole Directive remains in effect. In February 2017, then-DHS Secretary John Kelly stated that the Parole Directive “remain[s] in full force and effect” pending the DHS Secretary’s “further review and evaluation.”⁶ The government also represented to the U.S. Supreme Court later that year that the Parole Directive remains “in ‘full force and effect,’” and emphasized that the Parole Directive generally requires DHS “to release the alien if he establishes his identity [and] demonstrates that he is not a flight risk or danger,” and requires an individualized analysis that “calls for far more than checking a box on a form.”⁷

Nevertheless, DHS has, since the Trump administration took office last year, implemented a de facto policy of denying parole in virtually all cases at its Detroit, El Paso, Los Angeles, Newark, and Philadelphia Field Offices (“the ICE Field Offices”). Altogether, these ICE Field Offices detain approximately 24 percent of ICE’s total average daily detention population. ICE data show that between February and September

⁶ [Memorandum from John Kelly](#), DHS Secretary, Implementing the President’s Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvement Policies, at 9-10 (Feb. 20, 2017).

⁷ [Pet. Suppl. Reply Br.](#), *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, No. 15-1204, at 6-7 (U.S. filed Feb. 21, 2017) (quoting Kelly Memorandum at 10).

2017, Detroit officers denied parole in 98 percent of cases; El Paso denied 100 percent of cases; Los Angeles denied 92 percent; Newark denied 100 percent; and Philadelphia denied 100 percent of cases.⁸ As a result, many asylum seekers who clearly satisfy the Parole Directive’s criteria for release have been denied parole. This is a dramatic change from ICE’s past practice pursuant to the Parole Directive. Between 2011 and 2013, the ICE Field Offices granted parole to 92 percent of arriving asylum seekers pursuant to the Directive.⁹

In March 2018, nine asylum seekers detained in the five ICE Field Offices filed a class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia challenging the change in policy, and sought relief for themselves and others. They raised three claims: that the administration had violated the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) in failing to follow and/or de facto rescinding the 2009 Parole Directive; that the administration had adopted a blanket no-parole policy in order to deter asylum seekers from traveling to the United States, in violation of the immigration statute and the Constitution’s guarantee of due process; and that the administration had failed to provide them an individualized determination that detention was warranted by flight risk or danger, also in violation of the statute and due process.

III. What did the District Court do in *Damus v. Nielsen*?

In its order, Court both provisionally certified a class and granted a preliminary injunction against the change in parole policy.

The Court defined the class as

arriving asylum-seekers who are found to have a credible fear of persecution or torture and who are or will be detained by ICE after having been denied parole under the authority of the five ICE Field Offices.

Memorandum at 13, 2018 WL 3232515 at *7. The Court then entered a preliminary injunction that:

- Prohibits DHS “from denying parole to any provisional class members absent an individualized determination, through the parole process, that such provisional class member presents a flight risk or a danger to the community,” Order ¶ 3;
- Specifies that the “individualized determinations of flight risk and danger to the community referenced above shall be based on the specific facts of each

⁸ See Memorandum at 31, 2018 WL 3232515 at *15.

⁹ See *id.*

provisional class member's case" and "shall not be based on categorical criteria applicable to all provisional class members," Order ¶ 4;¹⁰ and

- Directs DHS to "provide provisional class members with parole determinations that conform to all of the substantive and procedural requirements of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Directive No. 11002.1, Parole of Arriving Aliens Found to Have a Credible Fear of Persecution or Torture (Dec. 8, 2009)." Order ¶ 5.

The Court found that Plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their claim that DHS had violated the APA by failing to follow the 2009 Parole Directive. Memorandum at 24-36, 2018 WL 3232515 at *11-17. The Court held that the agency was bound by the Directive, and that evidence of near complete parole denials in the five field offices demonstrated an impermissible departure from the Directive. The Court did not reach Plaintiffs' statutory or due process claims.

IV. What does the District Court's decision mean for me or my clients?

The following individuals are covered by the Order:

- Arriving asylum seekers with a credible fear of persecution who are currently detained by one of the five ICE Field Offices and making an *initial* request for release on parole;
- Arriving asylum seekers with a credible fear of persecution who were *denied* release on parole prior to July 3, 2018 and are currently detained by one of the five ICE Field Offices; and
- Arriving asylum seekers with a credible fear of persecution who were *denied* release on parole by one of the five ICE Field Offices prior to July 3, 2018, but were subsequently *transferred* and are currently detained outside the five ICE Field Offices.

¹⁰ In its Memorandum Opinion, the Court specifically prohibited DHS from denying parole based on categorical and non-individualized criteria, such as the fact that an asylum seeker is a "recent entrant." See Memorandum at 35, 2018 WL 3232515 at *16 (concluding that the denial of parole based on a finding that a plaintiff "was a recent entrant and thus presented a flight risk is contrary to the very concept of giving each applicant an 'individualized determination,' as 'recent entry' is a categorical characteristic of most, if not all, asylum-seekers" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). The Court also criticized DHS' use of "summary" and "boilerplate" parole denials for failing to demonstrate individualized reviews and compliance with the Parole Directive. See *id.*

- Arriving asylum seekers who were initially detained in a jurisdiction outside the five ICE Field Offices, but were subsequently *transferred* to one of the five ICE Field Offices and were *denied* parole by ICE prior to July 3, 2018.

Note that the asylum seekers remain eligible to apply for parole so long as they have not received a final order of removal that the government may execute.

If you were denied parole after July 3, 2018, you may still request reconsideration of the parole denial based on changed circumstances or additional evidence relevant to identity, flight risk, or danger. Parole Directive ¶ 8.2

As a result of the Order:

- The five ICE Field Offices should make parole decisions based on individualized flight risk and danger, in accordance with the substantive and procedural requirements of the Parole Directive.
- Unless asylum seekers individually pose a danger or flight risk that requires their detention, or fail to establish their identity, ICE should order their release on their own recognizance, a reasonable bond, or other conditions of supervision. *See* Parole Directive ¶¶ 6.2, 8.3.2.c.
- DHS should provide new parole determinations to all class members who were previously denied release. Although DHS is required under the injunction to provide these new parole reviews automatically, we advise detainees and their advocates to file a request for a new DHS parole determination with accompanying evidence to help ensure that their custody is reassessed under the proper standard and procedures—i.e., based on an individualized determination of flight risk and danger.

The government has not yet indicated whether it intends to appeal and seek a stay of the district court’s decision. But for the time being, the Court’s order is in effect and detainees should receive parole determinations pursuant to the Order’s requirements.

V. What effect does the *Damus* injunction have on detained asylum seekers who were not denied release on parole by one of the ICE Field Offices?

The *Damus* injunction applies only to the five ICE Field Offices who were named in the lawsuit. However, *Damus* provides strong persuasive authority that the Parole Directive is binding on DHS, and that DHS must follow the substantive and procedural requirements of the Directive when deciding parole requests. Indeed, other district courts have reached the same conclusion.¹¹ If your or your client’s parole application is pending

¹¹ *See Abdi v. Duke*, 280 F. Supp. 3d 373 (W.D.N.Y. 2017) (preliminary injunction requiring that DHS follow the Parole Directive in the ICE Buffalo Field Office); *Aracely R. v. Nielsen*, No.: 17-1976, 2018 WL 3243977 (D.D.C. July 3, 2018) (same, for individual asylum seekers detained in Texas).

or has recently been denied, you might consider supplementing the request with citation to the Court’s decision in *Damus* or requesting reconsideration based on the decision.

VI. What should I do to obtain a parole review pursuant to *Damus v. Nielsen*?

If you or your client was previously denied parole by one of the five ICE Field Offices, ICE should afford you a new parole determination pursuant to the preliminary injunction’s terms. The timeline for the government to provide these redeterminations is explained below. But if you are ready to go forward now and present a request for a new parole determination pursuant to the Order’s requirements, you should go ahead and do so.

If you or your client is applying for parole from one of the five ICE Field Offices for the first time, then your process for obtaining parole should follow the requirements of the Parole Directive itself. This means that “as soon as practicable” after a positive credible fear finding, the noncitizen should receive a “Parole Advisal and Scheduling Notification” that includes a date and time for the parole interview by an ICE officer. Parole Directive ¶ 8.1. The noncitizen should receive a parole interview by an ICE officer within seven days after a positive credible fear finding, unless “an additional reasonable period of time is necessary.” *Id.* ¶ 8.2. The noncitizen should receive a written parole decision within seven days of the interview, unless there is a “reasonable justification for delay.” *Id.* ¶ 6.6.

VII. What is the timeline for the government to provide parole redeterminations?

The Court has set a timeline for the government to provide parole redeterminations that meet the requirements of the injunction.¹²

- The deadline for the government to provide parole advisals to **all** the class members is **August 14, 2018**.
- The government will provide parole advisals to class members on a staggered basis. “[A]bsent compelling reason”:
 - Approximately **one third** of the advisals must be provided by **July 31, 2018**.
 - The **second third** must be provided by **August 7, 2018**.
 - The **final third** must be provided by **August 14, 2018**.

¹² See Minute Order, *Damus v. Nielsen*, No. 1:18-cv-00578-JEB (D.D.C. July 24, 2018).

- **Parole interviews** shall occur **within seven days** of the advisal unless the class member requests more time to prepare, or an exception in the Parole Directive applies.
- **Parole determinations** shall be made **within seven days** of the interview unless an exception in the Parole Directive applies.

VIII. How should I submit a parole request?

The Parole Directive contains detailed information about how the parole process works, as well as what evidence ICE should consider when examining a parole request. You should compile as much evidence as possible to support your or your client's parole request.

The key elements are:

- (1) proving your or your client's **identity**, either through government-issued documents, sworn testimony, or other evidence;
- (2) showing that you or your client is **not a flight risk**, meaning that you or your client will show up for immigration court, have a stable address, have an employment history, etc.;
- (3) showing that you or your client is **not a danger to the community**, or that you or your client have rehabilitated from any previous criminal or harmful behavior.

See id. ¶ 8.3.

Evidence to submit with your parole request could include:

- letters from friends and family in the United States about why you or your client is a good and reliable person who will show up for court and not commit crimes if released;
- documents or letters that show your or your client's name and prove who they are;
- documents or letters that show your or your client's sponsor's name and who they are;
- documents that show you or your client and your sponsor have worked or paid taxes;
- or any other documents that show you or your client will show up for court and will not commit crimes if released.

Attached to this advisory is a sample parole application. For additional information on how to prepare a parole application, please see CLINIC, [Practitioner's Guide: Obtaining Release from Immigration Detention](#) (May 2018).

IX. List of Detention Centers Covered By the Five ICE Field Offices

Detroit Field Office

- Michigan facilities: Calhoun County Correctional Center, Chippewa County Jail, Monroe County Jail, St. Clair County Jail
- Ohio facilities: Butler County Correctional Complex, Morrow County Correctional Facility, Seneca County Jail, Geauga County Safety Center

El Paso Field Office

- New Mexico facilities: Cibola County Correctional Center, Otero County Prison Facility, and Otero County Processing Center
- Texas facilities: El Paso Processing Center, FSL La Tuna, West Texas Detention Center (“Sierra Blanca”)

Los Angeles Field Office:

- Adelanto ICE Processing Center, James A. Musick Facility, Theo Lacy Facility

Newark Field Office:

- Elizabeth Contract Detention Facility, Essex County Correctional Facility, Hudson County Correctional Facility

Philadelphia Field Office:

- Abraxas Youth Center, Berks Family Residential Center, Cambria County Prison, Clinton County Correctional Facility, Pike County Correctional Facility, York County Prison

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**

ANSLY DAMUS, *et al.*,

Plaintiffs,

v.

**KIRSTJEN NIELSEN, Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security, *et al.*,**

Defendants.

Civil Action No. 18-578 (JEB)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

As the events of recent months make clear, the question of how this nation will treat those who come to our shores seeking refuge generates enormous debate. While arriving foreigners may have myriad reasons for wanting to settle in the United States, a subset claims a fear of persecution in their native lands. They seek asylum here. Since 2009, the detention of those asylum-seekers has, in part, been governed by a set of principles and procedures set forth in a “Parole Directive” issued by Immigration and Customs Enforcement, a component of the Department of Homeland Security. This document establishes the process by which ICE must determine whether an individual who has passed a credible-fear interview – the first step toward gaining asylum status – will be released from detention on parole pending a full hearing.

Plaintiffs (and other members of the class they seek to represent) are noncitizens being held at five ICE Field Offices who have received a credible-fear determination but have been denied parole. Although, in the past, individuals deemed to have a “credible fear” of persecution and thus a significant possibility of being granted asylum were overwhelmingly released, Plaintiffs contend that there is a new reality in place. Pointing to the fact that parole rates have

plummeted from over 90% to nearly zero, as well as to testimony from detained asylum-seekers and their counsel, they assert that the Government is no longer following its own Parole Directive. Plaintiffs allege that, rather than providing individualized determinations and procedural safeguards, DHS is now engaging in systematic detention.

Seeking the protections spelled out in the Directive, Plaintiffs have now turned to the courts. They filed suit in March of this year against DHS Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen, as well as Thomas Homan, the Acting Director of ICE, U.S. Attorney General Jefferson B. Sessions, and the directors of the five ICE Field Offices. Their Complaint alleges that Plaintiffs have been denied parole in violation of the ICE Directive, and that the Government has thereby violated the Administrative Procedure Act, the Immigration and Nationality Act, and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Defendants have now moved to dismiss, contending that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the various counts and that Plaintiffs have failed to state a viable claim for relief. The asylum-seekers both oppose dismissal and request a preliminary injunction requiring DHS to comply with the Parole Directive and to provide individualized parole determinations while this suit is pending.

Finding that the circumstances here merit that extraordinary form of relief, the Court will grant Plaintiffs' Motion. In so doing, this Opinion does no more than hold the Government accountable to its own policy, which recently has been honored more in the breach than the observance. Having extended the safeguards of the Parole Directive to asylum-seekers, ICE must now ensure that such protections are realized.

I. Background

A. Statutory and Regulatory Framework

Plaintiffs in this case are detained pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). This statute provides that if a noncitizen “who is arriving in the United States” demonstrates an intention to apply for asylum or expresses a fear of persecution or torture, he is referred for an interview to determine whether the fear is credible. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). If the interviewing officer determines this to be the case, the INA provides that the individual “shall be detained for further consideration of the application for asylum,” which includes a full asylum hearing before an immigration court and, if unsuccessful, an administrative appeal with the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). See 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(f); 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). This detention requirement is not, however, entirely inflexible. Instead, an individual detained under § 1225(b) can be paroled “into the United States temporarily” pursuant to the discretion of the Attorney General. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). According to agency regulations, the Secretary of Homeland Security “may invoke” this parole authority for individuals who are “neither a security risk nor a risk of absconding,” and who meet one or more of a series of conditions – namely, “for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” Id.; 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b).

It is this last factor – “public benefit” – that is the focus of the 2009 Directive, “Parole of Arriving Aliens Found to Have a Credible Fear of Persecution or Torture,” issued by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE Directive” or “Parole Directive”). See ECF No. 22-1 (ICE Directive 11002.1). The Directive explains the agency’s interpretation of “public benefit” for the purposes of determining parole and sets out a number of procedural requirements for assessing asylum-seekers’ eligibility for release. On a broad level, the Directive states that

“[e]ach alien’s eligibility for parole should be considered and analyzed on its own merits and based on the facts of the individual alien’s case,” and that if an asylum-seeker establishes his identity and that he presents neither a flight risk nor a danger to the public, “[ICE] should, absent additional factors . . . parole the alien on the basis that his or her continued detention is not in the public interest.” Id., ¶ 6.2 (emphasis added). More specifically, the Directive sets out a series of procedures ICE must undertake to determine whether a given asylum-seeker should be granted parole, including, *inter alia*, that the individual shall be provided written notice of the parole process explained in a language he understands, id., ¶¶ 6.1, 8.1, shall be granted a parole interview within seven days of a credible-fear finding, id., ¶ 8.2, shall be provided written notification of a parole determination, id., ¶ 6.5, and shall be given a “brief explanation of the reasons for any decision to deny parole.” Id., ¶ 6.5. As a result, although the Directive affirms that parole decisions are discretionary, it also establishes certain minimum procedures and processes that are to be utilized in making these determinations. Id., ¶ 4.4 (Directive “explains how the term [public interest] is to be interpreted by [ICE] when it decides whether to parole arriving aliens determined to have a credible fear” and “mandates uniform recordkeeping and review requirements for such decisions”).

B. Plaintiffs’ Detention

The nine named Plaintiffs and other members of the class they seek to represent are “asylum seekers who traveled to the United States, were found to have a credible fear of persecution, and were referred for immigration proceedings to decide their asylum claims.” Compl., ¶ 2. During the pendency of their asylum determinations, however, each has remained detained, allegedly “with no individualized review of whether their detention is necessary.” Id.

The lead plaintiff, Ansly Damus, is a former ethics teacher who is seeking asylum in the United States after fleeing political persecution in Haiti. Id., ¶ 11. Damus entered the United States in October 2016 and was referred for immigration proceedings after an asylum officer determined that he had a credible fear of persecution. He was subsequently granted asylum twice, but the Government appealed both determinations; meanwhile, the Detroit ICE Field Office denied his requests for parole in January 2017 and February 2018. Id. He has therefore remained detained – at this point – for over a year and a half. Id.

Plaintiff L.H.A. (the Court has permitted certain named Plaintiffs to proceed under pseudonyms) has been detained for even longer – over two years. Id., ¶ 16. He entered the United States in May 2016, upon fleeing threats in El Salvador. After receiving a credible-fear determination, L.H.A. applied for parole on June 14, 2017, but his request was denied by the El Paso Field Office and he remains detained. Id.

Plaintiffs Alexi Castro, H.A.Y., A.M.M., E.E.C.S., and L.I.L.M. have been detained for shorter periods (so far), but their experiences mirror those of Damus and L.H.A. Each was found to have a credible fear of persecution, each requested parole, and each was subsequently denied release and remains detained. Id., ¶¶ 14, 15, 17, 18. For two of the Plaintiffs, however, the story takes a slightly different twist. Abelardo Callol, who presented himself to immigration officers in December 2017 after fleeing persecution in Cuba, was denied parole and had been detained for over three months at the time the Complaint was filed. Id., ¶ 13. N.J.J.R., who presented himself to immigration in October 2017 after fleeing Venezuela, had been detained for over four. Id., ¶ 12. In the time since the Complaint was filed, however, both men have been granted asylum and released from detention. See ECF No. 32 (Pl. Class Cert. Reply) at 15 n.6.

According to Plaintiffs, this shared experience of being found to have a credible fear of

persecution but then being denied parole is indicative of the issue at the crux of this case – namely, the allegation that certain ICE Field Offices are no longer providing individualized parole determinations pursuant to the 2009 Directive. In support of this claim, Plaintiffs point to the steep descent of parole-grant rates in the initial months of the current administration. Citing figures showing that nearly 100% of parole requests processed by the five Field Offices at issue have been denied, Plaintiffs allege that the Government is no longer following its own parole policies.

This past spring, the asylum-seekers looked elsewhere to vindicate their claims. On March 15, 2018, they brought a class-action suit in this Court, challenging the parole regime currently in place at the Detroit, El Paso, Los Angeles, Newark, and Philadelphia ICE Field Offices. See Compl., ¶¶ 21-25. They claim that these Field Offices are categorically denying parole, an approach that Plaintiffs contend is contrary to law and arbitrary and capricious in contravention of the APA and the INA. Id., ¶¶ 66-74. They additionally bring a freestanding allegation that the current state of the parole system violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id., ¶¶ 75-80. Presently before the Court are Plaintiffs’ Motions for a preliminary injunction requiring that Defendants follow the Parole Directive during the pendency of this suit, as well as for provisional class certification for purposes of the requested injunction. Defendants oppose both Motions and separately seek dismissal of the suit under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). In keeping with the expedited nature of a preliminary-injunction proceeding, the Court held a hearing on May 17, 2018, after which it ordered further briefing on the issue of class certification. See ECF Order of May 29, 2018. That briefing complete, this Opinion regarding injunctive relief now follows. Given the result, the Court does not now tackle Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

II. Legal Standard

“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). A party seeking preliminary relief must make a “clear ‘showing that four factors, taken together, warrant relief: likely success on the merits, likely irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, a balance of the equities in its favor, and accord with the public interest.’” League of Women Voters of United States v. Newby, 838 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting Pursuing America’s Greatness v. FEC, 831 F.3d 500, 505 (D.C. Cir. 2016)). “The moving party bears the burden of persuasion and must demonstrate, ‘by a clear showing,’ that the requested relief is warranted.” Hospitality Staffing Solutions, LLC v. Reyes, 736 F. Supp. 2d 192, 197 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).

Before the Supreme Court’s decision in Winter, courts weighed these factors on a “sliding scale,” allowing “an unusually strong showing on one of the factors” to overcome a weaker showing on another. Davis v. PBGC, 571 F.3d 1288, 1291-92 (D.C. Cir. 2009); see Davenport v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 166 F.3d 356, 360-61 (D.C. Cir. 1999). This Circuit has hinted, though not held, that Winter – which overturned the Ninth Circuit’s “possibility of irreparable harm” standard – establishes that “likelihood of irreparable harm” and “likelihood of success” are “independent, free-standing requirement[s].” Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388, 392-93 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Davis, 571 F.3d at 1296 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring)); see League of Women Voters, 838 F.3d at 7 (declining to address whether “sliding scale” approach is valid after Winter). Unresolved, too, is the related question of “whether, in cases where the other three factors strongly favor issuing an injunction, a plaintiff need only raise a ‘serious legal question’ on the merits.” Aamer v. Obama, 742 F.3d 1023, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citation

omitted). Regardless of the extent to which showings of irreparable harm and success on the merits can be diminished, however, it is clear that where the plaintiff can show neither harm nor success, no relief is warranted. See Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 205 F. Supp. 3d 4, 26 (D.D.C. 2016).

III. Analysis

At the heart of Plaintiffs' suit is their assertion that, under the current administration, the parole practices at the five Field Offices have drastically departed from the policies and protections enshrined in the 2009 ICE Directive. Offering comparative statistics as well as declarations from detained asylum-seekers and their counsel, Plaintiffs contend that parole has been effectively eliminated as an option and detention has instead become the status quo. They attribute this shift in part to the Trump administration's emphasis on "deterrence" and "zero-tolerance" when it comes to the treatment of undocumented individuals. Defendants contest this characterization, claiming instead that there is no "deterrence policy" in place, that they continue to implement the ICE Directive, and that parole remains available to asylum-seekers at the five Field Offices.

Before turning to its analysis of these issues, however, the Court must first address two threshold complications: justiciability and class certification. According to Defendants, the asylum-seekers' case cannot proceed because this Court lacks jurisdiction over their claims and because they do not present a proper class. Disagreeing on both fronts, the Court will discuss these points separately before tackling the merits of injunctive relief.

A. Preliminary Issues

1. *Jurisdiction*

Defendants raise a bevy of jurisdictional objections. Specifically, the Government alleges that Plaintiffs' claims challenging the parole process are barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) and their request for classwide injunctive relief by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1). Ultimately, the Court concludes that these alleged jurisdictional hurdles are easily cleared by the asylum-seekers, and that their claims may therefore proceed.

One arrow Defendants pluck from their justiciability quiver relies on on 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which provides:

[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to review . . . any other decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security.

According to the Government, Plaintiffs are improperly attempting to challenge "ICE officers' discretionary weighing of the evidence." ECF No. 26 (Def. PI Reply) at 4.

To the extent Plaintiffs are challenging the determinations themselves – *i.e.*, the actual balancing of the merits of each application for parole – this Court agrees that it lacks jurisdiction. It will, therefore, not inquire into the specific strengths or weaknesses of the parole decisions under dispute, including Plaintiffs' allegation that certain of the proffered rationales for denial were "pretextual." ECF No. 24 at 8-10. Yet the asylum-seekers do not rest their case on a challenge to discrete parole determinations. Rather, they allege that ICE is, as a matter of general course, not complying with the policies and procedures of the Parole Directive. In other words, they are not challenging the outcome of ICE's decisionmaking, but the method by which

parole is currently being granted (or denied). The question, therefore, is whether such a claim falls within the scope of § 1252(a).

As the Supreme Court held in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not entirely strip federal courts of jurisdiction over claims relating to the parole process. In that case, the petitioners challenged the Attorney General’s authority to detain them indefinitely beyond the removal period. Id. at 682. The Court held that, although §1252(a) precludes judicial review of the discretionary determination to detain a noncitizen, the petitioners were not in fact challenging such decisionmaking. Instead, “they challenge[d] the extent of the Attorney General’s authority,” a claim that the Supreme Court held fell outside the scope of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). Id. at 688.

This Court reached a similar conclusion when interpreting a parallel jurisdictional bar, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e), in its decision in R.I.L.-R. v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164 (D.D.C. 2015). As here, the provision at issue in that case precluded judicial review over any decision by the Attorney General regarding the “grant, revocation, or denial of bond or parole.” Id. at 176. Yet, because Plaintiffs in R.I.L.-R. were contesting the policies underlying their detention, and not “th[e] discretionary determinations granting or denying bond or parole in an individual case,” the Court found that it had subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 177. Here, too, Plaintiffs are “challeng[ing] an overarching agency” action as unlawful – in this case, Defendants’ systematic failure to follow the Parole Directive and to instead impose detention without its safeguards and individualized determinations. Id. at 176. As a district court held last year when presented with nearly identical claims by a putative class of asylum-seekers detained at the Buffalo Federal Detention Facility, Plaintiffs are not asking for this Court to review the propriety of any given parole decision, but, instead, “simply seek compliance with certain minimum procedural

safeguards when parole decisions are made” by requiring that Defendants follow the Directive. Abdi v. Duke, 280 F. Supp. 3d 373, 385 (W.D.N.Y. 2017). This Court agrees that such claims do not fall within the jurisdictional bar of 1252(a). Id. at 384 (“Petitioners are asking that this Court ensure that Respondents comply with certain policies and procedures in making th[e] parole decision – issues that are beyond the jurisdictional bar of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).”).

Defendants additionally assert that the classwide injunctive relief sought by Plaintiffs is jurisdictionally barred by a separate provision of the INA. See ECF No. 22 (Def. Opp. to PI) at 10-12. Specifically, they point to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1), which provides that “no court (other than the Supreme Court) shall have jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation of the provisions of [8 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1232], other than with respect to . . . an individual alien against whom proceedings under such part have been initiated.” According to Defendants, to grant relief in this case, the Court would need to enjoin the operations of ICE in carrying out its delegated powers on a classwide basis – relief that they allege is prohibited under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1). See Def. PI Opp. at 10-12.

Even assuming that Plaintiffs’ claims fall within the provisions addressed by § 1252(f)(1) – a premise that is disputed by the parties – Defendants’ jurisdictional argument is easily defeated. As this Court noted in R.I.L.-R., Section 1252(f)(1) “prohibits only injunction of ‘the operation of’ the detention statutes.” 80 F. Supp. 3d at 184 (citing Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105, 1120 (9th Cir. 2010)). Put another way, “[w]here . . . a petitioner seeks to enjoin conduct that allegedly is not even authorized[,] . . . the court is not enjoining the operation of [the statute], and § 1252(f)(1) therefore is not implicated.” Id. (citing Rodriguez, 591 F.3d at 1120) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Here, Plaintiffs do not seek to “enjoin or restrain the operation” of any provision of the INA. Instead, they ask that this Court mandate

compliance with the Parole Directive, which addresses the discretionary authority of the Attorney General to grant temporary parole. As a classwide injunction in this case would not obstruct the “operation of” any statute, but merely require conduct that complies with ICE’s own Directive, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) does not stand in the way.

2. *Class Certification*

To achieve meaningful relief with respect to DHS’s allegedly unlawful actions, Plaintiffs sensibly ask this Court to provisionally certify a class. To obtain certification, a plaintiff must show that the proposed class satisfies all four requirements of Rule 23(a) and one of the three Rule 23(b) requirements. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 345-50 (2011). Rule 23(a) states that a class may be certified only if: (1) it is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable (“numerosity”), (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class (“commonality”), (3) the claims or defenses of the representative are typical of those of the class (“typicality”), and (4) the class representative will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class (“adequacy of representation”). Plaintiffs must show, in addition, that: (1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of inconsistent adjudications, (2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole, or (3) questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)-(3).

In deciding whether class certification is appropriate, a district court must ordinarily undertake a “rigorous analysis” to see that the requirements of the Rule have been satisfied. See Gen. Tel. Co. of SW v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982). “Rule 23 does not set forth a mere

pleading standard.” Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350. Rather, the party seeking class certification bears the burden of “affirmatively demonstrat[ing] his compliance with the Rule – that is, he must be prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of law or fact, etc.” Id. (emphasis in original).

Plaintiffs here, however, need only provisional class certification in order for the Court to grant their preliminary injunction. See Tr. of PI Hearing (May 17, 2018) at 6:6-8. In granting such provisional certification, the Court must still satisfy itself that the requirements of Rule 23 have been met. See Berge v. United States, 949 F. Supp. 2d 36, 49 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 Advisory Committee Notes 2003 Amendments). Its analysis is tempered, however, by the understanding that such certifications “may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits.” Bame v. Dillard, No. 05-1833, 2008 WL 2168393, at *5 (D.D.C. May 22, 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiffs’ proposed class consists of all arriving asylum-seekers who “are found to have a credible fear of persecution or torture” and “who are or will be detained by ICE . . . after having been denied parole under the authority of the [five] ICE Field Offices.” Mot. for Class Cert. at 5-6. The Court must therefore consider whether this class, as defined, meets the requirements under Rule 23. It will begin by addressing Defendants’ threshold contention that the class cannot be certified because certain members lack standing, and then briefly analyze the first and fourth prongs of Rule 23(a), neither of which Defendants contest. It then assesses the second and third specifications together, both of which are disputed. Finally, it considers whether Plaintiffs have satisfied their burden under Rule 23(b).

a. Standing

Defendants first attack Plaintiffs' standing to bring a classwide suit. According to the Government, Plaintiffs' request that this Court "certify a class that includes all arriving asylum seekers who are found to have a credible fear . . . who are or will be detained by ICE after having been denied parole under the authority of [the five] Field Offices" cannot proceed because the class definition "includes persons who have not experienced the harm Plaintiffs allege." Opp. to Class Cert. at 28. The asylum-seekers reply that "[t]o the contrary, all class members have been denied parole pursuant to Defendants' *de facto* parole denial policy and thus have suffered the injury alleged in Plaintiffs' Complaint." Pl. Class Cert. Reply at 14.

To establish standing, a plaintiff "must, generally speaking, demonstrate that he has suffered 'injury in fact,' that the injury is 'fairly traceable' to the actions of the defendant, and that the injury will likely be redressed by a favorable decision." Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471-472 (1982)). Standing is assessed "upon the facts as they exist at the time the complaint is filed," Natural Law Party of U.S. v. Fed. Elec. Comm'n, 111 F. Supp. 2d 33, 41 (D.D.C. 2000), and "Rule 23's requirements must be interpreted in keeping with Article III constraints." Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 592 (1997).

Here, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have adequately established the standing of their class members. As defined, the putative class includes only arriving asylum-seekers who have been or will be detained by the five ICE Field Offices after having been denied parole. Each of these individuals has suffered a concrete injury – detention imposed without the protections of the Parole Directive – from the Government's refusal to grant them the Directive's requisite

processes and protections. Although the Government asserts that “not all putative class members have been injured by Defendants’ purported policy . . . [as] not all persons detained at the Field Offices were denied parole,” Opp. to Class Cert. at 28, this line of argument entirely ignores Plaintiffs’ definition of the class as including only those asylum-seekers who are or will be detained “after having been denied parole.” Pl. Class Cert. Reply at 15 (emphasis altered). The (albeit negligible) percentage of asylum-seekers released by the Field Offices does not, therefore, undermine Plaintiffs’ classwide standing, as they are explicitly excluded from the definition of the class.

For those individuals who are (or will be) detained after being denied release on parole, Plaintiffs adequately allege that the Government is engaging in injurious conduct, the resolution of which would likely be redressed by a favorable decision by this Court. According to Plaintiffs, their detention is the direct result of the Field Offices’ current departure from the protections of the Parole Directive in favor of *de facto* detention – an allegation that, as discussed in more depth below, is robustly supported by statistics and other record evidence. In light of the prior substantial grant rates under the Directive and the near-uniform detention of asylum-seekers under the current administration, it is in no sense “speculative” that enjoining the Field Offices to implement the Directive would render Plaintiffs’ release far more likely. As this Circuit has emphasized, “A significant increase in the likelihood that [a litigant] would obtain relief that directly redresses the injury suffered will suffice for standing.” Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. Manson, 414 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Lichoulas v. FERC, 606 F.3d 769, 775 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Granting the injunctive relief in this case would mandate compliance with the procedures and policies of the Directive and would therefore result in a greater opportunity for class members’ release on

parole. The Court is, consequently, satisfied that the requirements of Article III are met by the proposed class.

b. Numerosity

The numerosity requirement is determined case by case and “imposes no absolute limitations.” Bynum v. D.C., 214 F.R.D. 27, 32 (D.D.C. 2003) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 330 (1980)). Plaintiffs need not prove exactly how many people fall within the class to merit certification. See, e.g., Kifafi v. Hilton Hotels Retirement Plan, 189 F.R.D. 174, 176 (D.D.C. 1999) (“So long as there is a reasonable basis for the estimate provided, the numerosity requirement can be satisfied without precise numbers.”). As a general benchmark, “courts have found that a proposed class consisting of at least forty members” satisfies this requirement. Johnson v. D.C., 248 F.R.D. 46, 52 (D.D.C. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); accord Taylor v. District of Columbia Water & Sewer Auth., 241 F.R.D. 33, 37 (D.D.C. 2007); Bynum, 214 F.R.D. at 32.

Defendants do not challenge the numerosity of the proposed class, and rightly so. Plaintiffs have provided ample evidence that a large number of asylum-seekers – well over 40 – have been denied parole at the five Field Offices, see ECF No. 17-10 (Decl. of Anne Daher), ¶ 10, and state that the “Government itself has identified nearly 800 class members.” Mot. for Class Cert. at 1. As discussed below, they have further demonstrated that the detention of class members is sufficiently tethered to ICE’s compliance, or lack thereof, with the protections and procedures enshrined in the Parole Directive. Nothing more is needed to satisfy the numerosity requirement under Rule 23.

c. Adequacy of Representation

In order to satisfy this prerequisite, Plaintiffs must show both that (1) there is no conflict

of interest between the named members and the rest of the class, and that (2) counsel is competent to represent the class. See Twelve John Does v. D.C., 117 F.3d 571, 575 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Johnson, 248 F.R.D. at 53-54; Taylor, 241 F.R.D. at 45; Bynum, 214 F.R.D. at 35. No trace of a conflict exists here, and Plaintiffs are represented by very capable counsel from the American Civil Liberties Union and Covington & Burling LLP. Defendants, appropriately, do not dispute that these requirements have been met either.

d. Commonality and Typicality

The Government, conversely, finds greater traction in citing two other prongs of the certification test. Rule 23(a)(2) – commonality – requires that Plaintiffs establish that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class.” Class members’ claims must depend on “a common contention [that] is capable of classwide resolution – which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Wal-Mart Stores, 131 S. Ct. at 2551. In other words, the representative plaintiffs must show that the class members have “suffered the same injury.” Id. (citation omitted). As the D.C. Circuit explained, commonality is satisfied where there is “a uniform policy or practice that affects all class members.” D.L. v. District of Columbia, 713 F.3d 120, 128 (D.C. Cir. 2013).

To demonstrate typicality, as required by Rule 23(a)(3), Plaintiffs must show that their claims are “typical of the claims . . . of the class.” Typicality means that the representative plaintiffs must “possess the same interest and suffer the same injury” as the other class members. See Falcon, 457 U.S. at 156 (citations omitted). The commonality and typicality requirements often overlap because both “serve as ‘guideposts’” to determine whether a class action is practical and whether the representative plaintiffs’ claims are sufficiently interrelated with the class claims to protect absent class members. See Taylor, 241 F.R.D. at 44-45 (quoting Falcon,

457 U.S. at 157 n.13). Here, as Defendants' principal challenge to class certification goes to both, the Court considers them together.

Contending that Plaintiffs have been unable to establish a categorical practice affecting parole at the five Field Offices, Defendants argue that a class action is an improper vehicle to challenge their alleged failure to conform with the Parole Directive. According to the Government, Plaintiffs "allege a variety of procedural and substantive violations of the Parole Directive facially unconnected to any coordinated agency action." Def. Opp. to Cert at 1. They contend, therefore, that class certification is not available here because the asylum-seekers "cannot credibly identify any single policy or practice that bridges all their claims." *Id.* (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Put another way, under the Government's view of the case, Plaintiffs are not challenging any uniform agency policy, but instead contest "the manner in which ICE has exercised its discretionary parole authority in more than a thousand different cases." *Id.* at 26 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). DHS goes on to argue that the "fundamental flaw in Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification is that it does not provide any evidence linking each Plaintiff's denied parole applications to a single or 'indivisible' government action capable of being enjoined 'in one stroke.'" *Id.* at 27 (citing Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350) (emphasis added).

This argument bears a striking resemblance to Defendants' objection that Plaintiffs have not established a common injury for the purposes of standing, and, for similar reasons, the Court rejects it here as well. While it is true that the reasons for any given discretionary detention cannot necessarily be proven on an individualized basis, the Government has nonetheless conceded that ICE is required to follow the Directive when determining parole for asylum-seekers who have established a credible fear of persecution. See Def. Reply at 5. Plaintiffs here

have provided ample evidence that, in the initial months of the current administration, nearly every application for parole from such individuals has been denied. This is in sharp contrast to the prior parole-grant rates, and, as discussed in depth below, indicates a likely departure from the policies and processes mandated by the Parole Directive.

The Court can, therefore, conclude that a “common question[] of law and fact” unites the class members’ claims – namely, the allegation that the five ICE Field Officers are no longer providing the “individualized determinations” of parole eligibility and procedural protections required by the Parole Directive. See D.L. v. D.C. (D.L. II), 860 F.3d 713, 724-26 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (evidence suggesting failure to follow statutory provisions satisfies commonality); R.I.L.-R., 80 F. Supp. 3d at 182 (holding that “ample evidence that nearly every Central American family apprehended since June 2014 has been detained” supports conclusion that “common questions of law and fact united the class members’ claims”). Such a showing provides the “glue holding” the alleged basis for the putative class’s detention “together.” Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 352. The asylum-seekers acknowledge that the circumstances of their detention may vary, but they have sufficiently identified a common cause and injury as a result of the current parole regime and ICE’s departure from the mandates of the Parole Directive. See Pl. Class Cert. Reply at 5-6.

The fact that the precise role this alleged failure to follow the Directive played in any specific determination may differ among the Plaintiffs does not destroy the fact that all (or nearly all) class members were subjected to the same system of *de facto* parole denial. Indeed, as this Circuit has held, if there is a “single” common question, “factual variations among the class members will not defeat the commonality requirement.” Hardy v. D.C., 283 F.R.D. 20, 24 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Bynum v. D.C., 214 F.R.D. 27, 33 (D.D.C. 2003)). As the court held in

Abdi when faced with the question of certifying the class of detained asylum-seekers at the Buffalo ICE Field Office, the question of whether Defendants were providing “certain procedural safeguards when adjudicating parole . . . determinations” is a common question that will “generate common answers apt to drive resolution of the litigation.” 323 F.R.D. at 141 (citation omitted). The court therefore rejected the Government’s contention, repeated here, that the request to certify the class could not proceed “because the claims require individualized factual determinations.” Id.; see also Borum v. Brentwood Vill., LLC, 324 F.R.D. 1, 15-16 (D.D.C. 2018) (no requirement under Rule 23 that “all members of the putative class will be affected by the policy in the same way”); Nio v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 323 F.R.D. 28, 32 (D.D.C. 2017) (“factual variations among class members” do not trump “the overarching questions common to the class” addressing the “legal authority to implement [the challenged] policies and practices”).

This Court agrees with the sound reasoning of Judge Wolford of the Western District of New York. Contrary to the Government’s assertion that “[i]f the class is certified, the Court will be forced to hear individualized evidence of ICE’s compliance or alleged non-compliance with the Parole Directive for potentially every putative class member,” the resolution of this case would require no such piecemeal litigation. See Def. Opp. to Cert. at 32. Rather, Plaintiffs ask this Court to determine only whether, as a general matter, the five Field Offices are following the Directive or are instead systematically denying parole. Analyzing this issue thus requires only a common, programmatic analysis, as the specific facts of each denial matter not if Plaintiffs are correct in their claim that the Directive is no longer in force overall.

Nor is commonality defeated by the fact that a small percentage of asylum-seekers were, in fact, released from two of the five Field Offices. As Plaintiffs correctly note, “A policy or

practice may satisfy Rule 23(a)(2), even when it is substantially less uniform than the near-100% parole-denial rates at issue here.” Pl. Class Cert. Reply at 5. See, e.g., Hoyte v. D.C., 2017 WL 3208456, at *10 (D.D.C. July 27, 2017) (commonality found when 43% of claims conformed to alleged D.C. practice of failing to provide interim hearings).

Finally, the Court can also dispose of Defendants’ contention that Plaintiffs are unable to establish commonality because they do not allege a common motive underlying the Field Offices’ departure from the Parole Directive. See Opp. to Class Cert at 30-32, 39. As this Circuit held in D.L. II, a common motive is not required under Rule 23 when “liability does not depend on the reason for a defendant’s failure” to follow the law. See 860 F.3d at 725 (distinguishing Wal-Mart on ground that “crux of the inquiry” under Title VII “is the reason for a particular employment decision”). Here, although Plaintiffs identify “deterrence” as the motivating factor behind the lack of individualized parole determinations and compliance with the Directive, the Court need not find any such common intention in order to certify the class. The asylum-seekers’ claims rest not on the impetus behind the Field Offices’ practices, but, instead, on the very fact that they are no longer following the binding guidance of the Parole Directive. See Pl. PI Brief at 17-19, 23-26, 28-31; see also Garnett, 2018 WL 1524748, at *5 (“The question the Court confronts is simply whether the applications are being . . . processed” lawfully, “not why they are . . . not.”) (emphasis added).

The same reasoning applies to Defendants’ challenge to typicality. The Government alleges that Plaintiffs “point to no evidence that the five ICE Field Offices have engaged in the ‘unitary course of conduct’ they allege . . . and so no named Plaintiff can say that his claim is ‘typical’ of anyone else’s.” Opp. to Class Cert. at 40 (citation omitted). Again, the typicality requirement is satisfied when the claims of the class representatives “arise from the same course

of conduct, series or events, or legal theories of other class members.” Hoyte, 2017 WL 3208456, at *4 (citation omitted). Here, it is clear from Plaintiffs’ filings and affidavits that the nine named class members have each alleged a personal deprivation of the protections of the Parole Directive, contending that they have instead been denied the opportunity for release under the Field Offices’ current practice of nearly uniform detention. Although the specific details of each named Plaintiff’s parole adjudication may vary, the crux of their allegations is typical of the claims of the putative class that the Government is no longer providing asylum-seekers with the individualized determinations and opportunities for release required under the Directive. In light of the record evidence of a current no-parole regime in place at the five Field Offices, see Section III. B, *infra*, such allegations are sufficiently tethered to a uniform course of governmental conduct. Defendants’ various objections thus parried, the Court finds that commonality and typicality have been established.

e. Rule 23(b)(2)

To obtain certification, a proposed class must also satisfy just one of the three Rule 23(b) specifications. Plaintiffs here invoke Rule 23(b)(2), which sets forth two basic requirements: (1) the party opposing the class must have “acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class,” and (2) “final relief of an injunctive nature or a corresponding declaratory nature, settling the legality of the behavior with respect to the class as a whole, must be appropriate.” Put otherwise, Rule 23(b)(2) codifies the “presumption that the interests of the class members are cohesive.” Lightfoot v. D.C., 273 F.R.D. 314, 329 (D.D.C. 2011).

In disputing that this cohesion requirement has been satisfied, Defendants regurgitate a variant of the same challenge they raised to standing, typicality, and commonality – to wit, that Plaintiffs have not shown that “all putative class members warrant the same relief for the same

reasons.” Opp. to Class Cert. at 41. Once again, the Court cannot concur. Plaintiffs allege that the five Field Offices no longer follow the policies and procedures outlined in the 2009 Parole Directive. They seek declaratory and injunctive relief requiring compliance with the Directive and mandating that the Field Offices provide the individualized parole determinations and protections required by such agency guidance. Contrary to the Government’s argument that “it is difficult to see how each individual alleged violation of the Parole Directive would be amenable to resolution on a classwide basis,” *id.* at 42, the asylum-seekers are not asking for this Court to remedy discrete errors in their parole determinations or to interfere with ICE’s discretionary decisionmaking. Rather, Plaintiffs ask only that the Court address an alleged systematic harm – the failure of the Field Offices to comply with the Directive. This departure from the Directive is an agency action “generally applicable” to all class members, and a determination of whether that practice is unlawful would therefore resolve all members’ claims “in one stroke.” *Wal-Mart Stores*, 564 U.S. at 350; see *R.I.L.-R.*, 80 F. Supp. 3d at 182 (Rule 23(b)(2) satisfied when class challenges agency action “generally applicable to all class members”). Rule 23(b)(2) thus poses no obstacle to class certification.

B. The Merits

The undercard bouts now concluded, the Court turns to the main event: the merits of Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction. The Complaint provides three distinct grounds for such relief. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that DHS’s actions: (1) are contrary to law under the APA by failing to follow the Parole Directive; (2) violate the APA by failing to conform with the INA; and (3) abridge Plaintiffs’ due-process rights under the Fifth Amendment. *See* Mot. for PI at 1-3. Because the Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ first theory warrants relief, it will focus its

attention accordingly. In doing so, it addresses each of the four prongs of the preliminary-injunction analysis.

1. *Likelihood of Success*

To remind any reader whose attention may understandably have flagged: in Count I of their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that DHS is no longer complying with the ICE Directive, a practice they assert is “contrary to law” under the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Likelihood of success, consequently, turns on the strength of their argument that Defendants are failing to follow the Directive, and that such a departure is unlawful. This is where the rubber meets the road.

Defendants contest both the premise and the substance of Plaintiffs’ APA claims. DHS contends that the asylum-seekers do not have a cause of action under the statute, that the Parole Directive does not provide a sound basis for the relief they seek, and that they do not demonstrate that the agency is in fact failing to follow the necessary procedures. Because Plaintiffs’ argument in support of this count rests in large part on a somewhat obscure area of law – the so-called Accardi doctrine – the Court will first lay out the fundamentals of this concept, next look at the question of whether Plaintiffs may raise such claims under the APA, and conclude with the alleged violations themselves.

a. The Accardi Doctrine

Plaintiffs’ first APA count is based, in large part, on the “Accardi doctrine,” which they allege requires Defendants to follow the ICE Directive in adjudicating parole determinations. This doctrine arises from a 1954 Supreme Court decision, United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954), in which the Court vacated a deportation order because it was issued without procedures that conformed to the relevant agency regulations. The Court

stated that “[r]egulations with the force and effect of law supplement the bare bones” of federal statutes, and that, even in areas of expansive discretion, agencies must follow their own “existing valid regulations.” Id. at 266, 268. Two decades later, in Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232 (1974), the Supreme Court returned to the doctrine – this time striking down a Bureau of Indian Affairs benefits determination because it did not comply with the procedures set forth in the agency’s internal manual. In doing so, the Court noted that Accardi’s teachings apply with particular force in those cases in which “the rights of individuals are affected,” stating that “it is incumbent upon agencies to follow their own procedures . . . even where [they] are possibly more rigorous than otherwise would be required.” Id. at 235.

This Circuit and district courts here have subsequently invoked the doctrine, noting that “Accardi has come to stand for the proposition that agencies may not violate their own rules and regulations to the prejudice of others.” Battle v. FAA, 393 F.3d 1330, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also Steenholdt v. FAA, 314 F.3d 633, 639 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“The Accardi doctrine requires federal agencies to follow their own rules, even gratuitous procedural rules that limit otherwise discretionary actions.”); Wilkinson v. Legal Servs. Corp., 27 F. Supp. 2d 32, 34 n.3 (D.D.C. 1998) (citing Accardi and stating that “government agencies are bound to follow their own rules, even self-imposed procedural rules that limit otherwise discretionary decisions”); Vanover v. Hantman, 77 F. Supp. 2d 91, 103 (D.D.C. 1999), aff’d, 38 F. App’x 4 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (judicial review under Accardi available for “claims that an agency has acted in violation of its own binding procedures where those procedures are promulgated for the protection of individuals, even where the procedures were not issued as formal regulations”); Jefferson v. Harris, 285 F. Supp. 3d 173, 185 (D.D.C. 2018). And, in the immigration context, the Second Circuit has explained that the Accardi doctrine’s “ambit is not limited to rules attaining the status of formal

regulation,” and that it can be applied to internal agency guidance. See Montilla v. INS, 926 F.2d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Zhang v. Slattery, 840 F. Supp. 292, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (requiring that INS adhere to internal procedures in parole memorandum).

The doctrine is not without its limits, however. Courts have distinguished between those internal agency regulations that are enforceable and those that remain unreviewable – drawing a line “between procedural rules benefitting the agency . . . and procedural rules benefitting the party otherwise left unprotected . . . [or] cases in which the agency has failed to exercise discretion required by its regulations.” Lopez v. FAA, 318 F.3d 242, 247 (D.C. Cir. 2003), as amended (Feb. 11, 2003). This Circuit has articulated this distinction as meaning that “agencies cannot relax or modify regulations that provide the only safeguard individuals have against unlimited agency discretion.” Id. Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that the enforceability of agency policies depends upon whether they impose binding norms on the agency. Vitarelli, 359 U.S. at 539–40; Dulles, 354 U.S. at 372. Following that guidance, this Circuit has synthesized these considerations to conclude that “an agency pronouncement is transformed into a binding norm if so intended by the agency,” a determination that takes into account the substance and intent of the agency action, as well as whether it confers individual protections or privileges. See Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citations omitted).

b. Accardi and Parole Directive

The next set of questions for the Court is therefore whether Plaintiffs can bring their Accardi claim pursuant to their first APA count, and whether the Parole Directive falls within the realm of agency rules, regulations, and guidance to which the doctrine can attach.

On the initial issue, Defendants contend that the asylum-seekers’ Accardi allegations present a claim without a cause of action. According to the Government, Plaintiffs’ assertion

that the Field Offices are failing to follow the Parole Directive is “not cognizable under Section 706(2) of the APA.” Opp. to Class Cert at 26. Plaintiffs respond that the APA empowers them to challenge agency action that is arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law, see 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 706(2), and that their allegation that ICE’s systematic departure from the Parole Directive is unlawful is thus actionable under that Act.

They are correct. “It has long been settled that a federal agency must adhere firmly to self-adopted rules by which the interests of others are to be regulated.” Mass. Fair Share v. Law Enft Assistance Admin., 758 F.2d 708, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1985). As numerous courts have held, the Accardi doctrine therefore provides plaintiffs with a means by which they can hold agencies accountable to their own policies. See, e.g., Burdue v. FAA, 774 F.3d 1076, 1082 n.2 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Under the doctrine outlined in Accardi, a party may always challenge an agency's failure to abide by its own regulations.”) (internal citation omitted). It is clear, moreover, that such claims may arise under the APA. See Schaefer v. Geren, 607 F. Supp. 2d 61, 68-70 (D.D.C. 2009), aff'd sub nom. Schaefer v. McHugh, 608 F.3d 851 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (addressing Accardi claim pursuant to allegation that Army Board for Correction of Military Records “acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and contrary to law” in violation of APA § 706(2)(A)); Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Norton, 340 F.3d 835, 841, 852 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding Accardi challenge under APA § 706 and finding that “[h]aving chosen to promulgate the [] policy, the [Fish and Wildlife Service] must follow that policy”); Alamo Exp., Inc. v. United States, 613 F.2d 96, 98 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding APA violation by Interstate Commerce Commission because it failed to comply with internal procedure).

This connection between § 706(2) and Accardi was carefully explained in a recent opinion from the Southern District of California addressing a different form of internal agency

guidance on immigration, the “Operating Procedures” governing Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals. See Torres v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 2017 WL 4340385, at *5-6 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2017). As the court spelled out in Torres, the plaintiffs’ allegation that Defendants had “fail[ed] to follow their own procedures in terminating Plaintiff’s DACA status” was properly framed as a claim that the agency’s actions were “arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion.” Id. at *5-6. Such allegations, Torres concluded, fell well within the scope of the Accardi doctrine: “While Defendants are granted broad discretion to commence, adjudicate, and execute removal orders, a fundamental principle of federal law is that a federal agency must follow its own procedures.” Id. (citing Morton, 415 U.S. at 233-35). For an agency to violate this governing maxim, the court found, would amount to an “unlawful” action under the APA. Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)). Agreeing with the analysis in Torres, and with the congeries of other cases addressing Accardi claims under the framework of administrative law, the Court rejects Defendants’ assertion that Plaintiffs have failed to identify a cause of action under the APA.

The Court finds the Government’s contention that Plaintiffs may not rely on the Parole Directive for their Accardi claim because it is not “binding” on the agency similarly unavailing. As discussed above, the premise underlying the Accardi doctrine is that agencies can be held accountable to their own codifications of procedures and policies – and particularly those that affect individual rights. Here, the policies and procedures contained within the Directive establish a set of minimum protections for those seeking asylum, including an opportunity to submit documentation, the availability of an individualized parole interview, and an explanation of the reasons for a parole denial. The Directive therefore falls squarely within the ambit of those agency actions to which the doctrine may attach. See Pacific Molasses Co. v. FTC, 356

F.2d 386, 389-90 (5th Cir. 1966) (“[O]nce an agency exercises its discretion and creates the procedural rules under which it desires to have its actions judged, it denies itself the right to violate these rules.”); Pasquini v. Morris, 700 F.2d 658, 663 n.1 (11th Cir. 1983) (“Although the [INS] internal operating instruction confers no substantive rights on the alien-applicant, it does confer the procedural right to be considered for such status upon application.”).

Defendants’ reliance on language in the Directive disclaiming that the document confers any substantive rights does not prove otherwise. The ICE Directive provides that it “is not intended to, shall not be construed to, may not be relied upon to, and does not create any rights, privileges, or benefits, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any party against the United States.” Parole Directive, ¶ 10. The Government points to this language in refuting Plaintiffs’ Accardi claims, stating in its briefing that “the Parole Directive’s statement that it places requirements on ICE and its officers without creating a private cause of action should be viewed by the Court as determinative evidence of the extent to which DHS intended to be bound by the Directive.” Reply at 2-3. Yet the Government’s subsequent statement at oral argument that the Directive is, in fact, binding compels the Court to find otherwise. See Tr. at 19:12-13. It would seem that this representation is in fact the “determinative evidence” of the extent to which the agency “intended to be bound.” The Court will therefore take Defendants at their word that the Directive is binding agency policy and thus concludes that it can be challenged via an Accardi claim.

The Court additionally notes that, even absent such concession, the Accardi doctrine could well apply to the ICE Directive. This case is distinguishable from a prior Opinion in this Circuit addressing the effects of disclaimer language in agency guidance, In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2006). In Miller, this Circuit held that DOJ

guidelines for issuing subpoenas to the media – which contained language similar to that in the ICE directive – did not create legally enforceable procedural rights. Yet although Miller relied in part on the express reservation at issue in that case, it does not stand for the proposition that such a disclaimer would necessarily defeat Plaintiffs’ claim that the Directive is binding upon and enforceable against DHS. Instead, Miller explicitly distinguished Morton on the ground that the procedures contained in the BIA manual at issue in that case were “intended to benefit” individuals, whereas the DOJ guidelines provided no such protections and instead “exist[ed] to guide the Department’s exercise” of its internal decisionmaking to seek subpoenas. See Miller, 438 F.3d at 1152. As discussed above, the ICE Directive falls clearly on the side of Morton rather than Miller, as “given the nature of the guidelines themselves, and the function they govern,” the Directive was intended – at least in part – to benefit asylum-seekers navigating the parole process. Id. at 1153. The Court finds, therefore, that the disclaimer language contained within the Directive does not bar the application of the Accardi doctrine. See Abdi, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 389 (holding that agency cannot “avoid application of Accardi by simply disclaiming any binding effect in the [D]irective itself” and that “[t]o find otherwise would render the teachings of Accardi and its progeny meaningless”).

c. Merits of Accardi Claim

Having determined that Plaintiffs may invoke the Accardi doctrine, the Court must now assess whether they are likely correct with respect to the substantive claim at the heart of this case – *viz.*, the allegation that ICE is no longer following the Directive. As an initial matter, the Court briefly addresses Plaintiffs’ assertion that the current practice at the five Field Offices of “denying parole in virtually all cases” is motivated by deterrence. See Pl. PI Reply at 2. This line of argument may well be true, see Pl. Class Cert. Reply at 6 n.2 (contending that “evidence

of the Trump Administration’s deterrence goals continues to accumulate”), but, as Plaintiffs acknowledge, it is not necessary for the Court to delve into the basis for the agency’s alleged departure from the Directive. See Pl. PI Reply at 14-15 (“Plaintiffs are entitled to a preliminary injunction, regardless of whether Defendants have been motivated by deterrence.”); Tr. at 5:17-19; 26:20-22. Because it need not resolve this issue of impetus, the Court turns instead to the record regarding the current parole regime at the various Field Offices.

It begins with the most compelling evidence in support of Plaintiffs’ case: the raw numbers. Although Benjamin Disraeli decried “lies, damn lies, and statistics,” the numbers here are irrefutable. According to records obtained by the asylum-seekers, “[D]uring the eight months from February to September 2017,” ICE’s El Paso, Philadelphia, and Newark Field Offices denied 100% of parole applications. See Pl. Reply at 1. During that same period, the Los Angeles and Detroit Offices denied 92% and 98% of applications, respectively. See Daher Decl., ¶¶ 5-1; Compl., ¶ 38. These figures, Plaintiffs assert, “constitute[] a marked departure from just a few years ago,” when ICE was also implementing the Parole Directive and granted parole to more than 90% of asylum-seekers. See id.; Compl., ¶ 39.

The Government’s response to these figures is underwhelming at best. Indeed, as counsel conceded at the hearing, in light of the numbers for the first months of the administration, “there are questions” as to whether the five Field Offices are following the Parole Directive. See Tr. at 19:19-25; Tr. at 20:17-25 (“[T]hose statistics certainly look like outliers” from the Parole Directive.); Tr. at 21:7-11 (Government is “trying to get more information” as to whether “these five offices are following the” Directive). Although Defendants now state that they are “trying to get th[e] numbers” for intervening years, see Tr. at 20:7-8, and are “in the process of retrieving more information on the parole data,” ECF No. 31-1 (Decl. of David W.

Jennings), ¶ 10, the fact remains that the only statistics submitted in this case are those cited by Plaintiffs. While DHS may believe that such figures overcount the actual parole-denial rate, their speculation is not sufficient to rebut Plaintiffs' assertion that the current release rate at the five ICE Field Offices is approaching zero.

Defendants' assertion that the statistics were "cherry picked" is similarly unavailing. See PI Opp. at 14. The Government attempts to cast doubt on Plaintiffs' figures by arguing that they strategically selected the numbers from only five ICE Offices across the nations. Yet, as Plaintiffs very reasonably note, "[I]t is those five Field Offices, and only those five, whose practices are at issue in this case." PI Reply at 4. It therefore seems to make perfect sense for them to present numbers from those specific locales. Nor can Defendants allege that the asylum-seekers have manipulated the figures from the five Field Offices at issue. The statistics presented by Plaintiffs include every parole request – more than 800 cases – recorded by ICE at those offices during the first eight months of the current administration. See Daher Decl., ¶¶ 5-11. The Court therefore finds that Plaintiffs' analysis adequately supports their claims.

The Court notes, moreover, that the dramatic departure in parole-grant rates from years past has not been explained in any way by Defendants. The Government does not dispute Plaintiffs' assertion that "there has been no significant change in the types of asylum seekers traveling to the United States," Pl. Reply at 1, nor does it indicate any other change in circumstances that would lead to a shift in how the Parole Directive is being applied. See Pl. Reply at 3 (noting that "Defendants do not suggest that asylum seekers detained in 2017 suddenly became more apt to flee or more apt to commit crimes than those detained earlier, and they make no other effort to explain the numbers"). Instead, in February 2017, then-DHS Secretary John Kelly stated that the Parole Directive "remain[s] in full force and effect," and the

Government represented the same to the Supreme Court just last year. See Def. MTD, Exh. B at 9-10 (Kelly Memorandum); Pet. Suppl. Reply. Br., Jennings v. Rodriguez, No. 15-1204, at 6 n.2 (filed Feb. 21, 2017). Declarations submitted by Defendants in this case, moreover, also state that the Parole Directive remains in force. See ECF Nos. 22-3 (Decl. of Diane L. Witte), ¶ 3; 22-4-5 (Declaration of Rebecca Adducci), ¶¶ 3-4. Such representations – and the dearth of data supporting the allegation that Plaintiffs’ numbers are off – place the Government in an untenable position. Defendants cannot claim that the ICE Directive remains fully in effect, and yet, at the same time, provide no explanation for the sudden shift in the day-to-day treatment of asylum-seekers under the current administration. Indeed, as the Government stated at argument, “The policy . . . certainly envisions case by case determinations that will result in parole.” Tr. at 20:23-24. Defendants concede that such an aim is “clear from reading the Parole Directive.” Id. Faced with the current record, the reasonable conclusion is that the five ICE Field Offices are not in fact putting this language into effect on the ground.

In addition to providing the Court with these troubling statistics, Plaintiffs support their claims with a number of declarations from asylum-seekers and their advocates. The record includes affidavits from each of the named Plaintiffs, all of whom assert various violations of the Parole Directive with respect to ICE’s adjudication of their release requests. See, e.g., Pl. PI Mot., Exhs. 12 (N.J.J.R. Decl.), ¶ 13; 13 (Callol Decl.), ¶¶ 10, 15; 16 (A.M.M. Suppl. Decl.) at 3, Exh. C. Plaintiffs’ evidence also includes the statements of attorneys such as Joan Del Valle, an experienced immigration lawyer, who asserts that she has been told by multiple ICE officials that “there is no more parole.” Pl. Exh. 10 (Decl. of Joan Del Valle), ¶ 8; see also Pl. Exh. 4 (Declaration of Jessica Miles), ¶ 6 (stating that as an immigration attorney she has been told by ICE officers that agency is “not granting parole”). Finally, there are also declarations from

various immigration practitioners stating that ICE is now denying parole to individuals who, in years past, would have been granted release under the Parole Directive. See Pl. Mot. at 8 (collecting statements from nine declarations). In sum, Plaintiffs argue that “the evidence demonstrates that similarly situated individuals who routinely were granted parole in prior years are being denied parole under the current regime,” and that the Parole Directive is thus no longer being implemented at these five locations. See Pl. Reply at 1.

DHS marshals its own declarations, asserting that the named Plaintiffs were in fact given individualized parole determinations and that the Directive remains in place. Yet, as Plaintiffs aptly note, Defendants’ declarations rely on records that have not been submitted to the Court and are written by individuals who largely did not have direct involvement with the specific adjudications. See Pl. Reply at 5-6; Ramirez v. ICE, 2018 WL 1882861, at *14 (D.D.C. Apr. 18, 2018) (refusing to credit declarations from ICE officials when officials were not decisionmakers and instead based assertions on “purported review” of documents). And, even if given full weight by this Court, the statements by various ICE officials do little to rebut the overwhelming evidence presented by Plaintiffs. See Huynh v. Harasz, 2016 WL 2757219, at *18-19 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2016) (denial of 215 out of 215 applications could support conclusion that agency had blanket policy of denying applications, even in light of evidence suggesting individualized review). Although Defendants have submitted copies of certain letters and forms sent to the named Plaintiffs regarding their parole determinations, these summary and often boilerplate records do little to shine light on whether the Field Offices did, in fact, provide individualized determinations and comply in full with the Directive.

Indeed, in certain cases, Defendants’ evidences cuts against DHS’s contention that it continues to follow the Parole Directive. In the case of Plaintiff H.A.Y., the Government has

provided a declaration from Diane Witte of the El Paso Field Office, stating that the office denied H.A.Y.'s parole request because she was "a recent entrant and thus presented a flight risk." Witte Decl., ¶ 23. This reasoning is contrary to the very concept of giving each applicant an "individualized determination," as "recent entry" is a categorical characteristic of most, if not all, asylum-seekers. For the El Paso Field Office to conclude that such entry is, itself, sufficient to demonstrate flight risk strongly suggests that it is not conducting the particularized assessments required by the Directive. Certain of Defendants' records similarly undermine their assertion that the processes mandated by the Directive remain in place, as they evince a lack of compliance with its enumerated procedures. See, e.g., ECF No. 22-6 (Declaration of Jennifer Ritchey), Exh. 2-5 (providing records showing that Plaintiffs Castro and Callol received letters advising them of the right to apply for parole only one day prior to receiving nearly identical boilerplate letters informing them of parole denial); compare ECF No. 23 (Decl. of Andre Quinones), ¶ 4 (stating that "parole interviews are not conducted in every case if the interview would be superfluous") with Parole Directive, ¶ 8.2 ("Unless an additional reasonable period of time is necessary . . . no later than seven days following a finding that an arriving alien has a credible fear, a [Detention and Removal Operations] officer . . . must conduct an interview with the alien to assess his or her eligibility for parole") (emphasis added); id., Witte Decl., ¶ 9 (discussing denial of parole for L.H.A. without interview).

In light of the drastic decline in parole-grant rates at the five ICE Field Offices, and the affidavits by the named Plaintiffs and their counsel regarding the processing of their parole applications, this Court finds that the asylum-seekers are able to demonstrate that individualized parole determinations are likely no longer par for the course. The Court therefore finds that Plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their Accardi claim that

Defendants are not abiding by their own policies and procedures. Having decided this critical issue, the Court moves on to the remaining three preliminary-injunction factors.

2. *Irreparable Harm*

To establish the existence of the second factor, a party must demonstrate that its injury is “of such imminence that there is a ‘clear and present’ need for equitable relief to prevent irreparable harm.” Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Wisconsin Gas Co. v. FERC, 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). The injury must also be “both certain and great; it must be actual and not theoretical.” Id. (quoting Wisconsin Gas, 758 F.2d at 674). Finally, the injury must be “beyond remediation.” Id.

Plaintiffs have satisfied this inquiry here. As discussed above, the evidence they present suggests that asylum-seekers are being denied parole without the protections of the ICE Directive. The record indicates that, instead, they are subject to a *de facto* “no-parole” reality, under which detention has become the default option. It is evident, moreover, that being deprived of the safeguards of the Parole Directive harms putative class members in myriad ways. See ECF No. 17-23 (Declaration of Allen S. Keller), ¶¶ 11-24 (discussing “harmful effects of immigration detention on the health and well-being of asylum-seekers”); Abdi, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 407-08 (finding irreparable harm when asylum-seekers detained at facility failing to follow Parole Directive). Although Defendants contend that Plaintiffs can seek parole redeterminations, and thus are not subject to irreparable harm, they make no showing that such requests are any more likely to be granted than the initial applications. See Def. Opp. at 24. Given that this Court has already agreed with Plaintiffs’ contention that parole requests are being nearly uniformly denied at the five Field Offices, it makes little sense to seek redetermination under the same

regime as a route to meaningful relief. See ECF No. 25-3 (Stambaugh Suppl. Decl.), ¶¶ 6, 10 (redetermination denial consisted solely of “original boilerplate parole denial letter”).

The injuries at stake, furthermore, are “beyond remediation.” Chaplaincy, 454 F.3d at 297. Members of the proposed class do not seek monetary compensation for their injuries. Instead, they seek injunctive and declaratory relief requiring that Defendants follow their own parole policies. Unlike economic harm, the harm from detention pursuant to an unlawful departure from agency procedure cannot be remediated after the fact. Cf. Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (economic losses are typically not irreparable because compensation can be awarded after a merits determination).

3. *Balance of Harms and Public Interest*

Under the circumstances of this case, factors three and four do not require in-depth analysis. As courts in this district have recognized, “The public interest is served when administrative agencies comply with their obligations under the APA.” N. Mariana Islands v. United States, 686 F. Supp. 2d 7, 21 (D.D.C. 2009). The Parole Directive itself, moreover, states that the detention of asylum-seekers who are neither a flight risk nor dangerous is “not in the public interest” and therefore requires an individualized parole determination as to whether they should be released. See Parole Directive, ¶ 6.2 (emphasis added). In light of the Court’s conclusion that DHS’s current failure to follow the ICE Directive is likely unlawful, and that the parole practices in place at the five Field Offices cause irreparable harm to those seeking asylum, the Court finds that these last two factors favor Plaintiffs as well.

* * *

To be clear, in finding that injunctive relief is warranted in this case, this Court is simply ordering that Defendants do what they already admit is required – follow the ICE Directive when

adjudicating asylum-seekers' detention. The Directive provides a framework of minimum protections for those claiming refugee status, and, as Defendants acknowledge, it is binding on the Government. To mandate that ICE provide these baseline procedures to those entering our country – individuals who have often fled violence and persecution to seek safety on our shores – is no great judicial leap. Rather, the issuance of injunctive relief in this case serves only to hold Defendants accountable to their own governing policies and to ensure that Plaintiffs receive the protections they are due under the Parole Directive.

IV. Conclusion

For the aforementioned reasons, the Court will grant Plaintiffs' Motions for a Preliminary Injunction and will grant provisional class certification. A separate Order consistent with this Opinion shall issue this day.

/s/ James E. Boasberg
JAMES E. BOASBERG
United States District Judge

Date: July 2, 2018

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**

ANSLY DAMUS, *et al.*,

Plaintiffs,

v.

**KIRSTJEN NIELSEN, Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security, *et al.*,**

Defendants.

Civil Action No. 18-578 (JEB)

ORDER

For the reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, the Court
ORDERS that:

1. Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction is GRANTED;
2. Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, dated March 20, 2018 (ECF No. 11), is GRANTED on a provisional basis for purposes of this preliminary injunction, and Plaintiffs' counsel are appointed as Class Counsel;
3. Defendants are hereby ENJOINED from denying parole to any provisional class members absent an individualized determination, through the parole process, that such provisional class member presents a flight risk or a danger to the community;
4. The individualized determinations of flight risk and danger to the community referenced above shall be based on the specific facts of each provisional class member's case. Such determinations, moreover, shall not be based on categorical criteria applicable to all provisional class members;

5. Defendants shall provide provisional class members with parole determinations that conform to all of the substantive and procedural requirements of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Directive No. 11002.1, Parole of Arriving Aliens Found to Have a Credible Fear of Persecution or Torture (Dec. 8, 2009);
6. Within seven days of this Order, the parties will meet and confer to develop a notice that explains the requirements of this Order and provides class members with contact information for Class Counsel; and
7. The parties shall appear for a status conference to discuss further proceedings in the case on July 10, 2018, at 11:30 a.m. in Courtroom 25.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ James E. Boasberg
JAMES E. BOASBERG
United States District Judge

Date: July 2, 2018

U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT
Parole of Arriving Aliens Found to Have a Credible Fear of Persecution or Torture

DISTRIBUTION:	ICE
DIRECTIVE NO.:	11002.1
ISSUE DATE:	December 8, 2009
EFFECTIVE DATE:	January 4, 2010
SUPERSEDES:	See section 3.
FEA NUMBER:	601-05

1. **PURPOSE.** The purpose of this ICE policy directive is to ensure transparent, consistent, and considered ICE parole determinations for arriving aliens seeking asylum in the United States. This directive provides guidance to Detention and Removal Operations (DRO) Field Office personnel for exercising their discretion to consider the parole of arriving aliens processed under the expedited removal provisions of section 235 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) who have been found to have a “credible fear” of persecution or torture by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) or an immigration judge of the Executive Office for Immigration Review. This directive establishes a quality assurance process that includes record-keeping requirements to ensure accountability and compliance with the procedures set forth herein.
 - 1.1. This directive does not apply to aliens in DRO custody under INA § 236. This directive applies only to arriving aliens who have been found by USCIS or an immigration judge to have a credible fear of persecution or torture.
2. **AUTHORITIES/REFERENCES.**
 - 2.1. INA §§ 208, 212(d)(5), 235(b), and 241(b)(3); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158, 1182(d)(5), 1225(b), and 1231(b)(3); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1.1(q), 208.30(e)-(f), 212.5 and 235.3.
 - 2.2. Department of Homeland Security Delegation Number 7030.2, “Delegation of Authority to the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Immigration and Custom Enforcement” (Nov. 13, 2004).
 - 2.3. ICE Delegations of Authority to the Directors, Detention and Removal and Investigations and to Field Office Directors, Special Agents in Charge and Certain Other Officers of the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, No. 0001 (June 6, 2003).
3. **SUPERSEDED POLICIES AND GUIDANCE.** The following ICE directive is hereby superseded:
 - 3.1. ICE Policy Directive No. 7-1.0, “Parole of Arriving Aliens Found to Have a ‘Credible Fear’ of Persecution or Torture” (Nov. 6, 2007).

4. BACKGROUND.

- 4.1. Arriving aliens processed under the expedited removal provisions of INA §235(b) may pursue asylum and related forms of protection from removal if they successfully demonstrate to USCIS or an immigration judge a credible fear of persecution or torture.
- 4.2. Arriving aliens who establish a credible fear of persecution or torture are to be detained for further consideration of the application for asylum. INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(ii). Such aliens, however, may be paroled on a case-by-case basis for “urgent humanitarian reasons” or “significant public benefit,” provided the aliens present neither a security risk nor a risk of absconding. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(c) (providing that aliens referred for INA § 240 removal proceedings, including those who have a credible fear of persecution or torture, may be paroled under § 212.5(b) standards).
- 4.3. The applicable regulations describe five categories of aliens who may meet the parole standards based on a case-by-case determination, provided they do not present a flight risk or security risk: (1) aliens who have serious medical conditions, where continued detention would not be appropriate; (2) women who have been medically certified as pregnant; (3) certain juveniles; (4) aliens who will be witnesses in proceedings being, or to be, conducted by judicial, administrative, or legislative bodies in the United States; and (5) aliens whose continued detention is not in the public interest. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b). *But compare* 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(4)(ii) (stating that arriving aliens who have not been determined to have a credible fear will not be paroled unless parole is necessary in light of a “medical emergency or is necessary for a legitimate law enforcement objective”).
- 4.4. While the first four of these categories are largely self-explanatory, the term “public interest” is open to considerable interpretation. This directive explains how the term is to be interpreted by DRO when it decides whether to parole arriving aliens determined to have a credible fear. The directive also mandates uniform record-keeping and review requirements for such decisions. Parole remains an inherently discretionary determination entrusted to the agency; this directive serves to guide the exercise of that discretion.

5. DEFINITIONS:

- 5.1. **Arriving Alien.** For purposes of this directive, “arriving alien” has the same definition as provided for in 8 C.F.R. § 1.1(q) and 1001.1(q).
- 5.2. **Credible Fear.** For purposes of this directive, with respect to an alien processed under the INA § 235(b) “expedited removal” provisions, “credible fear” means a finding by USCIS or an immigration judge that, taking into account the credibility of the statements made by the alien in support of the alien’s claim and such other facts

as are known to the interviewing USCIS officer or immigration judge, there is a significant possibility that alien could establish eligibility for asylum under INA § 208, withholding of removal under INA § 241(b)(3), or protection from removal under the Convention Against Torture.

- 5.3. **Parole.** For purposes of this directive, “parole” is an administrative measure used by ICE to temporarily authorize the release from immigration detention of an inadmissible arriving alien found to have a credible fear of persecution or torture, without lawfully admitting the alien. Parole does not constitute a lawful admission or a determination of admissibility, *see* INA §§ 212(d)(5)(A), 101(a)(13)(B), and reasonable conditions may be imposed on the parole, *see* 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(d). By statute, parole may be used, in the discretion of ICE and under such conditions as ICE may prescribe, only for urgent humanitarian reasons or for significant public benefit. As interpreted by regulation, “urgent humanitarian reasons” and “significant public benefit” include the five categories set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b) and listed in paragraph 4.3 of this directive, including the general category of “aliens whose continued detention is not in the public interest.”

6. **POLICY.**

- 6.1. As soon as practicable following a credible fear determination by USCIS for an arriving alien detained by DRO, DRO shall provide the alien with the attached *Parole Advisal and Scheduling Notification*. This form informs the alien that he or she will be interviewed for potential parole from DRO custody and notifies the alien of the date of the scheduled interview and the deadline for submitting any documentary material supporting his or her eligibility for parole. The contents of the notification shall be explained to such aliens in a language they understand. In determining whether detained arriving aliens found to have a credible fear should be paroled from custody, DRO shall proceed in accordance with the terms of this directive.
- 6.2. Each alien’s eligibility for parole should be considered and analyzed on its own merits and based on the facts of the individual alien’s case. However, when an arriving alien found to have a credible fear establishes to the satisfaction of DRO his or her identity and that he or she presents neither a flight risk nor danger to the community, DRO should, absent additional factors (as described in paragraph 8.3 of this directive), parole the alien on the basis that his or her continued detention is not in the public interest. DRO Field Offices shall uniformly document their parole decision-making processes using the attached *Record of Determination/Parole Determination Worksheet*.
- 6.3. Consistent with the terms of this directive, DRO shall maintain national and local statistics on parole determinations and have a quality assurance process in place to monitor parole decision-making, as provided for in sections 7 and 8 of this directive.

- 6.4. In conducting parole determinations for arriving aliens in custody after they are found to have a credible fear of persecution or torture, DRO shall follow the procedures set forth in section 8 of this directive.
- 6.5. DRO shall provide every alien subject to this directive with written notification of the parole decision, including a brief explanation of the reasons for any decision to deny parole. When DRO denies parole under this directive, it should also advise the alien that he or she may request redetermination of this decision based upon changed circumstances or additional evidence relevant to the alien's identity, security risk, or risk of absconding. DRO shall ensure reasonable access to translation or interpreter services if notification is provided to the alien in a language other than his or her native language and the alien cannot communicate effectively in that language.
- 6.6. Written notifications of parole decisions shall be provided to aliens subject to this directive and, if represented, their representative within seven days of the date an alien is initially interviewed for parole or the date the alien requests a parole redetermination, absent reasonable justification for delay in providing such notification.
- 6.7. A decision to grant or deny parole shall be prepared by a DRO officer assigned such duties within his or her respective DRO Field Office. The decision shall pass through at least one level of supervisory review, and concurrence must be finally approved by the Field Office Director (FOD), Deputy FOD (DFOD), or Assistant FOD (AFOD), where authorized by the FOD.

7. **RESPONSIBILITIES.**

- 7.1. The **DRO Director** is responsible for the overall management of the parole decision-making process for arriving aliens in DRO custody following determinations that they have a credible fear of persecution or torture.
- 7.2. The **DRO Assistant Director for Operations** is responsible for:
 - 1) Ensuring considered, consistent DRO parole decision-making and recordkeeping nationwide in cases of arriving aliens found to have a credible fear;
 - 2) Overseeing monthly tracking of parole statistics by all DRO Field Offices for such cases; and
 - 3) Overseeing an effective national quality assurance program that monitors the Field Offices to ensure compliance with this directive.
- 7.3. **DRO Field Office Directors** are responsible for:
 - 1) Implementing this policy and quality assurance processes;

- 2) Maintaining a log of parole adjudications for credible fear cases within their respective geographic areas of responsibility, including copies of the *Record of Determination/Parole Determination Worksheet*;
 - 3) Providing monthly statistical reports on parole decisions for arriving aliens found to have a credible fear;
 - 4) Making the final decision to grant or deny parole for arriving aliens found to have a credible fear within their respective areas of responsibility or, alternatively, delegating such responsibility to their DFODs or AFODs (in which case, FODs nevertheless retain overall responsibility for their office's compliance with this directive regardless of delegating signatory responsibility to DFODs or AFODs); and
 - 5) Ensuring that DRO field personnel within their respective areas of responsibility who will be assigned to make parole determinations are familiar with this directive and corresponding legal authorities.
- 7.4. **DRO Deputy Field Office Directors** are responsible for reviewing, and forwarding for their respective FODs' approval, parole decisions prepared by their subordinates in the cases of arriving aliens found to have a credible fear of persecution or torture. Alternatively, DFODs delegated responsibility under paragraph 7.3 of this directive are responsible for discharging final decision-making authority over parole determinations in such cases within their respective areas of responsibility.
- 7.5. **Assistant Field Office Directors** are responsible for reviewing, and forwarding for their respective DFODs' or FODs' approval, parole decisions prepared by their subordinates in the cases of arriving aliens found to have a credible fear of persecution or torture. Alternatively, AFODs delegated responsibility under paragraph 7.3 of this directive are responsible for discharging final decision-making authority over parole determinations in such cases within their respective areas of responsibility.
- 7.6. As applicable, **DRO field personnel** so assigned by their local chains-of-command are responsible for providing detained arriving aliens found to have a credible fear with the attached *Parole Advisal and Scheduling Notification* and for fully and accurately completing the attached *Record of Determination/Parole Determination Worksheet* in accordance with this directive and corresponding legal authorities.
8. **PROCEDURES.**
- 8.1. As soon as practicable following a finding that an arriving alien has a credible fear, the DRO Field Office with custody of the alien shall provide the attached *Parole Advisal and Scheduling Notification* to the alien and explain the contents of the notification to the alien in a language he or she understands, through an interpreter if

necessary. The Field Office will complete the relevant portions of the notification, indicating the time when the alien will receive an initial interview on his or her eligibility for parole and the date by which any documentary evidence the alien wishes considered should be provided, as well as instructions for how any such information should be provided.

- 8.2 Unless an additional reasonable period of time is necessary (e.g., due to operational exigencies or an alien's illness or request for additional time to obtain documentation), no later than seven days following a finding that an arriving alien has a credible fear, a DRO officer familiar with the requirements of this directive and corresponding legal authorities must conduct an interview with the alien to assess his or her eligibility for parole. Within that same period, the officer must complete the *Record of Determination/Parole Determination Worksheet* and submit it for supervisory review. If the officer concludes that parole should be denied, the officer should draft a letter to this effect for the FOD's, DFOD's, or AFOD's signature to be provided to the alien or the alien's representative and forward this letter for supervisory review along with the completed *Record of Determination/Parole Determination Worksheet*. The letter must include a brief explanation of the reasons for denying parole and notify the alien that he or she may request redetermination of parole based upon changed circumstances or additional evidence relevant to the alien's identity, security risk, or risk of absconding.
- 8.3. An alien should be paroled under this directive if DRO determines, in accordance with paragraphs (1) through (4) below, that the alien's identity is sufficiently established, the alien poses neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community, and no additional factors weigh against release of the alien.

1) Identity.

- a) Although many individuals who arrive in the United States fleeing persecution or torture may understandably lack valid identity documentation, asylum-related fraud is of genuine concern to ICE, and DRO must be satisfied that an alien is who he or she claims to be before releasing the alien from custody.
- b) When considering parole requests by an arriving alien found to have a credible fear, Field Office personnel must review all relevant documentation offered by the alien, as well as any other information available about the alien, to determine whether the alien can reasonably establish his or her identity.
- c) If an alien lacks valid government-issued documents that support his or her assertion of identity, Field Office personnel should ask whether the alien can obtain government-issued documentation of identity.

- d) If the alien cannot reasonably provide valid government-issued evidence of identity (including because the alien reasonably does not wish to alert that government to his or her whereabouts), the alien can provide for consideration sworn affidavits from third parties. However, third-party affiants must include copies of valid, government issued photo-identification documents and fully establish their own identities and addresses.
- e) If government-issued documentation of identity or third-party affidavits from reliable affiants are either not available or insufficient to establish the alien's identity on their own, Field Office personnel should explore whether the alien is otherwise able to establish his or her identity through credible statements such that there are no substantial reasons to doubt the alien's identity.

2) Flight Risk.

- a) In order to be considered for release, an alien determined to have a credible fear of persecution or torture must present sufficient evidence demonstrating his or her likelihood of appearing when required.
- b) Factors appropriate for consideration in determining whether an alien has made the required showing include, but are not limited to, community and family ties, employment history, manner of entry and length of residence in the United States, stability of residence in the United States, record of appearance for prior court hearings and compliance with past reporting requirements, prior immigration and criminal history, ability to post bond, property ownership, and possible relief or protection from removal available to the alien.
- c) Field Office personnel shall consider whether setting a reasonable bond and/or entering the alien in an alternative-to-detention program would provide reasonable assurances that the alien will appear at all hearings and depart from the United States when required to do so.
- d) Officers should exercise their discretion to determine what reasonable assurances, individually or in combination, are warranted on a case-by-case basis to mitigate flight risk. In any event, the alien must be able to provide an address where he or she will be residing and must timely advise DRO of any change of address.

3) Danger to the Community.

- a) In order for an alien to be considered for parole, Field Office personnel must make a determination whether an alien found to have a credible fear poses a danger to the community or to U.S. national security.
- b) Information germane to the determination includes, but is not limited to, evidence of past criminal activity in the United States or abroad, of activity contrary to U.S. national security interests, of other activity giving rise to concerns of public safety or danger to the community (including due to serious mental illness), disciplinary infractions or incident reports, and any criminal or detention history that shows that the alien has harmed or would likely harm himself or herself or others.
- c) Any evidence of rehabilitation also should be weighed.

4) Additional Factors.

- a) Because parole remains an inherently discretionary decision, in some cases there may be exceptional, overriding factors that should be considered in addition to the three factors discussed above. Such factors may include, but are not limited to, serious adverse foreign policy consequences that may result if the alien is released or overriding law enforcement interests.
- b) Field Office personnel may consider such additional factors during the parole decision-making process.

- 8.4. Assigned DRO officers should, where appropriate, request that parole applicants provide any supplementary information that would aid the officers in reaching a decision. The *Record of Determination/Parole Determination Worksheet* should be annotated to document the request for supplementary information and any response from the detainee.
- 8.5. After preparing and signing the *Record of Determination/Parole Determination Worksheet*, and in the case of a denial of parole, drafting a written response to the alien, the assigned DRO officer shall forward these materials and the parole request documentation to his or her first-line supervisor for review and concurrence.
- 8.6. Upon his or her concurrence, the first-line supervisor shall sign the *Record of Determination/Parole Determination Worksheet* where indicated and forward it, along with any related documentation, to the FOD (or, where applicable, the DFOD or AFOD) for final approval.
- 8.7. The FOD (or, where applicable, the DFOD or AFOD) shall review the parole documentation, consult with the preparing officer and supervisor as necessary, and

either grant or deny parole by signing the *Record of Determination/Parole Determination Worksheet* where indicated and, in the case of a denial, signing the written response to the alien.

- 8.8. Following a final decision by the FOD to deny parole (or, where applicable, the DFOD or AFOD), the Field Office shall provide the written response to the alien or, if represented, to the alien's legal representative, indicating that parole was denied. If parole is granted, the Field Office shall provide the alien with a date-stamped I-94 Form bearing the following notation: "**Paroled under 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b). Employment authorization not to be provided on this basis.**"
- 8.9. If an alien makes a written request for redetermination of an earlier decision denying parole, the Field Office may, in its discretion, reinterview the alien or consider the request based solely on documentary material already provided or otherwise of record.
- 8.10. The supporting documents and a copy of the parole decision sent to the alien (if applicable), the completed *Record of Determination/Parole Determination Worksheet*, and any other documents related to the parole adjudication should be placed in the alien's A-file in a record of proceeding format. In addition, a copy of the *Record of Determination/Parole Determination Worksheet* shall be stored and maintained under the authority of the FOD for use in preparing monthly reports.
- 8.11. On a monthly basis, FODs shall submit reports to the Assistant Director for Operations, or his or her designee, detailing the number of parole adjudications conducted under this directive within their respective areas of responsibility, the results of those adjudications, and the underlying basis of each Field Office decision whether to grant or deny parole. The Assistant Director for Operations, or his or her designee, in conjunction with appropriate DRO Headquarters components, will analyze this reporting and collect individual case information to review in more detail, as warranted. In particular, this analysis will rely on random sampling of all reported cases for in-depth review and will include particular emphasis on cases where parole was not granted because of the presence of additional factors, per paragraph 8.3(4) of this directive. Any significant or recurring deficiencies identified during this monthly analysis should be explained to the affected Field Office, which will take appropriate corrective action.
- 8.12. At least once every six months, the Assistant Director for Operations, or his or her designee, shall prepare a thorough and objective quality assurance report, examining the rate at which paroled aliens abscond and the Field Offices' parole decision-making, including any noteworthy trends or corrective measures undertaken based upon the monthly quality assurance analysis required by paragraph 8.11 of this directive.

9. **ATTACHMENTS.**

- *Parole Advisal and Scheduling Notification.*
- *Record of Determination/Parole Determination Worksheet.*

10. **NO PRIVATE RIGHTS CREATED.** This directive is an internal policy statement of ICE. It is not intended to, shall not be construed to, may not be relied upon to, and does not create, any rights, privileges, or benefits, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or other entities, its officers or employees, or any other person.

Approved:



John Morton
Assistant Secretary
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement



Suite
 Phone:
 Fax:
 WWW. .COM

February 26, 2018

Jennifer Ritchey, Acting Field Office Director
 US Department of Homeland Security
 Immigration and Customs Enforcement and
 Removal Operations
 114 North 8th Street
 Philadelphia, PA 19107

Deportation Officer Foster
 US Department of Homeland Security
 Immigration and Customs Enforcement
 and Removal Operations
 YCP
 3400 Concord Rd
 York, PA 17402

Re: Request for Release for [REDACTED] A# [REDACTED]

Dear Director Ritchey and Officer Foster:

This is a request for the release of [REDACTED], who has been detained by the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) since [REDACTED]. He is classified as an arriving alien and is being held at the York County Prison. His next master hearing is scheduled for [REDACTED]. By the time he gets an individual hearing, he will be detained for six months or more.

I. FACTS

A. IMMIGRATION HISTORY & CLAIM FOR PROTECTION

Mr. [REDACTED] is a [REDACTED]-year-old from Cuba who presented himself at the United States border on or around [REDACTED] to request asylum. After expressing fear of returning, he was transferred to York where he passed a credible fear interview. His case is pending with the York court.

Mr. [REDACTED] left Cuba after being threatened several times by the Cuban government accusing him of unlawful exit from the country and opposing the Cuban government. He was told that he would be imprisoned. Mr. [REDACTED] has been very vocal against the Cuban government and his disagreement with the communist government. As such, he fears reprisal from the Cuban government, imprisonment and torture upon his return.

B. RESPONDENT HAS COMMUNITY TIES

Mr. [REDACTED] has his mother [REDACTED], step-father [REDACTED] and his sister [REDACTED] living in the United States. His mother and step-father are willing to allow him to live with them at their residence at [REDACTED]. Not only are they willing to provide housing, but they have indicated a willingness to support him and ensure that he appears at all future hearings and complies with any order set by the court. Mr. [REDACTED] parents have provided identification documents, proof of employment, and documents demonstrating a fixed address. In addition, there is a medical report for Respondent's mother showing that she is currently having medical issues.

C. RESPONDENT IS NOT A DANGER

Mr. [REDACTED] does not have a criminal history. Given the circumstances surrounding his persecution and torture in Cuba, Mr. [REDACTED] felt that he had no choice but to flee and seek assistance in the U.S. Upon arriving at the U.S. border, he immediately sought asylum and has since applied for asylum with the Immigration Court.

Mr. [REDACTED] runs a high risk of suffering psychological affects of detention, especially given his past threats by his government. Being placed into immigration custody and detained in a criminal facility can be a fearful process. Numerous medical studies have concluded that detention of asylum seekers exacerbates psychological symptoms. *See e.g., Bellevue/New York University Program for Survivors of Torture, Mental Health of Detained Asylum Seekers*, LANCET 362:1721-3 (Nov. 22, 2003); Katy Robjant, Rita Hassan & Cornelius Katona, *Mental Health Implications of Detaining Asylum Seekers: Systemic Review*; THE BRITISH JOURNAL OF PSYCHIATRY (2009) 194, 306-302.

II. LAW

On February 20, 2017, DHS Secretary John Kelly released a Directive on Implementing the President's Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements Policies. In this directive, Secretary Kelly indicated that pending further review and evaluation, the 2009 Directive still remains in affect. Specifically, Secretary Kelly indicates:

“Notwithstanding any other provision of this memorandum, pending my further review and evaluation of the impact of operational changes to implement the Executive Order, and additional guidance on the issue by the Director of ICE, the ICE policy directive establishing standards and procedures for the parole of certain arriving aliens found to have a credible fear of persecution or torture shall remain in full force and effect. *ICE Policy No. 11002.1 : Parole of Arriving Aliens Found to Have a Credible Fear of Persecution or Torture (Dec. 8, 2009)*. **The ICE policy directive shall be implemented in a manner consistent with its plain language. In every case, the burden to establish that his or her release would neither pose a danger to the community, nor a risk of flight remains on the individual alien, and ICE retains ultimate discretion whether it grants parole in a particular case.**”

Directive 11002.1, Parole of Arriving Aliens Found to Have a Credible Fear of Persecution or

Torture, guides adjudication of this request for release. According to the Directive, DRO officers considering "arriving alien[s]" for parole should assess whether continued detention is in the public interest and humanitarian concerns, such as whether the "arriving alien" is a juvenile or suffers from serious medical conditions. Jon Morton, Assistant Secretary ICE, Parole of Arriving Aliens Found to Have a Credible Fear of Persecution or Torture, Directive No. 11002.1 § 4.3, 5.3 (Jan. 4, 2010); see also, 8 C.F.R. § 212.S(b).

"When an arriving alien found to have a credible fear establishes to the satisfaction of DRO his or her identity and that he or she presents neither a flight risk nor danger to the community, DRO should, absent additional factors [such as foreign policy concerns] ... parole the alien on the basis that his or her continued detention is not in the public interest." Directive 11002.1 § 6.2.

Under the Directive, which clarifies adjudication of asylum seekers' requests for parole, factors indicating flight risk (or lack thereof) and dangerousness (or lack thereof) should be considered. Directive 11002.1 §§ 8.3(2)(b), (3)(b). Such factors indicating degree of flight risk include: community and family ties, stability of residence in the United States, prior immigration and criminal history, the number of disciplinary infractions while detained, ability to post bond and possible relief or protection from removal. Directive 11002.1 § 8.3(2)(b). Factors indicating degree of dangerousness include: evidence of past criminal activity or other activity giving rise to public safety concerns, disciplinary infractions and criminal history. Directive 11002.1 § 8.3(3)(b).

Mr. [REDACTED] release does not pose a danger to the community nor a risk of flight. Specifically, he has no criminal history; this is his first arrival to the U.S; he applied for admission to the U.S. instead of sneaking in; and he has a lawful permanent resident mother and step-father with a fixed address and means to support Mr. [REDACTED]. Even more, Mr. [REDACTED] came to the U.S. to seek asylum and has applied for asylum with the immigration court. As such, he has every inclination and benefit to continue his case. Perhaps most importantly, he will have been detained for 6 months at the time of his scheduled merits hearings. Significant detention, especially for those who have been previously persecuted and tortured, calls for significant humanitarian discretion for release.

III. CONCLUSION

Mr. [REDACTED] is not a flight risk or a danger to the community. The country conditions evidence provided shows that there is a "reasonable possibility" that he will suffer persecution or torture in Cuba. This, in conjunction with his age, the willingness of his family to house him in [REDACTED], the support promised by his family, the length of his detention, as well as the negative psychological impact that prolonged detention may have on him, leads to the conclusion that DHS should release Mr. [REDACTED]. As an arriving alien, he should be afforded the opportunity to be released so that he can gather the evidence needed to effectively present his case.

While parole pursuant to INA § 212(d)(5) would be most appropriate, Mr. [REDACTED] family is happy to comply with an order of supervision setting reporting requirements and other reasonable terms of release and/or paying a bond for his release.
Should you have any questions or need additional information, feel free to contact me.

Sincerely,

[REDACTED], Esq.

EXHIBITS

A. Documents from Respondent's Family

- Letter of Support from [REDACTED], Respondent's Step-father
- Letter of Support from [REDACTED], Respondent's mother
 - i. ID of mother and step-father
 - ii. ID (LPR card) of [REDACTED], Respondent's sister
- Tax records
- Bank of America statement showing address
- Medical Report for Respondent's mother

B. Country Conditions Evidence on Cuba

1. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016,

<https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/#wrapper>

- Arbitrary arrests and short-term detentions continued to be a common government method for controlling independent public expression and political activity. By law police have wide discretion to stop and question citizens, request identification, and carry out arrests and searches. Police used laws against public disorder, contempt, lack of respect, aggression, and failing to pay minimal or arbitrary fines as ways to detain civil society activists. Police officials routinely conducted short-term detentions, at times assaulting detainees. The law provides that police officials furnish suspects a signed "act of detention," noting the basis, date, and location of any detention in a police facility and a registry of personal items seized during a police search, but this law was not always followed. Arbitrary stops and searches were most common in urban areas and at government-controlled checkpoints at the entrances to provinces and municipalities.
- The law allows a maximum four-year preventive detention of individuals not charged with an actual crime, with a subjective determination of "potential dangerousness," defined as the "special proclivity of a person to commit crimes, demonstrated by conduct in manifest contradiction of socialist norms." Mostly used as a tool to control "antisocial" behaviors, such as substance abuse or prostitution, authorities also used such detention to silence peaceful political opponents. On March 14, authorities charged UNPACU activist Luis Bello Gonzalez with pre-criminal social dangerousness and sentenced him to three years in prison. UNPACU leaders alleged authorities arrested and charged Gonzalez because of his regular participation in protests alongside other UNPACU members.
- The Ministry of Interior exercises control over police, internal security forces, and the prison system. The ministry's National Revolutionary Police is the primary law enforcement organization. Specialized units of the ministry's state security branch are responsible for monitoring, infiltrating, and suppressing independent political activity. The police supported state

security agents by carrying out house searches, arresting persons of interest to the ministry, and providing interrogation facilities.

- Under criminal procedures, police have 24 hours after an arrest to present a criminal complaint to an investigative police official. The investigative police have 72 hours to investigate and prepare a report for the prosecutor, who in turn has 72 hours to recommend to the appropriate court whether to open a criminal investigation.
- Within the 168-hour detention period, detainees must be informed of the basis for the arrest and criminal investigation and have access to legal representation. Those charged may be released on bail, placed in home detention, or held in continued investigative detention. Once the accused has an attorney, the defense has five days to respond to the prosecution's charges, after which a court date usually is set. Prosecutors may demand summary trials "in extraordinary circumstances" and in cases involving crimes against state security.
- There were reports that defendants met with their attorneys for the first time only minutes before their trials and were not informed of the basis for their arrest within the required 168-hour period.
- Reports suggested bail was available, although typically not granted to those arrested for political activities. Time in detention before trial counted toward time served, if convicted.
- Detainees may be interrogated at any time during detention and have no right to request the presence of counsel during interrogation. Detainees have the right to remain silent, but officials do not have a legal obligation to inform them of that right.
- Freedom of Speech and Expression: The government had little tolerance for public criticism of government officials or programs and limited public debate of issues considered politically sensitive. State security regularly harassed the organizers of independent fora for debates on cultural and social topics to force them to stop discussing issues deemed controversial. Forum organizers reported assaults by state security, video surveillance installed outside of venues, and detention of panelists and guests on the days they were expected to appear.
- Several government workers reported being fired for expressing dissenting opinions or affiliating with independent organizations. For example, in August local radio station journalist Jose Ramirez Pandoja was fired for publishing a controversial speech by the deputy director of the CP's official newspaper, *Granma*, on his personal blog. The speech cited young journalists leaving traditional media outlets due to censorship policies and low salaries.
- Several university professors and researchers reported they were forced from their positions or demoted for expressing ideas or opinions outside of government-accepted norms.

2. **Amnesty International Cuba 2017/2018,**
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/americas/cuba/report-cuba/>

- Arbitrary detentions, discriminatory dismissals from state jobs, and harassment in self-employment continued to be used to silence criticism. Advances in education were undermined by ongoing online and offline censorship. Cuba remained mostly closed to independent human rights monitors
- Human rights and political activists continued to be harassed, intimidated and arbitrarily detained in high numbers. The Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation, a Cuban NGO not officially recognized by the state, recorded 5,155 arbitrary detentions in 2017, compared to 9,940 in 2016.
- The Ladies in White, a group of female relatives of prisoners detained on politically motivated grounds, remained one of the primary targets of repression by the authorities. During detention, the women were often beaten by law enforcement officials and state security agents dressed as civilians.
- In January, Danilo Maldonado Machado, known as El Sexto, was released from a maximum-security prison. He had been arrested in November 2016, hours after the announcement of Fidel Castro's death, for having written Se fue ("He's gone") on a wall in the capital, Havana.
- In August, Yulier Perez, a graffiti artist known for painting dilapidated walls in Havana, was arbitrarily detained after months of intimidation and harassment from the authorities for freely expressing himself through his art.
- The leader of the pro-democracy Christian Liberation Movement, Dr Eduardo Cardet Concepción, remained in prison having been handed a three-year sentence in March for publicly criticizing Fidel Castro.
- A family of four human rights defenders were detained in Holguín, southeast Cuba, for allegedly leaving their house during the period of state mourning for Fidel Castro in 2016. The three siblings were given one-year prison sentences for "defamation of institutions, organizations and heroes and martyrs of the Republic of Cuba" and "public disorder" Their mother was sentenced to house arrest. On 2 April, after a prolonged hunger strike, the three siblings were freed under conditional release, but they continued to be intimidated by the authorities.
- Jorge Cervantes, a member of the political opposition group Patriotic Union of Cuba (UNPACU), was detained for approximately three months between May and August. Weeks before, UNPACU had published on its YouTube channel a video called "Horrors in jail" in which Jorge Cervantes interviewed a man who had allegedly been ill-treated in a Cuban prison, and a series of videos which alleged corruption by public officials.
- The authorities continued to present trumped-up charges for common crimes as a way to harass and detain political opponents, meaning there were likely many more prisoners of conscience than documented.

3. Freedom in the World, 2015, Freedom House,
<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/cuba>

- All political organizing outside the PCC is illegal. Political dissent, whether spoken or written, is a punishable offense, and dissidents are systematically harassed, detained, physically assaulted, and frequently sentenced to years of imprisonment for seemingly minor infractions. The regime has called on its neighborhood-watch groups, known as Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, to strengthen vigilance against “antisocial behavior,” a euphemism for opposition activity. This has led to the use of “acts of repudiation,” or supposedly spontaneous mob attacks, to intimidate and silence political dissidents. In recent years, dissident leaders have reported an increase in intimidation and harassment by state-sponsored groups as well as short-term detentions by state security forces. According to the Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation (CCDHRN), a record number of politically motivated short-term detentions were recorded in 2014, with figures totaling 8,899 as opposed to the 6,424 cases documented in 2013.

4. Human Rights Watch, World report: Cuba 2018,

<https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/cuba>

- The Cuban government continues to repress and punish dissent and public criticism. The number of short-term arbitrary arrests of human rights defenders, independent journalists, and others was significantly less than in 2016, but still remained high, with more than 3,700 reports of arbitrary detentions between January and August 2017. The government continues to use other repressive tactics, including beatings, public shaming, travel restrictions, and termination of employment.

Arbitrary Detention and Short-Term Imprisonment

- The Cuban government continues to employ arbitrary detention to harass and intimidate critics, independent activists, political opponents, and others. The number of arbitrary short-term detentions increased dramatically between 2010 and 2016, from a monthly average of 172 incidents to 827, according to the Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation, an independent human rights group that lacks official authorization and the government considers to be illegal.
- The number of detentions dropped significantly in 2017, with 4,537 reports of arbitrary detentions from January through October, a decrease of 50 percent compared to the same period in 2016.
- Security officers rarely present arrest orders to justify detaining critics. In some cases, detainees are released after receiving official warnings, which prosecutors can use in subsequent criminal trials to show a pattern of “delinquent” behavior.

Freedom of Expression

- The government controls virtually all media outlets in Cuba and restricts access to outside information. A small number of journalists and bloggers who are independent of government media manage to write articles for websites or blogs or publish tweets. The government routinely blocks access within Cuba to these websites and only a fraction of Cubans can read

independent websites and blogs because of the high cost of, and limited access to, the internet. In September 2017, Cuba announced it would gradually extend the home internet service to all the provinces in the country.

Political Prisoners

- The Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation reported scores of political prisoners—including 54 members of the group Cuban Patriotic Union (Unión Patriótica de Cuba)—as of May 2017. The government denies access to its prisons by independent human rights groups, which believe that additional political prisoners, whose cases they cannot document, remain locked up. Cubans who criticize the government continue to face the threat of criminal prosecution.
- They do not benefit from due process guarantees, such as the right to fair and public hearings by a competent and impartial tribunal. In practice, courts are subordinated to the executive and legislative branches, denying meaningful judicial independence

Travel Restrictions

- Reforms to travel regulations that went into effect in January 2013 eliminated the need for an exit visa to leave the island. Exit visas had previously been used to deny people critical of the government, and their families, the right to travel. Since then, many people who had previously been denied permission to travel have been able to do so, including human rights defenders and independent bloggers.
- Nonetheless, the reforms gave the government broad discretionary powers to restrict the right to travel on the grounds of “defense and national security” or “other reasons of public interest.” Such measures have allowed authorities to deny exit to people who express dissent.